GEOSTRATEGICAL IMPORTANCE OF SANDŽAK REGION AS A BRIDGE AND HEARTLAND THAT CONNECTS SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN BALKAN REGION - 13.09.2021
Uep Rapor No : 2021 / 1
13.09.2021
26 min read

Senad SEVDİK

Scholar in Residence, Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM)

 

Introduction

Sandžak’s Bosniaks have united themselves in terms of history, culture, religion and their fate with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ottoman Empire throughout history. Out of 350 Ottoman Sandžaks, today there is only one Sandžak left which is called as “Novopazarski Sandžak”.[1] Firstly, this paper will explain the historical background of Sandžak region and then it will elaborate on the internal political conflicts with emphasizing the peoples’demands for human rights. Thirdly, it will illustrate the geostrategical importance of the region for neighboring states and external great powers. Finally, this article will elaborate Turkey’s soft power policies in the region. This paper argues that Sandžak needs more profitable direct economic investments and more response to human rights demands from Serbia and Montenegro.

Historical Background of Sandžak Region

From the beginning of 19 th centruy, Sandžak Bosniaks’ history, like in BiH, has always been the history of genocides, migrations and massacres. Sandžak is the true heart of the medieval Serbian Kingdom since the Serbian state capital of Ras and ancient Orthodox churhes exist in Novi Pazar.[2] Sandžak region is located both in Serbia and Montenegro between the borders of BiH and Kosovo. Novi Pazar was founded in 1461 by Isa-Beg Isakovic. Sandžak region was started to including into BiH in 1377 and remained under Bosnian Eyalet until 1877.[3] After 1877, the region was joined to Vilayet of Kosovo. The name Sandžak is derived from Ottoman term “sancak” which means flag and administrative district of Ottoman Empire.[4] Sandžak of Novi Pazar is composed of six municipalities in Serbia; Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Priboj, Nova Varoš and six municipalities in Montenegro; Bijelo Polje, Rožaje, Plav, Pljevlja, Berane, Andrijevica (See Figure 1).

Figure 1

 

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Serbian Sandžak part was also divided into two districts which are Raška and Zlatibor districts (See Figure 2). Although BiH was under the administration of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Sandžak remained as a territory of Ottoman Empire until 1912 and its borders are internationally recognized by the Berlin Conference in 1878 (See Figure 3). In 1917, Muslim representatives gathered in Sjenica conference during the Austrian Hungarian occupation of Sandžak. They demanded to separate Sandžak from Serbia and Montenegro and either merge with BiH or give autonomy.

Figure 2

 

Source: King-Savic, Sandra. "History and Identity within the Sandzak Region."...

Sandžak was divided between Serbia and Montenegro after the First Balkan War in 1913 with the Treaty of Bucharest. During the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941), Sandzak was again confronted migration and massacres against Bosniak population. During World War II, Sandžak region was dominated by great powers of Germany, Italy and different resistance groups; Yugoslav partisans, the Serbian Četniks (royalists) and Sandžak Muslim Milita. Bosniaks and Albanians made alliances for defending Kosovo and Sandžak throughout history.[5] Ali Pasha of Gusinje successfully defended Plav and Gusinje against Montenegrin army in 1880.[6]

Figure 3

 

Source: Wikipedia

The partisan movement of Socialist Yugoslavia, National Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Sandžak (ZAVNOS), could not provide regional autonomy to Sandžak between 1943-1945 because of Cetnik (Serbian nationalists) forces[7](See Figure 4). Most of the leaders, for example, Rıfat Burdzevic-Trso, which supported autonomous Sandžak region were massacred by Cetnik forces in 1942.[8]

According to the 1968 Constitution of Socialist Yugoslavia, the Muslims were recognized as a distinct “Muslim nationhood” so they rejected the status of national minority in both Serbia and Montenegro. The consolidation of Muslim nationhood aimed to end the ownership claims of Serbian and Croat nationalists over Yugoslav Muslims.[9] The collapse of Yugoslavia in 1990s brought violence, psychological pressure, constant threats and discrimination discourse towards Sandžak’s Bosniaks by the Serbian state. During Bosnian war, Sandžak people have witnessed the massacres of Bosniaks in BiH and helped them every way. Before Bosnian war, there were many Bosniaks of Sandžak who migrated towards Sarajevo in different times. Hence, during Bosnian war, approximately, one in three people which were killed in the defense of Sarajevo and Brcko cities were Sandžak’s Bosniaks origin.[10] In 1993, Muslim intellectuals in Sarajevo accepted the name “Bosniak” to describe Muslims as a national identity. Hence Milosevic era was full of state terror against Bosniaks of Sandžak. In the first Post Milosevic term of Sandžak region (2000-2004), the state terror has ended and Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic tried to include Sandžak people into Serbian political system. Montenegrin Sandžak people were included into parliament since they supported Milo Djukanovic government in 1997. Although Bosniaks positively voted to Montenegro’s independence in 2006, Sandžak’s “cross border” autonomy was not implemented as promised.

Figure 4

 

Source: Wikipedia

Internal Political Conflicts and Human Rights Demands

After Yugoslavia disintegration, Sandžak’s Bosniaks still have not resolved their national and constitutional status. During Bosnian war, Sandžak people struggled to survive under state terror. These cases have been reported by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Sandžak and the Sandžak Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedom.

During Bosnian and Kosovo wars, the Yugoslav army encircled Novi Pazar and caused fear and psychological pressure over Sandžak’s Bosniaks through constant threats. The 1991 Sandžak autonomy referendum was held and the result was %98 in favor of independence with %70 registered voters.[11] During 1992, Serbian forces have burned Muslims’ homes, kidnapped and murdered some people in Sjeverin, Strpci, Priboj, Pljevlja and Kukurevci towns.[12] Although the region still is ignored by the Serbia and Montenegro governments, Sandžak’s Bosniaks still defend their values of cultural, linguistical and religious values both in Serbia and Montenegro.

Although both Serbia and Montenegro governments have passed minority laws, the region still faces the problems of basic infrastructure, high unemployment, shadow economy, narcotics trafficking and still ethnicity based discriminations. Unfortunately, Serbia’s current constitution in 2006 allows the strict centralization of the state.[13]While Rasim Ljajic (SPD) prioritizes Bosniaks participation into Serbia’s political institutions, Ugljanin is more on the line of “historic Sandžak” with Bosniak nationalism. During the last decade, the Justice and Reconciliation Party was founded by Muamer Zukorlić (former Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia)which joined Serbian parliamentary elections in 2016 and 2020 winning two seats.

According to International Crisis Group, there are unconstructive political factors which are produced by specific actors in Sandžak region. These are; extremists of Serbian Orthodox Church, the Wahhabi movement, the police, state, organized crime, nationalist forces of Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Bosniak Party for Democratic Action (SDA).[14] SDA’s historic Sandžak and their struggle for defending Sandžak’s cultural autonomy and Bosniak Muslims’ rights are priceless. However, they should not have conflicts with both Rasim Ljajic and Zukorlic for more stability and for the sake of Sandžak. Sandžak must be the example of multicultural and multireligious region and this is possible thanks to good public relations with Muslim people and Serbian people in Sandžak. Although it is not easy to implement practically in real life, both Serbian Orthodox Church and Islamic Community in Serbia should be secularized and separated from politics. Serbian goverment must review employment practices in public institutions and punish war criminals. In 1913, the Montenegrin army occupied Plav and Gusinje towns and they massacred 8.000 Bosniaks.[15] In 1924, Montenegrins massacred hundreds of Bosniaks in Sahovice and Pavino Polje which resulted migration to BiH and Turkey. During WWII, Draza Mihajlovic and his Cetnik forces of Montenegrin part are said to have killed 7.000-8000 Bosniaks in Bihor and Bukovica in 1943.[16] During Socialist Yugoslavia, Sandžak’s people status and well being increased in politics, education and economics towards equal level.

Therefore, Sandžak’s Bosniaks demand European standards of human rights; policy of tolerance, equal existence of Bosniaks in state institutions, protection of minorities, freedom of expression, choosing their representative, using their mother tongue, developing their culture and establishing relations with their close relatives from the same origin in neighbouring countries such as BiH. Decentralization is a necessary step for both Serbia and Montenegro. Municipalities need to have more authority in public property, education, police, land registers and infrastructure.

Different Perspectives From Sandžak’s Neighbourhood

For Serbian government, Sandžak region historically and religiously represents the first Medieval Serbian Kingdom (Nemanjić Dynasty). Therefore, Serbs prefer to call Sandžak as Raška region. A politically united and economically developed Sandžak region completely threatens Serbia’s influence in Balkans. Therefore, Belgrade divides and rules Sandžak both politically and religiously as well. Belgrade controls game politics in the region from the divisions of two Islamic Communities, dividing the political unity of Sandžak through supporting some Bosniak politicians. Belgrade is also worried of “Green Transversal” which propose Bosniak and Albanians collaborations.[17] Therefore, strategically, Belgrade prefers to encourage Bosniaks towards migration. From Sarajevo perspective, Sandžak is highly crucial area since they have strong ties with Bosniaks in Serbia politically, culturally and also kinship relations.

From Kosovo perspective, historically, both Bosniaks and Albanians have helped each other since they are co-religionists. Both Zukorlic and Sulejman Ugljanin visited Kosovo several different times with the President of Kosovo Hashim Thaci. Thaci argued that : “The Republic of Kosovo is open for cooperation with the Bosnian community in the field of economy, culture and other areas of interest” [18] Bosniaks in Kosovo have the right to to be educated in Bosnian language even in high school.[19]

In Montenegrin Sandžak, Bosniaks as a second largest ethnic group in Montenegro do not have equal rights with Albanians.[20] According to 2020 parliamentary election results, Montenegrin government now is in the hands of Serbian sided politician of Prime Minister, Zdravko Krivokapić. However, just after 2020 parliamentary election results, Bosniaks in Pljevlja were attacked by nationalists in Montenegro.[21] It is stressed that despite the legal guarantees of 2006 Law on Minority Rigth and Freedoms in Montenegro, these are still too complex to implement in real life due to inconsistent legislation.[22]

Geostrategical Importance of Sandžak Region

According to the former foreign minister of Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878, Gyula Andrássy, BiH’s national security can only be maintained through Sandžak region. Andrássy stresses that “Whatever it means to have the Bosphorus for Black Sea, having Sandžak region for BiH has the same meaning”.[23] It is the most important geostrategical region in Serbia since it directly allows Serbia to connect itself with Montenegro and thus to Adriatic Sea. For example, the “Belgrade-Bar highway” enabling this goal to be achieved is being built by Turkish companies.[24]

The region also connects BiH with Kosovo as well. In geographic terms it is positioned between five states; Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. Hence, it is very crucial for Turkey’s foreign policy in Balkan region. Sandžak always took attention from great powers; Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Italy, Russia and EU. Sandžak was commercial traffic center between Central Bosnia and the rest of the Ottoman Empire. The corridor which connects BiH and Kosovo through Sandžak towards Turkey where the Muslim population generally lives in the region is called as the “green corridor” by some experts. It can be said that this corridor is of vital importance for BiH’s cultural, economic and security relations with regional countries (See Figure 5).

Figure 5 

 

Source: Čagalj, Mislav Stjepan. "Političko-geografski aspekt demogeografskih kretanja u Bosni i Hercegovini." PhD diss., University of Zagreb. Faculty of Science. Department of Geography., 2019.

During the Bosnian war (1992-1995), Yugoslav army forces aimed to remove any hostile Bosniaks which could aid Bosniaks in BiH across border cooperation. Thus, the criminal Serb politician Vojislav Šešelj suggested to “ethnic cleansing” of all Bosniaks within 30 kilometers of the border between Sandžak and BiH.[25] Thus, accordingly in Pljevlja (Montenegro) and Priboj (Serbia) towns, there were murdering, torture, kidnapping, forced expulsion of Bosniaks, transporting Bosniaks to BiH and killing in Visegrad. This was a strategic move which aimed to break up BiH and cut off connection of Central Bosnia with the above mentioned “green corridor” countries through ethnic cleansing and forced expulsion of the people in the border. The Republika Srpska’s geographical position of “North-South” axis near Serbia’s border proves this strategic aim (See Figure 6). Accordingly, from North to South of Drina river, the ethnic cleansing of civilian people in the geographical line of Bijeljina, Srebrenica, Žepa, Višegrad, Foča and Trebinje cities was implemented strategically to unite Republika Srpska entity’s territorial integrity and control Drina river. Especially, Srebrenica’s geographical position is utmost crucial for the territorial integrity of Republika Srpska entity.

Therefore, the majority of Bosniak population in BiH and Sandžak parts are extremely important for BiH’s national security and its connection with Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia and Turkey.[26] The increase of Muslim population in Sandžak between 1948-1991 was the demographic factor of the Serbian aggression and one of the reasons of war in BiH in 1991 (See Figure 7).[27] According to 2002 census, the region had lost 8.64 per cent of its population since 1991 [28] (See Figure 8). According to 2011 census in Serbia and Montenegro, Bosniaks have the 54 per cent of the population and ethnic Serbs have 33.87 per cent (See Figure 9). While Bosniaks in the Serbian part of Sandžak are majority, in Montenegrin part they are minority.

Figure 6

 

Source: Botić, Jurica. "Bošnjaci Sandžaka u kontekstu suvremenih geopolitičkih i sigurnosnih izazova u Jugoistočnoj Europi."...

 

Figure 6 is extremely important since the Serbs chose strategic places in East part of BiH for reaching Adriatic Sea and break the connection between BiH and Sandžak. Therefore, in Bosnian war, Bosnian Serbs firstly attacked Dubrovnik from Trebinje in BiH. This attack from Trebinje was perhaps because of Bosnian Serbs’ desire to control Sutorina region which was a disputed Adriatic coast between Montenegro and BiH in Bosnian war. Overall, The Republika Srpska entity in BiH was established through ethnic cleansing of civilian people for reaching two aims; Firstly, breaking up the complete connection with BiH and Sandžak and secondly, with North-South position of Republika Srpska’s geography will allow them to reach Adriatic Sea. Therefore, Serbian existence in Adriatic Sea and intervention into Montenegrin politics threaten Croatia’s and EU’s national interests.[29]

Figure 7

Source: Mrduljaš, Saša. "Izjašnjavanje sandžačkih Bošnjaka o nacionalnoj pripadnosti u popisima stanovništva (1948.–2011.)." Migracijske i etničke teme 1 (2018): 7-43.

Figure 8

Source: Mrduljaš, Saša. "Izjašnjavanje sandžačkih Bošnjaka o nacionalnoj pripadnosti u popisima stanovništva (1948.–2011.)."

Figure 9

Source: Mrduljaš, Saša. "Izjašnjavanje sandžačkih Bošnjaka o nacionalnoj pripadnosti u popisima stanovništva (1948.–2011.)."

Additionally, Sandžak’s unique geographical position allows crucial European traffic corridors; Pannonian-Moravian, Balkanic and Montenegrin-littoral (See Figure 10). During Ottoman Empire ruling, Sandžak was crucial for the axis from Istanbul to Bosnia which was called as “Bosnian Way”. It goes across Povardarje (Macedonia), Kosovo, Novi Pazar, the mountains of Sjenica and then to Bosnia.

Figure 10

Source: Lozančić, Marinko. "Geostrategijski aspekt demografske dinamike Sandžaka."...

Figure 10 illustrates three main strategic corridors which pass through Sandžak. First one, Pannonian-Moravian which stretches along Morava-Vardar valley and over the connections of the Western Morava (1a); Ibar (Raška, Novi Pazar), (1a1); Užice – Prijepolje (1a2), which connect the strategic directions of 2 and 3. The second route, Balkanic strategic direction which connects Kosovo to Sandžak territory (Novi Pazar) and along the Lim valley (1a2) and (districts: Rudo, Čajniće, Goražde and Pale) towards Sarajevo (BiH). The third route, Adriatic-Montenegro direction is highly crucial since it allows Serbia to reach Adriatic Sea.[30] Overall, today Serbian aggression succeded to break the demographic link between Sandžak’s Muslims and Muslims in BiH through ethnic cleansing and forced migration. Rudo, Čajniće, Goražde and Pale towns’ Bosniak populations are extremely crucial for cooperation between BiH and Sandžak. The ethnic cleansing of East part of BiH (along Drina river) aimed to break the connection with Sandžak. It can be best illustrated between 1991 and 2013 ethnic map of BiH (See Figure 11).

Figure 11

Source: Čagalj, Mislav Stjepan. "Političko-geografski aspekt demogeografskih kretanja u Bosni i Hercegovini."...

Turkey’s Soft Power Policies in Sandžak Region

Balkan region has always been important because it is the only gateway to Europe for Turkey. One of rarely known issue is that thousands of Sandžak’s Bosniaks have given their lives “voluntarily” in the defense of Gallipoli in World War I.[31] They have also given their full support to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Turkish War of Independence. Turkey utilizes its soft power for emphasizing the security and stability in Balkan region. According to Safet Bandžović, Turkish government and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia made an agreement in 11 July 1938. According to him, Yugoslavian government has paid 20.000.000 Turkish Lira to Turkish government for the migration of 40.000 Muslim families (200.000 persons) from Sandžak to Turkey in 6 years.[32] Turkey’s soft power institutions in Balkan region are TIKA, Yunus Emre Institute and Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Turkey as a secular regional power utilizes Balkans as a leverage tool toward the EU.[33] Turkey considers Serbia as a key country for stability in Balkans.

Turkish Diyanet’s mediation for reconciling the two Islamic communities in Serbia between 2009 and 2014 has not been entirely successful. The division of Islamic Community in Serbia started in 2007 because of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities in 2006. This law imposed one Islamic Community and caused competition between Novi Pazar and Belgrade for the authority over Muslims in Serbia. Hence, there are two Islamic Communities in Serbia which are Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS), loyal to Muamer Zukorlić and Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS) based in Belgrade.

Turkey’s first diplomacy success in the mediation process was the reconciliation of Sandžak’s two strongest rival politicians, Sulejman Ugljanin and Rasim Ljajić (See Figure 12). While Ugljanin was close to Belgrade, Ljajić was close to Muamer Zukorlić, Mufti of Novi Pazar at that time. Zukorlić recognizes only the leadership of BiH’s Sarajevo Islamic Community presided at that time by then Grand Mufti (Reis ul-Ulema) of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is currently president of the World Bosniak Congress Mustafa Cerić.

Figure 12

Source: Politika.rs

The first draft agreement was reached between Diyanet and Bosnian Rijaset in Ankara for the unification of Islamic Communities in Serbia in 2011. Zukorlić supported this agreement since it recognizes Sarajevo-Novi Pazar line for Islamic Community in Serbia. However, Islamic Community of Serbia in Belgrade rejected the agreement and insisted that the headquarter should be in the Belgrade. Overall, Ankara’s soft power policy is confronted serious obstacles by the local actors during mediation period.[34]

Turkey’s project of Sarajevo and Belgrade highway is significantly useful for the stability of the region.[35] The leaders of Serbia, Turkey and BiH had a ceremony in Sremska Rača to start the official construction in 8th October 2019. It is being constructed by Tasyapı company and its 250 million euro cost is funded by Turkey’s Exim Bank and the rest of cost belongs to Serbian state budget. However the exact route of the highway was conflictual for two entities of BiH[36]. BiH’s Republika Srpska entity supports the yellow line and the Federation side supports red line (See Figure 13). Additionally, Novi Pazar-Tutin road is constructed by Tasyapı.[37]

TIKA’s investments of $20 million and new Turkish consulate in Novi Pazar are significant.[38] While Serbia’s import values have increased through Turkey, Turkey’s state direct investments in Serbia are still low.[39] (See Figures 14 and 15). Finally, increasing trade volume between BiH and Turkey to 1 milyar $ was decided by leaders of BiH and Turkey.[40] However it is criticized that “Turks give investments to Serbs and love to Bosniaks”.[41] Lack of investments in Sandžak and BiH can be associated with unfavorable geographical position of Sandžak and obstacles to Turkish investors for the BiH’s complex bureaucratic permissions.

Figure 13

Source: RAS Serbia

 

Figure 14

Serbia’s import values from Turkey

Source: Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi

Figure 15

2010-2019 Top 20 Countries in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Serbia

Source: T.C.Belgrad Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği

Finally, a non-paper of BiH provided by Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša, which aims to break up BiH peacefully and create greater Serbia, Croatia and Albania.[42] Both US and EUFOR rejected the non-paper and supports BiH’s sovereignty.[43]

 

Conclusion

From the 19 th century, Sandžak region has always witnessed infamous genocides and forced migrations. Sandžak’s legal borders and autonomy are recognized by Berlin conference in 1878 and in 1943 with ZAVNOS. Bosniaks of Sandžak demand economic development, political representation, ending discrimination and cultural autonomy. BiH and Sandžak are inseparable in terms of history, religion and ethnicity. The demographic factor of Sandžak is highly crucial for both Croatia’s and BiH’s national security. Geostrategically, Sandžak is BiH’s only gateway to nearby regions and it connects Montenegro and Adriatic Sea with Serbia. Thus, Sandžak’s Bosniaks don’t have an option to be separated among themselves at every level. They must have full unity to take their rights from both governments.

TIKA’s economic aids are significant but not sufficient for economic development. Turkey should help Sandžak for more profitable direct economic investments such as airports, fabrics, livestock industries and ski centers which will increase employment and prevent migration. Turkey must pressure Serbia to open airport in Sjenica or Novi Pazar so that Bosniak diasporas can easily travel from Turkey, Europe and US to Sandžak region. Belgrade’s project for opening airport in Kraljevo instead of Sjenica is the biggest sign that Serbian government does not trust Bosniaks of Sandžak. Another issue is lack of modern accessible roads. Both Sandžak parts’ cities must be connected to Belgrade- Sarajevo highway through modern side roads.

All in all, Sandžak needs more profitable direct economic investments in the region such as airports, modern roads, livestock industries and more response to human and representative rights from both governments. So that Sandžak’s Bosniaks will not fell as marginalized citizens in Serbia. Sandžak must pursue European path with more multicultural and multireligious character. Every political actors in Sandžak in basic issues such as SPD (Rasim Ljajić), SDA (Sulejman Ugljanin) and SPP (Muamer Zukorlić) must have full unity for the well being of Sandžak so that they can take their economical and political rights more easily. No one who individually desires to be a sole leader in the Sandžak, has no chance of success. Success is only possible with team work and inclusive approach of all kind of people in Sandžak.

 


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[2] International Crisis Group, “Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten,” Crisis Group, April 8, 2005, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/serbia/serbias-sandzak-still-forgotten

[3] Enes Pelidija, “Novopazarski Sandžak - Juče, Danas, Sutra,” in Bosna Sancak Akademik Kültür ve Tarih Vakfı Konferansları (, 2016).

[4] Princeton University, “Sandžak,” The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination, 2021, https://pesd.princeton.edu/node/731

[5] Džogović, Suada A., and Dženis Šaćirović. "THE ISSUE OF SANDŽAK IN THE CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND THE CREATION OF NEW STATES IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE." Knowledge International Journal 34, no. 5 (2019): 1507-1515.

[6] Imamović, Mustafa. Historija bošnjaka. Bošnjačka zajednica kulture, 1998.

[7] Zaugg, Franziska Anna. "Resistance and Its opponents in the region of Sandžak and Kosovo." Les Cahiers Sirice 1 (2019): 85-99.

[8 Enes Pelidija, “Novopazarski Sandžak - Juče, Danas, Sutra,”...

[9] Morrison, Kenneth, and Elizabeth Roberts. The Sandžak: a history. Oxford University Press, 2012.

10] Enes Pelidija, “Novopazarski Sandžak - Juče, Danas, Sutra,”...

[11] Bosniak National Council, “O Vijeću | Bošnjačko Nacionalno Vijeće,” web.archive.org, June 12, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150612111043/http://www.bnv.org.rs/o-nama/

[12] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refworld | Chronology for Sandzak Muslims in Yugoslavia,” Refworld, 2004, https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38f61e.html

[13] King-Savic, Sandra. "History and Identity within the Sandzak Region." (2011).

[14] International Crisis Group, “Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten,” ...

[15] Enes Pelidija, “Novopazarski Sandžak - Juče, Danas, Sutra,”...

[16] International Crisis Group, “Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten,” ...

[17] Vuković, Nebojša. "Comparative geopolitical analysis of “hotspots” in the Russian federation and in the Republic of Serbia." Зборник радова Географског института" Јован Цвијић" САНУ 61, no. 1 (2011): 61-83.

[18] President of the Republic of Kosovo-DR VJOSA OSMANI- SADRIU, “President Thaçi Received Representatives of of Bosniak National Council of Sandžak,” President of the Republic of Kosovo - DR. VJOSA OSMANI - SADRIU, 2021, https://president-ksgov.net/en/news/president-thaci-received-representatives-of-of-bosniak-national-council-of-sandak

[19] Dušan Janjić, “Sandžak in the Regional Context : Maping Influences and Proposing Solutions for Improvement of the Socio-Political Development in Sandžak” Forum For Ethnic Relations, 2017, http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/MAPPING-SAND%C5%BDAK.pdf

[20] CEU, “SANDZAK -A REGION THAT IS CONNECTING or DIVIDING SERBIA and MONTENEGRO?” (, 2005), http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002257/01/Sandzak.pdf

[21] Milivoje Pantovic, “Serbia’s Muslim Enclave Fears New Ethnic Violence,” euronews, September 21, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/21/serbia-s-muslims-fear-new-ethnic-violence-after-montenegro-post-election-attacks

[22] Jelena Dzankic, "Montenegro's Minorities in the Tangles of Citizenship, Participation and Access to Rights," Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 11, no. 3 (2012): 40-59

[23] Imamović, Mustafa. Historija bošnjaka. Bošnjačka zajednica kulture, 1998.

[24] Bugajski, Janusz. "Turkey’s Impact in the Western Balkans,." Atlantic Council (2012): 1-5.

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[26] Čagalj, Mislav Stjepan. "Političko-geografski aspekt demogeografskih kretanja u Bosni i Hercegovini." PhD diss., University of Zagreb. Faculty of Science. Department of Geography., 2019.

[27] Lozančić, Marinko. "Geostrategijski aspekt demografske dinamike Sandžaka." Geoadria 8, no. 2 (2003): 131-146.

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[29] Botić, Jurica. "Bošnjaci Sandžaka u kontekstu suvremenih geopolitičkih i sigurnosnih izazova u Jugoistočnoj Europi." In Forum za sigurnosne studije, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 164-188. Fakultet političkih znanosti-Centar za međunarodne i sigurnosne studije, 2018.

[30] Lozančić, Marinko. "Geostrategijski aspekt demografske dinamike Sandžaka." Geoadria 8, no. 2 (2003): 131-146.

[31] Redzep Skrijelj, "Volunteers from Sanjak in Galicia (1916/1917)," Historijski Pogledi
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[32] Safet Bandžović, Iseljavanje muslimana iz Sandžaka (Sarajevo: Biblioteka Ključanin, 1991)

[33] Oosterveld, Willem, Matthew Phillips, Hannes Roos, Bernhard Schneider, Hugo van Manen, Bart Schermers, Michel Rademaker, and Dylan Browne-Wilkinson. "Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans."

[34] Muhasilović, Jahja. "Turkey’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak."

[35] BIRN, “Erdogan Vows to Help Build Serbia-Bosnia Highway,” Balkan Insight, January 29, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/01/29/turkey-s-erdogan-promises-to-help-build-serbia-bosnia-highway-01-29-2018/

[36] Mladen Lakic and Maja Zivanovic, “Belgrade-Sarajevo Highway ‘to Bring Serbia and Bosnia Closer,’” Balkan Insight, October 8, 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/08/belgrade-sarajevo-highway-to-bring-serbia-and-bosnia-closer/

[37] T.C.CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI, “T.C.CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI : Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Sırbistan’da Toplu Açılış ve Temel Atma Törenine Katıldı,” www.tccb.gov.tr, 2019, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/111008/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-sirbistan-da-toplu-acilis-ve-temel-atma-torenine-katildi

[38] Daily Sabah with AA, “Turkish Contractor Signs $27M Deal to Repair Southern Serbia Highway,” Daily Sabah, October 29, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2018/10/29/turkish-contractor-signs-27m-deal-to-repair-southern-serbia-highway

[39] T.C.Belgrad Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği, “Yurt Dışı Yatırım Ülke Profili Sırbistan,” ticaret.gov.tr, 2020,https://ticaret.gov.tr/data/5b8a43355c7495406a227715/Yurt%20D%C4%B1%C5%9F%C4%B1%20Yat%C4%B1r%C4%B1m%20%C3%9Clke%20Profili-S%C4%B1rbistan-2020.pdf

[40] T.C.CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI, “T.C.CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI : ‘Bosna Hersek Ile Ticaret Hacmimizi Kısa Zamanda 1 Milyar Dolara Çıkarmayı Hedefliyoruz,’” www.tccb.gov.tr, 2021, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/125280/-bosna-hersek-ile-ticaret-hacmimizi-kisa-zamanda-1-milyar-dolara-cikarmayi-hedefliyoruz-

[41] Jojić, Stefan. "Erdogan as an admired sultan or an instrument in political competition? Locals' perceptions of the Turkish presence." (2021).

[42] Andy Heil, “Slovenia Raises Uncomfortable Questions with Talk of Bosnia’s ‘Dissolution,’” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/slovenia-bosnia-dissolution-borders/31205952.html

[43] Andrew Rettman and Ekrem Krasniqi, “US Rejects Slovenia-Linked Plan to Break up Bosnia,” EUobserver, 2021, https://euobserver.com/world/151572

 


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