

REVIEW OF
ARMENIAN STUDIES
A Biannual Journal of History, Politics, and International Relations

no:
37
2018

Facts and Comments

Alev KILIÇ

Review Essay: Killing Orders:
Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide

Ömer Engin LÜTEM - Yiğit ALPOGAN

The Perception of the Armenian Question in the
Spanish Diplomatic Reports (1914-1922)

Yasemin TÜRKKAN TUNALI

Review Essay: The Denial of the Right to Disagree

Jeremy SALT

BOOK REVIEW



REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics, and International Relations
2018, No: 37

EDITOR
Alev KILIÇ

MANAGING EDITOR
Mehmet Oğuzhan TULUN

EDITORIAL BOARD
In Alphabetical Order

| | |
|---|---|
| Prof. Dr. Seçil KARAL AKGÜN | Prof. Dr. Refik TURAN (President of Turkish Historical Society) |
| Prof. Dr. Sadi ÇAYCI (Başkent University) | Prof. Dr. Nurşen MAZICI (Marmara University) |
| Prof. Dr. Kemal ÇİÇEK | Prof. Dr. Hikmet ÖZDEMİR (Political Scientist) |
| Dr. Şükrü ELEKDAĞ (Ret. Ambassador) | Dr. Bilal N. ŞİMŞİR (Ret. Ambassador, Historian) |

ADVISORY BOARD
In Alphabetical Order

| | |
|--|---|
| Yiğit ALPOGAN (Ret. Ambassador) | Prof. Dr. Yusuf HALAÇOĞLU (Member of the Parliament) |
| Ertuğrul APAKAN (Ret. Ambassador) | Prof. Dr. Enver KONUKÇU |
| Prof. Dr. Nedret KURAN BURÇOĞLU (Boğaziçi University) | Prof. Dr. Justin MCCARTHY (University of Louisville) |
| Assist. Prof. Dr. Brendon J. CANNON (Khalifa University) | Prof. Dr. Jeremy SALT |
| Ahmet Altay CENGİZER (Ambassador) | Prof. Dr. Mehmet SARAY (Historian) |
| Dr. Edward ERICKSON (Historian) | Prof. Dr. Norman STONE (Bilkent University) |
| Uluç GÜRKAN (Journalist) | Prof. Dr. Ömer TURAN (Middle East Technical University) |
| | Prof. Dr. Hakan YAVUZ (Utah University) |

PUBLISHER
Hazel ÇAĞAN ELBİR

Review of Armenian Studies is published biannually

Review of Armenian Studies is a refereed journal. Review of Armenian Studies is indexed in the EBSCO and TUBITAK-ULAKBIM databases. Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The editorial board takes into consideration whether the submitted article follows the rules of scientific writing. The articles are sent to two referees known for their academic reputation in their respective areas. Upon their decision, the article will be published in the journal, or rejected. The reports of the referees are kept confidential and stored in the journal's archives for five years.

On behalf of AVRASYA BİR VAKFI (1993)
All Rights Reserved.

Publication Office

Terazi Yayıncılık Bas. Dağ. Dan. Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Abidin Daver Sok. No. 12/B Daire 4 06550 Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 • **Faks:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
www.avim.org.tr

ISSN: 1303-5304

Subscription Office

Hülya ÖNALP
Terazi Yayıncılık Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Süleyman Nazif Sok. No.12/B Daire 4 06550
Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24
Fax: 0 (312) 438 50 26
E-mail: teraziyayincilik@gmail.com

Design

Ruhi ALAGÖZ

Printing

Özyurt Matbaacılık
Büyük San. 1. Cad. Süzgün Sok. No: 7 İskitler / ANKARA
Tel: +90 312 384 15 36 **Fax:** +90 312 384 15 37

Printing Date: 31 July 2018

Annual Subscription: 30 USD
30 TRY

Please send your payment to the following bank account:
For TRY - Terazi Yayıncılık, Garanti Bankası-Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/6296007
Postal Check Account Ankara/Çankaya/Merkez 5859221

For USD - Garanti Bankası- Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/9086957
IBAN: TR60 0006 2000 1810 009 0869 57

Statements of facts or opinions appearing in Review of Armenian Studies are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editor and publisher.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written authorization of the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM).

CONTENTS

(İÇİNDEKİLER)

| | Page |
|---|------|
| Contributors | 5 |
| (Yazarlar) | |
| Editorial Note | 7 |
| (Editörün Notu) | |
| ARTICLES | 11 |
| (MAKALELER) | |
| Facts and Comments | 11 |
| (Olaylar ve Yorumlar) | |
| Research Article / Araştırma Makalesi | |
| Alev KILIÇ | |
| Review Essay: Killing Orders: | |
| Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide | 45 |
| (Değerlendirme Yazısı: Öldürme Emirleri: | |
| Talat Paşa'nın Telgrafları ve Ermeni Soykırımı) | |
| Article Category: Other / Makale Türü: Diğer | |
| Ömer Engin LÜTEM - Yiğit ALPOGAN | |
| The Perception of the Armenian Question in the | |
| Spanish Diplomatic Reports (1914-1922) | 83 |
| (İspanyol Diplomatik Raporlarında | |
| Ermeni Sorunu Algısı (1914-1922)) | |
| Research Article / Araştırma Makalesi | |
| Dr. Yasemin TÜRKKAN TUNALI | |
| Review Essay: The Denial of the Right to Disagree..... | 119 |
| (Değerlendirme Yazısı: Hemfikir Olmama Hakkının İnkârı) | |
| Article Category: Other / Makale Türü: Diğer | |
| Jeremy SALT | |
| BOOK REVIEW | 137 |
| (KİTAP İNCELEMESİ) | |
| A Frontrunner Study on Eminent Poet and Author Hovhannes Tumanyan | 137 |
| (Mümtaz Şair ve Yazar Hovhannes Tumanyan Hakkında Öncü Bir Çalışma) | |
| Tutku DİLAVER | |

Contributors

Alev KILIÇ graduated from the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University in 1968. The next year, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Republic of Turkey. During his service at the MFA, Ambassador (R) Kılıç served in Jordan (1972-1974) and Munich-Germany (1974-1977), at the Ministry in Ankara (1977-1979), in Germany at the Embassy in Bonn (1979-1983), at the Ministry in Ankara (1983-1985), in Bulgaria at the Turkish Embassy in Sofia as the First Councillor (1985-1991), back in Ankara as the Deputy Director General for Central Asian, Caucasus and Slavic countries (1991-1996). Kılıç served as the Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1996 and 1998 and Ambassador/Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg between 1998 and 2001. In 2001-2004, he served as the Deputy Undersecretary of the MFA for Economic Affairs. Kılıç again served as the Ambassador to Switzerland (2004-2009) and Ambassador to Mexican United States (2009-2011). He retired from the MFA in 2011. Ambassador (R) Kılıç has been the Director of Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) since 2013.




Ömer Engin LÜTEM was a retired ambassador and the honorary president of Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM). He graduated from Galatasaray High School and the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Ankara. After several assignments in Turkish missions in France, Germany, Italy, and Libya, he became Turkish Consul General at Cologne, Germany in 1975. He served as Director General of Personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey in 1979 and Director General of Intelligence and Research of the Ministry in 1981. He was assigned as the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Bulgaria in 1983 and served for six years. He served as Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry (1989-1992), Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the Vatican (1992-1995), and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Turkey to UNESCO (1995-1997). He is the founding president of Institute for Armenian Research at Eurasian Strategic Research Center - ASAM (2001) and the Crimes Against Humanity Research Institute (2006). He served as the Director of AVİM between 2009-2012. He was the editor of three journals published by AVİM: *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, *Review of Armenian Studies*, and *International Crimes and History*. Apart from these, beginning in 2006, he served as the instructor of a master's degree course titled "Emergence and Evolution of the Armenian Question" at the History Department of the Middle Eastern Technical University (METU), Ankara. Lütem passed away in January 2018.



Yiğit ALPOGAN graduated from the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University in 1967. In 1968, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, where he served in different positions ranging from Head of Section to Deputy Undersecretary, and abroad in Turkish missions in several countries. Alpoğan was appointed First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo (1972-1975) and in Nicosia (1975-1977), Counsellor of the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the UN Office in Geneva (1979-1983), First Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in The Hague (1985-1989), and Minister-Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Athens (1991-1995). Alpoğan became ambassador in 1995 and has since served in this position in several embassies such as Ashgabat (1995-1998) and Athens (2001-2004), before his appointment as the first civilian Secretary General of the National Security Council of Turkey (2004-2007). Alpoğan was then appointed Ambassador to London, where he served from 2007 to 2010. Following his retirement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010, he joined the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in Barcelona and served as Deputy Secretary General until the completion of his term in 2016. Alpoğan joined Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) in December 2016 in an advisory capacity.



Jeremy SALT is a former journalist and a former lecturer/professor at the University of Melbourne, Boğaziçi University, and Bilkent University. Throughout his academic career, he taught courses on modern Middle Eastern history, religion and politics in the Middle East, media and politics, and propaganda. He is the author of two books; *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians 1878-1896* (Frank Cass, London, 1993) and *The Unmaking of the Middle East. A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). His articles have appeared in the following journals: *Middle East Policy*, *Third World Quarterly*, *Insight Turkey*, *Arena*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, *Muslim World*, *Current History*, *Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies*, *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, and *Review of Armenian Studies*.



Dr. Yasemin TÜRKKAN TUNALI is a Research Assistant at the Atatürk Institute of Hacettepe University. She obtained her bachelor's degree from the Department of International Relations at Hacettepe University in 2005. In 2006, she began to serve as a research assistant at the Atatürk Institute of Hacettepe University. She completed her master's degree with the dissertation titled "Türk Modernleşmesinde Yeni Adam Dergisi (1934-1938)" ("The *Yeni Adam* Journal (1934-1938) in Turkish Modernization"), and her doctoral degree with the dissertation titled "İspanyol Diplomatik Kaynaklarına Göre I. Dünya Savaşı ve Milli Mücadele'de Türkiye" ("World War I and Turkey during the War of Liberation According to Spanish Diplomatic Sources") at the same university. Dr. Türkkan Tunali carried out the research portion of her doctoral studies in Madrid-Spain intermittently between 2009-2012 within the framework provided by the Erasmus+ Internship Mobility Program, TÜBİTAK Abroad Research Scholarship, and the Atatürk Institute of Hacettepe University. Within this timeframe, she served as a guest researcher at Scientific Research High Council, History Institute (CSIC - Instituto de Historia).



We start this time with the sad announcement of the loss of Ambassador Ömer Engin Lütem, the founder of Review of Armenian Studies and its editor until his passing. Ambassador Lütem had always distanced himself from the unconstructive emotional and partisan approaches to the long-standing issue of the Turkish-Armenian controversy. He launched the Review of Armenian Studies in 2001, aiming to stimulate inter-disciplinary debate between academics and practitioners on topics relating to Armenian studies and seeking to give a platform to scholars wishing to make an academic contribution to disputed subjects such as the 1915 events. We will honor his legacy by carrying on Lütem's work at the Review of Armenian Studies.

Picking up from where Ambassador Ömer Engin Lütem left off, in our first article for the 37th issue titled “**Facts and Comments**”, we cover Turkey-Armenia relations as well as the internal and international developments of Armenia between January and July of 2018. Key topics within this timeframe include Armenia's annulment of the Zurich protocols, the message sent to the Turkish Armenians by President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the election of Serzh Sargysan as the Prime Minister and the public demonstrations as a consequence of the latter's election leading to his resignation, and the election of Nikol Pashinyan -the leader of the demonstrations.

In 2016, sociologist Taner Akçam had published a book titled *Naim Efendi'nin Hatıratı ve Talat Paşa Telgrafları (The Memoirs of Naim Efendi and Talat Pasha Telegrams)*, in which he alleged that the documents published 98 years ago by Aram Andonian (attributed to several high-ranking Ottoman officials) are authentic. As such, Akçam also argued that Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca, in their work titled *The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?* published in 1983, were wrong in their judgement that the said documents are fake. In one of our journal's previous issues, Ömer Engin Lütem had concretely demonstrated that Akçam's assertions in defense of the “Andonian documents” are based on serious distortions, manipulations, and omissions. Akçam's recently published book titled *Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide* is the revised English translation of his Turkish-language book. In it, he essentially resorts to the same distortions, manipulations, and omissions to demonstrate the authenticity of the “Andonian documents”. Yiğit Alpogan, in the study titled “**Review Essay: Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian**

Genocide”, has taken the task of updating Ömer Engin Lütem’s previous work in order to once again concretely demonstrate the falsity of Taner Akçam’s assertions.

In her article titled “**The Perception of the Armenian Question in the Spanish Diplomatic Reports (1914-1922)**”, Yasemin Türkkan Tunalı utilizes Spanish diplomatic correspondences belonging to the years 1914-1922 to demonstrate how Spain, a neutral state during the First World War, perceived the Armenian Question and the Turkish War of Liberation and how such perceptions changed in time. Dr. Türkkan Tunalı demonstrates that while Spanish diplomats were sympathetic towards Ottoman Armenians in the beginning of the First War and critical towards the Ottoman government due to its precautions against armed Armenian gangs, Spanish diplomats’ approach began to change towards the end of this war and the beginning of the Turkish War of Liberation. It appears that the excesses and destruction committed by the armed Armenian gangs and the invasion of Turkish lands by the Allied Powers played an instrumental role in changing the Spanish diplomats’ perception on the past and the-then present events in the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

Jeremy Salt, in the study titled “**Review Essay: The Denial of the Right to Disagree**”, thoroughly analyzes sociologist Fatma Müge Göcek’s 2005 book titled *Denial of Violence. Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and Collective Violence Against the Armenians, 1789-2009*. In her book, Göcek proclaims her aim to study violence (especially as it pertains to the Armenian Question) and the negative consequences the “denial” of this violence by the officials of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. However, Salt demonstrates that Göcek grossly trivializes the misdeeds of the Armenians during the First World War and overemphasizes the misdeeds of the Turks during the same period. Furthermore, Salt demonstrates that Göcek attempts to use the “denial” label as way to shut down debate on the disputed 1915 events and to silence scholars who have opinions that diverge from the Armenian genocide narrative. Salt concludes that Göcek bases her book on the premise of putting certain questions that undermine the genocide narrative out of the bounds of discussion, and that her book thus fails to remain faithful to history.

Tutku Dilaver reviews the book titled *Ermeni Edebiyatının Mümtaz Şair Ve Yazarı Hovhannes Tumanyan’ın Hayatı Eserleri Ve Edebi Kişiliği (The Life, Works, And Literary Identity of Eminent Poet and Author of Armenian Literature, Hovhannes Tumanyan)* by Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş. Hovhannes Tumanyan was a celebrated poet and author in Armenian literature. However,

as explained in the book, Tumanyan was also an activist who espoused the ideal of brotherhood amongst peoples and who spoke out against Russia's machinations aimed to damage the sense of brotherhood between Turks and Armenians during the Tsarist period. Tutku Dilaver points out that by reading the well-known stories authored by Tumanyan shared in the book, the reader comes to realize that similar stories have been passed from generation to generation amongst Turks, meaning that such stories are a common cultural heritage in the geography in which Turkey exists.

Have a nice reading and best regards,

Editor

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Kılıç, Alev. “Facts and Comments.” *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 37 (2018).

Received: 02.07.2018

Accepted: 25.07.2018

FACTS AND COMMENTS

(OLAYLAR VE YORUMLAR)

Alev KILIÇ*

Abstract: *This article covers the relations of Turkey and Armenia as well as the internal and international developments of Armenia between January and July of 2018. Armenia’s annulment of the Zurich protocols, the message sent to the Turkish Armenians by President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the commemoration of April 24, the election of Armen Sarkissian as the new president of Armenia, the election of Serzh Sargysan as the Prime Minister, the public demonstrations as a consequence of the latter’s election leading to the resignation of Serzh Sargysyan and the election of Nikol Pashinyan - the leader of the demonstrations- as the new Prime Minister are the major issues that are going to be discussed within the scope of this article.*

Keywords: *Serzh Sargysyan, Armen Sarkissian, Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia, Turkey*

Öz: *Bu incelemede Türkiye-Ermenistan ilişkilerinde ve Ermenistan’ın iç ve dış dinamiklerinde 2018 yılının Ocak ila Temmuz aylarındaki gelişmeler ele alınmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, Ermenistan’ın 2009 Zürih protokollerini feshetmesi, Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Türkiye Ermenilerine mesajı, 24 Nisan’ın anılması, Ermenistan’da Armen Sarkisyan’ın yeni Cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesi, Serj Sarkisyan’ın Başbakan seçilmesi, bunun yol açtığı kitlesel gösteriler sonrası istifa etmesi ve gösterilerin lideri Nikol Paşinyan’ın Başbakan seçilmesi ele alınmaktadır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Serj Sarkisyan, Armen Sarkisyan, Nikol Paşinyan, Ermenistan, Türkiye*

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5180-2896>
Ambassador (R), Director of the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM), akilic@avim.org.tr

1. Domestic Developments in Armenia

The first months of 2018 passed in an extraordinarily lively and high-tempo manner for Armenia. In the international press during the beginning of January, there were news reports that societal unrest could occur in 2018.¹ The reason for these reports and concerns was that President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan's constitutional term of office was due to end, yet -in an attempt to remain in power- there was a high possibility of him being elected as a strong prime minister in the parliamentary system based on the constitutional amendment made in 2015. Likewise, there was the subject of who would become the new president.

In 19 January, President S. Sargsyan presented former ambassador, former prime minister, and businessman Armen Sarkissian as his presidential candidate of choice.² Disputes regarding the reactions of the opposition towards this choice remained on the agenda for some time.

As a result of the constitutional amendment approved by the referendum made in Armenia on 7 December 2015, there was a shift from the presidential system to the parliamentary system in 2018. The new parliament elections that were to play a key role in the shift to the parliamentary system were held on 2 April 2017 and President S. Sargsyan's Republican Party won the absolute majority.³ Thus, following the end of Serzh Sargsyan's term in April 2018, the new president would be elected not by the people but by the parliament.

Indeed, on 23 February, Armen Sarkissian was officially presented as the only candidate in the parliament for the presidency.⁴ On 2 March 2018, the new president Armen Sarkissian was elected for the first time not by the popular vote but by the parliament, for a seven-year period and made his oath of office on 9 April 2018.⁵

1 "Social Unrest Knocking on Doors in Armenia - Country's Media," *AzerNews.az*, January 8, 2018, <https://www.azernews.az/aggression/125154.html>

2 "Republican Party Nominates Armen Sarkissian for Next President of Armenia," *MassisPost*, January 19, 2018, <https://massispost.com/2018/01/republican-party-nominates-armen-sarkissian-next-president-armenia/>

3 "Republicans win majority of seats in Armenian parliament," *OC Media*, April 3, 2015, <http://oc-media.org/republicans-win-majority-of-seats-in-armenian-parliament/>

4 "Armenia Parliamentary Majority Nominates Ex-PM For President," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, February 23, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/armenian-armen-sarkisian-nominated-president/29058838.html>

5 "Dr. Armen Sarkissian Sworn in as President of Armenia," *Asbarez*, April 9, 2018, <http://asbarez.com/171551/dr-armen-sarkissian-sworn-in-as-president-of-armenia/>

President Armen Sarkissian was born in Yerevan on 23 June 1953. He is married and has two children. He is a physics professor. He has served as an ambassador and for a brief period as prime minister. After having served as Armenia's ambassador to London during the years 1991-1995 and 1998-1999, he retired, moved to the UK, acquired British citizenship and entered the business life.⁶ When he was nominated as a presidential candidate by Serzh Sargsyan, his British citizenship was criticized by the opposition and it was claimed that he had violated the Constitutional requirement that presidential candidates must be of Armenian citizenship for at least the last six years.⁷ In the explanation that A. Sarkissian made against these criticisms, he stated that he had cancelled his dual citizenship in 2011 and that he has been solely an Armenian citizen since that date.⁸ The Minister of Justice stated that the date A. Sarkissian himself canceled his British citizenship would be the basis taken into consideration. The opposition highlighted that in a British tax statement of 2014 that has his signature, he was still displayed in the records as a British citizen. A. Sarkissian explained that he had signed it without paying attention. In response to this explanation, Yelq MP Nikol Pashinyan criticized this as an “unserious attitude”, stated that A. Sarkissian “trivialized public discourse” and asked “when you become president, shall we expect you to sign other documents without paying attention and without reading the contents?”

When the new president was presented as the single candidate and elected in the parliament, it was time for the election of the new prime minister. Due to the position of the prime minister becoming the executive power of the country's new administration system because of the 2015 constitutional amendment, the spotlight was doubtlessly focused on this election.

When the new president was presented as the single candidate and elected in the parliament, it was time for the election of the new prime minister. Due to the position of the prime minister becoming the executive power of the country's new administration system because of the 2015 constitutional amendment, the spotlight was doubtlessly focused on this election.

6 “Entrepreneur, diplomat and ex-PM: Who is Armen Sarkissian?” *News.am*, January 19, 2018, <https://news.am/eng/news/431897.html>

7 Hrant Galstyan, “Does Armen Sarkissian Qualify as Armenia's Next President? British Documents Raise Armenian Citizenship Doubt,” *Hetq*, February 8, 2018, <http://hetq.am/eng/news/85625/does-armen-sarkissian-qualify-as-armenias-next-president-british-documents-raise-armenian-citizenship-doubt.html>

8 “Armen Sarkissian: I Am Only Armenia Citizen since December 2, 2011,” *News.am*, March 1, 2018, <https://news.am/eng/news/438906.html>

In 2015, the referendum for the transition from a presidential system to a parliamentary system⁹ took place under the leadership and intensive efforts of S. Sargsyan. Aiming to parry the accusations that this change was occurring so that he could maintain his rule, S. Sargsyan stated in 2014 with open, clear statements leaving no room for doubt that this change in the system was not conducted with personal agendas to extend his rule and that he would not be a candidate. He repeated this pledge several times afterwards.

In 2018, after it was observed that the presidential candidate could easily be determined and chosen by the ruling party, and with the encouragement he received from his party's absolute majority in the parliament, S. Sargsyan announced his candidacy for the prime ministership.

Upon this development, on 23 March civil society representatives began their protest demonstrations. These demonstrations grew and spread with a rolling snowball effect and turned into a massive reaction that spread throughout Armenia with the leadership of Nikol Pashinyan, who was the oppositional leader of the YELQ (“the way out/the exit way”) group represented with ten MPs in the Parliament. On 30 March, Pashinyan made a statement expressing that “[S.] Sargsyan should not become the prime minister.” And when the new president A. Sarkissian assumed his post ten days later, Pashinyan declared that S. Sargsyan would leave the government and called for him to be barred from returning to his position.¹⁰

On 31 March, the protest campaign organized under the leadership of Pashinyan started in Gyumri and continued marching towards Yerevan.¹¹ On 13 April, Pashinyan and his followers reached Yerevan and began permanent demonstrations in the Freedom Square.

On 17 April, the Armenian National Assembly conducted a special meeting electing Serzh Sargsyan as the Prime Minister. The demonstrators led by Pashinyan demanded S. Sargsyan's resignation and he declared a “velvet revolution” in the name of achieving this outcome.¹² In this process, many demonstrators were arrested.

9 The executive branch in the parliamentary governmental system is two-headed. One is “president/head of state”, the other is the “cabinet of ministers”. The prime minister is the head of cabinet as *primus inter pares*.

10 Seda Ghukasyan, “Pashinyan's March to Yerevan: “We Have No Plans of Going Home,” *Hetq*, April 10, 2018, <http://hetq.am/eng/news/87276/pashinyans-march-to-yerevan-we-have-no-plans-of-going-home.html>

11 Anahit Chilingaryan, “Protests Surge in Armenia,” *Human Rights Watch*, April 18, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/16/protests-surge-armenia>

12 “Nikol Pashinyan about Likely Scenario of Velvet Revolution Development in Armenia,” *Информационное агентство ARKA News Agency*, April 20, 2018, http://arka.am/en/news/politics/nikol_pashinyan_about_likely_scenario_of_velvet_revolution_development_in_armenia/

On 18 April, the US State Department made an official statement regarding the latest political developments in Armenia. It was expressed that the demonstrations were being closely followed and a call was made for the parties to avoid actions that would create tension or violence.

On 21 April, S. Sargsyan called on Pashinyan to establish a dialogue, Pashinyan explained that they would only talk with the government about Sargsyan's resignation.¹³ On the same day, President A. Sarkissian met with the demonstrators and spoke with Pashinyan.¹⁴

The religious front did not remain indifferent to these developments. Catholicos of Etchmiadzin Karekin II and Catholicos of Cilicia (based in Antelias, Lebanon) Aram I published messages inviting the demonstrators towards peace.¹⁵

On 22 April, Pashinyan and S. Sargsyan met in front of the television cameras. Pashinyan immediately demanded from S. Sargsyan his resignation.¹⁶ Sargsyan, however, stated that this was not a dialogue but an ultimatum, that it constituted blackmail against the state and legal authorities, and that Pashinyan should learn a lesson from the events of 1 March 2008. Pashinyan stated in response that threats would not deter the demonstrators, that the situation had changed, that Sargsyan did not have authority, and that the power in Armenia was in the hands of the people. In response, S. Sargsyan left the meeting, while Pashinyan invited the people to continue with the protests.¹⁷ Pashinyan was arrested on the same day right after the meeting.

On 23 April, Pashinyan was released, and shortly after S. Sargsyan announced his resignation.¹⁸ President Armen Sarkissian approved the government's resignation on the same day.

13 "Серж Саргсян о митингах в Ереване: Сложно понять, как дальше будут развиваться события," *News.am*, April 19, 2018, <https://news.am/rus/news/447274.html>

14 "Президент Армении пришел на площадь Республики," *News.am*, April 21, 2018, <https://news.am/rus/news/447607.html>

15 "Католикос всех армян: Призываем всех не терять трезвость и разум," *News.am*, April 19, 2018, <https://news.am/rus/news/447191.html>

16 "Armenian Protest Leader Pashinian Says PM Serzh Sarkisian Agrees To Meet," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, April 21, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-protests-pashinian-sarkisian-yerevan/29184296.html>

17 "Political Crisis Deepens in Armenia, Protest Leader Pashinyan Detained," *Daily Sabah*, April 22, 2018, <https://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2018/04/22/political-crisis-deepens-in-armenia-protest-leader-pashinyan-detained>

18 "Armenia's Prime Minister Sargsyan Resigns Amid Opposition Protests," *Sputnik International*, April 23, 2018, <https://sputniknews.com/europe/201804231063824234-sargsyan-resignation/>

Pashinyan considered S. Sargsyan's resignation as the first step. He explained that "The second step is for the National Assembly to assign a candidate of the people as a prime minister. This will be done in a week. Until then, a temporary government should be organized, afterwards, extraordinary parliament elections should be conducted."¹⁹

The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia that had been closely following the developments in Armenia, evaluating the latest developments, stated; "People who have been strong during the toughest times of their history, that have respected each other despite disagreements represent a grand community. Armenia, Russia is always with you."²⁰ Pashinyan expressed his gratitude for this statement and stated that support was expected from the international community for the "clean Armenian velvet revolution."²¹

The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of Armenia made a sudden visit to Moscow on 26 April. It was reflected in the press that high level meetings were held during the visit. It was reported in the Russian and Armenian media that President of Russia Vladimir Putin stepped in and met with Deputy Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan. It was indicated that Putin's main message was ensuring an immediate conclusion for the political crisis in Armenia in the framework of the current constitution and within the scope of the authorities of the parliament formed by the April 2017 elections.

Pashinyan, who had declared that he would not shy away from the responsibility if the people wanted to see him as the prime minister, wanted the protest demonstrations to start again. While the demonstrations were continuing, the Republican Party stated that a candidate from the party was not going to be presented for the prime ministership. On 30 April, the minority Yelq group in the parliament presented Pashinyan as a candidate for the prime ministership.²² On 1 May, the Armenian Parliament conducted a special session for the prime minister election and the Republican Party, which has the majority of seats, stated that it would not vote for Pashinyan. Therefore, Pashinyan was not elected as the Prime Minister. The elections were

19 "Пашинян: Ты победил, Гордый гражданин Республики Армения," *News.am*, April 23, 2018, <https://news.am/rus/news/447885.html>

20 "Мария Захарова прокомментировала последние события в Армении," *News.am*, April 23, 2018, <https://news.am/rus/news/447897.html>

21 "Velvet Revolution in Armenia: April-May 2018," *Human Rights Online*, May 22, 2018, <https://humanrights-online.org/en/velvet-revolution-in-armenia-april-may-2018/>

22 "Фракция «Выход» выдвинула кандидатуру Никола Пашиняна на пост премьер-министра Армении," *News.am*, April 30, 2018, <https://news.am/rus/news/448940.html>

postponed for seven days, and Pashinyan demanded the resumption of the civil disobedience and peaceful protests.²³

On 7 May, the Dashnaktsutyun Party, which is the coalition partner of the ruling party, stated that they would support the candidacy of Pashinyan. Also, the President stated; “If he is elected as the Prime Minister, I will work with Pashinyan.”²⁴

Ultimately, Nikol Pashinyan was elected as the Prime Minister of Armenia on 8 May 2018.²⁵

Nikol Pashinyan was born in the Armenian city of Ijevan on 1 June 1975. He is married and has four children. He entered the parliament as an MP in 2012.

He was discharged from the Yerevan State University’s Faculty of Journalism during his fourth year due to reasons regarding his political conduct. He served as the editor of the “Armenian Times” newspaper, which is Armenia’s best-selling liberal newspaper and known for its opposition against the policies of Kocharyan and Sargsyan. In 2000, his newspaper was accused of the offense of libel.

He had joined the March protests that were led by the first president Ter-Petrosyan against the February 2008 presidential elections that were held after President Kocharyan’s second term of office which resulted in Sargsyan’s election. 10 people had died, and 100 people were arrested in these protests. Pashinyan was also wanted by the police for charges of murder and disturbance of public peace and he eventually turned himself in after one year of hiding. On May 2011, he was released through the amnesty brought to political prisoners (this was the event that S. Sargsyan had reminded to Pashinyan during the 22 April meeting).

After being elected, Pashinyan’s first action was to visit Nagorno-Karabakh on 9 May. Speaking at a news conference, he said the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict cannot be resolved without the direct participation of the Nagorno-

23 Sara Khojayan, “Armenia Risks Further Unrest After Protest Leader Is Rejected as PM,” *Bloomberg.com*, May 1, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-01/armenian-parliament-fails-to-elect-protest-leader-as-premier>

24 Oliver Carroll, “Armenian President Says He Is ‘ready to Stand between Police and Protesters,’” *The Independent*, May 4, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/armenia-president-protests-police-name-violence-interview-anti-government-a8336661.html>

25 Margarita Antidze and Hasmik Mkrtchyan, “Protest Leader Nikol Pashinian Elected Prime Minister Of Armenia,” *Huffington Post*, May 8, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/armenia-prime-minister-election_us_5af17239e4b0c4f193267607

Karabakh authorities in the peace negotiations, adding that only these authorities have the right to speak on behalf of Karabakh. He criticized Azerbaijan's refusal to directly negotiate with Karabakh's ethnic Armenian leadership. He reiterated that "this negotiation format cannot be considered full-fledged until one of the parties to the conflict, the leadership of Karabakh, participates in it."²⁶ These remarks were met with widespread reaction. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov described Pashinyan's position on Karabakh as "possibly unconstructive."²⁷ Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson considered the statements a non-constructive step aimed at undermining the negotiation process on the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and maintaining the occupation-based status quo.²⁸ According to a British expert, Pashinyan's first statements on Karabakh stirred the situation, as he spoke more like a man from the crowd than a diplomat, saying that Karabakh is an "inseparable part" of Armenia.²⁹ It can be said that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, beyond being deemed a national cause in Armenia, is a sensitive issue for Pashinyan in respect of the connections the previous two presidents had with the area.

Also, during this visit, Pashinyan said that he was ready to establish relations with Turkey without preconditions. He claimed that Turkey was bringing forward preconditions and putting forward a third country (Azerbaijan) as an obstacle. He stated that he does not expect Turkey to recognize the "Armenian genocide" and that they, as Armenia, are striving in the international field for this to be recognized.³⁰

The Hankendi (Stepanakert) born S. Sargsyan had in essence foreshadowed from the beginning an uncompromising future due to his role in the war and invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, and especially his responsibility in the Khojali massacre. He had further ingrained the legacy he had inherited from Kocharyan. Lastly, in 20 February 2018, during the 30th year celebration of "Armenia's revival" by the separatist uprising in Nagorno-Karabakh that

26 "Pashinian Visits Karabakh," *For Rights*, May 9, 2018, http://forrights.am/?ln=2&page_id=458&id=29

27 "Russian Foreign Ministry Describes Pashinyan's Position on Karabakh as 'Possibly Unconstructive'," *ARKA News Agency*, June 1, 2018, http://arka.am/en/news/politics/russian_foreign_ministry_describes_pashinyan_s_position_on_karabakh_as_possibly_unconstructive/

28 "Armenia's New PM Angers Azerbaijan with Visit to Disputed Region," *TRT World*, May 9, 2018, www.trtworld.com/europe/armenia-s-new-pm-angers-azerbaijan-with-visit-to-disputed-region-17336

29 Thomas de Waal, "Armenia's Revolution and the Karabakh Conflict," *Carnegie Europe*, May 22, 2018, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/76414>

30 "Paşinyan: Karabağ'ın Uluslararası Çapta Tanınması Ermenistan'la Birleşmesine Yol Açabilir," *Sputnik Türkiye*, May 9, 2018, <https://tr.sputniknews.com/dunya/201805091033373673-pasinyan-karabag-ermenistan/>

started in February 1988, S. Sargsyan had incited militant feelings once more and the ASALA terrorist Monte Melkonyan was once again commemorated with respect and gratitude.³¹ During the end of February, as if aiming to create an excuse and justification for the Nagorno-Karabakh massacres, this time the disputed events (the veracity of which is subject to doubt) that had occurred on February 1988 in the city of Sumgait close to Baku were characterized as a massacre, and the 30th year of “Armenians being massacred” in Sumgait was commemorated.

Only time will tell whether Pashinyan assuming the administration of Armenia means the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh-origin administration that has been ruling the country for the past twenty years. In other words, the answer to whether the initiative to change the order of things and web of interests formed by the previous twenty year-administration will be successful or not is not yet clear. Pashinyan became the prime minister with the consent of the ruling party. Therefore, his executive capabilities are being kept under check. Pashinyan’s counter leverage originates from the obligation of Armenia to hold new elections if he is suspended from duty. It appears that the majority party is waiting for mistakes from Pashinyan and is biding its time for a counter initiative, while Pashinyan is aiming to form a powerful social base constituted of his followers by immediately attempting to enact reforms and carry out purges.

Only time will tell whether Pashinyan assuming the administration of Armenia means the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh-origin administration that has been ruling the country for the past twenty years. In other words, the answer to whether the initiative to change the order of things and web of interests formed by the previous twenty year-administration will be successful or not is not yet clear.

Although the constitution granted the Prime Minister fifteen days to form a government, Pashinyan made his appointments within a week. On 21 May, the new government was sworn in. There are three deputy prime ministers and seventeen ministers, the youngest of age 28, the oldest 52. Three ministers from the old cabinet have kept their positions, albeit with different portfolios. The list of the ministers is below:³²

31 “Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on Artsakh Revival Day and Karabakh Movement 30th Anniversary,” *President of the Republic of Armenia Official Website*, February 20, 2018, <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/02/20/President-Serzh-Sargsyans-address-on-the-30th-anniversary-of-the-Karabakh-movement/>

32 “Structure,” *The Government of the Republic of Armenia*, accessed July 25, 2018, www.gov.am/en/structure/

Ararat Mirzoyan, First Deputy Prime Minister
Tigran Avinyan, Deputy Prime Minister
Mher Grigoryan, Deputy Prime Minister
Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Artak Zeynalyan, Minister of Justice
Levon Vahradyan, Minister of Sport and Youth Affairs
Hrachya Rostomyan, Minister of Emergency Situations
Lilit Makunts, Minister of Culture
Erik Grigoryan, Minister of Ecology
Suren Papikyan, Minister of Territorial Administration and
Development
Mkhitar Hayrapetyan, Minister of Diaspora
David Tonoyan, Minister of Defense
Mane Tandilyan, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs
Arsen Torosyan, Minister of Health
Arthur Khachatryan, Minister of Agriculture
Atom Janjughazyan, Minister of Finance
Arthur Grigoryan, Minister of Energy Infrastructures and Natural
Resources
Artsvik Minasyan, Minister of Economic Development and
Investments
Ashot Hakobyan, Minister of Transport, Communication and
Information Technologies
Arayik Harutyunyan, Minister of Education and Science

On 28 May, Armenia commemorated the centenary of the proclamation of the country's first independent republic with a military parade at the village Sardarabad,³³ about fifty kilometers west of the capital where Ottoman forces, on their way to liberating Baku, were obstructed in 22-29 May 1918 from occupying Yerevan.

33 "Armenia Celebrates 100th Anniversary of First Republic," MassisPost, May 28, 2018, <http://massispost.com/2018/05/armenia-celebrates-100th-anniversary-of-first-republic/>

On 1 June, unprecedented protests broke out in Karabakh, demanding change, in the foot- steps of events and change in Armenia. Pashinyan took a resolute stand to discourage the further eruption of the demonstrations.³⁴

2. External Developments

In the framework of a working visit, President S. Sargsyan went to France in January. On 22 January, he met with the France-Armenia Parliament friendship group, the Armenian community representatives in France, and the Paris Mayor at the Paris municipality. The next day he met with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron.³⁵ Macron stated that France will continue its warm relations with Armenia and with its support in the international field. In his statement to the press he said; “France will always be with Armenia. As you have always done in your history, for your country’s future to triumph, France will accompany you in this turbulent regional framework.” Macron also referred to the “deep bonds” between the two countries enhanced by the presence of the significant and effective Armenian community and stated; “I am aware of the struggle of the Armenian diaspora for the remembrance of the genocide and I deeply respect this struggle.” In this meeting, an official invitation was made to Macron for visiting Armenia and it was reported that Macron had accepted the invitation to the 17th Francophone summit that is planned to take place in Yerevan on October 2018.

S. Sargsyan then passed on to Strasbourg on 25 January and addressed the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In his speech during which he mentioned the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, S. Sarkissian made the following points:

“It is necessary to adhere strictly to the current ceasefire and respect the agreements that have been made in the past. It is also essential that the resolution is peaceful and fair. All sides need to take collective responsibility and find groundwork for agreement based on a common aspect for the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. We can only accept the international format established by OSCE Minsk Group.

34 Sisak Gabrielian, “Pashinian Urges End To Protests In Karabakh,” *Azatutyun*, June 4, 2018, www.azatutyun.am/a/29270933.html

35 “Sargsyan-Macron meeting kicks off in Paris,” *ArmenPress*, January 23, 2018, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/919956/sargsyan-macron-meeting-kicks-off-in-paris.html>

For nine years, we have been hearing statements from Turkey of the need to take some steps. Everything is expressed clearly in the documents. First, relations will be established, after which problematic subjects between the countries will be discussed. We can never accept Turkey's preconditions. Yes, Turkey is a powerful country with a large potential that cannot be compared with Armenia. However, this does not mean that Turkey has to speak with Armenia with a language of power and precondition. This is unacceptable."³⁶

After his meeting with S. Sargsyan, on 31 January, President of France Macron addressed the Coordination Council of Armenian Organizations in France (CCAF) annual dinner and, promising to open the Armenian file, said that he would declare an "Armenian genocide commemoration day" in France.³⁷ He stated; "struggling for the recognition of the Armenian genocide and justice is the struggle for all of us. We conduct this struggle by supporting the genocide remembrance day." However, Macron turned down the request of the diaspora representatives wanting him to visit Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenia's occupation. He gave the message that in the current situation, visiting the region would lead to France losing its "intermediator" role in the resolution of the crisis. He stated that he would visit Armenia in Autumn as part of a state visit.

Moreover, during this period, S. Sargsyan brought forward a new discourse to the agenda and stated that they -as Armenia- will be celebrating the 2800th anniversary of the capital Yerevan. The President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev responded to this claim shortly after. On 9 February, Aliyev stated "Us Azerbaijanis should return to those historical lands [Yerevan]. This is our political and strategic aim and we should approach this aim gradually."³⁸

On 16 February, the Dutch parliament adopted a motion characterizing the 1915 events as genocide.³⁹ Before the voting for the motion in the parliament, the Dutch Deputy Foreign Minister Sigrid Kaag took the floor and explained

36 "Karabakh Conflict Resolution, End to Turkey Protocols Focus of Sarkisian's PACE Speech," *Asbarez*, January 25, 2018, <http://asbarez.com/170020/karabakh-conflict-resolution-end-to-turkey-protocols-focus-of-sarkisians-pace-speech/>

37 "French President Macron Pledges to Add Armenian Genocide to French Calendar and to One Day Visit Artsakh," *The Armenian Weekly*, February 1, 2018, <https://armenianweekly.com/2018/02/01/macron-ccaf-2018/>

38 "6th Congress of New Azerbaijan Party held in Baku VIDEO," *AzerTac*, February 8, 2018, https://azertag.az/en/xeber/6th_Congress_of_New_Azerbaijan_Party_held_in_Baku_VIDEO-1134998

39 "Dutch Parliament Recognizes 1915 Armenian Massacre as genocide," *Reuters*, February 22, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-turkey-armenia/dutch-parliament-recognizes-1915-armenian-massacre-as-genocide-idUSKCN1G62GS>

the Dutch government's stance on this subject. In brief, the Deputy Minister indicated that the definition of the crime of genocide was made in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and that a genocide must be proven and that the Dutch government preserves the opinion that it can only decide on a genocide's existence as a consequence of an internationally authorized court's decision, a UNSC decision, or a thorough scientific research. Additionally, the Deputy Minister also emphasized that the Dutch government approaches the 1915 events differently from the Dutch parliament and that a "genocide" decision that the parliament would make would not be binding for the government.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey also made the following statement regarding the decision taken by the Dutch parliament:

"We strongly condemn the decisions of the Dutch House of Representatives recognizing the events of 1915 as genocide.

The baseless decisions of the House of Representatives of a country who was a bystander to the Srebrenica genocide, an undying pain in the middle of Europe, have no place either in history or in justice. Thus, they are neither legally binding nor have any validity.

Turkey's position on the events of 1915 is based on historical facts and legal norms. The established jurisprudence in European law and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights affirm our rightfulness.

Even so, we take note of the Dutch government's statement that "it will not follow the House in its assessment recognizing the 1915 events as genocide and that being represented at a commemoration ceremony in Yerevan would not imply recognition of the events as genocide."⁴⁰

President S. Sargsyan addressed, on 17 February, the Munich Security Conference. In his speech targeting Turkey, S. Sargsyan voiced the claim that "the lack of political will in the Turkish administration is the main obstacle for the forming of relations between Armenia and Turkey." Continuing his words, he stated "During the Cold War period, Armenia was on the border of one of the two opposing blocs. It has been thirty years since the fall of the

40 "No: 53, 22 February 2018, Press Release Regarding the Decisions of the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the Events of 1915," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, February 22, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-53_-hollanda-temsilciler-meclisinin-1915-olaylari-konusunda-aldigi-karar-hk_en.en.mfa

Berlin Wall, but Turkey keeps its borders with Armenia shut. It seems that the clocks there have stopped working.”⁴¹

On 8 March, the Serbian parliament rejected by a majority vote the proposed resolution introduced by an opposition party to “recognize the genocide committed against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.”

A member of the German Parliament, Mr. Cem Özdemir of the Green Party, one of the presenters of the genocide resolution that was approved in the German parliament in 2016, received the Mkhitar Gosh medal on 23 March in a ceremony held in Armenia’s Berlin Embassy for his “significant contributions to the Armenian genocide’s recognition in the international sphere.”

Prime Minister Pashinyan assured the Russian President Putin that Armenia would remain allied to Russia during his tenure when they met for the first time in Sochi on 14 May. Putin’s response was that he regarded Armenia as “our closest partner and ally in the region.”⁴² Pashinyan has thereafter repeatedly said that he will not pull Armenia out of the Eurasian Economic Union or the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the two organizations he had voiced heavy criticism against in the past.⁴³

Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Zohrab Mnatsakanyan paid his first official visit to Moscow on 7 June where he met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. At the joint news briefing following the meeting, Lavrov said “we held good, constructive and trustworthy negotiations in the spirit of allied relations binding our states.”⁴⁴ On his part, Mnatsakanyan said “During the meeting, I highlighted the importance Armenia attaches to the strategic partnership with Russia. We plan to continue that partnership later based on the principles that exist in the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The intensity and depth of our relations really oblige us to make new efforts to ensure their cooperation.” The Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs added that the sides plan to further deepen and expand the close cooperation in all spheres, including within the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union.

41 “Munich Security Conference: President Sargsyan Stresses Armenia’s Top Foreign, Security Policy Issues,” *ArmenPress*, February 17, 2018, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/923063/munich-security-conference-president-sargsyan-stresses-armenia-s-top-foreign-security-policy-issues.html>

42 Joshua Kucera, “Pashinyan and Putin Hold First Meeting, Pledge to Build Closer Ties,” *Eurasianet*, May 14, 2018, <https://eurasianet.org/s/pashinyan-and-putin-hold-first-meeting-pledge-to-build-closer-ties>

43 Kucera, “Pashinyan and Putin Hold First Meeting, Pledge to Build Closer Ties.”

44 “Russia’s Lavrov Holds ‘Good’ Talks with Armenian FM,” *Azatutyun*, June 7, 2018, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29278454.html>

The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France visited Armenia on 28 May as the first foreign minister to visit the country following the formation of the new government, also timed to the 100th anniversary of the first republic. The French minister referred to the broad relations that link France and Armenia and underlined that France and Armenia have historical ties. On his part, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mnatsakanian emphasized the “privileged” character of their relations. “we have always felt France’s support” he stated.

Prime Minister Pashinyan paid a two day visit to neighboring Georgia on 30 May, accompanied by a high level and large delegation including ministers of foreign affairs, defense, education and science, culture, the diaspora, transportation, communication and IT as well as his deputy. He also visited the Javakheti region to meet with the Armenian community living there.

Armenia’s newly elected president Sarkissian started on 18 June a two-week journey to the United Kingdom, France and the USA for private and official meetings.

Pashinyan attended the NATO Summit held in Brussels on 11 July within the framework of the presidents and heads of governments of all countries that have contributed to the NATO-led mission Resolute Support in Afghanistan.

3. Relations with the European Union

The process of the “Comprehensive and Extended Partnership Agreement” signed with Armenia on 24 November 2017 in the framework of the European Union’s East Partnership Cooperation displayed a fast development. On 21 February, an agreement was signed regarding the priorities of the Partnership Agreement between the EU and Armenia.⁴⁵ Those priorities have been collected under three titles: 1) Improving of public institutions and good governance, 2) Economic development and market opportunities, and 3) Environment and energy.

On 9 March, the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini stated that “Armenia-EU relations have never been this close.”

45 “Nalbandian, Mogherini Sign Document on Implementation of Priorities of Armenia-EU Partnership,” *ArmenPress*, February 21, 2018, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/923533/nalbandian-mogherini-sign-document-on-implementation-of-priorities-of-armenia-eu-partnership.html>

The Armenian National Assembly unanimously approved the Partnership Agreement on 11 April despite the domestic upheaval in the country.

On 19 April, the new President A. Sarkissian signed the approval law and thus the law came into effect.⁴⁶

On 11 April, during a comprehensive interview that was published in the Armenian media, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov expressed the following views regarding Armenia-EU relations:

“It is true that Armenia has the desire to improve relations in all fields. This is a profitable and beneficial policy for a country. Post-Soviet countries should commit the mistake of making a choice between Russia and the West. This is an ideological and politically-motivated approach. I believe that Armenia’s persistence in forming relations with the EU -with Armenia’s rights and responsibilities in other integration processes being recognized through documents- is a step in the right direction. Of course, its very important for the European Union to abandon its crooked logic of ‘either me or them’ that lead to the 2014 Ukraine events so that the rights and interests of Armenia, Azerbaijan, or the other participants of the EU initiative called the Eastern Partnership do not get distorted. Otherwise, this would mean stripping a people of its opportunity to develop its cooperation with all its neighbors in the broadest way. This is an approach that Russia consistently maintains. As early as 2015, the Eurasia Economic Union had made an offer to make contact with the EU. However, the EU did not perceive the EEU as a partner to cooperate with due to ideological and political reasons. I am optimistic regarding the future of the EEU-EU relations. I am sure that the EEU administrative body’s Armenian president Tigran Sargsyan will make developments in this direction easier.”

On 21 June, the Armenian Minister Foreign of Foreign Affairs Mnatsakanian met with EU Foreign Policy Chief in Brussels for a meeting of the EU-Armenia Partnership Federica Mogherini. Mogherini and Mnatsakanian spoke to reporters after chairing the first session of the EU-Armenia Partnership Council, a body tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed in

46 “Armen Sarkissian Signs EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement,” *Arka News Agency*, April 19, 2018, http://arka.am/en/news/politics/armen_sarkissian_signs_eu_armenia_comprehensive_and_enhanced_partnership_agreement/

November 2017. Mnatsakanian reaffirmed his governments stated commitment to CEPA. Mogherini reaffirmed the EU's pledge to allocate 160 million euros in fresh assistance to Armenia over the next four years.⁴⁷

Following the NATO Summit, on 12 July, Prime Minister Pashinyan met with the President of the European Commission and later with the EU Foreign Policy Chief.⁴⁸ Speaking to reporters after his talks, Pashinyan complained that the EU has not provided extra aid to his government and said he “expressed bewilderment” at this situation in his first talks with EU leaders. He stressed “We specifically expect more concrete and greater assistance.”⁴⁹

4. The Annulment of the Zurich Protocols

In a statement that the Press Secretary of the Presidency of Armenia made on 1 March 2018, it was announced that President Sargsyan annulled the two protocols that were signed with Turkey in Zurich in 2009 in accordance with the decision taken during the National Security Council meeting.⁵⁰

As a result of the process between Turkey and Armenia that was launched with the facilitative hosting of Switzerland in Zurich on 10 October 2009, the “Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia” and “the Protocol on the Developing Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia” had been signed.⁵¹

The protocols that provided a framework for the normalization of bilateral relations were referred to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in order to be approved, and in Armenia they were forwarded to the Constitutional Court for examination in terms of compliance with the Constitution of Armenia.

The Constitutional Court of Armenia initially declared on 12 January 2010 that the protocols were in conformity with the Constitution, but in its final

47 “Mogherini to Mnatsakanyan: EU Ready to Assist in Armenia’s Reforms,” *News.am*, June 21, 2018, <https://news.am/eng/news/457899.html>

48 “Pashinyan and Mogherini Meet in Brussels; Stress Importance of Expanding Armenia-EU Relations,” *Hetq*, July 12, 2018, <http://hetq.am/eng/news/91220/pashinyan-and-mogherini-meet-in-brussels-stress-importance-of-expanding-armenia-eu-relations.html>

49 “Pashinyan and Mogherini Meet in Brussels; Stress Importance of Expanding Armenia-EU Relations.”

50 “Армения аннулировала армяно-турецкие протоколы,” *Голос Армении*, March 1, 2018, <http://golosarmenii.am/article/63342/armeniya-annulirovala-armyano-tureckie-protokoly>

51 “Армения аннулировала армяно-турецкие протоколы.”

decision of 18 January 2010, it put forth preconditions and restrictive provisions contrary to the letter and spirit of the protocols.⁵²

Armenia later announced that it had suspended the approval process of the protocols. The relevant documents were withdrawn from the Armenian Parliament in February 2015 by President S. Sargsyan.

President S. Sargsyan announced in September 2017 at the United Nations meetings in New York that Armenia would cancel the protocols in the spring of 2018.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Edward Nalbandyan stated, “These documents cannot be held hostage forever, for this reason President Sargsyan has stated in the UN that Armenia will cancel the protocols, and we will meet the spring of 2018 without them.”⁵³

President S. Sargsyan made the following statement regarding the subject:

“As of this moment, our obligations mentioned in the protocols signed with Turkey have lost their legal basis. From now on, we may take into consideration any offer that comes without any preconditions; however, our development will now continue -as it has been to this day- without any diplomatic relations with Turkey. Whether the protocols had been approved or not, Armenia has gotten the best out of the situation. We have demonstrated the will to develop relations by signing the protocols. On the other hand, we have come to realize that Turkey is not displaying the proper political will and cannot fulfill its obligations. Time has showed us that our concerns were legitimate. Until now, Turkish authorities failure to take necessary steps for the ratification process of the protocols, the ongoing efforts to tie the ratification of the protocols to preconditions, and the provocative statements of Ankara to Armenia and Armenian people clearly point out that Turkey is not ready to ratify and implement the protocols.”⁵⁴

The Turkish side did not respond to this declaration and annulment that evokes the Turkish saying “yavuz hırsız ev sahibini bastırır” (meaning: A brazen culprit can make others believe that s/he is completely innocent and that the

52 “Ermenistan, Zürih Protokollerini Feshetti,” *TRT Haber*, March 1, 2018, <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/ermenistan-zurih-protokollerini-feshetti-353292.html>

53 “Ermenistan, Türkiye ile Protokolleri İptal Etti,” *Aksam*, March 1, 2018, <https://www.aksam.com.tr/dunya/ermenistandan-turkiye-ile-protokolleri-iptal-etti/haber-712579>

54 “Armenia Scraps Zurich Protocols; President Sargsyan Points to Turkish Intransigence,” *Hetq*, March 1, 2018, <http://hetq.am/eng/news/86225/armenia-scraps-zurich-protocols-president-sargsyan-points-to-turkish-intransigence.html>

person s/he has wronged is guilty). Immediately after the signing of the protocols, Armenia -through the decision of its Constitutional Court- had closed from the beginning the ratification gates for the protocols by proclaiming that the protocols would be implemented to the extent that they conformed to Armenia's Declaration of Independence. On 22 April 2010, the decision to suspend the ratification process adopted by the joint Political Council of the ruling coalition parties and its official announcement to Turkey had, in essence, illustrated Armenia's intention. Thereafter, as President S. Sargsyan withdrew the protocols from the parliament in 2015, the outcome of the process had already been clear. S. Sargsyan repeated his intention most recently in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2017. In this way, while Armenia was on its way towards its unilateral termination of an international agreement to which it was uncomfortable with from the beginning, Armenia found -through gradual statements- the opportunity to measure the reactions that could occur in the international community from the violation of the basis of international law; the *pacta sunt servanda* principle.

Therefore, the decision of the annulment of 1 March 2018 did not mean much more than the declaration of what was already known, and reflected Sargsyan's effort of exonerating his record (while his term of office was coming to an end) from a past deed of his that was fiercely criticized from the beginning by the Diaspora and militant circles.

The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made a statement on 7 March about the annulment of the protocols. In this declaration, it was stated that "Russia supports the normalization of the Turkey-Armenia relations. The Russian delegation was present in Zurich during the signing process of the protocols and had played an active role. We are moving from the point that the normalization of the relations of the two countries is important for their own interests." Similar brief statements were also made by the US and France.⁵⁵

The Turkish side did not respond to this declaration and annulment that evokes the Turkish saying "yavuz hürsüz ev sahibini bastırır" (meaning: A brazen culprit can make others believe that s/he is completely innocent and that the person s/he has wronged is guilty). Immediately after the signing of the protocols, Armenia - through the decision of its Constitutional Court- had closed from the beginning the ratification gates for the protocols by proclaiming that the protocols would be implemented to the extent that they conformed to Armenia's Declaration of Independence.

55 "МИД РФ прокомментировал денонсацию армяно-турецких протоколов," *News.am*, March 7, 2018, <https://news.am/rus/news/439998.html>

The annulment decision was welcomed by the militant diaspora press and it was emphasized that signing of the protocols by itself had constituted a mistake. S. Sargsyan's understanding that "we are winners on both cases" was also criticized and it was argued that it was the Turks who had actually benefited from this process. The keeping of the door open for a similar process in the future was also condemned by expressing "have we still not learned a lesson?" The executive director of the leading Armenian diaspora organization the Armenian National Committee of America's (ANCA) made the following evaluation of the protocol process; "Armenia played checkers while Turkey played chess." In addition to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutyun), ANCA had essentially and steadfastly opposed the protocol process from the outset and had maintained its warnings on the negative effects of the protocols on Armenia and the Armenian cause.

On 15 March, Armenia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that they had formally informed Ankara that Armenia had cancelled the protocols normalizing relations that were signed with Turkey. The Deputy Minister stated that Turkey was informed as per the requirements of international law and expressed "In accordance with the instructions of our President, we have officially reported the cancellation of the protocols to Turkey. Also, I would like to remind you that Armenia is consistently expressing that it is unconditionally ready for negotiations and the normalization of the relations."⁵⁶

5. The Commemoration of 24 April

The 103rd commemoration of the anniversary of the April 24th were overshadowed by the developments and demonstrations in Armenia's domestic politics. The usual ceremony in Yerevan was held with the participation of the new President, the Deputy Prime Minister, and Pashinyan. The resigning Prime Minister did not attend. The French President expressed his regrets about the "genocide" in his message to A. Sarkissian.⁵⁷

The focus of Armenia was on the President of the United States' message and its content. The Armenian institutions continued their intensive lobbying activities in the US and many members of the congress were mobilized. It

56 "Ermenistan, Protokolleri İptal Ettiğini Türkiye'ye Resmen Bildirdi," *Sputnik Türkiye*, March 15, 2018, <https://tr.sputniknews.com/avrupa/201803151032646019-ermenistan-protokol-iptal-turkiye-resmen-bildirdi/>

57 "Эммануэль Макрон о Геноциде армян: Не забудем никогда," *News.am*, April 24, 2018, <https://news.am/rus/news/447978.html>

was hoped that the Turkish-US relations would enter into a tense atmosphere and it was expected that this time a message closer to their hearts -one which supports their own discourse- would be published.

A week prior to the US President's message, 102 members of Congress, including the heads of the House of Representatives Foreign and Intelligence Committees, sent a letter to President Donald Trump calling for the recognition of genocide claims.

The letter prepared by Co-Presidents of the Armenian Friendship Group in the US Congress; Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), David Trott (R-Mich.), Jackie Speier (D-Calif.), and David Valadao (R-Calif.), in addition Vice Presidents Adam Schiff (D-calif.) and Gus Bilirakis (R-Fla.) briefly states the following:

“The Armenian Genocide continues to stand as an important reminder that crimes against humanity must not go without recognition and condemnation. Through recognition of the Armenian Genocide we pay tribute to the perseverance and determination of those who survived, as well as to the Americans of Armenian descent who continue to strengthen our country to this day. It is our duty to honor those contributions with an honest statement of history recognizing the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians as the 20th century's first genocide. By commemorating the Armenian Genocide, we renew our commitment to prevent future atrocities.”⁵⁸

The said letter ends with the following demand: “we ask you to appropriately mark April 24th as a day of American remembrance of the Armenian Genocide.”⁵⁹

As for President Trump, he repeated the statements of the previous presidents in his message. In response to the media's questions, the White House Press Representative confirmed on 24 April that President Trump only used the words of his predecessors and indicated that the statement issued by President was consistent with the statements of previous US administrations.

Trump's message is as follows:

“Today we commemorate the *Medz Yeghern*, one of the worst mass atrocities of the 20th century, when one and a half million Armenians

58 “US Congressmen Call on Trump to Mark April 24 as Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day,” *Armenpress.am*, April 12, 2018, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/929663/us-congressmen-call-on-trump-to-mark-april-24-as-armenian-genocide-commemoration-day.html>

59 “US Congressmen Call on Trump to Mark April 24 as Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day.”

were deported, massacred, or marched to their deaths in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. We recall the horrific events of 1915 and grieve for the lives lost and the many who suffered.

We also take this moment to recognize the courage of those individuals who sought to end the violence, and those who contributed to aiding survivors and rebuilding communities, including the U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau, who sought to end the violence and later raised funds through the Near East Relief to help the Armenian people. We note with deep respect the resilience of the Armenian people, so many of whom built new lives in the United States and have made countless contributions to our country.

As we honor the memory of those who suffered, we also reflect on our commitment to ensure that such atrocities are not repeated. We underscore the importance of acknowledging and reckoning with painful elements of the past as a necessary step towards creating a more tolerant future.

On this solemn day, we stand with the Armenian people throughout the world in honoring the memory of those lost and commit to work together to build a better future.”⁶⁰

The fact that President Trump did not change the known discourse disappointed the leading figures of the diaspora with extremist, militant, racist, and anti-Turkish hate speech-filled narrative. As a result, Trump himself became the target of derogatory discourses. One of these figures even said the following; “It is good that Trump did not say genocide, for if such a president had recognized the genocide, it would not have brought honor to the Armenian cause”. Naturally, once again, the main target was Turkey and the Turks. The executive of the United States’ leading Armenian organization, ANCA, immediately issued a statement describing Trump’s statement as a failure and revealed his inner animosity through these expressions:

“President Trump’s ‘Turkey First’ approach tightens Erdogan’s grip over U.S. policy on the genocide of Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians and other Christians.

60 “Trump’s Commemorative Statement Fails to Properly Characterize Armenian Genocide,” *The Armenian Weekly*, April 24, 2018, <https://armenianweekly.com/2018/04/24/trumps-commemorative-statement-fails-to-properly-characterize-armenian-genocide/>

In his annual April 24th statement, the President once again enforced Ankara's gag-rule against honest American condemnation and commemoration of the Armenian Genocide.

In outsourcing U.S. leadership on genocide prevention to Erdogan – who openly undermines U.S. interests, attacks U.S. allies, threatens U.S. troops, imprisons American clergy, and even orders the beating of American citizens – President Trump is emboldening a foreign dictator who revels in the public spectacle of having bullied successive American presidents into silence on Turkey's still unpunished murder of millions [of] Christians.

Sadly, by caving in to Turkish pressure, President Trump is isolating America, which today stands alone as Ankara's last genocide-denial lifeline. Forty-eight of our U.S. states have recognized the Armenian Genocide, as have a dozen of our NATO allies – including France and Germany, the European Union, and, of course, Pope Francis.

We will press ahead with our work to end U.S. complicity in Ankara's obstruction of justice, in order to put in place a U.S. policy that actively pressures Ankara to abandon its denials, reckon with its responsibilities, and engage directly with Armenian stakeholders toward a truthful, just, and comprehensive international resolution of this crime against humanity.”⁶¹

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey also criticized Trump's statement. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 25 April is below:

“We reject the inaccurate expressions and the subjective interpretation of history in the written statement by Mr. Donald Trump, President of the USA, released on 24 April 2018 regarding the events of 1915.

Our expectation from the US Administration is a fair assessment of a period during which all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire suffered tremendously.

In this context, we remind President Trump that during the same period more than 500.000 Muslims were slaughtered as a result of the events in which Armenian insurgents took part.

61 “Trump's Commemorative Statement Fails to Properly Characterize Armenian Genocide.”

Turkey continues to offer the establishment of a Joint Historical Commission in order to shed light on this painful period of history and has opened its archives to researchers.

On the other hand, Ottoman Armenians who lost their lives in the conditions of World War I were commemorated this year once again on 24 April in a ceremony held at the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul suiting the respect they deserve and befitting the 800-year long friendship between Turks and Armenians. We recommend the US Administration to consider the message by our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent to the ceremony at the Patriarchate of Istanbul on 24 April 2018 addressing the descendants of Ottoman Armenians, which reflects Turkey's approach to this sensitive issue.

Besides all these points, we think it is in line with common sense that the statement made by the US President remained within international legal norms and did not refer to baseless genocide allegations.”⁶²

As for the events in Turkey, some associations and small groups, sympathizers of the Armenian narrative, organized commemoration services.

Naturally, a development that bears importance and meaning for Turkey is President Erdoğan's message that was sent to the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul. The condolence message of President Erdogan is as follows:

“Reverend Aram Ateşyan,

General Vicar of the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey,

My distinguished Armenian citizens,

I affectionately salute you with all my heartfelt feelings.

You have gathered today under the roof of the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul to remember the Ottoman Armenians who lost their lives during the fierce and harsh conditions of the First World War.

Once again, I remember with respect the Ottoman Armenians who lost their lives, and offer my sincere condolences to their children and descendants.

62 “No: 119, 25 April 2018, Press Release Regarding the Statement by the U.S. President Trump on the 1915 events,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, April 25, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-119_-abd-baskani-trump-in-1915-olaylarina-iliskin-aciklamasi-hk_en.en.mfa

On this occasion, I also pray for God's grace and mercy on millions of Ottoman citizens we lost due to contagious diseases, migration, war and clashes during the same period.

Throughout the history, we have always been a nation that shared the sufferings, never discriminating between peoples or pitting them against each other.

Besides our people living on our own lands, we have extended assistance to all those in need of help from Andalusia to Africa, from Southern Asia to Europe.

When doing that, we have never taken into consideration their belief, language, religion, ethnic or cultural identity.

Keeping that heritage as a nation, we strive today to strengthen the brotherhood, empathy, peace and serenity.

To be aware of the sufferings of our Armenian citizens in history and to share these pains is a requirement of the conscientious and moral posture of the Turkish Nation.

God willing, we will continue to share your sufferings and bring solutions to your troubles and problems in the days ahead.

No matter how, we will not tolerate marginalization or discrimination of any of our citizens based on their faith, religion or outlook.

I feel confident that our Armenian citizens will continue to contribute increasingly to our cultural, social, political and commercial life.

As hitherto, I kindly request you to avoid helping those who resort to create hatred, grudge and hostility by distorting our common history.

With these thoughts in my mind, I remember with respect, once again, the Ottoman Armenians whom we lost during the First World War.

I extend my greetings and tribute to all my citizens who joined the memorial ceremony."⁶³

63 "Message Sent by President Erdoğan to the Religious Ceremony Held in the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul on 24 April 2018," *Presidency of the Republic of Turkey*, April 24, 2018, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/92513/message-sent-by-president-erdogan-to-the-religious-ceremony-held-in-the-armenian-patriarchate-of-istanbul-on-24-april-2018>

6. Latest Developments in Turkey-Armenia Relations

After Pashinyan's statement during his Nagorno-Karabakh visit (following his election as the Prime Minister of Armenia on 8 May) that he is ready for relations with Turkey without preconditions, Prime Minister of Turkey Binali Yıldırım responded to his statement on 11 May. Prime Minister Yıldırım stated: "If Armenia is renouncing its hostile approach towards Turkey that it has sustained for years, if it wishes to turn a new page, we will review the relevant details and respond accordingly."⁶⁴

President Erdoğan issued the following call on 8 May; "The TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] archive has been completely opened, it is now ready for research. The Presidential archive has been opened, it is now ready for research. Anyone who has the integrity is welcome [to carry out research]. We have constantly made this call especially upon those who make the so-called Armenian genocide claim. If you have the integrity, please come in, we are opening our archives, and [so] you should open your archives as well."

On the other hand, President Erdoğan issued the following call on 8 May; "The TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] archive has been completely opened, it is now ready for research. The Presidential archive has been opened, it is now ready for research. Anyone who has the integrity is welcome [to carry out research]. We have constantly made this call especially upon those who make the so-called Armenian genocide claim. If you have the integrity, please come in, we are opening our archives, and [so] you should open your archives as well."⁶⁵

During his visit to the UK, President Erdoğan stated the following in his speech on 14 May at the Chatham House think tank regarding Turkey's active foreign policy: "As Turkey,

we support the historical silk road initiative. We support all initiatives for the development and prosperity of Caucasia. The only country missing in this positive picture is Armenia. We are especially awaiting the days when we will see a reasonable approach and commonsense in the administration of Armenia."⁶⁶

64 "Başbakan Yıldırım'dan Ermenistan Başbakanı Paşinyan'a Yanıt," *Hürriyet*, May 11, 2018, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-yildirimdan-ermenistan-basbakani-pasinyana-yanit-40833453>

65 "Erdoğan'dan, Soykırım İddialarına Yanıt: Yüreğiniz Yetiyorsa Buyurun," *HaberTürk*, May 8, 2018, <http://www.haberturk.com/erdogan-dan-soykirim-iddialarina-yanit-yureginiz-yetiyorsa-buyurun-1955469>

66 "Turkey's Regional and Global Vision," *Chatham House*, May 14, 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/turkey-s-regional-and-global-vision>

The Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mnatsakanyan said in a radio interview said that he was for good neighborly relations with Turkey in the name of regional stability, but not the expense of harming special interests.⁶⁷ He said that there are some fundamental issues that the Armenian side did not put forward as preconditions for the normalization of relations with Turkey.

On 27 June, a Turkish delegation attended the Council of Ministers meeting of the Organization of the Black Sea Cooperation held in Yerevan.⁶⁸

The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu personally congratulated Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan on being elected prime minister on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Brussels.⁶⁹

67 “Armenian FM Not Optimistic about Normalization of Relations with Turkey,” *Arminfo*, June 4, 2018, http://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=32187&lang=3

68 Artak Hambardzumian, “Azeri, Turkish Diplomats Attend Regional Meeting In Armenia,” *Azatutyun*, June 27, 2018, www.azatutyun.am/a/29323580.html

69 “Turkish FM Congratulates Nikol Pashinyan on Being Elected Armenia’s PM,” *Armenpress.am*, July 12, 2018, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/940719/>

BIBLIOGRAPGHY

“6th Congress of New Azerbaijan Party held in Baku VIDEO.” *AzerTac*, February 8, 2018. https://azertag.az/en/xeber/6th_Congress_of_New_Azerbaijan_Party_held_in_Baku_VIDEO-1134998

“Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on Artsakh Revival Day and Karabakh Movement 30th Anniversary.” *President of the Republic of Armenia Official Website*, February 20, 2018. <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/02/20/President-Serzh-Sargsyans-address-on-the-30th-anniversary-of-the-Karabakh-movement/>

“Armen Sarkissian Signs EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement.” *Arka News Agency*, April 19, 2018. http://arka.am/en/news/politics/armen_sarkissian_signs_eu_armenia_comprehensive_and_enhanced_partnership_agreement/

“Armen Sarkissian: I Am Only Armenia Citizen since December 2, 2011.” *News.am*, March 1, 2018. <https://news.am/eng/news/438906.html>

“Armenia Celebrates 100th Anniversary of First Republic.” *MassisPost*, May 28, 2018. <http://massispost.com/2018/05/armenia-celebrates-100th-anniversary-of-first-republic/>

“Armenia Parliamentary Majority Nominates Ex-PM For President.” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, February 23, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/armenian-armen-sarkisian-nominated-president/29058838.html>

“Armenia Scraps Zurich Protocols; President Sargsyan Points to Turkish Intransigence.” *Hetq*, March 1, 2018. <http://hetq.am/eng/news/86225/armenia-scraps-zurich-protocols-president-sargsyan-points-to-turkish-intransigence.html>

“Armenia’s Prime Minister Sargsyan Resigns Amid Opposition Protests.” *Sputnik International*, April 23, 2018. <https://sputniknews.com/europe/201804231063824234-sargsyan-resignation/>

- “Armenian FM Not Optimistic about Normalization of Relations with Turkey.” *Arminfo*, June 4, 2018. http://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=32187&lang=3
- “Armenian Protest Leader Pashinian Says PM Serzh Sarkisian Agrees To Meet.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 21, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-protests-pashinian-sarkisian-yerevan/29184296.html>
- “Armenia’s New PM Angers Azerbaijan with Visit to Disputed Region.” *TRT World*, May 9, 2018. www.trtworld.com/europe/armenia-s-new-pm-angers-azerbaijan-with-visit-to-disputed-region-17336
- “Başbakan Yıldırım’dan Ermenistan Başbakanı Paşinyan’a Yanıt.” *Hürriyet*, May 11, 2018. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-yildirimdan-ermenistan-basbakani-pasinyana-yanit-40833453>
- “Dr. Armen Sarkissian Sworn in as President of Armenia.” *Asbarez*, April 9, 2018. <http://asbarez.com/171551/dr-armen-sarkissian-sworn-in-as-president-of-armenia/>
- “Dutch parliament recognizes 1915 Armenian massacre as genocide.” *Reuters*, February 22, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-turkey-armenia/dutch-parliament-recognizes-1915-armenian-massacre-as-genocide-idUSKCN1G62GS>
- “Entrepreneur, diplomat and ex-PM: Who is Armen Sarkissian?” *News.am*, January 19, 2018. <https://news.am/eng/news/431897.html>
- “Erdoğan’dan, Soykırım İddialarına Yanıt: Yüreğiniz Yetiyorsa Buyurun.” *HaberTürk*, May 8, 2018. <http://www.haberturk.com/erdogan-dan-soykirim-iddialarina-yanit-yureginiz-yetiyorsa-buyurun-1955469>
- “Ermenistan, Protokolleri İptal Ettiğini Türkiye’ye Resmen Bildirdi.” *Sputnik Türkiye*, March 15, 2018. <https://tr.sputniknews.com/avrupa/201803151032646019-ermenistan-protokol-iptal-turkiye-resmen-bildirdi/>
- “Ermenistan, Türkiye ile Protokolleri İptal Etti.” *Akşam*, March 1, 2018. <https://www.aksam.com.tr/dunya/ermenistandan-turkiye-ile-protokolleri-iptal-etti/haber-712579>

- “Ermenistan, Zürich Protokollerini Feshetti.” *TRT Haber*, March 1, 2018. <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/ermenistan-zurih-protokollerini-feshetti-353292.html>
- “French President Macron Pledges to Add Armenian Genocide to French Calendar and to One Day Visit Artsakh.” *The Armenian Weekly*, February 1, 2018. <https://armenianweekly.com/2018/02/01/macron-ccaf-2018/>
- “Karabakh Conflict Resolution, End to Turkey Protocols Focus of Sarkisian’s PACE Speech.” *Asbarez*, January 25, 2018. <http://asbarez.com/170020/karabakh-conflict-resolution-end-to-turkey-protocols-focus-of-sarkisians-pace-speech/>
- “Message Sent by President Erdoğan to the Religious Ceremony Held in the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul on 24 April 2018.” *Presidency of the Republic of Turkey*, April 24, 2018. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/92513/message-sent-by-president-erdogan-to-the-religious-ceremony-held-in-the-armenian-patriarchate-of-istanbul-on-24-april-2018>
- “Mogherini to Mnatsakanyan: EU Ready to Assist in Armenia’s Reforms.” *News.am*, June 21, 2018. <https://news.am/eng/news/457899.html>
- “Munich Security Conference: President Sargsyan Stresses Armenia’s Top Foreign, Security Policy Issues.” *ArmenPress*, February 17, 2018. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/923063/munich-security-conference-president-sargsyan-stresses-armenia’s-top-foreign-security-policy-issues.html>
- “Nalbandian, Mogherini Sign Document on Implementation of Priorities of Armenia-EU Partnership.” *ArmenPress*, February 21, 2018. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/923533/nalbandian-mogherini-sign-document-on-implementation-of-priorities-of-armenia-eu-partnership.html>
- “Nikol Pashinyan about Likely Scenario of Velvet Revolution Development in Armenia.” *ARKA News Agency*, April 20, 2018. http://arka.am/en/news/politics/nikol_pashinyan_about_likely_scenario_of_velvet_revolution_development_in_armenia/
- “No: 119, 25 April 2018, Press Release Regarding the Statement by the U.S. President Trump on the 1915 events,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, April 25, 2018. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-119_-abd-baskani-trump-in-1915-olaylarina-iliskin-aciklamasi-hk_en.en.mfa

- “No: 53, 22 February 2018, Press Release Regarding the Decisions of the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the Events of 1915,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, February 22, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_53_hollanda-temsilciler-meclisinin-1915-olaylari-konusunda-aldigi-karar-hk_en.en.mfa
- “Pashinian Visits Karabakh. *For Rights*, May 9, 2018. http://forrights.am/?ln=2&page_id=458&id_=29
- “Pashinyan and Mogherini Meet in Brussels; Stress Importance of Expanding Armenia-EU Relations.” *Hetq*, July 12, 2018. <http://hetq.am/eng/news/91220/pashinyan-and-mogherini-meet-in-brussels-stress-importance-of-expanding-armenia-eu-relations.html>
- “Paşinyan: Karabağ’ın uluslararası çapta tanınması Ermenistan’la birleşmesine yol açabilir.” *Sputnik Türkiye*, May 9, 2018. <https://tr.sputniknews.com/dunya/201805091033373673-pasinyan-karabag-ermenistan/>
- “Political Crisis Deepens in Armenia, Protest Leader Pashinyan Detained.” *Daily Sabah*, April 22, 2018. <https://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2018/04/22/political-crisis-deepens-in-armenia-protest-leader-pashinyan-detained>
- “Republican Party Nominates Armen Sarkissian for Next President of Armenia.” *MassisPost*, January 19, 2018. <https://massispost.com/2018/01/republican-party-nominates-armen-sarkissian-next-president-armenia/>
- “Republicans win majority of seats in Armenian parliament.” *OC Media*, April 3, 2015. <http://oc-media.org/republicans-win-majority-of-seats-in-armenian-parliament/>
- “Russia’s Lavrov Holds ‘Good’ Talks with Armenian FM.” *Azatutyun*, June 7, 2018. <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29278454.html>
- “Russian Foreign Ministry Describes Pashinyan’s Position on Karabakh as ‘Possibly Unconstructive’.” *ARKA News Agency*, June 1, 2018. http://arka.am/en/news/politics/russian_foreign_ministry_describes_pashinyan_s_position_on_karabakh_as_possibly_unconstructive/

- “Sargsyan-Macron meeting kicks off in Paris.” *ArmenPress*, January 23, 2018. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/919956/sargsyan-macron-meeting-kicks-off-in-paris.html>
- “Social Unrest Knocking on Doors in Armenia - Country’s Media.” *AzerNews.am*, January 8, 2018. <https://www.azernews.az/aggression/125154.html>
- “Structure.” *The Government of the Republic of Armenia*, accessed July 25, 2018. www.gov.am/en/structure/
- “Trump’s Commemorative Statement Fails to Properly Characterize Armenian Genocide.” *The Armenian Weekly*, April 24, 2018. <https://armenianweekly.com/2018/04/24/trumps-commemorative-statement-fails-to-properly-characterize-armenian-genocide/>
- “Turkey’s Regional and Global Vision.” *Chatham House*, May 14, 2018. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/turkey-s-regional-and-global-vision>
- “Turkish FM Congratulates Nikol Pashinyan on Being Elected Armenia’s PM.” *Armenpress.am*, July 12, 2018. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/940719/>
- “US Congressmen Call on Trump to Mark April 24 as Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day.” *Armenpress.am*, April 12, 2018. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/929663/us-congressmen-call-on-trump-to-mark-april-24-as-armenian-genocide-commemoration-day.html>
- “Velvet Revolution in Armenia: April-May 2018.” *Human Rights Online*, May 22, 2018. <https://humanrights-online.org/en/velvet-revolution-in-armenia-april-may-2018/>
- “Армения аннулировала армяно-турецкие протоколы.” *Голос Армении*, March 1, 2018. <http://golosarmenii.am/article/63342/armeniya-annulirovala-armyano-tureckie-protokoly>
- “Католикос всех армян: Призываем всех не терять трезвость и разум.” *News.am*, April 19, 2018. <https://news.am/rus/news/447191.html>
- “Мария Захарова прокомментировала последние события в Армении.” *News.am*, April 23, 2018. <https://news.am/rus/news/447897.html>

- “МИД РФ прокомментировал денонсацию армяно-турецких протоколов.”
News.am, March 7, 2018. <https://news.am/rus/news/439998.html>
- “Пашинян: Ты победил, Гордый гражданин Республики Армения.”
News.am, April 23, 2018. <https://news.am/rus/news/447885.html>
- “Президент Армении пришел на площадь Республики.” *News.am*, April 21, 2018. <https://news.am/rus/news/447607.html>
- “Серж Саргсян о митингах в Ереване: Сложно понять, как дальше будут развиваться события.” *News.am*, April 19, 2018.
<https://news.am/rus/news/447274.html>
- “Фракция ‘Выход’ выдвинула кандидатуру Никола Пашиняна на пост премьер-министра Армении.” *News.am*, April 30, 2018.
<https://news.am/rus/news/448940.html>
- “Фракция «Выход» выдвинула кандидатуру Никола Пашиняна на пост премьер-министра Армении.” *News.am*, April 30, 2018.
<https://news.am/rus/news/448940.html>
- “Эммануэль Макрон о Геноциде армян: Не забудем никогда.” *News.am*, April 24, 2018. <https://news.am/rus/news/447978.html>
- Antidze, Margarita and Hasmik Mkrtchyan. “Protest Leader Nikol Pashinian Elected Prime Minister Of Armenia.” *Huffington Post*, May 8, 2018.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/armenia-prime-minister-election_us_5af17239e4b0c4f193267607
- Carroll, Oliver. “Armenian President Says He Is ‘ready to Stand between Police and Protesters’.” *The Independent*, May 4, 2018.
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/armenia-president-protests-police-name-violence-interview-anti-government-a8336661.html>
- Chilingaryan, Anahit. “Protests Surge in Armenia.” *Human Rights Watch*. April 18, 2018. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/16/protests-surge-armenia>
- de Waal, Thomas. “Armenia’s Revolution and the Karabakh Conflict.” *Carnegie Europe*, May 22, 2018.
<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/76414>
- Gabrielian, Sisak. “Pashinian Urges End To Protests In Karabakh.” *Azatatuyun*, June 4, 2018. www.azatatuyun.am/a/29270933.html

Galstyan, Hrant. "Does Armen Sarkissian Qualify as Armenia's Next President? British Documents Raise Armenian Citizenship Doubt." *Hetq*, February 8, 2018. <http://hetq.am/eng/news/85625/does-armen-sarkissian-qualify-as-armenias-next-president-british-documents-raise-armenian-citizenship-doubt.html>

Ghukasyan, Seda. "Pashinyan's March to Yerevan: "We Have No Plans of Going Home." *Hetq*, April 10, 2018. <http://hetq.am/eng/news/87276/pashinyans-march-to-yerevan-we-have-no-plans-of-going-home.html>

Hambardzumian, Artak. "Azeri, Turkish Diplomats Attend Regional Meeting In Armenia." *Azatutyun*, June 27, 2018. www.azatutyun.am/a/29323580.html

Khojjoyan, Sara. "Armenia Risks Further Unrest After Protest Leader Is Rejected as PM." *Bloomberg.com*, May 01, 2018. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-01/armenian-parliament-fails-to-elect-protest-leader-as-premier>

Kucera, Joshua. "Pashinyan and Putin Hold First Meeting, Pledge to Build Closer Ties." *Eurasianet*, May 14, 2018. <https://eurasianet.org/s/pashinyan-and-putin-hold-first-meeting-pledge-to-build-closer-ties>

ARTICLE CATEGORY: OTHER / MAKALE TÜRÜ: DİĞER

To cite this article: Lütem, Ömer Engin and Yiğit Alpogan. "Review Essay: Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide." *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 37 (2018).

Submission Date: 23.05.2018

Acceptance Date: 26.06.2018

REVIEW ESSAY: KILLING ORDERS: TALAT PASHA'S TELEGRAMS AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

(DEĞERLENDİRME YAZISI: ÖLDÜRME EMİRLERİ:
TALAT PAŞA'NIN TELGRAFLARI VE ERMENİ SOYKIRIMI)

Ömer Engin LÜTEM*
Yiğit ALPOGAN**

Taner Akçam, *Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 261.

In his recently published book "*Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide*", Taner Akçam contends that the telegrams and letters that were published 98 years ago by Aram Andonian and which are attributed to several high-ranking Ottoman officials, particularly the Ottoman Minister of the Interior Talat Pasha, are in fact genuine and authentic. Akçam's book at hand is the revised English translation of his Turkish-language book *Naim Efendi'nin Hatıratı ve Talat Paşa Telgrafları* (*The Memoirs of Naim Efendi and Talat Pasha Telegrams*) that was published in 2016.¹

* Honorary President, Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM)

** ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1967-4331>
Advisor, Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM), yalpogan@avim.org.tr

1 For that book, the Honorary President of the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM), Ömer Engin Lütem, had penned an extensive article analyzing Akçam's Turkish-language book: Ömer Engin Lütem, "An Assessment On Aram Andonian, Naim Efendi And Talat Pasha Telegrams," *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 34 (2016), p. 129-156. Many of the points that had been raised by Lütem for that book are almost entirely applicable to the revised English translation book as well. However, as Lütem unfortunately passed away on January 2018, I have taken upon the task of updating Lütem's analysis for the revised English translation book. In order to properly credit the previous work carried out by Ömer Engin Lütem, his name has been listed as one of the authors as well for this article.

Akçam's main argument is based on the assertion that the book *The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?*, which was published in 1983 by Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca (the English version of this book is titled *The Talât Pasha Telegrams: Historical fact or Armenian fiction?*) and which examined the documents in detail and concluded that they must be forged, is full of errors and that the charges leveled against Aram Andonian and the documents themselves are unjustified.

In addition, the materials published by Andonian and Akçam are actually photographs of photographs. We thus lack the originals of the all the disputed documents and texts. It is therefore not possible to subject them to a forensic examination either. Thus, Akçam's impassioned efforts to authenticate the documents are tenuous at best.

Contrary to Orel's and Yuca's claims, Akçam argues that there was an Ottoman official by the name of Naim Efendi and that it was actually him who provided Andonian with the documents in question. Moreover, according to Akçam, the memoirs published by Andonian were personally written by Naim Efendi. In order to buttress his claims, Akçam refers to three "archival documents" which he falsely characterizes as "Ottoman Archival Documents." Furthermore, Akçam annexed to his book the text of memoirs which he claims to have been written by Naim Efendi and which he found in the private papers of Krikor Guerguerian. According to Akçam, Krikor

Guerguerian found these memoirs in the Boghos Nubar Library in Paris and copied them by photographing.

It is necessary to remind readers at this point that there is actually no indication whatsoever (such as a name, signature, paraph, dates etc.) on the text of the memoirs, demonstrating that these memoirs were in fact written by Naim Efendi. Furthermore, even if the memoirs were in fact written by Naim Efendi, there is no information on whether changes were subsequently made on the text or whether the text was edited by someone or some people. It is also necessary to point out that there are no available samples of the handwriting of Naim Efendi other than the text produced by Akçam. It is therefore impossible to compare the handwritings. In addition, the materials published by Andonian and Akçam are actually photographs of photographs. We thus lack the originals of the all the disputed documents and texts. It is therefore not possible to subject them to a forensic examination either. Thus, Akçam's impassioned efforts to authenticate the documents are tenuous at best.

A more interesting point is that the text published by Akçam as the "memoirs of Naim Efendi" does not actually resemble the "memoirs" that historians

know of. The so-called “memoirs” do not provide a narrative of Naim Efendi’s role inside the events, contain no dialogues with others, and do not cover events in a sequential-chronological manner. Perhaps the strangest of all, the “memoirs” do not contain any biographical information on Naim Efendi himself and his occupation, or the post he was serving at.

Classically, a memoir would provide some biographical data on its author and the author’s place inside the events and would provide plenty of details about his/her interactions with other persons involved in the events covered by the memoirs. Unfortunately, the text offered by Akçam as “Naim Efendi’s Memoirs” does none of these. The “memoirs” merely provide a text that is alleged to be official correspondences between various state officials and include occasional commentaries on these correspondences. Moreover, the events are presented in a completely haphazard manner as the text does not follow a chronological order. For instance, telegrams dated September 1915 are provided following telegrams dated January 1916, and this continues to be the case throughout the text of the so-called memoirs. Again, a telegram dated February 1917 is followed by other telegrams dated 1915 and 1916. Moreover, throughout the text, there is no indication on what Naim Efendi’s duty was and where he served. In this respect, as mentioned above, the text do not resemble the texts of standard memoirs, and give the impression of a custom-made work that would serve a specific agenda.

The text published by Akçam is also strikingly different from the text of the memoirs published by Andonian in 1920. For instance, while the text published by Andonian contains statements about the places and positions in which Naim Efendi served, no such statements are contained in the text published by Akçam. Thus, the obvious suspicion which arises is that the text might have been changed by Andonian (and by the Armenian Bureau in London and the Armenian National Delegations in Paris who made changes on the text as mentioned by Andonian in one of his letters) in line with their interests. However, as Akçam is completely taken in with the authenticity of Andonian narrative and published documents, he does not even consider and discuss this possibility. Akçam cannot bring himself to question and critically analyze the accuracy of Andonian’s narrative and insists that Andonian’s narrative must be the sole truth. In order to explain discrepancy between the two texts, Akçam makes the assumption that there must be still another “memoir text” in addition to the one he published and Andonian must have published that other text and this would explain why there actually two different texts. However, Akçam fails to provide any indication, let alone evidence, supporting this possibility. As a matter of fact, it is actually this approach by Akçam that constitutes the book’s main problem. In fact, in cases where there is no evidence to prove the authenticity of these documents, Akçam

consistently tries to explain away inconsistencies and suspicions by making one assumption on top of another assumption.

It would be useful to remind readers that Andonian's explanations and comments, made on different dates, about the same events and people do not always conform and even frequently contradict each other. It is therefore extremely problematic to unquestioningly take Andonian's statements at face value and accept them as departing points. For instance, Andonian depicted the so-called Naim Efendi as a kind-hearted and charitable person, and wrote that Naim Efendi, despite his poor financial situation, provided him with these documents without expecting anything in return simply to ease his own conscience.² However, in a letter he wrote in 1937, he describes Naim Efendi as "an alcoholic and gambler" and "an entirely dissolute creature", and states that the documents were acquired from Naim Efendi in return for money.³

Similarly, Andonian, in his letter dated 1937, claims that the authenticity of the documents he published were confirmed by the German Court in Berlin in 1921 during the trial of Soghomon Tehlirian who had assassinated Talat Pasha. However, when the proceedings of the court are checked, it can be seen that this is not the case. According to the court proceedings, despite Tehlirian's attorney's request to submit five documents from Andonian to the court, it is seen that he dropped his request following German prosecutor's objections. According to the prosecutor, it was not for the court to decide whether Talat Pasha was guilty or not, and such determination necessitated a historical research. This effort necessitated the examination of materials different from those that were present. According to the prosecutor, the fact that the accused Tehlirian had been convinced of Talat Pasha's guilt was sufficient in terms of revealing Tehlirian's intention to murder him. In the face of these objections, Tehlirian's attorney Adolf von Gordon abandoned the request to submit the documents to the court.⁴ Furthermore, during the trial in Berlin, the prosecutor had a distanced and reserved approach towards these documents, and had taken into consideration the possibility that they could be forged:

"The use of the forged documents cannot also lead me into error... I am familiar with the history of how, in the chaos of the revolution, we came to possess documents bearing the signatures of high ranking individuals, and how it was subsequently proved that they were forged."⁵

2 Şinasi Orel ve Süreyya Yuca, *Ermenilerce Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların Gerçek Yüzü* (Ankara Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), p. 7.

3 Orel & Yuca, *Ermenilerce Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 8.

4 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2007), p. 66 ; Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 18

5 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 19.

At this juncture, it should be stated that these comments by the prosecutor were legitimate observations. Indeed, at the end of the First World War, several groups, including foreign intelligence services, ambitiously embarked on a quest to find documents in order to accuse and try the Union and Progress Government. As mentioned by a British intelligence officer, this state of affairs had created “a very large market” of salable documents and had resulted in the “regular production of forgeries for the purposes of sale.”⁶ Ultimately, the authenticity of the documents was not in any way verified by the Court.

It could be concluded from these instances that Aram Andonian did not always tell the truth. Therefore, it would be appropriate for serious historians to approach Andonian's words with a degree of caution. Taking Andonian's allegations at face value without making any verification is problematic from the point of view of historical methodology. However, Akçam, in his book, accepts the claims of the Naim-Andonian narrative without any questions and forms his arguments based on a set of assumptions.

Akçam also faults Orel and Yuca for claiming that the encrypted telegrams published by Andonian do not match with the encryption techniques and number groups used by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior, and that therefore these telegrams should be considered fake. Furthermore, Akçam claims that the objections raised by Orel and Yuca regarding the type of paper used in Andonian's documents are completely groundless. Giving several examples about these objections, Akçam concludes that both the type of paper and “the encryption techniques found in the telegraphic cables that Naim sold to Andonian are the same as those used by the Ottoman Government” and that these instances do not actually “bring into question their authenticity, but instead confirms it” (p. 100-101). In addition, Akçam also takes issues with Orel and Yuca's claims that the signatures, allegedly belonging to Governor of Aleppo Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey, contained on Naim-Andonian documents were fake by providing some other samples of the governor's signatures. Stretching the issue further, Akçam further claims that inconsistent dates used on Naim-Andonian documents cannot be considered as a basis for claiming that the documents should be fake and concludes that they must be, to the contrary, be considered as indications of their authenticity (p. 102-114).

In a follow-up chapter following these polemics, Akçam claims that certain events and individuals mentioned in the “memoirs” of Naim

6 Lewy, *A Disputed Genocide*, p. 49.

Efendi and in the documents published by Andonian can be found in Ottoman archival documents. Accordingly, on the basis of these similarities, Akçam concludes that these documents must be authentic (p. 123-163).

The substance of Akçam's assertions and the method and evidence he uses in the support these assertions will be examined in detail below. However, before proceeding to a detailed examination of these claims, an important problem concerning Akçam's book must be highlighted. Throughout his book, when presenting and summarizing the findings of Orel and Yuca in their studies about Andonian's documents, Akçam consistently oversimplifies, misrepresents, and distorts these findings and attributes false assertions and opinions to Orel and Yuca that were never raised by them to begin with. He then attempts to refute these assertions that he claims were made by Orel and Yuca, and based on this, he concludes that the study by Orel and Yuca are unreliable and full of mistakes. Through such shrewd manipulations, he concludes that objections raised by Orel and Yuca about the forged nature of Naim-Andonian documents are not insignificant and can be "easily refuted."

It is possible that some of Akçam's claims might impress readers who are not familiar with Orel and Yuca's work and the debate, and who find out about the objections concerning the authenticity of these documents only through Akçam's misrepresentations. However, readers who personally read Orel and Yuca's work will see that many of Akçam's accusations are both unfair and inaccurate. By taking these reservations into consideration as well as analyzing Akçam's contentions in some detail, this review article aims to provide readers with a more balance perspective on the Naim-Andonian documents.

The Existence of Naim Bey

Akçam, at the very beginning of his book, refers to arguments about whether the documents published by Aram Andonian are authentic and whether Naim Bey who is claimed to have provided these documents to Andonian was a real person. According to Akçam, the claims by Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca may be summarized as follows:

"The authors based their claims on three main arguments: (1) It was unlikely that there was an individual by the name of Naim Efendi; (2) a non-existent person cannot write a memoir, and such memoir cannot therefore exist; (3) the telegraphic cables attributed to Talat Pasha were falsified. They thus concluded that both the memoirs and the documents

are forgeries perpetrated by Armenians, most likely by Andonian himself.”(p. 36)

The striking problem here is the presentation of the arguments of Orel and Yuca in such a grossly inaccurate and oversimplified manner. To begin with, Orel and Yuca did not in any way allege that “it was unlikely that there was an individual by the name of Naim Efendi” and that “a non-existent person cannot write a memoir, and such memoir cannot therefore exist.” According to Orel and Yuca, there might be different possibilities on this issue. However, given the limited knowledge available on the issue, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusive judgement. In discussing whether there was actually an official by the name of Naim Efendi, Orel and Yuca provide the following discussion:

The striking problem here is the presentation of the arguments of Orel and Yuca in such a grossly inaccurate and oversimplified manner. [...] According to Orel and Yuca, there might be different possibilities on this issue. However, given the limited knowledge available on the issue, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusive judgement.

“...it can be said that there are three possibilities regarding Naim Bey:

- a) Naim Bey is a fictitious person.
- b) Naim Bey is an assumed name.
- c) Naim Bey is an actual person.

In these circumstances, it seems impossible to make a definite judgement on whether Naim Bey was an actual person or not. [emphasis added] The only point which can be made with certainty is that if Naim Bey actually existed, he was undoubtedly an unimportant official. Indeed, Andonian confirms this in his letter of 26 July 1937, where he writes:

‘Naim Bey was an entirely insignificant official...’⁷

As might be seen above, Orel and Yuca clearly state that in the light of available information, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusive judgement on the subject. However, if an official by the name of Naim Bey indeed existed, they reach the conviction that he must have been a very low-ranking official who would not have had access to top secret documents.

7 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 23-24.

Having misrepresented the arguments of Orel and Yuca, Akçam then proceeds to refute the claims he falsely attributed to Orel and Yuca. Referring to three different documents (which he presents as “Ottoman Documents”) that mention an official by the name of Naim Efendi, Akçam attempts to give the impression that one of the basic arguments of Orel and Yuca was incorrect and that he thus proved Orel and Yuca wrong. This attempt of course remains desperately unconvincing when one checks the original account of Orel and Yuca.

Furthermore, it is rather problematic, to say the least, to present the three documents Akçam refers to as “Ottoman Archival Documents”, since one of these documents is actually a document published by Aram Andonian -the authenticity of which is under doubt. Incredibly, Akçam attempts to validate the controversial Naim-Andonian documents by referring to Naim-Andonian documents themselves. The other two documents referred by Akçam are also unpublished Naim-Andonian documents that are preserved in the Andonian Collection contained in the Nubar Library in Paris. These are not Ottoman archival documents. Thus, Akçam uses one set of Naim-Andonian documents to authenticate another set of Naim-Andonian documents, and in the process misrepresents these documents as “Ottoman Archival Documents”.

Another source utilized by Akçam to prove that Naim Efendi was a real person is a document⁸ that makes a reference to an official by the name of Naim Efendi. The document itself is the testimony of a former dispatch officer named Naim Effendi and his testimony was required for his involvement in a corruption case that took place in the region.

Before proceeding to the testimony itself, the document provides a brief description of the official named Naim Efendi:

“The testimony of Hüseyin Nuri’s son Naim Effendi, 26, from Silifke, married, the former dispatch officer at Maskanah, currently employed as the grain cellar official of the municipality. (November 14-15, 1916).”⁹

In his book, Aram Andonian mentioned that the individual whom he refers to as Naim Bey had at one point served at Maskanah. For this reason, there is a possibility that the Naim Efendi mentioned in the testimony could be the same

8 Contained within the seventh volume of the document collection titled *Armenian Activities According to Archive Documents (Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri)* published by the Directorate of Military History and Strategic Research (ATASE) of the Turkish General Staff in 2007: T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Arşiv Belgelerinde Ermeni Faaliyetleri, Cilt VII*. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt (ATASE) Başkanlığı Yayınları (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2007).

9 T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Arşiv Belgelerinde Ermeni Faaliyetleri, Cilt VII*, p. 264.

person as Andonian's Naim Bey. However, there is no evidence or indication to verify that these two individuals are one and the same person. Furthermore, as Orel and Yuca indicates, serious question marks exist as to how an individual who was a minor civil servant in a small district such as Maskanah and who had been dismissed shortly afterwards from his duty on charges of corruption could have gotten his hands on top secret communications between the Minister of the Interior and the Governor.¹⁰

According to Akçam, Naim Efendi served in Aleppo as the head clerk of the Director-General of Dispatches, Abdülhad Nuri Bey, and it was through this position that he might have obtained the documents. However, apart from the narrative of Naim-Andonian book itself, there is no evidence to indicate that Naim Efendi served in this position. The only source about this is the sentence attributed Andonian to Naim Efendi: "I have been appointed to the head clerk position of Abdülhalad Nuri Bey," allegedly uttered by Naim Efendi after he came to Aleppo. Apart from the sentence quoted above, no evidence has so far surfaced to verify this sentence. The text of the memoir published by Akçam also does not contain any statement or information in this direction.¹¹

Serious problems arise even if we assume that the Naim-Andonian narrative is accurate, since according to the document published by ATESE, as of November 1916, the individual named Naim Efendi's duty was that of a municipal grain cellar officer. The explanation based on this assumption would have made sense to a certain extent if the documents published in the Naim Efendi collection covered events only before this date. However, the Naim-Andonian documents and the so-called memoirs of Naim Efendi cover a period until February 1917. Then remains the critical question of how Naim Efendi, as a municipal grain cellar officer, could he have obtained the alleged top secret communication between the governor and the minister of the interior? This question becomes even more critical when one considers that Naim Efendi's testimony on allegations of corruption was taken during the dates in question. Starting from November 1916, Naim Efendi served in a position in which, unequivocally, he could not have reached the mentioned correspondences. Also, due to the charges of corruption, he must be viewed with skepticism as someone unreliable whose statements was quite difficult to be believed in. We must accept that, under normal circumstances, it would not be expected for such an official to have access to the correspondence in question. However; Akçam, by making one assumption on top of another

10 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 11-12.

11 For the full text of the alleged "memoirs", see Appendix A in: Taner Akçam, *Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 176-196.

assumption, takes the Naim-Andonian narrative entirely at face value and finds entirely plausible that Naim Efendi would have access to these documents during aforementioned dates and reaches the conclusion that his memoirs must be authentic.

In conclusion, Akçam misrepresents Orel and Yuca's arguments concerning Naim Efendi and attributes assertions to Orel and Yuca which were never advanced by them to begin with. Subsequently, Akçam attempts to refute these false claims never made by Orel and Yuca by referring to a single document mentioning a certain "Naim Efendi". Only through a great deal of twisting and misquoting, Akçam arrives at the dubious conclusion that the findings of Orel and Yuca are entirely wrong. When one checks the original account of Orel and Yuca, Akçam's contentions (which may impress readers who are not familiar with the debate) remain rather trivial and insignificant. In addition to these issues, Akçam, by unquestioningly accepting the entire Naim-Andonian narrative, assumes that the official named "Naim Efendi" was all omnipotent to reach every relevant information and correspondence. Given problems summarized above, it seems clear that Akçam's assumptions stand on very shaky ground.

Ciphering Techniques

A significant portion of Akçam's book is devoted to the encrypted telegrams used by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior. In their work, Orel and Yuca argued that the number groups used for ciphering in Naim-Andonian telegrams do not conform to the number groups used in the telegrams of the Ottoman Archives, and that these number groups were constantly changed at certain time intervals for security reasons while Naim-Andonian telegrams use the same ciphers in a period spanning over two years. In the relevant section of his book, Akçam claims that the encrypted telegrams used two, three, four, and five-digit number groups at the same time and in a mixed way throughout the war. On the basis of his findings, Akçam argues that Orel and Yuca's claims concerning encryption methods of the Ottoman Interior Ministry "are entirely incorrect and are without any material basis" (p. 79).

In order buttress his contentions, Akçam refers to a number of archival documents. In 1983, Orel and Yuca noted that in the documents they found during their research, the two, four, and five-digit numbers were used at certain times and were regularly changed during the war. In this respect, the telegrams using three-digit numbers found by Akçam is a new information.

It would be necessary to remind readers at this point that Naim-Andonian documents contains a number of telegrams using two and three-digit ciphers in the alleged correspondence between the governor of Aleppo and the Ottoman minister of the interior. Relying on the existence of two and three digit numbers used for encryption amongst the documents he found at the archives, Akçam arrives at the conclusion that the documents published by Andonian and the Ottoman Archival documents conform to each other and that there is no discrepancy between them (p. 78-96).

Despite this new piece of information provided by Akçam, there is an important issue that needs to be taken into consideration here. Documents utilized and the facsimiles of which have been published by Orel and Yuca are composed of telegrams sent from the center to the provinces. However, all documents referenced by Akçam in his book (he uses the facsimiles of some of them as well) were sent from the provinces and various commissions in the provinces to the center, thus to the Ministry of the Interior (p. 78-96). This situation will only gain clarity if all the numbers used in ciphered telegrams to the Aleppo Province from the Ministry of the Interior are analyzed in their entirety. Furthermore, as can be understood from telegram numbers in the archives, the telegrams sent from the provinces to the center and used in Akçam's book had not yet been classified at the time of Orel and Yuca's work, and were documents that were classified and made available to the readers later on. That is to say, during the period in which Orel and Yuca conducted their research, they might not have had the opportunity to examine these documents. As such, this issue should not be overlooked when criticizing Orel and Yuca's work. A more crucial problem with Akçam's handling of the encrypted telegrams is his complete lack of understanding concerning the occasions in which the two or three-digit numbers used for encrypting a telegram. These instances are typically occasions where personal encryption codes were given to high-ranking civil or military officials (such as inspectors) to communicate with the center on issues including, but not limited to, dismissal or criticism of the provincial or district governors. In such circumstances, the official in question needed to use an encryption different from the provincial authorities so as to relay their judgement and criticism to the center without any concern that their communication might be read by the provincial authorities themselves. Akçam completely misses this point. In fact, this point becomes clearer if one considers the fact that all of the correspondence between the governor of Aleppo and Ministry of the Interior uses four or five-digit numbers for encryption. Akçam fails to provide a single sample telegram from the correspondence between the governor of Aleppo and Ottoman Ministry of the Interior using three or two-digit groups.

In addition, digit groups were not the only source of doubts concerning the authenticity of the encrypted telegrams contained in Naim-Andonian documents. In Naim-Andonian documents, one can see that “two-digit” and “three-digit” numbers are used in the same document in a manner that belies logic and encryption methods. For instances, although the telegram dated 29 September 1915, attributed by Andonian to Minister of the Interior Talat Bey, was written with an encryption code composed of three-digit numbers; the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh lines of the telegram contain two-digit numbers for encryption.¹² Likewise, the telegram dated 26 December 1915, attributed to Abdülhad Nuri Bey and composed of with two-digit numbers for encryption on the whole, contains three-digit numbers in the first, eleventh, and fourteenth lines.¹³ Similarly, the telegram dated 20 March 1916 attributed again to Talat Bey, although consisting of three-digit numbers, contains two-digit numbers in its sixth line.¹⁴

Using both two-digit and three-digit number groups in the same telegram necessitates two separate encryption keys for the decoding of a telegram. Yet, as Orel and Yuca underlines, the decoding of such a telegram is not possible due to encryption techniques. In none of the authentic telegrams for which Akçam gives examples (he provides facsimiles for some of the telegrams) in his book based on the Ottoman Archive is there a similar case, meaning that a three-digit encryption used alongside with a two-digit number in the text of the same telegram. Akçam fully overlooks this obvious and striking discrepancy between the authentic documents in the Ottoman Archive and Naim-Andonian documents, and argues that there is no contradiction and discrepancy between them. He then claims that Naim-Andonian documents could be authentic. Significantly, there is simply no archival telegram with different digit numbers being used within the same text including in those which were provided by none other than Akçam in his book. One can thus conclude that there is a serious difference between the Naim-Andonian Documents and the Ottoman Archival documents that begs explanation. Yet Akçam simply ignores this crucial discrepancy.

The Use of Lined Papers

According to Akçam, one of Orel and Yuca’s main assertions to conclude that Naim-Andonian documents were forgeries was “has to do with the paper on

12 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 74-75.

13 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 59.

14 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 65-66.

which they are written. They claim that the fact that one of them is written on lined paper is proof of it being a forgery” (p. 98). Akçam goes on to quote Orel and Yuca as stating the following in their book:

“One of these ‘documents’ was written on a piece of paper bearing the document number 76 but does not bear any official mark. Such a piece of paper, which more greatly resembles the type used in calligraphic lessons at French schools, cannot be expected to be found in use as official stationery in Ottoman [administrative] offices.”(p. 98)

This is a classic example of how Akçam practices deception. In the above quote, Akçam allegedly quotes Orel and Yuca verbatim, presenting their text in an indented quote. Yet he leaves out inconvenient parts of their argument and does so without giving the readers any indication such as ellipsis “(…)” to indicate that he left out parts of the text. Considering his previously-demonstrated questionable conduct, this is a deliberate attempt to manipulate what Orel and Yuca said in the first instance. In the original text, Orel and Yuca’s objection regarding paper type center on the fact that the paper used was “double lined.” Yet Akçam entirely left out this part of their objections. This is what Orel and Yuca actually wrote:

This is a classic example of how Akçam practices deception. In the above quote, Akçam allegedly quotes Orel and Yuca verbatim, presenting their text in an indented quote. Yet he leaves out inconvenient parts of their argument and does so without giving the readers any indication such as ellipsis “(…)” to indicate that he left out parts of the text. Considering his previously-demonstrated questionable conduct, this is a deliberate attempt to manipulate what Orel and Yuca said in the first instance.

“Among the ‘documents’, the one numbered 76 was written on a double lined paper [emphasis added] and one that does not bear any official signs. It cannot be expected that a paper that rather looks like the type used in calligraphy classes in French schools to be in use in Ottoman [administrative] offices as official papers.”¹⁵

In Akçam’s version, Orel and Yuca’s objections concerning the double-lined paper are deliberately left out even though the text is presented as a verbatim quote. In his subsequent discussions, Akçam distorts Orel and Yuca’s objections and claims that Orel and Yuca objected to single-lined papers and this claim

15 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 60.

has no basis in fact and that it was certainly odd for Yuca and Orel to make that assertion:

“The authors’ judgment that lined paper ‘cannot be expected to be found in use as official stationary in Ottoman [administrative] offices’ and their use of this fact as evidence of forgery is simply incomprehensible. Lined paper was in fact used within the Ottoman bureaucracy during the period in question...”(p. 97)

Following this, Akçam notes that lined papers were used quite often in the Ottoman Archives and he refers to a numbers of documents from the Ottoman Archive using lined papers. After all these arguments, Akçam arrives at the following bold conclusion:

“As will be understood below, Orel and Yuca’s claim is entirely wrong that the lined paper found in one of Naim’s documents proves it to be a forgery. Encrypted correspondence was not smooth or straight, so using lined paper provided a useful foundation for such. Thus, the fact that one of the documents provided by Naim was on lined paper does nothing to prove that it is a forgery—on the contrary, it far more shows it to be authentic.”(p. 98)


However, as indicated above, Akçam distorts here another important objection of Orel and Yuca concerning the Naim-Andonian documents by twisting their words and arguments. In their work, Orel and Yuca do not in any way claim that “a telegram written on a lined paper” is the “proof” that it must have been forged. As will be elaborated in more detail below, Orel and Yuca’s main objection is based on the fact that this document was written on a “double lined paper” that “bears no official inscription.”

Orel and Yuca raised no objection to the single lined papers that were used as a standard in the encrypted telegrams. When one examines the documents used in Orel and Yuca’s work (in which they even provided the facsimiles of these documents), Akçam’s assertion became grotesque, placing Akçam in an embarrassing position. A perusal of Orel and Yuca’s study makes it clear that the encrypted telegrams that Orel and Yuca obtained from the archive (and produced exact photos of) are written on single lined papers.

In line with this, telegrams dated 26 August 1915 and 11 December 1915 that were sent by the Minister of the Interior Talat to certain *sanjaks* (sub-divisions of provinces) that were published by Orel and Yuca in their books should constitute good example for this:


Document 1

The copy of the ciphered telegram which was written on official “single lined” paper dated 26 August 1915 that was published by Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca in page 77 in their book. This telegram was sent by Minister of the Interior Talat Bey to Lieutenant Governorship of Çanakkale.



Document 2

The copy of the ciphered telegram which was written on official “single lined” paper dated 11 December 1915 that was published by Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca in page 78 in their book. This telegram was sent by Minister of the Interior Talat Bey to Lieutenant Governorship of Karahisar-ı Sahip (Afyon).



As can be seen in authentic telegrams that are taken from Orel and Yuca’s book, Orel and Yuca themselves published documents containing telegrams that were written on single lined papers. The objection of Orel and Yuca on this issue is not about the papers being single lined as might be seen from the following passage: “among the ‘documents’, the one numbered 76 was written on double lined paper that contains no official inscription”¹⁶ [emphasis added]

Thus Orel and Yuca’s words make it clear that what they objected was the use of “double lined papers,” and more importantly, the paper’s “lack of any official inscription” in contrast to Ottoman Archival documents. Akçam completely ignores the objection concerning the lack of any official inscription on Naim-Andonian documents and makes no comment on this point. In addition, by

16 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 60.

distorting Orel and Yuca's objection concerning "double lined paper", Akçam argues that they, instead, claimed that "lined paper" was not used by the Ottoman bureaucracy. Only through distorting and twisting the arguments of Orel and Yuca is Akçam able to arrive at the conclusion that their arguments are "incomprehensible" and "entirely wrong."

However, as can be seen in the copies of the telegrams presented above, Orel and Yuca do not object to the single lined papers, and they even published documents written on single lined papers. Akçam here first distorts Orel and Yuca's arguments, then attempts to refute these false arguments that were never advanced by Orel and Yuca to begin with. Within such confusion, Akçam overlooks and tries to hide away Orel and Yuca's objections about the papers being "double lined" and about the absence of official inscriptions on these papers unlike the authentic Ottoman Archival Documents.

Telegram Numbers

In 1983, Orel and Yuca drew attention to the fact that the telegrams amongst the Naim-Andonian documents are different from the Ottoman Archival documents in terms of telegram numbers as well. According to Orel and Yuca, there is absolutely no relation whatsoever between the telegram numbers used in the Naim-Andonian documents and the heading numbers of the authentic telegrams (contained in the Ottoman Archive) that were sent on the same date. Thus the heading numbers that are used in the Naim-Andonian documents and Ottoman Archival documents contain great discrepancies. Furthermore, there is no record on Naim-Andonian documents in the incoming-outgoing documents log of the Aleppo Province. Amongst the telegrams that are present in the Ottoman Archive, even though from time to time one comes across telegrams that were sent during the same time as the Naim-Andonian telegrams, it can be seen clearly that both in terms of the telegram numbers and their contents, these two sets of telegrams are completely different from each other.

According to Akçam, Orel and Yuca were wrong with their assertions on this subject. According to Akçam, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior Talat Bey had had installed a telegram machine in his own house, and from time to time communicated with governors through it and sent telegrams to provinces from his house. Again, according to Akçam, it is impossible to know what kind of heading numbers was used in these telegrams that were sent from the house of the Minister of the Interior (p. 76-77). Therefore, according to Akçam, the discrepancy exhibited by the Naim-Andonian documents' numbers with that

of the archival documents is not a proof of the Naim-Andonian documents' being forgeries.

First of all, again with no evidence, Akçam makes the assumption that all Naim-Andonian documents were sent from the house of Minister of the Interior Talat Bey. Both in the explanations made by Andonian about the documents, and in the text of the "memoirs" alleged to have belonged to Naim Efendi, there is simply no indication that the telegrams were sent from Talat Bey's house. On the contrary, it is clearly indicated that these documents were sent from the Office of Ministry of the Interior (*Dâhiliye Nezareti Celilesine*). Additionally, the wording of the telegrams leaves no room for doubt that the telegrams from Aleppo to the center were sent to the Office of the Ministry of the Interior, and they include no indication such as "Addressed to Minister of the Interior Talat Bey" (*Dâhiliye Nazırı Talat Beyefendi'ye*) to suggest that they were sent out to his private house.

Under these circumstances, the argument that the entire correspondence must have been sent out from Talat Bey's private house is an exercise in stretching the argument beyond logic and to do so merely on the basis of assumptions and without any evidence shows Akçam's impassioned attitude in considering the documents' authenticity.

Additionally, the inconsistency regarding the heading numbers given to the telegrams are not only valid for the ones alleged to have been sent from the Ministry of the Interior to the Aleppo Province. The same inconsistency is also visible in the telegrams alleged to have been sent from Aleppo to the Ministry of the Interior. Amongst the Naim-Andonian documents, the telegram attributed to Adbülhad Nuri Bey numbered 76 and dated 7 March 1332 (20 March 1916) is the most striking example. According to the Rumi Calendar used by the administrative system of the Ottoman bureaucracy, the new year starts at 1 March 1332 (14 March 1916). Accordingly, in order for the telegram attributed to Adbülhad Nuri Bey to be numbered 76, he would have had to send 76 ciphered telegrams to Istanbul between the dates 1-7 March 1332 (14-20 March 1916), meaning in just seven days.¹⁷ In this regard, the inconsistency on the heading numbers in the Naim-Andonian telegrams are valid for both the telegrams sent from Ministry of the Interior to Aleppo, and the ones sent from Aleppo to the Ministry. In the relevant section of his book dealing with this question, Akçam once again completely overlooks this and does not provide any plausible explanation for the telegrams sent out from Aleppo province to the center.

17 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 60.

Similarity with Ottoman Documents

An important portion of Akçam's book is devoted to the efforts to prove the presence of similarities between the memoirs allegedly belonging to Naim Efendi and the Ottoman archival documents. In this respect, the author gives ten separate examples in order to prove his argument that there are great similarities between what is being told in the memoirs of Naim Efendi and the events that actually took place as recorded by the Ottoman archival documents. On the basis of this, the author arrives at the conclusion that the so-called memoirs and the documents must be genuine and authentic. It is not possible to reach a judgment on the veracity of Akçam's arguments without individually examining each document that Akçam refers to. However, even if we were to take all of Akçam's allegations at face value, the similarity between the Ottoman archival documents and the Naim-Andonian materials is not a proof for the authenticity of these documents. First of all, there is nothing new or surprising about Akçam's arguments. In fact, Orel and Yuca pointed that out as early as 1983 that some of the events and individuals "said by Andonian to have been employed in Aleppo and its vicinity during the relocation of the Armenians, do appear in the archival documents" (p. 123-163). If someone is producing forged documents for the purpose of making money and if he is above a certain level of intelligence, that person will certainly make every attempt to make the documents and the memoirs look as realistic as possible to give them some appearance of authenticity. The literature on forged documents memoirs diaries etc. provide ample instances on this.

Another forged document concerning the Armenian Question and similarly produced for money, and simply known as the "Ten Commandments", demonstrates this case. Canadian historian Gwynne Dyer has characterized it as an attempt "to reconstruct what might have been said, had the actual events of April 1915-mid 1916 all been foreordained in a single comprehensive official document."¹⁸ In a similar vein, Dutch historian Erik Jan Zürcher noted that it should come as no surprise that the contents of forged documents resemble to actual events. According to Zürcher "any insider forging a document to make money would have taken care that it did [resemble to actual events] and inserted it among genuine documents of the period."¹⁹

Luckily, the examples similar to this are not confined to the Armenian Question. It is not unusual for forged documents produced for various purposes

18 Gwynne Dyer, "Correspondence," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 9 (1973), p. 377.

19 Erik Jan Zürcher, "Ottoman Labour Battalions in World War I." in Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed.), *The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah* (Zürich: 2002), p. 194 n.1.

and covering different topics to contain a certain amount of true information about actual events and people. The most striking example of this is the so-called “Hitler Diaries” which created quite a sensation in the 1980s. In the forged diaries, Adolf Hitler’s various speeches, notes, and meetings are contained in a way that is similar to the actual ones. Moreover, the forged diaries provide verbatim texts of certain speeches or meetings of Hitler, exactly as they appear in some genuine documents and studies. This was enough to mislead some historians; taking into account all the similarities, the details, and the variety of the materials, some historians -including the celebrated British expert on Nazi Germany Hugh Trevor-Roper and Gerhard Weinberg- initially expressed their confidence in the diaries’ authenticity. However, as a result examination conducted by German forensic science experts, it was revealed that the “Hitler Diaries” were fake²⁰ and that certain ingredients of the diaries such as the papers, bindings, adhesives etc. were not yet actually in use during the period when Hitler lived.²¹

A similar case involves the forged diary of Maxim Litvinov, the famous Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In 1950s, a diary journal allegedly belonging to Litvinov surfaced in Paris for the purposes of sale. After examining the diary, E. H. Carr, the celebrated British historian of the Soviet Union, concluded that the diary must be authentic. He did so again on the basis of the details and accurate information provided by the diary. Yet the subsequent examiners established that the diary was forged and that it added to the knowledge of the scholars “as much as a forged banknote adds to our wealth.”²²

If the verification logic employed by Akçam for the Naim-Andonian documents were to be applied to the “Hitler Diaries” and “Litvinov Diary”, it would result in the odd and erroneous conclusion that these forged diaries must be authentic. According to Akçam’s logic, the fact that some of the information contained in the diaries is congruent with other sources must point to the authenticity and genuineness of the diaries. As indicated above; however, as a result of the examination of German forensic experts and other experts on the Soviet Union, it was established beyond any doubt that both the Hitler Diaries and the Litvinov Diary are fake documents produced by some people to earn money. The rather obvious conclusion is that some forged documents might contain information similar to the actual events or authentic sources speeches

20 Robert Harris, *Selling Hitler: The Story of Hitler Diaries* (London: Arrow Books, 2010).

21 For an analysis of the content of the fake diaries, please see: Josef Henke, “Revealing the Forged Hitler Diaries,” *Archivaria*, Volume 19 (1984), p. 21-27.

22 Hiroaki Kuromiya, “Guide to Emigre and Dissident Memior Literature,” in Sheile Fitzpatrick & Lynne Viola (ed.), *A Researcher’s Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History in the 1930s* (Armonk, N.Y, 1990), p. 258.

etc., but this does not necessarily mean that such documents must be authentic. Historian Hiroaki Kuromiya, an expert on Soviet history, notes for instance that “being consonant” does not “necessarily guarantee the reliability of the memoirs as sources of information.” He considers that The Litvinov Diary case “may have been a fortunate case because... it was closely examined by many experts who knew at least something about Litvinov.” Kuromiya concludes that “historians, who deal with much less known ordinary people and their lives, would have to take extra caution in using memoir literature.”²³

The key question concerning the dispute of whether the documents are authentic is not the similarities, but the inconsistencies among the authentic and disputed materials. In the dispute over the Hitler Diaries or Litvinov Diary; historians, while drawing attention to the similarities they have to the actual speeches and some sources written about Hitler or Litvinov, nonetheless came to the conclusion that the diaries are forgeries by pointing to a series of contradictions and rather absurd errors within the diaries.²⁴

Akçam's work is essentially quite weak on this point. Below, a more balanced picture will be drawn for the readers by examining the points ignored by Akçam.

The key question concerning the dispute of whether the documents are authentic is not the similarities, but the inconsistencies among the authentic and disputed materials. In the dispute over the Hitler Diaries or Litvinov Diary; historians, while drawing attention to the similarities they have to the actual speeches and some sources written about Hitler or Litvinov, nonetheless came to the conclusion that the diaries are forgeries by pointing to a series of contradictions and rather absurd errors within the diaries. Akçam's work is essentially quite weak on this point.

The Issues Ignored by Akçam

Akçam remains completely silent on a number of subjects concerning the points raised by Orel and Yuca: the chronological discrepancies of the Naim-Andonian documents, the signature attributed to the Governor of Aleppo being different from the actual one that is contained in the Ottoman Archive, Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey's signing of some documents with the title “Governor” before he had actually been appointed to that post as a governor, and both Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey'in and Abdülahad Nuri Bey adding notes to the documents

23 Kuromiya, “Guide to Emigre and Dissident Memior Literature,” p 258, 260.

24 Henke, “Revealing the Forged Hitler Diaries,” p. 21-27 ; Kuromiya, “Guide to Emigre and Dissident Memior Literature,” p. 257-260.

and signing them during dates when they were still in Istanbul and had not yet reached Aleppo. A similar problem remains for the letters attributed to Bahaettin Şakir Bey, which were allegedly sent from Istanbul to Adana in February and March 1915, even though during those dates Bahaettin Şakir Bey was not actually in Istanbul but in Erzurum. Additionally, while the Ottoman archival documents used by Akçam as examples are all written on papers bearing official inscriptions, the papers on which Naim-Andonian documents are written do not. These points are completely ignored by Akçam.

It must be pointed out that the signatures attributed to the Governor of Aleppo Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey occupy a special place in the dispute over whether or not the documents are authentic. This subject will be touched upon in more detail below. Before moving forward to this subject; however, it must be indicated that there are errors and inconsistencies in the Naim-Andonian document that are ignored and never mentioned by Akçam.

All the telegrams from the Ottoman Archives that Akçam uses as reference point (and provides facsimiles for some of these telegrams) have been written on headed papers bearing official inscriptions.²⁵ However, the telegrams and documents in the Naim-Andonian documents are different in this respect. Some of them have been written on blank papers bearing no official inscription whatsoever and which are different from the ones used by the Ottoman bureaucracy. Akçam makes no comment on and remains silent about this apparent inconsistency between the papers on which the Ottoman archival documents and the papers on which the Naim-Andonian documents are written.

Again, in Akçam's book, the cipher number groups used in all the ciphered telegram texts are composed of the number digits. For example, in a telegram using four-digit ciphers, all number groups are four-digits and number groups with different amount of digits are not used in the text. The same is true for telegrams using two, three, and five-digit numbers, and number groups with different amount of digits were not confused with each other within the telegrams.

As previously mentioned, however, the telegrams among the Naim-Andonian documents use both two-digit and three-digit numbers in a mixed and haphazard manner within the text of the same telegram. As explained above, this is a telegram not possible to decode in terms of encryption techniques, because it will require two different code keys for the telegrams to be decoded

25 See all the documents provided as facsimiles in: Akçam, *Killing Orders*.

and will create great complications and misunderstandings.²⁶ This clear inconsistency between the Ottoman archival documents and the Naim-Andonian documents is yet again ignored by Akçam throughout his book and this problem is thus evaded with silence.

The inconsistencies in the Naim-Andonian documents are not limited to this. Among the Naim-Andonian documents, in telegrams allegedly sent on 3 September 1331 (16 September 1915) and on 5 September 1331 (18 September 1915) by Minister of the Interior Talat Bey to the Governor of Aleppo; Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey writes some notes on the telegram paper and puts his signature underneath it as the governor.²⁷ Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey addresses Abdülahad Nuri Bey in these notes and asks him to do certain things. However, in the dates during which those telegrams were sent, the notes were written, and the signature was put, the governor of Aleppo was Bekir Sami Bey, not Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey.²⁸ Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey was only appointed as the Governor of Aleppo by 10 October 1915. This means that if the documents were actually authentic, it would have been Bekir Sami Bey, and not Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey, who signed the telegram sent on 16 September 1915. Also, despite the note dated 18 September 1915 addressed to Abdülahad Nuri Bey, Abdülahad Nuri Bey had not yet been appointed to his position in Aleppo by that date. According to the Ottoman archival records, in a telegram he sent on 14 October 1915, the Minister of the Interior Talat Bey asks Şükrü Bey, the Director of the office for the Settlement for Tribes and Refugees (*İskân-ı Aşairin ve Muhacirin Müdürü*), about his opinion of Abdülahad Nuri Bey since the latter was being considered for appointment to Aleppo.²⁹ In other words, as of the date of 14 October 1915, Abdülahad Nuri Bey had not yet been appointed to his position in Aleppo, and the decision process about him had been still ongoing, and other bureaucrats had been asked about their opinions on him.

Thus, in this so-called document, there is a correspondence between a governor and a civil servant, both of whom had not yet been appointed to their posts. This chronological inconsistency regarding the posts and the terms of office of these individuals is one of the serious evidences that prove these documents being forged. However, Akçam never touches upon this issue and in fact remains silent with regard to these inconsistencies throughout his book.

26 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 59, 65-66, 74-75.

27 Aram Andonian, *Documents Officiels Concernant les Massacres Armeniens* (Paris: Imprimerie H. Turabian, 1920), p. 109.

28 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 54.

29 BOA DH DŞR 56-385. Telegram dated 13 October 1915 *Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti* to Şükrü Bey.

As indicated above, Mustafa Abdulhalik Bey was only appointed as Governor to Aleppo by 10 October 1915. Therefore, it can be argued that the signatures attributed to Governor of Aleppo Mustafa Abdulhalik Bey in the Naim-Andonian documents after 10 October 1915 (27 September 1331) are rather less suspicious. There is another document in Naim-Andonian documents sent from the Ministry of the Interior in 29 September 1331 (12 October 1915). Similarly, four days after this telegram, on 3 October (Teşrin-i Evvel) 1331 (16 October 1915), Mustafa Abdulhalik Bey seemingly noted down his name as Governor of Aleppo and signed the document.³⁰ Therefore, since Mustafa Abdulhalik Bey was appointed as governor six days before this telegram, this document seems comparably less suspicious.

On the other hand, when one looks at the Ottoman Archive registries, although Mustafa Abdulhalik Bey was appointed as governor on 10 October 1915, it can be seen that he was in Istanbul until 1 November 1915, and that he only arrived to Aleppo on 8 November 1915. The same applies to Abdülahad Nuri Bey as well. The then-recently appointed Governor of Aleppo Mustafa Abdulhalik Bey and Abdülahad Nuri Bey left Istanbul together for Aleppo on Monday, 1 November.³¹ A telegram stating that the two officials would arrive to Aleppo on 8 November was sent to Istanbul.³² Thus, it is impossible for Mustafa Abdulhalik Bey and Abdülahad Nuri Bey to have written down notes or to have signed documents in Aleppo as of September and October 1915. This is clearly and undisputedly the case because they had arrived to Aleppo only in 8 November. This is another serious evidence that the documents are fake.

The same inconsistency can be found in a letter attributed to Bahaettin Şakir Bey and which was supposedly sent by the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to CUP's Adana delegate Cemal Bey on 2 March 1915.³³ On the date in which the letter was sent, Bahaettin Şakir Bey was not in Istanbul but in Erzurum, and remained there until 13 March 1915.³⁴ Thus, this is yet another indication that the Naim-Andonian documents are fake and have serious discrepancies with the authentic documents and chronology of events.

30 Andonian, *Documents Officiels*, p. 110.

31 DH ŞFR 57/191. In the telegram dated 31 October 1915 sent to Şükrü Bey, it is requested that "since Governor of Aleppo and Abdülahad Nuri Bey will set out for their journey on Monday, be present at Aleppo on their arrival."

32 BOA DH ŞFR 496/53. Telegram dated 8 November 1915 from İsmail Bey to the Ministry of the Interior.

33 Andonian, *Documents Officiels*, p. 96-98 ; Aram Andonian, *Memoirs of Naim Bey* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1920), p. 49-51.

34 Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harp Hatıralarım: Birinci Cihan Harbi, Cilt II* (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1990), p. 378.

The Question of Signatures

Naim-Andonian documents include a number of signatures attributed to Governor of Aleppo Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey, which he allegedly signed as “Mustafa Abdülhalik.” The signatures attributed to Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey has a particular role in the dispute over the authenticity of the Naim-Andonian documents. This is because in a letter written in 10 June 1921, Aram Andonian himself defended the authenticity of the documents on the basis of the signatures attributed governor Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey:

“There is no doubt that these documents were taken out of the files of the Assistant Directorship of the Deportation Office in Aleppo. The Governor of Aleppo, after having had the orders he received from the Minister of the Interior (Talat Pasha) concerning the Armenians deciphered, appended a note with his signature to them in which he referred them for implementation to the Assistant Directorship of the Deportation Office where Naim Bey was a secretary.

When Naim Bey agreed to provide us with these documents, the Aleppo Armenian National Union, which was an official organization, had the handwriting and signatures (appended to the documents in question), examined. This examination lasted exactly one week. Other documents to which the Governor Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey had appended notes and his signature were examined, and even the smallest details were subjected to comparison. Finally, it was determined without any possibility of doubt that the handwriting and signature in the notes added to the documents belonged to the Governor Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey. This erased even the slightest suspicion as to the authenticity of the documents...”³⁵

As might be clearly seen from the above quote, the main basis for the authenticity of the documents in question was the assumption that the signature on the documents attributed to Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey was genuine.

In order to test the validity of the Andonian's claims, in 1983, Orel and Yuca compared the signatures attributed to Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey on Naim-Andonian documents to the original signatures of him contained on the Ottoman archival documents. Their comparison revealed that, contrary to what Andonian claims, the original signatures from the Ottoman archival documents and those from the Naim-Andonian documents were significantly different.

35 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 13.

On these grounds, Orel and Yuca concluded that the comparison of the signatures “clearly establishes that the ‘signatures’ on Andonian’s ‘documents’ are forged, because they bear no relationship to Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey’s actual signature.”³⁶

In his book, Akçam also provides a number of samples from the signatures of Governor Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey. Akçam notes that whereas Orel and Yuca only presented samples from documents which the governor signed as “Mustafa Abdülhalik,” he himself found other documents which he signed as “Abdülhalik” using only one of his names. This leads Akçam to believe that

The consistent and marked differences between two set of signatures clearly establishes that the signatures contained in the Naim-Andonian volume do not jibe with the authentic signatures from the Ottoman archival documents and must therefore be considered fake.

the governor used different signatures and on the basis of different signatures the governor used, Akçam concludes that “one cannot use these differences in signatures alone to decide the authenticity of the documents containing them” (p. 107). Akçam’s conclusion is clearly an erroneous one not only because he attempts to blur and gloss over the significant differences between the signatures but also because he misses the main point; that Andonian himself in the first place argued that the authenticity of the “sold documents” had been established by a comparison of the signatures and that even “even the smallest details were subjected to comparison”, and

they “determined without any possibility of doubt” the signatures in question were the same and that this “erased even the slightest suspicion as to the authenticity of the documents.” Akçam thus seems to have forgotten Andonian’s own words.

After serving as the governor of Aleppo, Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey was appointed as an undersecretary to the Ministry of the Interior in 1917. During this period, the volume of documents that he had to sign significantly increased. Presumably as a result of the high number of documents he had to sign on a regular basis, during his tenure as undersecretary he used only “Abdülhalik” when signing documents.

In the tables presented below, the readers will see a comparison of the authentic signatures of the governor and those attributed to him in the Naim-Andonian documents. To be more precise, Table-1 compares authentic documents which

36 Orel & Yuca, *Talat Paşa’ya Atfedilen Telgrafların...*, p. 13.









the governor signed as “Mustafa Abdülhalik” to those attributed to him in Naim-Andonian. Table-2 compares the documents the governor signed merely as “Abdülhalik.” Finally, Table-3 table highlights the differences in authentic signatures, whether signed as “Mustafa Abdülhalik” or merely as “Abdülhalik,” in comparison to those contained in Naim-Andonian volume. This detailed comparison will enable readers to see the differences between the authentic signatures of the governor on the one hand and those attributed to him in Naim-Andonian volume on the other. The consistent and marked differences between two set of signatures clearly establishes that the signatures contained in the Naim-Andonian volume do not jibe with the authentic signatures from the Ottoman archival documents and must therefore be considered fake.

The names or numbers within the boxes indicate the sources from which the signatures has been taken. The numbers indicate the archival references to documents from the Cipher Office collection of the Ottoman Archives' Ministry of the Interior papers (*Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi*):

Table 1: Signed as Mustafa Abdülhalik

Samples from Authentic Signatures

Samples from Naim-Andonian

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>Orel & Yuca</p>  | <p>Naim-Andonian</p>  |
| <p>Orel & Yuca</p>  | <p>Naim-Andonian</p>  |
| <p>Orel & Yuca</p>  | <p>Naim-Andonian</p>  |
| | <p>Naim-Andonian</p>  |
| | <p>Naim-Andonian</p>  |

As might be evident from the Table-1, the authentic signatures (presented on the left side of the table) are significantly different than the fake signatures (presented on the right side of the table) that were attributed to Governor Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey in the Naim-Andonian documents. In the authentic samples, the tail at the left end of the signatures is longer than the ones on the fake signatures. What is even more striking is that the authentic samples' tail -which starts at the left and extends to the right over the main body of the signature- never extends beyond the main body of the signature. However, in the fake samples, the tail extends way beyond the main body of the signature. In addition, the connection between ق (kaf) -the last letter of the signature- and the main tail of the signature are starkly different on both sets of signatures. On the authentic signatures, as the letter ق (kaf) ends it moves slightly upwards and connects with the main tail to the left; whereas on the fake signatures the tail of letter ق (kaf) goes up and makes a rightwards curve and then connects with the main tail of the signature.

Below the table compares the signatures signed merely as “Abdülhalik”.

Table 2: Signed as Abdülhalik

Samples from Authentic Signatures

Samples from Naim-Andonian
















| Samples from Authentic Signatures | Samples from Naim-Andonian |
|---|--|
| <p>77/59</p>  | <p>Andonian-Nubar Library</p>  |
| <p>77/95</p>  | |
| <p>78/8</p>  | |
| <p>78/158</p>  | |
| <p>78/178</p>  | |
| <p>79/74</p>  | |
| <p>79/132</p>  | |

Table 2 Continued

Samples from Authentic Signatures Samples from Naim-Andonian

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>79/186</p>  | |
| <p>79/188</p>  | |
| <p>79A/28</p>  | |
| <p>80/15</p>  | |
| <p>80/18</p>  | |
| <p>80/29</p>  | |
| <p>80/71</p>  | |

Again, as will be seen from the Table-2, the authentic signatures (presented on the left side of the table) are significantly different than the fake signatures (presented on the right side of the table) that were attributed to governor Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey in the Naim-Andonian documents. As with the signatures on Table-1 previously presented, the signatures bear the same characteristic differences on table two. Again, in the authentic samples the tail at the left end of the signatures is longer than the ones on the fake signatures while the connection between the letter ك (kaf) and the main tail of the signature bears the same difference highlighted on Table-1. Yet again, the authentic samples' tail -which starts at the left and extends to the right over the main body of the signature- never extends beyond the main body of the signature. However, in the fake samples, the tail (although its right-end section is faint) extends way beyond the main body of the signature.

A further stark difference between the authentic signatures and those of the Naim-Andonian documents is the consistent manner in which both set of signatures connect ه (ha) and ل (lam) letters when composing the signature. The difference regarding the connection points of the two letters between the group of signatures are presented on Table-3 below.

Table 3: Signed as Both Mustafa Abdülhalik and Abdülhalik

| Authentic Signatures | | Naim Andonian |
|---|---|--|
| Orel & Yuca  | Orel & Yuca  |  |
| 77/59  | 79/186  |  |
| 77/95  | 79/188  |  |
| 78/8  | 79A/28  |  |
| 78/158  | 80/15  |  |
| 78/178  | 80/18  |  |
| 79/74  | 80/29  |  |
| 79/132  | 80/71  |  |

Again, as will be evident from the Table-3, both set of signatures connect \simeq (ha) and \cup (lam) letters are strikingly different when composing the signature. In the authentic ones, Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey extends the tail of \simeq (ha) upwards and by drawing a curve backwards/rightwards it starts drawing the letter \cup (lam) from behind that curve (which makes it take on the shape of a cancer awareness ribbon). In signature after signature, the authentic samples follow the same, consistent ribbon pattern. However, in the fake signatures of Naim-Andonian documents, the drawing and connection of the two letters are quite different. In the fake signatures of the Naim-Andonian documents, the forger extends the tail of \simeq (ha) upwards and without drawing curve back/right, it goes left and starts drawing the letter \cup (lam). Thus, the connecting point of the two letters on Naim-Andonian signatures resemble a horseshoe as displayed on the right-hand side of the Table-3, whereas on the authentic signatures from the Ottoman archives, it resembles a ribbon as indicated above. Table-3 above highlights the relevant connecting points of the two letters by showing them within red circles.

The readers might see that while authentic signatures from the Ottoman Archives are quite similar and consistent with each other, they are significantly different from those signatures displayed on the Naim-Andonian column. Naim-Andonian documents are also consistent in themselves, making it obvious that, regardless of whoever the forger might have been, they took enough care to compose signatures in a consistent manner to avoid suspicion. In signature after signature, the forged samples connect the letters of \simeq (ha) and \cup (lam) in a way that resembles a horseshoe and, in a manner, completely and starkly different from the authentic signatures of Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey. Moreover, this continues to be case both in documents signed as “Mustafa Abdülhalik” or merely as “Abdülhalik”, which demonstrate that Akçam’s claims concerning the different signatures used by governor is desperately unconvincing.

Editorial Shortcomings

Beyond the myriad of manipulations and distortions present in Akçam’s book, one can also come across some note-worthy editorial mistakes and shortcomings within the text of the book. These include:

- a) Books containing academic research are expected to have chapter numberings, as such numbering provide a proper structure to such serious works. However, Akçam’s book lacks such chapter numbering (the Turkish version published by İletişim Yayınları in 2016 lacks chapter numbering as well).

- b) The signature table on page 106 titled: “Image 6 – Table of signatures of Governor Mustafa Abdulhalik” has a Turkish entry (“Bogos Nubar ve Andonyan) despite the book being in the English language.
- c) One of the book’s appendixes titled “Appendix A.1: The Ottoman-Turkish Original of Naim Efendi’s Text” starting on page 176 in fact contains an English text rather than the “Ottoman-Turkish original” as indicated by the title.
- d) Note 76 on page 72 states “emniyeti İsmail Canpolat” when it should have stated “emniyet-i umumiyye müdürü İsmail Canbolat” (his last name has been misspelled and his title is incomplete). His last name has also been misspelled in pages 148 and 259 (index section).

These are the kinds of the editorial mistakes and shortcomings that one would not expect from a publication house as prestigious as Palgrave Macmillan and suggests that Akçam’s book was not edited properly in line with the publication house’s standards.

These are the kinds of the editorial mistakes and shortcomings that one would not expect from a publication house as prestigious as Palgrave Macmillan and suggests that Akçam’s book was not edited properly in line with the publication house’s standards.

Conclusion

As the detailed analysis provided above indicates, Akçam’s arguments on Naim-Andonian documents are based on the oversimplification and even worse on the distortion of Orel and Yuca’s previous findings. In order to bring credibility to his claims, Akçam presents Orel and Yuca’s findings in a distorted manner and ignores these writers’ most basic objections. Having presented these objections and findings in an oversimplified and distorted manner, Akçam then goes on to refute the arguments and objections which Orel and Yuca never made to begin with. Claiming that he easily refuted Orel and Yuca’s objections, Akçam then attempts to prove the authenticity of the Naim-Andonian documents by resorting to various manipulations.

However, as has been examined above, while listing his allegations, he bases his arguments on serious logical errors and obvious distortions. Apart from these, in his book, Akçam remains completely silent on a number of issues for which no explanation can be given, such as: the chronological discrepancies

in the Naim-Andonian documents, the signature attributed to governor of Aleppo being different from the genuine signature of the governor contained in the Ottoman Archive, Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey's signing of some documents with the title "Governor" before he had actually been appointed as a governor, and also both Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey'in and Abdülahad Nuri Bey adding notes to the documents and signing them during dates when they were still in Istanbul and had not yet reached Aleppo. Unable to present credible evidence to explain the inconsistencies and discrepancies of the Naim-Andonian documents, Akçam resorts to several assumptions to be able to argue that the documents must be authentic, assumptions for which he does provide any evidence for most of the time.

On top of all this, Akçam does not present convincing explanations for the most basic objections (fake signatures, the type of paper used by the Ottoman bureaucracy, chronological discrepancies etc.) directed by Orel and Yuca towards the Naim-Andonian documents and ignores many of these objections. For these reasons, it is apparent that Akçam's study cannot be taken as a credible and balanced work of scholarship that makes a meaningful contribution to the debate on the concerning the authenticity of the Naim-Andonian documents.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), [Prime Minister's Office, Ottoman Archives], Istanbul.

Dâhiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi Evrakı (Cypher Office of the Ministry of the Interior Collection)

Secondary Sources

Akçam, Taner. *Naim Efendinin Hatıratı ve Talat Paşa Telgrafları, Krikor Gergeryan Arşivi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016.

Akçam, Taner. *Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Andonian, Aram. *Documents Officiels Concernant les Massacres Armeniens*. Paris: Impremerie H. Turabian, 1920.

Andonian, Aram. *Memoirs of Naim Bey*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1920.

Dyer, Gwynne. "Correspondence". *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 9, 1973.

Fitzpatrick, Sheila & Viola, Lynne (ed.). *A Researcher's Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History in the 1930s*, New York: Armonk, 1990.

Harris, Robert. *Selling Hitler: The Story of Hitler Diaries*. London: Arrow Books, 2010.

Henke, Josef. "Revealing the Forged Hitler Diaries". *Archivaria*, Volume 19, 1984.

Kieser, Hans-Lukas (ed.). , *The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah*. Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2002.

Kuromiya, Hiroaki. "Guide to Emigre and Dissident Memoir Literature" in Sheila Fitzpatrick & Lynne Viola (ed.), *A Researcher's Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History in the 1930s*, New York: Armonk, 1990.

Lewy, Guenter. *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2007.

Orel, Şinasi and Süreyya Yuca. *The Talât Pasha Telegrams – Historical fact or Armenian fiction?* Lefkoşa (Nicosia): K. Rustem and Bro., 1983.

Orel, Şinasi ve Süreyya Yuca. *Ermenilerce Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların Gerçek Yüzü*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983.

Sabis, Ali İhsan. *Harp Hatıralarım: Birinci Cihan Harbi*, Cilt II. İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1990.

T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı. *Arşiv Belgelerinde Ermeni Faaliyetleri, Cilt VII*. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt (ATASE) Başkanlığı Yayınları. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2008.

Zürcher, Erik Jan. "Ottoman Labour Battalions in World War I". Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed.), *The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah*. Zürich: 2002.

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Türkkan Tunalı, Yasemin. “The Perception of the Armenian Question in the Spanish Diplomatic Reports (1914-1922).” *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 37 (2018).

Received: 31.05.2018

Accepted: 03.07.2018

THE PERCEPTION OF THE ARMENIAN QUESTION IN THE SPANISH DIPLOMATIC REPORTS (1914-1922)*

İSPANYOL DİPLOMATİK RAPORLARINDA
ERMENİ SORUNU ALGISI (1914-1922)

Dr. Yasemin TÜRKKAN TUNALI**

Abstract: The Armenian Question has been the focus of many national and foreign academic studies in the field of history. The primary sources used in such studies generally belong to the archives of the states like Russia, Ottoman, Britain, and France that had been the parties of the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin and where the Armenian Question had become an international issue. Thus, the scope of the documents and the studies based on them differs according to those states' policies toward the Ottoman territories and to their relationship with the Ottoman Empire in the World War I either as an enemy or as an ally. On the other hand, the studies based on the archives of the states out of this circle are low in number. This paper studies the Armenian Question in the light of the diplomatic reports of 1914-1922 of Spain, which was a neutral state during World War I and thereby preserved its diplomatic corps in the Ottoman territory. Moreover, Spain neither had any role in the emergence of the Armenian Question, nor had the issue created a direct effect on bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, with this study, it is aimed to present the perception of a neutral and impartial state about the events and developments of the mentioned years, which have led to the genocide

* This is the English translation by Ahmet Can Öktem of the article by Yasemin Türkkan Tunalı titled “İspanyol Diplomatik Raporlarında Ermeni Sorunu Algısı (1914-1922)” that was original published in: *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue: 57 (2017), p. 133-166. The original article was derived from the following doctoral dissertation prepared by the author: “İspanyol Diplomatik Kaynaklarına Göre I. Dünya Savaşı ve Milli Mücadele’de Türkiye” (“World War I and Turkey during the War of Liberation According to Spanish Diplomatic Sources”), Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Atatürk Institute, Hacettepe University, Ankara, 2016.

** ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1001-0240>
Research Assistant, Atatürk Institute, Hacettepe University, yturkkan@hacettepe.edu.tr

allegations today. It is also aimed to demonstrate the change in the Spanish perception about the roles of the Turkish authorities, the Armenians, and the Great Powers in a period from the First World War to the era of the War of Liberation (also known as the National Struggle in Turkish), as well as about the responsible party of the events of 1915. In this study based on the diplomatic reports obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain, it is expected to determine the turning points of the Armenian Question, which transformed from a historical phenomenon into a political issue.

Keywords: Spain, Armenian Question, Diplomacy, Perception, Ottoman Empire, National Independence War, First World War

Öz: Ermeni Sorunu, tarih yazıcılığı içinde yerli ve yabancı birçok akademik çalışmaya konu olagelmıştır. Bu tür çalışmalarda kullanılan birincil kaynaklar, çoğunlukla, Ermeni Sorununun uluslararası bir mesele haline geldiği Ayastefanos ve Berlin Antlaşmalarının tarafları olan başta Rusya ve Osmanlı olmak üzere İngiltere, Fransa vb. devletlerin arşivlerine aittir. Dolayısıyla belgelerin ve çalışmaların bakış açısı; söz konusu devletlerin Osmanlı toprakları üzerindeki politikalarına ve Birinci Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı Devleti ile muhasımlık-müttefiklik bağıntısına göre farklılık göstermektedir. Öte yandan, bu bağıntı dışında kalan devletlerin arşivlerine dayanan konuyla ilgili çalışmaların sayısı ise oldukça azdır. Çalışmamız konuyu; Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında tarafsız bir devlet olan, bu sayede Osmanlı Devleti topraklarında diplomatik teşkilatını koruyan İspanya'nın 1914-1922 yıllarına ait diplomatik raporları ışığında ele almaktadır. Zira İspanya, Ermeni Sorununun ortaya çıkışında herhangi bir rol oynamadığı gibi; mesele, Osmanlı Devleti'yle ikili ilişkilerinde de doğrudan bir etken oluşturmamıştır. Bu şekilde; günümüzde soykırım iddialarına sebebiyet veren bu yıllarda yaşanan gelişmelerin, konuyla doğrudan doğruya ilgisi ya da çıkarı bulunmayan bir devletin diplomatik temsilcileri tarafından nasıl algılandığının ortaya konması hedeflenmektedir. Birinci Dünya Savaşından Millî Mücadele yıllarına uzanan süreçte, Ermeni Sorunundaki Türk devlet idarecilerinin, Ermeni tebaanın ve Büyük Devletlerin rolüne dair İspanyol algısının geçirdiği değişime dikkat çekilmesi hedeflenmektedir. İspanyol diplomasisi nazarında Ermeni Sorununun ortaya çıkışında ve özellikle 1915 yılı Tehcir Kanununun uygulanışı sırasında yaşanan olayların sorumluluğunun; Osmanlı Devleti'nden Büyük Devletlere; Büyük Devletlerden Osmanlı Ermeni tebaasına kayışındaki sebepler ortaya koyulmaya çalışılmaktadır. İspanya Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivinden edinilen diplomatik raporların kaynaklık ettiği çalışmada; Ermeni Sorununun tarihsel bir olgudan, siyasi bir olguya dönüşmesinde etken olan tarihsel kırılma noktalarının ortaya konması hedeflenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İspanya, Ermeni Sorunu, Diplomasi, Algı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Millî Mücadele, Birinci Dünya Savaşı

Introduction

The Armenian component of the multinational and multiethnic Ottoman Empire had lived in peace and prosperity; and had been named as the “the loyal nation” (*millet-i sâdıka*) by the rulers due to their services in the echelons of the Ottoman government. The conflict between the Armenian and Muslim-Turkish components was rooted in the European states’ policies to influence the Ottoman non-Muslim subjects since the second half of the 19th century. Especially during the Ottoman-Russian War between 1877-1878, Russia, in line with its interests over Caucasia, had conducted propaganda and initiatives that had cultivated the Armenians’ desire to establish a nation-state of their own. The signing of the Treaty of San Stefano after the war that had ended with the Ottoman defeat and the Berlin Treaty that had been signed in its place had led to the birth of the Armenian Question, even causing it to gain an international dimension. As per these treaties, the Ottoman Empire had agreed “to conduct reforms in provinces where the people were Armenian and to guarantee the peace and safety of the Armenians against the Circassians and Kurds and the governance of all European states on the conduct of the reforms”.¹

The Ottoman Armenians, upon the reforms promised to them not being materialized and the Berlin Treaty not providing benefits for them as it did for the Greeks and Bulgarians after their rebellions; had initiated armed uprisings from the 1880’s onward. Apart from a few committees formed in Ottoman lands, the Hunchak Revolutionary Party that was formed in Switzerland in 1887 aimed for the union of Armenians in the lands of Turkey, Russia, and Iran under an independent Armenia. From 1896, the Dashnaksutyun organization was in the forefront of Armenian activities. Many Armenian uprisings that were carried out between 1890-1896 and the precautions that the Ottoman Empire took against these were used abroad for Armenian propaganda by those organizations. Russia had cultivated the Armenian organizations in accordance with its policies towards the Ottoman lands.²

1 Matthew Smith Anderson, *Doğu Sorunu 1774-1923 Uluslararası İlişkiler Üzerine Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), p. 217-228; Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey* (Utah: The University of Utah Press, 2005), p. 7, 8.

2 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, p. 3-30. For detailed information on this subject, please see: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Ermeni Komiteleri (1891-1895)* (Ankara: 2001); Erdal İter, *Türkiye’de Sosyalist Ermeniler’in Silâhlanma Faaliyetleri ve Milli Mücadele’de Ermeniler (1890-1923)* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2005) ; *Ermeni Komitelerin Amaçları ve İhtilal Hareketleri, Meşrutiyet’in İlanından Önce ve Sonra* (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2003); Orhan Koloğlu ve Mehmet Okur, “Taşnak Komitesi’nin Anadolu’da Örgütlenişine Dair Bir Rapor”, *Karadeniz*, Sayı 10, 2011, p. 127-134; *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918, Cilt I-II* (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2005).

Even though the Ottoman Empire had put the Eastern Anatolia reforms back on the agenda following the Balkan Wars, the reforms could not be implemented due to the outbreak of the First World War and Ottoman Empire's participation in this war. The developments during the beginning of the war even led to the Armenian issue gaining a new dimension. Together with the military recruitments in the framework of the Ottoman Empire declaring mobilization on the 3rd of August 1914, Armenian uprisings were observed in settlements with dense Armenian populations, and Armenian soldiers and officers that were serving in the Ottoman army began joining the separatist uprisings by fleeing from the army with their weapons.³ Together with the Ottoman Empire de facto joining the First World War, voluntary Armenian regiments crossed the border and joined the Russian army. The Ottoman Armenians, while spying and providing logistic support for the enemy states, at the same time, attacked the local Muslim people.⁴ The Armenian committees and armed gangs formed by them were covertly receiving arms and equipment aid from Britain and France, similarly as from Russia, attacked the Ottoman army's reinforcements and independent troops and participated in events such as the disruption of telegraph lines and the raiding of police stations.⁵ During a time when the Ottoman Empire was fighting in the Gallipoli, Caucasia and Syria fronts, such Armenian gang activities forced the Ottoman government to dispatch its forces more to the uprisings than the fronts. However, the Sublime Porte's (*Babiâli*) precautions for public order were insufficient. Upon those events in Eastern Anatolia obtaining the status of a general uprising, by the beginning of May, the removal of the insurrectionist Armenians from the war zones and sending them to other regions was put into effect,⁶ and this

3 Esat Arslan, "1915 Zorunlu Göç Geçici Yasasının Gerekliliği ve Uygulamalarının Değişik Açılardan Değerlendirilmesi", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 7, Sonbahar 2002, p. 23.

4 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, p. 92. Also see: Mehmet Perinçek, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye Ermenilerinin Rus Ordularına Katılımına Dair Yeni Belgeler", *Karadeniz*, Sayı 10, 2011, p. 9-50 ; Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkaslar'da ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezâlimi I, 1906-1918* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1995).

5 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Ermeni Tehciri* (İstanbul: Babiâli Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2004), p. 48-54. For these states' relationship with Ottoman Armenians, please see: Yusuf Sarıncay, "Fransa'nın Ermenilere Yönelik Politikasının Tarihi Temelleri", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 7, Sonbahar 2002, p. 55-70 ; Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Fransız İlişkileri (1879-1918)*, Cilt I (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2004) ; Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Rus İlişkileri (1907-1921)*, Cilt III (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2006) ; Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri (1896-1922)*, Cilt IV (Ankara, 2004). The most important of these kinds of insurrections and cooperation with the enemy was the insurrection that they started in Van, Çatak, and Bitlis in April 1915 that would expedite the invasion of Van by the Russian army: Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, p. 95-109 ; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Ermenilerin Suriye'ye Nakli: Sürgün mü, Soykırım mı, Belgeler* (Ankara: Ankara Ticaret Odası, 2005), p. 8. For details on the Van insurrection, please see: Ergünöz Akçora, *Van ve Çevresinde Ermeni İsyancıları (1896-1916)* (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları, 1994); Faiz Demiroğlu, *Van'da Ermeni Mezâlimi (1895-1920)* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1985).

6 Berna Türkdöğen, "Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri (Tehcirden Günümüze)", Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara, 2006, p. 69-70.

practice was legalized with the 29 May 1915 Relocation Law.⁷ In this way, it was decided that the Armenian population in the regions where these committees were operating would be transported to and settled in Syria and Aleppo as demilitarized zones of the First World War. The basis of today's genocide claims mainly derives from the events experienced during the conduct of relocations, such as the attacks on Armenian convoys and the deaths connected to epidemics as well as the negligence of some Ottoman civilian and military officials in the process of relocation.

Spain, which had announced its neutrality in the First World War,⁸ had assumed the role of representing the rights and interests of the warring states in enemy lands between 1914-1918. With the number of states joining the war increasing, the Spanish diplomatic organization deployed itself in the center of war diplomacy by appointing its Portugal and Romania embassy for the German interests; its Germany, Iran and Belgium embassy for the French interests; its Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Belgium embassy for the Russian interests; its Italy and Portugal embassy for the Austria-Hungary interests; its Central Powers embassies for British interests, etc.

Spain, which had announced its neutrality in the First World War, had assumed the role of representing the rights and interests of the warring states in enemy lands between 1914-1918. With the number of states joining the war increasing, the Spanish diplomatic organization deployed itself in the center of war diplomacy...

With the Ottoman Empire joining the war within the Central Powers bloc from November 1914, the duty of protecting its rights and interests in the Allied Powers' lands was again carried out by Spain. This way, the Spanish embassy in Istanbul got the chance to closely follow the developments in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the Ottoman Empire's policies in the war, and the Sublime Porte's political pulse.

Among the embassy's diplomatic reports that were informing the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Armenian Question was taken into consideration for the first time in the context of the Eastern Anatolia reforms. In the reports of January and February of 1914, it is indicated that the meetings between the Great Powers and the Sublime Porte had been continuing for 35 years and that most recently the ambassadors of Germany and Russia had

7 Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermenilerin Sevke ve İskânı (1878-1920)* (Ankara, 2007), p.155-157. For the text of the law, please see: Salâhaddin Kardeş, "Tehcir" ve *Emval-i Metrûke Mevzuatı* (Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008), p. 17-20.

8 *Gaceta de Madrid*, No: 219, August 7, 1914, p. 308.

prepared a report regarding the necessary arrangements for the reforms to be completed and had presented them to the Ottoman government.⁹ The ongoing negotiations for subjects such as determining the nationality of the consultants and inspectors that would serve in the cities of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Harput and their periods of service¹⁰ were concluded with accord during the beginning of February.¹¹ In the news of the Ottoman press, it is assured that a full accord was reached between the Russian and German ambassadors representing the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente and the Sublime Porte. According to the decision, the Ottoman geography would be divided into six regions and a chief inspector would be assigned to each one. The two chief inspectors that were to be assigned to the two regions that comprised the Eastern provinces would be chosen from the subjects of neutral states.¹² Spain's Istanbul Ambassador of that period Germán María de Ory y Morey¹³ was of the opinion that those reforms were officialized as they were announced by the Ottoman Agency (*Osmanlı Ajansı*) and therefore the issue had been completely resolved. Moreover, in the mentioned reports, it is indicated that the reason the Ottoman government brought the Eastern Anatolia reforms up the agenda once again after 35 years was to ensure a decision favorable to the Ottoman Empire in the Aegean Islands question that the Balkan Wars had brought about, and also quicken the approval of the credit requested from France. After February, no Istanbul Embassy reports can be found

9 Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, (AMAE), Correspondencia, Legajo: 1782, Despacho No: 182, From the Istanbul Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IEMFA), "Concerning Important Reforms that Are Required to be Made in East Anatolia", Istanbul, July 20, 1914.

10 It is understood that alongside Germany and Russia, the other Great Powers were involved as well in the offer presented to the Sublime Porte about the application method of the East Anatolia reforms. This can be understood from the fact that the offer was prepared by the chief consultants (first dragomen) of Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy who had gather in Istanbul under the chair of Russia's international legal counselor Mandelstam who was present in Istanbul. *Ibid.*

11 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1782, Despacho No: 46, IEMFA, "Concerning the Intense Activity Engaged By the Sublime Porte for the Resolution for the Resolution of All Matters with the Great Powers," Istanbul, February 10, 1914.

12 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1782, Despacho No: 62, IEMFA, "Explains the Application of the Reforms in Anatolia," Istanbul, February 24, 1914.

13 Germán María de Ory y Morey (1853-1932) had worked in Spain's Montevideo Embassy between 1907-1912. Between 1912-1913, he had worked as a department chief in Spain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between February 1914-June 1914, he served in Spain's Istanbul Embassy as an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. He retired in 1919. The diplomat was also declared Marquis of Montecorto in 1920 and 1924. *Gaceta de Madrid*, No: 12, January 12, 1907, p. 133 ; *Gaceta de Madrid*, No: 52, February 21, 1913, p. 458 ; *Gaceta de Madrid*, No: 4, January 4i 1919, p. 34 ; *La Epoca*, July 16, 1920, p. 1 ; *ABC*, May 6, 1924, p. 19 ; Suna Suner, "The General Index of the Ambassadors to and from the Ottoman Empire", <http://archive.donjuanarchiv.at/go/bot/> (12.06.2015) ; <http://compactgen.com/es/m/mon.htm> (12.06.2015) ; Óscar Javier Sánchez Sanz, "Diplomacia y Política Exterior España, 1890-1914," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Recent Era History, Faculty of Geography and History, Madrid Complutense University, Madrid, 2004, p. 149.

regarding developments on reforms¹⁴ or the Armenian Question throughout 1914.

The Years of the First World War

It is noteworthy that, in the archives of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are very few reports that were sent to the Ministry by the Istanbul Embassy on March-May of 1915. Furthermore, in these reports, there is no information regarding the developments such as the Armenian uprisings that occurred during those dates, the Armenian gangs' cooperation activities with the enemy, or the enactment of the Relocation Law. The same situation is valid for the reports of the following months of 1915.¹⁵ Even the reports that can be considered related to the subject, the matter is only indirectly referred to on the occasion of other developments and events. However, the terms used in the reports by the Spain's Istanbul representative of the time Ambassador Julián María del Arroyo y Moret¹⁶ and his perspective on the situation are striking as they reflect Spanish diplomacy's approach towards the Armenian Question.

In his 23 November 1915 report in which he mentions the Ottoman State's relations with its allies during the First World War, the ambassador makes some observations on the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) Government towards foreigners and minorities (mainly the Armenians). It must

14 In fact, the appointment of the foreign chief inspectors to serve in the Eastern provinces beginning in the month of June, Monsieur Vestenenk (who had served as senior official in the Netherlands' colonies) and Major Nikola Hof (who was serving as a law instructor at the Norway Military Academy), had already been made. Münir Süreyya Bey, *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasî Tarihçesi (1877-1914)* (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Yayını, 2001), p. 117, 118.

15 It is seen that the first document associated with the Armenian Question in the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain was sent to the Ministry from Spain's Bern Embassy. This document is a declaration prepared by the Armenian Aid Committee of Switzerland (*Comité de secours aux Arméniens*) in September-October 1915 titled "Appeal/Call". The declaration, drawing the world public opinion's attention to the events experienced during the application of the Relocation Law, calls upon people to protest the Ottoman State. Spain's Bern Embassy had only presented the declaration as an attachment and had not made any comments regarding this subject in the report. AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 3025, Despacho No: 203, From the Bern Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relays A Circular from the Armenian Aid Committee," Bern, October 16, 1915. It is understood that the Ottoman government had found out about this declaration via the press and had taken precautions to refute these claims. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Hariciye, Siyasi Kısım, (HR. SYS.), Dosya No: 2881, Gömlek No:3, 07.10.1915.

16 Julián María del Arroyo y Moret had worked in Spain's embassy in the city of Lima accredited to Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia in the years 1908-1912, and had worked in Spain's Havana Embassy in the years 1912-1913. After having worked as a department chief in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain in 1914, Arroyo served in Spain's Istanbul Embassy as an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary between the dates June 1914-June 1918. Gaceta de Madrid, No: 107, April 16, 1912, p. 113 ; Gaceta de Madrid, No: 153, June 2, 1914, p. 591 ; Guía Oficial de España 1914, p. 126 ; Guía Oficial de España 1915, Madrid, 1915, p. 140 ; https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Embajadores_de_Espa%C3%B1a_en_Ecuador (23.06.2015).

be expressed that the ambassador does not provide any information on the decision-implementation-result stages of these policies; the language he uses almost gives the impression that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was already informed regarding the situation. According to this, the Young Turks' xenophobia and insolence were on the rise. According to the ambassador, the Young Turks - having attained victory at the Battle of Gallipoli- were even openly mentioning that "Turks will be sufficient to survive" and "of the necessity of getting rid of all foreigners", and that they were referring to the minorities as "weeds".¹⁷ Ambassador Arroyo claims that the Young Turks had done away with the Armenians with this mentality and that they were initiating the same conduct towards Europeans in general and the Greeks in specific. He even makes the comment that the CUP administration, by cleaning out -in their terms- the weeds, they were also taking away the healthy and fertile soil and leaving pebbles and rocks where no plants can sprout. It can be understood that the Spanish diplomat perceived the mentioned words and comments attributed to the CUP as an open hostility toward Christians/non-Muslims beyond xenophobia. It is clear that the ambassador believed that the Ottoman government conducted a "weeding out policy" against the Armenian and Greek subjects, and that he saw these minorities as the beneficial fraction of the Ottoman community and the Muslim-Turkish component as -to put it mildly- unproductive and useless. In addition to this, in light of the words in the report stating that "the neutral state representatives fear the Young Turks' xenophobia," an interpretation can be made that the rising Turkish nationalism in the CUP administration was disturbing the representatives of the states that were not involved in the First World War.

The Armenian Question was directly mentioned in the Istanbul embassy's reports for the first time in February 1916 after the Ottoman government sent a booklet in French titled *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement and the Truth Regarding Government Precautions (Vérité sur le Mouvement Révolutionnaire Arménien et les Mesures Gouvernementales)* to the embassy.¹⁸ In this booklet published in 1916 in Istanbul, the Ottoman government puts forth the origin of the Armenian Question and its development in general terms. The booklet argues that while the Armenians had been a nation that had gained the trust of the Ottoman Empire and had been able to reach the highest positions in state administration and the economy, following the signing of the treaty after the 1878 Berlin Congress, they came under the protection of the

17 AMAE, Política, Legajo: 2702, Despacho No: 458, IEMFA, "Confidential", Istanbul, November 23, 1915.

18 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783, Despacho No: 101, IEMFA, "The Brochure Published by the Government Concerning the Armenian Revolutionary Movement," Istanbul, February 29, 1916.

Empire's enemy, Russia. According to the booklet, from that date onwards, the Armenians in the Empire, with the powerful competition and incentive derived from the treaty, had formed the underground organizations called Hunchak and Dashnak in order to draw Europe's attention towards themselves.

The booklet points out the effective role that Russia had played in these committees' activities for "the desire of an independent Armenia". Especially to support this thesis, it quotes the Russian Tsar's following statement; "Armenians, it is time for you to be rid of the despotism and slavery which you have been exposed to for five centuries and which some of you are still a victim of. To benefit from freedom and justice, join your blood brothers under the scepter of the Tsardom." The booklet displays samples of the correspondences showcasing the Russian ambassadors' and consulates' contact with the Armenian committees and the provocative articles in the Armenian press, and summarizes the committees' attacks on the Ottoman army and the Muslim people. Among the locations that are mentioned as the centers of such attacks are Muş, Kozan, Van, Bitlis, Zeytun, Diyarbakır, Sivas, Suşehri, Merzifon, Amasya, Şarki-Karahisar, İzmit, Adapazarı, Bursa, Boğazlıyan, Maraş, and Urfa. The booklet also explains the grounds for the Relocation Law, issued by the Ottoman government. According to this; "the necessity to provide inner peace and external defense [emerged] with requests coming from all over the Empire [regarding similar attacks], has necessitated to removal of the Armenians from locations where their presence is considered threatening and to transfer them to inner regions that are safer and away from foreign influence." Along with accepting that the Armenians "had been victims of deplorable abuse and attacks" during this implementation, it is stated that "because of the deep rage the Muslim people had for the Armenians who were working towards betrayal and uprising to endanger the country of which they are citizens of, these events are inevitable despite being tragic". "Despite the precautions taken against reoccurrence of those kinds of completely unpredictable events," attacks were carried out against the convoys, where the gendarmeries and the police officers who were in charge of protecting the Armenians' lives and property were also killed. In the face of such events, a special law was enacted, whereby a commission was formed for the protection of the property of the relocated Armenians.¹⁹ In the booklet, samples are presented of the report that this commission had prepared as a result of an

19 Per the bylaw issued on 10 June 1915, the Abandoned Properties Commission (*Emvâl-i Metrûke Komisyonu*) to be established in the cities were tasked with registering and protecting the property of the Armenian subjected to the relocation. Kemal Çiçek, "Türk-Ermeni Anlaşmazlığının Siyasi Kökenleri: Tehcir ve Dönüş Üzerine Yaklaşımlar," *Teori*, Sayı 183, Nisan 2005, p. 78. To examine the text of the "Ahar Mahallere Nakledilen Eşhasın Emval ve Düyün ve Matlûbat-ı Metrûkesi Hakkında Kanun-u Muvakkat," please see: "Tehcir" ve Emval-i ...", p. 23-31.

investigation in Sivas. According to this, 53 Ottoman civil, military, judicial, and tax officers were sent to the Court Martial for misconduct and were about to receive criminal sentences. For the 56 people compromised of civil servants, gendarmeries, and soldiers, the Court Martial had imposed compensation penalties of varying quantities and prison sentences varying between one

In his report, the Spanish ambassador Arroyo does not make any evaluations regarding the validity or falsity of the Ottoman government's explanations about the events that had occurred since the genesis of the Armenian Question or the accusations made against of the Allied States. Again, in a similar way, he disregards the justifications and information that had been stated regarding the Relocation Law's enactment and implementation.

month and three years, and the gendarmeries' ranks were demoted. Similarly, 46 officers and soldiers, two gendarmerie commanders, and two privates of the Ottoman army were to be brought to the Court Martial for various crimes. Other than these, 34 people were sentenced to compensation penalties and prison between one month and three years for similar crimes, and four people were sent to the court for crimes of robbery and extortion.

The booklet describes the statements and publications of the Allied Bloc's statesmen and press accusing the Ottoman government of "heading towards a special policy aiming to annihilate the Armenian and other Christian components" as a "web of nonsense". The evaluation of the Sublime Porte towards these types of accusations is as follows:

"With the aim of placing the Ottoman army in a dire situation along with instigating a revolution in the country, the ones who encourage and agitate the Armenians to revolt against the State by presenting the enticing hopes of an independent Armenia are none other than the Allied Powers.

And the unfortunate Armenians have rushed into this colossal struggle only with their dream of reaching their national ideal. The necessary precautions taken against them are only the outcomes of their doing and the doing of those who had encouraged them."²⁰

In his report, the Spanish ambassador Arroyo does not make any evaluations regarding the validity or falsity of the Ottoman government's explanations about the events that had occurred since the genesis of the Armenian Question

20 The above-mentioned booklet was accessed from the attachment of embassy report with the following tag: AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783, Despacho No: 101, IEMFA, "The Brochure Published by the Government Concerning the Armenian Revolutionary Movement," Istanbul, February 29, 1916.

or the accusations made against of the Allied States. Again, in a similar way, he disregards the justifications and information that had been stated regarding the Relocation Law's enactment and implementation. Despite this, he writes that "even though the [Ottoman] Government appears sure of itself before the foreign states' protests regarding its 'indefinable treatment' against the Armenians, it has actually deepened the issue by publishing this book." According to him, it was necessary to really go deep into the issue in order to fully understand where the Young Turks would stop. Because to him, with this booklet, the Young Turks were aiming to prepare the public opinion for their new persecutions. These statements of the ambassador display his deep mistrust towards the CUP Government and thus the booklet's contents. Moreover, he strikingly states that the Ottoman government raged at the survival of the Armenians by aiding the Russians in the Caucasus and also felt jealous of the Armenians' being hardworking and smart compared to lazy and useless Turks. In that case, the Spanish diplomat believes that the relocation was a product of the Young Turks' fanaticism despite the Ottoman government's open rejection of any annihilation policy against the Armenians.

The Spanish diplomat maintains his same mistrustful approach in the report regarding the photograph album titled *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement and Desire (Die Leidenschaft und Bewegung armenische Revolutionäre)* that the Ottoman government had sent to the Spanish embassy.²¹ Despite the governments stating that the people photographed in this album were collaborator Armenians who had joined the Russian army, Ambassador Arroyo argues that the album does not prove this and that these people, instead of being Ottoman Armenians, could also have been Russians fighting for their country. On the other hand, he avoids making comments regarding a second booklet that the Ottoman government had sent to the Spanish embassy in November (this booklet was a continuation of the booklet *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement and the Truth Regarding Government Precautions*).²² Rather, he mentions statements of the Armenian circles in Istanbul that constitute a response to the claims in the booklet. According to those, the Young Turks had been supportive of the prosperity of all non-Muslim people under the Constitution following the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Era, however now, they were making use of the Armenian nationalist movements as an excuse to strengthen their rule. They also argued that it was very difficult

21 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783, Despacho No: 171, IEMFA, "Relays the Album Concerning the Armenian Revolutionary Movement," Istanbul, April 21, 1916. This album which the ambassador had indicated that he was presenting as an attachment was accessed during archival research.

22 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783, Despacho No: 466, IEMFA, "Relays the Second File Concerning the Armenians," Istanbul, November ?, 1916. This booklet which the ambassador had indicated that he was presenting as an attachment was accessed during archival research.

to prove that the weapons photographed as captured weapons in the Ottoman government's publications actually belonged to the Armenians. Even if it was proven, they reminded that the Government had distributed weapons to them long before, so that they could protect themselves against the Kurds. Lastly, the Ottoman Armenians stated that; "Apart from their sympathy, they chose to join the Russian army because they are running away from the racist tortures of the Turks and from their sole goal of death." It is striking that while ambassador Arroyo avoids making his own comments and evaluations in his report, he expresses these counter-claims as if they were the common opinion of all the Ottoman Armenians. Taking into account his distrustful approach against the claims in the Sublime Porte's previous publications and his general approach towards the Young Turks' minority policies; it can be said that the Spanish diplomat shared the Armenians' arguments and views.

Another development that had taken place in the First World War I was the annulment of the 1863 Charter of Armenian Nationals (*Ermeni Milleti Nizamnamesi*) and the enactment of the Armenian Catholicosate and Patriarchate Charter (*Ermeni Katogigosluk ve Patriklik Nizamnamesi*) in its place on 10 August 1916.²³ The biggest change that the new charter had made was the merging of the Sis and Ahtamar Catholicosates (despite them being at the highest level in the spiritual hierarchy) and their articulation to the Istanbul and Jerusalem Patriarchates, and the closing Istanbul Patriarchate and its transfer to the one in Jerusalem. Another change was the removal of the General Assembly (*Meclis-i Umumi*), formed of 140 people and in charge of the election of the patriarch and the patriarchate's clergy and civil council and its replacement with a 12-person Religious Council (*Meclis-i Ruhani*) and a Mixed Council (*Meclis-i Muhtelit*).²⁴

The Spanish diplomat Arroyo evaluates these changes as "a blow on the low degree of freedom that a race and people, who have been subjected to discrimination and mistreatment, owned within the Empire," and comments that "the Young Turk Government is eager to pulverize the existing and the traditional".²⁵ According to him, the Russian armies' entry into the Turkish area

23 Murat Bebiroğlu, *Tanzimat'tan II. Meşrutiyet'e Ermeni Nizamnameleri* (İstanbul: Ohan Matbaacılık, 2003), p. 158,159.

24 Bebiroğlu, *Tanzimat'tan II. Meşrutiyet'e...*, *Ibid.* ; Bengi Kümbül, "Tercüman-I Hakikat Gazetesine Göre Osmanlı Ermenileri (1914-1918)," *Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Tarih Anabilim Dalı, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi, Eskişehir*, p. 39-42. For the hierarchy of the Armenian Church, please see: Mahmut Niyazi Sezgin, "Ermenistan'da Dini Yapı-Dini Hayat", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 8 (Kış 2003), p. 153-176. Detailed information regarding the Armenian Church hierarchy and the changes in the charter has been provided: Türkkan Tunalı, "İspanyol Diplomatik Kaynaklarına Göre..." p. 181.

25 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783, Despacho No: 347, IEMFA, "The Charter Reform for the Armenian Patriarchate," Istanbul, August 21, 1916.

in the Caucasus had brought the Armenian Question to a critical point. At this point, the importance of the General Assembly that was going to be shut down becomes evident once again. The ambassador states that the Young Turks believed that the Apostolic (Gregorian) Armenians had much more privilege than the the Greek Orthodox community and that, unlike the two assemblies of the Greek Orthodox's, the Armenian General Assembly had been provided with wide legislative prerogatives. According to the Young Turks, the 1863 Charter had created revolutionary Armenian organizations and many Armenian priests had become committee members due to the religious institutions' being influenced by political parties. Ambassador Arroyo accepts the degree of truth in this view of the Ottoman government. According to him, "when thinking of the sermons being used for political and nationalist propaganda and high-ranking priests being spiritually connected to the Etchmiadzin Church, it is natural for the Armenian priests to comply with the provocations of the Russians." Moreover, in line with its political plans over Anatolia, the Moscow government had been guaranteeing broad authority and prerogatives to the Etchmiadzin Church during the recent years. Despite this, the Spanish diplomat attributes the effective influence that the Etchmiadzin Church had obtained over the Ottoman Armenians (through the use of spiritual supremacy), once again, to the persecution and maltreatment by the Ottoman government. According to him, "it is certain that the administration that the Young Turks had implemented on the poor Armenians had served the cause of the Russians and led them to gain the sympathy of the Armenians". The ambassador states that, otherwise, the Armenians themselves would have opposed such a justification.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman press had written that the regulation did not abuse the previous religious rights and prerogatives, on the contrary "it highlights the freedom of the Patriarchate so that it does not become a toy of the committee members." In response to the press's approach, the Spanish diplomat Arroyo writes that "nobody is disregarding that a large majority of the Armenians living in Turkey (excluding the settled ones in Syria, Palestine, and the two metropolises of Istanbul and Izmir) were killed ruthlessly and were subjected to a harsh relocation law that meant for them to be in exile in the Arab-Palestinian deserts where they would starve to death." According to him, for exactly this reason, the Armenians of the capital had been surprised by the Ottoman government's establishment of a Catholicosate-Patriarchate in a more practical and suitable way, rather than shutting down the Patriarchate completely and relocating the patriarchs and priests. Ambassador Arroyo evaluates this act of the government as "as a plan to preserve the remaining few hundred thousand of the pre-war two million Armenians so that it would be a 'respectful novelty'." Lastly, the ambassador believes that following this

reform, the government -wanting to interfere in everything existing in Turkey- would now target the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the other churches imposing onto them new arrangements. In light of this report, it is clear that the Spanish diplomacy was of the belief that the CUP Government was conducting a policy to directly annihilate and discourage the Armenians. Moreover, as it has been highlighted in previous reports, it becomes clear that the Spanish diplomacy was of the view that this policy was not limited to the Catholic Armenians and that it would gravitate towards other nationalities who were members of Christianity's other sects.

In the Istanbul Embassy reports of 1917, the Armenian Question is not discussed directly approached in 1917.²⁶ By the year 1918, it is mentioned with the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty between the Alliance Bloc and Russia and the Russian army's withdrawal from the areas that it had occupied in Eastern Anatolia. In his report, Ambassador Arroyo states that the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials had personally guaranteed him that the Empire would be respectful towards the Christian populations in the areas that the Russians were withdrawing from.²⁷ Moreover, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated to him that the Armenians residing in Europe were provoking the foreign nations against the Turks, that the Armenians were initiating activities of murder, arson, and demolition especially in the areas that were invaded by the Russians, and that despite this, the Ottoman government had decided to act respectfully towards everyone in this region regardless of their culture, religion, or ethnicity and to rebuild the settlements that had been destroyed. The Ottoman government, which had sent a press convoy to follow the advances in the region and to provide information, expected foreign governments to acknowledge and appreciate this approach. However, it can be seen that Ambassador Arroyo's evaluation of the government's plan and activities exactly negates this expectation. The ambassador wrote that "the hate between the Turks and Armenians is real and both sides have been attempting to avenge the insults done to them at every opportunity." According to him, Germany, which was capable of ending this situation, was aiding the CUP from the very beginning. The ambassador wrote that the general expectation after the war was that Germany would have control over the Ottoman Government

26 Between the period of November 1916 and March 1918, the Ottoman Armenians are mentioned in the Spanish diplomatic correspondence only in the framework of humanitarian aid efforts during the First World War. In our research conducted at the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain, we have not been able to reach any other report directly dealing with the Armenian Question. This makes us think that such reports may have been lost in the archives or that the Spanish representatives' interest in the subject may have diminished in time.

27 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 3025, Despacho No:119, IEMFA, "Confidential", Istanbul, April 29, 1918.

-like the control previously possessed by the foreign powers- and that rough days were awaiting the Christians, especially the surviving Armenians.

In that case: it can be said that during the developments of the First World War, the Spanish diplomacy's perception towards the Armenian Question was that the CUP Government was directly targeting the Armenian component and that policies based on fanaticism were playing a dominant role; and that every explanation and claim by the Ottoman government -instead of creating any difference in this perception- actually cemented this belief.

The Periods of the Armistice and the War of Liberation (National Struggle)

During the days following the Ottoman Empire's signing of the Armistice of Mudros on the 30th of October, 1918 the Spanish diplomatic reports referred to the Armenian Question only based on the domestic political developments and in one sentence. For example, the report of 19 November states that during the previous day, during the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) session that had assembled due to Tevfik Pasha establishing a new cabinet, "the killings of the Armenians and the Government's vote of confidence" were discussed.²⁸ Similarly, the 1 December report notifying Istanbul's occupation by the Allied Powers refers to the subject as: "the pro-Allied newspapers in Istanbul are exploitatively campaigning against the Turks regarding the assumed killers of the Armenians."²⁹ Despite the report not providing any further information; it can be said that, by indicating the Allied press' excess exploitation, foreign state propaganda in the Armenian Question was mentioned for the first time in the Spanish diplomatic correspondence. Lastly, the 9 December report expresses that in one of the sessions of the Ottoman Chamber of Notables/Senate (*Meclis-i Ayan*), some of the ministers that were present in the government during the war were questioned regarding "the killings of the Armenians and the poor management of the budget."³⁰

The Spanish diplomatic correspondence of 1919 adverted the Armenian Question parallel with the Allied forces' occupation and the Turks' attempt to prove the Turkishness of these areas as a response. In that effort, the report

28 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783, Despacho No:300, IEMFA, "Concerning Politics," Istanbul, November 19, 1918.

29 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783, Despacho No:310, IEMFA, "Concerning the Present Political Situation," Istanbul, December 1, 1918.

30 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783, Despacho No:321, IEMFA, "Concerning Turkish Politics," Istanbul, December 9, 1918.

issued by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the High Commissioners of Britain, the US, Italy, and France emphasized that “the region named as ‘Armenian Provinces’ by Europe are the eastern provinces of the Empire” and provided population statistics displaying the Turks as being the majority in the region.³¹ Spain’s Istanbul Ambassador of the time, Juan Servert³² states that this report of the Ottoman government and similar publications³³ were about the Ottoman Armenians’ crimes committed with the argument of ‘rebellion against the Turkish oppression.’ According to him, the only aim of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in using these publications was to prove the Turkishness of these provinces through statistics and to show the “impossibility and unjustness of the goal to grant the Armenians a large region that the Muslim population would evacuate or continue to be in the majority.” The ambassador, taking into consideration the Americans’ rigor and interest for the Armenians, believed that the Turks’ claims would be of no use. Moreover, according to him, the real goal of the US’ charitable aids was to join France and Britain in the splitting of Anatolia. The US was underhandedly conducting its idea of hegemony over wide areas through the humanitarian aid collected in the US for the Ottoman Armenians and distributed in this the area.³⁴

The Istanbul Embassy of Spain’s reports show that the Turkish public opinion did not remain unresponsive towards the disputes regarding mandates and

31 AMAE, Política, Legajo: 2702, Despacho No:70, IEMFA, “Relays the Nations Principle Published by the Ottoman Government and the Report Concerning the Claims of the Killing of Armenians,” Istanbul, March 6, 1919. In this way, it becomes clear that the Government is referencing Article 24 of the Armistice of Mudros paving the way for the establishment of an Armenian state in these lands. For detailed information regarding the armistice, please see: Tolga Başak, *İngiltere’nin Ermeni Politikası (1830-1923)* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008), p. 325-345.

32 Juan Servert y Vest (1868-1932) had served as the first counsellor at the Chile Embassy between the years 1911-1912, and as Spain’s ambassador in Venezuela in the years 1913-1916. After having served as a department chief at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1917, Servert was appointed as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Istanbul Embassy in June 1918. After presenting President Mustafa Kemal Pasha with his letter of credence in August 1925, Servert served as Spain’s first ambassador in the Republic of Turkey. He continued serving in this position until 1932. *Guía Oficial de España 1911*, Madrid, 1911, p. 108 ; *Guía Oficial de España 1912*, Madrid, 1912, p.106 ; *Guía Oficial de España 1913*, Madrid, 1913, p. 140 ; *Guía Oficial de España 1916*, Madrid, 1916, p.144 ; *Gaceta de Madrid*, No: 345, December 11, 1917, p. 564 ; *Luz*, September 24, 1932, p. 16 ; Suna Suner, “The General Index of the Ambassadors to and from the Ottoman Empire”, <http://archive.donjuanarchiv.at/go/bot/> (14.07.2015)

33 Apart from the Government’s report, a brochure titled “A Russian Military Officers Notes Regarding the Atrocity at Erzurum” was added to the diplomatic report. The brochure is based on the memoirs of the Russian lieutenant colonel Tverdohlebof relaying the Armenians’ activities in the Eastern Front. The said memoirs were published by the Turkish General Staff’s Directorate of Military History and Strategic Research (ATASE). Please see: Yarbay Tverdohlebof, *Gördüklerim, Yaşadıklarım - Erzurum 1917-1918* (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2007).

34 AMAE, Política, Legajo: 2702, Despacho No:148, IEMFA, “Concerning His Visit to the Chief Rabbi and the Interesting Statement Made by Him,” Istanbul, May 14, 1919. Also see: Türkkan Tunalı, “İspanyol Diplomatik Kaynaklarına Göre...,” p. 191, 192.

patronage over the Eastern Provinces. It can be said that this response, as a part of the National Struggle against the invasion of Anatolia, also aimed to avert the invasion of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Elazığ and Diyarbakır. In his report of 26 July 1919, the ambassador Servert states that the Embassy received “very heated” protest telegrams sent by the leading figures and officials of the Ottoman Government “against the support given to the Armenians for the allotment of the Eastern Provinces.”³⁵ In the protests it was emphasized that these locations had been under Turkish ownership and reign unobstructedly for ages and that “fake accusations were being resorted to in order to deceive Europe.” The signatories of the protest telegram had affirmed -also as an indicator of their courage- that they would sacrifice their blood if necessary rather than accepting any course at the hands of the Armenians. On the other hand, Ambassador Servert summarizes the contents of the other protest telegrams coming from the people regarding the French occupation forces’ replacing the British in Cilicia and the Armenians’ activities within the French army, in a general framework, as “protests against the occupations of various regions of Anatolia.”³⁶ In these telegrams sent from the Han Pazarı and Adana, Şırnak and Antep, it is explained that the Armenian and Nestorian gangs encouraged by the French and British occupation forces were committing all kinds of atrocities against the local Muslim population’s honor and lives and a call is made to end this massacre.³⁷ In the ambassador’s reports, apart from expressing the content of the protests, there are no comments on the claims of the violence committed by Armenians. Despite this, it is noteworthy that he prefers to state that “the Armenians are being protected by the French” instead of acknowledging the Armenians joining the French occupation forces. In addition to this, it is seen that he does

It can be stated that, with this approach, the ambassador as well as the Spanish diplomacy disregarded the Armenians’ acts of destruction and violence during the occupations; despite this, they were very sensitive towards any threat that could be directed at the Armenian component.

35 AMAE, Política, Legajo: 2703, Despacho No:247, IEMFA, “Quotations from the Protests Concerning the Eastern Provinces and Armenians’ Ambitions,” Istanbul, July 26, 1919.

36 AMAE, Política, Legajo: 2703, Despacho No: 415, IEMFA, “New Telegraph Protesting Foreign Occupations and the Barbarity of the Troops,” Istanbul, December 13, 1919.

37 AMAE, Política, Legajo: 2703, Despacho No: 421, IEMFA, “Provides Information about Certain Confidential Information,” Istanbul, December 20, 1919. For Britain’s policy towards the Nestorians in the region, please see: Yonca Anzerlioğlu, *Nasturiler* (Ankara: Tamga Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 79 et. al. For the activities of the Armenian and Assyrian-Nestorian troops, please see: Deniz Bayburt, “Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde Süryaniler”, *Akademik Bakış*, Cilt 3, Sayı 6 (Yaz 2010), p. 45-72 ; Salâhi R. Sonyel, “İngiliz Gizli Belgelerine Göre Adana’da Vuku Bulan Türk-Ermeni Olayları”, *Belleten*, Cilt LI, Sayı 201’den ayrı basım), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988.

mention the background of these attacks addressed by the protest telegrams; meaning the establishment of the Armenian Legion with the support of the French during First World War and, following the Armistice of Mudros, the Legion's aims to build an Armenian kingdom in the Cilicia region.³⁸ Despite this, the Spanish diplomat highlights that the resistance of the Nationalist Forces (*Kuvâ-yi Milliye*), which were struggling against this invasion and the attacks, was threatening the Armenian presence.³⁹ It can be stated that, with this approach, the ambassador as well as the Spanish diplomacy disregarded the Armenians' acts of destruction and violence during the occupations; despite this, they were very sensitive towards any threat that could be directed at the Armenian component.

It can be observed that as the National Struggle gained momentum in Anatolia, the diplomatic correspondence began to refer to the Armenian Question less and less. In the reports written at this point, it is stated that the Armenians and Greeks, who were fearing the possibility that the National Struggle would succeed, had a change in attitude as they wanted to completely forget the arrogance, offence, and contempt of the past.⁴⁰ A change in the Spanish diplomacy's approach towards the Armenian Question is also observed during this period. Despite the Spanish Consul in Adana having written to the Istanbul Ambassador Servert that "the agitation against the Armenians is continuing increasingly and has now turned into a hatred against all Christians" in Adana and its domain, Servert argues that a part of the blame for such "extremism" belonged to the French.⁴¹ Likewise, according to the rumors he had heard, while the French forces were withdrawing from the region, they had prevented the Armenians (by pointing their guns at them) from withdrawing with them. According to the ambassador, whether these rumors were true or not, the occupation forces were still at fault for their imprudence and egoism. The Allied Powers had not provided enough protection to the Armenians who had left their homelands voluntarily or due to the conflicts; yet the Armenians were

38 The Armenian Legion (East Legion) was formed by the French Colonel Romieu in November 1916 from the Armenians who had deserted and fled to Egypt. It functioned as a support unit for the French army in the Southern Front. M. Serdar Palabıyık, "Fransız Arşiv Belgelerinin Işığında Doğu Lejyonu'nun Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (November 1916-1917) II," *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 23-24 (2006), p.206-225. For detailed information, please see: M. Serdar Palabıyık, "Fransız Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Doğu Lejyonu'nun Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (November 1918 – 1921)," *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 30 (2008), p. 113-138.

39 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 412, IEMFA, "Political News," Istanbul, December 10, 1919.

40 AMAE, Política, Legajo: 2702, Despacho No:341, IEMFA, "Government and Nationalism," Istanbul, October 11, 1919.

41 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 119, IEMFA, "Civil War and the Status of the Christians," Istanbul, April 21, 1920.

to ones to bear the consequences of this. These comments of the ambassador have significant importance as, for the first time, he had accepted the role of the Allied Powers in the Armenian Question. Nonetheless, it should not be overlooked that both Spanish Ambassador at Istanbul and the Istanbul Consul at Adana do refer to the Armenian activities that led to the reaction and resistance of the Muslim-Turkish people and only evaluate the events in the framework of the struggles that the Armenians had faced.

The Spanish Vice Consul at Adana's 6 June 1920 report is, however, take a completely different approach.⁴² The Vice Consul indicates that approximately 15,000 armed Armenians who had come to Adana from Sis (Kozan) and Saimbeyli (Haçın) had forcefully settled in the houses of the Muslims and were carrying out all manner of abuse against the Muslims, who were unarmed compared to them. The Vice Consul believed that even if a ceasefire were to be signed between the Nationalist Forces and the French forces, it would have been difficult to convince the Armenians, who had amassed in Adana and were nearly 30,000, to give up their weapons. That being the case; the French soldiers did not have the sufficient power to stop the crimes occurring in the region or to restore order. It is seen that when the Istanbul Ambassador Servert informed the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the situation, instead of presenting citations from the Mersin Vice Consul's report, he gave the exact French copy of it. Thus, Ambassador Servert maintained his attitude by avoiding making comments in the face of the reports and telegrams until this date that had expressed the Armenians' separatist and destructive activities. The feature of the report that is different from the previous ones is that it does not include comments that highlight the victimhood of the Armenian people in relation to the Ottoman Government, the Nationalist Forces, or the Muslim-Turkish people, or reveal sympathy towards Armenians. In fact, for the first time with this report, an official within the Spanish diplomacy mentions the armed Armenians' abuse against the Muslim-Turkish people. It is significant to emphasize that the report was written after the 20-day ceasefire declaration⁴³ from 29/30 May 1920 between the French forces in the South Front and the Nationalist Forces. This development is for sure an indicator that the success of the National Struggle was on the rise.

A greater change in the Spanish diplomacy's approach towards the issue would occur with the verification of the reality that the Ottoman Armenians were

42 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 214, IEMFA, "Situation in the Adana Province," Istanbul, July 15, 1920. The report of the Spanish Vice Consul in Mersin dated 6 June 1920 is supplied as an attachment in the report of the Istanbul Embassy dated 15 July 1920.

43 "Ayıntap Cephesinde Fransızlarla Harbin Durdurulduğuna Dair Telgraf," Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri IV, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006, p. 348.

attacking the local population.⁴⁴ In his report of 30 July regarding the conflicts between the Armenians in the province of Adana and the Kemalist forces', Ambassador Servert comments that "the roles of the victim and the executioner are changing between the Armenians and the Turks depending on the ups and downs of the war." Moreover, it is written in the report that "the violence committed by the Armenians should be condemned, but the Armenians in Europe are conducting biased campaigns that they are innocent victims of the Turks' cruelty and their need to be defended and supported against the Turks." According to him, if this campaign that the Armenians were conducting did not covertly gain vitality -with the impetus of politics- the crime and the criminal could not be determined and no punishment could be given. In the continuation of the same report, the Ambassador Servert advocates that "the persecution policy" the French occupation forces were conducting through the Armenians would reduce the Turkish population to nothing, but at the same time, would lead the Turks joining the ranks of the Kemalists. On the other hand, his words "the French officials are not considering at all the possibility that the Armenians and Turks could collaborate –as they had done so in the past- against the foreigners, thus aggravating their [foreigners'] life" and his explanation for this is quite striking. According to him, the Armenians who had immigrated to the US before the First World War had attained prosperity there due to their intelligence and industriousness. But a large majority of the Armenians that did not face any significant obstacle from leaving the country before the war, had found exploiting the lethargy of the Turks more favorable to their interests and, by means of this lethargy, they had reached prosperity without taking heed of the danger of death. The ambassador was of the view that "now; as the Turks move away from the regions where they had lived together, the Armenians will not be able to compete against any of the French, Greek, or Italian components who will settle here and will not be able to continue their tireless exploitations." According to him, the Armenians, for exactly this reason, would realize their mistake of overdoing the spite and the evil against the Turks.

As it can be seen, in the summer of 1920, the Spanish diplomacy validated that the Armenians had cooperated with the invading forces, that the Turks were forced to migrate by pressure and oppression, and that this policy belonged to the Allied Powers. Nonetheless, it was also accepted that the Armenians were conducting a biased campaign in Europe against Turks. As the Spanish Ambassador Juan Servert had openly and continuously shared his opinion that it was the Armenians oppressed by the Turks (not the other way around) so far,

44 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 227, IEMFA, "Explains and Comments the Situation in the Adana Province," Istanbul, July 30, 1920.

this acknowledgement constitutes a breaking point in the Spanish diplomacy's perception of the Armenian Question. Now the ambassador -emphasizing that the opinion was aggravated by a biased campaign- pointed out that if the European politics continued to support the Armenians and succeeded at this, at the end the Turks would be blamed as the responsible ones for the events experienced during the relocation. Moreover, the ambassador attributed the reason that the people, who were subjected to the Armenian Relocation, did not leave the country before to "their preference exploiting the Turks." Thus, he accepted that the Armenians were maintaining a better social status to the detriment of the Muslim-Turkish component. It is quite interesting that he attributed the possibility of mutual forgiving and togetherness between the Turks and Armenians to the Armenians' desire to seek the same interest –the desire to continue exploiting. With this view of his, the Spanish diplomat painted a picture much different than his general approach towards the industriousness and skills of the Armenians that he often admired, in comparison to the "lethargic Turks."

It can be stated that this change occurred during a period when the National Struggle was gaining success against the occupation forces with aid from Anatolia. The embassy reports of this period were reiterating news of "the Armenians, who were presented in Europe as the innocent victims of the Turks' cruelties, are conducting atrocities against the Turks" and that "the Allied officials are not able to prevent the arbitrary acts of the Armenians."

It can be stated that this change occurred during a period when the National Struggle was gaining success against the occupation forces with aid from Anatolia. The embassy reports of this period were reiterating news of "the Armenians, who were presented in Europe as the innocent victims of the Turks' cruelties, are conducting atrocities against the Turks" and that "the Allied officials are not able to prevent the arbitrary acts of the Armenians."⁴⁵ Moreover, the reports were indicating two possible solutions of the Allied Powers' invasions in Anatolia through the Armenians and other minorities. The first of these was the Armenian component joining the Muslim-Turkish component against the Allied Powers, the second was the country's eventual unification around the Turkishness-Muslimness common ground due to the impossibility of reconciliation with the non-Muslim components. In any case, it was often highlighted in this period as well that the Turks had no other option but to defend their country, that the National Struggle was a justified and fair war for

45 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 251, IEMFA, "The Situation in the Adana Province," Istanbul, August 23, 1920.

survival. Despite this, it was not denied that the Armenians would use the events that had occurred during the relocation against the Turks as the justification for their own cruelty and excess.⁴⁶

The Spanish diplomatic correspondence does not mention the Ottoman Armenians or the Armenian Question from October 1920 to November 1921. During this period exceeding a year, even in reports mentioning the Sevres Peace Treaty that the Ottoman Empire had signed, the articles of the treaty that were to lead to the establishment of an Armenian state in Anatolia are not mentioned.⁴⁷ Likewise, the reports do not contain any information about or reference to the Republic of Armenia signing the Gyumri Treaty with the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) or thus, its renunciation of ambitions over Anatolian lands which meant the collapse of the Armenian people's desire of "Great Armenia." In 1921, the only information given relating to the Armenian Question is that after the signing of the 1921 French-Turkish Agreement, despite the Ankara Government having explained that respect would be given to the minorities, the Armenians and Greek -who "knew that the Turks' commitments of forgiving or forgetting could not be trusted"- had evacuated Cilicia -where the Ankara Government's army would enter.⁴⁸ In the reports of 1922, the Armenian Question is increasingly neglected and the subject is mentioned only in the context of the Greek army's and Ottoman Greeks' atrocities against the Muslim-Turkish people.

The most interesting one amongst these reports is about a brochure that claimed the Turks were persecuting the Pontus Greeks. Ambassador Servert stated that he did not consider these claims believable at all, on the contrary, he pointed out in his report that "after the Armistice of Mudros, the Greeks and Armenians had faith in the current and future absolute power of the Allied armies. They have insulted, tortured, and committed all kinds of intemperance against the Turks under the shelter of this power."⁴⁹ The ambassador expressed that every

46 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 289, IEMFA, "The Turkish-Armenian War," Istanbul, October 16, 1920.

47 For the articles numbered 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, and 93 of the treaty under the title "The 6. Section Armenia," please see: Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri, Cilt I (Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, 1953), p. 451-455. As for the Article 230 of the treaty, it clearly makes a reference to the deaths experienced during the Armenian Relocation. Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve ...*, p. 604.

48 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1785, Despacho No: 207, IEMFA, "General Harrington's Statements after Arriving in Istanbul and the Accord on the Articles of the French-Turkish Agreement Concerning Armenian, Greek etc. Residents in Cilicia," Istanbul, November 15, 1921 ; AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1785, Despacho No: 231, IEMFA, "A Plan for Conference in Istanbul for a Peace in the East," Istanbul, December 26, 1921.

49 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 65, IEMFA, "Relays the Brochure Concerning the Violence Attributed to the Turks in the Black Sea (Ponto Euxino)," Istanbul, March 17, 1922.

state punishes uprisings and insurgencies during wars and that this is very natural. Furthermore, the ambassador stated; “For this reason, those who revolt should not expect the mercy from the Turks who have made their own uprising in Anatolia against the powerful victorious states.” The ambassador, while accepting that the Greeks and Armenians had sometimes faced really harsh treatment in the Empire, advocated that both of these peoples had reached prosperity by benefitting from the laziness of the Turks. Faced with this fact, it is very striking that he wrote “the Turkish army may have surpassed the boundary it had aimed for, but those boundaries can sometimes be surpassed by even the most civilized nations.” According to him, “the saddest aspect of this and similar events is the presence of a sly campaign that is striving to use the ‘religious oppression against the Christians’ mask as a justification.” Perhaps the most striking part of the Spanish diplomat’s report is that, for the first time since him taking office, he had used an anti-Armenian wording. The development that had caused this change was the Armenian gangs’ (who were either collaborating with the occupation forces or acting independently) torture and torment against the unarmed Muslim-Turkish people becoming undeniable especially following the Armistice of Mudros. Likewise, it is seen that: whereas in 1920 he had preferred to relay without comment the consulate reports that were explaining these kinds of attacks and destruction carried out by Armenians; in 1922, he was rejecting the news that were claiming that Turks were oppressing the minorities, and in fact, during the beginning of the First World War, he was accusing the Armenians for revolting against the Ottoman Empire.

The Years of 1922-1923

In the Istanbul Embassy reports of the final quarter of 1922, the Armenian Question is approached in the framework of a ‘mass immigration’ issue. The mass migration, unlike the forced migration that was employed during World War I under the Relocation Law, can be evaluated as a way of escape or a search for a homeland that the Armenian circles themselves had organized. Regarding the mass immigration that was being brought to the agenda with the GNAT beginning to hand out passports to Armenians,⁵⁰ the Catholic Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul met with the Ambassador Juan Servet and

50 Nejla Günay also writes that, upon the high number of requests for migration submitted from Adana and its environs, the GNAT Executive Deputies Delegation (*TBMM İcra Vekilleri Heyeti*) had allowed on 22 April 1922 the Christian folk to travel to foreign countries. Nejla Günay, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Maraş Yöresinde Sosyal Yapı Değişimleri ve Bu Değişimde Ermeni-Fransız Rolü,” Gazi Üniversitesi, *Türk Kültürü Ve Hacı Bektaş Velî Araştırma Dergisi*, Sayı 51 (2009), p. 252. It is understood that the passports mentioned by the ambassador were the ones that had been prepared this way and were visa passports that were valid for at most one year.

requested that the Spanish government initiate the necessary steps so that the Latin American states would accept the mass immigration of 6000 Armenians to their lands.⁵¹ In his report regarding the topic, Ambassador Servert also clearly displayed his view on the Relocation Law. To him, the Armenians and Greeks' deaths and forced migration were not always due to "the Turks' fanatic and capricious hostilities," but due to these components revolting against the Turks with "little or no justification." The Armenian uprisings were based on "the desire and ambition of the Armenians -who were actually superior in wealth, influence, and activity- to bring the dominant Muslims-Turks under their own [Armenians'] yoke." The Allied Powers did not know of this situation and "did not want to research the matter as they were benefitting from the anti-Turkish atmosphere that the Armenian laments were creating." Under the circumstances, "the Turks, who saw the future, had no other choice than to decide on the mass migration of some components." This was so because these components "who had been living in prosperity and who had become wealthier at the expense of the Turks," had "forgotten all the gratitude and loyalty in times of difficulty and had rushed to fill enemy lines and to work on behalf of the enemies' goals and claims." Faced with the success of the Turks' National Struggle, the Greeks had left their properties and disappeared, while the Armenians were thinking without doubt that, after their misdeeds, their slates would be wiped clean. On the other hand, the Turks had not declared the Armenians as enemies, instead, they had "decided on the relocation by moderating their emotions of revenge." According to the ambassador, the Turks' not bearing animosity against the Catholic Armenians alone had proved that fanaticism was not influential in the events related to the deaths and the forced migration. "At the same time, this difference is an indicator that the Turks' hatred -even if the more or less violent precautions were directed at all of them [Armenians] without differentiation- were due to the extremism of the separatist Armenians." According to the ambassador, considering all of this, the Kemalist officials were making "a great favor" by allowing the mass migration of the Armenians.

As the report clearly expresses, Ambassador Servert advocated that the responsibility of the minority problem in general and the Armenian Question in specific belonged to these nations (Greeks, Armenians), and that the passing of the Relocation Law and the events that had occurred during the forced migration were also the results of these components' thoughts and actions. It is very striking that this argument overlaps with the justifications and

51 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 230, IEMFA, "The Request to Attempt for the Mass Migration of Catholic Armenians," Istanbul, September 26, 1922. For detailed information on Spain's attempt to aid the Armenian migration, please see: Yasemin Türkkan Tunali, "İspanyol Diplomatik Kaynaklarına Göre...", p. 206-215.

explanations that the Ottoman government had put forward long before in its booklet published in 1916 titled *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement and the Truth Regarding Government Precautions (Ermeni Devrimci Hareketi ve Hükümet Önlemleri Hakkında Hakikat)*.⁵² It is striking because, in his previous reports, the ambassador had evaluated this booklet of the Ottoman government and its other similar publications as precursors to other cruelties and thus, had displayed his mistrust towards the government as well as his sympathy towards the Armenian people. Moreover, throughout the First World War, he had defended his opinion and argument that the sole responsibility for the Armenian Question, especially for the events that occurred during the relocation and Armenian deaths that had occurred throughout the First World War, belonged to the Ottoman government. Yet the prominent view in his last report appears to be similar to the closing statement of the Ottoman Government's booklet that was published six years before.⁵³ As a matter of fact, the ambassador's evaluation includes not only the atrocities that the Armenians had carried out against the Muslim people in Eastern Anatolia, Caucasia, and lastly Cilicia between 1918-1920, but also the insurrectionary movements during 1915. This change in the Spanish diplomat's view -again based on his own words- can be connected to him researching the depths of the matter unlike the Allied Powers. It can be argued that from that report on, he maintained the same line of thinking, because of his references⁵⁴ regarding the Armenians being directly responsible for especially the enacting of the Relocation Law such as: "the Armenians who revolted despite living in Turkey under good conditions at the expense of the Turks and being children of Turkey, contrary to the Greeks, did not have excuses such as patriotism and the growth of the nation that they belonged to."⁵⁵

Amidst military and political developments such as the National Struggle's victory gaining clarity, the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, the establishment of the GNAT's administration in Istanbul and the Thrace, and

52 Please see footnote 21.

53 "... The precautions that had to be taken against them were solely the product of their own and their encouragers' doing."

54 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 257, IEMFA, "Explains the Telegraph Number 26 Concerning the Armenian Migration," Istanbul, October 19, 1922.

55 In these reports, the following views comes to the fore; "The reason for the death of the Armenians and the Greeks did not always have to do with the Turks' religious hatred," and "these nations had betrayed the state despite being Ottoman subjects." AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 282, IEMFA, "Explains the Telegraph Number 26 Concerning the Armenian Migration," Istanbul, November 6, 1922 ; AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 291, IEMFA, "Repeats the Urgent Requests Concerning the Voyage of the Armenian Migrants," Istanbul, November 16, 1922 ; AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 319, IEMFA, "Explains that the Contents of Telegraph Number 40 Concerning Migration to Bolivia Has Been Relayed to the Armenian Catholic Acting Patriarch, Istanbul, December 16, 1922.

the initiation of the Lausanne Peace Conference; the number of reports that referred to the Armenian Question had dropped significantly. In one of these reports, a news report is shared regarding the hearing of assassination preparations against the prominent leaders of the Ankara government by some members of Armenian committees that came from abroad.⁵⁶ In the report, it is stated that the news report had given the impression “to the European foreigners that the Ankara government was aiming to set up the stage to kill and suppress the Armenians,” but there are no comments regarding the validity of this news report or how the Armenian components would be affected by this. Along with this, the diplomatic report includes that the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul had visited the GNAT government’s Istanbul Representative Refet Paşa upon this news report and expressed “his contentment for the victory that the nationalists had won and stated in an exaggerated manner that the Armenians want to stay in the country.” In this manner, it can be said that the report indicates the rapprochement efforts of the Armenian circles towards the Ankara government.⁵⁷ Again in the same report, a prediction of the Spanish diplomacy is shared regarding the future situation of the relations between the Armenian component and the Ankara Government. According to this, the Kemalist officials, who had noticed that the mass immigration would be a major loss for the development of the country and the reparation of the war damages, “had ordered for every Christian that left Istanbul without justification to be taxed 100 liras and for those that did not pay this tax to not be allowed to leave the country.” For this reason, according to the diplomatic report, it could be believed that if this good sign displayed by the Ankara Government would be supported during the Lausanne Peace Conference, “the Turks would no doubt give assurances to the Christian minorities in exchange for matters that interested them more.” In fact, it was thought that in the future, the Turks “would accept an apology from the Armenians even if it was forced or insincere.”⁵⁸ It can be gathered from this that Spanish diplomacy believed

56 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 307, IEMFA, “An Attempt Is Offered in Favor of the Christian Minorities,” Istanbul, December 1, 1922.

57 The Armenian Patriarch had already visited Refet Pasha several times before the one that was announced by the Anadolu Agency. After this visit, the patriarch made enthusiastic statements concerning the Armenian community’s loyalty to the Ankara government and their desire to live together with the Turks. After the assassination attempt news, his visit to Refet Pasha together with the other religious leaders in Istanbul was also relayed İsmet Pasha, the Turkish Chief Delegate who was at the Lausanne Conference at the time. Ramazan Erhan Güllü, “Ermeni Sorununun Ortaya Çıkış ve Gelişim Sürecinde İstanbul Ermeni Patrikhanesi’nin Tutumu (1878-1923),” Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2013, p. 536-538 ; Bilâl N. Şimşir, “No. 138, Başbakan H. Rauf Bey’den İsmet Paşa’ya, 19 Aralık 1922”, *Lozan Telgrafları I (1922-1923)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990), p. 246-247. It is understood that both the Armenian Patriarch and the other religious leaders had been closely following the Ankara government.

58 AMAE, Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784, Despacho No: 291, IEMFA, “Repeats the Urgent Requests Concerning the Voyage of the Armenian Migrants,” Istanbul, November 16, 1922.

the Ankara government was ready to clean the slate regarding the Armenians' crimes and that it was even possible for their minority rights to be guaranteed.

In the Spanish diplomatic correspondence, the last report that mentions the Armenian Question presents the Ankara Government's approach towards the situation in the framework of the Lausanne Peace Conference. According to the statement of the Spain Bern Ambassador who was following the conference, during the meetings of the Subcommittee on 6 January 1923⁵⁹, the Turkish delegate and his entourage had left the hall in the face of reparations being demanded "for the Armenians and the others."⁶⁰ The Spanish diplomat linked this event to the Turks being encouraged by the Paris Conference's failure and the disagreements between the Allied Powers. In fact, it is known that this attitude of the Turkish delegation was linked to the Ankara government's instruction on making no concessions on especially the subjects of the establishment of Armenian country and the removal of the capitulations.⁶¹

Scanning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain Archive, among the files numbering no more than ten that date back to 1928, no files can be found that advert the Lausanne Peace Treaty signed during the meetings in the second half of the Lausanne Peace Conference or afterwards. For this reason, the Spanish diplomacy's information, interpretation and point of view regarding the Armenian Question and how it was shaped at the beginning of the newly built Republican era is left in the dark.

Conclusion

While generally evaluating the Spanish diplomacy's correspondence between 1914-1923 concerning the Armenian Question, it is seen that certain events and developments that we know to have occurred, have not been reflected onto the reports. It is also seen that the reports mention the subject mostly indirectly while expressing the military and political developments on the agenda or

59 In the telegraph, even though it is indicated that the commission was the Subcommittee for Mines, the said event that taken place in the Subcommittee for Minorities. Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım, Cilt III* (İstanbul, 1968), p. 1061-1064 ; Şimşir, "No.197-198, İsmet Paşa'dan Başbakanlığa, 7 Ocak 1922", *Lozan Telgrafları...*, p. 344-348. For the discussions that took place in the 6 January 1923 in the Subcommittee for Minorities, please see: *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar-Belgeler, Birinci Takım, C. I, Kitap II*, çev. Seha L. Meray, 3.b. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), p. 275-282.

60 AMAE, Política, Legajo: 2702, No: 59, From the Bern Ambassador Reynoso to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegraph, Lausanne, January 6-7, 1923.

61 *Türk İstiklâl Harbi, II. Cilt, 6. Kısım, IV. Kitap* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Dairesi Resmî Yayınları, 1969), p. 117, 118.

sometimes directly together with events that involve the subject. The fact that these developments did not take place in the reports neither indirectly nor directly, and the inability to access the reports dealing with them suggests the possibility of the documents' being missing in the archive. For example; the Spanish Istanbul Embassy report of 21 August 1916 very thoroughly examines the annulment of the 1863 Charter of Armenian Nationals and the enactment of the Armenian Catholicosate and Patriarchate Charter in its place. However, in the reports of 1918, there is no information regarding the Ottoman Empire reenacting the 1863 Charter following the Armistice of Mudros⁶² or the Armenian Patriarch Zevan Efendi -who had been banished to Baghdad due to his harmful activities in 1913- returning to his duty in 1918.⁶³ Similarly, in the reports of 1918, there is no information on the Ottoman government preparing the 31 December 1918 Return Bylaw for the return and settlement of the Armenians who had been subjected to relocation or the endeavors that continued until 1920⁶⁴ according to this bylaw. The document the absence of which is most striking in the Spanish embassy reports is the Ottoman government's diplomatic memorandum sent to Sweden, Holland, and Denmark together with Spain in 13 February 1919, petitioning for the establishment of a neutral commission aiming to investigate the relocation.⁶⁵ Having carried out a scan in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, neither this diplomatic memorandum, nor the Istanbul embassy's memorandum to the Sublime Porte stating that it had sent the Ottoman government's memorandum to the Spanish Ministry Foreign Affairs could be found. Similarly, the document indicating the negative response from the neutral states on 6 May 1919 cannot be found either.⁶⁶ This author became aware of the presence of these documents from other authors who have made use of the Ottoman State Archives. These kinds of developments involving the Armenian Question not being in the reports makes one think of the possibility that either the Spanish diplomats never wrote about this subject or the reports they had sent have disappeared from the archive in time -as it has been the case for the three mentioned reports.

62 Ramazan Erhan Güllü, "Ermeni Sorununun Ortaya...", p. 483-486 ; Abdurrahman Bozkurt, "Osmanlı Devleti ile Ermenistan Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki İlişkiler (1918-1920)," *Ankara Üniversitesi OTAM Dergisi*, Sayı 34 (2013), p. 44, footnote no: 93.

63 Ramazan Erhan Güllü, "Ermeni Sorununun Ortaya...", p. 481-490.

64 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Ermeni Tehciri*, p. 104-110 ; İbrahim Ethem Atnur, "Osmanlı Hükümetleri ve Tehcir Edilen Rum ve Ermenilerin Yeniden İskânı Meselesi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, Cilt 4, Sayı 14, p.121-139 ; İsmigül Çetin, "Milli Mücadele Döneminde İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliği'nin Ermenilerin Yeniden İskânı, Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselelerindeki Rolü," *Yeni Türkiye*, Sayı 60 (2014), p. 1-11.

65 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Ermeni Tehciri*, p. 94.

66 Please see: Osmanlı Arşivi, Hariciye Nezareti, Mütareke, No: 43/17 - Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Ermeni Tehciri*, Ek XX, XXI, p. 148-153.

It is seen that the Spanish diplomacy's perception on the Armenian Question does not display a consistent approach; the discourses and viewpoints change through time. Throughout the First World War, according to Spain, at the heart of the situation lay the Young Turks' intentional hostility towards the non-Muslim people, especially the Armenians, reaching the point of fanaticism. According to that view, the Relocation Law served the Committee of Union and Progress' aim to eliminate the Armenian component through oppression and forced migration or expulsion from the country; in order to use the Muslim-Turkish component to fill the gap in the economic life left in their absence. It linked the annulment of the Armenian National Charter in 1916 to the CUP's aim to take away the few freedoms that the Armenian people possessed. In addition, the Spanish diplomats displayed a clear mistrust towards the Ottoman government's claims of Russia's role in the formation of the Armenian Question and the Armenian Church's support towards the Armenian gangs in their attacks against the local people and their collusion with the Russian army. The Spanish diplomacy continued its pro-Armenian attitude during the Allied Powers' occupation of Turkey.

However, in the face of the Allied Powers' and the Armenian collaborators' attacks on the local people, the Spanish diplomacy considered the Great Powers responsible of these attacks and the rise of the Armenian Question. Lastly, in the period when the Turkish National Struggle was achieving successive military victories, despite having previously very much criticized the CUP, the Spanish diplomacy advocated that the CUP's policies towards the Armenians had valid grounds. The Spanish diplomacy began to accuse the Armenians, whom it had previously described as oppressed and despised people, for having betrayed the state and having been ungrateful towards the Muslim-Turkish people.

Parallel to the Armenian Question, from the First World War towards the end of the National Struggle, a change can be observed in the Spanish diplomacy's perception of the Turks. According to this, the 'Turk' in the context of the CUP was defined as anti-Christian, jealous of the status and prosperity that the non-Muslims had attained with their industriousness, and a lazy and useless component of the Ottoman community. But the 'Turk' in the context of the

In short, the Spanish diplomacy's perception during the period in which the CUP was defeated in the First World War was not the same as its perception during the period in which the Ankara government was victorious. From this viewpoint, it is understood that the change in Spain's perception of the Armenian Question was directly related to the Turkish politics' status in world politics.

Ankara Government denoted a nation merely fighting for its survival and who held no feelings of vengeance despite the Armenian and Greek gangs having attacked them and who had a forgiving character enabling it to once again live together with these people -as it had been the case before the intervention of the Allied Powers.

In short, the Spanish diplomacy's perception during the period in which the CUP was defeated in the First World War was not the same as its perception during the period in which the Ankara government was victorious. From this viewpoint, it is understood that the change in Spain's perception of the Armenian Question was directly related to the Turkish politics' status in world politics. The course of Spain's evaluation of the matter from a time when it was neutral in the war and when the Armenian Question was an on-going issue and Spain's eventual developing of a discourse a discourse incongruent with the 'Armenian thesis' (a thesis formulated through distortions) is also a subject that should be highlighted. This situation proves that the Armenian Question had already been turned into a political issue from its very beginning.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación,
(AMAE): Correspondencia, Legajo: 1782.

Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación,
(AMAE): Correspondencia, Legajo: 1783.

Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación,
(AMAE): Correspondencia, Legajo: 1784.

Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación,
(AMAE): Correspondencia, Legajo: 1785.

Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación,
(AMAE): Correspondencia, Legajo: 3025.

Política, Legajo: 2702.

Política, Legajo: 2703.

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA):

Hariciye, Siyasi Kısım, (HR. SYS.), Dosya No: 2881.

Periodicals

Gaceta de Madrid, No: 12, January 12, 1907.

Gaceta de Madrid, No: 107, April 16, 1912.

Gaceta de Madrid, No: 52, February 21, 1913.

Gaceta de Madrid, No: 153, June 2, 1914.

Gaceta de Madrid, No: 219, August 7, 1914.

Gaceta de Madrid, No: 345, December 11, 1917.

Gaceta de Madrid, No: 4, January 4, 1919.

La Epoca, July 16, 1920.

ABC, May 6, 1924.

Luz, September 24, 1932.

Books

Akçora, Ergünöz. *Van ve Çevresinde Ermeni İsyancıları (1896-1916)*. İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları, 1994.

Anderson, Matthew Smith. *Doğu Sorunu 1774-1923 Uluslararası İlişkiler Üzerine Bir İnceleme*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001.

Anzerlioğlu, Yonca. *Nasturiler*. Ankara: Tamga Yayıncılık, 2000.

Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918, Cilt I-II. Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2005.

Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri IV. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006.

Başak, Tolga. *İngiltere'nin Ermeni Politikası (1830-1923)*. IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008: İstanbul.

Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkaslar'da ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezâlimi I, 1906-1918*. Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1995.

Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. *Ermeni Komiteleri (1891-1895)*. Ankara: 2001.

Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermenilerin Sevk ve İskânı (1878-1920)*. Ankara, 2007.

Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915-1920)*. Ankara, 1994.

Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Fransız İlişkileri (1879-1918), Cilt I*. Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2004.

Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Rus İlişkileri (1907-1921), Cilt III*. Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2006.

Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri (1896-1922), Cilt IV*. Ankara, 2004.

Bebiroğlu, Murat. *Tanzimat'tan II. Meşrutiyet'e Ermeni Nizamnameleri*. İstanbul: Ohan Matbaacılık, 2003.

Çiçek, Kemal. *Ermenilerin Zorunlu Göçü, 1915-1917*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2005.

Erim, Nihat. *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri, Cilt I (Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları)*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, 1953.

Ermeni Komitelerin Amaçları ve İhtilal Hareketleri, Meşrutiyet'in İlanından Önce ve Sonra. Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2003.

Faiz Demiroğlu, *Van'da Ermeni Mezâlimi (1895-1920)*. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1985.

Guía Oficial de España 1911, Madrid, 1911.

Guía Oficial de España 1912, Madrid, 1912.

Guía Oficial de España 1913, Madrid, 1913.

Guía Oficial de España 1914, Madrid, 1914.

Guía Oficial de España 1915, Madrid, 1915.

Guía Oficial de España 1916, Madrid, 1916.

Gürün, Kamuran. *Ermeni Dosyası*. Remzi Kitabevi, 2005.

Halaçoğlu, Yusuf. *Ermenilerin Suriye'ye Nakli: Sürgün mü, Soykırım mı, Belgeler*. Ankara: Ankara Ticaret Odası, 2005.

Halaçoğlu, Yusuf. *Ermeni Tehciri ve Gerçekler*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2001.

Halaçoğlu, Yusuf. *Ermeni Tehciri*. İstanbul: Babıâli Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2004.

İlter, Erdal. *Türkiye'de Sosyalist Ermeniler'in Silâhlanma Faaliyetleri ve Millî Mücadele'de Ermeniler (1890-1923)*. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2005

Kardeş, Salâhaddin. *"Tehcir" ve Emval-i Metrûke Mevzuatı*. Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2008.

Lewy, Guenter. *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey*. Utah: The University of Utah Press, 2005.

Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar-Belgeler, Birinci Takım, C. I, Kitap II, çev. Seha L. Meray, 3.b. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001.

Münir Süreyya Bey. *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasî Tarihçesi (1877-1914)*. Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Yayını, 2001.

Özdemir, Hikmet et al. *Ermeniler: Sürgün ve Göç*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2005.

Sakarya, İhsan. *Belgelerle Ermeni Sorunu*. Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1992.

Şimşir, Bilâl N. *Lozan Telgrafları I (1922-1923)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990.

Şimşir, Bilâl N. *Ermeni Meselesi, (1774-2005)*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 2005.

Türk İstiklâl Harbi, II. Cilt, 6. Kısım, IV. Kitap. Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Dairesi Resmî Yayınları, 1969.

Uras, Esat. *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987.

Yarbay Tverdohlebof. *Gördüklerim Yaşadıkların Erzurum 1917-1918*. Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2007.

Articles

Arslan, Esat. “1915 Zorunlu Göç Geçici Yasasının Gerekliliği ve Uygulamalarının Değişik Açılardan Değerlendirilmesi.” *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 7 (Sonbahar 2002), p.18-40.

Atnur, İbrahim Ethem. “Osmanlı Hükümetleri ve Tehcir Edilen Rum ve Ermenilerin Yeniden İskânı Meselesi.” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, Cilt 4, Sayı 14, p. 121-139.

Bayburt, Deniz. “Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde Süryaniler.” *Akademik Bakış*, Cilt 3, Sayı 6 (Yaz 2010), p. 45-72.

Bozkurt, Abdurrahman. “Osmanlı Devleti ile Ermenistan Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki İlişkiler (1918-1920).” *Ankara Üniversitesi OTAM Dergisi*, Sayı 34 (2013), p. 19-58.

- Çetin, İsmigül. "Milli Mücadele Döneminde İngiliz Yüksek Komiserliği'nin Ermenilerin Yeniden İskânı, Ermeni Kadınları ve Çocukları Meselelerindeki Rolü." *Yeni Türkiye*, Sayı 60 (2014), p. 1-11.
- Çiçek, Kemal. "Türk-Ermeni Anlaşmazlığının Siyasi Kökenleri: Tehcir ve Dönüş Üzerine Yaklaşımlar." *Teori*, Sayı 183 (Nisan 2005), p. 67-82.
- Günay, Nejla. "Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Maraş Yöresinde Sosyal Yapı Değişimleri ve Bu Değişimde Ermeni-Fransız Rolü." *Gazi Üniversitesi Türk Kültürü Ve Hacı Bektaş Velî Araştırma Dergisi*, Sayı 51 (2009), p. 235-258.
- Koloğlu, Orhan ve Mehmet Okur. "Taşnak Komitesi'nin Anadolu'da Örgütlenişine Dair Bir Rapor." *Karadeniz*, Sayı 10 (2011), p. 127-134.
- Palabıyık, M. Serdar. "Fransız Arşiv Belgelerinin Işığında Doğu Lejyonu'nun Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (Kasım 1916-1917)." *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 23-24 (2006), p. 206-225.
- Palabıyık, M. Serdar. "Fransız Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Doğu Lejyonu'nun Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (Kasım 1918 – 1921) II." *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 30 (2008), p. 113-138.
- Perinçek, Mehmet. "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye Ermenilerinin Rus Ordularına Katılımına Dair Yeni Belgeler." *Karadeniz*, Sayı 10 (2011), p. 9-50.
- Sarınay, Yusuf. "Fransa'nın Ermenilere Yönelik Politikasının Tarihi Temelleri." *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 7 (Sonbahar 2002), p. 55-70.
- Sezgin, Mahmut Niyazi. "Ermenistan'da Dini Yapı-Dini Hayat." *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 8 (Kış 2003), p. 153-176.
- Sonyel, Salâhi R. "İngiliz Gizli Belgelerine Göre Adana'da Vuku Bulan Türk-Ermeni Olayları." *Belleten*, Cilt LI, Sayı 201'den ayrı basım. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988.
- Suner, Suna. "The General Index of the Ambassadors to and from the Ottoman Empire." <http://archive.donjuanarchiv.at/go/bot/> (12.06.2015)

Online Sources

<http://compactgen.com/es/m/mon.htm> (12.06.2015)

https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Embajadores_de_Espa%C3%B1a_en_Ecuador (23.06.2015).

Dissertations

Güllü, Ramazan Erhan. “Ermeni Sorununun Ortaya Çıkış ve Gelişim Sürecinde İstanbul Ermeni Patrikhanesi’nin Tutumu (1878-1923).” Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2013.

Kümbül, Bengi. “Tercüman-I Hakikat Gazetesine Göre Osmanlı Ermenileri (1914-1918).” Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Tarih Anabilim Dalı, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi, Eskişehir, 2005.

Sánchez Sanz, Óscar Javier. “*Diplomacia y Política Exterior España, 1890-1914.*” Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Recent Era History, Faculty of Geography and History, Madrid Complutense University, Madrid, 2004.

Türkdoğan, Berna. “Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri (Tehcirden Günümüze).” Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara, 2006.

Türkkan Tunalı, Yasemin. “İspanyol Diplomatik Kaynaklarına Göre I. Dünya Savaşı ve Milli Mücadele’de Türkiye.” Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Ankara, 2016.

ARTICLE CATEGORY: OTHER / MAKALE TÜRÜ: DİĞER

To cite this article: Salt, Jeremy. "Review Essay: The Denial of the Right to Disagree." *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 37 (2018).

Received: 10.02.2018

Accepted: 28.06.2018

REVIEW ESSAY: THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO DISAGREE

(DEĞERLENDİRME YAZISI:
HEMFİKİR OLMAMA HAKKININ İNKÂRI)

Jeremy SALT*

Fatma Müge Göçek, *Denial of Violence. Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and Collective Violence Against the Armenians, 1789-2009* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 629 pp.

This book is a study of violence and the consequences of what the author claims is its 'denial' by state authorities in the late Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. She argues that 'unless [the] Turkish state and society come to terms with the collective violence embedded in their past' they will not be able to recover trust and respect in each other. The focal point of her study is the 'Armenian question' from the past to the present.

Like most books published in the mainstream on the 'Armenian question' over the years, the moral traffic in this publication is all one way. The heinous nature of generalized Turkish behaviour is highlighted endlessly: the heinous nature of others, including Armenians guilty of mass murder in the First World War, is minimised to a degree that would be unacceptable to readers familiar with late Ottoman history and indeed insulting to the descendants of Turks or Kurds slaughtered by Armenians in eastern Anatolia. This particular understating of historical reality should have no place in a book about 'denial.'

* Former lecturer/professor at the University of Melbourne, Boğaziçi University and Bilkent University

The author states that the *tehcir* ('relocation') and massacres of Armenians in the First World War was 'the first instance of a crime against humanity.' In fact it was not; it was the first use of the phrase and only the first *allegation* that such a crime had been committed. Furthermore, the accusation by Britain, France, and Russia, specifically of 'crimes against humanity', was part of an intense propaganda war being waged against the Ottoman Empire by the allied powers. They had built their own empires through war, mass murder, and the destruction of cultures and were wide open to the same accusation many times over. Indeed, the recorded history of the human species is characterised by such crimes. The ethnic cleansing of Muslims from the Balkans twice in the

Like most books published in the mainstream on the 'Armenian question' over the years, the moral traffic in this publication is all one way. The heinous nature of generalized Turkish behaviour is highlighted endlessly: the heinous nature of others, including Armenians guilty of mass murder in the First World War, is minimised to a degree that would be unacceptable to readers familiar with late Ottoman history

19th century (1877-78 and 1912-13) and the atrocities committed by the Greek army after its landing at Izmir in 1919 would be open to the same accusation. The same British government that accused the Ottomans of committing 'crimes against humanity' ushered the Greek army into western Anatolia in 1919. When this army's atrocious behaviour was exposed, it could only react in embarrassed silence or try to distract attention by reheating accusations of crimes committed against the Armenians. The hypocrisy in all of this is so monumental that it speaks for itself.

Given the demographics, inevitably far more Ottoman Muslims died in the First World War than Ottoman Armenians. A very large number were massacred by Armenian gangs, far more than the author is willing to concede. None of

this is to diminish the suffering of Armenians, but the virtual invisibility of one injured party in the narrative cannot produce anything like a balanced 'history.' As the fate of the Armenians flowed on from the decisions of the Ottoman government, it ultimately has to bear the responsibility for what happened to them, but there is no evidence that it could foresee the consequences of its decisions or, even worse, that it decided to wipe out the Armenians. On the basis not of evidence, but conjecture and speculation, such an accusation is inflammatory in the extreme, coming close to group slander, yet still manages to find its way into the pages of books published by prestigious university presses.

A centrally orchestrated mass murder of Armenians was improbable in the first place, given the ramshackle state of Ottoman administration, as admitted by

virtually every outsider who travelled through Ottoman lands. This was not a modern industrial state capable of such slaughter, but a pre-modern, pre-industrial state in which the authority of the government weakened the further it extended from the centre to the periphery. The wartime reality was much untidier. Soldiers, *jandarma*, and senior provincial officials were all implicated in the violence against Armenians, but much of it was clearly a localized reaction by armed groups, often tribal, Kurdish or Arab, out for booty or revenge for the killing of Muslims by Armenian bands.

The war did not set Armenians and Kurds against each other, but only accelerated a process set in motion after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when 'reforms' were demanded of the Ottoman government that would privilege the Armenians in provinces where they constituted 20 per cent or less of the general population. The Kurds could see their land being swept from under their feet and eventually set aside for an Armenian state. This they would never accept. The explosion of violence in the east in 1894-96 was partly -if not largely- the consequence of this meddling in Ottoman affairs, especially by Britain, and, in this context, the interplay of violence in the eastern provinces during the First World War was not just a product of the war, but the culmination of tensions that had been building up for a long time.

Furthermore, the roots of violence in the Ottoman Empire had other sources beyond the decisions of governments. Sociologically, they are to be sought not only in political history but in the codes of behaviour of social groups, especially tribal groups in eastern or south-eastern Anatolia. Another element is education or rather the lack of it, amongst an Ottoman population that was almost 90 per cent illiterate. Unable to read or write, how did soldiers, police and the general population know what was going on around them and what effect did their illiteracy have on their behaviour and general world view? Here is a rich field of research for the sociologist. Yet another element is religious conservatism; yet another the inability of the government to control inter-ethnic violence in remote regions, as opposed to allegedly sponsoring it. All this and more would have to come into play to properly understand the events of the 19th century and what happened during the First World War, but none of it appears in this book.

The author deliberately eschews official documents in favour of memoirs as her principal source of information, as if they are somehow more reliable. Her reason is that official documents are used by 'those representing the Turkish state position', these same people also relying on 'some Western sources that support, or at least do not challenge, the official Turkish state position' (p. 2). Precisely the same accusation could be made against writers identifying with

or (unofficially) representing the Armenian state position or ‘at least’ not challenging it. There is no shortage of misquotes in their ‘histories’, no shortage of quotes taken out of context and no shortage of unsubstantiated charges but whether Turkish, Armenian or anyone else, the fact that some people misuse official documents does not invalidate them as an essential source of information.

Official documents anywhere need to be read carefully and sceptically, but their exclusion as a source base would not even be considered in works of history written by historians. The centrally relevant fact here is that if the author took the official documents into account, she would be confronted with a hard core of irrefutable truth that would completely subvert the narrative she has chosen to write. Sidestepping the problem, she chooses memoirs, a notorious avenue for taking personal revenge or shifting the blame, whatever the truths they also contain.

As an argument against what she calls the ‘official Turkish discourse’ on the Armenian question, the author uses the fact that that Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) does not contain ‘a single reference to the works of those advocating the official Turkish stand’ (p. 2). It is not clear who she means by this: there are, in fact, many independent scholars who write the truth as they see it, and not the truth as the Turkish government sees it. They are not ‘advocating’ anything, but trying to write history as best as they can. Their difficulty is not finding source material to substantiate what they write, but finding editors brave enough to publish it, given the stranglehold that Armenian lobbies have managed to put around public opinion.

Every age has its taboos and in this age the ‘Armenian question’ is one of them: it is a ‘question’ no-one is allowed to question, lest the gatekeepers of academic and more general opinion be smeared by association with ‘denialists’, a word used against scholars who happen to disagree with the mainstream narrative and are prepared to challenge it, whatever the cost to their own reputations.

As editors do not dare publish what they write, of course nothing shows up in the SSCI statistics and writers like this author can claim this as proof of what she calls the ‘consensus’ of the ‘western scholarly community’ (p. 2). As the vast bulk of this ‘community’, so described, has no specialized knowledge of late Ottoman history, its alleged consensus boils down to opinions based on a ‘truth’ which this same vast bulk of academics have never independently tested for themselves.

Majority opinion is a tactic that has been used throughout history to silence dissenters. On the realities of the ‘Armenian question’, however, in the view

of authors inside the Armenian propaganda and propaganda-as-history network, the dissenters are not just wrong but ‘denialists’. In this theological Star Chamber approach to the writing of history, there can be no dissent or disagreement. There can be only truth and denial of truth. The alarm bells should be ringing; what authentic historian would ever claim to know *the* truth, as opposed to the truth as he or she sees it?

It needs to be noted here that the accusations of crimes against humanity and the genocide of Armenians has never been tested in court. The hearing of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in 2015 comes closest to a finding on the second accusation. Upholding the appeal by Doğu Perinçek against conviction in a Swiss court for saying in public that there was no genocide, the chamber ruled that the Swiss court had violated his right to express his opinion, and was wrong in punishing him for it. At the very least, this was a very important legal precedent. What Fatma Müge Göçek calls ‘denial’ is actually disagreement with her view of history.

‘Denial’ is a weapon in the hands of the propagandist and the historian who uses it risks being put in the same category. What it means is that all relevant facts are known and beyond challenge. To question them is to ‘deny’ their truth. In

‘Denial’ is a weapon in the hands of the propagandist and the historian who uses it risks being put in the same category. What it means is that all relevant facts are known and beyond challenge. To question them is to ‘deny’ their truth. In a work of history, such an approach should be completely unacceptable. In their entirety, facts are never known. One history is only the layering over of other histories, to be replaced in its turn as new facts and more plausible explanations come to light. When it comes to the Armenian question, however, this process is short-circuited by ‘denial’.

a work of history, such an approach should be completely unacceptable. In their entirety, facts are never known. One history is only the layering over of other histories, to be replaced in its turn as new facts and more plausible explanations come to light. When it comes to the Armenian question, however, this process is short-circuited by ‘denial’. It is the heavy weapon used to close access to alternative facts, figures, and interpretations that would completely disrupt the mainstream ‘western’ narrative, were they ever given room to breathe. This is taken as far as accusing those who disagree with the mainstream narrative of perpetuating genocide, of which, according to the writer, their ‘denial’ is the ‘last stage’ (p.11).

What more effective way could there be of closing down debate than this smear of those who just happen to disagree with Fatma Müge Göçek’s reading of

history? Who would want to face such an accusation; whatever the contrary facts at hand, better and safer to go along with the mainstream view, to shut up and say nothing, to write nothing and if one is an editor, publish nothing.

‘Bombing the place flat’

There is no clear starting point for the communal violence that shook the eastern Anatolian provinces in the 1890s, but the Sasun/Talori uprising of 1894 was a landmark event. Of this upheaval, Göçek writes that ‘when the Armenian subjects refused to pay their taxes the sultan’s official sent to contain the resistance instead bombed the place flat’ (p. 127). This is a cartoonish caricature of what actually happened. What the author calls ‘resistance’ was an Armenian uprising which involved atrocities committed against Kurdish Muslim villagers, including women. The army was called in and what followed was a regular military operation carried out over weeks, and adjusted accorded to what was known of the number of Armenians involved in the uprising.

The ‘official’ sent to Sasun was Zeki Paşa. He was sent not from Istanbul but from Erzincan, and he was not an ‘official’ but the *ferik* (commander) of the 4th Army garrison. The information is available in the official documents Göçek chooses not to consult and thus she gets even these small details wrong. These documents were authentic daily reports and memoranda written in 1894 and exchanged between the government in Istanbul and the army in the field. In the two years of violence that followed Sasun, the author claims that the sultan’s Kurdish Hamidiye regiments carried out ‘most of the murders’ (p. 17). Stated as fact, without any attempt at substantiation, this is only her opinion: no-one could know who was responsible for ‘most’ of the killings. The Hamidiye -notoriously poorly trained and hard to discipline- were useful as a mobile auxiliary force at a time of deepening insurgency. On duty, they were under the command of regular army officers. Off duty, they may well have joined mob attacks on Armenians, as reprisals for Armenian attacks on Muslims or because they believed militants were planning new attacks. However, the ‘regiments’ as such are not to be blamed for this and if there is evidence that they were responsible for ‘most of the murders’, the author does not produce it.

Wavering Approximations

When it comes to numbers, Göçek writes that ‘approximately 100,000 to 200,000 Armenians were massacred’ between 1894-96 (p. 20); later she increases these figures to 100,000-300,000 (p. 62); later again, she refers to

‘approximately’ 300,000 Armenians being massacred, this time not between 1894-1896 but between 1893-1896 (p. 71). Such wavering ‘approximations’ from different years and from one enormous round figure to another even more enormous are not plausible. It is certainly not true that anything like 300,000 or even 200,000 Armenians were killed in the 1890s. These exaggerations came out of Armenian, missionary, and ‘humanitarian’ sources pushing the Armenian case, in Britain, France, or the US: other estimates (well below the author’s lowest figure) that should be introduced for readers to contemplate have no place in this book.

When it comes to the First World War, the author claims that while the Ottoman wartime government, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), destroyed 800,000 to 1.5 million Armenians, ‘Armenians massacred at most 40,000 to 60,000 Muslims’ (p. 216). This statement is stricken with inaccuracies. Census figures put the pre-war Ottoman Armenian population at 1.2 million. Allowing for all variations, the total Ottoman Armenian population in 1915 could not have been much more than 1.5 million. As hundreds of thousands of Armenians survived the war, 1.5 million could not have been ‘destroyed.’ Furthermore, however many Armenians died, they died during the whole course of the war, not just in 1915, and they died from precisely the same mix of causes that ended the lives of millions of Muslim civilians, namely massacre, malnutrition, exposure, epidemic diseases, and inter-ethnic violence. Many Armenians crossed the border into the Caucasus during the war to get away from the fighting, shrinking the number of Ottomans who were allegedly massacred even further.

Even if the relevant facts are not in this book, they can be found by readers willing to dig a bit deeper. The true Armenian death toll, according to the careful estimates of Justin McCarthy, who has done the hard slog on Ottoman demographics, probably stood at between 500,000-600,000, a figure surely large enough not to need exaggeration. Other critical elements in the general civilian death toll, affecting Muslims as badly as Christians, included the blockade of the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts by allied navies and the locust plague that devastated Syria in 1915. As a result, not just displaced Armenians but hundreds of thousands of Syrians died during the war.

While increasing the Ottoman Armenian dead to an impossible maximum, the author reduces the Muslim dead at the hands of Armenians to an unacceptable minimum. She gives no source for her 40,000-60,000 figure, but the evidence suggests it is a gross under-estimate. Included in the ‘official sources’ the author chooses not to consult hundreds if not thousands of Ottoman documents recording what the survivors of massacres told army officers and government

officials when they were able to return to the eastern provinces in 1918. These documents are very specific, down to the names of those killed and often the names of the Armenians who killed them. These were large-scale killings of a horrific nature, coming from towns and villages across the eastern region and telling the same or similar stories of extreme violence at the hands of Armenians. Based on the evidence, these records show that more than half a million Muslim civilians were killed between 1914-19 by Armenian and/or Russian forces. Allowing for exaggerations, inventions and tales told by people not actually present, the same cautions one has to apply to the estimates of Armenian dead, by no means can this figure be credibly reduced to 40,000-60,000.

A Tainted Source

The author quotes the memoirs of Ahmet Refik (Altınay) on the mistreatment and massacres of Armenians during the *tehcir*, referring finally also to Altınay's 'accounts of the massacres the Armenian revolutionary committee Dashnak committed against the Muslims in 1918 from Erzurum all the way to Trabzon' (p. 154). She allocates three pages to the former and three lines to the latter, totally omitting the horrific detail of what Ahmet Refik saw in Erzurum, a shattered town littered with the butchered bodies Armenians left behind when they retreated. These were the most shocking scenes, yet the author questions Altınay's use of them, as in her view this 'second wave' of violence (Second to what? Armenian bands had been massacring Muslims since the beginning of the war) was 'nowhere close to the ferocity of the violence committed by the CUP', as she puts it (p. 154-55). Even a moral philosopher would have trouble making such a judgment.

She refers to an assumption of the Young Turks that they could 'annihilate the Armenian presence in the empire or at least reduce it to no more than to 10 per cent of the local population' (p. 63). In her view 'a radical CUP' faction exploited wartime conditions to destroy the Armenians. Quoting a source identified as Rifat Mevlanzade, she writes that 'it appears that the CUP decision to deport and destroy the Armenians was duly taken in January, 1915, by select members' (p. 202). The same claim of a decision taken in secret early in 1915 is also made by the author's Turkish-American colleague Taner Akçam and his mentor, Vakahn Dadrian, both of whom resort to 'documents' that detailed research has shown to be forged.

According to Mevlanzade, government officials in the provinces 'sprung [sic.] into action' on receiving orders from the CUP. The Armenian victims were

turned over to ‘the slaughterhouse of ferocious SO [Special Organization or *Teşkilat i-Mahsusa*] monsters’, who dispatched them ‘amid laughter and applause’ (p.202).

There are so many problems with these passages that it is hard to know where to begin. First of all, the accusation that a CUP faction took a decision to annihilate the Armenians is so inflammatory that it should never be made, let alone published, without concrete proof. These authors do not even have plausible evidence. The *Teşkilat i- Mahsusa* was a black operations group of the kind established by governments in wartime and maintained in peace as intelligence agencies. Göçek claims that it carried out ‘most of the mass killings outside of settled areas’ (p. 22) and that it was ‘secretly ordered to massacre the Armenians’ (p. 154). She provides no proof for either of these claims: certainly, more than a century later, it would be impossible to say who carried ‘most of the mass killings’ of Armenians outside towns and villages.

As for Rifat Mevlanzade, he is a tainted source. Readers are not told -as they should have been - that he was bitterly hostile to the CUP; that he was equally hostile to the Kemalist government; that he left Turkey after the victory of the national resistance, never to return before his death in 1930; and that he was a Kurdish nationalist, this very probably explaining his shifting of Kurdish responsibility for the killing of Armenians on to the shoulders of the *Teşkilat*. Furthermore, these quotes underline the general dangers of using memoirs in history; they can be useful, but in any language, they are a notorious vehicle for taking personal or political revenge.

The *Teşkilat* was an unsavory organisation, some of whose members were recruited because their criminal background suited them to the dirty work at hand, yet it did not organize the *tehcir*. That responsibility was handed to provincial authorities and whatever the involvement of the *Teşkilat* in this process, whatever the crimes committed by some of its members then or at other times, the massacres of Armenians was the work of many hands. In the annals of secret ‘black’ organizations, the *Teşkilat* was hardly unique. All governments find dirty hands to do their dirty work and the Ottoman government was no exception.

The claim that the CUP wanted to ‘reduce’ the number of Armenians to no more than 10 per cent of the local population is derived, inaccurately, from instructions sent out to provincial authorities during the ‘relocation’. Where the Armenians were resettled, they were not to amount to more than 10 per cent of the local population and were to be kept away from infrastructure vital

to the war effort such as railways. These were security considerations, consistent with the thinking behind the decision to 'relocate' the Armenians in the first place: where Armenians built up to more than 10 per cent of the local population orders were sent for them to be moved on. The question was not one of 'reducing' the Armenian population but of not allowing it to build up beyond a certain level in any specific location. In wartime conditions, suspicion and fear of the internal enemy, fed by Armenian desertions and sabotage from behind the lines, ensured that the regions from which Armenians were moved quickly widened.

The 'relocation' of the Armenians was ordered on the recommendation of the military command. The military record is absolutely central here. Those who claim that 'military necessity' was a pretext are surely obliged to study the mass of documents and prove their point. Otherwise, their claims have no logical value. Göçek bypasses the military record altogether in favour of speculation and conjecture, concentrating on the atrocities committed during the 'relocation' and sticking to her view of a nefarious plan of annihilation being set in motion long before the 'relocation' decision was taken at the end of May 1915. Edward Erickson, a military historian who has done the work in the Ottoman archives, concludes that the perception of a lethal threat from Armenian insurgents to Ottoman lines of supply and communication, to the point of endangering the entire war effort, was genuinely held in the military high command. Only one of these competing narratives is introduced in this work of 'history' and it is not Edward Erickson's.

Wartime Trials

The author gives space to the post-war trials held in Istanbul under the auspices of occupying allied powers and the puppet government they controlled. Two Ottoman officials were convicted and hanged, the execution of one demonstrating the underhand political nature of these trials, as even Göçek makes clear. Other members of the wartime government or sympathetic to it had been exiled to Malta where they were finally released, according to Göçek, 'in exchange for the same number of captured British nationals': in the end 'not only [do they] escape justice and are never held accountable for the atrocities they committed but some became prominent members of the new Turkish national assembly, eventually serving as ministers, prime ministers and even as president' (p. 45). The salient facts here are that as hard as they tried, the British could not find the evidence anywhere, not in the Ottoman records, not in their own records, and not in US records that would be necessary to launch successful prosecutions. They had no option but to release their

prisoners. As they were never tried, it is not for Göçek to pass judgment, that they escaped justice and were not held responsible for the atrocities *she* - not any court- says they committed.

Göçek ignores the far more significant trials held in late 1915/16 after the Ottoman government set up commissions of inquiry into crimes allegedly committed against Armenians. These were real trials, not trials held under the aegis of occupying powers determined to destroy the Turkish national movement and break up the Ottoman Empire in their own strategic interests. In these earlier trials, more than 1600 individuals, including soldiers, gendarmes, members of the *Teşkilat* and town and provincial officials, were court-martialled. Hundreds were convicted and more than 60 sentenced to death. The Interior Minister, Talat Paşa, after receiving reports of attacks on the Armenian convoys, had sent out numerous instructions to officials to protect the Armenians and punish the perpetrators of violence. The trials were the evidence that he was serious in his warnings. They raise an obvious question: if the central government was so hell-bent on annihilating the Armenians, why was it prosecuting and even executing people charged with committing criminal acts against them? These trials would throw a spanner in the works of Göçek's narrative, if they had any place in it.

The author touches on the Ottoman defeat at Sarikamış but not in the detail needed to assess the consequences. This shattering blow destroyed the 3rd Army's ability to launch offensive operations for a long time to come. Denuded of manpower because of the demands at the front, and because of the disaster at Sarikamış, the 3rd Army was unable to staunch attacks on lines of communications and supply by Armenian bands fighting with the Russians from behind the lines. Neither could it offer any protection to civilians. It was in this climate that the Armenians of Van launched their uprising in April. While there had been piecemeal removal of Armenians, along with other ethnic groups, it was only after Van fell to Armenian rebels and was handed over to the Russians that the mass 'relocation' of Armenians was ordered.

Göçek pays no attention to what the Armenians did in and around Van during and after their capture of the city. Had readers been given some insights into the bloody detail, they would understand why the military command reacted as it did. The destruction of government buildings and the Muslim quarter in a city close to the Russian border was accompanied by the slaughter of Muslim civilians in Van and in villages around the lake by Armenian and Cossack bands. Many thousands died. Having seized the city, the Armenians handed it over to the Russians. No general staff anywhere, in any war at any time, could

contemplate these developments with anything but the determination to immediately stop the situation deteriorating any further. Hence, the decision to deprive the Armenian insurgents of the sea in which they could swim undetected, by removing the general Armenian population. Such a decision is hardly unique in history: Spain, France, Britain, and the US have all relocated suspect populations in the past century, in South Africa, Cuba, the Philippines, Algeria, Malaya, and Vietnam. The Ottoman decision was ruthless and the consequences dire, but it made military sense from the point of view of the general staff.

‘Plunging’ Into War

In her narrative runup to the outbreak of war, the author deals with the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War (1912-13), as experienced by the political class, by the refugees pouring into Anatolia, and by a general population stirred up by patriotic fervour and anger at European duplicity and indifference to Muslim suffering. The author writes of the Ottoman government ‘plunging’ into the war (p. 43), certain of a swift victory. In fact, the Ottoman state did not plunge into war but was *plunged into it* by the four Balkan states: Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro. They had long been planning for war; the Ottoman state did not want war, and was not planning for it, apart from trying to keep abreast of the growing military strength of the Balkan states, particularly the strength of the Greek navy. Their war followed the Italian invasion of Ottoman Libya.

With war forced upon the Ottoman Empire yet again, the Muslim population responded with fiery declarations to fight to the end, as civilian populations always do in wartime. From this atmosphere of patriotic fervour, the author manages to extrapolate the finding that the catastrophic outcome of the Balkan Wars for the Ottoman Empire ‘legitimated the subsequent collective violence against the non-Muslims of the empire in general and the Armenians in particular’ (p. 228). In other words, even before the war began, even before the decision it allegedly took early in 1915, the Ottoman government was all set to wipe out the Armenians: in Göçek’s depiction of events, all subsequent developments were ancillary to this central reality.

The suppositions on her part are contradicted by the view, based on the military records, that the fate of the Armenians unfolded in correlation with developments on the battlefield and insurgent actions behind the lines and had little or nothing do with the understandably bitter feelings stirred up by the Balkan war. The attack on the Empire in 1912 was a war for territory clothed

in Christian religious propaganda. The war further poisoned relations between Ottoman Muslims and Christians, but this was not the reason for the decision to relocate the Armenians in 1915. The decision originated with the military and was directly tied to the situation on the battlefield.

Göçek argues that while about two million Muslims died during the course of the war, ‘they did so throughout the empire, primarily at battlefields fighting the Allied soldiers and thereby without any contact with the Armenians’ (p. 250). Both parts of this sentence are inaccurate. Between 1914 and 1919, the Ottoman population fell by about four million. The total number of Muslim civilian dead was probably about 2.5 million. Ottoman military deaths (killed, missing in action, and dying of wounds) amounted to 305,085, according to the computations of the military historian Edward Erickson, with a further 330,796 soldiers dying of disease, according to the estimates of Hikmet Özdemir. In other words, most Muslims did *not* die on the battlefield but, like the Armenians, were massacred or died from the shocking conditions created by total war. In absolute terms, inevitably, given their preponderance in the population, far more Muslim civilians died in the war than Armenians. Both groups died of exactly the same combination of causes, massacre, exposure, malnutrition, disease, and inter-ethnic conflict at the civilian level.

Unequal Suffering

Göçek regards the argument of equal suffering as a ‘false equation’ (p. 250), a point which raises the question of how suffering is to be measured; weighed according to the number of bodies or measured according to some other criteria? Apparently, it is not sufficient to say that both religious communities suffered terribly and let the matter rest there. No, an equivalence in suffering cannot be allowed; for the sake of the genocide narrative, it has to be shown that the suffering of the Armenians was worse, however ‘worse’ might be calculated.

As we have seen, in absolute terms, the Muslim civilian death toll was far higher than the Armenian (or Christian) death toll. On the basis of numbers, we might argue that Muslim suffering was greater: if we talk of proportionality, Muslim and Christian depopulation in the eastern provinces was about the same. The crucial difference lay in the ability of the overwhelming Muslim majority to absorb such losses. Logically, seeing that the word is theirs, the advocates of genocide should also be called upon to explain why the large-scale killing of Muslims in eastern Anatolia should not be put in the same category, but they deal with this by completely understating the reality.

Unfortunately, the dead cannot be summoned to be asked who they thought suffered the most.

Included in the author's pre-war narrative is the communal violence which followed the crushing Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War. The necessary prelude to the reaction of Ottoman Muslims against Ottoman Greeks is the ethnic cleansing of Balkan Muslims which had just taken place. On the author's scale of relative suffering, the reprisals taken against Greeks down the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean coast weighed far less than the mass ethnic cleansing of Balkan Muslims by Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks in 1912-13, yet it is only the former which the author describes as 'pogroms' (p. 208). She holds the CUP government responsible, when it is clear that much of the violence was spontaneous, orchestrated (if at all) at the local level and not sanctioned by the CUP government.

The region was flooded with Muslim refugees telling stories of the horrors they had endured, and they or other Muslims struck back. The source of many of the accusations made against the CUP was the British government, extremely hostile to the nationalist government in Istanbul because it was threatening British interests, financial and strategic, in the Near East. But even from British documents, it is clear that the CUP government, with the Interior Minister Talat Paşa, taking the lead, tried to stop the violence, secure the return of Christians to their homes, and settle Muslim refugees away from Christian villages.

The author tries to maintain the thread of Turkish 'denial' of violence right up to the wave of assassinations of Turkish diplomatic and consular staff (and sometimes members of their families as well) by Armenian terrorists in the 1970s-80s, not that the author calls them 'terrorists': they are merely 'assailants.' In one passage, dealing with the 1982 attack in Lisbon that left a Turkish embassy attaché dead and his wife fatally wounded, she comes close to blaming the state and Turkish people for these crimes: 'yet this was not the end of the violence incurred [sic.] by the Turkish state and society' (p. 446).

Internal 'Orientalization'

This thread is maintained throughout the book. Violence directed against the Ottoman state, the Ottoman people, the Turkish state, and the Turkish people is discussed primarily in the context of how, in the author's view, it was instrumentalized by the state to justify its own violence. In similar vein, the

plunder of Greek or Armenian property is raised, but nothing is said of the mass of property destroyed or plundered *by* Greeks and Armenians. There is a mountain range of evidence showing the extent of the massive damage they did, but the question of reparations for destroyed Muslim property is not raised and neither is there any mention of who should be held responsible. Young people are quoted to bolster the author's prosecutorial brief: she mentions, in particular, the anger of Young Civilians (*Genç Siviller*) at the rape and murder of hundreds of thousands of Greeks and Armenians and the theft of their property.

If their statement has been quoted in its entirety, this same group apparently had nothing to say about the murder of similarly large numbers of Muslims and the plunder of their property. This amounts to an internal orientalizing of Ottoman and modern Turkish history, which has as its precedent the 19th century servility of local servants of European imperial interests. Those Turks demanding restitution for Armenians should surely be demanding restitution for the Muslims as well. The fact that they do not helps to preserve an unbalanced 'western' mainstream narrative in which only the Armenians were the victims of extreme violence and only 'the Turks' the perpetrators of such violence.

Those Turks demanding restitution for Armenians should surely be demanding restitution for the Muslims as well. The fact that they do not helps to preserve an unbalanced 'western' mainstream narrative in which only the Armenians were the victims of extreme violence and only 'the Turks' the perpetrators of such violence.

Contrary to what some might assume are the effects of state propaganda, Turkish school textbooks have little to say on the Armenian question and young people know little of what happened to the civilian population of the Ottoman Empire in 1914-18. Ambitious young scholars tend to avoid the subject not just because they fear it might get them into trouble in their own country, but because they know that if they challenge the mainstream 'western' discourse, it will get them into trouble outside their own country. Placed in the category of 'denialists' of a sanctified truth, all doors will be shut; there will be no fellowships and no scholarships for them. They will be shunned, and if they want to get on, they will have to think of a different topic for their Ph.D theses.

The same is true of Turkish academics who, more or less, have adopted the official Armenian discourse, but have nothing to say about the millions of Muslims who died in this war and the very large number massacred by Armenians. They also know, even if they are not going to admit it, that if

they challenge the mainstream ‘western’ discourse, all doors will also be shut in their face as well. No more visiting professorships and guest lectures for them at prestigious American or European universities: ruined reputations will be their lot. In this sick state of affairs, truth in history, and the possibility of reconciliation between Armenians and Turks, are the main victims.

Modern Turkey has a turbulent history. The author understates the meddling of the European powers in the 19th century, writing that ‘while the origins of the Armenian issue were domestic, it was presented by the sultan as internationally instigated’ (p. 62). In fact, the Armenian ‘question’ would not have been turned into a question without the intervention of European powers acting in their own strategic interests. Britain, in particular, did great damage by its meddling in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, worsening rather than improving the situation of its Armenian protégés. By the 1890s, the eastern provinces of the Empire were a powder keg which Britain helped to ignite before shunning all responsibility and seeking to offload it on to other shoulders (essentially the sultan’s). Britain was to continue its insidious role in Ottoman affairs down to the outbreak of the First World War, saying nothing about attacks on the Empire unless and until it saw its own interests being threatened. Hostile even after the war had ended, it sponsored the Greek invasion of western Turkey and the attempt to destroy the Turkish national movement in its infancy.

The 1908 revolution was followed by the turmoil and violence common to a post-revolutionary period. There was nothing unusual about it and nothing wrong with the government’s wish to shake off the status of a semi-colonised power: neither was there anything unusual in the desire of European imperial powers to preserve a situation which suited them. Wars with one or another of the powers from 1911-1918 were followed by more wars and the attempts of the same powers to partition Ottoman lands. Out of the literally smouldering ashes, a new country, a new society, and a new culture had to be built. It was not going to be a tidy process. Hard decisions would have to be taken: what would have seemed necessary then can be seen as wrong or misguided now, but then hindsight is a wonderful thing. Up to the present day, Turkey’s modern history is no less free of turbulence. Many who would disagree strongly with Göcek’s reading of the Armenian question may well be just as critical as she is of the actions of the state when it comes to other issues. There is no blind clinging to an ‘official discourse’ here.

The author’s use of the word ‘denial’ is surely presumptuous. What the word means is that she knows the truth and others do not. No true historian would

ever write like this, but then, by training, the author is not an historian but rather a sociologist who has succeeded in writing a book which falls neatly between these academic disciplines. Her writings overlap with the ‘official discourse’ of the Armenian government and the propaganda of Armenian lobbies around the world in the same way the writings of other scholars overlap with the ‘official’ Turkish discourse. If this is to be regarded as coincidental when it comes to Professor Göçek, scholars who disagree with her are entitled to expect the same courtesy. The ‘official discourse’ is a red herring anyway. Books are to be judged on their contents and the flaws in this author’s narrative, factual and otherwise, are sufficiently numerous to show that her grasp of truth is not nearly as complete as her repeated use of the word ‘denial’ would seem to indicate.

Truth in history -‘the’ truth and not the approximations that are about as close as anyone can get- is always elusive and can never be completely captured. Historians are *strivers* after truth, and generally speaking, they are far too cautious (perhaps humble) to claim anything else. The truth implicit in ‘denial’ is for theologians, not historians. Even then, only the most fundamentalist of theologians would refuse to entertain challenges to their belief in the existence of God. Those who uphold the mainstream Armenian narrative live by the same illiberal standards, shaping their histories around a central truth to which they hold as powerfully as any revelation. Amongst the religiously faithful, this is predictable, but amongst the historically faithful, it is not acceptable. One cannot be faithful to history by putting certain questions out of bounds, but this is the central principle around which Fatma Müge Göçek has woven her narrative.

BOOK REVIEW / KİTAP İNCELEMESİ

To cite this book review: Dilaver, Tutku. "A Frontrunner Study on Eminent Poet and Author Hovhannes Tumanyan." Review of *Ermeni Edebiyatının Mümtaz Şair Ve Yazarı Hovhannes Tumanyan'ın Hayatı Eserleri Ve Edebi Kişiliği*, by Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş. *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 37 (2018).

Received: 21.05.2018

Accepted: 12.07.2018

Tutku DİLAVER*

A FRONTRUNNER STUDY ON EMINENT POET AND AUTHOR HOVHANNES TUMANYAN

MÜMTAZ ŞAİR VE YAZAR HOVHANNES TUMANYAN HAKKINDA ÖNCÜ BİR ÇALIŞMA

Author: Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş

Title: Ermeni Edebiyatının Mümtaz Şair Ve Yazarı Hovhannes Tumanyan'ın Hayatı Eserleri Ve Edebi Kişiliği

Published: Ankara, Harf Eğitim Yayıncılık, 2018

Language: Turkish

ISBN: 9786059969987

Number of Pages: 112

Literature is an effective tool to understand the identity of a people or a nation. Sometimes the backstory provided by a novel or a poem gives us a clue about the atmosphere of a certain era and the conceptions of a people during that era. It was with such a perspective that Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş wrote the book titled *Ermeni Edebiyatının Mümtaz Şair Ve Yazarı Hovhannes Tumanyan'ın Hayatı Eserleri Ve Edebi Kişiliği* (*The Life, Works, and Literary Identity of Eminent Poet and Author of Armenian Literature Hovhannes Tumanyan*).

Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş is an Associate Professor at the Department of Eastern Languages at Yıldırım Beyazıt University. She also lectures in

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3379-4313>
Scholar in Residence, Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM), tdilaver@avim.org.tr

Caucasus Studies Program at the Institute of Social Sciences at the same university. As such, Professor Deveci Bozkuş is competent in Eastern Armenian and on the politics, history, and literature of Armenia.

The book titled *Ermeni Edebiyatının Mümtaz Şair Ve Yazarı Hovhannes Tumanyan'ın Hayatı Eserleri Ve Edebi Kişiliği* is the result of her previous studies on Hovhannes Tumanyan. These studies also laid the foundation for the presentation Deveci Bozkuş delivered on Tumanyan with the same title in an international conference in Czechia last year.¹

Most of the academic researchers in Turkey have not focused very much on Armenian literature. In this regard, M. Fuat Köprülü was the first due to his 1922 study on Armenian minstrel literature.² However, his study comparing Armenian and Turkish minstrel literatures was subject to many criticisms because he did not know the Armenian language. From that time onwards, there have been no works other than a few generally focusing on Armenian literature.

Deveci Bozkuş mentions in the foreword of her book that some valuable works have started to be carried out in the field of Armenian literature (p. 9). According to her, the interest in Armenian literature had been limited until recently due to studies in Turkey mostly focusing on the 1915 events at the expense of other Armenian-related subjects. Deveci Bozkuş's book tries to break this approach by revealing the common culture and history between the two peoples -Turks and Armenians- through the works of Hovhannes Tumanyan. In this respect, her book is a significant contribution to the limited list of Turkish-language literature focusing on Armenian-related subjects.

The book consists of four chapters. The first chapter gives biographical information about Tumanyan. Tumanyan's personal life, the schools he went to, and teachers who shaped his literary identity are told in the first chapter. As it is understood from the book, Tumanyan was an activist who defended the brotherhood of peoples. According to Tumanyan, Tsarist Russia had provoked the Anatolian people against each other to prevent spreading of revolutionary ideas that could threaten the basis Tsarist rule. Because of this idea, he was imprisoned twice by Russian authorities (p. 18). In the light of that information,

1 Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş, "The Life, Works and Literary Identity of Eminent Poet and Author of Armenian Literature Hovhannes Tumanyan," International Conference: The West of The East, The East of The West, July 4-7, 2017, Prague/Czechia.

2 Famil Medetov, "Fuad Köprülü'nün Bilimsel Araştırmalarında Türk-Ermeni Folklor İlişkileri Sorunu," *Motif Akademi Halkbilimi Dergisi*, Cilt: 9, Sayı:18 (Temmuz – Aralık 2016), p. 283-290. This article can be accessed at: <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/288281>

the readers get the chance to consider the events that unfolded in Anatolia from Tumanyan's perspective.

The second chapter is given to the assessments made by other writers about Tumanyan's works. It also contains an informative list of the thesis studies, articles, and the books written about Tumanyan. Through this chapter, the reader is given an understating of what Tumanyan has come to denote for the world of literature.

The third chapter includes the short assessments of Tumanyan's selected works such as "Gikor" (his famous short story) and "Anuş" (his popular lyric poem). Deveci Bozkuş not only makes an assessment, but also informs the readers about the place this work of Tumanyan's occupies in modern literature. The works reviewed in this chapter reveal Tumanyan's view on life in the Caucasus during a past era.

The fourth and final chapter of the book consists of the translations of Tumanyan's selected fables and fairytales. The translations of the stories are not verbatim, but the meanings of the stories have been attempted to be preserved as much as possible. When these tales and fables are read, the reader will immediately notice similarities with the Turkish stories. As Deveci Bozkuş mentioned at the beginning of the story titled "Altın Dolu K p" ("the Gold-Filled Pot"), some of these stories have been passed through from generation to generation in Turkey. This shows us that some stories in this geography are a common cultural heritage.

At the end of the book, there are two additional chapters. One of them is the bibliography of Tumanyan's works, the other is the bibliography of some of Tumanyan's works compiled by different editors. By this way, Deveci Bozkuş informs readers who wish to carry out additional research on Tumanyan's works.

In conclusion, the lack of qualified studies on Armenian literature places *Ermeni Edebiyatının M mtaz Őair Ve Yazarı Hovhannes Tumanyan'ın Hayatı Eserleri Ve Edebi KiŐiliŐi* in a special position. It stands to serve as a frontrunner for other Turkish-language works that will be written on this subject. Beyond its status as a frontrunner, this informative book -written with an accessible language- offers Turkish-speaking audiences a chance to get familiar with Armenian culture and lifestyle through the perspective of a pivotal author that was Hovhannes Tumanyan.

CALL FOR PAPERS AND STYLE SHEET: *REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES*

The *Review of Armenian Studies* is a biannual academic journal that was established with the aim of publishing academic papers to stimulate inter-disciplinary debate between academics and practitioners on topics relating to Armenian Studies. Since 2002, 37 issues of *Review of Armenian Studies* have been published.

The *Review of Armenian Studies* invites paper submissions on any subject related to the journal's scope of research, which include:

- The Armenian revolts in the 19th and 20th century era of the Ottoman Empire
- Historical, political, and social dimensions of the 1915 events
- Various aspects of the dispute over the 1915 events
- Politics in the Armenian world (in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora)
- Culture and society in the Armenian world (in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora)
- Bilateral relations of Armenia with other countries
- Regional and international politics of Armenia

Review of Armenian Studies is indexed by EBSCO and TÜBİTAK/ULAKBİM.

Manuscript Submission

Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The journal's language is English. *Review of Armenian Studies* accepts academic research that has not been previously submitted to another journal for publication. Submissions must be written in accordance with the standards put forward by the journal, and with a clear and concise language. The journal uses the latest edition of Chicago Manual of Style (full note) as its citation style. Please refer to Chicago Manual of Style official website for further details regarding proper citation methods (www.chicagomanualofstyle.org). *Review of Armenian Studies* recommends the use of automated citation platforms such as "Zotero" or "Citation Machine" to make citation faster and easier for the authors.

Please submit manuscripts via e-mail to Managing Editor Mehmet Oğuzhan Tulun via motulun@avim.org.tr.

Review of Armenian Studies welcomes the submission of manuscripts as articles and book reviews.

Articles should range from 6,000 to 18,000 words and should be approximately 10-30 single-spaced pages in length (including footnotes and bibliography). Articles must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1-1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially. There should be a clear hierarchy of headings and subheadings. Quotations with more than 40 words should be indented from the left margin.

The title page of the article should include the following information:

- Article title
- Names and affiliations of all contributing authors
- Full address for correspondence, including telephone and email address
- Abstract: please provide a short summary of up to 300 words.
- Keywords: please provide 5 key words, suitable for indexing. Ideally, these words will not have appeared in the title.

Book reviews should range from 1,200 to 2,400 words and should be approximately 2-4 single-spaced pages in length (including footnotes), and should be on recently published books on related subjects. Book reviews must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1-1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially. Page numbers regarding the book under review should be given in parentheses within the text, other citations should be given in the footnote section.

Book reviews should have a title. The details of the book under review should be listed with the following details:

- First and last name(s) of the author(s) or editor(s) of the book under review.
- Title of book
- Year of publication
- Place of publication
- Publisher
- Number of pages
- Language of the book
- Price (please indicate paperback or hard cover) if available.

We are now welcoming contributions for the 38th issue of this journal.

Complete submissions are due 1 November 2018.

The editorial office will make every effort to deal with submissions to the journal as quickly as possible. All papers will be acknowledged on receipt by email.



ORDER FORM

Name : Address :
Last Name :
Telephone :
E-mail :

Subscriptions

- Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal - 4 Months Annual 45 TRY ~~XX~~
 Review of Armenian Studies Journal - 6 Months Annual 30 TRY ~~XX~~
 Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal - Per Year Annual 17 TRY

Ordering of Single Volumes

- Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal – Latest volume (volume 59) 17 TRY
 Review of Armenian Studies Journal – Latest volume (volume 37) 17 TRY
 Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal – Latest volume (volume 18) 17 TRY

Ordering of Previous Volumes

- Previous volume/volumes of Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal Each is 9 TRY
 Previous volume/volumes of Review of Armenian Studies Journal Each is 9 TRY
 Previous volume/volumes of Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal Each is 9 TRY

Books

- Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler / Ömer Engin LÜTEM / (Extended version and 2nd edition) 15 TRY
 Armenian Diaspora / Turgut Kerem TUNCEL 35 TRY
 Turkish-Russian Academics / A Historical Study on the Caucasus 20 TRY
 Gürcistan'daki Müslüman Topluluklar / Azınlık Hakları, Kimlik, Siyaset 30 TRY
 Ermeni Konferansları 2017 / Der: Ömer Engin LÜTEM 30 TL
 Ermeni Propagandasının Amerika Boyutu Üzerine / Bilâl N. ŞİMŞİR 20 TL
 Ermeni Sorunuyla İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri (1912-1923) / British Documents on Armenian Question (1912-1923) / Tolga BAŞAK 30 TL

* To receive your order, send the form with your receipt.

Contact

Address: Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12/B Daire: 3-4 06550 Çankaya / ANKARA
Telephone: 0312 438 50 23 - 24 • Fax: 0312 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Account Number:

Terazi Yayıncılık Garanti Bankası A.Ş. Çankaya /Ankara Şubesi
Account No: 181 /6296007 IBAN No: TR960006200018100006296007

Postal Check Account No: 5859221

