

REVIEW OF
ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics and International Relations

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Facts and Comments

Ömer E. LÜTEM

Ottoman Armenian Intricate Relations with Western Powers
before and during the Peace Settlements of the First World War

Prof. Dr. Seçil KARAL AKGÜN

Turkish-American Relations and the Armenian Issue

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Serdar PALABIYIK

BOOK REVIEWS

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS



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EDITORIAL NOTE

After a brief interlude, we are happy to be reunited with our readers with issue number 18 of the *Review of Armenian Studies*.

The first 17 issues of this journal were published by The Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM)- a subsidiary of Avrasya-Bir Foundation. Upon our request, The Board of Directors of Avrasya-Bir Foundation ceded to us the publishing rights of this journal alongside those of the journal with the Turkish title; *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*. In this manner, the said journals which are the only publications in Turkey to deal solely with the Armenian Question will continue to be published uninterrupted. For this reason, I am indebted to the President of the Avrasya-Bir Foundation, Şaban Gülbahar, and the other members of the Board of Directors.

On a somber note, before moving on to the itinerary of this issue we must express that we were deeply saddened by the tragic loss of former ASAM President, parliamentarian and Ret. Ambassador Gündüz Aktan. He leaves behind an irreplaceable void within the Armenian Question research community.

In holding with previous issues, this journal will continue to publish scholarly articles dealing with all aspects of the Armenian Question. This issue opens with the "Facts and Comments" article which examines the foremost developments concerning the relations between Armenia and Turkey that took place throughout the September 2008-February 2009 period. In doing so, the initiative of President Sargsyan to open a new phase of dialogue between the two countries is addressed. Furthermore, this article analyzes the campaign for an apology to the Armenians and focuses on U.S.-Turkey relations in the aftermath of President Obama's election. Finally, recent developments concerning genocide allegations in several countries as well as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly resolution pertaining to the archives and historical research are examined.

In the article entitled "Ottoman Armenian Intricate Relations with Western Powers before and during the Peace Settlements of the First World War", Prof. Seçil Karal Akgün, provides for an examination of the developments whereby the Great Powers changed their stance during the Paris Peace Conference and began to approach Armenian demands with reluctance. Akgün sets forth that the Lausanne Peace Treaty effectively ended Armenian expectations of an independent state encompassing Turkish territories.

Prof. Dr. Nursen Mazici examines present relations between Turkey and the United States in light of Armenian genocide claims, and also charts likely developments and the course of relations between the two countries in the article "Turkish-American Relations and the Armenian Issue".

In the article entitled "Terrorism and Asymmetric Threat: Activities against Turkey, from the Beginning of the 20th Century to the Present", Assoc. Prof. Sadi Çaycı focuses on the Armenian rebellions and the terrorist activities waged by both the Armenians and the PKK that were directed against Turkey and the Turks. The author sheds light on the cause and consequences of the Armenian rebellions of 1915, and also sets forth that between 1975-1984 Armenians and pro-Armenians used terrorism as a means to publicize their claims of an Armenian genocide.

Furthermore, the article discusses the strategic and political objectives of the PKK and the means employed to this end. In this context it is maintained that Turkey did not receive the necessary international support to counter PKK terrorism. The author emphasizes the importance of actively engaging in international cooperation to combat terrorism.

The sixth and last of a series of articles “The Establishment and Activities of the Eastern Legion in French Archival Documents (November 1918-1921)”, written by Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, examines the changes in the structure of the Eastern Legion and its activities in the Cilician region between the period from November 1918 to the end of 1921.

As with previous issues we have included book reviews and a list of recent publications dealing with the Armenian Question. Moreover, in this issue, we are featuring the full text and English translation of an archival document published in the Swedish Newspaper *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* in 1917. Therein a first-hand observation of the Armenians living under the Ottoman Empire at the time is provided for.

We hope this is a fulfilling and interesting issue for our readers.

Sincerely,

The Editor

FACTS AND COMMENTS

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Abstract: *This article is composed of four chapters. The first one covers relations between Turkey and Armenia, and the initiative that President Sargsyan has made to open a new phase of dialogue to normalize relations. The second chapter concerns the latest development in Turkey concerning the ‘apology campaign’ launched by a group of Turkish intellectuals in mid December. The third chapter analyzes the latest developments in the United States after President Obama’s election. The fourth and final chapter is related to developments regarding the genocide allegations in several countries and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly resolution concerning the archives and historical researches.*

Key Words: *Turkish-Armenian relations, Serzh Sargsyan, apology campaign, Obama, genocide allegations.*

I. RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA

Since the foundation of the Republic of Armenia, high level diplomats and the ministers of foreign affairs of Turkey and Armenia have come together on numerous occasions. However, disagreement persists with respect to the recognition of existing borders, the political usage of genocide allegations, and the Karabakh issue.

After the presidential elections in Armenia; President Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Babacan issued congratulatory messages to their Armenian counterparts- Serzh Sargsyan, Tigran Sarkisyan and Edward Nalbandian- and made a call to resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries. In a statement made on this matter, Nalbandian expressed how these congratulatory messages were well received, that they were responded to favorably and that they are ready to talk frankly and openly to discuss all outstanding issues.¹ In doing so, Nalbandian voiced the hope that a new phase of relations between the two countries will begin.

Meanwhile high level authorities of the US Department of State have been suggesting certain principles and guidelines for finding solutions to the problems between the two countries. In a speech that Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried delivered in the House of Representatives, he supported the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, called for Turkey to “come to terms with a dark chapter in its history” and stated that Armenia must

¹ “Yerevan Sees ‘Positive’ Signals from Ankara”, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, May 1, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/>.

acknowledge the existing border and disavow any claim on the territory of Turkey.¹ Voicing the same ideas, albeit in a slightly different manner, Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza expressed that he hopes Turkey and Armenia will soon normalize their relations and voiced that this will involve not only a decision by Turkey to restore diplomatic relations and reopen its border with Armenia, but also the Armenian recognition of its existing border with Turkey. Bryza added that he hopes these steps will also lead to a heartfelt discussion of the shared and tragic past of these two friends of the US.³

In a speech delivered to the Armenian ethnic community in Moscow, President Serzh Sargsyan stated that he will take further steps to stimulate Armenian-Turkish relations and that he will most likely invite President Abdullah Gül to Yerevan to watch a football match between the Armenian and Turkish national teams. He added that “borders must not be sealed in the 21st century. Regional cooperation would be a better way of asserting stability”. Furthermore, Sargsyan was quoted as stating that “a recommendation is made by Turkey to form an expertise committee which would examine the historic facts of the genocide. We are not against any examination, as examination does not mean to doubt the real facts. But the establishment of such committee would be quite logic if we have set diplomatic relations and have open borders. Otherwise the problem will be prolonged.”⁴

Sargsyan’s recommendations are different than those proposed by US Secretary of State officials. Sargsyan suggests that a joint commission for historical research is formed only after Turkey establishes diplomatic relations and opens its borders with Armenia. However, by stating that they do not question the truth, Sargsyan has in effect made this commission redundant because if the “genocide” is taken to be a fact, what is there for the commission to discuss? In addition to this, Sargsyan did not make mention of the recognition of Turkey’s borders.

Even these cautious words of Sargsyan have led to objections within Armenia. The Dashnaks are against the idea of a commission, because its formation would mean questioning the truth of the genocide, which in turn would lead to a delay in Turkey resolving the ‘genocide’ issue.⁵ It is of no surprise that the Popular Movement, supporter of former President Levon Ter-Petrossian, has condemned these words of Sargsyan because of this same reason.⁶

Meanwhile, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nalbandian has expressed that Armenia will continue to seek international recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide

2 Testimony of Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Caucasus; Frozen Conflicts and Closed Borders,” July 18, 2008

3 “USA Department of State Hopes For Soonest Normalization of Armenia-Turkey Relations”, *Panorama Armenian Information Portal*, June 25, 2008, <http://www.panorama.am/en/>.

4 “Armenian President Plans to Invite Turkish-Leader to Yerevan”, Interfax News Agency, June 24, 2006; “President Remained Stable to Armenian-Turkish Relationship” *Panorama Armenian Information Portal*, June 26, 2006, <http://www.panorama.am/en/>.

5 Noyan Tapan, “Serzh Sargsyan Given Bad Advice on Issue Connected with Armenian-Turkish Commission, ‘Kiro Manoyan Considers’”, July 1, 2008.

6 “Sarkisian Signals Support For Turkish Genocide Proposal”, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 26, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/>.

despite its readiness to agree to the creation of a Turkish-Armenian commission of historians.⁷ These words have rendered the recommendations of Sargsyan meaningless. In this situation, Armenia will establish diplomatic relations with Turkey without recognizing Turkey's borders (territorial integrity), the joint border will open, and only after this will a joint commission of historical research be established. Furthermore, during this time Armenia will be able to continue its campaign of genocide propaganda and strive for other countries to adopt resolutions recognizing the genocide allegations.

In order to justify his invitation made to Turkey, Sargsyan published an article in the American Wall Street Journal- a strategy that Armenian politicians have not resorted to till this date.⁸ After expressing his complaints about the border being closed and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway by-passing Armenia, he stated that the existent deadlock needs to be overcome. Within this frame, Sargsyan expressed that he wanted to propose a new phase of dialogue with the government and people of Turkey with the goal of normalizing relations and opening the common border. He added that establishing normal political relations would enable the establishment of a commission to comprehensively discuss all of the complex issues affecting Armenia and Turkey. Furthermore, Sargsyan stated that he invited President Gül to the Turkey-Armenia football match and that this represents a new symbolic start in relations between the two countries. He added that whatever the differences, there are certain cultural, humanitarian and sports links that the people of both countries share, even with a closed border. He continued by expressing that Armenia and Turkey need not and should not be permanent rivals and added that a more prosperous, mutually beneficial future for Armenia and Turkey as well as the opening up of a historic East-West corridor for Europe, the Caspian region and the rest of the world, are goals that can and must be achieved.

The essence of this article provides a discussion of Sargsyan's proposal to establish a new phase of dialogue with Turkey in order to normalize relations and open the joint border. Latterly it appears that Sargsyan has altered his June 21 Moscow speech on one issue: instead of making mention of a joint commission of historians Sargsyan proposes the establishment of a single commission for all outstanding issues between the two countries. President Sargsyan has decided to support this latter idea due to reactions directed against the idea of establishing a joint commission of historical research.

However, should one take Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Nalbandian's statements into consideration, it appears that there is not a change in Armenia's stance concerning relations with Turkey. Nalbandian expressed that all Armenia wants is the normalization of relations with Turkey without preconditions and stated that President Sargsyan's invitation, which is merely a good will gesture, does not translate into questioning the fact of genocide. In addition he stated that

7 "Genocide Recognition Still On Armenia Foreign Policy Agenda", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 26, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/>.

8 "We are Ready to Talk to Turkey by Serzh Sargsyan", *Wall Street Journal*, July 9, 2008.

Armenia will not make concessions neither with respect to the recognition of Turkey's borders nor with respect to the Nagorno Karabakh issue.⁹

Coming to the issue of the Turkey-Armenia national football match, the Dashnaks not only strongly opposed the Turkish President being invited to Armenia to watch the game, but expressed that in the event that this actualizes they would organize a demonstration of protest against the visit.¹⁰ The opposition Republican Party was disgruntled by this course of conduct and Suren Surenyants, a prominent member of the said party, expressed that if the Turkish President's visit to Yerevan is of such importance to the Dashnaks they should first withdraw from the government and then criticize the President.¹¹ The day before the match certain Turkish television stations had interviewed the people of Yerevan which set forth that for the most part they were pleased with and supported the Turkish President's visit to Yerevan. Meanwhile, it appears that Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisyan indirectly criticized not only the Dashnaks but also other opponents of Turkey by stating the following: "we should develop a pro-Armenian understanding rather than an anti-Turkish one."¹²

On another note, President Gül's visit to Ani in Kars was interpreted as a gesture towards Armenia. During the groundbreaking ceremony of the Baku-Tibilisi-Kars railway to which Aliiev and Saakashvili also attended, Gül said "this project is open to all countries in the Caucasus. It is open to all that are willing to contribute to stability, peace and good neighborly relations in the region."¹³ He brought clarity to his remarks through the following response to a question posed by an Armenian newspaper: "If countries want to be a part of this project, they have to recognize each other's territorial integrity."¹⁴

Upon President Gül's visit to Armenia becoming probable, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Manuşehr Mottaki, who wants to lead an active policy in the region, proposed to his Armenian counterpart Nalbandian to be the mediator between the two countries. However, the Turkish Foreign Affairs spokesman specified that they met directly with Armenian officials and that a mediator was not needed.¹⁵

Prior to President Gül arriving at a conclusive decision regarding his visit to Armenia, both sides made gestures showing their good will towards each other. In this context it was set forth that a visa was not required from Turkish spectators who were going to watch the match.¹⁶ Turkey, on the other hand, increased the number of flights from Armenia to aid those escaping the clashes in South Ossetia and arriving at Armenia.¹⁷ Meanwhile, mutual expressions of

9 "Armenia Will Never Stop Pressing for Armenian Genocide International Recognition", *PanArmenian Network*, July 30, 2008, <http://www.panarmenian.net/>.

10 "Dashnaks Worried About Sarkissian Support for Turkish- Armenian Panel", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 30, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/>.

11 "Armenian Opposition Party Critical of Dashnaks' anti-Turkish Plans", *Arminfo Independent News Agency*, August 29, 2008, <http://www.arminfo.info/>

12 "Le Premier Ministre Demande de mettre fin aux Sentiments Anti-Turcs," *Armenpress Armenian News Agency*, July 23, 2008, <http://www.armenpress.am/arm/news/news.htm>.

13 See. : http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/konusma_aciklama_mesajlar/

14 "Gül'den Kapalı Sınırın Sırı Noktasından Ermenistan'a Toprak Bütünlüğü Mesajı", *Zaman*, July 24, 2008.

15 PanArmenian.Net, August 2 2008, "Turkey Doesn't Need Iran's Mediation for Normalization Ties With Armenia"

16 "Armenia Scraps Visas for Turkish Soccer Fans," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, August 14, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/>.

17 "Erivan'a Havada Kota Esnekliği" (Flight Quota Flexibility Granted to Armenia), *Haberler Haber Portalı*, August 14, 2008, <http://haberler.com/>.

goodwill have also continued. The statements of Abdullah Gül expressed at Nevşehir with respect to the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform initiative (made in the aftermath of the conflict in South Ossetia) to the effect that Turkey is not an enemy of anyone in the region,¹⁸ was well received by Sargsyan who expressed that these statements of Gül would engender tangible steps vis-à-vis the relations of the concerned parties. Furthermore, Sargsyan added that there is no sense and necessity for being constant adversaries.¹⁹

That Armenia has not changed its stance with regard to the outstanding issues with Turkey, could also be surmised from the long interview that Serzh Sargsyan gave to *Radikal* columnist Murat Yetkin.²⁰

In this interview, concerning the recognition of Turkey's borders (or territorial integrity), Sargsyan stated that no Armenian official is demanding territory from Turkey, that Armenia respects its international obligations, and that the 1921 Kars Treaty which determines the borders is still in force.

On the issue of genocide allegations, Sargsyan expressed that there is not a single Armenian in the world that does not believe genocide took place. But the question is not who believes in what, it is the fact that, just like Armenia, the Diaspora via its diplomatic representatives is waging campaigns directed against Turkey. Such a course of conduct is difficult to reconcile with normal diplomatic relations.

By stating that a solution to the Karabakh issue would soon be found, Sargsyan hinted at the imminent Azerbaijani presidential elections. However, the statements of Azerbaijani officials, with İlham Aliyev taking the lead, are not very optimistic which point to the continuation of the disaccord concerning the status of Karabakh.

A day later, Murat Yetkin interviewed President Gül.²¹ Therein, Gül specified that he read the interview with President Sargsyan very carefully and expressed that he found it to be important. In response to a question concerning diplomatic relations with Armenia and opening the borders, Gül stated that he sincerely supported the recent efforts made in order to maintain peace in the region, stressed the importance of taking advantage of present opportunities, voiced that Turkey wants to solve all issues with its neighbors, attributes importance to solving problems through dialogue, and is in a situation to resolve problems in the region. In addition, Gül expressed his belief that resolving frozen conflicts, and in particular the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, would engender peace and prosperity among the people of the region. Gül voiced his hope that one day every country in the region will take part in the present projects of cooperation. Finally, Gül expressed that the people of the region who exhibit very similar cultures and customs, even though they do not share the same religion and

18 "Turkey No Enemy to Armenia: Gül", *Agence France Presse*, August 16, 2008, <http://www.afp.com/afpcom/en/>.

19 Noyan Tapan, "Serzh Sargsyan: Attempts To Resist With Armed Forces In A Struggle For Right Of Self-Determination Are Fraught With Serious Military And Geopolitical Consequences", August 25, 2008.

20 Murat Yetkin, "Gül'ün Ziyaretine Çok Önem Veriyoruz", *Radikal*, August 28, 2008.

21 Murat Yetkin, "Hepimiz Aynı Toprağın Çocuklarıyız", *Radikal*, August 29, 2008.

ethnic roots, would attain a level of stability and prosperity beyond their expectations once an atmosphere of security is established.

The President's date of visit to Armenia was announced two days before the match. The main reason for this delay was ongoing talks with Armenia in order to ascertain the issues that would be discussed as well as necessary security measures and probable demonstrations. After the report of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ünal Çeviköz was evaluated this visit became certain.

One day prior to announcing his forthcoming visit to Armenia, President Gül discussed the Cyprus issue as well as questions related to Georgia and Iran with US President George W. Bush.²²

The President's visit to Yerevan lasted less than a day. After meeting with Sargsyan in the Presidential Palace and watching the match Gül returned to Turkey.

Honoring Gül, Sargsyan said: 'You accepted our invitation. The hand extended was not left hanging. You made us happy. I thank you in the name of all the Armenian people'.²³ On the way to the city from the airport, the Dashnaks organized demonstrations against Gül and his delegation, held up disapproving banners, and some vigorously hissed the Turkish national anthem during the match. But these demonstrations did not cause any serious discomfort for Gül and his delegation.²⁴

On his return to Turkey, in a statement made at the airport, the President expressed that he had very positive feelings and thoughts about the visit and expressed that during this occasion constructive and sincere talks were made especially with respect to bilateral relations and developments in Georgia. Furthermore, he voiced his pleasure concerning Armenia's support of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform Initiative. Gül also stated that Turkey-Armenia relations, the Northern Karabakh issue, and Azerbaijan-Armenia relations were discussed and that a consensus was attained with respect to lifting, by way of mutual dialogue, all obstacles that stood in the way of bilateral relations. In brief, he expressed that the visit was productive and that it carries with it a promise of hope for the future.²⁵

On the flight back to Turkey, the President, during a conversation he had with some journalists mentioned that neither the 'genocide' nor the land border issue was discussed. He stated that Sargsyan introduced the topic of Karabakh, that it was discussed in detail and expressed that the visit may contribute to this issue being resolved. The President added that the psychological barrier in the Caucasus was surmounted.²⁶

22 *Zaman*, September 3, 2008.

23 *Hürriyet*, September 7, 2008.

24 *Hürriyet*, September 7, 2008.

25 http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/konusma_aciklama_mesajlar/aciklama_mesajlar/

26 "Gül'den soykırım açıklaması", *Hürriyet*, September 7, 2008.

In response to a question posed by a journalist about a week after the said visit, Serzh Sargsyan stated that Gül expressed his readiness to help resolve the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Sargsyan voiced his pleasure in the face of this proposal as “only an abnormal man can turn down an offer of help.” However, Sargsyan added, “there should be made a distinction between assistance and a mediation... any step designed to contribute to the OSCE Mink Group co-chairs' activities in the resolution of this issue should be assessed positively.”²⁷

After the Yerevan visit, President Gül sent a letter thanking Serzh Sargsyan for the hospitality shown to him and his delegation. Also, having expressed that the discussions during the visit were fruitful, Gül invited Sargsyan to Turkey for the return leg to be held between the national teams in 2009.²⁸

The President's visit to Yerevan was criticized by the main opposition parties in Parliament, namely The Republican Peoples Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

CHP Party Chairman Deniz Baykal stated that there are three main reasons why normal relations cannot be established with Armenia. The first reason is Armenia not recognizing Turkey's national borders and territorial integrity; the second is Armenia using every possible means at its disposal to support the allegation of genocide directed against Turkey; and the third is the occupation of Azerbaijani territory and Northern Karabakh by Armenia. After stating these reasons, Baykal said: “You are asking me if I would go to Yerevan; I would rather go to Baku to watch a match.”²⁹

On the other hand, MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli in a written statement expressed that Armenian policies revolving around a hatred of Turkey is the biggest obstacle in the way of establishing normal relations between the two countries. In this context he mentioned Armenia not recognizing Turkey's territorial integrity and borders, Armenia not relinquishing territorial claims as stated in its Constitution, and the Armenian occupation of one fourth of Azerbaijan's territories. Additionally he mentioned that there are no political, moral or legitimate grounds for placing Turkey in a pleading position to repair relations between the two countries and further expressed that should Armenia professedly accept the Joint Commission for Historical Research, this will not accord any prestige to Turkey. Moreover, Bahçeli expressed that Gül has sworn to protect the glory and honor of the Republic of Turkey, that under these circumstances going to Yerevan is not compatible with his office and voiced his hope that the President would not engage in a course of conduct that would dent the honor of Turkey.³⁰

As for Armenia, the visit of president Gül was welcomed by Levon Ter Petrossian,

27 “Armenian Leader Set to Improve Relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan”, *Armenian Public TV*, September 13, 2008.

28 http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/konusma_aciklama_mesajlar/aciklama_mesajlar/?id=4571

29 “Baykal'dan Gül'e Ermeni Taşı!” *Hyetert*, September 1, 2008.

30 “Tarihi Gaflet”, *Akşam*, September 2, 2008.

former Head of State and Chairman of the Armenian National Congress-the main opposition party. Petrossian expressed that the match offered a good opportunity for thawing bilateral relations.³¹

In brief, on September 10, 2008, the Dashnaks, also known as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party, published a proclamation concerning relations between Turkey and Armenia.³² To summarize, this proclamation specifies that Armenia and Turkey, as neighboring states, must work toward the normalization of bilateral relations. However, good neighborly relations can only be established after the recognition by Turkey of the Armenian genocide and the restoration of the rights of the Armenian people. The lifting of the blockade and the establishment of diplomatic relations can only serve as first steps on this path. Turkey must not be party in the Artsakh conflict; it should not talk to Armenia with preconditions, and must relinquish its policy of blockading and isolating Armenia. Since 1998 Armenia is pursuing a foreign policy based on universal recognition and condemnation, including by Turkey, of the Armenian genocide. Armenia views this not only as a restoration of historical justice, but also as a way to improve the overall situation and mutual trust in the region, thus preventing similar crimes in the future.

Ken Hachikian; Chairman of the main Dashnak organization in the United States, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), sent a letter setting forth similar views and requests to U.S. Senators and members of the House of Representatives prior to Gül's Yerevan visit. The said letter requested lifting domestic restrictions on the study, discussion, and recognition of the Armenian genocide, as well as abandoning opposition to the international recognition and commemoration of this crime, removing restrictions on Armenian stewardship of cultural and religious heritage sites within Turkey, ending military support for Azerbaijan's armed forces, and lifting all restrictions on the collective rights of the Armenian community in Turkey.³³

In addition to this, Ken Hachikian also called for the President to visit the genocide memorial in Yerevan.³⁴

In the light of the foregoing, it can be gathered that the Armenian Dashnaks, despite being a part of the coalition government, have adopted a different stance than that of the Head of State concerning the policy to be exercised against Turkey. Should Turkey and Armenia engage in cooperative efforts at a future date, it would be reasonable to expect the Dashnaks to withdraw from the coalition government.

The strongest reaction to Abdullah Gül's visit to Yerevan came from the Azerbaijani media and some Azerbaijani politicians. For the most part a lot of material of a speculative nature was published that argued the visit did not

31 "Gül's Yerevan Visit Welcomed by All But Extremist Opposition", *Today's Zaman*, September 4, 2008.

32 ARF-Dashnaktsutyun Press Office, September 10, 2008.

33 "ANCA Outlines Concerns About Gül Visit to Armenia", *Armenian National Committee of America*, Press Release, September 4, 2008.

34 "ANCA: Gül Should Attend Armenian Genocide Memorial In Yerevan", *PanArmenian Network*, September 5, 2008, <http://www.panarmenian.net/>.

materialize on Turkey's initiative but as a result of EU and US pressures, that the border could be opened without consideration of its implications vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and that Turkey could forgo its stance of supporting Azerbaijan in return for Armenia's recognition of Turkey's territorial integrity.³⁵

This negative atmosphere was not present within the Azerbaijani government. The main reason accounting for this situation is that high level information concerning the visit was given to Azerbaijani officials. For example, information in this regard was relayed in advance to Elmar Mammadyarov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, on the occasion of his trip to Turkey to discuss the events unfolding in Georgia.³⁶ Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, having gone to Baku on August 21 to discuss the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform Initiative, obtained the opportunity to explain to İlham Aliyev the reasons behind the President's prospective visit to Armenia. Despite these explanations, Azerbaijani officials did not adopt a stance empathizing with and/or supporting President Gül's visit. A more neutral tone was espoused and in line with this, statements to the effect that the visit is a domestic affair Turkey and that Azerbaijan can not interfere in it³⁷ or that the Turkish State has the right to pass a decision on all issues so they cannot state an opinion on this issue³⁸ were voiced. Such statements, without protesting Turkey's decision, indirectly expressed unease and disappointment.

This situation in Azerbaijan made it necessary for President Gül to visit Baku. Four days after the Yerevan visit, Gül went to Baku and discussed with İlham Aliyev the details of his meetings in Armenia, the latest situation in the region, Turkey's Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform Initiative and certain other topics concerning both countries.³⁹ After a joint press conference, Gül returned to Turkey.

On his flight to Baku, the President expressed that Azerbaijan should not feel any discomfort about his visit to Armenia; and that if there are those who continue to do so this is unfair to Turkey as Turkey has sacrificed its interests from time to time as the greatest supporter of Azerbaijan.⁴⁰ No doubt, Turkish-Armenian relations were discussed during the visit İlham Aliyev paid to Turkey in November following his election as President for the second time. Turkey has regularly informed Azerbaijani high level officials concerning its relations with Armenia. To this end, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Ali Babacan paid Azerbaijan a visit on two separate occasions; the first materialized in December 2008, and the second in February 2009.

With respect to bilateral relations, the first was held in Yerevan the night of September 6 when a meeting bringing together the presidents was followed by

35 Ramin Abdullayev, "Azeriler Türk-Ermeni Diyalogundan Tedirgin", *NTV-MSNBC*, July 21, 2008.

36 *Today's Zaman*, July 30, 2008

37 Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov, "Azerbaijan Cannot Interfere in Turkish President's Visit To Armenia", *Azerbaijani Press Agency*, September 4, 2008.

38 "Participation of Azerbaijan and Armenia in any Platform is Impossible Unless Nagorno Karabakh Conflict is Solved", *Azerbaijani Press Agency*, September 8, 2008.

39 Cumhurbaşkanı'nın Azerbaycan'a Hareketinden önce Havaalanında yaptığı açıklama, September 10, 2008. http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/konusma_aciklama_mesajlar/aciklama_mesajlar/

40 "Gül: Azerlerin Rahatsız Olması Haksızlık Olur", *ntvmsnbc*, September 10, 2008, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/>.

a meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan and his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandian. In a statement issued by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,⁴¹ Nalbandian reaffirmed the principal position of the Armenian side to establish relations without preconditions. He also stressed, that Armenia considers President Gül's visit as a serious stimulus in that direction and that Armenian and Turkish Foreign Ministers expressed their determination on the comprehensive normalization of bilateral relations. The two mentioned that consistent steps in that direction will be taken and that they examined the Karabakh peace process, and agreed to gather in New York at the United Nations General Assembly meetings. Furthermore, the statement highlighted that Armenia welcomed Turkey's Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform Initiative.

From this statement one makes note of Armenia's insistence to establish diplomatic relations without any preconditions, that is, opening Turkish borders and establishing diplomatic relations. Also one may surmise that the issues of recognizing Turkey's territorial integrity (or borders) and that of the genocide allegations were not brought to the agenda. However, from subsequent statements made by Minister of Foreign Affairs Babacan, one can deduce that these issues were indeed addressed. Babacan, during a television interview, stated that it is important to bring the events of 1915 to light and that the proposal of the Joint Commission for Historical Research is still on the table. Expressing his desire that Armenia opens its archives he stated that "regarding this issue a step forward appears to have been taken."⁴² Babacan further expressed that Turkey is ready to face its past and whatever this proposed commission comes up with at the end of its studies.⁴³ That there exists a strong desire on the part of Armenia to resolve the territorial claim advanced against Turkey and that Armenia understands Turkey's sensitivities with respect to this issue and vice versa was also touched upon in the said interview.⁴⁴

In conclusion, from President Gül's Yerevan visit and the subsequent meetings held between the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries, it is possible to deduce the following:

- Armenia has accepted Turkey's Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform Initiative.
- Armenia has agreed to Turkey contributing to the resolution of the Karabakh issue. However, the Minsk Group's mediation task will continue.
- At present a decision has not yet been arrived at concerning the proposal of a joint commission of historical research to analyze the events of 1915 (namely, the genocide allegations); however, talks on this issue are continuing. Alongside the establishment of this commission, it appears

41 http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/news/frameset_arch.html

42 "Ermenistan ile Diyalog Sıklaşacak", *CNNTurk*, September 10, 2008.

43 "Babacan Presses Armenia For Joint Studies of Genocide Claims", *Today's Zaman*, September 13, 2008.

44 "Babacan Presses Armenia..."

probable that Armenia will request the establishment of other commissions to enhance economical, cultural, and diplomatic relations.⁴⁵

According to the press, talks are taking place in Bern between high-level officials who are working on a goodwill declaration.⁴⁶ Moreover, Ali Babacan and Edward Nalbandian have been engaging in bilateral talks at every international meeting they have jointly taken part in (foremost that of the United Nations).

It should be stated that President Gül's visit to Armenia has left a positive impression on the Western public. Albeit to varying degrees, the great majority of the news covered by the media in these nations viewed the said visit in a favorable light. The press of the Armenian diaspora resorted to a fairly moderate language. The main reason accounting for this situation is the pleasure engendered by the prospect of resolving ingrained problems between Turkey and Armenia. Furthermore, receiving good news regarding the Caucasus at a time of great concern due to the conflicts between Georgia and Russia, has most likely led to a sense of relief.

Official circles within the US and the EU, alongside the general public, have also voiced their positive opinions on this issue. For example, French President Nicolas Sarkozy (who usually displays an adverse stance against Turkey), commended the political courage of Gül and Sargsyan and noted that both countries showed the world that reconciliation is possible through openness, dialogue and respect of others.⁴⁷ Also, in a statement of the Presidency of the Council of EU, the visit was made mention of as being historic and highly symbolic, and the hope that that this visit constitutes a first step in the normalization of tense relations between the two countries was voiced.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn referred to the trip as an important first step and hoped it would soon be followed by others that lead to a full normalization of relations between these two countries.⁴⁹ Additionally, in a speech delivered before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried expressed that they are delighted the president of Armenia invited President Gül and that he accepted this invitation. Fried added that the US had been encouraging Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan to work toward settling their differences and voiced that they want Armenia's border open.⁵⁰

In the aftermath of President Gül's Yerevan visit, certain positive developments have taken place concerning the relations between the two countries. To cite an example, Turkey abandoned the prior notification protocol previously required for Armenian passing transit through Turkish airspace.⁵¹ Furthermore, in contrast to previous years, representatives of the official Turkish offices abroad are allowed to participate to the invitations of official Armenian offices.⁵²

45 "Ermeni Tarihi Adıma Yaklaşıyor. Ortak Tarih Komisyonu Yolda", *Zaman*, September 15, 2008.

46 "Ermenistan' la Bern 'de 2. Tur Gizli Görüşme", *Hürriyet*, September 19, 2008.

47 "President Gul's Yerevan Visit boost Turkey's credentials in Europe", *Today's Zaman*, September 8, 2008.

48 "EU Hails Turkey 's 'historic' Armenia visit", *EU Observer*, September 5, 2008, <http://euobserver.com/>.

49 "EU Hails Turkey 's 'historic' Armenia..."

50 Ümit Enginsoy, "US Urges Turkey To Open Border", *Turkish Daily News*, September 11, 2008.

51 "Ermenistan'a Hava Ulaşımında Sınırlamalar Kalktı", *CNN Türk*, September 26, 2008.

52 "Türk Büyükelçiliklerine Ermenistan Resepsiyonlarına Katılma İzni", *Zaman*, September 27, 2008.

However, this positive atmosphere between offices has not been paralleled by the sentiment of the general Armenian public. In a public opinion poll conducted in the beginning of October, %11 of the people were against any form of cooperation with Turkey; for %33 reconciliation with Turkey was impossible, for %76 the establishment of relations with Turkey would be possible if the Armenian side observes Turkey's preconditions and for %64 the establishment of relations with Turkey was possible but Armenia must be careful and not forget that Turkey is an enemy.⁵³

Approximately two months later, in another poll conducted by the Gallup Institute,⁵⁴ although the same questions were not asked, a slight change in public opinion in Turkey's favor was witnessed. According to the said poll, only %7 was against any form of cooperation with Turkey, and %18 would cooperate with Turkey only if the "genocide" is recognized. Accordingly, %25 is against establishing ties of cooperation with Turkey. Those in favor of instituting cooperative efforts with Turkey short of any preconditions amount to %26. Of those who took part in the poll %47 is of the view that a degree of caution should be exercised concerning relations with Turkey. Finally, %50 views Turkey as an economic partner. In conclusion, it would not be wrong to say that there is a degree of indecisiveness in Armenia with respect to engaging in political cooperation with Turkey; however there appears not to be such a problem concerning economic cooperation.

Armenian people have a generally negative, or undefined, perception of Turkey. No doubt, Kocharyan's anti-Turkish rhetoric during his ten year term of office as President played an important role in this respect. This situation has made Sarkisyan, who is bent on normalizing relations with Turkey, display a hesitant and susceptible stance vis-à-vis Turkey. For instance, President Gül in his speech on September 23, 2008 at the United Nation General Assembly used the terms 'Karabakh under occupation' and Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisyan, who usually does not talk about foreign affairs, expressed that these words had a cold shower effect and contained some hazards.⁵⁵

President Serzh Sargsyan, unlike his predecessor Kocharyan, is determined to resolve the outstanding issues with Turkey. In a speech he delivered at the United Nations General Assembly, Sargsyan stated that the most important decision he took together with President Gül was not to leave the current problems to future generations. In tandem with this, Sargsyan expressed his belief that it is necessity to move fast and resolutely in this direction.⁵⁶

In the face of Sargsyan's approach, for the most part the diaspora pursues a 'wait and see' policy. However, the discomfort of the Dashnak Party concerning this matter continues. The bureau of this party, meeting in Beirut between the dates

53 "Thirty-Three percent of Armenian Citizens Believe Reconciliation With Turkey Impossible", *Armenian Center for National and International Studies Public Opinion Polls*, October 1, 2008, <http://www.arminfo.info/>.

54 "La Population de l'Arménie Estime qu'Erevan Doit Être Prudent Dan Ses Relations Avec La Turquie", *Nouvelles Armenie Magazine*, December 5, 2008, <http://www.armenews.com/>

55 "Cold Shower", *Hayots Ashkhar Daily*, October 17, 2008

56 "RA President: During Talks With Gül We Decided Not to Leave Current Problems to Future Generations", *PanArmenian Network*, September 26, 2008, <http://panarmenian.net/>.

of November 29- December 1, expressed their views concerning the relations between the two countries. Accordingly, Armenia and Turkey should continue their efforts toward normalizing relations. However, according to the Dashnak Party, Turkey has not taken any positive steps and to the contrary has used ongoing meetings as a hindrance to the genocide recognition process and has made the relationship of the two states conditional upon Armenia's relations with a third state, namely Azerbaijan. With this last point, the Dashnak Party implied that during negotiations conducted with Armenia, Turkey also endeavors to protect the interests of Azerbaijan.

Furthermore, the Dashnak Party stated that it was appreciated that the highest authorities of Armenia are in accord and that the recognition and condemnation of the Armenian genocide in general and by Turkey in particular is one of the strategic directions of Armenia foreign policy. Upon the insistence of the Dashnak Party, efforts were exerted for the international recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations by the governments during Kocharyan's term of office and also subsequently by the Sargsyan government. However, as will be touched upon below, neither during Kocharyan's term nor Sargsyan's term was a request made that Turkey recognizes the genocide allegations. In fact that such a request was not advanced within the frame of normalizing relations was clearly expressed. Against this background, the Dashnak Party making remarks to the contrary is somewhat of a criticism directed against Sargsyan.

Another issue of concern to the Dashnak Party is that the present importance of resolving Armenia-Turkey relations should not be valued more than the rights of generations to come. At first glance, these words might not appear to have a profound meaning; however, this statement essentially expresses that Armenia should not recognize Turkey's borders. According to the Dashnaks, Armenia as it stands at present, can not effectuate its territorial claims over Western Armenia (Eastern Anatolia). But in the future this situation could change. In other words, Armenia could grow strong enough to acquire these territories. As such, Turkey's present borders should not be recognized. If not, the rights of future Armenian generations would be relinquished. This negative stance of the Dashnaks, is not completely shared by the diaspora. As mentioned above, the diaspora has a tendency to wait and see how events unfold.

In conclusion, President Gül's Yerevan visit has started a new era in the relations between these countries. Although the negotiations that took place between high level officials have not born fruit within a short span of time, both sides still look ahead at the year 2009 with hope. As a matter of fact, Minister of Foreign Affairs Babacan has expressed that the two countries have never come this close to finding a solution to the problem present since the First World War, and stated that even if they have not yet reached the stage of resolving this issue, great progress has been made in this regard.⁵⁷ Nalbandian stated that he shared Babacan's views, and expressed that they truly were very close to resolving this problem.⁵⁸

57 "Ermenistan ile Çözümüne Hiç Bu Kadar Yakın Olmadık", *Hürriyet*, December 22, 2008.

58 *Asbarez Armenian Daily Newspaper*, January 21, 2009, <http://www.asbarez.com/>.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY

During the period reviewed, the most important development for the Turkish general public has been the initiation of “the apology to the Armenians campaign” by a group of Turkish intellectuals in mid December.

On the website, www.ozurdiliyoruz.com (we are apologizing.com), the following text has been opened for signature:

My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial at the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and in my share I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them.

The words “great catastrophe” in this text are the translation of what is used in the Armenian language to denote the Armenian genocide: Metz Yegern. It is highly probable that this term was intentionally used in the text, bearing in mind the negative reactions the word genocide elicits in Turkey. As such, those who drafted the text and the individuals who signed it thereafter have indirectly adopted a stance accepting that the Armenians were subjected to genocide.

To justify or necessitate an apology being made, in the first instance there needs to be a concrete act that harmed or at least hurt the individuals or communities in question. Since about a century has elapsed since the events of 1915, the people of today can not be held responsible for them. This could only be possible if one’s grandfather bore responsibility in connection with the relocation of that time-cases of which are very few and far between. Even if such a case were at hand, it should be noted that no form of responsibility for a crime is hereditary. No one can be held accountable for crimes committed by their ancestors; therefore, in such an event they are not required to apologize and even if they are to do so, it would not have any legal consequences.

Announced as constituting a personal venture, the said campaign in reality possesses the attributes of a political initiative as efforts have been exerted to have it supported by as great a number of people as possible. In fact, if at the end of this campaign, planned to last at least for a year, a great number of people embrace the text of apology, then it may have some political consequences.

The most significant of these is that it would be more difficult to defend the view that the Armenians had not experienced genocide, and consequently, to prevent resolutions from being passed by various nations’ parliaments starting mainly with the U.S. Congress.

Secondly, should a large number of Turks subscribe to the genocide thesis; there would be no need to establish a joint commission of historical research which constitutes an important component in the ongoing negotiations with Armenia.

Thirdly, if the number of those siding with the idea of apologizing to Armenians are high, then this would soon bring the issue of acknowledging the Armenian

“genocide” to the agenda and it would be easier for those who have apologized to acknowledge and speak of the events of 1915 as such. After a while, this would be followed by a claim for paying compensation to Armenians, and if this also is accomplished, then will come the stage whereby the demand to cede some East Anatolian territory to Armenia will be voiced. In short, the apology campaign is not at all an innocent initiative and it constitutes the first step of a process which may have very serious drawbacks.

In our opinion, the most negative aspect of this campaign is that it has regard solely for the feelings and sorrows of Armenians and pays no attention to the great disasters the Turks have experienced in the near past and makes no mention of those who have been expelled from the territories lost by the Ottoman Empire starting as of the 19th century, most of them brutally killed or who took refuge in Thrace and Anatolia under very miserable conditions. However, the atrocities the Turks and other Muslims faced during and following the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, the Balkan Wars, World War II and the Turkish War of Independence have been well documented. Furthermore, the murder of Turkish diplomats by Armenians about 20 years ago, solely because they represented Turkey, should also be considered within this context. Making no mention of these disasters represents a course of conduct acknowledging the suffering of the Armenians to those of the Turks and hence fundamentally represents an unjust attitude against Turkey and the Turks.

The number of those who apologized on this site that opened for signing on December 15 2008 reached 26,000 on December 31, 2008 and progressed very slowly afterwards.⁵⁹ As of March 15, 2009 the figure is 29,408.

About two days after the apology campaign was launched, presumably December 17, another site named www.ozurbekliyorum.com (I expect an apology.com) was opened on the internet. According to this site, those who are supposed to apologize are not the Turks, but the Armenians for the various massacres they have perpetrated against the Turks and the other Muslims.⁶⁰ By December 31, 2008, the number of those who expressed they are expecting an apology was 112,300- subsequently the headway made in this respect slowed down. As of March 15, 2009 the figure is at 116,750. Accordingly, the figure for those who expect apology is more than four times that of those who offer it.

However, other internet sites and “facebook” groups have also opposed the “We Apologize” campaign apart from the above mentioned “I Expect an Apology” campaign. As of December 30, 2008 the number of those who

59 As per March 15, 2009, this figure has reached 29,408.

60 This text was put on the web site:

I believe that all Armenians and their supporters should apologize for the atrocities that the Armenians had exposed to the Ottoman people in the past.

I declare that I can not tolerate these; and on behalf of the Turkish world and Ottoman Descendants, I expect apology! Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; “They had killed thousands of blameless and aidless mothers and children with torture. It was the Armenians who had done this atrocity that has no equal in the history”, p.260-261.

assumed an opposing stance against the “We Apologize” campaign is over 665,000.⁶¹ This figure is 25 times that of those who have apologized.⁶²

The “We Apologize” campaign has been severely criticized in Turkey. The first body that stood up against it is the Retired Ambassadors Group in Ankara. In its declaration, published in the “Current Documents” of our periodical, the Group qualified the campaign as unjust, erroneous and as standing in conflict with national interests. Furthermore, it underlined that the campaign constitutes an act of disrespect to our history, and betrayal to those who lost their lives as a consequence of Armenian terror, stated that the sufferings and losses of the Turkish folk due to Armenian uprisings and terror acts are no less than those of the Armenians, and placed special emphasis on the Armenian terror activities of the 70’s and 80’s that targeted the Turkish diplomats. The Group expressed that against this background the Armenians should apologize from the Turkish nation. It was noted that in our day Armenian terror completed its function and that the next scheme is apologizing which will be followed by designs to obtain financial compensation and territorial claims. The declaration concluded with the Group’s wish that utmost care is paid to not becoming an instrument of such a plan, and that if deemed absolutely necessary the two sides may mutually share the sorrows they both experienced throughout history.

The retired ambassadors’ initiative was covered by the foreign press⁶³ and in this manner the acts of terrorism directed against Turkish diplomats (which have been forgotten or that have been purposefully erased from collective memories) were remembered.

Many politicians in Turkey have strongly criticized this campaign. Prime Minister Erdoğan, referring to those who initiated the campaign stated that “they are apologizing because they probably committed such genocide. The Republic of Turkey does not have such a problem. In the event of a crime, the ones who have committed it should apologize. However, neither my country, nor my nation, nor I have such an issue. In its contacts with other countries Turkey has displayed its stance on this issue very openly and clearly... I personally do not support and accept this campaign. And I will not take part in it.. It is not possible to

61	ozurdiliyoruz.com	26,086
	ozurbekliyorum.com	12,419
	ozurdilemiyorum.net	60,950
	ozurdileme.com	29,261
	ozurdilemiyoruz.biz	74,370
	http://anket.milletmeclisi.com /blog/ermenilere-ozur-kampanyasi/	3,578
	Facebook - Ermenilerden "Özür" Falan Dilemiyorum! (I don't apologize to Armenians or what)	282,208
	Facebook - Ermenilerden Özür Dilemiyoruz! (We don't apologize to Armenians)	36,582
	Facebook - Özür Dileyenlere Karşı Tarihin Işığında Türkçe Duruş (Turkish stance against the apologizers under the light of history)	1,365
	Facebook - Ben Özür Dilemiyorum (I do not apologize)	36,752
	Facebook - sözde ermeni soykırımı için özür dileyen Sözde Aydınları Protesto Ediyoruz! (We protest the so called intellectuals who apologize for the so called Armenian genocide)	5,566
	Facebook - Ermeniler'den Özür Dilemiyorum, Özür Bekliyorum! (I do not apologize to Armenians, I expect an apology)	22,005

62 As per March 15 2009, this number has reached 116.750.

63 Nicolas Cheviron, “Une Pétition demandant pardon aux Arméniens crée la polémique en Turquie”, *AFP*, December 19 2008; Nukte V. Ortaç, “Turquie, Arméniens la fin d'un tabou”, *L'Express*, January 22, 2008; Guillaume Perrier, “Des milliers de Turcs demandent ‘pardon’ aux Arméniens”, *Le Monde*, December 20, 2008; “Les Excuses aux Arméniens pour 1915 divisent la Turquie”, *RF1*, December 28, 2008.

understand this course of conduct... This only reverses every step forward taken.”⁶⁴

President Gül, in response to a question, stated that “Turkey is a country where views are freely expressed. The stance of the Turkish state is known. We are determined to resolve our problems with our neighbors via dialogue, this is possible. It is not useful for outstanding issues to persist.”⁶⁵ These words have been interpreted in the Armenian press as if the President supported the apology campaign and that he does not share the Prime Minister’s point of view.⁶⁶ Having later enounced that this campaign will affect relations between Armenia and Turkey negatively, the President has prevented any further misunderstandings to emerge on this issue.

Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Köksal Toptan,⁶⁷ Republican People's Party Chairman Deniz Baykal,⁶⁸ Nationalist Movement Party Chairman Devlet Bahçeli,⁶⁹ the General Staff,⁷⁰ The Turkish Historical Society,⁷¹ and many universities have also criticized this campaign.

On the other hand, the separatist Kurdish movements’ representative Chairman of the Democratic Community Party Ahmet Türk has supported the apology to Armenians.⁷²

For the most part the Turkish press has criticized the ‘I apologize’ campaign which has received wide coverage. Only a few liberal left wing newspapers like ‘Taraf’ have supported the campaign.

The reaction of the Armenian press concerning this issue was of a limited nature. The fact that the word ‘genocide’ was not used was criticized; also, this campaign was seen as a start of Turkey expressing remorse for the events of 1915.⁷³ The diaspora press also did not attribute much interest to this issue as well; criticisms mainly addressed the belief that this declaration was not sufficient and the fact that the word ‘genocide’ was not used. According to this standpoint, it was unsatisfactory that the apology text made mention solely of the phrase ‘1915 events’; furthermore, the actual period should be stated as encompassing the years from 1915 to 1923.⁷⁴ It was also noted that the apology should come from the state of Turkey and not actual people and that the apology can not take the place of reparations.

64 “Soykırımı İşlemişler ki Özür Diliyorlar”, *Milliyet*, December 18, 2008.

65 “Görüşler açıkca ifade ediliyor”, *Hürriyet*, December 17, 2008.

66 “Turkey’s President Defends Armenia Apology Campaign”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 18, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/>; “Le Président Gul prend ses distances avec son premier Ministre”, *Armenews*, December 19, 2008.

67 “Özür Vahim Kampanya”, *Radikal*, January 18, 2009.

68 www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=news&page=readmore&news_id=5 December 17, 2008.

69 “Bahçeli’den çok sert Açıklamalar”, *Sonsayfa Haber Sitesi*, December 7, 2008, <http://sonsayfa.com/>.

70 “Genelkurmay ‘Ermeni Kardeşlerimden Özür Diliyorum’ Kampanyasını Eleştirdi”, *Milliyet*, December 20, 2008.

71 “Arabozucu Kampanya’ya tepkiler”, *Anadolu Ajansı*, January 6, 2008.

72 “DPT Lideri Ahmet Türk Süryanilerden Özür Diledi”, *Hürriyet*, December 30, 2008.

73 Golos Armenii and Zerkalo, *Nouvelles d’Arménie Magazine*, December 30, 2008, <http://www.armenews.com/>.

74 “Turkish Apology for Armenian Genocide: Good First Step, But Not Good Enough”, *California Courier Online*, December 18, 2008.

As for the major organizations of the diaspora, in a declaration⁷⁵ the pro-Dashnak Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) stated that the efforts of those courageous parliamentarians and historians in Turkey who have placed the Armenian genocide at the center-stage must be commented on. The declaration continued by expressing that “the campaign by Prime Minister Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders to quash honest discussion of the murder of 1.5 million Armenians from 1915-1923 must not be rewarded. Silence by the international community will be misinterpreted by Turkey’s leadership as support for their genocide denial agenda. Only by formally recognizing the Armenian Genocide can the U.S. and democratic countries around the world send a clear message that they stand with the voices of truth in Turkey”. As for the apology campaign, the text was criticized because “the centrally planned and systematically executed campaign of deportations, starvation and murder of 1.5 million Armenians was not characterized as ‘genocide.’”

Bryan Ardouny, Executive Director of the second biggest Armenian organization, the Armenian Assembly of America’s (AAA), was in a more favorable approach towards the ‘We Apologize’ campaign. Ardouny expressed that an irreversible trend has commenced in Turkey and that this public apology is a first step in that direction which will inevitably lead to Turkey coming to grips with its genocidal past.⁷⁶

The European Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy, which claims to represent all Armenian organizations in Europe, published a press statement⁷⁷ commending the organizers of the ‘We Apologize’ campaign and declaring that the Armenian Question should be solved without causing too much damage to Turkey; mass crime cannot be “apologized” away by populist initiatives and deliberately avoiding usage of the term genocide intends to de-criminalize the destruction by the Ottoman Turkish government of 1,5 million Armenians. The statement also voiced the view that the present Turkish Government, the successor of the Ottoman Empire, must formally recognize this genocide and take full responsibility of all its legal consequences. Furthermore the statement expressed the opinion that there is no alternative for Turkey other than recognition and reparation of the Armenian genocide.

On the other hand, very few organizations or people from the diaspora have reacted positively to the campaign. Meanwhile, on January 19, 2009, individuals in France of Armenian origin published a statement thanking those who organized and endorsed the ‘We Apologize’ campaign, and stated that they not only support it, but also accept this as a historical development.⁷⁸

Faculty member at the Macquarie University in Australia and co-chairman of the Turkish-Armenian Dialogue Group has mentioned opening an apology text

75 “ANCA Statement on Recent Efforts in Turkey to Confront the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923”, *Armenian National Committee of America*, Press Release, December 22, 2008.

76 “An Irreversible Trend Has Commenced in Turkey”, *Armenian Assembly of America*, Press Release, December 17, 2008.

77 “Armenians Still Demand Recognition and Reparation of Their Genocide by Turkey”, *European Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy*, Press Release, February 2, 2009.

78 Collective Van, January 19, 2008, “Des Arméniens disent merci aux Citoyens de Turquie”.

for signature⁷⁹ but had to call off his attempt after being subjected to various threats.⁸⁰

III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

During the period under review, some developments have taken place in the U.S. Of particular significance was Adam Schiff (a leading pro-Armenian member of the House of Representatives) having submitted a bill proposing that Turkey should open its borders with Armenia. Another development has been the problem concerning the assignment of the US ambassador to Armenia. Pending for almost two years, this issue has been resolved by Senate's approval of Ms. Jovanovich's candidacy. Meanwhile, the appointment of the US Ambassador to Turkey has materialized despite certain impediments brought about by pro-Armenians. Other significant developments include the frequently voiced statements by Democrat Party Presidential Candidate Senator Barack Obama supporting the Armenian allegations of genocide and his assigning the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations President Joe Biden, known for his pro-Armenian stance, as his vice-presidential candidate. Pro-Armenians taking part in the government formed by Obama following his election, has also caused some concern in Turkey.

A. The Bill Concerning Turkey Opening its Borders with Armenia

On March 15, 2008, Mr.Schiff submitted a bill to the US Congress calling for Turkey to lift its blockade on Armenia. In the findings section of the bill, after a repetition of the known allegations regarding the closure of the joint border between the two countries and stating that it inflated Armenia's transportation costs by 30 to 35 percent, it was mentioned that the closure prevented US and international humanitarian assistance and constituted a violation of international law. Thereafter the bill states the following:⁸¹

- i)In order to restore economic, political and cultural links with Armenia, the President and the Secretary of State shall call upon Turkey to immediately lift its ongoing blockade on Armenia;
- ii)The Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report that outlines the steps taken by the United States to end Turkey's blockade on Armenia.

Adam Schiff had submitted prior bills on this particular issue but they were not brought to the floor. However, submitting such a bill at a time when everyone is preoccupied with the presidential, House of Representatives and Senate elections, and when a Congressional recess is near, makes it appear that this is

79 *Radikal*, February 21, 2008. Baskin Oran, "Ceza Değil, Madalya Verelim".

80 Dr. Armen Kakavyan, Arminfo, February 10, 2009, "ASALA and Ukht Ararati Union of Former Political Prisoners and Freedom Fighters Against Initiative".

81 "Rep. Schiff Introduces Bill Calling for the End of Turkey's Blockade of Armenia", *Armenian National Committee of America*, Press Release, May 15, 2008.

connected with a motive to get re-elected by attracting the votes of the rather sizable Armenian community residing in his electorate region in California. As a matter of fact, no debate has taken place regarding this bill. Furthermore it has become null and void due to the renewal of the House of Representatives following the elections.

B. Appointment of the US Ambassador to Armenia

For approximately 2 years, there has not been a US ambassador in Yerevan. As mentioned above,⁸² Ambassador John M. Evans was removed from office in September 2006. It was understood that Evan's recognition of the 1915 events as genocide, contrary to the stance of the Bush administration, played a role in his removal. Bush nominated Richard Hoagland to be the US Ambassador to Armenia to replace John Evans. In line with formal procedures in the US, this nomination should have been approved by the Senate. Although Hoagland was placed under pressure at the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, he remained loyal to the stance of his government by refraining from using the word 'genocide'. The Commission approved his appointment with 11 votes against 8 and sent it to the Senate's General Assembly for endorsement. Yet, due to Senator Robert Mendez's strong opposition, Hoagland's actual appointment has not materialized.

Three points regarding this event should be taken into account. The first one is that certain Armenian Diaspora organizations wanted, with the support of like-minded senators, to force ambassadorial candidates to define the events of 1915 as genocide and therefore push the Bush administration into a difficult position. Secondly, some senators yearned, beyond the bounds of Armenians' demands, to use this endorsement process against the Bush administration. And the third one is that the Armenian Government desired to appoint a US ambassador to Armenia in order to establish high level contacts with the United States. From this perspective, it can be seen that the Diaspora and the Armenian Government have differing approaches regarding this issue; with the Diaspora organizations holding their obsession with genocide above the interests of the Armenian Government.

In March 2008, Ms. Marie L. Yovanovitch, who is the present US ambassador to Kirghizistan, was nominated as a candidate for the post of ambassador to Armenia. She answered the questions posed by senators at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the 19th of June. Despite Robert Mendez's efforts to pressure her to define the events of 1915 as genocide, she refrained from using this word. Instead, Ms. Yovanovitch stated that, she, like the US Government, acknowledged and mourned the mass killings, ethnic cleansing and forced deportation that devastated over one and a half million Armenians during the final days of the Ottoman Empire; and that the US views these events, which are defined as "Medz Yegern" or Great Calamity by the Armenians, as one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. In response to a question why she

82 See: Ömer Engin Lütem, "Olaylar ve Yorumlar", *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No 25 (2007): p. 26, 27.

did not use the term genocide, she stated that “President Bush pursued, like the previous presidents, the policy of not using that term and stated that the President encourages Turkish citizens to reconcile with their past and with the Armenians.”⁸³ After the oral questioning was concluded, some of the Senators addressed written questions to Ms. Yovanovitch. From among these, we will refer solely to the most significant of those posed by Barack Obama and will highlight Ms. Yovanovitch’s replies.

In response to Obama’s question, “how do you define the events surrounding the Armenian ‘genocide’, Yovanovitch reiterated that the US acknowledges “the mass killings, ethnic cleansing and forced deportation at the final stages of the Ottoman Empire.”

Responding to Obama’s question “how will you commemorate the victims of genocide if appointed”, Yovanovitch said in brief that if confirmed, she pledges to continue the tradition of attending the official memorial event held in Yerevan every April and will make it a priority to promote understanding and reconciliation between the peoples and governments of Armenia and Turkey.

In response to Barack Obama’s question “What are the actions taken by the US Secretary of State to promote more substantial investigation of the ‘genocide’ and its recognition in Turkey?”, Yovanovitch stated that they have been working on a program which envisages to invite Turkish archivists to observe how historical research is carried out in the US, that they have been in contact with Armenian archivists, and that they hope the archivists from both countries will ultimately work on a joint program.

To Obama’s final question on “whether the amendment made to Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code satisfied the US Secretary of State”, Yovanovitch responded that the US administration prefers the removal of Article 301 and said that the current arrangement lowered the maximum imprisonment sentence to two years from three and that the sole authorization to allow the opening of a case in this context was given to the Minister of Justice. She mentioned that a fall in the number of cases is anticipated due to this role bestowed upon the Minister of Justice.⁸⁴

On July 29, the day when the voting for the endorsement of Yovanovitch’s appointment would take place, head of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Mr. Matthew A. Reynolds sent a letter to Mr. Joseph R. Biden to give complementary information on some of the questions directed at Ms. Yovanovitch.

In the letter it was noted that the US was investigating a project which would invite some archivists from Turkey and Armenia with a view to provide them with

83 “Pennington Hopes for Confirmation of Marie Yovanovitch as U.S. Envoy in Yerevan”, *PanArmenian Network*, June 23, 2008, <http://panarmenian.net/>.

84 “Armenian genocide pressure on Obama and ARMRAPID”, *Haberaktuel*, July 12, 2008, <http://haberaktuel.com/>; “U.S. Ambassadorial Nominee Responds to Obama Inquires on Armenian Genocide Policy”, *ARMRADIP*, July 11, 2008.

advanced professional training. The aim of the project was stated in the letter as to help archivists protect, for the investigations of the future generations, the evidential documents on the mass killings and forced deportations of the Armenians committed by Ottoman soldiers and other Ottoman officials. Secondly Reynolds has also mentioned in his letter that the US Government recognizes that the mass killings, ethnic cleansing and forced deportation which devastated over one and a half million Armenians during the last days of the Ottoman Empire, and, that the US Government holds the Ottoman officials responsible for those crimes.⁸⁵

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, with the exception of Ms Marbara Boxer, endorsed Yavonavitch's appointment on July 29, 2008 and the Senate General Assembly approved this decision on the 1st of August. The new US Ambassador arrived at Yerevan in mid September.

If Yovanovitch's appointment process is assessed with a closer look, it is seen that the US Government had its ambassadorial candidate use the terms mass killings and ethnic cleansing which are close to yet not same as the term genocide. On the other hand, by using for the first time the words "Medz Yegern" which is the word for genocide in the Armenian language and also means 'great disaster', it was aimed to satisfy the Armenian Diaspora and certain senators acting on their behalf. Moreover, that 1,5 million Armenians died is mentioned as an unquestionable fact, yet it is possible to disprove this with scientific evidence.

C. Appointment of the US Ambassador to Turkey

As was the case of Ms. Maria Yovanovitch who was appointed as the ambassador to Armenia, Mr. James F. Jeffrey who was appointed as ambassador to Ankara, had to answer many questions during the sessions convened on September 24, 2008 to endorse his appointment. These questions were posed by pro-Armenian senators, especially by Mr. Bob Menendez of New Jersey alongside the then head of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and current Vice President of the USA, Mr. Joe Biden. Mr. James Jeffrey also did not use the word "genocide".

Mr. Joe Biden addressed the following question to him "Do you dispute that US diplomats serving in the Ottoman Empire during the "Armenian Genocide" documented a systematic, government-sponsored campaign "with intent to destroy in whole or in part the Armenian population?". Mr. Jeffrey indirectly expressed⁸⁶ that he viewed the events of 1915 as constituting genocide by responding to this question with the following statement: "I do not dispute Ambassador Morgenthau,⁸⁷ Ambassador Elkus, and other diplomats that

85 *PanArmenian Network*, July 30, 2008, <http://www.panarmenian.net>.

86 The reports of Henry Morgenthau, US Ambassador to Istanbul between 1913-1916, on Armenian Relocation and his book *The Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* written in 1918 are presented by Armenian circles as proof of genocide. For the scientific critique of this book please see: *The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, (Istanbul: 1990). For the Turkish and English texts of this book, please see the "books out of print" section of the following website www.eraren.org.

87 *Armenian National Committee of America*, Press Release, September 26, 2008.

reported during the time period on what they described as an attempt to exterminate the Armenian population”.

The Senate approved Mr. Jeffrey’s appointment without further impediments and Mr. Jeffrey started his mission in Ankara on December 3.

D. Mr. Obama’s Stance as a Presidential Candidate

As a Democratic Candidate for the US Presidential elections held in November 2008, Senator Barack Obama has kept on all through his election campaign with his declarations that he would recognize the “Armenian genocide” and end the “blockade” imposed on Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan.⁸⁸

In an explanation he made in April 2008 on the occasion of the Armenian “genocide” commemoration, he stated that 2 million Armenians were deported and approximately 1,5 million of those deported were killed during the Armenian genocide which was carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923 and said “it is imperative that we recognize the horrific acts carried out against the Armenian people as genocide”. He added that he would stand with the Armenian American Community in calling for the government of Turkey to acknowledge it as such.⁸⁹

It is understood that Mr. Obama and his aides have converted a text prepared by the Armenians into a declaration without examining it much. Although it is often alleged without any proof that 1,5 million Armenians have been killed by certain sources, it is difficult to encounter a source (even those of pro-Armenian historians) that make mention of 2 million Armenians relocated. On the other hand, the fact that the Ottoman Empire was defunct in the year 1923 was overlooked. Yet the most worrying aspect about Obama’s declaration, besides classifying the events of 1915 as genocide, was his words to the effect that he would demand Turkey to categorize the events in the same manner.

In a letter he sent to the Chairman of ANCA on the occasion of Ms. Marie Yovanavitch’s appointment as the ambassador to Armenia, Mr. Obama has repeated the above mentioned points and referring to the Armenian relocation, stated that the Bush administration’s refusal to recognize this event as genocide is inexcusable and added that he would continue to speak out in an effort to move the Administration to change its position.⁹⁰

Furthermore, as discussed above, Mr. Obama has addressed a few written questions regarding the “genocide” issue to Ms. Maire Yovanovitch.

Finally, it should be underlined that Barack Obama selected Senator Joe Biden as his candidate for the post of Vice Presidency. Mr. Biden, who has worked in

88 See: Ömer Engin Lütem, “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Number 27-28 (2008):p. 47

89 “Statement from Senator Barack Obama in Remembrance of Armenian Genocide”, *State News Service*, April 29, 2008.

90 “Obama Reaffirms Commitment to US Genocide Recognition”, *Asbarez*, June 17, 2008.

Congress since 1967 and latterly served as the Chairman of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, is a person known for his as anti-Turkey stance and who has endeavored for the approval of various texts pertaining to the genocide allegations for years.⁹¹ His selection as candidate for Vice Presidency was welcomed with great joy by Armenian circles in the US and leading organizations like ANCA and the Armenian Assembly of America. The latter has published a declaration praising Mr. Biden and commenting on his pro-Armenian endeavors.⁹²

E. The New US Government and the Armenian Question

Obama who won the Presidential elections without difficulty, formed a government with many people who have granted support to the Armenian views. First and foremost on this list is the Secretary of State Ms. Hillary Clinton who has expressed, while she was still a presidential candidate, that she would acknowledge the Armenian genocide once elected.⁹³ Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar, Secretary for Labor Hilda Solis and Secretary for Transport Ray LaHood have been the joint presenters of draft resolution Nr. 106 submitted to the House of Representatives for the recognition of the genocide allegations. The new CIA Director Leon Panetta also supports the Armenian views.⁹⁴ Furthermore, Ms. Samantha Power, who widely covered the Armenian genocide allegations in her book *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, has been appointed to an important position in the Security Council at the White House.⁹⁵

When it comes to the US Parliament, Chairperson of the House of Representatives Ms. Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Speaker Mr. Harry Reid, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman of the House of Representatives Mr. Howard Berman and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman Mr. John Kerry are all known for their pro-Armenian views.⁹⁶

Under these circumstances, it seems that the possibility of the US government to issue a decision for the recognition of genocide allegations has remarkably increased- a situation that has been anticipated by the Diaspora Armenians for many years now.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between the requirements of the election campaign and the responsibilities of a government. In fact, during the interviews in the Senate convened to endorse her appointment to the Office of the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton responded to a question by Senator Robert Mendez (champion of Armenian views) regarding whether the new government

91 "Kandemir: Biden Çıbanbaşı Olur". *Milliyet*, August 24, 2008.

92 "Obama/Biden Democratic Presidential Ticket Strong on Genocide Recognition; US-Armenia Relations", ANCA, Press Release, August 23, 2008;"Obama Taps Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Biden as his Vice-Presidential Running Mate", *Armenian Assembly of America Press Release*, August 23, 2008.

93 See: Ömer Engin Lütem, *Olaylar ve Yorumlar, Ermeni Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Number 27-28 (2008): p. 47

94 "New U.S. Administration Majority Stands For Armenian Genocide Recognition", *PanArmenian Network*, January 14, 2009.

95 "Ekip Tamam", *Hürriyet*, January 31, 2009.

96 "Ekip Tamam..."

will recognize the Armenian genocide allegations and where the Cyprus policy will lead to with the following vague answer: “we will be looking very closely at those and other challenging issues with the eye of moving forward and being effective in responding to these very legitimate concerns.”⁹⁷

Only a few days before Barack Obama began working in the presidential office, about twenty Armenian organizations located in the US sent Barack Obama a lengthy letter⁹⁸ on behalf of the 2 (?) million Armenians living in America. After congratulating him for his election as the president, the letter states that the Armenian Genocide is not an allegation but rather a widely documented mass crime supported by an overwhelming body of evidence; that the US Government must clearly and unequivocally condemn the 1915 crime of race extermination; that under Turkey’s pressure the American Presidents used evasive and euphemistic terminology in the past rather than directly acknowledging the Armenian Genocide, and, that the term, Armenian Genocide, is the only one that can meaningfully be used to characterize the crime committed by Ottoman Turkey.

In the same letter where it is alleged that Turkey (rather than being a factor for peace) has actively contributed to increased tension in South Caucasus, it is noted that Turkey applies pressure on other governments to underwrite its guilt and that the US should not be hostage to Turkey’s fears.

The letter also invites Obama to contribute to the growth of US-Armenia relations, Armenia’s economic development, security of Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh region, to lifting the Turkish and Azerbaijani economic blockade of Armenia and ending the exclusion of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh from regional commercial and infrastructure projects.

In short, the letter was drafted to ask for support as regards acknowledgement of Armenian allegations, aid and assistance to Armenia and Karabakh, opening of the Turkey and Azerbaijani borders, and inclusion of Armenia in Nabucco and similar regional projects.

The Armenian National Committee of America, which is understood to have initiated the process regarding this letter has started a campaign directed at the White House on the internet.⁹⁹

The second largest Armenian organization in the US, the Armenian Assembly of America has not participated in this process presumably due to its rivalry and disaccord with ANCA. Yet this organization has congratulated Obama after starting office by having a full page advertisement published in Roll Call, a journal familiar to Congressional circles. Furthermore, the Director of the Assembly, Ms. Ardouny, demanded the strengthening of relations between the US, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh as well as the termination of genocide denial.¹⁰⁰

97 *Turkish Daily News*, January 15, 2009.

98 Yerkir, “Armenian Americans Congratulate Obama on Inauguration”, January 20, 2008.

99 “ABD’li Ermeniler’den Soykırım Girişimi”, NTV, January 21, 2009.

100 “Armenian Assembly of America Salutes President Obama on His Historic Inauguration”, *Armenian Assembly of America*, Press Release, January 21, 2008.

Adam Schiff, Frank Pallone, George Radanovich and Mark Kirk, who have since long been supporters of Armenians in the Congress, have already started preparing a draft resolution aimed at the acknowledgement of Armenian allegations and began the process of negotiating it with various circles with a view to getting it submitted to Congress towards the end of February.¹⁰¹ On February 13 2009, they sent a letter to members of the House of Representatives asking them to be the joint supporters for this draft.¹⁰² It is understood that in principle this draft will contain the same arguments voiced in the preceding drafts.¹⁰³

IV. DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE GENOCIDE ALLEGATIONS

Developments regarding the genocide allegations that have occurred in some countries and in the OSCE are summarized below.

A. Canada

Canada's Armenian community is well organized though not large in number. As a result of the pressures exerted by this community, in 2002 the Senate of Canada, and in 2004 the Parliament of Canada passed a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations; but Canadian governments, taking into consideration relations with Turkey, have not adopted it. After the elections, the new Prime Minister Stephen Harper, has clearly adopted a pro-Armenian approach. Moreover, in a letter that Harper sent to the Armenian National Committee it was stated that the 'recognition of the Armenian genocide represents the official position of the Government of Canada.'¹⁰⁴ Although it may be possible to explain this unconventional approach of the Prime Minister on the basis of certain political considerations, being a country of immigration, for Canada to prefer the Armenians to the Turks will engender hardships for the Prime Minister and his Party in the long term because the Turkish community is dense and is getting better organized day after day.

As a result of to the Turks becoming better organized, they have concertedly opposed courses on genocide being taught in the state of Toronto and have struggled against this for a long time. Meanwhile, Turkish associations have protested the reference book used in these courses, Extraordinary Evil by a Catholic nun Barbara Coloroso. After collecting 1,200 signatures in a petition, the book was taken out of the curriculum.¹⁰⁶

This issue was undertaken by the Toronto District School Board on June 12 2008

101 "Une Résolution Sur le Génocide Arménien Présentée Fin Février au Congès", Armenews, February 7, 2009.

102 "New Drive for Armenian Genocide Resolution Launched", *Arminfo*, February 13, 2009.

103 "Ermeni Lobisi Tasarısını Sundu", *Habergazete Sitesi*, February 13, 2009, <http://www.habergazete.com>.

104 "Nearly All Canadian Political Forces Stand for International Recognition of Armenian Genocide", *PanArmenian Network*, April 29, 2008.

105 "Le débat du genocide", *Toronto Star*, May 21, 2008. A Turkish source claims that the number of petitions is 11, 000 ("Canadian Turks have cut out the genocide from the curriculum", *Star*, May 17, 2008).

106 "Genocide Course Sparks Controversy in Toronto", *National Post*, June 13, 2008.

under the title 'Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity', and starting from September, this has become a selective course where the Jewish Holocaust, the Armenian genocide and the Rwanda genocide were taught as part of the curriculum.¹⁰⁷

There is no doubt that this decision does not reflect a scholarly outlook; it is the result of Armenian propaganda in Canada. While the Bosnian case which was ascertained as constituting genocide by a decision of a competent court is not covered by the course, the Armenian "genocide" is despite the fact that there is no such competent court decision to the effect that it constitutes genocide.

B. Sweden

The Swedish Parliament from time to time is faced with demands regarding the recognition of the Armenian genocide. In a report prepared by the Parliament Foreign Affairs Commission in 2000, the 1915 events were mentioned. However, since a resolution directly concerning the 'genocide' has not been passed, it would be wrong to say that Sweden recognized the 'genocide'. In 2002 the Foreign Affairs Commission acknowledged that the UN did not accept the Armenian genocide, that there are no such UN resolutions concerning the Armenians, Assyrians nor Chaldeans. The disclosure of the Armenian organizations in the country having misled the Commission of Foreign Affairs, for a certain period served to thwart attempts directed at Sweden's recognition of the genocide.

In May this year, some members of the Parliament have taken the initiative for the recognition of these allegations, and this matter was discussed in the Foreign Affairs Commission. The report adopted by the Commission contained four main points.

First, mention was made of how there are no UN resolutions involving the Armenian genocide adopted in 1985 or any year thereafter.

Second, it was expressed that the 1915 Assyrian and Chaldean events which occurred in the Ottoman Empire would have qualified as genocide if the 1948 UN Convention was in force at the time. These statements point out how the UN Genocide Convention is only applicable to events which occurred after 1951 (the date of entry into force) and hence, is not applicable to the events of 1915. The assertion that the events of 1915 would classify as genocide, were the Genocide Convention in force at the time, is merely an assumption and as such carries no legal significance. Against this background it becomes clear that the aim of this initiative was simply to satisfy the Armenians and Assyrians.

Third, it was stated that there is no consensus between the views of experts studying the events that occurred during the fall of the Ottoman Empire. With this statement it was implied that there are certain experts that do not describe the

¹⁰⁷ "Sweden's Refusal to Recognize Armenian Genocide to Harm Turkey", *PanArmenian Network*, June 12, 2008.

events of 1915 as “genocide”. Those submitting this report strongly opposed this statement. A text alleging that the Armenians were subjected to genocide that was signed by 64 scholars from different countries was circulated among parliaments but had no effect.

The fourth and last point raised pertains to abstaining from negatively affecting the ‘critical national process’ that Turkey is currently undergoing. This means that if the Swedish Parliament adopts such a resolution, it might serve to fuel fanatic movements in Turkey. Up until now, it is hard to say that fanatic movements have been affected by resolutions adopted by Parliaments. However, it is true that Turkey’s relations with countries that have adopted such resolutions have been adversely affected.

On June 11, the Foreign Affairs Commission’s report was discussed for three hours, with 37 favorable and 245 unfavorable votes; the recognition of the Armenia ‘genocide’ was refused. There was only one abstaining vote, and 66 people did not take part in the voting. The total number of unfavorable votes totaled %70 of the total.

There is no doubt that this vote was a defeat to the Union of Armenian Associations and the Union of Assyrian Associations. It will be hard to bring this matter back onto the agenda of the Swedish Parliament.

C. Slovakia

On November 30, 2004, the Slovakian Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the Armenian “genocide” as a crime against humanity.¹⁰⁸

In the end of May, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Harabin visited Armenia and laid a wreath beneath the genocide memorial. In the speeches made on this occasion he stated that there is a law penalizing people for denying the Jewish Holocaust, and that a resolution penalizing any kind of denial concerning genocides, including the Armenian genocide, was proposed to the Parliament, that this resolution will probably be adopted by the Parliament in January or February 2009, that even though the freedom of speech is the most important human right it has a limit; and referring to the Armenians said that there are some expressing unacceptable remarks towards genocide-stricken nations.¹⁰⁹ If this resolution becomes law, saying that there was no Armenian genocide might lead to prison sentence of five years.¹¹⁰

A day after this event, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan visited Slovakia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia Jan Kurbis, in a statement he made to the Anatolian Agency stated that the Slovakian parliament's decision in 2004 does not represent the official stance of the government and that he would take

108 Ömer Engin Lütem, “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, *Ermeni Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Number 16-17, ss.37-39.

109 “Slovakian Justice Minister: Armenian Genocide Can’t Go Unpunished”, *ARKA*, May 26, 2008; “Slovak Minister on Armenian Genocide on the Eve Turk’s Visit”, *Czech News Agency*, May 27, 2008.

110 “Slovakya’da ‘Soykırım İnkârı’ Suç Oluyor”, *Milliyet*, May 28, 2008.

up the matter with Justice Minister Stefan Harabin, adding history should be treated by historians, not politicians. He will discuss this matter with the Slovakian justice minister and members of the government. He knows the sensitivity of the Turkish public opinion on this matter and will not permit this topic to place a shadow on good relations between Turkey and Slovakia.¹¹¹

The talks that the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Kurbis said he was going to have with the Minister of Justice Harabin produced no results because at the end of August in a meeting that he had with Chairman of the Union of Assemblies of Armenians in Europe, he mentioned that he sees no problem "in the issue of approval of the law on the Armenian Genocide within the planned period, especially as the resolution confirming and condemning the Armenian Genocide, which was adopted by the National Council of the Slovak Republic in 2004, has the status of an imperative necessity for the country's government". He added that regarding the Minister of Foreign Affairs Babacan's proposal to open the archives, every person who visits the Genocide Museum in Yerevan becomes acquainted with the Armenian archives, besides, "no one doubts that after committing the genocide the Turks also organized a 'genocide of archives'".¹¹² As seen, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice of Slovakia besides embracing the genocide allegations, are both acting and speaking like an Armenian militant.

D. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Resolution Regarding the Archives and Historical Research

Prime Minister Erdogan's proposal to President Kocharyan in the beginning of April 2005 for the events of 1915 to be studied by historians from both countries (and from other countries if necessary) and other experts was objected to by nationalist circles of Armenia and the diaspora. For these people who recognize Armenian genocide allegations, analyzing the 1915 events will damage this truth. As mentioned above, President Sargsyan's words regarding the acceptance of this commission have led to many reactions. However, many countries are in favor of and support the establishment of such a commission.

The declaration that was adopted at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly's meeting (that ended on July 3 in Astana) supported the Turkish view.

The Astana Declaration's main theme is transparency in the OSCE member states. In the chapter regarding democracy, human rights and humanitarian questions the importance of fully opening all archives to improve the transparency and accuracy of historical studies is pointed out (article 62). Furthermore, the declaration calls upon all OSCE state bodies working with historical and political archives to grant as full access as possible to all archives to researchers and interested individuals (article 66).

¹¹¹ "History must be Left to Historians", *Turkish Press*, May 29, 2008.

¹¹² Noyan Tapan, "Deputy Prime Minister of Slovak Republic: Nobody Doubts That After Committing Genocide Turks Also Organized "Genocide of Archives", August 29, 2008..

We should specify that Turkey has finished classifying all archives regarding the Armenian genocide, and these archives are open to the public. As for the Armenian side, it is known that the archives are closed to some, even though statements to the contrary are pronounced.¹¹³ Regarding the diaspora archives; the Dashnak archives in Boston, the Nubar Pasha archives in Paris and the Zoryan Institute archives are all special archives. In other words, permission is required to access these archives, so there are not in line with the ‘fully opening of all archives’ principle of the Astana Declaration.

Article 68 of the Astana Declaration regarding the mixed commission “encourages the establishment of joint history commissions between participating States, composed of their historians and experts, including where necessary those of third countries, to conduct research in the relevant historical, political and military archives in order to shed objective and scientific light on contentious episodes in the history of participating States, with a view to further contributing to transparency and mutual understanding’. As seen, this article supports Turkey’s proposal to Armenia and encourages the foundation of a joint commission of historians.

Aside from Armenia, other countries have voted favorably on OSCE’s Declaration mentioned above. Armenia with this conduct found itself in a difficult situation; Armenia puts forth allegations, but does not want them to be studied or analyzed, placing itself in an unconvincing situation.

Meanwhile, this declaration might set an example to others; aside from a few exceptions, members of the European Council Parliamentary Assembly and the Assembly of NATO are almost the same as OSCE members, so they also might adopt a similar declaration. Under a proper article, the UN General Assembly will easily adopt a resolution concerning the transparency of archives and for controversial issues, the founding a common commission of historians

V. VISITS TO THE GENOCIDE MEMORIAL AND MUSEUM IN YEREVAN

Foreigners that pay an official visit to Armenia are usually encouraged to visit the Genocide Memorial and Museum in Yerevan and leave a garland; this might be interpreted as if the country they represent recognizes the ‘genocide’. For this reason, visits made to the Memorial and Museum are important.

The foremost visits of a political significance during the year 2008 are enlisted below.¹¹⁴

March 2 2008: His Eminence Tarcisio Cardinal Bertone, secretary of the state of Benedict XVI Pope of Rome has recognized the Armenian genocide allegations

113 See: Ömer Engin Lütem, “Olaylar ve Yorumlar”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume 3 Number 9, p.20-21.

114 This information was obtained from the web site of the Armenian Genocide Museum
<http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/delegation.php>

in 2000. Cardinal Bertone left a note in the Commemoration Book stating: 'I wish that this will never take place. Long life to the Armenian heroic nation!'

April 25, 2008: The vice Minister of Defense of Hungary Mrs. Agnesh Vadda has not recognized the Armenian genocide allegations.

May 21, 2008: The Cultural Minister of Belarus Vladimir Feodorovich Matvichuk has not recognized the Armenian genocide allegations

May 25, 2008: The delegation of the U.S. House of Representatives headed by Congressman Adam Schiff. Adam Schiff is the one if the main protectors of Armenian interests.

May 26, 2008: The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice of Slovakia Stafan Harabin. We have mentioned his views above.

June 27, 2008: The Minister of Education and Science of Georgia Mr. Giorgi Nodia. The Georgian Parliament has not recognized the Armenian genocide allegations.

July 6, 2008: The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic Karel Schwarzenberg. The Czech Republic Parliament has not recognized the Armenian genocide allegations.

September 13, 2008: The Czech Senate Prshemisl Sobotka. As mentioned above, The Czech Republic Parliament has not recognized the Armenian genocide allegations.

September 26, 2008: The minister of culture of Slovakia Marek Madyarich. The Slovakian Parliament has adopted a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations.

October 2, 2008: The president of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia Gunars Kutris. This country's parliament has not passed a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations.

October 21, 2008: The president of the Russian Federation Dmitri Medvedev. Medvedev left a note in the Commemoration Book: "Armenian Genocide Museum and memorial are the evidences of awful tragedy of 20th century. In the same time it reminds that life is the most important value that given for safe to civilized nations".

November 12, 2008: Chairman of the Cyprian House of Representatives Marios Garoyan. The Parliament of Cyprus has passed a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations. As we can infer from his name, Garoyan is from Armenian origin.

November 17, 2008: Hungarian Foreign Minister Mrs. Kinga Goncz. As mentioned above, the Hungarian Parliament has not passed any resolutions concerning the Armenian genocide allegations.

OTTOMAN ARMENIAN INTRICATE RELATIONS WITH WESTERN POWERS BEFORE AND DURING THE PEACE SETTLEMENTS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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Abstract: *When the First World War brought the two imperialistic blocks of Europe face to face, the clashing interests of each included the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The extremist Armenians of the Empire were already an armed force committed to the Allies when the Ottoman Empire, siding with the German block, had entered the war. Particularly at the Russian front they wholeheartedly contributed to the Allies, with the anticipation of an independent Armenia including Eastern Turkish provinces. Their anticipations for territorial claims increased with the Wilsonian principles and the ambiguous Article 7 in the Armistice of Mudros following the Ottoman defeat. However, the attitude of the Bolshevik Government in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the Turkish nationalists' resistance to the occupations in the wake of the Armistice caused the Allies to approach Armenian demands with more caution during the Paris Peace Conference. With the Turkish resistance having turned into an organized independence war under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and with the defeat of the Armenians in the East, the Great Powers reached a consensus in Paris that the Armenian demands were beyond anything to be realized. Upon the defeat of the Armenians the Treaty of Gyumri was concluded whereby the Eastern border of Turkey was secured. The stance of the Allied Powers toward the Armenian delegations continued throughout the Paris Peace Conference. It was not until the Lausanne Treaty signed on the 23rd of July 1923 that an Armenian expectation of an independent state encompassing Turkish provinces was put to an end.*

Key Words: *Armenians, Allies, Paris Peace Conference, Turkish nationalists.*

Historical acknowledgments on the Armenian Question support the claim that this long-debated question, which emerged during the second half of the 19th century and continues to be discussed today, is an artificial question, for the mutual existence of Turks and Armenians throughout the centuries does not indicate major disturbances between them. Armenians under Ottoman rule enjoyed more privileges than other non-Muslim communities within the framework of the *millet* system, which entitled them to full religious and communal autonomy. They were recognized as *millet-i sadıka* (most loyal subjects); many enjoyed the confidence of the rulers as dragomans or were given important positions in the administrative hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian historian Mikael Varandian, in his book

History of the Armenian Uprisings, Geneva, 1914, summarizes well the condition of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire as follows:¹

Turkish Armenians, when compared to the Russian, were quite independent and strong about their culture, language, history and literature. Until the beginning of the 19th century, Europe was not aware of Armenian nationhood. Europeans knew the Armenians only through Istanbul, as merchants dispersed all over the world, as people who had no other value than their interests, similar to Jews, as unlucky vagabonds, people without a nation or country.

It was with the provocations and support of the great powers, holding imperialistic interests upon the weakened Ottoman state of the 19th century that the Armenians fell into a chain of armed struggles with the Turks.²

It must be kept in mind that since the end of the 18th century, the foreign policy of each of the three great powers of Europe (England, France and Russia) focused on Mediterranean supremacy for colonial expansion and each had its own motive for establishing itself in the Middle East and using the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire to reach this aim. On the other hand, the great power across the Atlantic Ocean, the United States of America, did not have significant contact with the Ottoman Empire until the 1820s when American Presbyterian missionaries started to venture to Ottoman lands with the purpose of proselytizing. Developing economic interests in the Ottoman Empire and concluding a commercial treaty in 1830 were the immediate outcomes of this newly formed relationship for the U.S. This allowed America to observe the European approach to Ottoman minorities as instruments to further enhance their economic advantages and created interest in the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. By the middle of the 19th century, each of the great powers had formulated its own geopolitical, strategic, and economic approaches to fulfill expansionist expectations from Ottoman territories and created its own policy concerning the Armenians. Therefore, to more fully understand the Armenian Question, it is essential to briefly examine the role played by these powers in the emergence of this question in the 19th century.

Russia, recognized as a European state since the 18th century reforms of Peter the Great, was the only western power which shared frontiers with the Ottoman Empire. However, adherence to the Russian Tzar's policy of reaching the Mediterranean Sea³ through Ottoman territories via Eastern Anatolia or the Balkans became the cause of numerous wars between the two states, making them archenemies. The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca ending the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768–1774 provided Russia with recognition as the protector of the Orthodox communities of the Ottoman Empire composed mainly of Greeks and Armenians. This gave Russia the right to interfere with Ottoman internal affairs through these communities while it set eyes on Armenians in Eastern Anatolia with the intention of using them as a means of reaching the Mediterranean.

1 *Uras, Esat, Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, Istanbul: 1976, p.150.

2 *Karal, Enver Ziya, Osmanlı Tarihi V.VIII*, Ankara: 1983, pp.126-145.

3 *Klyuchevsky, Vasili*, translated by Archibald, Liliana, London: 1963 (See for Peter the Great's policy and Reforms).

Russian strategy included inciting the Armenians to rise against the Ottoman Empire for autonomy, diverting the attention of the Ottoman administrators to Eastern Anatolia. Weakened control of the capital and the straits undoubtedly would leave the doors to Istanbul open for Russian advancements.

The Middle Eastern policy of Great Britain, the most advanced colonial power of the time, focused on preserving Mediterranean security for a safe passage to its valuable colony, India. Accordingly, the possibility of a Russian blockade on this route was a major threat which compelled Britain to support Ottoman integrity, providing that the state remained weak. Russian interest in and expectations from the Ottoman Armenians concerned Britain, which was equally interested in this community. Accordingly, while supporting the American missionaries proselytizing Armenians, Britain increased her efforts to acquire state approval for constructing the first Protestant church in Jerusalem in 1842. This provided Britain the protectorateship of the multiplying Protestants in the Empire⁴ as well as closer contacts with the Armenians. However, British policy included providing the foundation of a buffer Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia to confront possible Russian advancements toward the Mediterranean. Britain was confident that possible Russian violations of this small Christian state in order to pass to the Mediterranean would be met with objections by Christian societies of the western world that undoubtedly would remain silent in the case of similar violations of Ottoman territories. Hence, the British intentions included inciting Armenians against the Ottoman state to the point of establishing an independent Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia.

The Ottoman-French alliance, which dates to the 16th century, had endowed France with close socio-economic and cultural ties, as well as recognition as the protector of the Catholic elements of the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations France acquired through this established alliance, and the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt at the end of the 18th century, had provided it with multiple installations and investments in the Ottoman Empire. Being a Mediterranean power, France designed its colonial expansions in the Middle East and North Africa, although this strained Ottoman-French relations from time to time. France sought liberal utilization of its investments in Ottoman lands, which depended on preventing Ottoman interference by exercising France's power in the Mediterranean. France maintained very favorable relations with the Maronite Christians in Lebanon and during the conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the 1850s, played a prominent role in providing an almost autonomous status for Lebanon with the 1861 regulation. This furthered French prestige among the Christians, particularly the Armenians seeking a similar status. Consequently, France became the supporter of the Zeytun Armenians who revolted for privileges and started to interfere on behalf of the Armenians in the area with the anticipation of providing for the autonomy of Cilicia.⁵ France was aware that Armenians' amity would be instrumental toward the Mediterranean superiority France longed for, thus France supported the Armenians for its own interest and, by nationalistic propaganda, constantly provoked them against the Ottoman state.

⁴ Karal, *Enver Ziya, Osmanlı Tarihi...*, p. 128.

⁵ Gürün, *Kamuran, Ermeni Dosyası, Ankara: 1983, pp. 57-69.*

Although a non-European power, the intentions of the U.S. concerning the Ottoman Empire were no different than that of the Europeans' aims; accordingly, the U.S. also manipulated the Ottoman Armenians for achieving its hidden imperialistic ambitions in the Middle East. The conclusion of Treaty of Commerce and Amity in 1830⁶ had introduced a closer recognition of the Ottoman Empire in America. Meanwhile, as American philanthropic and economic interests in the Ottoman Empire expanded, it was through the Christian missionaries rather than the commercial contacts that America discovered the Armenians there. The missionaries, after realizing that the Ottoman government's restrictions would not allow them to convert Muslims to Christianity, had turned their attention to Armenians and approached them philanthropically. The U.S. government, not wanting to be only a spectator to European expansionism in the Middle East, made good use of this newly established close relationship. Gradually, the Christian missionaries in the Middle East, originally in the region for evangelical purposes, were guided into becoming the agents of the U.S. State Department⁷ and close observers of the American policy of weakening the Ottoman Empire since a feeble Ottoman state was a most essential part of the American imperialistic scheme. Proselytizing, which was supposed to be the primary task of the missionaries, became their ostensible duty. They created an extensive network of schools and health centers and approached the Armenians with benevolence in these institutions. With the awareness that acknowledgment would facilitate inciting the Armenians against the state, the missionaries assumed the responsibility of enlightening them. Institutions operated by the missionaries were well suited for this purpose. In schools they established in Istanbul, Lebanon and different parts of Anatolia, they taught the Armenians their own history and literature and informed them about identity, nationalism and human rights.⁸ What was learned in schools was carried to homes, coffee houses, church events and health centers where people gathered and discussed everything. These discussions served to establish a propaganda chain which, for America, contributed to substantial proselytizing and for Armenians to demand reforms from the state.

Especially after the Greeks gained their independence in 1830, the Armenians frequently and bitterly complained of the ill-treatment they claimed that they were being subjected to on account of being Christians. Encouraged by the Russian Armenians and consulates, they appealed to the state for reforms and in 1860 took the preliminary step toward expressing their identity by preparing the Armenian Constitution. In 1863, the constitution, which included the establishment of the Armenian General Assembly, was sanctioned by the Ottoman sultan. State recognition of the constitution restricted the absolute power of the Armenian Church. Some scholars regarded this movement as the

6 Trask, Roger R., *The U.S. Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939*; Michigan: 1971, p. 5-6. Article 9 of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, finalized in May 7 after consecutive attempts since 1799, and approved by the Senate on February 1 1831, equipped America with the most favored nation treatment for commerce as well as the benefits of "capitulations"; namely, commercial privileges the Ottoman Empire first granted to France in 1535. Capitulations which later encompassed social, judicial and educational privileges as well were granted to other states also in the course of time and were described by one writer as "a code of legal reconciliation founded upon the immiscibility of Christianity and Islam" See Trask, 5-7.

7 *Grabill Joseph*, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927, Minneapolis 1971, p.40.

8 Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Tarihi...*,p. 129.

Armenian approach toward western civilization and education, for the subsequent steps taken included the openings of Armenian schools and cultural institutions of western styles, not only in Istanbul but in various parts of the country. Armenians published newspapers and journals, developed their language and culture and socially elevated themselves as they continued requesting reforms from the state.⁹ In each of these steps, they were guided by American missionaries who since the 1820s had taught and employed the Ottoman Armenians by the hundreds. Close contact with the missionaries steadily preaching to them the Bible as well as liberation stimulated the independence sentiment among the Armenians. Soon gaining independence became an obsession for the Armenians. When the Ottoman Constitution was declared in 1876, they appeared to be content and praised the state, but soon they realized that Ottoman parliamentarism would be a stumbling block for their march toward independence; thus, they recommenced with seeking reforms that would equip them with educational and administrative privileges.

Armenians found better opportunities to react against the Ottoman administration after the Russian victory of the 1877–78 Ottoman-Russian War which concluded with the San Stefano Treaty of March 3. The treaty included state commitments to Russia for the radical reforms Armenians sought (Article 16). England, France and Germany, concerned that the article allowing the control of the promised reforms gave too much authority to Russia, sought the modification of this treaty with the Berlin Treaty of July 17, 1878. This treaty, which altered the San Stefano Treaty by extending the same authorization to the four powers with Article 61, can be regarded as the first official display of the Armenian Question in European diplomacy. The Berlin Treaty also became a turning point that opened the way for the intervention of these powers on all issues pertaining to Ottoman-Armenian relations.¹⁰ Once the Armenians were assured the full support of the great western powers, and relied on their commitment to Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, the Armenians repeatedly pressured the Ottoman state to apply the promised reforms. Yet, all of the concerned states knew that fulfilling such an obligation was beyond the capacity of the Ottoman state. Reforms were postponed each time they were brought up. This fueled the hostility of the Armenians against the administration as they, in the following years, were exposed to the provocations of the revolutionary societies of the Armenekyan, Hincak and Dashnakutsyun, all founded abroad after the Ottoman-Russian War to propagate revolts among the Armenians, distressed from unfulfilled commitments of the Ottoman state.

The following decades witnessed multiple attempts by the revolutionaries to prompt European states to intervene on behalf of their cause while consecutive Armenian uprisings were met with Ottoman reprisals. Both the Turkish and Armenian populations were subjected to violence by each other, shedding much blood. As Turkish-Armenian relations were more and more damaged by these unfortunate events costing many Turkish and Armenian lives, the great powers rapidly approached their goal of further weakening the Ottoman state.

⁹ Nalbandian, Louis, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, Los Angeles: 1963, pp.26-27.

¹⁰ Vertanes, Charles, *Armenia Reborn*, New York:1947, p. 15.

This desire for a weakened Ottoman state materialized with Ottoman defeats in the Tripoli and Balkan Wars of 1911-13. Although Adrianople was reoccupied by the Turks during the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman military had proven unbattleworthy and the government, among immediate measures for its resurgence, sought the military expertise and assistance of Germany for the army, Britain for the navy and France for the gendarmerie forces. Russia, disappointed for failing to reassert its grip on the Balkans, suffered another disillusionment with the appointment of German General Liman von Sanders as a commander of the Ottoman First Army Corps. Germany was provided this appointment in return for military assistance, which was a move toward converting the Turkish army into an instrument of German aggression, and, undoubtedly, challenged Russia's expectations for possessing the Straits. Accordingly, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Serge Dmitrievich Sazanov, deciding that the Straits, without allowing a third power, should for the time being remain in Turkish hands, turned to Eastern Turkey, where a future political partitioning seemed inevitable. Using the Armenians of this region for creating a zone of special privileges for Russia was once more resorted to with the signing of the 1914 February Turkish-Russian Convention, authorizing Russia to supervise reforms providing for the appointment of foreign inspector generals and for elected assemblies of Christian and Muslim community representatives.¹¹ The settlement of some of the many Turks who were displaced after the Second Balkan War was resettled in Eastern Anatolia following the Muslim migration from the Balkans.

When the First World War brought the two imperialist blocks of Europe face to face, expectations of each block included granting formal recognition of their economic spheres of influence in Turkish territories, which meant the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Most of the Ottoman Armenians were already an armed force committed to the Allies when the Ottoman Empire, siding with the German block, entered the war at the end of October 1914.

Within the next few months, the Ottoman armies were fighting at the Caucasian, Egyptian and Gallipoli fronts as the Allies used the Armenians as pawns once again. Armed Armenian revolutionaries and propagandists dispersed throughout the Ottoman Empire to agitate the Armenians against the government while the Allied embassies and consulates assisted and facilitated their activities by spying. In a line stretching from Kars toward Aleppo, encompassing Sivas-Kayseri to Muş-Bitlis, Ottoman supply lines were cut and not only the military but civilians were also attacked by guerilla troops, composed of Armenians refusing to join the Ottoman army.¹² Thus, the Turks, engaged in a war in which the existence of their country was at stake, were confronted by an internal enemy as well. Trapped in a multi-front war, the Ottoman administrators, after several warnings, resorted to removing the insurgent Armenians from the war zone and transferring them elsewhere within the Ottoman frontiers until the fighting ceased. The state was compelled to resort to this measure in late May 1915, which involved relocating several hundred thousand Armenians, of which a

11 Kent, Marion, *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, London: 1984, p. 96.

12 Sonyel, Salahi, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, Ankara: 1993, p.390.

significant percentage died during the long migration. Casualties resulting from fatigue, hunger and epidemics as well as from attacks and combat between Turks and Armenians raised the death toll to the point that the relocation became the bleeding wound of the War for the Ottoman Empire.

AMERICA AND THE ARMENIANS

Americans became familiar with the Armenians mainly through the writings of missionaries. Most of the missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, rebuffed by Muslim Turks and well received by the Armenians, often stigmatized the Turks in their correspondence. Consequently, Americans viewing the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Armenians, through the eyes of the missionaries, came to believe that the Armenians were vulnerable Christians, suffering under the Muslim yoke and wholeheartedly supported them through the multiple conflicts prior to World War I. Many of the missionary installations served as Armenian hideouts or depots for their weapons during these insurrections. Although America did not enter the war until 1917, during the war years and especially after the Armenian relocation, American sentiment already in favor of the Armenians surged tremendously. The U.S. government, officially displaying neutrality for the sake of American installations and investments in the Ottoman lands, did not refrain from encouraging the Near East Relief Fund, a supportive organization for the missionaries, from nourishing this sentiment. Efforts were made to keep the public interest high and raise charity funds for the Armenians. Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. Ambassador in Istanbul at the time of the relocations, remained a staunch defender of the Armenians and conducted relations with Ottoman authorities in the triangle of Istanbul-U.S. State Department and the Near-East Relief Fund.¹³ There was various correspondence exchanged between the State Department, the U.S. Ambassador in Istanbul, and James Barton, chair of the Near East Relief Organization, which serves to underscore the close U.S. connection, and, of course, state involvement in missionary entanglements with the Armenians (Appendix 1).

Furthermore, the close contact of the American missionaries with Ottoman Armenians and the involvement of some of the missionaries with the Armenian Revolutionary Committees served demonstrate missionary support for Armenian independence as well as provide evidence of America's partiality on the issue. Direct involvement of the missionaries with the Armenian revolutionary committees frequently became a matter of dispute between the Ottoman state and the U.S. Embassy. The Ottoman government, unable to overlook this involvement, frequently requested the assistance of the U.S. Embassy for the replacement of those involved in such matters (Appendix 2).

13 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions-ABCFM.

AMERICA IN WORLD WAR I

The U.S, in observing the Monroe Doctrine,¹⁴ preserved its neutrality during the first years of World War I, although multiplying commercial ties continued American relations with European countries. The U.S. policy, not any different from that of both European imperial blocks, was focused on the welfare of state interests and investments in war zones. As far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, these were either commercial investments or installations such as educational institutions and health centers established and operated by the American missionaries. Similar to the proselytizing activities of the missionaries, American installations also appealed mostly to the Armenians within the Ottoman Empire, thus their preservation depended on supporting the Armenians whose relations with the Ottoman state had been diminished several decades before the war. Moreover, the steady deterioration following the first disputes had triggered what the world even to this day terms the Armenian Question.

When America declared war against Germany on April 6, 1917, the U.S. government, concerned with preserving its existing philanthropic and commercial investments, carefully refrained from declaring the Ottoman Empire among the belligerent countries. On the other hand, commitments to the Armenians had made the Armenians dependent on the U.S. for the realization of their dreams of independence. As a matter of fact, aiming to be more supportive of obtaining independence, many Armenians working in American missionary institutions had even become American citizens. Thus, when America's entrance into the war also brought the hope of peace, providing a good representation for the Armenians, the approaching negotiations became one of the primary concerns of the U.S. government. U.S. state officials even proceeded with the preparations for and the handling of the Armenian case without awaiting the end of the war.

U.S. Foreign Secretary Robert Lansing, in a letter dated May 29, 1917 directly consulted W.G. Sharp, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris concerning the personality and status of Boghos Nubar, the head of the Armenian National Delegation, who was not recognized as an official but was in Paris as a prospective representative. Secretary Lansing promptly reflected affirmative results of his inquiries about Boghos Nubar to the U.S. Congress. Meanwhile, Nubar, with a May 24 memorandum titled "The Armenian Question at the Peace Conference"¹⁵ had already forwarded to Secretary Lansing his people's request for an autonomous Armenia. The memorandum, with nine points, expressed that an autonomous Armenia should be "composed of the entire Armenian territory in Asiatic Turkey consisting of the six vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekir, Mamuret-ül Azis and Sivas, together with Cilicia and the ports of Mersina and Alexandretta on the Mediterranean and of Traibzond on the Black Sea." The

14 Several passages of President James Monroe's annual message to the Congress delivered on December 2 1823 hitherto was recognized by the US as the principals of American foreign policy and was referred to as the Monroe Doctrine: "...that the American continents, by the free and independent conditions which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers....Our policy in regard to Europe...is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers (but) but to cultivate friendly relations with it, submitting to injuries from none", Faulkner, U. Harold, *American Social and Political History*, New York: 1952, pp. 191-192.

15 Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2 Part I: Continuation of the War- Participation of U.S. pp.792-795.

placement of the Armenian state under the protectorate of the great powers at first and administration by an independent assembly after a certain period were also among the requests (Appendix 3).

America's entrance into the war determined the destiny of the two blocks and, as mentioned above, served as an indication of the approaching peace. As each of the fighting nations started to take their own measures, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's determination that U.S. should play a major role in peace settlements prompted him to compile information by various means on probable areas of Armenian concentration.

Although a state of war did not exist between the Ottoman Empire and America, involvement with the Ottoman Armenians invited closer U.S. attention to Ottoman territories. Academicians were assigned and commissions were appointed by the government to investigate and report military, geographical, administrative and economic conditions of the areas holding American interests within the Ottoman frontiers. Needless to say, missionary installations erected mostly in regions populated by Armenians were the pinpoints. U.S. representatives in different European states were also consulted to obtain the various views concerning the existing condition of the Armenians within the Ottoman Empire, including information about their welfare and disputes with the Turks and Kurds. The April 15, 1917 report of William P. Cresson, Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Petrograd to State Secretary Lansing offers a prime example of such acknowledgments. This lengthy report includes opinions about the factors causing the deterioration of Turco-Armenian relations, details about Armenian-Kurdish conflicts and views concerning different states' ambitions on Ottoman territories. Cresson wrote:¹⁶

It should be borne in mind that until within recent years the Armenian population of many Turkish border districts lived upon terms of comparative friendliness with their Moslem neighbors. According to reliable authorities (notably Lynch and Sykes) the present lamentable state of affairs dates largely from the unsatisfactory state of affairs set up by the Congress of Berlin, 1878.

As previously mentioned, the Ottoman Armenians since 1878 strove first for autonomy, then independence and tried to convince the great powers that they were worthy of independence since they had a demographic majority in the areas that they anticipated to create their state. However, Cresson's report continued:

.... The principal argument in the Turks' denial of an independent Armenia lay in the fact that in no district of the Armenian-claimed Turkish territory were Armenians originally a nation, or had majority, although it is claimed that the decrease in Armenian population in the mentioned areas are due to deportations.

16 ABCFM 353, Roll 6, *April 15, 1917.*

The report includes the below comparative table, which Lynch related as the population of the Armenian lands for the year 1890.

Provinces	Muslims	Christians
Van	52,229	75,644
Bitlis	145,494	97,184
Kharpüt	182,000	93,000
Diarbiker	45,580	15,000
Erzeroum	428,495	109,000
Total	853,758	389,828

The report also contains a different view of the Armenian-Kurdish belligerency assumed to be stemming from being the cohabitants of Eastern Anatolia.

Nevertheless the complacent decision of the powers were always addressed to the Porte in a language which, by ignoring their most elemental rights, fired the blood of the none too patient Kurdish tribesmen, uniting the interests of the unruly subjects of the Porte for the first time in their history to the Government of Constantinople, and setting them in opposition to their Christian neighbors. Moreover, the differences between the Kurds and Armenians have always been economic rather than political or religious...

... While the agitation for an independent Armenia may continue, especially among persons not cognizant of the above conditions, the general impression among the more intellectual and liberal minded Armenians of the Caucasus appears to be that an assured place and future is reserved for the Armenian elements of the population in the liberated Russian State...

The report includes an interesting acknowledgment, inviting a different outlook to the 1915 relocation. This is the opinion of an Armenian from Aleppo, Marc Toroyan, who was employed as courier by a German officer (Lieutenant Otto Oelmann). Toroyan's explanations to Cresson concentrated on German involvement in the decision phase of the relocation:

A fact of particular interest emphasized by this man's testimony is that the Armenians of the Gilion (Alexandretta, Tarusus, Syria hinterlands) were not, as a part of general policy, molested during the recent massacres. These appear to have been directed solely against the population who, from their geographical position, might have become "contaminated" by the revolutionary propaganda for a "free and autonomous Armenia" under Russian rule.

The Young Turks appear to have realized the commercial value of the industrious town Armenians of Gilion, and the deportations which took place are principally directed against the Armenian peasantry whose lands

were coveted by their Turkish neighbors as a pasture for their flocks and herds. It would indeed appear that the Euphrates became, in a tragically literal sense, the “dead line” beyond which the organized massacre did not extend....

However active individuals of this nationality (Germany) may have been in attempting to save their fellow Christians from the hideous policy adopted by their political allies, there is an unfortunate consensus of local Armenian testimony to prove that as a rule, German officers and other officers consistently adopted a policy of complete dislocation, not only say a cynical indifference to these events. A searching examination of the witness left me in the impression that while Armenian workers under German contract engaged in constructing the Baghdad Railway, were in many cases protected from molestation, this policy was avowedly based on utilitarian reasons. It would of course be idle to maintain that the full result of the deportation massacres was realized by Professor Rohrbach (a name widely known and execrated among the Armenian population of the border provinces as the author of the whole deportation scheme) when he proposed to add to the commercial efficiency of the Arab population along the line of the Baghdad Railway elements drawn from the population of the Russian border provinces.

What may have been, at worst, an attempt to remove an active and possibly a dangerous political element from Russian influences, was a scheme at any rate through misunderstood or misapplied to suit the circumstances by the allies of Germany. A heavy burden of proof which, in the interest of the good name of the European in the East, it is to be hoped Germany will feel someday called upon to consider, rests upon the German Government. In order to clear the reputation of her officers stationed in this territory it will be necessary to show why, under the circumstances, they did not attempt to use their undoubtedly overwhelming prestige not only in Constantinople, but locally, in order to initiate, in some measure, the organized sovereignty of the military executions in Turkey and the deliberate massacres ordered from Constantinople by officers indirectly subordinated to German military control.

Such an assumption is not unique in the sense that U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau had also mentioned that the *en masse* deportation of the Armenians, a method Turks were totally alien to, was probably a German suggestion, in other words, “exclusively Germanic.”¹⁷

Cresson, in a section of the report marked “Confidential” evaluates Russia’s desire to possess Constantinople and the control of the Dardanelles as “a neo-Slavic movement supported by a number of the high officials of the present government.” He also points to the favorable position of the American missionaries among the Armenians and in the Ottoman Empire in general, and

17 Morgenthau, Henry, *Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story*, New York: 1918, p. 366.

concludes by underlining the importance of American investments and influence “which may be considered even of commercial value as creating a constantly growing relationship between America and the Middle East through the training offered by missionary schools.”

Most of what was related pertaining to the Armenians in the report above repeats what American officials already knew, including that when America entered the war, the substantial role America would be playing during the peace negotiations was readily accepted by the Armenians. In order to prove worthy of America’s support, Armenian community leaders preparing for the approaching peace conference carefully consulted or applied to the U.S. government not only for intentions in the war zone but even for community affairs. For example, when Miran Sevasly, the President of the Armenian National Union of America Federation, was considered for becoming the representative of the Armenian National Delegation in the United States, the Armenian leader Boghos Nubar applied to Lansing, asking him to grant the recognition and received the immediate response of the Secretary (Appendix 4). Similarly, when the Armenians wanted to form an armed force independent from France to fight for the Allies under the flag of “free Armenians,” they approached the U.S. officials for approval and assistance, and responsively were guided for the procedures to be followed (Appendix 5).

RUSSIA AND THE ARMENIANS

The Russian invasion of Eastern Anatolia in the beginning of World War I intensified the collaboration between the Russian forces and Ottoman Armenians. Even before the Ottoman Empire entered the war, Armenians in Zeytun had declined to be under the Ottoman flag and rebelled while Transcaucasia was flooded with Armenian volunteers from all over the world to enlist in the Russian army to fight against the Turks. The Tzar, following the Ottoman bombardment of Sebastapol on October 14, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. So, too, did the Dashnakutsyun: The Armenian revolutionaries distributed arms and ammunitions to the civilian Armenians as the Russian army was ordered to cross the Turkish border. Although the Turks resisted the violations, they suffered heavy losses under the advancing Armenian-Russian forces in Eastern Anatolia and were massacred in Van when the city fell. The Van incident constituted one of the causes for the replacement to which the Young Turk government resorted.

However, the Tzarist government in accepting armed Armenians’ support had no intention of complying with their repeated pleas for independence, so it can said that Armeno-Russian relations were already strained at the time of the Van incident.¹⁸ As the Russian army advanced into Eastern Turkey and took possession of Trabzon, Erzurum and Erzincan in the advancing months of 1916, it become clear to the Armenians that the Tzarist policy toward them no longer held the previously warm sentiments. The Armenian volunteers, accused of

18 Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, Istanbul: 1976 pp.593-609 .

lawlessness and looting, were disbanded by the Russian government and refugees were forbidden to return to their districts without presenting valid property deeds. Armenian hopes for autonomy disappeared by June 18, 1916 with the announcement of the “Rules for the Temporary Administration of Turkish Areas Occupied by the Right of War.”¹⁹ Declared by the Russian Chief of Staff, these rules combining eastern Ottoman provinces into a military governorship did not include the word “Armenia” or “Armenian” and were applicable to any territory under Russian military occupation. The following lines, “to reestablish and defend law and order, to protect the life and honor, property, religious – civil liberties of inhabitants to consider all nationalities equal before Russian government, and to guarantee these inhabitants the possibility of free and tranquil labor, on the condition that they submit into the suzerainty of Russia,”²⁰ reflecting Tsarist absolutism only served to confirm their disillusionment. Consequently, the direct and unconditional annexation of the Armenian territories into the Romanov Empire had started. Viceroy of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nicholas, underlining that any existing Armenian problem before the war was outside of Russia and any procedure toward Armenian autonomy would only complicate matters, announced his opinion as such:

It is my profound conviction that there is at present within the bounds of the Russian Empire absolutely no Armenian question, nor should even a mention of such a question be permitted, for the Russian Armenian subjects within the Viceroyalty are, like Moslems, Georgians and Russians, equal subjects of Russia.²¹

However, the Tzarist regime in Russia did not survive long enough to see the end of the war.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND THE SECRET TREATIES

The Bolshevik Revolution was another determining factor in the destiny of the Armenians and the war. Similar to America’s entry, the Bolshevik retreat from the war indicated that the end of the war was approaching.

The Armenians, fully confident in Russian assistance for Armenian independence, contributed wholeheartedly to the Allies during the Great War, particularly at the Russian front. However, developments close to the end of the war proved their anticipations to be futile. The Armenians faced reality immediately after the revolution when the Bolshevik government made public the documents pertaining to the secret partitioning of the Ottoman Empire among the Allies: During the war, England, France, Italy and Russia, wishing to safeguard their strategic and economic interest zones, shared most of the Ottoman territories concerned on paper with a set of secretly concluded treaties. Russian and French desiderata, totally disregarding Armenians’ expectations of establishing an independent

19 Hovannisian, Richard G. “The Allies and Armenia 1915-18”, *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, Jan 1968 p. 163.

20 Hovannisian, Richard G. “The Allies and Armenia...”, p.164.

21 Hovannisian, Richard G. “The Allies and Armenia...”, p.165.

Armenian state, included East Anatolia and Cilicia where a large portion of the territories of this prospective state was located. Even the Anglo-Russian confirmation of the shared Ottoman territories in East Anatolia by the Sykes Picot Treaty did not include land for the Armenians. Nevertheless, the Armenians, not informed about the presumptions until the Bolshevik revelation on November 24, did not lose their aspirations for an independent Armenian state. This presumed state, whether it were to be in boundaries extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, covering Cilicia, or limited to Northeastern Turkey, included portions from territorial anticipations of the Allies.²²

Learning about the minus-Armenia partitioning was a blow to the Armenians who previously were so confident about England and France as they were of Russia for supporting their cause. In fact, this had prompted their immediate military contribution when the French government in October 1916 requested that the National Armenian Delegation furnish volunteers for an expedition into Anatolia. The head of the delegation, Boghos Nubar, was promised the broadest possible autonomy under French protection, after the war, in territories which, according to the 1915 London Agreement, (the second of the secret treaties) remained within the French zone of influence (Appendix 6). Volunteers from different areas had rushed to join the *Legion d'Orient*, later named *Legion Armenienne*, to fight under French command for Cilicia. Not different from the Armenian volunteers who fought in the Caucasus against the Turks and Germans and held the front almost a year after its collapse, the Armenians had held the Cilicia front.²³ The French sentiments for the Armenian volunteers were conveyed to Boghos Nubar by Clemenceau on July 14, 1918 with the following lines:

The spirit of self sacrifice of the Armenians, their loyalty towards the Allies, their contributions to the Foreign Legion, to the Caucasus front, to the *Legion d'Orient*, have strengthened the ties that connect them with France. I am happy to confirm you that the government of the Republic, like that of Great Britain, has not ceased to place the Armenian nation among the peoples whose fate the Allies intend to settle according to the supreme laws of Humanity and Justice.²⁴

Throughout the war, the British repeatedly implied that providing for the establishment of an independent Armenia was one of their war aims. In the same manner, Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, announced in the House of Commons on November 6, 1917 that Britain had pledged to liberate the Armenians. Soon after that, on December 20, British Premier Lloyd George, in the same platform, repeated the same commitment by declaring that:

What will happen to Mesopotamia must be left to the Peace Conference when it meets, but there is one thing which will never happen. It will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turk...That same observation applies to Armenia, the land soaked with the blood of innocents, and massacred by the people who were bound to protect them.²⁵

22 Kurat, Yuluğ Tekin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Paylaşılması*, Ankara:1976, p. 45-47.

23 See Appendix 6 for details.

24 Hovannisian, Richard G., "The Allies and Armenia...", p. 151.

25 Hovannisian, Richard G., "The Allies and Armenia...", p. 148.

The Armenians heard such promises only to learn by the announcing of the secret treaties that they were let down even before the war came to an end. The contrast between Allied words and Allied deeds was striking and this became more noticeable as the end of the war approached.

Matters pertaining to the Armenians entered a new phase with Russia's collapse and the Bolshevik Revolution. Russia's retreat from the war with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, 1918 dimmed Armenians' hopes by returning to the Ottomans the East Anatolian provinces they looked upon as a part of their prospective state. Although along with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan rejoiced when the Bolsheviks seized power in October, it soon became evident that the new government sought centralization. The trio comprising the Trans-Caucasian Republic had not yet been recognized and resorted to splitting into three, each declaring their independence at the end of May.²⁶

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks' denunciation of Tsarist war aims compelled England and France to reconsider their war years' policies. Although they no longer were enthusiastic to avoid the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the revelation of the secret treaties obliged them to partiality in matters pertaining to Ottomans for the sake of their economic investments. Great Britain, however, was more concerned about the reaction Muslims in its colonies would display after learning of British ambitions in the caliph's empire. Accordingly, Lloyd George in the beginning of January 1918 did not appear to be as protective of the Armenians, but seemed to have tempered his outlook on the Ottomans as he said:

Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race..... While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homeland of the Turkish race, with its capital at Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized, Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred. Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our allies on this and other subjects. I can only say that as new circumstances, like the Russian collapse and the separate Russian negotiations, have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are and always have been perfectly ready to discuss them with our allies.²⁷

Gradually, the Armenians began to notice the true attitude of the powers they relied upon for decades. "The politics of expediency rendered pledges to the Armenians obsolete."²⁸ During the Paris Peace Conference, it became more

26 Bayur, Hikmet, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi* vol. III Part IV, Ankara: 1967, p. 175-192.

27 Mears, Eliot Grinnell, *Modern Turkey*, New York: 1924, p. 622-23, from *Manchester Guardian*, January 7, 1918.

28 Hovannisian, Richard G. *The Armenian Holocaust, A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres and Dispersion of the Armenian People, 1915-1923*, Cambridge:1980, p. xv.

apparent that the Allies were not the strong defenders of their commitments. Accordingly, the British and the French governments lost further credibility with the Armenians as they postponed recognition of the Armenian Republic until January 1920. This was another sad surprise for the Armenians who had been led to believe that an independent Armenia was one of the primary war aims of the Allies.²⁹

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The reluctance the Allies displayed for the prompt recognition of the new republic made Armenian representation at the approaching Paris Peace Conference problematic. The uncertainty brought by the revolution, which was made more severe by the attitude of the Allies, compelled President Wilson's advisor Colonel Edward M. House, who was in Europe to make arrangements for the president before the peace conference, to reconsider Armenian participation. The joint memorandum issued following his meeting with the Allied representatives revealed that existing conditions in Russia made it impractical to admit formally to the conference any representatives from the recently founded governments in Russia, which were not yet recognized. However, it was underlined that national groups such as the Armenians, the Jews in Palestine and the Arabs not admitted to the Congress as a member power would be received and heard through their representatives. During the discussions, the status of Armenia, which was not a belligerent power officially, would also be taken up.

According to the decision reached, the list, published in January, 1920 of representatives to attend the Paris Peace Conference did not include the Armenian representatives.³⁰ Armenian communities protested the list as President Wilson promised Boghos Nubar to provide the presentation of the Armenian cause, if not the invitation of representatives. Despite President Wilson's good intentions, it was not until January 19 that the U.S. Supreme Council announced the *de facto* recognition of the Armenian Republic. Although the recognition was immediately retracted, it was confirmed on April 23, 1920.³¹ On the other hand, Boghos Nubar's struggle for eligibility continued during the Paris Peace Conference through numbers of sessions even after the Sevres Treaty for since the Armenian Republic did not exist before it did not appear as a belligerent power to Turkey, so its participation at the conference was questionable. Nubar extended a memorandum to the Conference in early December, before the beginning of talks concerning Armenians, to verify that Armenian volunteers were ready to fight their traditional enemy, the Turks, in order to free their native soil. (Appendix 7).

Despite Armenian efforts, the controversial stand of the British and the French governments concerning war year commitments, the difference of opinion

29 Aspaturian, Vernon V., "Armenia in the World Arena 1914-1921", *Armenian Review* Vol.46, No. 1-4 pp.181-184 (1993) p. 119.

30 Hovannisian, Richard G. "The Allies and Armenia..."p.167.

31 Gidney, James B., *A Mandate for Armenia*, Unpublished PhD Thesis Ohio, 1967, p.208.

between the U.S. Congress and President Wilson and the emergence of the Turkish national movement all became obstacles in the way of the hoped-for integrated Armenian state.

TOWARD THE PEACE TREATY

On January 8, 1918, President Wilson addressed the U.S. Congress to announce a set of principles he designed with the anticipation that they would provide a foundation for world peace. These principles based on “self-determination” of all nations were recognized as the President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and included terms such as open diplomacy, impartial adjustment of territorial claims, freedom of the seas and removal of economic barriers. One of the points called for the creation of a general association of nations to assure peaceful coexistence, which within two years, had materialized as the League of Nations. These terms, cherished by millions as the harbinger of peace, paved the way to negotiations. Armistices and peace treaties ending the war were prepared according to the Fourteen Points. The twelfth point directly addressed the Ottoman Empire:

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.³²

Ironically, this was the article upon which both Turkish nationalists and the Armenians relied for the recognition of their self-governing nation-state.

When it finally became evident that the Central powers had lost the war, on October 4, 1917, Germany appealed for an armistice according to the Fourteen Points.³³ Shortly after, the Ottoman Empire followed suit. England and France, with the awareness that observation of the Fourteen Points calling for open diplomacy would cost their shares in secret treaties, meticulously worded the Mudros Armistice, which the Ottomans had signed on October 30, 1918. Article 7 gave the Allies the right to occupy any strategic point in the event of any situation arising which threatened their security, and Article 24 provided the basis for an independent Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia by allowing Allied intervention in case of disorder in Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, (Mamuretülaziz) Harput, Sivas,³⁴ referred to in the West as the “six Armenian provinces.”

32 Mears, *Eliot Grinnell, Modern Turkey...*p. 622; *On the Fourteen Points, see: Tumulty Joseph P., Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, New York: 1921, p. 340.*

33 *Faulkner, U. Harold, American Social and...*, p. 682.

34 The names of four, and than two of the six vilayets were first mentioned in 1880, for the reforms promised by the Berlin Treaty of 1878; See: Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Tarihi...*pp. 126, 134 and in the given order in Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve...*p. 298.

The Allies, reluctant to observe the Fourteen Points, made use of the ambiguity in the mentioned articles and did not lose any time in landing troops on territories which actually were their areas of interest but according to Mudros, remained within Turkish frontiers. In fact, the Turkish nationalist struggle was launched following the Greek landing at Izmir on May 15, 1919 was the rejection of the occupations violating Article 12 of the Fourteen Points. The Allies, not overlooking this, approached the Paris Peace Conference, which convened in January 1919, very cautiously. They came to Paris prepared to present alternatives which would justify the occupations and allow them to preserve their interests. Among these alternatives was a suggestion for Armenians.

The joint memorandum Armenians submitted to the conference on February 26 proposed the establishment of an integrated Armenian state extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Its designed boundaries did not only include Eastern Anatolia but also Cilicia, still looked upon as a French zone of influence. This triggered England and France to suggest their alternative, which was the placement of underdeveloped areas of the world under mandates of the great powers until they economically and socially became capable of self-governance. In order to preserve their shares in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria that were obtained by the secretly concluded Sykes Picot Treaty, they introduced the idea of establishing Armenian and Kurdish states in Eastern Anatolia to be administered as mandates. France, interested in Cilicia and its southern region, desired to become the mandate power in the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria-Lebanon area. Considering that the Kurdish populated territories were in fertile, oil-rich lands, the English volunteered for the mandate of Mesopotamia. Both Britain and France suggested that America assume the Armenian mandate. This proposal was extended to President Wilson by British Premier David Lloyd George at the May 1919 Paris meeting of the Big Four³⁵ as the mandate system, conceived and articulated by General Smuts in Paris, became “the way out of the dilemma of violating promises or of foregoing the spoils of war.”³⁶

The suggestion was applauded in Europe and was tentatively agreed upon by President Wilson, with the reservation of it first being presented to the U.S. Senate for approval. However, the consideration was met with hesitation in the U.S. Adding to uncertainties in America were the dispatches to the American Peace Mission at Paris from Admiral Bristol, U.S. High Commissioner to Turkey, warning them of the Allied motives for insisting on an American mandate over Armenia. Admiral Bristol underlined that such a step would create an Armenia to serve as a buffer against Bolshevik expansions toward Tran-Caucasus, which was among the chief concerns of England. He also pointed out that it would also secure U.S. protection for the rich oil resources of Mesopotamia, which would be under British mandate. Finally, he called attention to the fact that American acceptance of an Armenian mandate inevitably would bring an end to America’s objection to the partition of the Ottoman Empire.³⁷ Hence, two commissions were

35 Bryson, Prof Thomas A. Mark Lambert Bristol, U.S. Navy, Admiral-Diplomat: His Influence on the Armenian Mandate Question, *The Armenian Review* Vol. 21, No. 4-84, Winter 1968, p.2.

36 Gordon, Leland James, *American Relations with Turkey 1830-1930*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press:1932, p. 268.

37 Gordon, Leland James, *American Relations with...*, pp. 3-9.

formed to investigate the area involved. The King Crane Commission, appointed by the Big Four in Paris, was to tour the Arab provinces. The General Harbord Commission, appointed by President Wilson, was charged with investigating East Anatolia and Trans-Caucasus to determine the possibilities for an independent Armenian state encompassing the mentioned area and assuming an American mandate over Armenia and the Ottoman Empire.

The General Harbord Commission investigated at first hand the economic and demographic conditions of the area to determine the requirements necessary should the U.S. assume a mandate. When General James G. Harbord,³⁸ arrived in Erzurum, which the Armenians intended to include in their prospective state, he was greeted by Turks holding posters which read, “*Vive l’Article 12 des Principes de Wilson.*” This was to signal that Turks constituted the majority in the province and ought to be entitled sovereignty.

General Harbord, before returning to Istanbul in mid-September, stopped at Sivas, where a congress had recently been held to organize the nationalist movement, to confer with Mustafa Kemal, who was recognized as the leader of the nationalist action. Mustafa Kemal explained to Harbord that Turks wanted nothing more than independence within the frontiers determined by Mudros Armistice, which was based on the Fourteen Points. After numerous interviews before and after the Sivas visit, Harbord was assured that the nationalists were not antagonistic to Christians and that their only aim was to provide the unconditional acceptance of a sovereign Turkish state. Harbord’s interviews with Turkish and Armenian authorities in Turkey and Trans-Caucasus as well as his personal experiences during the journey convinced him that “there was much to show that, left to themselves, the Turks and Armenians have hitherto been able to live together in peace.”³⁹ His impressions were compatible with Admiral Bristol’s concern that the British and the French were spreading propaganda “looking to their advantages.”⁴⁰ It should be noted that Admiral Bristol had already conveyed his views to Paris and to the U.S. and swayed influence over some senators, particularly Henry White and Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both senators, in favor of the U.S. mandate over Armenia at the beginning of the Senate discussions, became rejecters during discussions.⁴¹

The view expressed in the report General Harbord submitted to President Wilson upon his return⁴² did not encourage the establishment of an independent Armenia covering Eastern Turkey, where there was a Turkish majority. Rather than two mandates, an integrated mandate, if any, was suggested in the report while twelve reasons for and against it were listed without any specific recommendation as to acceptance or rejection. It was also stated that American troops would be needed in the area should the U.S. assume such responsibility.

38 Akgün. Seçil, *General Harbord’un Anadolu Gezisi ve Raporu, İstanbul: 1981.*

39 Harbord, Maj. Gen. James, *Investigating Turkey and Transcaucasia, Worlds Work V. XL, NY 1920, pp 185-87.*

40 Bryson, Prof. Thomas A. “Mark Lambert Bristol, U.S. Navy, Admiral-Diplomat: His Influence on the Armenian Mandate Question”, *The Armenian Review* Vol. 21, No. 4-84, Winter 1968, p. 9.

41 Bryson, Prof. Thomas A. “Mark Lambert Bristol...”, pp.9-15.

42 Harbord, Maj. Gen. *James G. Conditions in the Near East- Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia, Washington Government Printing Office, 1920.*

In general, the report, including a very high financial estimate, was not favorable to Armenian interests, therefore was a letdown to American Armenophiles. Although it was dated October 16, 1919, it was transmitted by President Wilson to the Senate on April 3, when, according to the *New York Times* on April 6, it was "several months after it ceased to have any practical value."⁴³ Debates on the report started shortly before the Allies met first in London, then at San Remo, to determine the peace terms to be presented to the Ottoman Empire.

During the months President Wilson viewed the appointed commissions' reports to guide him to the right decision concerning the mandate, the delay in concluding peace with the Ottoman Empire had started to cause severe criticisms in France and England, eagerly awaiting to confirm their interests. Journals, particularly in England, lost no time in cynically reflecting that the Armenian Question was still not solved.⁴⁴ The House of Commons' pressing request for the solution to the Armenians' problem, diverted to the British Premier, was also in the daily papers. These pressures started to dim the glamour of the Armenians and the issue to the point that Sir Eyre Crowe, Undersecretary of the British Foreign Ministry, complained: "There is no doubt that the Armenians are chiefly responsible from the crusade the Turks started against them," while even Lord Curzon, the Foreign Minister, commented "the Armenians are not innocent lambs."⁴⁵

On April 18, English, French and Italian representatives met at San Remo to determine the peace resolutions over matters pertaining to the Armenian and Kurdish elements of the Ottoman Empire. The general expectation of the Christian world from the Allies was to provide the foundation for an independent Armenian state situated in Turkish territories and under an American mandate in addition to the existing Republic of Armenia. In fact, determining the frontiers of the Armenian state in Anatolia, preferably with outlets to the Black Sea from Trabzon and Cilicia to the Mediterranean, was the topic of discussion that occupied the congress for days. The Allies strove to formulate adequate terms to impose this on the Ottoman government, also preparing for the peace settlement. They were also determined to involve the U.S. in the Armenian mandate, but when they extended a formal proposal to President Wilson on April 25, the U.S. Senate had already announced that America would not be officially represented at the peace discussions in Europe.⁴⁶ President Wilson, through his Foreign Secretary Colby, informed the conference that he could not attend officially. However, England and France, aware of his sentiments, were persistent in guaranteeing America's commitment. Finally, President Wilson was personally invited to determine the Turkish-Armenian frontier. He gladly accepted this task officially given to him by the Paris Peace Conference, but met unexpected resistance at home, especially from his political opponents who were aware of the challenges the U.S. faced over oil.

43 *New York Times*, April 6, 1920, p.10.

44 *The Manchester Guardian*, April 22, 23, 1920.

45 Akgün, Seçil, *General Harbord'un Anadolu ...*, p.153.

46 Gordon, Leland James, *American Relations with...*, p. 30.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION IN THE U.S. SENATE

Discussions in Washington on the U.S. assuming the Armenian mandate largely focused on the Harbord Report, yet there were two other dimensions of major importance. These were the approaching elections and oil interests in the Middle East. Bitter complaints from some senators that President Wilson had endangered the Armenians' case by submitting the report months after it was given to him, certainly were not favorable comments for Wilson's upcoming presidential campaign. Therefore, on May 24 when he conveyed the San Remo proposals concerning Armenian mandate and determination of the Armenian frontiers to both houses of Congress for approval, he carefully worded his message with Christian sentiments so he could win the hearts of the American people. However, his political opponents mostly disregarded his philanthropic tone and harshly reminded him that the French and the British took away the most fertile provinces, the rich oil wells and copper mines. He was even questioned on whether he intended to exchange mandates with Great Britain.⁴⁷

The general atmosphere of the Congress was supportive to Armenians but reluctant to approve the mandate. Yet, it was impossible not to notice the brooding contempt among some senators not only in assuming the mandate, but even toward the Armenians when responsibilities and obligations the U.S. would have to confront were learned through the Harbord Report. The number of lives to be sacrificed and the amount of dollars to be invested for the Armenian cause left only to America were brought up by one senator after the other. Senator James A. Reed of Missouri even underlined that the Armenians themselves had been guilty of massacres "so that it is a case of eastern barbarism on both sides...The U.S. is asked to assume control for the countries which have stolen the lands of these people all over the world and decline to take control because it is expensive."⁴⁸

President Wilson was further challenged over the mandate by those ready to approve immediate military action in order to help the Armenians. One such advocate was Mississippi Senator John Sharp Williams who, in presenting the resolutions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), the Near East Relief Society, and Armenian National Union of America, called for "immediate action to protect Armenians whose very existence was in danger" and offered that the adoption of responsibility would only "afford to the Armenian people immediate protection."⁴⁹

The mandate, in the view of many of the rejecters, was regarded as little more than a British imposition on the U.S. This was a view Admiral Bristol had once voiced, and in the course of time, similar to other warnings from the Admiral, gained more adherents. Senator Williams' Senate Resolution 106, urging President Wilson to send U.S. army and naval forces to the aid of Armenians also met the Bristol-influenced opposition of Senator Warren Harding, Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee Chair, as well as a few other senators.

47 *Gidney, James B. A Mandate for Armenia...*, p. 228.

48 *Gidney, James B. A Mandate for Armenia...*, pp.227-232.

49 *Gidney, James B. A Mandate for Armenia...*, pp.223.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on the May 27, 1920, introduced a senate resolution declining to grant President Wilson permission to accept the mandate. When the resolution was opened to debate two days later, Lodge commented:

...Let me say... that northern Armenia which was Russian Armenia, where they have their capital, the name of which I believe is Yerevan, is just at the point where attacks are made. England is there holding Mesopotamia; France is holding Syria; Italy has a great block of territory in the neighborhood, and Armenia is the point at which they must be protected, and not merely from the Turks but from the Kurds, and the Georgians—and there has already been fighting with the Georgians. It is the crossroads; as I have heard it described by somebody, there are three banks and a poorhouse there, and we have been given the poorhouse.⁵⁰

Even the Americans' discovery of opportunities for new economic investments, particularly in oil-rich areas were not sufficient enough for developing a favorable approach to accepting an American mandate over Armenia, for the General Harbord Report carefully underlined the very high cost of such an undertaking. Following the debates, and undoubtedly with the inspirations of the General Harbord Report, on June 1, the U.S. Congress by 52 to 23 votes denied President Wilson the requested mandate authorization and refused the U.S. to assume any responsibility in the area.⁵¹

The Armenians were well aware that without the consent of the U.S. Congress, President Wilson could not extend them any support and under the existing circumstances, they would have to resort to other means to provide the military and financial backing for protection and repatriation. Admittance to the League of Nations appeared to be one of the two hopes left for the Armenians. They considered that this membership could furnish them with the protection America had denied. In case this could not be provided, support from France, established in Cilicia, was their other hope.⁵² The League of Nations was also approached by numbers of societies the Armenophiles founded in the U.S. and in Europe to work for the Armenian cause. Most of these societies were founded when the official decline of commitment to the Armenians brought forth the need for more concerted private support for the Armenian case. One such prominent society in the U.S. was the Armenia-America Society founded by Walter George Smith, a staunch defender of Armenian independence and a member of the American Committee for Near East Relief. The goal of this society was "to unite in cooperation the many friends of Armenia for the purpose of ascertaining the needs of Armenia, of bringing these needs before the American people and securing satisfaction of those needs through American assistance."⁵³ This society collaborated with others such as the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia and the International Phil-Armenia League to form a pressure group, which was established by the end of 1920. The group carried out

50 Bryson, Thomas A. "Mark Lambert Bristol....", pp 9- 16.

51 Akgün. Seçil General Harbord'un Anadolu...., p. 158.

52 Gidney James B. *A Mandate for Armenia*...., p. 241.

53 Bryson, Thomas A., "The Armenia-America Society: A Factor In American-Turkish Relations, 1914-1924", *Records of the American Catholic Historical Society, June 1971*, pp. 85-86.

various actions to attract the attention of the League of Nations for the recognition of an Armenian homeland in territories belonging to the Ottoman Empire. However, the close ties maintained with the American Committee for Near East Relief as well as the joint efforts of the societies did not suffice in achieving their goal.⁵⁴ The League Council heard the Armenians' complaints at the end of October, after the Sevres Treaty, including the establishment of an independent Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia was signed by the Ottoman government, but was rejected by the Turkish nationalists. Nevertheless, this was to no avail, for the status of the League opinion was best expressed by the French delegate, Rene Viviani as follows: "We are a powerless Assembly, because we have been entrusted with a responsibility without having been given real authority."⁵⁵ The developments during the time the League spent in discussions served to bring complete futility to the problem: Armenians attacked Eastern Anatolia, were defeated by Turkish nationalists, retreated from Kars and were compelled to sign a treaty returning the Eastern Anatolian provinces they had occupied to Turkey. Within the weeks following the Gümürü (Alexandropol) Treaty concluded on December 3, 1920 the Bolsheviks annexed Armenia which became the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic⁵⁶ defeating White Russians commanded by Wrangel. In 1918 Wrangel led the Caucasus Army, and later became the commander in chief of first the volunteers and then⁵⁷ the entire of the White Forces in Crimea. Armenian hopes of admittance to the League completely disappeared when it became clear that the Soviet government did not allow for the interference of the League in the Caucasus.⁵⁸

FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM CILICIA

Cilicia, where a considerable Armenian population has lived before the 1915 relocation, was even previously referred to as "Little Armenia." When France gained control of Cilicia after the war, rather than installing French forces to confront the Turkish nationalists, it relied upon the Armenians, mostly repatriated deportees who had returned to the area as the end of the war approached. The proposal to arm Armenian volunteers was initially brought to Boghos Nubar by George Picot in London at the French Embassy in October 1916. Nubar, however, suggested to Picot that in order to obtain better cooperation, he should be entitled to give assurances to his people for "an autonomous Armenia for the race to reconstruct itself and for Armenian nationality to develop under protection of France."⁵⁹ After he was authorized by Picot and cabled to order his son, Arakel Nubar, in Egypt on October 27th to organize Armenian volunteers, it was not difficult for France to arm them to fight against the Turks.

A commission under the direction of *M. Le Commandant Romieu* was sent by the

54 Bryson, Thomas A., *The Armenia-America Society* ..., pp. 83-105.

55 Gidney James B. *A Mandate for Armenia*..., p. 244.

56 Karabekir, Kazım, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, Istanbul: 1960, pp. 902-910.

57 For more about Pyotr Nicolayevitz Wrangler, who in 1918 led the Caucasus Army, and later became the commander in chief of first the volunteers and then the entire of the White Forces in Crimea, see Peter Kenez, *The Ideology of the White Movement, Soviet Studies*, vol XXii, No. 1, 1980, pp. 58-83.

58 Bryson, Tomas A., "The Armenia-America Society...", pp. 84-86.

59 See Appendix 7.

French government to Egypt to organize the Armenian volunteer corps which would later be referred to as *La Legion d'Orient*, (later called *La Legion Armenienne*). It was declared by Romieu that the *Legion*, with the objective of obtaining the Armenians' freedom of Cilicia, would constitute the nucleus of the future Armenian army and under the French flag would fight against the Turks only in Cilicia. The *Legion* constituted the largest part of the French forces during the Palestine Campaign and received the tribute of British Field Marshall Lord Allenby. Consequently, with official permission granted by the order of George Picot, 208,000 Armenian refugees returned to Cilicia from Syria, Palestine and Egypt (Appendix 7). Volunteers among them were armed by France to fight against the Turkish nationalists when the Turkish Independence War started. Until Turkish-French struggles brought consecutive defeats to France, many Americans, especially members of Armenophile societies, thought of Cilicia as the potential Armenian "national homeland out of the former Ottoman territory."⁶⁰

It should be pointed out that a "homeland" was a perceptible concession from the Armenians who had started the war with a large, independent Armenian state in mind. They eventually had to yield to accepting a considerably limited territory to be "home," and the continuing Turkish Independence War made even that not very likely to materialize. With this understanding, Boghos Nubar, complaining over the terms of the Serves Treaty not providing full Armenian sovereignty of Cilicia, in a memorandum dated December 9 (cited in Appendix 7), admitted that the Armenians would be "content by obtaining an autonomous administration in Cilicia under Turkish Sovereignty and French control." He, of course, was wrong in thinking that such an accomplishment could be solved through diplomatic channels and required nothing more than the Ottoman Sultan's proclamation (*irate*), for the sultan had lost his credibility with the Turks, particularly since Istanbul was formally occupied in March 1920.

In this context, as the Allies, after the opening of the National Assembly in Ankara, gradually accepted that control of Turkey was in the hands of the nationalists, French Premier Briand took the first step at the 1921 London Conference to negotiate with his Turkish counterpart from the Ankara Assembly on the withdrawal of French troops from Cilicia. The French attempt to compromise with the Turks, which materialized in the advancing months of the same year, was the beginning of the end of Armenian expectations from France and the termination of Armenian dreams of establishing a "national home" in Cilicia. The Franco-Turkish compromise also paved the way for the withdrawal of Italian forces from Antalya, leaving the British-supported Greeks alone in fighting the Turks.

THE SÈVRES TREATY

The Paris Peace Conference, as intended, did provide a conclusion of peace treaties among the belligerent powers of World War I. Peace terms with the Ottoman Empire were the last to crystallize. Once determined by the Allies, they

60 Bryson, Thomas A., "The Armenia-America Society....", p.86.

were handed to the representatives of the Istanbul government at Sèvres as late as July 1920. Despite the official stance of the U.S., the Soviet government and the Turkish nationalists' resistance, the Sevres Treaty was accepted by the Ottoman Delegation on August 10. It included most of the favorable provisions the Armenians were anticipating. Most of all, the treaty provided the grounds for the long-awaited Armenian state, although without defined frontiers.

Article 88, with the words, "Turkey.... Hereby recognizes Armenia as a free, independent state," outlined Ottoman commitment to the Armenians and Article 89 included full authorization for the Allies, Ottomans, and Armenians and extended to President Wilson the option to arbitrate in determining the boundaries of this state (including the provinces of Bitlis, Erzurum, Trabzon, Van) as well as the agreement for demilitarization of the neighboring territories. Article 90 confirmed that Turkey would give up all rights over the mentioned territory while Article 91 stated that 15 days after the probable submittance to the Armenians of the territory mentioned in Article 89, an appointed commission would determine the definite frontiers. Article 92 focused on determining Armenia's frontiers with Azerbaijan and Georgia and Article 93 held Armenia's commitment to observe the principles that the Allies deemed essential to safeguard within its frontiers the rights of nations of different races, religions and languages. Through the framework of the provisions determined by the Allies, Armenia also agreed to certain concessions enabling free commercial opportunities to different nations.⁶¹

Although the above articles appear to be significant for the Armenians, the correspondence and applications of Boghos Nubar as the head of the Armenian National Delegation indicate that the Armenians were not content with the provisions and leaving to the Ottomans parts of Cilicia, which they regarded as their "national home."⁶² Yet, the same articles, together with the rest of the treaty bringing military restrictions and the dismemberment of most Ottoman lands except for limited territory in Central Anatolia, turned the Sèvres Treaty into practically a death proclamation for the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, U.S. Secretary Hughes defined the Sèvres Treaty as: "Its terms were more severe than those of the European peace treaties, not only depriving Turks of vast territories but imposing on them an even greater measure of foreign control than had been the case before war."⁶³

The approval of the Sèvres Treaty by the Ottoman Delegation did not hold any political value at all for the Turkish nationalists, possessing full control of Turkey by then. In fact, the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies provided them the opportunity to base their resistance on the legal assurance of an elected assembly. The Grand National Assembly (GNA), adhering strictly to national sovereignty, convened in Ankara on April 23, 1920. The primary duty of the assembly, accepted by the entire body of chosen deputies, was to rescue the national frontiers under occupation. Chaired by Mustafa Kemal Paşa, the GNA

61 Uras, Esat, *Tarihçe Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, Istanbul: 1976- pp.660-61.

62 See Appendix 6,7.

63 Gordon, Leland James, *American Relations with...*, p 267.

immediately turned the Turkish guerilla forces into a regular army and launched an organized independence war. Needless to say, all commitments of the Istanbul government were regarded as null and void. The geographically unclear Armenian Republic, formally recognized by the Ottoman government, was immediately challenged by the nationalists, and by the beginning of December, 1919 Turkish forces secured the Turkey-Armenia frontier with the Gümrü (Alexandropol) Treaty, which was the first international treaty that the GNA signed. To the Armenians' dismay, this treaty, eliminating the western front for the Turkish nationalists, confirmed for the Allies that Serves Treaty was stillborn. Their attempts to modify this defunct treaty in order to reach a compromise with the GNA was the revelation of solitude awaiting the Armenians at the forthcoming peace conference.

THE DESERTED ARMENIANS

This was not the first time the Armenians confronted the deploring reality of betrayal. From the emergence of the Armenian Question, "they had been used to promote western purposes only to be heartlessly cast aside when the purposes had been accomplished."⁶⁴ The statesmen of the great powers often refrained from fulfilling their commitments to the Armenians when the conditions ripened for display. In fact, the initial broken promise could be traced back to the Berlin Treaty of 1878 after which the great powers assured the Armenians of providing the application of reforms the treaty promised. Yet the Armenians only observed their leniency once England acquired the right to invade Cyprus in return for supporting the Ottomans against Russia.⁶⁵

Another example from the later years involves America's attitude following the 1894-95 incidents in Samsun, which actually started a few years before, when Armenians, provoked by Armenian revolutionaries formed bands armed with native guns, raided villages, and incidences increased with Turkish retaliation to the point of bringing military forces to the area. While the climbing incidences gradually wiped away the remaining harmony between the Turks and Armenians, continuing violence and increasing casualties from both sides invited the intervention of Big Powers and⁶⁶ the Armenian issue was brought to the U.S. Senate for the first time. Americans were already informed about the conflicts through the exaggerated reports and mostly misleading correspondence of the American missionaries. In spite of the popular wish, the missionaries' commitments, and requests made by both houses of the U.S. Congress, President Cleveland declined to even protest to the Ottoman government, let alone send an investigation committee to the area.⁶⁷

Yet still another demonstration of how Armenians were let down by the great powers involves the 1915 relocation. At the start of a new replacement following

64 Gidney, James B. *A Mandate for Armenia...*, p.75.

65 Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Tarihi...*, p. 72.

66 Gürün, Kamuran, *Ermeni Dosyası...*,p. 112; see also: Sonyel, Salahi, *The Ottoman Armenians*, London: 1987, pp. 118-159.

67 Gidney James, *A Mandate for Armenia...*, p.208.

that of the May migration, Wangenheim, the German Ambassador to Istanbul had suggested to the U.S. Ambassador that some of the Armenians ought to be moved to the United States.⁶⁸ However, Ambassador Henry Morgenthau's proposal to provide "the wholesale emigration of Armenians to the United States....to prevent further bloodshed" was declared impractical⁶⁹ and was vetoed by the Department of State, although the Ottoman Interior Minister Talat Paşa gave "permission for the departure of all Armenians whose emigration Morgenthau could vouch for as *bona fide*."⁷⁰

It should also be recalled that the secret treaties the Allies concluded during the war years, sharing the fertile and oil-rich Ottoman lands, were observed not to contain any area reserved for Armenians when the Bolsheviks revealed them to the world after the Russian Revolution.⁷¹

It is difficult to determine how sincere British Premier Lloyd George, author of the below lines, was at the time he wrote these words, for the name of Armenia did not even appear on the list of the nations admitted to the Paris Peace Conference:

From the movement war was declared, there was not a British statesman of any party who did not have in mind that if we succeeded in defeating this inhuman Empire, one essential condition of the peace we should impose was the redemption of the Armenian valleys [should be *vilayets*] forever from the bloody misrule with which they had been stained by the infamities of the Turk.⁷²

Pertaining to the same matter, Armenian belligerency to the Turks was debated so intensely by the Allies that Boghos Nubar had to submit a protesting declaration reminding them of the Armenian contributions during the war:

..... Our sorrow and our disappointment are beyond expression. ...Armenians naturally expected their demand for admission to the Peace Conference to be conceded, after all they have done for the common cause....ever since the beginning of the war the Armenians fought by the side of the Allies on all fronts. Adding our losses in the fields to greater losses through massacres and deportations... Armenia's tribute to death is thus undoubtedly heavier in proportion than that of any other belligerent nation. For the Armenians have been belligerent de facto since they indignantly refused to side with Turkey.⁷³

68 Morgenthau, Henry, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*..., p. 374.

69 Gordon, *Leland James*, PhD, *American Relations with...*, p.27.

70 Ahmet Vefa, *The Truth About Armenians*, Ankara: 1975, p. 25, from *The New York Times*, October 2, 1915 *Decimal File*, 867.4016/117 *Morgenthau to Secretary of State*, Sept. 3, 1915.

71 Kurat, Yuluğ Tekin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Paylaşılması...*, p.13.

72 Gidney, James B., *A Mandate for Armenia*..., p. 74, from David Lloyd George, *The Truth About Peace Treaties 2 vols*, London: 1938.

73 *Armenian Allegations: Myth and Reality A Handbook of Facts and Documents*, Washington D.C.:1986 p17., *The Times of London*, January 30, 1919, see also Appendix 6.

To add to the humiliation they suffered during the Paris Peace Conference, the repeated requests from the Armenian delegation, expecting to receive exceptional treatment, for a brief meeting with Lord Curzon were repeatedly turned down by the Lord, with the excuse that he did not accept any of the delegations.

The January 5 1918 explanation from the British Premier for his country's war aims, which included the assertion also mentioned above, that Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria were "entitled to a recognition of their separate national condition"⁷⁴ was overlooked as far as Armenia was concerned, and it was not validated while final peace terms were being determined.

The actual betrayal the Armenians confronted came with the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty.

ARMENIANS' CONTINUING ANTICIPATIONS FROM THE GREAT POWERS

On November 20, 1922, the Peace Conference met at Lausanne to revise the defunct Sèvres Treaty. The Allies had made two vain attempts in the springs of 1921 and 1922 to modify the rejected treaty. It was the conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence which compelled the Allies to hold a conference at Lausanne with the victorious Turks to determine the terms of the new peace treaty to replace the Sèvres Treaty. The Ottoman Empire had collapsed before the conference opened. The invitation extended to the Ottoman representatives to attend the conference became the excuse for the Ankara Assembly to take the decision of ending Ottoman rule. Separated from the caliphate, the sultanate was abolished by the Turkish Parliament on November 1, 1922. The decision to end the Ottoman Empire left the former sultan only as the caliph; the Turkish Parliament appointed Abdülmecit Efendi to this position following the plight of Sultan Vahdettin, the last Ottoman sultan. The dual system of governance of the past two years having ended, the Turkish Delegation appeared at Lausanne as the sole representative of Turkey.

Among all the complicated matters such as the defining of Turkey's boundaries, the Straits, capitulations, Ottoman debts, etc., the Armenian Question was scheduled to be taken up within the discussions of the Minorities Session. Relevant to Armenian territorial requests, Armenian representatives were persistent that an Armenian "national home" be highlighted as the theme of the discussion. The term "national home" was carefully selected by the Allies to distinguish the prospective Armenian settlement to be established on Turkish territory, for expanding Russian Armenia would mean strengthening the Bolshevik state they found formidable.⁷⁵ Whatever the theme of the discussion may be, in regard to the commitments made to Armenians, the issue closely concerned each of the Allied powers. Yet, in relevance to strong ties acquired

74 Kurat Yuluğ Tekin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Paylaşılması...*, p.17 from D.Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, New Heaven 1928 VI, p.152, Hovannisian, Richard G. "The Allies and ...",p.148.

75 Khatissian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference and the Two Armenian Delegations", *The Armenian Review* V.XIV, No.3-55, Sept. 1961, p.6.

through the aforementioned missionary installations and the mandate issue, U.S. involvement with the Armenians rewarded the others.

The U.S., similar to the previous peace conferences pertaining to the Turks, did not have official participants at the Lausanne Conference. Armenophiles and key figures of the Armenia-America Society did not find this agreeable. Months before the conference, they argued that settlements concerning American interests were not only moral obligations to the Armenians but involved U.S. interests and should not be made without official U.S. representatives. President Smith and Secretary Montgomery attempted in vain to garner the support of the U.S. President in writing him a letter with the following lines, pointing out the economic advantages of participation at the peace conference as a signatory power:

America's commercial and philanthropic investments and their probable developments in Turkey are of such a character and of such importance, as to give by themselves a warrant for America's taking official part in the Near East settlement. Our interest is second to those of no other power.⁷⁶

Washington remained unresponsive to this appeal. Unable to accomplish what they thought they could, even before the peace conference had started, the Armenophiles and members of the Armenia-America Society started to notice that the idealism the Americans, in general, had espoused concerning the Armenian issue until the end of the War was being replaced by materialistic feelings. Nevertheless, the conference was not left unattended. Richard Washburn Child, Joseph Grew and Admiral Bristol attended as U.S. government observers. The Armenia-America Society representatives, Dr. Barton, the President of Near East Relief, and Dr. George Redlington Montgomery, the Director of the Armenia-America Society, as well as the representative of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America were at Lausanne as representatives of the church and charitable organizations. Their primary concern was to provide the fulfillment of the provisions concerning the Armenians. Dr. Montgomery, the spokesman of the latter group, was in charge of the project for creating a reservation for Armenians within the surroundings of Cilicia (Osmaniye). He regarded Cilicia as a region Armenians would readily go to although he was aware that the British support he expected would not work without the consent of the Turks. Yet, he was convinced that the legal status of this region was such that settling the Armenians there "... may be discussed without trampling upon the nationalistic demands of the Turks."⁷⁷ To the dismay of the American philanthropists, the French and Italians did not comply with his plan. Moreover, the American observers Grew and Child, noting the Turkish opposition, also refrained from supporting it.⁷⁸

76 Bryson, Thomas, *The Armenia-America Society...*, p.98.

77 *New York Times*, 18 Nov, 1922.

78 Bryson, Thomas, *The Armenia-America Society...*, p.100.

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE AND THE LOSS OF ARMENIAN HOPES

The Armenian case was pursued by two different Armenian delegations at the Lausanne Peace Conference. The Independent Republic of Armenia was headed by the President of the Armenian National Council, a literary man and a poet, Avetis Aharonian. Accompanying him were two delegates, Alexander Khatissian, who became the second prime minister of the Republic of Armenia and Vahan Papazian, (doctor) a leading revolutionary who was also the chief representatives of revolutionary committees in Van, known more as an organizer rather than a fighter.⁷⁹ Boghos Nubar Paşa, the son of the former Prime Minister of Egypt, represented the Armenians of Turkey as the head of the Armenian National Delegation.⁸⁰ At the start of the Lausanne Conference, members of both Armenian delegations, which later were brought together under Boghos Nubar's presidency to form an "All Armenia Delegation" (*delegation de l'Armenie Integrale*)⁸¹ toured Paris, London, Berlin and Moscow to explain their case and acquire supporters. To press the case, Armenian communities all over the world were instructed meanwhile to bombard the conference with inquiry wires seeking a solution.⁸² Propaganda tours as well as wires from Armenian communities pouring into Lausanne raised the hopes of Armenian representatives in attending their related sessions believing that they were adequately supported in their goal.

Following their arrival in Lausanne, Armenian representatives this time pursued personal contacts with the key figures of the countries attending the conference. They felt confident about having the sympathy of the French, especially after conversing with Barrare and Bompard. Both French delegates had promised to speak to Lord Curzon to ensure that the Armenian "national home" issue was placed on the agenda. It was a fact that the French had rejected the proposal suggesting Cilicia for the "national home" and repeated their rejection even to Curzon, but their opposition was to the vicinity, not to the concept. On the other hand, to leave this autonomous "national home" under Turkish protectorate was a frequent suggestion, undoubtedly made with the anticipation of obtaining Turkish approval. However, they knew that sustaining the idea was initially subjected to the consent of the Turks, repeatedly refusing to make any sacrifices from the frontiers they outlined in the National Pact. The Turks, with the awareness that every autonomy ended with independence, were not sympathetic to an autonomous Armenian "national home" within Turkish frontiers. Accordingly, on December 4, underlining that "Turks have not made a single concession" so far on any matter discussed, Barrare suggested that in order not to raise so much noise in Ankara, the case should not be placed under the "Territorial" category, but under the one of the "Minorities."⁸³

In the coming days, Armenian representatives continued applying to other Allied delegations to explain their anticipations. On December 6, Noradongian and

79 Sonyel, Salahi, *The Ottoman Armenians*...p. 257.

80 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference and the Two Armenian Delegations", *The Armenian Review*, V.14, N.3-35, Catholic Historical Society, 82, June 1971, p.100.

81 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference ...Autumn-Sept.1961....", p.3.

82 Gidney James B. *A Mandate for Armenia*..., p. 85.

83 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference... Autumn-Sept.1961....", p.4.

Aharonian met with the Italian representative Garoni, recognized as a Turcophile, and were assured of the Italian support for the Armenian case. However, Garoni was not promising in taking any initiatives and noted that since the Armenians had worked on behalf of England during the war, the British should have the first say on the matter. His conviction was that best solution could be obtained by negotiating with the Turks directly.⁸⁴

In resorting to the British, the letter Naradoungian received from Harold Buxton voicing their point of view was too conditional rather than encouraging. Buxton did confirm that the British government was going to defend an Armenian "national home," but indicated that the degree of this support depended on the extent France, Italy and particularly America supported the case. He also specified that there was no certainty on Lord Curzon winning over the Turks since they received each and every proposal thus far made belligerently. He, like Garoni, advised the Armenians to make their own efforts to resolve relations with the Turks in order to facilitate the handling of the question. Meanwhile, the delegates received an indirect but an inspiring message regarding the placing of "national home" on the agenda. It was an explanation, which came from Harold Nicholson, Lord Curzon's secretary, that Lord Curzon had originally set the "Armenian home in Cilicia" on the conference agenda before the opening, but it was left suspended when he encountered a heavy French opposition. The delegates' spirits were further raised when they learned that the new premier Bonar Law's policy on the conference and the Armenian issue differed from Lloyd George's system of personal interference in foreign affairs, and that Curzon still was completely authorized and fully supported by the new government.⁸⁵

Although the Armenian delegates expected and relied upon Russia's support, they were exposed to silence both from Yerevan and Moscow. However, they received word from Chicherin that he defended the "United Armenia" thesis of joining the Russian Armenia with the prospective Armenian state in Turkish territories. Yet, he, too, specified that he did not think a compromise could easily be reached with the Turks, for Armenians had gone too far in fighting against them and serving as a tool of the Allies.⁸⁶

Armenian representatives regarded the American delegates at Lausanne as perfectly reliable. Whether government officials or representatives of church and charity organizations, they were at Lausanne only as observers, but this did not decrease their credibility. They were extremely influential particularly among the Armenians and were often consulted before and during the conference. During the conference, Armenian delegates were under the impression that the Americans were constantly in touch with and were instructed by their government to defend the project of an Armenian "national home" made up of several Turkish provinces.⁸⁷ This prejudice, which continued until the end of the discussions, even led them to believe that the confirming statement Child made

84 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference... Autumn-Sept. 1961...", p.6.

85 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference... Autumn-Sept. 1961...", p.8.

86 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference... Autumn-Sept. 1961...", p.9.

87 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference... Autumn-Sept. 1961...", p.9.

on December 30 assuring the delegation and the British High Commissioner Rumbold of American support for the “national home” was one of the kind. It was clarified in the course of time, however, that this assertion was not true and that Child acted on his own initiative based on general instructions which included the defense of minorities and free travel in Turkey.⁸⁸ Such a conviction served to store American reliance among the Armenians. The delegates must have felt the same confidence when Admiral Bristol related to Khatissian, upon the latter’s visit, his opinion on the improbability of the Armenians and the Turks continuing to live side by side and that they ought to be separated by a “national home.” During the same visit, Admiral Bristol explained that the Turks were reluctant to concede their land and also were concerned that Armenians could become a tool for Russia. Admiral Bristol did not think the Turks, British and French regarded Cilicia as suitable vicinity for the creation of a “national home,” but promised to recommend the Turks conciliation as he advised the Armenian Delegation to make its own attempt for negotiations.⁸⁹

Confronting all the above views of the different states were the Turks. The head of the Turkish Delegation, İsmet Paşa, was instructed to decline this expected proposal before his departure from Ankara. His firm rejection continued throughout the interviews and the discussions in the subcommittee. Declining an interview with the Armenian Delegation, İsmet, through a member of the Turkish Delegation, summarized the Turkish opinion, which remained unchanged until the end of the conference. This was not more than expressing that Turks had already signed an agreement settling frontier disputes with the Armenian Republic and territorially, and there was nothing to add to this. What the spokesman had specified was that Armenians within the Turkish frontiers were Turkish subjects, possessing equal rights with the rest of the Turks and naturally were free to live wherever they desired in Turkey, so there was no longer the need for a “national home.” He pointed out that the Turkish delegation also represented the Armenians in Turkey, so no other Armenian Delegation than that of the Armenian Republic was recognized by the Turkish Delegation.⁹⁰

The efforts of the Armenian delegates, holding the interviews soon bore fruit: Before they all assembled at Lausanne, for the first time, acknowledgment of the *de jure* independence of Armenia was communicated to them by the English and French Foreign Ministers, Lord Curzon and Poincare. Furthermore, the Armenian case, focusing on an Armenian “homeland,” was placed on the conference agenda, to be brought up on December 11 in the Minorities Session, and the delegations were promised a hearing, if found necessary.

When the Lausanne Conference commenced, there was the general conviction that persuading the Turks to negotiate would not be too time consuming. Alexander Khatisian in his diary noted, “It seems the conference will take a long time, at least one month.”⁹¹ Lord Curzon expected to conclude the treaty in a few weeks and be at home before Christmas. However, very soon after the

88 Khatsian, Alexander, “The Lausanne Conference...”, p.5.

89 Khatsian, Alexander, “The Lausanne Conference...”, p. 54.

90 Khatsian, Alexander, “The Lausanne Conference...”, pp.6-9.

91 Khatsian, Alexander, “The Lausanne Conference...”, p.10.

conference started, all participants became convinced that the provisions of the Sevres Treaty or any similar document would not even be debated by the Kemalists unless the Turks were recognized to have full independence and territorial integrity. It was obvious that the creation of an Armenian “national home” was going to be one of the determining issues pertaining to Turkish territorial demands. Nevertheless, in the early days of the conference, there was general optimism toward meeting this request of the Armenians. However, possibly due to the understanding reached through lengthy discussions concerning the mandate issue, U.S. state officials did not share this feeling. On December 9, only three days before the Minorities Issue came before the conference, Secretary Hughes expressed in a message he sent to Senator Lodge that “no Turkish territory could in any probability be obtained for this purpose without an intervention by force of arms on the part of some power and the maintenance by force of any territory which might thus be obtained.” This point of view was not applicable to philanthropist American representatives, who later accused the officials’ opinion as “trading Armenian rights for commercial concessions from the Turks.”⁹²

On December 12, Lord Curzon addressed the Minorities Commission and pointed out that Soviet Armenia was already overcrowded with 1,250,000 Armenians, mostly refugees, and could not hold anymore. Pointing out that on the other hand, the six Anatolian provinces were almost completely stripped of their Armenian population, he noted that the Armenians of Cilicia joined the French when they evacuated the area. He continued his speech with the warning that Turkey was under the obligation of reserving a territory somewhere within the Turkish frontiers to serve as an Armenian “national homeland,” whether it be within the northern provinces or in the south, anywhere from Cilicia to the Syrian border.

Lord Curzon’s speech, followed by those of the Allied representatives’ and Child’s remarks was criticized by the Armenians (as well as Montgomery, Pitt and Barton) for not using the word “home” but “region.”⁹³ His promises for financial support from individual sources rather than the government also disturbed the Armenians, forgetting that he was not an official representative, therefore was not even entitled to make such a commitment.

The next day (December 13) İsmet Paşa, this time officially, indicated that the Armenians in Turkey possessed full equality with the Turks and were not deprived of any rights or subjected to any provisions restricting their security and prosperity.⁹⁴ Two days later, a subcommittee was organized to handle the Armenian issue, under Mondania, Italian Ambassador to Greece, including Laroche to represent France, Sir Horace Rumbold for England and Dr. Rıza Nur for Turkey. On the same day, Lord Curzon sent word to Noradungian that the Armenian case occupied his special attention and that he had addressed the Turks “with a powerful and threatening speech” telling them he would extend

92 Khatsian, Alexander, “The Lausanne Conference...”, p.4.

93 Bryson T. *The Armenia-America Society...*, pp.101-102.

94 Khatsian, Alexander, “The Lausanne Conference...”, p. 62.

support for Turkish loans if they supported an Armenian “national home.” In return, he expected the Armenians to accept Turkish suzerainty.⁹⁵

The session aimed to suit Armenian wishes, however, as discussions continued, it became more apparent that the Allies still were the supporters of the Armenians, but they were not willing to sacrifice anything or declare war for their cause. The subcommittee had scheduled to take up the question of an Armenian “national home” again on December 16 and 18. Meanwhile, the Armenian representatives, anticipating to persuade the Turks to compromise, intensified their approaches with members of different countries. During the interviews, clouds of despair slowly started to shroud the delegates, accustomed to elaborated commitments of the great powers. Nothing concrete developed through the talks reflecting sentiments. Perhaps the only realistic comment came from Venizelos, who on December 16 asserted that both the Armenian and Greek cases were political defeats. Complaining that they were both completely abandoned by the Allies, Venizelos advised Khatisian to choose one of the three possibilities he listed, which were to 1) strengthen Russian Armenia, which appeared to be the only hope for the Armenians; 2) pursue efforts in America to secure the continuation of financial, moral and political aid; 3) continue negotiations to keep the Armenian cause politically alive in London and Paris to be ready to take advantage of every probability while not relying on papers but on facts and keeping close ties with friends, “foremost among which, do not forget, to reserve a place to Greece.”⁹⁶

This meeting represented the striking collaboration against Turkey by the two nations, once subjects of the Ottoman Empire, which were both exploited by the great powers, turned into archenemies of the Turks, played prominent roles in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and were stranded alone at the end of the long war which cost them blood and prestige, all lost only to satisfy the ambitions of the Allies.

Meanwhile, twice declined by Chicherin, Noradongian was received by two other Bolsheviks, Rakowski and Midwani, and then by Barrere while Aharonian spoke with Mondania and Adamski, the Secretary of the Russian Delegation and later, with Grew and Nicholson, only to hear the same supportive but ambiguous words the others had uttered. None brought any positive results but the talks made them understand that none of the states involved was prepared to resort to arms for their sake. Aharonian even talked with İsmet Paşa and with the Swiss Professor Pittarde, there as an advisor. For a while, devising a resolution under the term “neutral zone” was brought up in order to pass the case while preserving Turkey’s territorial integrity as embodied in the Turkish National Pact. Turkish representatives stood firm against all proposals to replace an Armenian “national home,” more so a neutral zone, which, disregarding the principles of the National Pact, sought territorial concession from Turkey. Nevertheless different delegations the Armenian representatives conversed with on the following days again to no avail continued to assure them that the treaty could not be signed unless the Armenian Question was solved.⁹⁷

95 Seha Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Ankara: 1977 vol. I book I*, pp. 185.

96 Khatisian, Alexander, “The Lausanne Conference...”, pp. 55-59.

97 Khatisian, Alexander, “The Lausanne Conference...”, p.59.

Finally, on the evening of December 23, the Armenian Delegation received communication from the General Secretary of the Lausanne Conference that it would be given a hearing on the December 26 at 3:30 p.m. When the representatives met on the assigned day, Noradongian in 13 minutes presented the carefully prepared report. Next, Aharonian's 15 minute explanation of the historical background and political importance of Armenian claims, hopes, expectations, confidence in the Allies was also listened to with utmost attention. The questions posed by members of the subcommittee were clarified by comprehensive answers. Aharonian and Noradongian noted that their unison reflected the "sentiment and the mind of all Armenian people, regardless of party, origin or Armenian communities of the world."⁹⁸ To the Armenians' dismay, the prolonged discussions in the following days only served to wear out the Allies' approach to an Armenian "national home," as the Turkish Delegation repeatedly explained that the Turkish government was the actual representative of the Armenians in Turkey. Moreover, before the hearing on December 26, the Turkish Delegation notified the subcommittee that it would not sit through the presentation of a delegation Turkey refused to recognize.

The zeal over the issue had greatly declined by December 30, when Child, through a formal statement, conveyed the consent of the American Delegation to a "national home" and expressed that Armenians and Americans had been assured of its discussion at the conference. The statement concluded by asserting America's persistence although "Turks favor a practical solution of the question"⁹⁹ The Turkish Delegation asserted that America was not officially represented and protested this statement. Yet on the same day, Montgomery presented before the subcommittee the proposal he had designed for the creation of a "national home" in Cilicia. Despite multiple proposals, the subcommittee, quite aware of the Turkish opposition, refrained from even opening it to discussion.¹⁰⁰

The last meeting of the subcommittee on the Minorities Issue was held on January 06 when Mondania and Rumbold spoke consecutively to reflect positive views of their delegations on the establishment of a "national home" for the Armenians. The following speaker scheduled was the French delegate, but when he had the floor, Dr. Rıza Nur blocked him, as he reminded him that the Turkish Delegation, up to that point, listened to the presentations of countries under moral obligations to the Armenians, but refused to hear the presentation of the country that armed the Armenians and used them as political weapons against Turks. The Turkish Delegation left the session in protest after Dr. Nur's words. This was interpreted as a "scandal" by the American representatives as Grew noted in his diary that Curzon, Barrere and Mondania each confessed to him his conviction was that the establishment of a "national home" for the Armenians was no longer feasible.¹⁰¹ However, Dr. Nur's protest served to focus the meetings of the next two days on the reality that Turks would never agree to the

98 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference....",p. 55-56.

99 Khatsian, Alexander, "The Lausanne Conference....",p. 61.

100 Gordon, Leland James, *PhD, American Relations....*, p.33.

101 Bryson Thomas.,*The Armenia-America Society....*, p.100.

establishment of a “national home” or even its appearance on the treaty. Accordingly, all written material concerning the establishment of a “national home” for the Armenians was sent to the First Commission by Mondania on January 8, 1923.¹⁰²

CONCLUSION

The Armenian Question was not brought up during discussions after January 9, when Curzon touched upon it very briefly. Great Britain and the U.S. agreed on many matters from the capitulations to minorities, but could not reach a compromise on economic rights due to their clashing interests for oil. This constituted one of the major causes which brought an interim to the conference on February 04. Armenophiles during this interim until April 23, announced publicly that the treaty should not be signed unless it contained a definite solution for the Armenian issue.¹⁰³ However, they were aware that all they had at hand as a concrete development, since the earliest days of the problem starting with the false stimulations of the Armenian Revolutionary Committees and continuing with the pre-war, war and post-war promises of the great powers, was the Soviet Armenian Republic. Hovannes Katchaznoui, the first Prime Minister of the Independent Armenian Republic in the 1923 meeting of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutioun) finally expressed his conviction as follows:

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation has nothing to do anymore....It has only one more thing to do, a supreme duty to the Armenian cause, and to its own existence...it must end its existence. Our party has lost its *raison d'être* – reason of existence and this is the bitter truth.¹⁰⁴

This statement fortified the assertions of the Turkish Delegation throughout the subsequent discussions and when the Armenians, as well as other minority groups in Turkey, were placed under the supervision of the League of Nations. It was at that point that Forbes Adams from the British Delegation confessed that “it is quite useless to raise the question of Armenians in Turkey territorially.” Consequently, Rumbold’s remarks on the sufficiency of discussions on Minorities Issue and suggestion to end the session gained acceptance.¹⁰⁵

Not a word about the Armenian “national home” appeared in the articles of the peace treaty signed on July 24, 1923. The Lausanne Treaty, with an additional protocol provided for the Armenians not within the Turkish frontiers at the time of the treaty, the right to return to Turkey as Turkish citizens in the following two years, but it did not include anything pertaining to a Armenian “national home.”¹⁰⁶ This was an unrepairable disappointment for the Armenians and particularly for the Armenophiles of America. *The New York Times* in evaluating the Lausanne

102 Gürün, Kamuran, *Ermeni Dosyası...*, p. 302.

103 Khatsian, Alexander, *The Lausanne Conference...*, p.54.

104 *Bryson Thomas*, *The Armenia-America Society...*, p.101.

105 *Şimşir, Bilal*, *Armenians In the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, (1912-1926)*, *Istanbul:1984*, p. 79, from *The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutioun) Has Nothing to do Any More, New York, 1955*

Treaty in September remarked that the treaty was concluded “as if the Armenians did not exist at all.”¹⁰⁷

Americans, as observers to the Lausanne Conference were not in the position to sign the treaty. Hence, a separate document, the Turkish-American Treaty of Lausanne was signed a fortnight later on August 6. The failure in keeping the commitments to the Armenians did not raise as much opposition in Europe as it did in the United States. Following the Lausanne Treaty, some critics voiced that an Armenian “national home” was cast aside for valuable oil concessions.¹⁰⁸ This stirred up American public opinion. Grew, as one of the observers, felt the obligation to explain that the project failed due to the insurmountable opposition of the Turkish government. He tried to justify the unsatisfactory conclusion by explaining that, “No effort was left unmade, no argument left unused, but the powers represented at Lausanne were obliged to deal with the facts.”¹⁰⁹ On November 19, a “Memorandum Against Ratification by the Senate of the Lausanne Treaty” was issued by the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia and was signed by many prominent Americans such as Governor A. Smith of New York, Josephus Daniels, Walter George Smith, Herbert Croley of *The New Republic*, Bishop Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of Catholic University, and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. The signatories of this memorandum attributed their opposition primarily to their conviction that the U.S. government had traded Armenian rights for commercial concessions from the Turkish government and failed to obtain for Armenians a “national home.” Accordingly, Secretary Hughes voiced his conviction when he wrote to Senator Lodge that no Turkish property for this purpose could have been obtained without an armed intervention. Several years after the Lausanne Conference, Hughes, reflecting the awareness that this could not have materialized only by popular support, wrote:

..contrary to an impression which is somewhat widespread in this country, this government, while it has always exerted its influence in a humanitarian way, has not assumed political obligation with respect to the Armenians or other Christian minorities in the Near East. Treaties concluded by other powers undertook, however, to deal with such questions.¹¹⁰

The Turkish Parliament declared the republic shortly after the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference. The announcement of the new Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923 thoroughly discarded even the feeblest traces of the Ottoman administration from the horizons of this new state. The Lausanne Treaty was the official recognition of the new Turkish state by the world. None of the participants seemed to have understood or admitted this at the beginning of the conference. For example, Khatissian had noted that Turks had to be made to understand that conquering the Greeks was not conquering the Allies.¹¹¹ Yet, the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference and the treaty signed nullified all such convictions, as it underlined the closing of the Armenian Question for all signatories.

106 *Şimşir, Bilal*, Armenians In the Ottoman Empire ...,p.80.

107 *Seha Meray*, *Lozan Barış Konferansı?Ek protokol...* p. 14.

108 *New York Times*, 12 September, 1924.

109 *Bryson Thomas*, *The Armenia-America Society...*, p.101.

110 *Gordon, Leland James*, *American Relations with ...*,p.32.

111 *Khatsian, Alexander*, The Lausanne Conference and the Two Armenian Delegations, *The Armenian Review*, part I, p.5.

APPENDIX 1

ABCFM
Unit 5 Vol 6
Reel 504

February 5, 1916

The Reverend James L. Barton
14 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts

Sir:

There is herewith enclosed to you a paraphrase of a telegram from the American Ambassador at Constantinople, dated January 26th, communicating a message which the Armenian Patriarch requests be delivered to the Armenians in the United States, concerning the steps to be taken by them to most efficiently aid the Armenians in Turkey.

Your obedient servant,
For the Secretary of State
Second Assistant Secretary

(next page)

“The American Ambassador in Turkey, in a telegram dated January 26, 1916, states that the Armenian Patriarch requests that the following be communicated to the Armenians in the United States.

“First. They should contribute as generously as possible to the relief funds to be distributed through missionaries, and also to funds to be distributed through the Patriarchate and the Armenian people. Funds can be transmitted to the Patriarchate through the American Embassy at Constantinople.

“Second. Armenians in other countries should obtain from public utterances and demonstrations of a character calculated to jeopardize the safety and lives of Armenians in Turkey.

“Third. Armenians throughout the world should continue at all times to appeal to the humanitarian feelings of the allies of Turkey and of neutrals to aid in keeping alive the Armenians in Turkey until the arrival of normal times once more.”

APPENDIX 2

ABCFM
Unit 5 Vol. V
Reel 506

(TRANSLATION)

Sublime Porte
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
No. 80136/90

March 29, 1916

Note Verbale

The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had the honor of receiving the note verbale which the Embassy of the United States of America was pleased to address to it on November 24, 1915, relative to the American missionaries Rev. Alpheus N. Andrus, Dr. Thom, and Miss Agnes Fenega, who were established at Mardin.

The Department of the Interior, to such a request for information in this connection was made, states in reply that these missionaries had direct relations with the Armenian Revolutionary Committee and the rebels of Madiat, and that the money and effects seized by the local authorities did not belong to them but some Armenians. These sums of money are at present deposited in the public treasury and the effects are cared for by the commission constituted for the purpose, to settle the property left by the Armenians.

As to the valuables and other objects belonging to these missionaries, they were delivered by the said imperial authorities to their representative or attorney, and no damage has been done to their real property.

These Americans traveled freely as far as Sivas, without being the object of any bad treatment by the Imperial authorities, who, on the contrary, even allowed them to stop for several days where they wished to do so.

Consequently, in view of the relations with the said missionaries carried on with the Armenian Revolutionary Committees, the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs regrets to be unable to comply with the request which formed the purpose of the said verbale.

To the Embassy of the United States of America

ABCFM
Unit 5 Vol:V
Reel 506

“By its note of April 18th, this Embassy informed the Sublime Porte that it could not allow such an allegation to pass unchallenged, and that therefore it is requested that any substantial evidence in the hands of the Ottoman authorities be furnished to it. In its reply dated March 13th, the Foreign Office merely states that the local authorities had established beyond all doubt the connection between these missionaries and the Armenian revolutionaries.

The Embassy is in receipt of a telegram from Sivas stating that Mr. Andrus, Miss Fenenga, as well as all the American Missionaries at Sivas except Miss Graffam and Miss Fowle, started from that place for Constantinople on 13th instant. This action is doubtless due to the taking over of the American Mission buildings at Sivas for hospital purposes which was reported in my telegram No. 1800 of May 12th.

With respect to the American Missionaries who remain at Mardin, I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 1790 of May 8th. In view of the difficulties of travel at the present time, and the delicate state of health of Mrs. Andrus, these missionaries do not seem to wish to leave their station at present. On April 27th the Consul at Aleppo was telegraphically instructed to keep in close touch with these ladies, and in case of need to send a canvass to bring them to Aleppo. No reply has yet been received from Mr. Jackson.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

Enclosures
Embassy to Porte April 18, 1916
Porte to Embassy May 13, 1916

(signed) Hoffman Philip

ABCFM
Unit 6 Vol:VI
Reel 506

No. 1386
Note Verbale

April 18, 1916

The Embassy of the United States of America has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Note Verbale of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated March 29, 1916, No. No.80136/90, relative to the case of three American missionaries who were compelled to leave Mardin and proceed to Sivas, and to state in reply that the contents thereof have been communicated to its Government.

This Embassy cannot, however, allow to pass unchallenged the allegation contained in the said note verbale to the effect that these three American citizens were carrying on direct relations with the Armenian Revolutionary Committee and the rebels at Madiat. That these three Americans should have been engaged, even indirectly, in any undertaking inimical to the imperial Ottoman Government or tending to disturb local peace and order, this Embassy cannot readily believe, and it therefore requests the Imperial Ministry to furnish it with any substantial evidence to such effect which may have been submitted to the Sublime Porte by the local authorities.

To Thsde Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sublime Porte

ABCFM
Unit 5 vol:V
Reel 506

“The Foreign Office states that the Ministry of the Interior has informed it that these three Americans carried on direct relations with the Armenian Revolutionary Committee and with the rebels at Madiat, and that the money and valuables seized by the local authorities (see the latter part of this Embassy’s note verbale No. 923 of November 24, 1915) belonged to certain Armenians and not to the missionaries.

As to the valuables and other effects of these three missionaries, the local authorities are stated to have delivered these articles to the duly authorized representative of the mission, and it is added that no damage has been done to their real estate.

The notes concludes with the statement that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regrets that it is unable to comply with the request of this Embassy that the two remaining missionaries be allowed to return from Sivas to Mardin. I have discussed this matter with Mr. W W. Peet, who, while utterly repudiating the charges of the Ottoman authorities, joins me in the opinion that it will be best for the remaining American missionaries, five women, who are still at Mardin, to come to Constantinople, and to have Mr. Andrus and Miss Fenenga join them at some place on the railway line most easily attainable from Sivas, and come here with them. A telegram to this effect has been sent to Mardin, with a request for a telegraphic reply as to when these five ladies will be able to start.

The substance of the enclosed note and of the decision of Mr. Peet and the Embassy is being communicated to the Department by telegram.”

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE ARMENIAN ISSUE

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Abstract: *In this paper, the Turkish-American relationship is studied in light of the Armenian “genocide” claims. Furthermore, how the relations between Turkey and Armenia will be shaped under the Caucasus and the Middle East policies of the U.S. and Russia is explored. In this context, whether or not the Obama administration will ratify the Armenian “genocide” bill is discussed .*

Key Words: *Armenian Issue, Turkey, the USA, relations of the two states, Karabakh.*

INTRODUCTION

Though Americans became acquainted with Turks in the late 18th century, the first official treaty between the U.S. and the Ottoman state was signed in 1830, which was based primarily on trade relations. Around this time, the first American missionaries began to arrive in the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the 19th century, Ottoman-American relations were relatively smooth, continuing in this manner through the early 20th century as a result of America not declaring war on the Ottoman state during World War I.¹ This cordial atmosphere allowed American diplomats and missionaries to write reports and carry out neutral, objective observation studies during the war. However, wide press coverage in the U.S. regarding the tragic incidents of oppression against Armenian rebels around 1915 gave place to a pro-Armenian/anti-Turkish public opinion in the U.S. Disturbed by numerous biased reports that emerged from European circles, U.S. President Wilson dispatched General Harbord to Eastern Anatolia in 1919 just as the Turkish national movement was getting underway. Harbord’s meticulously objective report,² which states that Armenians and Turks alike died in large numbers during that period’s regional conflict, is stored in the National Archives in Washington D.C.

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS BETWEEN 1923-2008

After the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Republic of Turkey, the initial stages of Turkish-American relations proceeded with the U.S.

1 L. James Gordon, *American Relations With Turkey 1890-1930*, London: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932, pp. 191-266.

2 Nurşen Mazıcı, *Amerika’nın G.Kafkasya Politikası Olarak Ermenistan Sorunu 1919-1921*, İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2005, pp. 55-61.

participating to the Lausanne Conference as observer. The U.S. Senate vetoed the Lausanne Treaty, partly due to the lobby pressure of the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S., creating the first political challenge between the two countries. However, as a result of American business interests, including the New York Chamber of Commerce, and the skillful diplomacy of High Commissioner Admiral Mark. L. Bristol, followed by the first U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Joseph C. Grew, the bilateral Friendship and Trade Agreement, ratified in 1927, served to restore relations between the two nations.³

Turkish-American relations began to focus upon the military platform after World War II, with the Truman Doctrine and then the Marshall Plan aid starting in 1947, Turkey dispatching troops to Korea to fight alongside American soldiers, and Turkey becoming a member of NATO in 1952.

However, in 1964, Turkish-American relations again were strained, this time over the Cyprus issue. When Greek Cypriots attempted to purge the island of Turks, the latter responded with a military intervention on Cyprus, basing their actions on Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee signed by Turkey, Greece and England. As a consequence of the Turkish intervention, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü a letter on June 2, 1964, which stated, "If Turkey makes a move requiring Soviet interference, the rest of NATO will not protect her."⁴ This letter incident gave rise to significant anti-U.S. sentiment in Turkey, a reduction of American personnel in the country and the fostering of relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Subsequently, the U.S. backed down on its tough political stance, with tensions between the two countries, stabilizing in 1967.⁵

However, relations between the two countries reached a critical stage over the Cyprus Question again in 1974. On July 15 of that year, the island was taken over by a military *coup d'état* led by Nikos Sampson with the intent of annexing Cyprus to Greece. As Greek-Cypriots were carrying out a massacre of their Turkish counterparts, Turkey countered this time with a military intervention within the same Guarantor Treaty framework. The U.S. then initiated an arms embargo against Turkey. Turkey countered this move in abrogating the 1969 Defense and Cooperation Agreement whereby all American facilities in Turkey, excluding those belonging to NATO, were effectively closed. Though Turkey was close to being ejected from NATO in 1978, the U.S. lifted the arms embargo the same year, because the solution plan of UN General Secretary about Cyprus issue was accepted by the Turkish side of the island, but rejected by Greek part. Therefore, a subsequent realignment in relations between the two nations was afforded.⁶

Turkish-American relations passed fairly uneventfully during the 1980s and 1990s, with the exception of the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal switching off

3 John A. de Novo, *American Interest and Politics in the Middle East 1900-1939*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963, pp.237-272.

4 For the Johnson's letter see *Middle East Journal*, Vol : 20, No:3, Summer 1966, pp. 386-388.

5 William Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, Mozaik Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, pp. 154-157.

6 William Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası...*, pp. 161-169.

the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Pipeline in the beginning of the 1991 Gulf Crisis. The situation changed dramatically when Turkey declined its support to the U.S. invasion of Iraq on March 1, 2003. The relationships hit rock bottom with the Süleymaniye Incident where American soldiers captured Turkish soldiers in Süleymaniye - Irak. In consequence, hatred and anger against the Bush Administration began among Turkish people at that time.

In this context, various media organizations suggested that Turkish-American relations would go beyond a critical mass and unravel completely on April 24, 2007 when the "Armenian Genocide Bill" was scheduled to pass in the U.S. Congress. Ultimately, President Bush did not use the word "genocide" during his speeches on April 24, 2007 and 2008, although he had promised to approve the "the Armenian Genocide in 1915 Bill."

Speculations had it that the Democrat Party, which gained a majority in both the House and the Senate during the past U.S. mid-term elections, might put the Bush administration on trial for the detrimental Iraq policy if the Democrat Party's candidate won the 2008 presidential election. Moreover, it is known that the first female House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, is also a supporter of the claims regarding the so-called Armenian genocide. Also, then Democrat candidate Barack Obama promised the Armenian lobby in the U.S. to approve the "Armenian Genocide Bill" if he won the 2008 elections. Now that Obama has been elected, it remains to be seen if he will keep this promise.

DEMANDS OF ARMENIA FROM TURKEY

At various meetings, Armenian officials have put forth a number of demands to Turkey for the improvement of bilateral relations, including:

- Taking the Sèvres Treaty rather than the Kars Treaty as a basis to redraw the border between Turkey and Armenia,
- Having Turkey pay reparations to the relocated Armenians who were allegedly subjected to genocide,
- Having Turkey desist from seeking a solution that favors Azerbaijan over the Karabagh conflict and from saying that there was no genocide,⁷

In 1998, the Dashnak Party issuing a declaration claiming sixteen and half Turkish provinces as "Western Armenia" and being able to insert a reference to this declaration into the Armenian constitution due to the efforts of Robert Kocharyan, former president of Armenia, also a Dashnak party member. In this context, one ought to ask Armenian politicians the following: Please let us know if you wish to draw the Turkish-Armenian border along Giresun-Sivas-Mersin or through Trabzon-Malatya-Hatay. It is incomprehensible that government representatives of these two countries can put forth such illegal and unserious proposals.

⁷ *Hürriyet*, January 2, 2008.

First, it should be reminded that:

1. For a text to become a treaty the parties have to sign it, and then the respective parliaments need to ratify it. Finally, the respective heads of state need to sign it and publish it for the treaty to be executed. Armenian politicians ought to know that the Sèvres Treaty only made it to the first stage and that no other signatory country, except for Greece, proceeded to the second stage, which essentially renders Sèvres closer to a “draft” rather than a treaty.

2. In addition, preceding the Kars Treaty, the Ankara government signed the Gyumri (Gümrü) Treaty with the independent Republic of Armenia on December 2, 1920, represented by the Dashnak Party’s former Minister of Finance Avram Gulhandanyan, former Prime Minister Alexander Hadisyan and Deputy Minister of Interior İstevan Gurganyan. The Gyumri Treaty stipulates in Article 2 that the current Turkish-Armenian border has been recognized with minor adjustments. Article 3, dealing with the legal status of the territories left with Turkey according to this agreement, speaks of the “undeniable historical, legal and ethnic relations of Turkey” to these territories. Article 4 stipulates “the cessation of acts that violate the order and security and are a result of the instigation and encouragement of imperialist countries.” Article 6 regulates that “the signatories allow for the return of all refugees to their homes left inside the old borders, except for those who have joined enemy armies and took up arms against their own state or have participated in wholesale massacres in occupied territories...” Article 10 states that the “Yerevan Government accepts the Sévres Treaty, which was rejected categorically by the Turkish Grand National Assembly as null and void and commits to recall (Armenian) representative delegations in Europe and the United States, which have become instigation tools in the hands of some imperialist governments and political circles in a bona fide effort to remove all ill will between the two countries. The Republic of Armenia commits to not include ill intended and violent individuals with imperialist designs who have jeopardized peace and security between the two nations.”

The Kars Treaty⁸ of October 13, 1921 ratified the border between Turkey and Armenia with minor changes and also recognized Turkey’s international/national borders. The treaty was signed on behalf of the Republic of Armenia by Foreign Affairs Commissioner İskinaz Mravyan and by Interior Affairs Commissioner Bogos Makisyan.

As the treaty reveals, the Dashnak party officials formally reiterated on behalf of the Armenian government that they did not recognize the Sévres Treaty. In a sense, they also confessed to Ottoman Armenians’ collaborating with the imperialists and committing massacres. Therefore, Armenia’s political leaders should know that one of the two conditions of defining an administration as a “state” is “continuity”; the other is “recognition” and that these two conditions complement each other. It must also be known that the Ankara government, which signed the Gyumri Agreement, also managed to have all three conditions

8 İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları 1.Cilt (1920-1945)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983, pp. 41-47.

required by international law, satisfied by the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty and turned this treaty into the title deed which is recognizing the Republic of Turkey as a sovereign state. Under these circumstance this treaty is also a taboo for Turkey.

In this legal framework, one does not need to be a foreign minister or deputy or even an academic to know that demanding land from Turkey or Armenia or from any other “sovereign state” is a *casus belli*. However, occasionally, it can happen in every society that some rather educated albeit dense individuals make claims to eastern Anatolian lands or that others claim Armenia to be an ancient Turkish khanate and demand land from Armenia.

As for the Lausanne Treaty and the Property Debate, while discussing the Lausanne Treaty, it may be appropriate to evaluate the demand voiced in the Armenian National Assembly’s session on December 19-20, 2007. Reportedly demanded by the former Armenian Ambassador to Canada Ara Papyan, Turkey was responsible for paying reparations in the amount of \$14.5 million. The 1915 Law for Relocation and Resettlement, since being a provisional law, required the government to hold an inventory of the property belonging to Armenians in anticipation of their return after the war. This was followed in 1918 with the Repatriation Law. As also stipulated in Article 3 of the Gyumri Treaty,⁹ those exiled were given the right to return to their homes within three years. Armenian properties were also subject to lengthy discussion during the Lausanne Conference culminating in a determination that while Ottoman citizens who left their residents during the war had a right to regain their property upon their return, the statute of limitations had expired and that they had lost their property rights.

Furthermore, the Addendum to the Lausanne Treaty outlined an amnesty for all crimes committed during the war for political and military purposes and determined that no compensation was due to Armenians who died during the war.

Another issue related to Armenians’ demands is the Karabakh Debate. According to the year 2007 reports, former Foreign Minister Oskanyan stated, “Turkey’s demands from us to end the Karabakh problem in Azerbaijan’s favor and drop our genocide allegations, aside from the legal perspective, had no moral basis.”¹⁰ Moral values carry a philosophical definition that may differ among societies and can be subject to debate. However, based on the historical record, Karabakh¹¹ came under Ottoman rule during the reign of Sultan Murat III, entered a time of turmoil as it constantly changed hands among Turkey, Russia and Iran during the 18th and 19th centuries. When the Turkish army left the region after the Mudros Armistice, the British entered in 1920 declaring Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. In 1923, the Soviet Union declared Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh. While the Armenians in Karabakh petitioned the Soviet Union in

9 İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları...*, pp. 19-23.

10 *Taraf*, January 4, 2007.

11 For history of Karabagh, see İsmail Özçelik, *Karabağ Tarihi ve Karabağ'da Ermeni Olayları*, Ankara: Bilge Yayınları, 2003.

1929 to annex Karabakh to Armenia and settle Armenians from outside of Armenia there and continued to do so at every occasion, these demands were rejected by the Soviet Union.

After independence, both countries pledged to adhere the OSCE principles with respect to Karabakh and to support the peacekeeping efforts of the UN and other international institutions. However, after the Armenian offense that resulted in the ethnic cleansing and deportation of one million Azeris from Karabakh and particularly in 1993 following the massacres of Azerbaijanis in Hodjali,¹² Turkey changed its policy regarding the problem, mainly an internal issue of the Soviet Union and remained uninvolved. Henceforth, Turkey engaged in a policy that revolved around seeking regional peace in the Caucasus. Turkey received assurances from the OSCE that Karabakh's official status as an autonomous region within Azerbaijan will be recognized and also requested that this status shall not change by means of aggression.

Russian Foreign minister Sergeev Lavrov presented a new concessions package to solve the Karabakh issue to the Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan prior to the OSCE Foreign Minister's Assembly on November 29, 2007. Entitled 'The Framework Agreement' by the Minsk Group, this document outlined that:

- Armenian forces must withdraw from the seven other Azerbaijani provinces they occupied in addition to Karabagh,
- Refugees will return,
- Karabakh's status was to be determined.¹³

These provisions in the Framework Agreement, under which the status of Karabagh was yet to be determined, show clearly that Turkey's policy is in line with international law and that it is not pursuing in any way a policy that favors Azerbaijan.

In the same meeting, former Foreign Minister Oskanyan also stated that "Turkey missed the opportunity to normalize relations in 1991 when the Soviet Union broke apart and when Turkey started membership talks with the EU." Turkey was at the top of the list of countries to recognize Armenian independence in 1991. It was also due to the insistence of former Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, that Armenia was admitted to the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, despite objections of others concerning the fact that Armenia was not a littoral country to the Black Sea.

With respect to the legal dimensions of the allegation that Armenians were subject to genocide, such an allegation can only have legal consequences once it is adjudicated by a court of law. In documents on this issue, found particularly in the Russian, British, U.S. and French archives, court decisions, Western

12 <http://azerbaycan.ihh.org.tr/insan/daglik/sorunun.html>.; Ömer, E.Lütem, www.hannover-bk.de/ermeni/3.doc

13 <http://unzipped.blogspot.com/2008/10/disclosed-madrid-principles-of-Karabagh.html>

commission reports, diplomatic dispatches and others, the events that occurred between 1890-1918 are referred to as mutual massacres. There is no doubt that the 1915 Relocation is not an “auspicious event” for the Ottoman Armenians; it is a great tragedy. Yet, this tragedy was mutual. It is hoped that the two Eastern nations, which previously slaughtered each other as a result of British imperialism and German militarism, will prove that history only repeats itself for fools and will become the main actors in the new balance of power which is being shaped in the region.

After being elected in 2008, President Sargsyan surprisingly shifted Armenia’s foreign policy toward Turkey to discuss bilateral relations between the two countries, and invited the Turkish President Abdullah Gül to watch a football game between Turkey and Armenia in Yerevan. However, it is important not to forget that Armenia’s policy toward Turkey came forth during Georgia’s intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, namely Caucasus regional rivalry between Russia and the U.S.

CONCLUSION

As an academician who has conducted studies on both the Armenian Question and Turkish-American relations and who has had the opportunity to observe the political and social environment while living in the USA for approximately four years, I deem it unlikely that President Obama will use the word “genocide” on April 24, 2009 simply because of the following reasons:

1. American political history shows that even though there are significant differences in viewpoints between the Democrat and Republican parties regarding domestic policy, their stances on foreign affairs are rather similar. In this context, populist sound bites propagated during the election campaign in the quest for votes are more or less dismissed after the election. Under these conditions, President Obama likely will not use the word “genocide” on April 24, 2009 and the most the Obama administration would probably do about the Bush administration’s Iraq policy is to condemn it and expedite U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. This is due to the fact that the “Greater Middle East Project” was drafted during the Democratic Clinton administration. In any case, beyond the “sword of democracy” that is poised above the U.S. Congress is that of the American interest groups such as the defense industries, petroleum companies and so on which are the real power wielders when it comes to U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, for the U.S. to overcome the self-induced Iraq syndrome with the least amount of damage possible, it depends entirely on how the U.S. mends its relations with the Muslim world. Though the Cold War is a concept of the past, how the U.S. keeps Russia and China in check in the Middle East and the Caucasian region depends mainly on how it decides to proceed with its alliance with Turkey.

2. One of the top domestic policy concerns for the U.S. is infighting amongst religious and ethnic groups comprising of its own citizens. In this regard, the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, chaired by David Phillips, was

cordially established to devise a solution for this problem once and for all. Though the U.S. is regarded as sincere in dealing with this issue, the commission effectively failed in its capacity due to Philips' lack of information and ineptitude in dealing with the Armenian Question. If, in fact, President Obama accepts the claims regarding the Armenian "genocide," which is not based on any court decision, on April 24, 2009 or in 2010, there may be more harm done to the social fabric in America than to Turkish-American relations. A hint of what is referred to here occurred on September 15, 2005 at a House International Relations Committee debate on the draft resolution of the Armenian Genocide (H.Res 316). I had also participated in this meeting, whereas the first reaction came from an African-American congressman who exclaimed something to the effect of, "Go ahead and mess around in other countries' affairs when you should be sweeping the porch of your own home; my fellow African-Americans have yet to receive an apology for what we were subject to for the past century or so." In an era that is full of domestic problems, including an economy that is not performing well, it does not appear possible that the American administration is going to follow populist, risky policies. What President Obama could do before April 24, 2009 on the Armenian claims is to locate a political way that suggests to the Turkish government to open the Armenian border with Turkey and to the Armenian government not to express genocide claims while negotiating Turkish-Armenian relations.

As Armenian claims are generally based neither on historical nor juridical problem but political grounds, the latter may be the most logical and realistic path to follow.

3. If in this period Turkish-American relations reach a breaking point, without Turkey' support, the U.S. administration will have to consider how to manipulate Israel, which follows American policies in the Middle East as well.

In short, are Turkish-American relations, which have survived 179 consecutive years without interruption and have been put to the test once before with the Armenian Diaspora and twice by the Greek lobby, going to reach a breaking point for a second time because of the Armenian Diaspora? This is not likely, but only time can tell for certain.

TERRORISM AND ASYMMETRIC THREAT: ACTIVITIES AGAINST TURKEY, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 20th CENTURY TO THE PRESENT

(Armenian Terror Activities and PKK Terror
Organization Activities since 1915)

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Abstract: *This article examines selected armed violence activities, namely Armenian rebellions and terrorism and PKK terrorism, directed against Turkey and Turks. The 1915 Armenian incidents were not a simple, single event where "Ottoman Muslims massacred innocent Armenians," but were part of a sequence of a complex process. One must not forget the root cause of the tragic events: the Armenian national ideology, which aimed to establish a greater Armenia in parts of Ottoman territory. Armenian rebellions of 1915 negatively affected the entire Ottoman population. Between 1975-1984, Armenians and pro-Armenians used terrorism as a method of publicity, to draw the attention of world public opinion to their Armenian genocide claims. Twenty-seven attacks on Turkish diplomats worldwide, with 31 killed, did not prevent their campaign for publicity and the captured suspects did not face any serious prosecution. So long as the international community hesitates on active international co-operation and solidarity against terrorism, global and regional security environments will likely continue to deteriorate.*

Key Words: *Armenians, ASALA, PKK, rebellion, terrorism.*

INTRODUCTION

In general, the relationship between Turkey and the West appears to continue to suffer from a negative effect of mutual lack of confidence.¹ To have a clear understanding of the issue, one must study history. Only then will one understand the roots of the "terrible Turk" image in the minds of the many people of the Western nations. This stereotype to this day is an important popular factor, i.e., in opposing Turkey's accession to the E.U. or used for Armenian genocide claims relevant to the 1915 incidents.²

1 Halil İnalçık, in Devrim Sevımay, "Ünlü Tarihciden 'İtİdal' Çağrısı," *Milliyet*, November 12, 2007, p. 20. Compare: Ian Buruma, "Legislating History," *Los Angeles Times*, December 5, 2007, <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-buruma5dec05,0,785333.story?coll=la-tot-opinion&track=ntothtml>; Gregory Rodriguez, "Radical Outspoken Professors: Scholars or Activists?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 7 August 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0807/p09s01-coop.html>; "The Courts and History," *The Washington Post*, February 4, 2001, p. B06.

2 Halil İnalçık, in Özlem Kumrular, *Avrupa'da Türk Düşmanlığının Kökeni: Türk Korkusu*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, February, 2008, p. 9.

Contrary to current controversy on the place of Turkey and Turks within the Western sphere, between the years of 1520-1590, the Ottoman state already was a prominent member of the European states' system of balance.³ Lack of knowledge on Islamic law of war, coupled with a poor understanding of the two pillars of the Ottoman war strategy and tactics have been major reasons for the emergence of the much spoken-about myths of the "terrible Turk" and the "Turkish fear."⁴

Even today, the West still has a tendency to overlook the fundamental cultural revolution that separates the Ottoman Empire and modern, democratic Turkey, in many respects.⁵ The West especially had perceived Ottoman Turkey as a major threat.⁶ Consequently, through a series of overt and clandestine alliances and policies, Western powers of the time had pursued a complete and final resolution of the "Eastern Question," aiming at driving away Turkey and Turks from Anatolia and partitioning Ottoman territory among themselves by applying concerted measures intended to rapidly cause the complete failure and dissolution of the Ottoman state structure.⁷

Under the new environment created by the victorious Turkish War of Independence, however, this initiative of partitioning Ottoman territories among the members of Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia) ended in limited success. Nonetheless, one may speak of a continuing policy towards Turkey, which may be based on the concept of "anti-Turkism," this time aiming to contain and control Turkey and Turkish affairs to the maximum extent possible. One may detect a trace of this attitude by following the policy patterns of not only the Western countries, but also some other countries' policy practices towards Turkey. In this context, this article will examine two such examples: the Armenian Question and PKK terrorism.⁸

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

The 1915 Armenian incidents were not a simple, single event where, allegedly, Ottoman Muslims massacred innocent Armenians, but were part of a sequence of a complex process. The root cause of the developments can be found in the

3 İnalçık, in *Avrupa'da Türk Düşmanlığının...*, p. 12.

4 İnalçık in *Avrupa'da Türk Düşmanlığının...*, pp. 15-17.

5 İnalçık in *Avrupa'da Türk Düşmanlığının...*, p. 20.

6 Examples of some popular expressions in local languages will give the reader an idea of how the negative Turk image had been used as a signal of danger, to alert the common public: "Hay moros en la costa" (Northern Africans [Ottomans] are at the shore); "prin na erthoun oi Tourkoi" (hurry, before Turks come); "tourkopaidevo" (Turkish torture – heavy punishment), "horda / orda / hord" (looter – from the Turkish word: "ordu"). According to Kumrular, Western entities of the time used this negative Turk image to educate, alert, unite and mobilize their populations against the common enemy; the Ottomans, on the other hand, succeeded in exploiting that attitude as a means of psychological warfare, to prevent resistance to invading Ottoman armies. See: *Avrupa'da Türk Düşmanlığının...*, pp. 33-42.

7 For a brief explanation on the "Eastern Question," Western plot to drive away Turks from Europe and Asia Minor, see: Mümtaz Soysal, "Şark Meselesi", *Hürriyet*, June 3, 1998, p. 13.

8 See Richard Cohen, "Turkey's War on the Truth," *The Washington Post*, October 16, 2007, p. A 19; Thea Halo, "This Was Genocide, But Armenians Were Not Its Only Victims," *Guardian*, October 31, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329614735-103677,00.html>, and compare: Laurent Pech, "The Armenian Genocide Resolution and the Perils of State-sponsored History," *Jurist*, October 11, 2007, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/armenian-genocide-resolution-and-perils.php>.

Armenian national ideology, which aimed to establish a greater Armenia (known as “Hay-dat ideology”) and a series of consecutive and complex rebellions against Ottoman rule to that end.⁹ In this context, the genocide claims against Turkey and Turks have been exploited as a most effective political propaganda instrument. Having no legal basis, the basic Armenian strategy consists of first creating a political dispute against Turkey and, via publicity, pressuring the Turkish government first to recognize the existence of a genocide; if that succeeds, continue the political campaign by requesting compensation, return of property and persons, territorial claims, and in the follow up, adding new claims of genocide, to perpetuate the matter.¹⁰

For centuries, the Armenian minority had lived in peace in the Ottoman territory alongside the Muslim majority. This positive situation gradually transformed into hostility when Tsarist Russia occupied the Caucasus and the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War created a favorable environment for the Russians to further their territorial expansion in the region.¹¹ Russians envisaged manipulating Armenians, under the guise of supporting their independence, in fact, to capture more Iranian and Ottoman territories. Coupled with growing Armenian nationalism and observing the inspiring precedents with regard to Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, it was thought to be an appropriate time also for Greeks, Macedonians and Armenians living in Ottoman territories to follow the successful examples of previous secessions, following Berlin Agreement.¹²

ARMENIAN REBELLIONS

In this context, the Armenian national action plan, as one may call it, had begun with the establishment of the Armenian Movement on the centennial anniversary of the French Revolution. Following the Berlin Congress, Armenians were the only non-Muslim population in Ottoman territory who did not receive autonomy or independence. The Ayestefanos (San Stefano) Pact of March 3, 1878, followed by the Berlin Treaty of July 13, 1878, envisaged reforms in the Ottoman state structure, for the benefit of Armenians. These developments had been the first steps towards preparing an international legal ground to interfere with the domestic affairs of the Ottoman State and an important factor to encourage an Armenian political movement. Thus, in 1886 and 1890, the Armenians founded the Hunchak and Dashnaksutyun revolutionary organizations to lead the

9 As an example, for the background of the famous book, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, considered as a key reference in support of the Armenian claims, see: Heath W. Lowry, *The Story Behind Ambassadors Morgenthau's Story*, The Isis Press, Istanbul, 1990, passim. Compare: “Robert Hanks: First Rule of History – Verify Your References,” *The Independent*, April 16, 2007, <http://comment.independent.co.uk/commentators/article2452406.ece>.

10 Şükrü Elekdağ, in *1915 Olaylarının Ardındaki Gerçekler ve Bugüne Yansımaları*, panel, Başkent Üniversitesi, November 22, 2007, pp. 22-23.

11 For an in-depth analysis of the policies of the great powers of the times, see: Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian File – the Myth of Innocence Exposed*, London: K. Rustem & Bro. and Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Ltd., 1985, pp. 65-72.

12 Ömer Engin Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, Ankara: Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007, pp. 7-8; Sadi Çaycı, “Armenian Genocide Claims: A Contextual Version of the 1915 Incidents,” in *The Criminal Law of Genocide*, Ralph Henham and Paul Behrens (eds.), Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007, pp. 20-23.

Armenian community in organizing a political and military campaign against the Ottoman State via activating armed committees in selected regions.¹³

These groups had planned to follow the successful example of the Bulgarian strategy. In the first phase, a bloody rebellion would be staged. Followed hopefully, by a harsh and bloody response and suppression of their rebellion by the Ottomans, it was expected to trigger a humanitarian intervention by the Western powers to save “innocent” Armenian lives. Several unsuccessful attempts were made between 1890-1894 like the Musa Bey Incident, in Erzurum, Kumkapi, Merzifon, Kayseri, Yozgat, and Samsun.¹⁴ Until then, functioning only as a “think tank,” but seeing these negative developments, the Ottoman’s Union and Progress Party started to think about developing an action plan to counter the growing threat posed by such rebellions.¹⁵

Previously, Eastern Anatolia (in the eyes of European countries, historical “Armenia”) had been treated as an inter-European issue, under the arrangements contained in Berlin Congress. Just like in the Ayestefanos Agreement, a new agreement concluded with the Russians on February 8, 1914 at Yeniköy placed the Russians again in a unique position to unilaterally control the Ottoman Armenian issue, with a view of establishing an Armenian state in the future. Yet, the outbreak of World War I precluded implementation of this agreement.¹⁶

HUMAN TRAGEDY

Therefore, the tragic events of 1915, affecting the entire Ottoman population, had been a direct result of Armenian insurgencies against and massacre of the Muslim population during the World War I years.¹⁷ From 1910 to 1922, Armenian bandits had killed 523,955 Ottoman Muslims.¹⁸ In the same period, Armenians collaborated with the enemy (namely, the Russians and the French) in the time of a world war.¹⁹ Armed Armenian bandits also conducted attacks and committed

13 For programs and methods of these organizations, see: *The Armenian File...*, pp. 120-127.

14 For a detailed analysis on Armenian terrorist activities and rebellions during 1880s, see: *The Armenian File...*, pp. 127-162.

15 Sina Akşin, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 5th Edition, February 2008, pp. 47-48.

16 *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi*, pp. 91-92; Kemal Çiçek, in *1915 Olaylarının Ardındaki Gerçekler ve Bugüne Yansımaları*, pp. 7-8.

17 *1915 Olaylarının Ardındaki...*, pp. 8-9; Justin McCarthy, “Ermeni İşyanları ve Osmanlılar,” in *Ermeni Sorunu-Temel Bilgiler ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), ASAM Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, Ankara, 2007, pp. 69; *Ermeni Komitelerinin Amaçları ve İhtilal Hareketleri*, (a report prepared by the General Directorate of Security of the Ottoman State in 1916 and translated into modern day Turkish by Rıza Açıkan), Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı, Ankara, 2003, pp. 141-144 (example: Zeytun – Maraş), 167-191 (example: Van), 241-264 (example: Armenian atrocities against Muslims). During various rebellions and massacres, Armenians killed a total of 518,105 Ottoman Muslims in Eastern Anatolia between 1914-1921. See: *Armenian Terror*, p. 12; Hikmet Özdemir, “Çatışmalar,” in *Türk – Ermeni İhtilali – Makaleler*, TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu, Hikmet Özdemir (ed.), Ankara: April 2007, pp. 155-209; Yusuf Sarıınay, in *Massacres of Turks Throughout History*, a panel discussion, Başkent University, 25 February 2005, pp. 23-29.

18 Information based on documentation provided by the General Directorate of the State Archives of the Turkish Prime Ministry: Nuray Babacan, “Ermeni Çeteleri 523 Bin Türk’ü Katletmiş,” *Hürriyet*, 18 April 2005, p. 19.

19 For Armenian – Russian collaboration, the inside story of the Zeitun rebellions, role of the missionaries, and the rationale for the relocation decision at the Ottoman government level, see: *The Armenian File...*, pp. 191-204, 216. For details concerning British, Russian and French involvement and policies regarding Ottoman Armenians, see: *Belgelerle Ermeni Sorunu*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı, 1992, pp. 167-181.

acts of sabotage against the Ottoman Army. All areas for rebellions had been very professionally selected to best serve the military interests of the invading Russian troops.²⁰

In this overall context, the Ottoman government logically determined what any other state would conclude: All necessary and proportionate administrative, military and legal counter-measures were taken for the sake of territorial integrity preservation, homeland defence and the very survival of the state.²¹ This took place in the time of a world war, where the Ottoman state was a belligerent, although already at the brink of total collapse. Nevertheless, the Ottoman government did not hesitate to prosecute responsible individuals, including military and civilian public servants, to the extent possible for any wrongdoings.²² In sum, contrary to common perception of the international community, a humanitarian tragedy first had been experienced by the Ottoman Muslim population and later by the Armenians. The tragedy was not limited to Ottoman Muslim civilians and Armenians, but affected also many members of the belligerent Ottoman armed forces.²³

The second pillar of the campaign against Turkey and Turks is related to the terrorism aspect of the applied policies. Since 1882, first the Ottoman state and then the Republic of Turkey have been the target of several waves of terrorism. Indirect aggression, in the form of terrorism continued via various phases of Armenian terrorism perpetrated by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) militants.²⁴ This has been followed by the terrorism of the secessionist Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Below is an analysis of Armenian terrorism, which will be followed then by an examination of PKK terrorism.

ARMENIAN TERRORISM

The first generation of Armenian terror covers the period between 1882 and 1909. Armenian secret organizations (Black Cross, Homeland Defenders) and political parties (Armenekan Party, Hunchak Committee Party, The Armenian

20 Examples: Van, nerve centre of the Ottoman administrative system for Eastern Anatolia. Erzurum, Ottoman logistics and communication lines. Saray – Başkale, two vital passages to be secured for advancing Russian armies. Çatak, vital mountain passes for the Ottoman army to be able to deploy military forces to the Iranian border area. Sivas, ideal area to launch guerilla type raids to interrupt logistics flow for the Ottoman army. Kilikya, British military objective for invasion, to control the Ottoman movements via railways towards southern territories. See: *Ermeni İsyanları ve...*, p. 74; *Belgelerle Ermeni Sorunu*, pp. 202-220.

21 *1915 Olaylarının Ardındaki...*, p. 10; *Ermeni Komitelerinin Amaçları...*, pp. 195-241. For the text of document dated 25 February 1915 – from the Supreme Command Hqs. to all military units about duties and responsibilities of the commanders in case of an Armenian uprising, see: *Turkish – Armenian Conflict – Documents*, Hikmet Özdemir – Yusuf Sarıncay (eds.), Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu, 2007, pp. 4-5.

22 *1915 Olaylarının Ardındaki...*, p. 11. For an example, see: minutes of the Council of Ministers meeting dated 29 September 1915 regarding establishment of a commission for inquiring about the officials who abuse their duties during the relocation, in *Turkish – Armenian Conflict – Documents*, p. 294.

23 For a detailed analysis of the Armenian atrocities against the Ottoman Muslim population, even after the Russian Revolution of 1917, and after the conclusion of the Mondros Truce on October 30, 1918, see: *Belgelerle Ermeni Sorunu*, pp. 293-338; 367-385.

24 For brief background information on late Armenian terrorism, see also: Erich Feigl, *Armenian Mythomania – Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Historical Context*, Amalthea Signum, 2006, pp. 124-129.

Revolutionary Federation / Dashnak Federation) had been active in this period. All employed terrorism, rebellions, attacks and assassinations as political tools. The Ottomans had to respond to 37 consecutive Armenian rebellions.²⁵

The basic motivation of many Armenian revolts came from Russian provocations and Armenian responses to these provocations. Some examples include the raid at the Office of the Ottoman Prime Minister (Bab-i Ali) on September 28, 1895; the assassination attempt on Sultan Abdulhamid on July 21, 1905; and the raid at the Ottoman Bank and the taking of hostages on August 14, 1914.²⁶

The second generation of Armenian terror covers the years between 1914-1922. The Ottoman military campaign during World War I first started against invading Russian armies. Armenian bandits cooperated and collaborated with Russian armed forces. Seeing that Ottoman defeat in the war was almost certain, Armenians had begun killing Muslims in Eastern Anatolia.²⁷ Large numbers of Muslims had been internally displaced towards the interior regions of Anatolia. Just as Armenians later faced their own tragedy, which they themselves triggered, many Muslims, due to unfavourable environmental conditions, died on their way to safer regions. Armenian collaboration with the enemy had not been limited to the Russians. Between 1919-1920, in South-eastern Anatolia, the majority of the troops constituting the invading French Légion d'Orient was Armenians and there they had massacred and tortured the Muslim population. After the war, Armenians continued extra-judicial killings by assassinating top Ottoman officials: Talat Pasha (March 15, 1921), Sait Halim Pasha (Rome, December 6, 1921) Bahattin Sakir Bey and Cemil Azmi Bey (Berlin, April 17, 1922), and Cemal Pasha, along with his aides Maj. Nusret Bey and Lt. Sureyya Bey (Tbilisi, April 21, 1922). The Armenians' objective was first, revenge; second, to prepare the ground in support of the imminent Greek invasion of western Anatolia.²⁸

The third generation of Armenian terror was a result of different attitudes between the first and subsequent generations of Armenians towards Turkey and Turks. First generation Armenians had been critical solely of the activities of the high-level Ottoman officials, whereas later generations transformed that attitude into a fully racist animosity against Turkey and Turks. Thus, genocide claims had increased from the end of World War II. A series of attacks on Turkish diplomats had started with the assassination of Turkey's Los Angeles Council-General Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir on January 27, 1973. Several bombings, raids and assassinations directed against Turkish diplomats and institutions had continued since then.²⁹

25 See *The Armenian File...*, pp. 133-135, 139-142, 148-156.

26 Due to the diplomatic pressure from the great powers of the time, the Ottoman government could not prosecute caught suspects. The European press, however, presented these counter-insurgency efforts as torture and cruelty against Armenians (*Armenian Terror*, pp. 8-11).

27 For Ottoman and Russian documents on Armenian atrocities, see: Halil Kemal Türköz, *Osmanlı ve Sovyet Belgeleriyle Ermeni Mezalimi*, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 2nd Edition, 1982, passim.

28 *Armenian Terror*, pp. 12-14.

29 Organized new generation Armenian terror started with ASALA, with the objective of liberating Armenia (Eastern Anatolia). ASALA had been financially supported by the Armenian diaspora. ASALA planned and executed 581 of 699 terrorist raids between 1973 and 1986. The second major terrorism actor had been the "Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide." The Justice Commandos ended their violent campaign after the Orly Massacre (24 September 1981), following the public's reaction to the murders. See: *Armenian Terror*, pp. 15-22.

ASALA TERRORISM

On August 7, 1982, Levon Ekmekciyan and Zohrap Sarkisyan opened gunfire at Ankara's Esenboga Airport, killing 10 people and injuring 72 others.³⁰ On July 15 1983, the explosion of luggage left close to the Turkish Airlines check-in desk at the Orly International Airport in Paris killed 8 and wounded more than 60 persons. ASALA claimed responsibility. After nearly each raid, Armenians succeeded in putting pressure on relevant authorities to stop or divert criminal prosecutions. As in several other cases, all convicted individuals were freed, including Garbidiyan of the Orly attack, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment.³¹

Briefly, between 1975-1984, Armenians and pro-Armenians used terrorism as a method of publicity, to draw the attention of world public opinion to their genocide claims. It appears to a great extent that they have succeeded in doing so. Twenty-seven attacks on Turkish diplomats worldwide, 31 killed, did not prevent their campaign for publicity and the captured suspects did not face any serious prosecution.³²

PKK TERRORISM AGAINST TURKEY

For some, indirect military aggression is seen as a workable paramilitary option to intervene or influence policy practices of targeted governments. Low intensity conflict, operations other than war and other similar concepts function as feasible strategies to change governments or to force a government to accept or change certain policies.³³ Through subversion, terrorism, insurgency and full-scale civil war, the basic concept includes a wide spectrum of phased strategy.³⁴

PKK HISTORY

In this context, Kurdish irredentism is one important aspect of the PKK terrorism question in Turkey.³⁵ The PKK came to the scene during the Cold War years. From the U.S.S.R.'s entrance to the Middle East state of affairs, several initiatives have been launched to counter-balance the regional power represented in the alliance between the U.S. and Israel. In this general context, guerrilla-training centers in the region had been transformed into common training grounds to cover the entire spectrum of Marxists-Leninist movements.

30 *Armenian Terror...*, p. 28.

31 *Armenian Terror...*, pp. 28, 30.

32 *1915 Olaylarının Ardındaki...*, pp. 23-24.

33 See Michael Radu, "The PKK Strategy in Europe to Place Turkey on Trial," Foreign Policy Research Institute, 26 February 1999, <http://fpr.org/enotes/balkansturkey.19990226.radu.pkkstrategy.html>.

34 Sait Yılmaz, *21. Yüzyılda Güvenlik ve İstihbarat*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, June 2006, pp. 498-503.

35 This is not something new. Starting from 1919, for example, the British had been the first foreign power to manipulate Kurdish insurgencies against Turkey and Turks. For a list of Kurdish rebellions from 1806 to 1999, see M. Ali Birand, "Bugüne Kadar Kaç Kürt İsyanı Oldu?", *Milliyet*, January 3, 2008, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2008/01/03/yazar/zbirand.html>. For a detailed analysis of the "Islamic" – Kurdish rebellions between 1919-1925, see: Uğur Mumcu, *Kürt İslam Ayaklanması, 1919-1925*, UM:AG Vakfı Yayınları, 21st Edition, August 1996, passim.

Towards the end of the 1970s, Kurdish groups based on the same ideology had also exploited the same facilities. Thus, the U.S.S.R. found leverage to counter-balance the efforts of the U.S., Israel and Iran in the region, all of which, beginning from the 1960s, had manipulated the Kurdish movement to further their national interests. Thus, in the beginning, PKK activities in Turkey provided the U.S.S.R. with the opportunity to take part in the processes.³⁶

The PKK was established on November 26-27, 1978 in Lice, Diyarbakir. From the first meeting, Abdullah Ocalan emerged as the leader. Frequently causing foreigners to have a misperception, as if the case concerns a political party in the traditional sense, the meaning of its name, Kurdistan Workers Party, only implies the Marxist – Leninist ideological basis of the terror organization.³⁷

In the beginning, the group called themselves “Kurdistan Revolutionaries.” On capture of several prominent figures in May 1979 in the Elazig region by the martial-law authorities, Abdullah Ocalan had to move into Syria. The plan for publicity and declaration of the establishment of the organization was to assassinate a local prominent political figure and a traditional local leader: Mehmet Celal Bucak. On July 29, 1979, the PKK attempt for his assassination had failed, but still the event made headlines in the Turkish media. In a written communiqué left at the scene of the assassination attempt, the establishment of the PKK had been made public for the first time.³⁸

PKK: STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

Kurds in Turkey enjoy similar status and rights as any citizen, without any negative discrimination.³⁹ Yet, the strategic objective of the PKK has been to establish an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan in the region. The PKK's goal, as proclaimed in its manifesto, dated October 27, 1978, is to establish an independent Kurdish state in parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Adapting the strategy to the requirements of the developing conditions, statements in this regard have been modified to make references to other concepts such as regional autonomy, human rights, even mere cultural rights, etc.⁴⁰ Because of the contradiction between words and deeds of the PKK terror organization and pro-PKK political activists, Turkish public opinion is far away from taking it seriously, with similar opinions and analysis being expressed by some human rights activists and some of Western politicians.⁴¹

36 Nihat Ali Özcan, *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi), Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi*, Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 1999, pp. 12, 323.

37 PKK / KONGRA-GEL / KADEK (various names used to change the public image of the same organization) is considered as a terror organization, not only by Turkey, but also by the U.S. and the E.U.

38 Operational procedures of the PKK suggest that it had been initiated by secret services of the Eastern Block of the time, namely, Syria and/or Bulgaria. The basic concept appears not to leave the fate of an oil rich region solely to the influence and activities of the U.S., acting through Barzani groups. See: *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi)*..., pp. 42-51.

39 See Bruce Fein, “Unveiling the PKK,” *The Washington Times*, January 3, 2008, <http://www.washingtontimes.com...>

40 *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi)*..., pp. 64-65.

41 The general conviction of the common public in Turkey is that, in the present environment, under the cover of promoting broader human rights practices, Turkey is being asked to support a “nation building operation” for future steps in the direction of a Kurdish secession. This conviction appears to have sound grounds. For

MILITARY STRATEGY: TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

Inspired by the strategy set and successfully implemented by Mao during the Chinese communist revolution via guerrilla warfare and in the context of a long-term “peoples war,” in order to establish effective control in the countryside, propaganda, informing and educating local populations, applying revolutionary violence would be the basics of the PKK’s operational framework. In the first phase, founding safe base areas and afterwards creating liberated zones would have priority in the operational progress. Taking guerrilla warfare as the basic military tactic, long-term armed struggle would be completed in three phases: strategic defence, strategic balance, and strategic attack. The PKK, throughout the preparatory phase of so-called “armed propaganda,” committed many atrocities, acts of terrorism, all in the name of the so-called “revolutionary violence.” To date, the PKK’s terrorist attacks have killed almost 40,000 to include their fellow Kurds.⁴²

REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

The basic military capability could only be developed by the assistance provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in collaboration with Syria. Guerrilla training had been completed in 1981-1982. The PKK’s guerrilla groups entered Turkey beginning from April 1980. In the context of cooperation between Iran and Syria, the PKK could find safe havens in and around the I-KDP camps of Barzani in northern Iraq. Armed propaganda units began touring the “Botan” region from the beginning of 1983. The first large-scale attacks had been directed against Erzurum and Samsat on the night of August 15, 1984. The vital problem was that people living in the region did not support PKK activities. To eliminate this lack of cooperation with the PKK, the revolutionary violence turned

example, according to the President of the DTP (Democratic Society Party, pro-PKK) the government should negotiate with the PKK: “Demirtaş: PKK’yla Masaya Oturulsun,” *Radikal*, December 5, 2007, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=240729>. According to another DTP member of the parliament, Turkey needs to establish a confederation: Emine Ayna, in “DTP’li Milletvekili Konfederasyon İstedi,” *CNN-Türk.com*, January 27, 2008, <http://www.cnntrk.com/interactive/yazdir.asp?PID=318&haberID=423478>; finally, according to a provincial president of the DTP, the PKK is a revolutionary movement: Murat Polat in “DTP’li Başkan: PKK Devrimci Bir Hareket,” *NTVMSNTC.com*, February 9, 2008, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/print.asp?pid=435145>. Leyla Zana, former DEP (pro-PKK) member of the parliament, suggests that Abdullah Öcalan should be allowed to participate in politics, together with the people: Leyla Zana, in Okan Konuralp, “Öcalan’ı Halkın Yanına Getirin, Siyaset Yapsın,” *Hürriyet*, 27 October 2007, p. 23. Seemingly, Turkey’s accession to the European Union will not satisfy DTP: Ahmet Türk, in Neşe Düzel, “AB, Biz Kürtler İçin Yeterli Değil,” *Radikal*, April 17, 2004, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=184669>. (Compare with Doğu Ergil, “International Terrorism and Turkey’s Kurdish Problem,” *Turkish Daily News*, December 25, 2006, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/editorial.php?ed=dogu_ergil; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “The Cultural Situation of the Kurds,” Res. 1519 (2006), dated October 4, 2006.) Not fully understanding the multi-nationalistic past of the Republic of Turkey and its present consequences appear to be an important factor in making irrelevant human rights interpretations on the status of Kurds in Turkey. (See Toktamış Ateş, “Batılı’nın Derdi,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 6, 1998, p. 3.) It is often forgotten that, contrary to the common belief, “The Kurds are not monolithic, linguistically or politically.” (Denise Natali, *The Kurds and the State*, Syracuse University Press, 2005, 238 pp., reviewed in Michael Rubin, “Brief Reviews,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2007, <http://www.meforum.org/article/1666>.)

42 For a complete list of PKK chronology, to include information on PKK atrocities between 1976-2006, see: “Chronology of the Important Events in the World/PKK Chronology (1976-2006),” *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, September 13, 2006, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=217>.

directly on the local and other populations.⁴³ An attempt to use the local population as militia failed. As a result, the Turkish government established temporary village guard units, recruited from among the local population.⁴⁴

PRESENT SITUATION

Upon the capture of the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999, and already suffering heavily from the effective Turkish military operations, the PKK ceased to launch terrorist attacks and used the following years to pursue a "wait-and-see" policy and internal restructuring. As it had been the case following the Gulf War, the U.S.-led Coalition Forces' intervention in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, again, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, developments in Northern Iraq, and the U.S. indifference to its existence and activities of the PKK in that region once more created a favorable environment for the terror organization. This author is in the opinion that the said U.S. military action had been in gross violation of the international law and that even if Turkey had actively taken sides with the U.S., the situation in Iraq would not be any better. Thus, the last wave of PKK terrorism started in 2004 and still continues. During the counter-terrorism campaign against the PKK in the 1990s, Turkey did not receive any meaningful understanding, assistance or support it expected from the international community. On the contrary, it had been harshly criticized.⁴⁵ As a result, Turkey had been put in a position to assess, determine and apply counter-terrorism measures all by itself. In the light of these developments, it is very difficult to conclude that Turkey and Turks received fair treatment from their Western friends and allies in the context of legitimate international cooperation against terrorism.⁴⁶

- 43 On March 13, 1999, three PKK militants set fire to a large shopping center, Mavi Çarşı, in Göztepe, İstanbul, burning 13 shoppers to death: "İşte Eseriniz!", *Hürriyet*, March 14, 1999, p. 1, 2, 3, 27. One hundred thirty-eight elementary school teachers were among the casualties of the PKK's terrorist attacks, almost all killed before the eyes of the pupils, in the classrooms: Hasan Pulur, "138 Şehit", *Fiesta - Milliyet Pazar Dergisi*, March 12, 1995, No 86, p. 9; Celalettin Çetin, "Gözyaşı Çok Şey Anlatıyor!", *Milliyet*, September 19, 1994, pp. 1, 6. In one separate incident, the PKK ambushed a village, Yavi, Erzurum, gathered the residents to the main square and executed 35 individuals by shooting: "Köy Basıldı: 35 Ölü," *Cumhuriyet*, October 26, 1993, pp. 1, 15. On the night of August 16, 1993, the PKK launched an attack on the Yüksekova town, in the Southeast. Many homes and business places burned. Responded to by the security forces in the area, the engagement lasted the whole night with almost 400 PKK militants involved: "Cehennem Gecesi," *Milliyet*, August 17, 1993, pp. 1, 18. In Kemaliye, Erzincan, PKK militants ambushed Başbağlar village, executed 28 innocent people by shooting and burning to death four other individuals together with their homes, to include one woman and one child: Macit Gürbüz-H. İbrahim Özdemir-Şeyhmus Çakan, "Kemaliye'de Vahşet!", *Milliyet*, July 7, 1993. Among the casualties in six different cities of Southeast Turkey had been 362 troops and 72 security police who were ethnic Kurds: Mehmet Faraç, "Terör Kardeşini Vuruyor", *Cumhuriyet*, December 19, 2005, p. 6.
- 44 *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi)...*, pp. 73-105. Temporary village guards proved to be an efficient local defense capability and thus a major target for the PKK's terrorist attacks. In one instance, the PKK attacked an elite unit of the temporary village guards, killing 16. Temporary village guards, in defense, killed 48 PKK militants: "PKK'dan Hain Saldırı," *Milliyet*, October 15, 1998, pp. 1, 16.
- 45 In the course of countering PKK terrorism, consecutive governments have frequently asked for the support of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). The TAF launched cross-border operations to eliminate the terrorist threat. Such cross-border operations started from 1983 onwards. (For a chronology, see: "Sinir Ötesi Operasyonlar 1983'te Başladı," *CNN-Türk.com*, February 22, 2008, <http://www.cnnturk.com/interactive/yazdir.asp?PID=318&haberID=430959>. In many instances, the Western media did not hesitate to distort the objectives and consequences of these military operations. For examples, see: Jason Burke, "Turkish Onslaught Paves Way for Major Assault on Iraq Kurds," *Guardian*, February 24, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/24/turkey.iraq>.
- 46 As an example, according to the 2007 Annual report published by the German Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, the PKK has 11,500 members in Germany and could collect millions of Euros, in support of the PKK activities: Süleyman Bağ, "Alman Raporu: PKK, Hala Milyonlarca Euro Topluyor," *Zaman Online*, May 16, 2008, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazdir.do?haberno=690139>. (Compare with: Ergin Saygun, in "PKK

CONCLUSION

In this overall context, overt and clandestine support provided by some members of the international community to the terrorist or extremist organizations has had an intensely negative effect on the general state of the global, regional, and national security environment.⁴⁷ Under the present circumstances, where the territorial integrity and national unity of states that are targeted by third party states, it is very difficult to enhance and strengthen nations such as a modern and pluralist democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, which represent core human values in the region.⁴⁸

So long as the international community is hesitant to engage in active international cooperation and solidarity against terrorism and overlooks the fact that the distinctive criteria of terrorism (notwithstanding its political, religious or ideological objectives, which sometimes may be an acceptable or tolerable reason for sympathy and even may be a legitimate concern) is not the political, ideological or religious objective pursued, but is the unacceptable tactics, means and methods of armed violence employed which if allowed to continue, the international community will not be able to reduce the terrorist threat to an acceptable and manageable level.⁴⁹ To the contrary, in the face of asymmetric threat and warfare, global and regional security will likely continue to deteriorate towards a more complex and difficult security environment.

Revenues Reach 500 million Euros," *Today's Zaman*, March 12, 2008, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/>..). Within the ongoing period, which started from Al Qaeda's terror attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, Turkey has observed a relatively positive shift in Western attitude towards Turkish counter-terrorism efforts. Seeing the terrorist threat directed against them, Turkey's Western friends and allies put into practice their own strict means and methods of countering terrorism.

- 47 For an assessment of financial and other aspects and consequences of the struggle against PKK terrorism, see: Cemil Çiçek, in Abbas Güçlü, "Çiçek: PKK'ya 300 Milyar Dolar Harcandı," *Milliyet*, November 23, 2007, p. 20; Güngör Uras, "Terörle Mücadelenin Faturası Var," *Milliyet*, October 24, 2007, p. 7. As of October 2007, the Turkish government paid compensation to 85,000 applicants in the region: Yalçın Doğan, "85 Bin Kişiyse Tazminat Ödendi," *Hürriyet*, October 2, 2007, p. 11.
- 48 For a comprehensive analysis, see: Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, *Uluslararası Terörizm*, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, Ankara, February 2008, pp. 543-578.
- 49 See Emine Kart, "Turkey Taking PKK Complaints to UN, NATO," *Today's Zaman*, June 2, 2007, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/>.. For nuances between human right issues - political activism and supporting PKK terrorism, see: Hasan Cemal, "Kürt Sorununda Barışçı Çağırının Yanlışları Üzerine Bir Yazı," *Milliyet*, May 22, 2008, p. 17. As an example of indirect support to an ongoing terrorist activity; Roj-TV is known as the main TV station serving the PKK. Denmark, however, overlooking the administrative and security nature of the fact, still appears to continue to collect evidence, in order to close the station (see Mahmut Gürer, "Danimarka Kanıt Topluyor,"

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EASTERN LEGION IN FRENCH ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS (NOVEMBER 1918 – 1921)

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Abstract: *This article is the sixth and the last of a series of articles regarding the establishment and activities of the Eastern Legion. The basic aim of this article is to examine the changes in the structure of the Legion, the debates concerning its composition and activities in the Cilician region between November 1918, (when the Legion occupied the Cilician region), and the end of 1921, (when the legion was finally disbanded). In this period, first of all the French-Armenian occupation of the Cilician region and the subsequent Armenian atrocities perpetrated against Muslims are briefly examined. Then, the criticisms put forward by Armenian and Syrian committee leaders towards the Eastern Legion, which was divided into Armenian and Syrian Legions, are touched upon. The indiscipline and disobedience of the Armenian legionnaires and the subsequent reactions of the French soldiers to this situation are covered as well. Finally, the steps taken for the disbanding of the Legion is dealt with. In sum, this article analyzes developments regarding the Eastern Legion in the aforementioned period through French archival documents.*

Key Words: *Eastern Legion, Armenians, Syrians, Cilicia, the Armistice of Mudros, the Treaty of Ankara.*

INTRODUCTION

Being the sixth and the last one of a series of articles that concerns the establishment and activities of the Eastern Legion and that has been published since the 23rd and 24th editions of the *Ermeni Arařtırmaları*, this article primarily aims to examine the changes in the structure of the Legion, the debates concerning its composition and activities in the Cilician region between November 1918, when the Legion occupied the Cilician region, and the end of 1921, when the legion was finally disbanded. In short, it evaluates the Legion within this time span of three years in which it was actively used. Although it might at first glance seem surprising that the two-years-period between the establishment of the Legion and it being dispatched in Cilicia has been covered in five consecutive articles while these last three years constitute the subject of a single article, such a choice relies on two important reasons. The first is that, compared to previous years, and in respect to these three years, the archives of the French Foreign Ministry, which constitute the main sources of this article,

contain much fewer documents. That is why three additional sources have been used in this article. Ottoman archival records are one of these. Where the French archives remained mostly silent on the matter of the atrocities perpetrated by the Armenian Legion against the Muslim population, the Ottoman archives proved indispensable to be incorporated. These documents were published in the second volume, covering the period between 1918-1919, of the three-volume-work entitled *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri (Armenian-French Relations in Ottoman Documents)*, put together by the General Directorate of State Archives.¹ The second source is *The Tricolor over the Taurus* authored by Robert F. Ziedner.² This publication is very important in making good sense of the French archives since it makes use not only of the Foreign Ministry correspondence, but also other French archives and various memoirs that reflected the atmosphere of that period. The third source is Ulvi Keser's *Kıbrıs Anadolu Ekseninde Ermeni-Doğu Lejyonu (The Armenian-Eastern Legion in the axis of Cyprus-Anatolia)*. This piece is the most comprehensive one among a few Turkish works on the subject of the Eastern Legion. Even though it rarely refers to the records of the French Foreign Ministry, it still bears significance by virtue of providing details of the resistance of Turkish forces against the Legion.³

The second reason why a long period of three years was covered by a single article is the necessity to sum up the resistance of the Turkish National Defence forces (Kuvva-yi Milliye) against the French occupation and their subsequent struggle in the Southern Front, which are extensively dealt with in Turkish literature. This emerges as a necessity because the volume of research and publications on that matter makes it impossible to fully elaborate on the issue without the preparation of several articles. Moreover, the existence of such literature does not require to further write on that subject on the basis of the same sources. Finally, since this article has been based on French archives, to refer to many other sources might have undermined its integrity subject-wise. Given all these reasons, this article uses French archival documents and the relatively small number of these documents resulted in this period of three years being dealt with through a single article.

After this clarification, the main themes that will be explored in this article can be summarized as follows: The first part analyzes the Eastern Legion's occupation of Cilicia and its treatment of the Muslim population in the region. Ottoman archives are largely used in this section. The second part deals with the debates that pervaded the process of separating the Eastern Legion into two divisions for some political and practical reasons: the Armenian Legion and the Syrian Legion. The third part addresses the criticisms of certain Armenian committee leaders about the Armenian Legion to French authorities and the latter's response. Next, the article explores the indiscipline and disobedience of the Armenian Legion in Cilicia that would culminate in a rebellion and it underlines the French reaction to

1 Yusuf Sarıınay (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Volume II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, Three Volume.

2 Robert Ziedner, *The Tricolor over the Taurus*, Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Publications, 2005.

3 Ulvi Keser, *Kıbrıs Anadolu Ekseninde Ermeni-Doğu Lejyonu*, Ankara: Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği Yayınları, 2007, pp. 226-227.

that. While the fifth part looks into the Armenian migration to the Cilician region during the French occupation, the sixth one highlights legal problems regarding the Legions in this period and mentions the criticisms of some Syrian committee leaders on the Syrian Legion to the French authorities. The seventh and the eighth parts trace the process that resulted in the disbandment of the Eastern Legion. Being the last of the series, the article ends with an overall assessment of the Eastern Legion.

As it was with all the other articles of this series, this article also relies on authentic archival documents, which is very important so as to reflect the general atmosphere of that period as well as reveal the nature of how the French perceived the Armenians and the Syrians. These documents have been analyzed in the most objective way possible within an academic genre and the results have been noted down with very small explication. Unfortunately most of the works carried out on the Armenian problem either in the West or in Turkey have granted objectivism and the scientific attitude a lesser role, which has made it impossible to analyze the matter at hand in its full scale. Because archival documents are first hand sources to supply the researcher with authentic data, they also spare him/her from such problems objectivity. In short, this article benefits from only these first-hand sources and the developments on the Eastern Legion during these three years are analyzed within the general framework of the late 1910s and early 1920s as objective as is allowed in social sciences.

I. THE DISPATCH OF THE EASTERN LEGION TO THE ADANA PROVINCE AND THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION

The employment of the Eastern Legion in the occupation and control of Anatolian territories began two years after its establishment, approximately in November 1918. Before that, some of the vanguard divisions of the Legion had been deployed to Syria and Palestine; yet, the attack of some legionnaires against the local Muslim population there led to the Legion being dispatched to Anatolia. It was the Armistice of Mudros, signed on October 30, 1918 that provided the legal justification for the occupation of Anatolia. This part of the article is going to briefly touch upon the subsequent occupation of Cilicia to the Armistice of Mudros by the Eastern Legion and legionnaires' activities in the region until January 1919.

The first occupation forces began to land on the province of Çukurova on November 9, 1918, ten days after the Armistice had been signed. Through the protocol that was signed by David Beauregard, the representative of the Entente Powers, and Kaymakam Ali Bey, the commander of the İskenderun province, it was decided that the Ottoman army would evacuate the region. On November 12, the French officially occupied İskenderun, while on November 21, the divisions of the Eastern Legion that consisted of Armenians was transferred to the province. This was accounted in a telegram sent to the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs by the Governorship of Adana where it was stated that the small amount of Entente Powers deployed in İskenderun had withdrawn to be replaced

by Armenian soldiers.⁴ The Ottoman archives reveal that before the occupation spread, some Armenian battalions visited local governors to inform them about the upcoming invasion. For example, in a correspondence submitted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 11, there is a reference to a telegram sent by Nazım Pasha, the Governor of Adana.⁵ In this telegram the latter states that two Armenian priests and an Armenian officer came to the Dörtöl village from İskenderun by car on December 8, and that they declared the village to be occupied in a few days and warned the local community not to clash with occupation forces.⁶

As correspondence went on between the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, a division of the Eastern Legion consisting of 400 soldiers under the command of three officers occupied Dörtöl. In a telegram sent to the Sadaret Makamı by the Ministry of Military Affairs on December 14, it is noted that most of these legionnaires were conscripted out of Armenians who had fled from the Çukurova region. In other words, since French authorities did not have a good grasp of the region, they chose to make use of the divisions of the Legion as occupation forces which consisted of Cilician Armenians who had relatives still living in the area. However, this triggered Armenian legionnaires to attack the local Muslim population. They were motivated by the idea of taking revenge for the Armenian relocation for which the Muslim population had been held responsible by the Armenians and the latter's raids resulted in severe consequences. As a matter of fact, these offenses started right after the Legion's vanguard troops landed on İskenderun on November 30. The French Governor of İskenderun informed the Commander of French Forces in Near East, General Jules C. Hamelin that the legionnaires had engaged in terrorist activities against Muslims and that they had been attacking the local Muslim population within the pretext of saving Armenian women from the harems.⁷ The arrival of the actual Armenian Legion was still two weeks ahead when these developments took place. As soon as the main forces arrived, they scattered across the area and carried out usurpation, ransack and massacre in violation with the orders they received from French officers. These atrocities were recorded in detail in Ottoman archival documents. For example, on December 14, Armenian legionnaires broke into twelve houses, seized property and money and wounded a woman in her throat.⁸

In its institutionalization, the Eastern Legion comprised of four Armenian and two Syrian divisions. While the Syrian branches were deployed in Syria, the

4 From the Governorship of Adana to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 27 November 1918, BOA.HR.SYP.2555-2/18, Yusuf Sarınoy (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 3.

5 From the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Foreign Ministry, 11 December 1918, BOA. HR. SYP. 2555-2/33-36, Yusuf Sarınoy (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 4.

6 From the Governor of Adana Nazım Pasha to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 10 December 1918, BOA. HR. SYP. 2555-2/33-36, Yusuf Sarınoy (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 5.

7 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 78.

8 From the Ministry of Military Affairs to the Sadaret Makamı, 14 December 1918, BOA.BOE.340957, Yusuf Sarınoy (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, pp. 6-7.

remaining four Armenian ones were sent to the Cilician region. The First and Fourth Divisions of the Armenian Legion, occupied İskenderun, whereas on December 17 the Second and the Third Divisions invaded Mersin.⁹ In the telegram sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs by Nazım Pasha, the Governor of Adana, it is stated that 500 Armenian armed troops and around 20 officers arrived in Mersin.¹⁰ However, General Hamelin was almost sure that the Armenians would act offensively and that is why he ordered the Ninth Algerian Infantry to move to the city.¹¹ On December 17 when Mersin was occupied, the Commander of the Armenian Legion, Colonel Louis Romieu set up headquarters in Adana and got appointed as the commander of the occupation forces in Cilicia by General Hamelin.¹²

While the invasions generated great reaction on the part of the locals, there further emerged a pessimist atmosphere because of the withdrawal of the Ottoman armies two weeks before the occupation and the obligation to disband or abolish them as envisaged in the Armistice of Mudros. The telegram sent by the Governor of Adana, Nazım Pasha, on December 20, 1918 is very important in displaying his despair. As he wrote the following lines, a battalion of 350 soldiers consisting of mostly Armenian legionnaires had been invading Adana:¹³

According to the statements of a British officer from Aleppo, it is understood that Antep and Maraş will be occupied as well. Then, the province of Adana, İskenderun, Antakya, Belen, Antep and Maraş will be invaded. Without any doubt, Armenia will be eventually established in these lands through the provocation of anarchy and disorder. This situation must be ended immediately. There is by no means any sign of good will in neither the current state of affairs, nor the path it is going to follow. Actually, to waste time on needless share of opinion will result in significantly dreary circumstances and fait-accomplis, which would not be possible to reverse. Ottoman administration will be limited to a small part of Asia Minor.¹⁴

It was also disturbing for the Ottoman government that most of the French occupation forces comprised of Armenians. Ottoman Foreign Minister Reşid Pasha sent a letter to the French High Commissioner Admiral Amet in which he expressed his concerns over the possibility of the occurrence of undesired events that might arise out of the fact that the Armenian occupation forces in Adana were former Ottoman citizens. Reşid Pasha further requested that for the

9 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 74.

10 From the Governor of Adana Nazım Pasha to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 17 December 1918, BOA. HR. SYP. 2555-2/56, Yusuf Sarınoy (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 11.

11 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 74.

12 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 74.

13 From the Governorship of Adana to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 20 December 1918, BOA.HR.SYP.2555-2/69-70, Yusuf Sarınoy (der.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 16.

14 From the Governor of Adana Nazım Pasha to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 17 December 1918, BOA. HR. SYP. 2555-3/5, Yusuf Sarınoy (der.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 13. The original version of the telegram is present in the aforementioned book, yet it was rendered more simple through its transcription.

sake of maintaining order and peace, Armenian forces were not to be deployed in areas where Ottoman troops were being disbanded.¹⁵ Moreover, he reported to Admiral Amet and to the British High Commissioner Admiral Richard Webb the activities taken up by the Armenian soldiers in Adana, Payas and Dörtöyl against civilians in details. He requested that the Armenian soldiers were pulled out of the region urgently.¹⁶ Indeed General Hamelin was also discontented with the assaults and that throughout December, he inspected the troops in Adana and İskenderun in order to make them refrain from such offenses and comply with military discipline.¹⁷ What is more, he began to take into consideration complaints coming from the local gentry and requests asking for the Armenian Legion to be pulled out of the region and even be sent to farther areas such as Maraş.¹⁸

Raids on the local Muslim population continued throughout January 1919. On January 1, Armenian soldiers, without informing French officers, rallied the village of Karakese, an administrative district of Dörtöyl. They broke into houses, ransacked property and killed some of the villagers. General Rupin, the Commander of the French Occupation Forces in the region immediately rushed to the barracks and prevented the participation of further soldiers into the events.¹⁹ However, at every opportunity, Armenian legionnaires escaped the headquarters and went on with their rallies into villages with the arms and armoury they were provided by the French.

The deployment of French occupation forces that consisted mostly from Armenians in Cilicia encouraged Armenians living in surrounding areas. On that matter, a telegram sent by the Division Commandership of Gendarmerie in Maraş to the Ministry of Internal Affairs on January 21 is highly significant. It was stated that around four hundred Armenians living in Aleppo had been moving to İskenderun to join the Legion as volunteers and on the way they captured and slaughtered two Ottoman soldiers in the district of Afrin. Moreover, they attacked the Kefre and Baytar outposts, but the soldiers deployed there managed to defend themselves and withdraw.²⁰

In the meantime, the commanding wing of the French occupation forces were arriving to the region towards the end of January. General Hamelin who came to Adana on December 18, was followed by Colonel Edouard Brémont who was appointed as the Governor General of Cilicia on January 30. Brémont took office

15 From the Foreign Minister Reşid Pasha to the French High Commissioner Admiral Amet, 28 December 1918, BOA.HR.SYS 2555-2/66, Yusuf Sarıınay (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 17.

16 From the Foreign Minister Reşid Pasha to the French High Commissioner Admiral Amet and British High Commissioner Admiral Webb, 28 December 1918, BOA.HR.SYS 2555-2/71, Yusuf Sarıınay (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, pp. 18-19.

17 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 79.

18 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 79.

19 From the district official of Dörtöyl, Midhat Bey to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 4 January 1919, BOA.HR.SYS 2555-3/107, Yusuf Sarıınay (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, pp. 36-39.

20 From the Commandership of Gendarmerie of Maraş to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, January 21, 1919, BOA.HR.SYP.2602-1/22, Yusuf Sarıınay (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 24.

on February 2 along with Colonel Normand who took up the position of Deputy Governor.²¹

II. THE SEPARATION OF THE EASTERN LEGION INTO TWO BRANCHES

As the Eastern Legion occupied the Çukurova region, the French government had been discussing whether to divide the Legion into two parts. As a matter of fact, from the establishment of the Legion to the occupation of Cilicia, there were serious problems between the Armenian and Syrian legionnaires especially in the camps founded in Cyprus Monarga. The solution was sought in the idea of creating separate Armenian and Syrian divisions rather than mixed ones. As it has been mentioned above, by the time it was sent to occupy Ottoman lands, the Eastern legion was de facto divided into two. As of January 1919, the French Government had been trying to formalise this separation. This part of the article deals with this process and analyses the correspondence that took place between French political and military authorities.

In a document that was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Ministry of War on January 22, 1919,²² it was pointed out that the Armenian Committee (*Comité Arménien*) had asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to divide the Eastern Legion into an Armenian (*Légion Arménienne*) and a Syrian Legion (*Légion Syrienne*). While the Foreign Ministry forwarded this request to the Ministry of War, the latter did not welcome it. In its reply, the War Ministry stated that the Eastern Legion de facto had Armenian and Syrian troops separate from each other, and that currently four Armenian battalions were deployed in the Cilicia region whereas one Syrian counterpart was based in Syria. In short, the War Ministry decided that a formal separation would not bring any advantages to the Eastern Legion.²³ This correspondence is highly interesting in displaying the disagreement between the Armenians and Syrians in the Legion, as well as between the Foreign Ministry, (which argued in favour of the division), and the Ministry of War, (which found the suggestion dismissible). Yet again, the War Ministry wanted to consult the commanding wing of the French forces in the region.

As a reply, General Hamelin, who returned to Beirut in January, sent a telegram to the Africa division of the Ministry of War on January 12. Contrary to the

21 Ulvi Keser, *Kıbrıs Anadolu Ekseninde Ermeni-Doğu Lejyonu...*, pp. 226-227. The Ottoman documents refer to the titles of "Governor General" and "Deputy Governor" as "Vilayet Idare Memuru" and "Sancak Idare Memuru". On the issue of these appointments, please see the correspondence sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ahmet İzzet, 3 February 1919, BOA. HR. SYP. 2555-3/63, Yusuf Sarıncay (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 28.

22 Georges Clemenceau, who served as Prime Minister (Le Président du Conseil) from November 1917 to January 1920 in France, also held the position of Minister of War. This is why all correspondence from that period refer to him as both "Prime Minister" and "Minister of War". In order to avoid redundancy and prevent any confusion of terminology, "Ministry of War" will be used. Indeed, even though it may seem that correspondence took place between Prime Minister and another minister or among ministers, they were signed by the staff of the relevant ministries. While quoting from correspondence, this article opts for using names of the institutions rather than personal names except for special circumstances.

23 From the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, p. 2

decision reached by the War Ministry, the commanding wing asserted that such a separation within the Legion would be beneficial. They recommended that the Armenian Legion should consist of 4,124 Armenians currently based in Cilicia, while the Syrian Legion would be constituted by 698 Syrian soldiers deployed around Beirut and it would gain the same legal status with the Armenian one. General Hamelin also advised the Ministry to promote volunteer recruitments so as to enlarge the Syrian Legion.²⁴

Since both Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria, and General Hamelin defended the idea of dividing the Eastern Legion in an Armenian and a Syrian sub-legion, the Ministry of War then changed its position too. It was decided that by January 20, 1919 the Eastern Legion was officially divided into two branches, each enjoying the same legal status with their predecessors.²⁵ The new arrangement was communicated through a cryptic telegram to both Georges Picot and to the French missions in North and South America in order for the volunteer recruitments to be carried on accordingly.²⁶

Prominent members of the Armenian diaspora enthusiastically welcomed the division. While Bogos Nubar Pasha expressed his gratitude for this decision in the letter he addressed to Minister plenipotentiary Jean Gout, the Chairman of the Central Committee for Armenian Volunteers Sevadjian sent a letter to Prime Minister and Minister of War Clemenceau where he remained grateful to France, which he stated to be always helpful to the oppressed people and supportive of the establishment of a fully independent Armenia.²⁷

III. CRITICS OF THE ARMENIAN ORGANIZATIONS ON THE EASTERN LEGION

This friendly atmosphere between Armenian organizations and the French Government did not last long as the former began to highlight material and emotional problems that members of the Armenian legion had been going through. This part of the article takes an interest in how these criticisms were reflected to the French Government and how the latter responded.

24 From General Hamelin, Commander of French Forces in Near Asia, to the Africa Division of the Ministry of War, January 12, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 11.

25 From the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 20, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 16.

26 From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Georges Picot and French Diplomatic Missions in Washington, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos-Aires, Caracas, Quito, Havana, Port-au-Prince, Bogota, St. Domingue, St. Paul, Santiago du Chili, Mexico, La Paz and Lima, January 22, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 19.

27 From Bogos Nubar Pasha, the Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation, to Minister plenipotentiary Jean Gout of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 22, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 28; From Sevadjian, the Chairman of the Central Committee of Armenian Volunteers, to Prime Minister and Minister of War, Clemenceau, January 24, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 29.

Armenian legionnaires of the Eastern Legion had been complaining to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Chairman of the National Armenian Delegation, Bogos Nubar Pasha. A delegation consisting of members of the National Armenian Union of Egypt, which operated under the Armenian National Delegation, gave Bogos Nubar Pasha a report indicating Armenian grievances, which he, in turn, forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First of all, Bogos Nubar Pasha claimed that Armenian volunteers who had once been praised for their bravery by English and French commanders, were now considered as auxiliary troops of an inferior race and that they were subjected to inhumane treatment.²⁸ In fact, the report asserted that French officers humiliated Armenian volunteers by stating that the Turks had had reason to massacre Armenians.²⁹

According to Bogos Nubar Pasha, apart from this emotional degradation, Armenian volunteers suffered from a serious material discrimination, which he meant to exemplify through some comparisons. For instance, while an Algerian soldier had four-fifty francs daily allowance, an Armenian soldier was entitled to only two-fifty. Again whereas Christian and Muslim Arabs in Beirut received half-kilo flour and rice a day, five Armenians had a kilo of bread and two biscuits.³⁰

On January 25, Bogos Nubar Pasha sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs copies of two letters that had been sent by D.N.B. Katchedjian, the Chairman of the National Armenian Unity of Egypt, to Georges Picot and the commander of the Eastern Legion, Colonel Romieu.³¹ In the first letter addressed to Georges Picot, in addition to the aforementioned grievances, there were complaints about Armenian volunteers who had been serving in Cilicia wearing the same clothes for the past two years and that their outfit being not appropriate for the climate of the region. The letter that was sent to Colonel Romieu had a stricter tone by claiming that Armenian volunteers who had been sent to the Cilician region were not nourished well, their accommodation problems had not been dealt with and on top of these they had been insulted many times. Moreover, the letter pointed out that if these problems were not overcome, the consequences would deteriorate and neither civil nor military Armenians would tolerate these insults.³²

28 From Bogos Nubar Pasha, the Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation, to Minister plenipotentiary Jean Gout of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 13, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, p. 5.

29 From Bogos Nubar Pasha, the Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation, to Minister plenipotentiary Jean Gout of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 13, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, p. 5.

30 From Bogos Nubar Pasha, the Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation, to Minister plenipotentiary Jean Gout of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 13, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, p. 5.

31 For copies of these letters please see, From Bogos Nubar Pasha, the Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation, to Minister plenipotentiary Jean Gout of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 25, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, pp. 21-26.

32 From the Chairman of the Armenian National Unity of Egypt, D. N. B. Katchedjian, to the Commander of the Eastern Legion, Colonel Romieu, December 30, 1918, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, p. 24.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs passed all these letters of complaint on to the Ministry of War. Having looked at the issue, the latter, in his letter of reply, decided that most of the allegations were false. For example, the daily allowance paid to Armenian volunteers was two seventy-five francs, not two-fifty and this amount was determined as a result of the legal status of the Eastern Legion. Since the latter was an auxiliary force, it was perfectly normal for the government to pay these legionnaires less than what is paid to French soldiers. This arrangement had already been clearly underlined in the statute of the Eastern Legion that was prepared in 1916. Because legionnaires could not enjoy some of the side payments granted to the French soldiers, their daily earnings were relatively low.³³ In a report sent by General Hamelin on February 15, there were clear statements on how Bogus Nubar Pasha had distorted the realities. Hamelin argued that rather than 500gr flour and rice, it was 500gr of bread and 100gr of rice or vegetables that was given to Muslims and Christians, while Armenians received 700gr of bread and 200gr of rice.³⁴ As a result, the Ministry of War wanted to refute the criticisms of Armenian organizations and strived for the preservation of the status quo by pointing to the invalidity of these allegations.

IV. THE DISOBEDIENCE OF THE ARMENIAN LEGION AT CILICIA AND THE COMPLAINTS OF FRENCH MILITARY AUTHORITIES

As Bogos Nubar Pasha and other prominent Armenian leaders were determined to give a voice to the grievances of the Armenian Legion, French military authorities serving in Cilicia reported the disobedience of and atrocities committed against the local Muslim population by Armenians. Indiscipline and disobedience of Armenians since the occupation resulted in a major uprising around İskenderun in February 1919. The clash that began on February 2 between Armenian and Algerian legionnaires escalated quickly. By mid-February, most of İskenderun had been plundered; some French soldiers had been attacked and killed. These events are highly important in displaying the weakness of the French authority in Cilicia.³⁵

A cryptic telegram sent to the Ministry of Way by General Hameln on February 2, 1919 is also very significant in displaying the disobedience of Armenian soldiers in Cilicia. It was stated that Armenian troops had been first sent to Syria but having attacked the local Muslims, they were then transferred to Cilicia where they were expected to feel more at home. To the contrary, Armenian troops increased the level of their disobedience and wanted to take advantage of being under French protection by attacking the local Ottoman population. What is more, General Hamelin also underlined that he had been receiving complaints

33 From the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 23, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 27.

34 From the Commander of French Forces in Near East, General Hamelin, to the Africa Division of the Ministry of War, February 15, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 84.

35 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 80.

from British authorities in the region on the matter of Armenian soldiers engaging in pillaging and massacres.³⁶ In his report dated February 15, he stated that he had warned each of the Armenian troops for stopping the atrocities committed against the local Muslims, but that a great deal of them had not stopped.³⁷ This correspondence is very significant in showing the despair of French military authorities.

In a letter sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Georges Picot on February 19, it was recorded that Armenian troops in Iskenderun had attacked Muslim neighbourhoods, soldiers had burnt down two houses and that many Muslims had been wounded while one was murdered.³⁸ Picot prepared another report where he informed the Ministry that peace was restored on February 20, the Armenian battalion was disarmed, but he went on by arguing that some Armenian soldiers could start another set of clashes in the northern part of the region.³⁹ In a cryptic telegram sent to the Ministry of War by General Hamelin on February 25, it was stated that the Fourth Division that had participated in the clashes was disbanded with its squad being allocated to other divisions, while 400 Armenians were disarmed. The telegram also requested that these soldiers be sent to southern Tunisia until the end of the war.⁴⁰

In the meantime, the commanding wing of the British occupation forces in the region held their French counterpart responsible for the rebellion and its consequences and demanded that a strict position be adopted vis-à-vis the Armenian Legion. In a document dated February 20, 1919, Georges Picot pointed out that the Commander of British Forces, General Edmund Allenby had objected to the deployment of 1,000 more Armenian legionnaires to Cilicia. He added that Allenby insisted he was the man in charge on the field and that no change in the number of the troops could be made without his consent.⁴¹ However, the same General Allenby had concluded in December 1918 that the volume of the Eastern Legion might not be sufficient for securing control over the Cilician region and this was why he had permitted General Hamelin to recruit volunteers among Armenian immigrants in the Near East. In fact Allenby considered these immigrants as a potential source of disorder in the British

36 From the Commander of French Forces in Near East, General Hamelin, to the Africa Division of the Ministry of War, February 2, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 35.

37 From the Commander of French Forces in Near East, General Hamelin, to the Africa Division of the Ministry of War, February 15, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 85.

38 From Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 19, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 40.

39 From Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 20, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 41.

40 From the Commander of French Forces in Near East, General Hamelin, to the Africa Division of the Ministry of War, February 25, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 52.

41 From Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 20, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 42.

occupation zone and reasoned that it would be beneficial if they were controlled in the French army.⁴² Nevertheless, after the last act of disobedience, General Allenby first wished for the removal of the entire Armenian Legion from the region, but when faced with Hamelin's opposition, he developed a new strategy. Accordingly, the reinforced British 19th Infantry Division consisting of Indian soldiers took over the military control of the area and its commander General Walter S. Leslie was appointed as the commander of the Entente Powers in the region. The control of British forces initiated a relatively orderly period until they left Cilicia in October.⁴³

The punishment given to the divisions of the Armenian Legion who took part in the rebellion created great resentment among the prominent leaders of the Armenian diaspora. In a letter sent to Jean Gout by Bogos Nubar Pasha on February 28, the latter asserted that there had been legitimate and sound reasons for the Armenian unrest. In his words:

Was the Armenian Legion a victim of provocation? Are Armenian soldiers ripping off Turkish hands over the Armenian orphans and girls detained in the harems? Is this a consequence of intrigues forged by the Turkish administration, which continues to operate in Cilicia, and is not willing to acknowledge the presence of Armenian troops in the country?⁴⁴

It is very interesting that Bogos Nubar Pasha was trying to legitimize Armenian assaults, which had been condemned even by French military authorities who had established the Eastern Legion and deployed it in Cilicia. As a matter of fact, in the same letter Bogos Nubar Pasha wanted Jean Gout to initiate an investigation on this issue and thus disclose the facts. However, by then the French authorities had already conducted an investigation and prepared some reports. In the report dated March 1, prepared by Admiral Cassard who served in Port Said and sent to the Ministry of Navy, it was suggested that Armenian troops had not been provoked, but that they had been motivated with great feeling of vengeance against the Turks.⁴⁵ General Hamelin sent another report on similar terms to the Ministry of War.⁴⁶ As a reaction to these reports, a document was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ministry of War, in which it was defended that while Georges Picot had asked for an increase in the recruitment of Armenian volunteers, this would not be appropriate given the circumstances and that it would be put off until 'bad elements' of the Legion were eliminated.⁴⁷ In short, just

42 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 68.

43 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 80.

44 From Bogos Nubar Pasha, the Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation, to Minister plenipotentiary Jean Gout of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 28, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 59.

45 From Admiral Cassard serving at Port Said to the Ministry of Navy, March 1, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 60.

46 From the Commander of French Forces in Near East, General Hamelin, to the Africa Division of the Ministry of War, February 28, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 62.

47 From the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 5, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 68.

as it did not take into consideration the opinions of Bogos Nubar Pasha when he had brought up the complaints of the Armenian Legion, the French Government once again dismissed his interpretation of the events that shook the French authority in Cilicia to its very foundation.

In a telegram he sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 6, Georges Picot notes that Armenian soldiers did not even bother to apologize for their disobedience and their part in the uprising. He further added that while these soldiers wanted to leave the Eastern Legion, it was very essential that the Legion be preserved at whatever cost.⁴⁸

On March 5 the Ministry of War received a very interesting telegram in which General Hamelin expressed his desire to state his opinions on this matter by virtue of his experiences even though he claimed that as a military man, he was not entitled to speak on political matters. His main concern was the intelligence forwarded to him implying that the United States wanted to make the Armenian state, which would soon be established, an American protectorate. Given that France had undertaken huge costs to consolidate its military presence in the region, such a situation would gravely harm French interests and undermine its prestige and credibility.⁴⁹

On the same day General Hamelin sent another cryptic telegram to the Ministry of War. In this correspondence he informed the Ministry that 400 Armenian soldiers who had participated in the uprising in Cilicia were disarmed and sent to Port Said with a British ship by March 1. He also stated that the British commandership in the region had suggested that all Armenian troops be withdrawn, relocated in Morocco, and be replaced with a battalion of French colonial infantry. He went on by pointing out that two new British battalions had been brought to Cilicia. General Hamelin noted that he had not accepted this proposal by asserting that the foundational statute of the Armenian Legion did not allow it to be based in anywhere other than Cilicia.⁵⁰ All these documents testify to the distrust that French authorities harboured against the British.

V. ARMENIAN IMMIGRATION TO THE CILICIAN REGION

In the spring of the year 1919, when British military presence in the region established a relatively quite environment, Armenian immigration to the Cilician region accelerated. Governor General of Cilicia, Colonel Brémond stated that by the end of 1919 approximately 120,000 Armenians settled in the region and that

48 From Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 6, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, p. 67.

49 From the Commander of the French Forces in Near East, General Hamelin, to the Africa Division of the Ministry of War, March 5, 1919, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, p. 73.

50 From the Commander of the French Forces in Near East, General Hamelin, to the Africa Division of the Ministry of War, March 5, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Février 1921)*, p. 74.

this stood for almost one-third of the entire population of Cilicia.⁵¹ According to a dairy that belonged to a Khacher Matosian, an Armenian who migrated to Adana, in September 1919 the Armenian population in the whole Cilician region, together with those settled to the east of Amanos, was about 250,000 and that most of them were Armenians who were not originally from the Cilician region.⁵² Interestingly, among those who arrived to Cilicia was Andranik Ozanian Pasha, who had pioneered guerrilla activities against Ottoman troops during the First World War.⁵³ It is doubtlessly clear that the presence of an Armenian who earned a reputation for his atrocities against the local Muslim population in Eastern Anatolia would be highly detrimental to the already fragile state of affairs in Cilicia.

Upon the Armenian claim that Turks had been secretly arming themselves, on April 28, 1919 General Allenby and General Brémond agreed to disarm the city of Adana. Local population was ordered to hand their arms to the mission that would consist of a British battalion and an Armenian interpreter. The process of disarmament, however, was subjected to many incidents where many Muslims were attacked.⁵⁴ It was then followed by intense Armenian offence throughout summer and fall. In short, despite the efforts of the British forces to maintain order in the region, undisciplined and disobedient Armenian legionnaires were not prevented from committing atrocities against the local Muslim population, which was fully accounted in the Ottoman archival documents.⁵⁵

VI. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS OF THE EASTERN LEGION AND CRITICS AGAINST THE SYRIAN LEGION

The end of World War I brought about a serious discussion on the legal status and the military assets of the Eastern Legion. The letter that was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ministry of War on April 7 is an important document in respect of showing the problems and the overall situation of the Eastern Legion in April 1919. Accordingly, the Eastern Legion, which was founded in 1916 and most of whose volunteers would be employed until the end of the war, was now separated into two branches. The number of Armenian volunteers who actively fought in the Armenian Legion in the First World War had risen to 3,600. Nevertheless, 2,600 of these were soldiers whose contract would expire at the end of the war. The same went for the Syrians as 650 volunteers and 350 soldiers under contract. In other words, right after the end of the war, Armenian soldiers would decrease to 1,000, while Syrian troops would number around 300. In order to prevent that, a change was introduced to the statute of the Eastern Legion so as to give the legionnaires the chance of extending their contracts for one or two years.

51 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, pp. 95-96.

52 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 96.

53 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 96.

54 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurup...*, p. 107. For the entire text of the disarmament decree issued by General Bremond please see Süleyman Hatipoğlu, *Fransa'nın Çukurova'yı İşgali ve Pozantı Kongresi*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989, pp. 109-111.

55 Documents on that matter can be found in Yusuf Sarıncay (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni Fransız İlişkileri, Cilt II: 1918-1919*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002.

The Ministry of War also underlined that with the end of the war, the Eastern legion risked dismemberment and in order to prevent that the already existing four Armenian and two Syrian battalions needed to be preserved. For that, at least 3,000 Armenians and 1,500 Syrians had to be recruited to the Legion. However, there was a serious problem to that: The Commander of British forces in Britain and Cilicia, General Allenby. The Ministry of War stated that it was against the idea of receiving volunteers from Ottoman lands. For example, when France brought up the issue of recruiting volunteers among Druses and Ensnarés in Lebanon, General Allenby did not allow it. In order to eliminate British opposition on this matter, the Ministry of War wanted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to start an initiative vis-à-vis the British Government. It further wished for the promotion of volunteer recruitments in North America through similar campaigns directed towards the American Government.⁵⁶ However, after the war ended, volunteer recruitments almost ceased either among the non-Muslim population in Near East or from the American continent. This, in turn, made it almost impossible for the French to come up with new forces and left them with no choice but to make use of the existing troops. In fact, in a document sent by the Ministry of War to the Military Governor of Paris and District Generals of Marseilles and Bordeaux, it was stated that until further notice all volunteer recruitment activities from France and the United States were stopped. Thus they were instructed not to receive any volunteers coming to either Bordeaux or Marseilles.⁵⁷

In the meantime, in May 1919 prominent members of the Syrian organizations expressed another complaint about the Syrian Legion similar to those voiced by Armenian organizations about the Armenian Legion. On May 16, 1919, the Chairman of the Central Syrian Committee, Şükrü Ganem, sent a letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stephen Pichon. Accordingly, Syrian volunteers who had been cut off from the Eastern Legion were not offered new jobs in the region and that was why they went back to France in order to look for employment. Pointing to their misery, Ganem asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to help them by making Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner on the field, to issue a regulation providing for these former soldiers be offered jobs relevant to their qualifications.⁵⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly informed Georges Picot on the matter and asked for the cooperation of the High Commission in finding employment for these former legionnaires.⁵⁹

56 From the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 5, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 99.

57 From the Ministry of War to the Military Governor of Paris and District Generals of Marseilles and Bordeaux, August 22, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 145.

58 From the Chairman of the Syrian Central Committee, Şükrü Ganem, to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stephen Pichon, May 16, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 123.

59 From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria, George Picot, May 20, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 124.

On July 27 Georges Picot's letter of reply arrived in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Picot underlined that soldiers serving in the Syrian Legion were financially in a very bad situation compared to the members of the French army. For instance a French soldier received four-sixty six francs a day, whereas a Syrian legionnaire earned two-fifty five. The difference was even bigger for officers. A French officer was given twelve-sixty a day while his Syrian fellow got three-fifty. Picot noted down that this inequality created serious discontent among the soldiers.⁶⁰ In order to alleviate the situation, the Ministry of War agreed to make a minor increase in the salaries of Armenian and Syrian legionnaires. From then on soldiers received an extra fifty-five cents while officers got a raise of seventy cents.⁶¹ It is very significant that French authorities, who had not responded positively to such previous requests from Armenians, went ahead with Syrian wishes.

In a correspondence sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Ministry of War on September 27, legal problems suffered by Armenian and Syrian legions were highlighted and some solutions were suggested. According to the statute of the Eastern Legion, the contracts of Syrian and Armenian volunteers were good for fighting against Turkey during the war.⁶² However, as it has been mentioned above, the Legion continued to exist even after the war ended and the contracts of the legionnaires were extended for a year or two. In order to provide a legal excuse for the maintenance of both legions, the Ministry of War found it appropriate that a decree be prepared so as to extend the validity of the contracts of legionnaires based on the claim that clashes would continue until Entente Powers signed a peace treaty with Turkey. The last sentence of the document, however, is highly interesting: when it comes to the Armenian Legion, even though it is a valuable military asset, it might be disbanded for secret political reasons.⁶³ While these clandestine political motives were not spelled out, it is very probable that they were rooted in the disobedience of Armenian legionnaires, which resulted in a remarkable Turkish resistance against the French authority in the region making it very difficult for France to sustain the occupation. In fact, from that moment on the attitude of French authorities towards the Armenian Legion would deteriorate gradually.

VII. THE OCCUPATION OF ANTEP, MARAŞ AND URFA BY THE FRENCH, THE END OF THE TURKISH-FRENCH CLASHES AND THE DISBANDMENT OF THE EASTERN LEGION

On September 15, 1919, as a result of the Syria Accords signed between France

60 From Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 27, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 131.

61 From the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 135.

62 From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 27, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 149.

63 From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 27, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 149.

and Britain, cities of Maraş, Urfa and Antep, which had been invaded by the British, were handed over to the French. As soon as British forces withdrew from the region, French forces consisting of Armenian soldiers occupied these cities. The French had full control over Antep on October 27, Maraş on October 29, and Urfa on October 31.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the local population quickly organized a resistance movement, while forces of Turkish revolutionaries, Kuvva-i Milliye working in cooperation with the Government of the Grand Turkish National Assembly, did not remain indifferent to the invasion either. Especially as a result of the clashes in Maraş, the French military presence, including Armenian legionnaires, had to leave the city on February 11, 1920. That was followed by the liberation of Urfa from French occupation on April 11, 1920. The resistance in Antep, which began on April 1, 1920 and lasted for 11 months, ended in the French re-occupying the city on February 9, 1921 because of ammunition and food shortage. It was only after the Ankara Treaty that Antep was restored to Turkish control on December 25, 1921.

In the meantime, because of the change of government on January 20, 1920 in France, Georges Clemenceau had to leave his office to Alexandre Millerand, who also took over the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that was formerly performed by Stephen Pichon. André Lefèvre, in turn, was appointed as the Minister of War.

A letter sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ministry of War on May 20, 1920 is very remarkable in revealing the attitude of the new government towards the Armenian Legion. The document starts with the suggestion of General Gouraud, Chief Commander of the Levant Army, to disband the Eastern Legion as soon as possible because of the legionnaires' disobedient behaviour as he had expressed in a letter he sent to the Ministry of War on May 1.⁶⁵ The Ministry of War held a similar opinion:

These negative behaviours had been observed many times since our deployment in the Levant. Especially in Cilicia, the presence of auxiliary Armenian forces did nothing but to render our control of the region more delicate. The difficulties brought about by recent developments could, to a large extent, be argued to take root in the deployment of these forces in an area predominantly populated by Turks over whom Armenian legionnaires aspired nothing but to satisfy their vengeance.⁶⁶

Given these, the Ministry asserted that the Armenian Legion was not needed any longer, thus could be disbanded with a decree of the Ministry of Defence. As a matter of fact, the signing of the Sèvres Treaty at the end of the war by the Ottoman Government would leave no legal ground for the maintenance of the

64 Ulvi Keser, *Kıbrıs Anadolu Ekseninde Ermeni Doğu Lejyonu...*, p. 345.

65 For this letter, please see from the Chief Commander of the Levant Army, General Gouraud, to the Middle East Division of the Ministry of War, May 1, 1919, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 180.

66 From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 20, 1920, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 179.

Legion. However, the Ministry also argued that while the Armenian Legion can be disbanded, its Syrian counterpart should be preserved in order for French authorities to use it in areas that would remain under French protectorate.⁶⁷

The Ankara Treaty that was signed between the Government of the Grand Turkish National Assembly and France on October 20, 1921 brought the Eastern Legion to an end. In line with Article 1 of the Treaty the belligerent status between the Parties ceased to exist. Subsequent articles dealt with the release of war prisoners, the withdrawal of French forces to the south of the border delineated by Article 8 and deployment of Turkish forces to the north of it, the issuing of general amnesty in areas to be evacuated.⁶⁸ In sum, this treaty acknowledged that the French occupation had ended and that French forces including Armenian legionnaires would withdraw. The last French battalion left Mersin on January 5, 1922 leaving the entire region under Turkish control.

Right after the Ankara Treaty, Armenian camps in Monarga, Cyprus were immediately closed down. In fact, the British Governor of the island, Mr. Clauson, had been for a long time complaining about Armenians attacking Greek and Muslim villages. Seeing the opportunity that rose out of the Ankara Treaty, the Governor had the camps terminated within the framework of the treaty that had been signed between the French and British Governments. All the equipment and ammunition from the camps were handed over to Lieutenant Colonel Motherwell, the Commander of British War Prisoners Camp. While all correspondence found at the camps were seized, Armenian volunteers left the island in French ships. The graves of the Frenchmen who had died in these camps were taken to the French cemetery in Larnaca thanks to the efforts of the French diplomatic mission in Cyprus in the 1940s. Likewise, Armenian graves were carried to the Armenian cemetery in Larnaca.⁶⁹

CONCLUSION

Since this article is the last piece of a series of articles that have addressed the establishment and activities of the Eastern Legion, it would be plausible to strike a general assessment of the Legion in the conclusion part.

The project of the Eastern Legion was initiated as an attempt to facilitate the shortage of military personnel that France had been experiencing in mid-World War I. After the elite forces of the French army suffered severe casualties along the France-Germany line in the first two years of the War, the French Government, for its military operations in the Middle East, opted for using local units that shared a common vision of rebelling against the Ottoman rule in the region. That is why Muslim and Christian Syrians, and Lebanese volunteers were

67 From the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 20, 1920, Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Directorship of Political and Commercial Affairs, Serie E, Box 304, File 7, *Turquie: Légion d'Orient (1 Janvier 1919 – 4 Fevrier 1921)*, p. 179.

68 Selahattin Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar*, 4 Volumes, Ankara: Başbakanlık Kültür Müsteşarlığı Yayınları, 1974, vol. 4, p. 52.

69 Ulvi Keser, *Kıbrıs Anadolu Ekseninde Ermeni Doğu Lejyonu...*, pp. 522-531.

also incorporated into the Legion even though at the beginning it was decided that only the Armenians of Mount Musa would be recruited. These forces were first gathered at Port Said in Egypt and were then taken to the camps founded in Monarga, Cyprus.

France targeted Armenians and Syrians not only living in the Middle East, but also those who had migrated to the Americas and established considerable communities there throughout the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. For that purpose, Armenian and Syrian delegations were established to engage in propaganda activities in the Americas with all their expenses covered.

Despite the intense work done by Armenian and Syrian delegations, volunteer recruitment from South America did not meet the expectations of the French Government. The main reason for that was the weak legal status of the Eastern Legion, the problems caused by the discrepancy between the rights to retirement and pension of the legionnaires with those of French soldiers, and most importantly the clashes between the Armenian and Syrian communities living in Latin America. They were actually not confined to those living in South America, but were also in effect between Armenian and Syrian soldiers constituting the Legion itself.

Being established in 1916, the Eastern Legion, along with the French army, was taken to the Cilician region so as to occupy the area within the terms of the Mudros Truce. However, the disobedience and indiscipline displayed by the legionnaires pertaining to the Armenian Legion caused discontent on the part of French and British officers. These legionnaires would often break away from their garrison, attack local Muslim population, and engage in plunder and massacres. All these assaults were accounted for both in Ottoman and French archives. The level of disobedience of the legionnaires would sometimes go as far as uprising against the French army, which resulted in the rebels being expelled to Port Said.

The French occupation which had started in Adana and its surrounding in 1918, was then extended to cities of Antep, Urfa and Maraş as a result of the Syria Accords, signed between France and Britain in September 1919, providing for the withdrawal of British forces from these cities and their replacement with French troops. Nevertheless, while there was no resistance organized during the occupation of Adana because of the lack of Turkish national awareness, this was by no means the case with respect to the invasion of Antep, Urfa and Maraş. In fact, from the occupation of Adana to those of Antep, Urfa and Maraş, Mustafa Kemal had moved to Samsun and started to organize the national resistance movement. The latter took a gained a more organized and coordinated character when the Grand Turkish National Assembly was established on April 23, 1920. With the national consciousness on the rise, the French occupation faced fierce resistance and the forces of Kuvva-i Milliye were able to repel French forces on many occasions.

With the Ankara Treaty, which was signed on October 20, 1921 between France and the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the *raison d'être* of the Eastern Legion ceased to exist, which led to the disbandment of the

Legion, termination of the camps in Monarga and legionnaires being sent back to France. Hence, buried to the dark pages of history, in its aftermath the Eastern Legion, one of the biggest legionnaire formations stational in the Middle East during World War I was buried in to dark pages of history.

BOOK REVIEWS

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TURKISH ACCUMULATION VIS-À-VIS ARMENIAN ALLEGATIONS

(ERMENİ İDDIALARI KARŞISINDA TÜRKİYE'NİN BİRİKİMİ)

Author: Prof. Dr. Hikmet Özdemir

Ankara, TBMM Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008, 163 Pages.

The book entitled “Turkish Accumulation Vis-à-vis Armenian Allegations” written by Prof. Dr. Hikmet Özdemir gives detailed information on the issue of publications in Turkey on the Armenian issue which have been published until today.

Prof. Dr. Hikmet Özdemir, who interprets the increase in numbers and the quality of the recent publications in Turkey as a positive trend, wishes for a change in academic circles to be effective especially in civil society organizations.

In the first part of the book, it is seen that Prof. Özdemir, who examines the literature of the Turkish thesis against the Armenian claims regarding the events of 1915 under two different headings separates these in two periods: before Lausanne and from Lausanne to the end of 2007. Regarding the period before Lausanne, the author emphasizes the “territory claims” of the Ottoman Armenians in Eastern Anatolia which were rejected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly administration. This solution was officially acknowledged within the Lausanne Peace Treaty, and the Armenian claims were accounted invalid. For this reason, Prof. Özdemir, who interprets the Lausanne Peace Treaty as a historical turning point, provides for details and tables concerning rare publications.

Publications before Lausanne are examined under three separate headings: publications in Europe, the memoirs of Talat Pasha and Cemal Pasha. In the subsequent part, the publications after Lausanne are evaluated in two phases. The period in question is examined in two separate categories; publications pre-1970 and post-1970.

The third part of the book is kept longer since there are more publications in this period. Prof. Özdemir, who interprets the period after 1923 from Lausanne up to 1980 as a “rebellion with Pen”, mentions the formation of two separate attitudes after Lausanne in the context of lethargy experienced in Turkey during this period.

The book includes some examples regarding the extreme “sensitivity” in various echelons. The reactions to Prof. Leon Kawan in 1931 and Armenian diaspora in the periods of Atatürk and İnönü has also been touched upon. He also interprets two notes of statement added to the original text of Prof. Kawan which was presented in the Population Congress held in Rome in 1931 while it was being prepared for publication in Turkey in 1935 as a response to the writer because of the distortions applied in the text.

The book, which includes the policies regarding Armenia during the İnönü period, also mentions the visit of the Prime Minister of the İsmet İnönü period to Armenia in 1935. Prof. Özdemir, who notes that some studies were carried on in the General Staff on the issue of the Armenian question in the coming years, underlines that there is important information about the activities of the Armenian diaspora, especially in the report titled “Report of State of the General Staff” in 1949. In this work, Armenian demands during the years in question were pointed out. Chronological information about the Turkish-Armenian dispute is also included.

In this part, there is also information about the classic work of Esat Uras, titled *Armenian and the Armenian Question in History*. Uras’s book comes first among the essential reference books about the Armenian question. Prof. Özdemir evaluates this work as the single undisputable book which is prepared by using Armenian resources in original language in the field of Armenian studies in Turkey, and he also mentions broadly the contents of the book.

Prof. Özdemir, who indicates that the first “rebellion by pen” about the Armenian issue in Turkey emerged in 1965 as a result of activities against Turkey, points out that the first article about this issue was published in the *Journal of Turkish History in Documents* under the leadership of a lawyer, Ertuğrul Zekai Ökte in 1967. Prof. Özdemir mentions the academic meetings again with regard to the Armenian issue, and the works of the Turkish Historical Society (THS) about the issue. He also gives some examples from the works published by the THS on the Armenian issue.

In this book, in which there also are publications by the Institute for Armenian Research, information about the journals of the institute and the congress papers published between the years 2004 and 2007 is included. In addition, the book contains information about the ATASE archive of the General Staff concerning the Armenian issue and the works published by the State Archives. In the table at the end of this part it is clearly seen that there is a progressive increase in publications especially after 2000. In the book which also includes publications in foreign languages, it is seen that there was rapid progress in Turkey in the field of foreign publications between the years 1975-2007.

In conclusion, the work titled “Turkish Accumulation vis-à-vis Armenian Allegations” is fundamental since it gives a brief history of Turkish studies in the field of Armenian studies and guides researchers interested in this subject. In addition, studies made in each period are enriched with tables. This work, which can be considered as a chronological book examining the Turkish thesis regarding the events of 1915, is fairly important in terms of demonstrating Turkey’s place regarding the Armenian issue.

BOOK REVIEWS

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THE ARMENIAN COMMITTEES' IN PURSUIT OF A GREATER ARMENIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS

(*BELGELERLE BÜYÜK ERMENİSTAN PEŞİNDE ERMENİ KOMİTELERİ*)

Author: Jean-Louis Mattei

Istanbul, Bilgi Yayınevi, 2008, 355 Pages.

In the 19th century states such as France, Britain and Russia have developed policies in line with the interests of the Ottoman state with economical reasons and posed the issue of the “Eastern Question”. They tried to secure their trade routes in their favor by beginning to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state through minorities. Armenians, who were used as intermediaries, accepted to be the tool of imperialist states in order to establish an independent state with the national consciousness that they acquired. This situation turned out to be a mutual relationship of interest between the imperialist states and Armenians. Armenians, who acquired national consciousness at the end of the 19th Century, took action for independence, and Armenian revolutionary committees began to be established. These Armenian committees initiated revolts and terrorist activities.

French writer and researcher Jean-Louis Mattei demonstrates the activities of the Armenian committees, especially in Bursa, who resorted to violence as of 1890, in his work titled *The Armenian Committees' Pursuit of a Greater Armenia Through Documents*.

The most important aspect of this work is that resources and documents in different languages are used. Mattei, who studied French Literature and Latin, Ancient Greek Languages, speaks Latin, Modern Greek, Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Turkish, Armenian, Russian, German, and French. The use of resources in Ottoman Turkish, Turkish, Armenian, Russian, German, and French in this work is important for the objective evaluation of the work.

This book is composed of twelve parts. In the first part entitled “Why this book”, the author explains why he conducts research on Armenians as a French national. According to the author, who was sent to Turkey in 1976 by the French government which allowed educated young people to do their military service abroad. The writer informs that he has questioned the Turkish image in

France; barbarian Turks who slaughtered Armenians. This image has lately begun to change.

Under the heading of the second part “Information on Armenians”, Mattei begins studying the issue by giving brief information about Armenians. He also passes on information about Armenian history on the basis of resources in Armenian. The author emphasizes that the Ottoman Armenians have never been slaughtered even though they lived among Byzantines and Persians and then among Turks, Russians, and Iranians. He also demonstrates that they were religiously independent. Mattei, who compares Greeks and Armenians, indicates that Armenians were not a majority like Greeks were. They were a minority living divided in the East. He also indicates that Russia has supported Armenian nationalism after the 1980s and has played from time to time a negative role in Armenian-Turkish relations.

In the third part under the heading of “Armenians were not slaughtered in the Ottoman city Bursa during the Deportation”, by relying on the documents it is demonstrated that atrocities against Armenians were not carried out. It is presented with documents that Armenians, who were the second minority after Greeks in Bursa, received aid after the earthquake that occurred in 1895. Armenians of Bursa received financial aid in the years when Armenian events began which shows Armenians were not maltreated.

It is explained that Armenians working in silk factories in Bursa, and owners of these factories were under the pressure of some committees such as Hinchak and Tashnak. Mattei, who uses the newspapers *Hüdavendigâr* and *Ertuğrul* published in Bursa, displays the work waged against the Armenian committees through these newspapers’ agencies.

The writer indicates that the the relocation decree could not be totally approved and innocent people had to be punished aside the offenders. The committees are pointed out to be the reason of this fact. In the conclusion of this section, it is explained that the Armenians of Bursa were not slaughtered, and some of them were never subjected to deportation.

In the fourth section entitled “Armenians in the City of Marseille”, Mattei, who is himself from Marseille, gives brief information about this city. Subsequently the historical background of the Armenians in Marseille is examined. It is indicated that there were also Armenians among those who exported silk to Marseille in the 18th century, and at the end of 19th and in the beginning of 20th centuries there were also Armenians who moved to Marseille from the Ottoman state. The writer explains obtaining information about the Armenians arriving in Marseille after the 1920s from the magazine *L’Arc-en-ciel Arménien* and Takavorian’s short story *Armenouche*. The writer expresses that in such works all the Armenians were innocent and puts forth negative aspects of the revolutionary ignored by the Armenian committees. In addition to these, a film by Ashot Manukian entitled *558, Rue Paradis* is analyzed within this framework. The writer, who mentions the “genocide monument” in Marseille,

also draws attention to the “genocide monument” built for Armenians who died in Karabakh.

The researcher, indicating that Armenian propaganda has worked continuously throughout history, gives examples from the Armenian press about this issue. He examined the newspaper *Armenia* as an example from the press. It is shown with quotations from the journal that *Armenia* which was succeeded by *L’Arc-en-ciel Arménien* in 1990, continued the anti-Turk attitude. In this study, some Armenian studies of Marseille and the full interview with the Turkish consul in Marseille Taylan İzmirli was broadcasted in *Escape Arménien* affiliated with the radio station *Radio Dialogue*.

Under the heading of the fifth part, “Armenian Revolutionary Organizations and Parties”, the historical background of groups and committees that waged terrorist acts in Turkey is given. Firstly, the author provides information on the history of the *Armenagan Party*. Secondly, the *Hinchak Party*, which is evaluated as a party that contrasted with chauvinist nationalism and socialism, is examined. The activities of the party, whose program has been given, are proved to be terrorist activities. General activities and propaganda methods of the *Hinchak Party* are explained and the acts of rebellion. The Kumkapı Demonstration and Bab-i Ali demonstration are also dealt with. That the Hinchak Party is a proponent of terror is shown to the reader through excerpts from various resources and documents. In this part, thirdly, information about the *Tashnaksutyun Party* has been given. The writer, who makes assessment by utilizing various resources, expresses that there was a competition between the *Tashnak* and *Hinchak*. The report of Colonel Debeil is given and analyzed about the terrorist activities of *Tashnak*.

Mattei, who refers to the works of Anahide Ter Minassian almost throughout of the study, shows insubstantiality Minassian’s attempt to exonerate the Tashnaksutyun. It is possible to find information about the propaganda agencies such as *Troshak* and *Pro Armenia* here. Another striking issue in this part is the analysis of the Kurdish and Armenian collaboration. Some articles of the accord signed between the *Kurdish Hoybun Society* and *Tashnaksutyun* are provided with comments of the author.

In the sixth part under the heading of “Eastern Incidents”, the Armenian incidents in the East, which had begun at the end of the 19th century and that lasted until the beginning of the 20th Century, assessed. The Eastern incidents of the period are explicated on the basis of the work of V.T. Mayevski titled *Portrait of Van and Bitlis Provinces in Statistics* and the short stories of Avetis Ahorianian. As a witness, the work of Maveyski is considered important. The works of Ahorianian, although written on propaganda purposes, reflects the situation in the East quite well. In addition to these resources, there are references to the works of Anahide Ter Minassian and Chelebian, which are also frequently resorted to other chapters.

In the seventh part entitled “Armenian Propaganda Before and After Deportation” the Armenian propaganda tools are evaluated. The function of Armenian

propaganda is explained by excerpts from the weekly journal *Masis* and the book titled *Nor Knar*. In addition to the translation of the poems, there are also transcriptions from Armenian to Turkish. That there are some minor problems in transcriptions from Armenian to Turkish which stems from the fact that a standard could not be set in while transcribing.

In this part, it is explained how the newspaper *Horizon*, which makes the propaganda of the Tashnak Party, *Matter of Reform, Protest, and The Forgotten Heroes* prepared by Kristopher Mikaelian, *Avazagabedi* of Arman Shidanian and the comic named as *Le Rire* were used as tools of propaganda. In addition to these, the book entitled *Arménie 1900*, which was used as a tool of propaganda after relocation is examined. Another striking issue in Armenian propaganda is the claims of Turkish and Kurdish collaboration against Armenians. The researcher, who shows the negative attitude of Armenians towards Kurds and common activities of Armenians and Kurds that were in contradiction with this, displays that Armenian propaganda pursues a policy of lies and silence.

Under the heading of “Armenian Anti-Revolutionary Epigram: Comrade Panchuni (1909, 1914, 1923)”, the eighth part, the work of Yervant Odian titled *Comrade Panchuni* is examined. The reason this work is examined is that it describes the Armenian committees very well. There was an inconsistency between the policies of the Ottoman state and Odian. However, it is important that Armenian committees of a period are humorously scrutinized with *Comrade Panchuni*. The happening in which the character Panchuni provoked those who worked in factory with his undertakings is being narrated in connection with the Armenian workers who were on strike in Bursa. The establishment of such a connection shows the reality of the story titled *Panchuni*. Through the detailed analysis of the author, it is proved that some Armenian organizations are not innocent.

Under the heading of “Deportation”, which is the ninth part, the committees’ armed clashes with the Turkish soldiers and their harms to the civilians are being told. The decision taken on April 24, 1915 for the closure of the committees is mentioned. Among those who were arrested, the situations of Daniel Varujan and Rupen Sevak are examined. The researcher indicates that all of those who were arrested were not offenders, and there were also innocent people who died aside the homicides. The writer, who indicates that the decision of relocation was taken on 27 May 1915, tells the tragic story of Madam Chukurian under the name of “*Exile at the age of eight*”. Mattei says that the Armenian committees brought about this tragic event.

Additionally, accusations of Yves Ternon and documents of fake Andonian are examined. The researcher shows in documents that the information given by Ternon are false, and the documents of Andonian are fake. The number of Armenians subjected to relocation in the years 1915-1916 and the losses of Armenians are given in this part under the light of some documents.

Under the heading of “An Enemy of Turks: Zoravar Antranik (General Antranik)”, which is the tenth part, the political activities of Antranik Ozanian, who was an

eminent representative of Armenian revolutionary movements, are scrutinized. Information about General Antranik is obtained from the book of Antranik Chelebian titled *General Antranik and Armenian Revolutionary Movement*. It is known that the aim of Antranik was to demolish the Ottoman state and establish a Greater Armenia. Here, the reason of Antranik's stay abroad and his actions in Bulgaria are questioned. The corpse of Antranik famous for his racist attitude was taken from France to Yerevan with an official ceremony in 2000. The researcher urges the reader to ponder on policies of Armenia with information he gives.

Under the heading of "The Pride of Armenians: Kevork Pamukchian and Pars Tuğlacı", which is the eleventh part, the two personalities mentioned that may be mediators for solving existing problems are discussed. It is indicated that Pars Tuğlacı has positive contributions to Turkish-Armenian relations. Pamukchian has also been evaluated in the same way. It is emphasized that the works of these people should be taken into account in research conducted today.

In the conclusion, the author mentions a letter of protest that he sent in correspondence to Bernard Thomas about the Armenian issue in a famous French journal called as *Le Canard Enchaîné*. In addition to this, the bloody events initiated by the ASALA terrorist organization, the dissolution of the U.S.S.R and the establishment of Armenia, are addressed.

Overall, this work entitled as *The Armenian Committees' Pursuit of a Greater Armenia Through Documents* is an important work explaining the activities of Armenian committees starting from 1890, especially in Bursa and France, Armenian propaganda and the events of 1915 by making use of various resources.

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THE SITUATION OF THE ARMENIANS: BY ONE WHO WAS AMONG THEM

By Hj Pravitz, *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*, 23 April 1917.

Hj Pravitz takes a deeper look at the statements that had previously been made by Mrs. Marika Stjernstedt, in Nya Dagligt Allehanda, a Swedish Newspaper published in the period 1859-1944.

"... Recently returned home from abroad I have right now - i.e. somewhat late - had the opportunity to look at two Swedish booklets on the Armenian issue. "Sven Hedin - adelsman" [Sven Hedin - a nobility], by Ossiannilsson and "Armeniernas fruktansvärda läge" [the terrible situation of the Armenians], by Marika Stjernstedt. The former book went immediately in the waste basket. In all its poorly hidden appreciation of the title character, it annoyed me more than a main article in *Dagens Nyheter*. The latter, which seemed spirited by the compassion for the suffering Armenians, I have read repeatedly, and it is really this and its inaccuracies that my article is about.

I dare to claim, that hardly any other Swede has had the opportunity like me, to thoroughly and closely study the misery among the Armenians, since I now for about a month have traveled right among all the emigrating poor people. And this, during the right time, fall 1915, during which the alleged brutalities, according to both writers, were particularly bad.

I want to hope, that what I am describing below, which are my own experiences, will have the purpose to remove the impression of inhumanity and barbarity from the Turkish and German side, which is easily induced by the reading of the two booklets mentioned above.

If I understand the contents of the books correctly, both writers want to burden the Turks as well as the Germans with deliberate assaults or even cruelties.

My position as an imbedded eyewitness gives me the right and duty to protest against such claims, and the following, based on my experiences, will support and strengthen this protest.

Despite the fact that I was and am such a pronounced friend of Germany and its allies, which is consistent with the position of a servant of a neutral country, I started my journey from Konstantinopel (Istanbul) through the Asian Turkey, with a certain prejudiced point of view, partly received from American travelers,

about the persecution of the Armenians by their Turkish masters. My Lord, which misery I would see, and to which cruelties I would be a witness! And although my long service in the Orient has not convinced me that the Armenians, despite their Christianity, are any of God's best children, I decided to keep my eyes open to see for myself to which extent the rumors about Turkish assaults are true and the nameless victims were telling the truth.

I sure got to view misery, but planned cruelties? Absolutely nothing.

This is precisely why it has appeared to me to be necessary to speak up.

To start with, it is unavoidable to state, that a transfer of the unreliable Armenian elements from the northern parts of the Ottoman Empire to the south was done by the Turkish government due to compulsory reasons.

It should have been particularly important to remove, from the Erzeroum district, all these settlers, who only waited for a Russian invasion to join the invading army against the hated local legal authority. When Erzeroum fell in February 1916, an Armenian, with whom I just shared Russian imprisonment, uttered something I interpreted as 'it would have fallen way earlier if we had been allowed to stay.' That a country like Turkey, threatened and attacked by powerful external enemies, is trying to secure itself against cunning internal enemies, no one should be able to blame her.

I think it points to a misconception when one claims that the Armenians are living under the uninterrupted distress of some sort of Turkish slavery. There are peoples that have it worse. Or what about Indian Kulis and Bengalis under British rule, and the Persian nationalists in Azerbaijan under the Russians' - "pénétration pacifique", and the Negroes in Belgian Congo, and the Indians in the Kautschuk district in French Guyana. All these, not to mention many others, seem to me, are victimized to a higher degree and more permanently than the Armenians. I guess technically, one can say that a longer lasting but milder persecution is less bearable to endure than a bloody but quick act of despotism, as in (Ottoman) assaults of the kind that from time to time put Europe's attention on the Armenian issue. Apart from these periodical so-called massacres, the reason of which could to a large degree be ascribed to the Armenians themselves, I do think that the (Armenians) are treated reasonably well.

The (Armenians) have their own religion, their own language, both in speaking and writing, their own schools etc.

As far as the much discussed major Armenian migration is concerned, I am the first to agree that the attempts of the Turkish side to reduce the difficulties of the refugees left a lot to be desired. But I emphasize again, in the name of fairness, that considering the difficult situation in which Turkey, as the target of attack from three powerful enemies, was in and it was, in my opinion, almost impossible for the Turks, under these circumstances, to have been able to keep up an orderly assistance activity.

I have seen these poor refugees, or "emigrants", to use Tanin's words, seen them closely. I have seen them in the trains in Anatolia, in oxen wagons in Konia and elsewhere, by foot in uncountable numbers up in the Taurus mountains, in camps in Tarsus and Adana, in Aleppo, in Deir-el-Zor and Ana.

I have seen dying and dead along the roads - but among hundreds of thousands there must, of course, occur casualties. I have seen childrens' corpses, shredded to pieces by jackals, and pitiful individuals stretch their bony arms with piercing screams of "ekmek" (bread).

But I have never seen direct Turkish assaults against the ones hit by destiny. A single time I saw a Turkish gendarme in passing hit a couple of slow moving people with his whip; but similar things have happened to me in Russia, without me complaining, not then, nor later.

In Konia, there lived a French woman, Madame Soulié, with family and an Italian maid. They lived there, despite the war, and the Turks did them no harm. And as far as the Germans stationed in the town are concerned, she called them 'our angels.' 'They give all they have to the Armenians!.' Such evidence of German readiness to sacrifice I established everywhere the Germans were.

In Aleppo, I lived by the Armenian Baron, the owner of a large hotel. He did not tell me about any Turkish cruelties, although we talked a lot about the situation of his fellow citizens. We also talked about Djemal Pasha, who would come the day after and with whom I would meet. Baron expressed himself very positively about this man, who by the way, least of all seemed like an executioner.

In Aleppo, I hired an Armenian servant, who then during a couple of months was my daily company. Not a word has he told me about Turkish cruelties, neither in Aleppo nor in his home town of Marash or elsewhere. I must unconditionally believe in exaggerations from Mrs. Stjernstedt's side and I do not put one bit of confidence in the Armenian authorities she claims to refer to.

On page 44, Mrs. Stjernstedt writes about (the town of) Meskene and an Armenian doctor Turoyan. I was in Meskene right when he was supposed to have been there. I looked carefully around everywhere for historical landmarks, since Alexander the great crossed the Euphrates (river) here, and the old testament also talks about this place. There was not a sign of Armenian graves and not of any Armenians either, except for my just mentioned servant. I consider Mr. Turayan's evidence very questionable, and I even dare to doubt that this man, if he exists, was ever there during the mentioned time. If the conditions in Meskene really were as he claims, will anyone then believe that the suspicious Turks would have sent an Armenian up there with a "mission from the government"?

For fourteen days, I followed the Euphrates; it is completely out of the question that I during this time would not have seen at least some of the Armenian corpses that, according to Mrs. Stjernstedt's statements, should have drifted along the river en masse at that time. A travel companion of mine, Dr. Schacht, was also

traveling along the river. He also had nothing to tell when we later met in Baghdad.

In summary, I think that Mrs. Stjernstedt, somewhat uncritically, has accepted the hair-raising stories from more or less biased sources, which formed the basis for her lecture.

By this, I do not want to deny the bad situation for the Armenians, which probably can motivate the collection initialized by Mrs. Stjernstedt.

But I do want to, as far as it can be considered to be within the powers of an eyewitness, deny that the regular Turkish gendarme forces, who supervised the transports, are guilty of any cruelties.

Later on, in a different format, I want to impartially and neutrally like now treat the Armenian issue, but at the moment, may the adduced be enough.

Rättvik, April 1917

HJ Pravitz.

