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# REVIEW ESSAY: AURORE BRUNA’S ANTI-HISTORY OF THE ANKARA AGREEMENT

(DEĞERLENDİRME YAZISI: AURORE BRUNA’NIN  
ANKARA ANTLAŞMASI HAKKINDAKİ ÇARPIK TARİHÇESİ)

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**Aurore Bruna, *L’Accord d’Angora de 1921. Théâtre des relations franco-kémalistes et du destin de la Cilicie* (Paris : éditions du Cerf, 2018).**

The political affiliation and agenda of authors are not, in themselves, relevant to assess the value of their books; but the counterpart of this principle is that historians must, as much as possible, leave aside their political preferences in working on history and in writing it. Aurore Bruna is currently (2021) serving as chair of the Ramkavar-affiliated Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU, *UGAB* in France) of Marseille, after having been, from 2018 to 2020, president of the southern branch of Coordination Council of France’s Armenian Associations (CCAF), also headquartered in Marseille. Regrettably, this book is not a scholarly contribution; it is not even a partly valuable, politically oriented work akin to what other Armenian nationalist historians have made.<sup>1</sup> This is, rather, a

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1 For example, please see: Gregory L. Aftandilian, *Armenia, Visions of a Republic. The Independence Lobby in America, 1918-1927* (Boston: Charles River Books, 1981) ; Mark Malkasian, “The Disintegration of the Armenian Cause in the United States, 1918-1927,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XVI-3, August 1984: pp. 349-365 ; Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915-1923*, (London-Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984).

kind of political tract, but without the quality of any ordinary tract, namely concision. It is a repetition of most of the traditional grievances of the Armenian nationalists against Turkey, the French diplomacy, and the large majority of the French press in 1920-1923. According to these grievances, in essence; the Armenians, a people entirely made up of innocents, were betrayed by France (and other powers) for poorly conceived economic interests, while Turkey is evil and the Turks have never done anything right.

Chaotically organized, the book irritates in this regard even the most favorably disposed reader, and in fact, no review or citation can be found on Google scholar more than two years after its publication. The introduction is an overview, often inaccurate, of the late Ottoman history and of the subject of the book: The Ankara Agreement between France and Turkey in 1921 (a peace treaty in practice), its causes, its perception in the French press and its short-term consequences. The two first chapters are devoted to the Turkish national movement and the Greek-Turkish war. The three next chapters speak about the preparation, the signature, and the context of the Ankara Agreement. Two other chapters claim to be devoted to the public opinion and the Agreement, but are in fact mostly devoted to British and Swiss articles attacking this peace and to the tiny minority of French newspapers defending such views, with an odd and irrelevant reference to the short-lived pro-Armenian movement in France (1896-1897). The last three chapters speak about the aftermath of the Agreement.

### The General Problem Of The Sources

This book is the published version of a master's thesis submitted in 2007. It cannot be judged according to the standards of a doctoral dissertation, still less as the author never got a PhD. However, as it has been published more than ten years after the master's thesis was submitted, it is only fair to expect somewhat more than the references of a master's thesis. Yet, it is far from reaching even what is normally required for such a research.

Regarding the bibliography, the only major book written in a Western language on the French occupation of Çukurova, namely the published dissertation of Robert Zeidner,<sup>2</sup> is never cited (even to criticize it) and the monumental history of the Turkish war of national liberation by Stanford Jay Shaw<sup>3</sup> is equally absent. A master's thesis should be rejected for less than that.

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2 Robert Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurus* (Ankara: TTK, 2005) (1st edition: New York, 1996).

3 Stanford Jay Shaw, *From Empire to Republic. The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923* (Ankara: TTK, 2000).

Barely less serious is the ignorance of most of the basic bibliography regarding the end of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of modern Turkey: Feroz Ahmad, Edward Erickson, Kemal Karpat, Bernard Lewis (mentioned in name only), Andrew Mango, Xavier de Planhol, Jean-Paul Roux, Salâhi Sonyel, Stéphane Yerasimos and Gilles Veinstein are never cited, even negatively. Correspondingly, no book or article published after 2007 has been used. Even more incredibly, the voluminous literature on the relations between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Armenian nationalists is disregarded, despite the numerous pages devoted by the author to the policy of Britain and to a lesser extent of the United States.

Concerning the printed sources, the *Speech* (1927) of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is cited only one time, the recollections of Damar Arikoğlu and Abdülgani Girici (two Turkish witnesses of the events in Çukurova at that time), the book of Turkish journalist Alaeddine Haïdar published in 1921, etc., are completely ignored. Even more paradoxically, the author emphasizes the importance of memoirs and of the point of view of the officers, but in practice, she has neglected the majority of the published testimonies of French officers who served in Çukurova and the neighborhood during the occupation and/or evacuation, namely Maurice Abadie, Édouard Andréa, Maxime Bergès, Georges Boudière, Raoul Desjardins, Jean Pichon, Dr. Simon, Auguste Sarrou (Ms. Bruna mentions him pp. 96-97, but does not seem to know even his first name), C. Thibault, the wife of Gaston Anfré (I include her in the list because her husband expressed the same views in the archival documents), an anonymous officer<sup>4</sup>, and the first book of Roger de Gontaut-Biron.<sup>5</sup> The book of Gustave Gautherot is mentioned in the bibliography but never used within the main text. The testimony of two civil servants having worked in Adana, namely Paul Bernard and Adrien Léger, and the book of Pierre Lyautey, chief of the civilian staff of General Henri Gouraud at the High Commission of Beirut, titled *The Oriental Drama and the Role of France*<sup>6</sup> are also conveniently omitted.

The amazement of the reader does not stop here: Even most of the basic printed sources written by the Armenian nationalist leaders, such as the published diary of Avetis Aharonian, the Memoirs of Alexander Khatissian, or the books of Jean Loris-Mélicof (a member of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia) and Kricor Tellalian (who was representative of the of Catholic Armenians at the Armenian National Union of Adana) are not cited a single time. Similarly, no Anglo-Saxon witness (except George Horton, a fanatic Turkophobe,

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4 \*\*\*, « Le soldat syrien », *Le Correspondant*, 25 septembre 1924, pp. 865-877.

5 Roger de Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie (1919-1920)* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1922).

6 Pierre Lyautey, *Le Drame oriental et le rôle de la France* (Paris: Société d'éditions géographiques, maritimes et coloniales, 1923).

discussed below) is cited, making it legitimate to wonder if Ms. Bruna even knows the book of Mary Caroline Holmes, head of the Near Relief Station in Urfa from 1918 to 1922.<sup>7</sup> Last but not least in this regard, no compilation of British or American documents is ever utilized.

Regarding now the archives, the less serious grievance is the absence of any work in the police records, despite their utility in finding data on the Turks and Armenians acting in France for their respective countries: This is only too typical of the historians of the international relations who have no postgraduate courses on social history. Much less forgivable is ignorance of the personal papers of Édouard Brémond, Chief Administrator in Adana from January 1919 to September 1920; of the archives of this same administration (located at the Center of the Diplomatic Archives of Nantes); and of the reports of the Navy's Intelligence Service. Not only is no box of the military archives in Vincennes (specifically containing such reports) cited, but even the copies contained in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives are disregarded. Moreover, no microfilm of the subseries Armenia 1918-1940 is used for this book.

Briefly discussing the Turkish archives, the author claims, p. 28, that they are “in Osmanli until 1928” and that “a special authorization is always a must to consult them.” In truth, most of the Ottoman diplomatic documents are in French during the late period, a part of the Enver Paşa papers (to mention only this example) contain documents in the same language (as well as others in German) and no “special authorization” is required.<sup>8</sup> The question of the Armenian archives is not discussed a single time by Ms. Bruna.

The result is an over-reliance on a few books and booklets, particularly those of Paul de Rémusat (aka Paul du Véou), Michel Paillarès, and René Puaux. Yet, de Rémusat/du Véou was an agent of influence of Fascist Italy<sup>9</sup> and his book used by Ms. Bruna is structured around the thesis of a Jewish-Masonic plot behind the Committee Union and Progress (CUP), the Turkish national movement led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the signature of the Ankara Agreement in 1921.<sup>10</sup> Ms. Bruna herself plays with fire when she echoes the myth of the Freemasons as string pullers, an occult leader (pp. 97 and 113),

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7 Mary Caroline Holmes, *Between the Lines in Asia Minor* (New York-Chicago-London-Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1923).

8 Yücel Güçlü, *Historical Archives and the Historians' Commission to Investigate the Armenian Events of 1915* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2015), pp. 29-118.

9 René Massigli, *La Turquie devant la guerre. Mission à Ankara, 1939-1940* (Paris: Plon, 1964), pp. 53-55 and 127-129.

10 Paul du Véou (Paul de Rémusat), *La Passion de la Cilicie* (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1954), pp. 32, 107-108, 286-289 and 303. Some of the most delirious parts of the original (1937) edition (pp. 62-63 and 66-67 of this first version) have disappeared without explanation 17 years later. The anti-Masonic obsession is also visible in: Paul du Véou, *Chrétiens en péril au Moussa Dagh* (Paris: Baudinière, 1939), p. 183.

and the myth of a Jewish background of Atatürk (p. 35). Paillarès was a journalist who also used the topic of the Jewish-Masonic plot (in the book cited by Ms. Bruna<sup>11</sup>) and who wrote from 1890s to 1920s at the request of Greece and with Greek money,<sup>12</sup> something Ms. Bruna cannot ignore, as she also refers to a book where the corruption of Paillarès is exposed with French documents.<sup>13</sup>

René Puaux is the author of the fake news, spread in February 1919, regarding imaginary persecutions and threats against the Christians of western Anatolia. He also was shameless in using anti-Semitic, bogus allegations against the CUP leadership.<sup>14</sup> During most of his trip in western Anatolia in 1919, he refused to meet any French citizen, as he did not want to hear any bad things about the Greeks.<sup>15</sup>

### A Reign of Error

The book as a whole is remarkably inaccurate in both major and minor matters. P. 16, the arrival in power of Abdülhamit II is dated 1878 (he actually became the sultan in 1876). P. 265, the agreement for the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey is dated 1924 (it was signed in 1923). The real name of Captain Pierre André and his pen name (Pierre Redan) are systematically confused. P. 41, Ms. Bruna writes that Damat Ferit Paşa resigned before the Sivas Congress of 4 September 1919 even though he actually resigned on 30 September. Much more seriously, p. 145, she confuses the armistice signed on 11 November 1918 with Germany and the Versailles Peace Treaty. Then on p. 158/n. 5, she writes that a booklet of Pierre Loti (strangely called a “book”) on the Armenian issue, printed in 1918, was published in 1898 and was devoted to the 1894-1896 events.

On p. 44, Ms. Bruna claims that the Sèvres Treaty “reveals the deep intents of the imperialist powers,” which is absolutely false regarding France (the Quai d’Orsay tried, in vain, to leave Trabzon and Izmir to the Turks; the treaty was signed at a moment when the overwhelming majority of the press was against

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11 Michel Paillarès, *Le Kémalisme devant les Alliés* (Istanbul-Paris: éditions du Bosphore, 1922), pp. 50 and 472.

12 Note de M. de Perretti, 31 octobre 1922, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères, La Courneuve, P 3958 ; Le commissaire spécial, chef du Service de sûreté, 30 novembre 1922, Service historique de la défense (SHD), Vincennes, 20 N 1103.

13 François Georgeon, « La presse de langue française entre les deux guerres mondiales », in G. Groc and İ. Çağlar (ed.), *La Presse française de Turquie, de 1795 à nos jours* (Istanbul: Les éditions Isis, 1985), p. 33, n. 18.

14 René Puaux, « Le péril de l’Asie mineure », *Le Temps*, 15 février 1919, p. 2 ; René Puaux, « La Grèce et la question d’Orient », *Revue bleue*, 4 février 1922, p. 80.

15 Lettre de Georges Bourdon à Robert de Billy, 13 mars 1919, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères, La Courneuve (AMAE), P 14497.

the treaty<sup>16</sup> and when it was clear that there is no majority to ratify it<sup>17</sup>) and Italy, then, on pp. 45 and 47, she admits that Rome gave weapons to the Turkish national movement (whose raison d'être was precisely to obtain the cancellation of the Sèvres Treaty) and even was "the undeclared ally" of the Kemalists. On p. 45, too, she claims that "In 1921, the Italian troops completely leave continental Turkey and remain on the Dodecanese only." Yet, beside the fact that Italian soldiers remained in Istanbul and the Straits region until 1923, the Italian military presence in Kuşadası continued until April 1922. Even more incredibly, the book contains several sentences (pp. 36, 96, 184, 217, 218, etc.) where an error of French is obvious.

These confusions serve no polemical purpose, but this is not the case of all. On p. 22, Ms. Bruna speaks about "the [political] parties in Ankara," which is barely an approximation. Parties in the contemporary sense of the word did not exist yet, but there were several parliamentary blocs in practice: an opposition, a majority, and a group in the middle. It would not deserve to be mentioned if she did not claim, pp. 97 and 209, that the single party regime already existed in Ankara during the war of national liberation, which is nonsense; this regime was imposed in 1925 (and disappeared in 1945-46) after a brief interruption in 1930.

On p. 179, the author dares to claim that "Smyrna was attributed to Greece [by the Sèvres Treaty] because the population was almost exclusively Greek and Greek-speaking." Of course, no source is provided. Yet, beside the fact that the city and its hinterland were attributed to Greece in practice rather formally, the province and even the city itself had no Greek majority. The last Ottoman census found 47.5% Muslims (mostly Turks), 35% of Greeks, 5.2% of Armenians in the agglomeration of İzmir, and the others being Jews and

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16 Jacques Bardoux, « L'action inter-alliée en Allemagne et en Turquie », *L'Opinion*, 27 mars 1920, p. 345 ; Jean Lescure, « Faut-il détruire la Turquie ? », *Revue politique et parlementaire*, avril 1920, pp. 42-48 ; Jacques Bainville, « L'ordre des questions examinées à San Remo », *Excelsior*, 21 avril 1920, p. 2 ; Saint-Brice, « Les clauses essentielles du traité turc », *Le Journal*, 10 mai 1920, p. 1 ; Jacques Bainville, « L'Asie contre l'Europe », *L'Action française*, 11 mai 1920, p. 1 ; « Le traité avec la Turquie — Le règlement oriental est-il définitif ? », *L'Écho de Paris*, 12 mai 1920, p. 3 ; Antoine Peretti, « Le traité turc est-il acceptable ? Non ! », *La Lanterne*, 15 mai 1920, pp. 1-2 ; Édouard Herriot, « La crise de la démocratie », *Le Rappel*, 14 mai 1920, p. 1 ; Georges Scelle, « Le traité turc et l'opinion française », *L'Information*, 19 mai 1920, p. 1 ; « Il y a un traité turc... Mais il y a aussi des Turcs », *L'Intransigeant*, 26 mai 1920, p. 1 ; Jean Longuet, « L'Islam et le Socialisme », *Le Populaire*, 29 mai 1920, p. 1 ; Paul Allain, « Un "bandit" », *Le Radical*, 26 juin 1920, p. 1 ; René d'Aral, « Notre politique en Orient », *Le Gaulois*, 27 juin 1920, p. 1 ; Saint-Brice, « La révision de la liquidation orientale », *Correspondance d'Orient*, 30 juin 1920, p. 531 ; René Johannet, « Il faut réviser le traité turc — Constantinople », *La Croix*, 1er juillet 1920, p. 1 ; René Johannet, « Il faut réviser le traité turc — Smyrne », *La Croix*, 15 juillet 1920, p. 1 ; « La réponse des alliés à la Turquie », *Le Temps*, 19 juillet 1920, p. 1 ; « La Turquie signera-t-elle ? — Le grand vizir et les sultanes inclinent à la soumission », *L'Œuvre*, 23 juillet 1920, p. 1 ; « Encore une paix qui ne paie pas — La paix de Sèvres », *Le Rappel*, 27 juillet 1920, p. 1 ; A. Jacque-Ollivier (Jacques Kayser), « L'Inde bouge — Funestes conséquences du traité turc », *La Dépêche de Toulouse*, 30 juillet 1920, p. 3 ; « Le pauvre vieux Grand Turc », *Le Petit Marseillais*, 3 août 1920, p. 1.

17 « La journée », *La Croix*, 27 juin 1920, p. 1.

Levantines (these two last categories being as hostile as the Muslims to any annexation or domination by Greece). In the province as a whole, it was 77.6% Turks, 18.5% Greeks and 1.2%.<sup>18</sup> The report of the French, American, British and Italian officers on the Greek landing of 15 May 1919 also concluded that the Turks were in majority in the province and more numerous than the Greeks in the city itself.<sup>19</sup> More insidiously, p. 77, Ms. Bruna quotes the British allegation, made at the London conference of February-March 1921 (which was supposed to revise the Sèvres Treaty), about a Greek majority in eastern Thrace. In fact, there was a Turkish majority.<sup>20</sup> The city of Edirne had, in 1913, 120,000 inhabitants, including 55,000 Turks and almost 20,000 Jews, the second being as loyal as the first to the Ottoman state.<sup>21</sup>

Concerning the Jews, precisely, they are conveniently omitted, on p. 172, where Ms. Bruna claims that the French influence in the Ottoman Empire was only due to Christians. Actually, during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, the Jewish minority was, with the Maronites, the most French-speaking and French-oriented community<sup>22</sup> and targeted by Christian anti-Semitism.<sup>23</sup> But this is not the only aberration of Ms. Bruna's claim: Her sentences totally forget the tensions between the Christians themselves, such as the hatred of many Orthodox Greeks and Orthodox (Apostolic/Gregorian) Armenians against the Catholics or the rivalry between Protestant and Catholic missionaries,<sup>24</sup> and, in the last analysis, the Muslim students of the French schools cannot be ignored, even if they were less numerous, because they were overrepresented in the Ottoman administration.<sup>25</sup>

The most incredible errors, regardless, are about the French-British rivalry. This rivalry is underestimated (pp. 118-120) as the author seems to believe that

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18 Meir Zamir, "Population statistics of the Ottoman empire in 1914 and 1919," *Middle Eastern Studies*, XVII-1, January 1981: p. 90.

19 Nihat Reşat, *Les Grecs à Smyrne* (Paris: Imprimerie Kossuth, 1920), p. 13.

20 Meir Zamir, "Population statistics of...", p. 89.

21 Gustave Cirilli, *Journal du siège d'Andrinople (Impressions d'un assiégé)* (Paris: Chapelot, 1913), p. 31.

22 Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews. The Alliance israélite universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling, 1860-1925* (Bloomington-Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1990), pp. 147-148.

23 Paul Dumont, "Jewish Communities in Turkey during the Last Decades of the Nineteenth Century in the Light of the Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle," in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (ed.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (New York-London: Holmes & Meier, 1982, volume I), pp. 222-224 ; Leon Kontente, *L'Antisémitisme grec en Asie mineure. Smyrne, 1774-1924* (Istanbul: Libra, 2015).

24 « Arménie », *Œuvre des écoles d'Orient*, n° 167, juillet 1888, p. 317 ; « Correspondance — Asie mineure », *Les Missions catholiques*, 16 février 1894, p. 74 ; « Informations diverses », *Les Missions catholiques*, 9 mars 1894, p. 110 ; « Correspondance — Syrie », *Les Missions catholiques*, 15 octobre 1897, p. 493.

25 Sinan Kunalalp (ed.), *Une ambassadrice de France à Constantinople. Les souvenirs de Gabrielle Bompard de Blagnières, 1909-1914* (Istanbul: Les éditions Isis, 2016), p. 38.

it became relatively serious in 1920 only and mentions in the half of a sentence only the dispute regarding Germany (p. 132). Actually, the tensions started before the armistice was even signed, among other reasons, because David Lloyd George was not clear in 1917-1918 about the restitution of the Alsace-Moselle to France and because the French protectorate on the Christians of Jerusalem was unilaterally suppressed by the British after the capture of this city.<sup>26</sup> Regarding Germany, the military in France, as well as a large part of the big business and all the civilian nationalists, from the center left to the far right, were deeply displeased by the successful veto of the Anglo-Saxon powers to a permanent occupation of Rhineland and to an annexation of Saarland without referendum, during the preparation of the Versailles Treaty.<sup>27</sup> In the East, the tension rose faster: As early as January 1919, a formal protest was sent by Paris to London regarding the bullying of Francophile Arabs, French schools, and French diplomatic agents by a part of the British officers in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Lebanon as well as regarding the promotion by the British of Emir Feysal—who asked for an unified Arab state.<sup>28</sup> Considering that Ms. Bruna rightfully used the detailed book of journalist Jacques Bardoux titled *Lloyd George and France*,<sup>29</sup> where the disputes regarding Germany are discussed at length, and that her master's thesis supervisor Robert Frank is a well-respected specialist of international relations, particularly in western Europe during the interwar, such an ignorance is quite difficult to understand.

### The Legacy Of The Ottoman Period And The Armenian Issue Until 1918

Bernard Lewis observed that, in the 1990s, “the view which the genocide proponents have maintained,” had “remained unchanged for three-quarters of a century.”<sup>30</sup> It remains unchanged in this 2018 book, concerning the Ottoman history in general and the Armenian issue before and during the First World War.

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26 Colonel Brémond, Note à Monsieur de Margerie, 16 janvier 1918, in Hasan Dilan (ed.), *Les Événements arméniens dans les documents diplomatiques français* (Ankara: TTK, 2005, volume I), pp. 387-392 ; Un officier, « La France et ses rivaux dans l'Empire ottoman », *L'Opinion*, 27 avril 1918, p. 330 ; Pierre Renouvin, « Les buts de guerre du gouvernement français (1914-1918) », *Revue historique*, CCXXXV-1, janvier-mars 1966: pp. 34-35.

27 Georges-Henri Soutou, « La France et les marches de l'est, 1914-1919 », *Revue historique*, CCLX-4, octobre-décembre 1978: pp. 341-388.

28 Note pour le ministre, 2 novembre 1918, AMAE, P 1426 ; Le haut-commissaire de la République française à Beyrouth à la direction des Affaires politiques et commerciales, 6 décembre 1918 ; Note sur les menées anglaises en Asie mineure, 31 janvier 1919, AMAE, 196 PA-AP 6 ; Note sur les intérêts moraux et matériels de la France en Syrie, 1er février 1919, AMAE, 196 PA-AP 8.

29 Jacques Bardoux, *Lloyd George et la France* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1923).

30 Bernard Lewis, *Notes on a Century. Reflections of a Middle East Historian* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012), p. 289.

On p. 209, the author pretends that “the Christian minorities” of Çukurova “had experienced exactions since 16<sup>th</sup> century.” As a no source is provided, a few examples will suffice to refute this extraordinary claim. In the province of Adana, from 1860 to 1908, the Armenian presence in the Ottoman administration was: “One to three were employed in the control of revenue and expenditure and in the taxation department; one or two in the Ottoman Bank, and between two and four in the branch of the Agricultural Bank, as well as in the public debt and in the salt administration.”<sup>31</sup> Unlike provinces such as Erzurum or Diyarbakır, almost no eruption of violence took place in Adana during the 1890s. The most serious attempt happened in Tarsus in December 1895, but the *kaymakam* (governor) and his men blocked a threatening Muslim crowd, “even broke a cane on the head of the most recalcitrant and the rest dispersed.”<sup>32</sup> During the last six decades of Ottoman history, the cotton production the same province was dominated by Greeks.<sup>33</sup> Where were the “exactions”?

On p. 14, Ms. Bruna claims that “between 1894 and 1896, 300,000 Armenians have been massacred” and gives as only source a press interview given by Claude Mutafian, an assistant professor in mathematics, and Anahide Ter-Minassian, a specialist of the Caucasus and a Dashnak. No source is provided in the interview. Not fearing the internal contradiction, Ms. Bruna gives, without any reference, the figures of “between 200,000 and 250,000” for the same casualties, during the same period, pp. 158-159/n. 5. None of these figures is even close to the truth. The only estimate based on a research in Ottoman and western archives gives the figure of 20,000—and more than 5,000 Turks and other Muslims killed during the same period by Armenian insurgents.<sup>34</sup> It remains unchallenged to this day.

Returning to the 1894-1896 events on p. 167, Ms. Bruna alleges, one more time without any source, that they had been “orchestrated by Sultan Abdülhamit II.” There is in fact no evidence for such an accusation, which is a convenient and political way to avoid the issue of the bloody provocations and insurrections organized by the Armenian revolutionary nationalists,<sup>35</sup> and

31 Mesrob K. Krikorian, *Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 66.

32 M. Summaripa, consul, chargé du vice-consulat de France à Mersine, à M. Paul Cambon, ambassadeur de la République française à Constantinople, 14 décembre 1895, in *Documents diplomatiques. Affaires arméniennes (1895-1896). Supplément* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1897), p. 98.

33 Charles Issawi, “The Transformation of the Economic Position of the *Millet*s in the Nineteenth Century,” in Bernard Lewis and Benjamin Braude (ed.), *Christians and Jews...*, p. 264.

34 Kâmurân Gürün, *Le Dossier arménien* (Triangle, 1984), pp. 189 and 200-201.

35 Gaston Aubyneau, *La Journée du 26 août 1896 à la Banque impériale ottoman* (Villeurbanne: Imprimerie Chaix, 1912), pp. 28 and 34 ; Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005), pp. 11-29; Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878-1896* (London-Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 54-157 ; Bilâl Şimşir (ed.), *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians*, volume III, 1891-1895 (Ankara: TTK, 2008) (1st edition, 1989), p. 334 and passim.

contrary to all the pragmatic policy of Abdülhamit II, particularly the fact that 20% of the best paid civil servants of Istanbul were Armenians in 1896.<sup>36</sup> Incidentally, it may be remarked that Archag Tchobanian, future Ramkavar leader in France, denied the responsibilities of the Armenian insurgents of the 1890s when he wrote in French, but denounced them in vivid terms when he wrote in Armenian.<sup>37</sup>

On p. 15, Ms. Bruna alleges that the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF-Dashnaktsutyun) helped the CUP a lot to impose the restoration of the Constitution in 1908. It was in fact the CUP that saved the ARF from a complete destruction by the Hamidian regime.<sup>38</sup>

The laconic description of the Adana events in April 1909 is even worse. According to the author, “the liberation army sent by the Young Turk cabinet” supposedly “massacred 25,000 Armenians in Adana.” One more time, no source is provided. Actually, there were three steps in the Adana events: Violent clashes between Armenians and Muslims (about 500 deaths on each side), caused by the numerous provocations by Armenian nationalists since Autumn 1908; mutual massacres in the countryside at the same moment; then, after order was restored, the murderous shootings of many Turks, followed by indiscriminate reprisals of the army.<sup>39</sup> Of course, not a word is said by Ms. Bruna about the action of Governor Cemal (later Cemal Paşa) for reconstruction and reconciliation, from 1909 to 1911.<sup>40</sup>

The most concerning, not to say scary, is the part on the 1915-16 events and the Nemesis Operation (a series of terrorist attacks against former Ottoman officials, former Azerbaijani officials, and loyal Ottoman Armenians, carried out by the ARF), p. 184:

“[It is] the implementation of the Nemesis operation that brings justice to the Armenians. Soghomon Tehlirian assassinates Grand Vizir Talat

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36 Sidney Whitman, *Turkish Memories* (New York-London: Chas. Scriber’s Sons/William Heinemann, 1914), p. 19.

37 Archag Tchobanian, *L’Arménie, son histoire, sa littérature, son rôle en Orient* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1897), pp. 9-12 and 80-88; William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890-1902* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 160, n. 50.

38 Maxime Gauin, “The Missed Occasion: Successes of the Hamidian Police Against the Armenian Revolutionaries, 1905-1908,” *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 30 (2014): pp. 113-131.

39 Le vice-consul de France à Mersine et Adana à Son Excellence M. Pichon, 23 octobre 1908, AMAE, P 16742 ; Dispatches of Bie Ravndal, U.S. consul in Mersin, to the Undersecretary of State, 25 April and 6 May 1909, p. 5, National Archives and Record Administration, RG 84, Records of Foreign Service Posts, Diplomatic Posts Istanbul, vol. 216; Mikael Varandian, *Rapport présenté au congrès socialiste international de Copenhague par le parti arménien « Daschnakzoutioun ».* Turquie — Caucase — Perse (Geneva, 1910), pp. 27-28.

40 For instance, please see: M. Barré de Lancy, vice-consul de France à Mersine et à Adana, à Son Excellence M. Pichon, ministre des Affaires étrangères, 24 août 1909, AMAE, P 16742.

Pasha, the grand organizer of the extermination of the Armenians, in Berlin, where Talat had fled. The testimonies of Tehlirian, Christine Terzibashian, Johannes Lepsius and even of General Limand von Sanders, as well as the hold documents, among them 5 ciphered telegrams sent by Talat to Naim Bey [sic] give a new dimension to the trial, where the genocidal crime of Talat and the Young Turks is in turn exposed. The tribunal acquits Soghomon Tehlirian.”

Not a single source is cited; almost everything is false and dangerous. The first assumption is that a terrorist operation can “bring justice”—which is in itself a reason to wonder what the author actually thinks about the later terrorist attacks by the ARF and other Armenian nationalists, during the 1970s and 1980s for example. The five forged “documents” published Ramkavar member Aram Andonian in 1920 were not supposed to have been sent to “Naim Bey” and were not accepted by the court: Facing the profound skepticism of the prosecutor and finding no support from the president, the defense lawyers of Tehlirian themselves renounced their demand for “authentication” of these “telegrams.”<sup>41</sup> Later, references were made to these fakes for the defense of terrorists of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation for Armenia (ASALA), especially during the trials of Paris, January 1984 (the bloody hostage taking at the Turkish consulate) and Créteil, February-March (Orly bombing).<sup>42</sup>

The “testimony” of Tehlirian was completely false, as proved by a comparison with his memoirs, with the apologetic obituary published in 1960 in the *Dashnak Armenian Review* and even more with the ARF archives.<sup>43</sup> Lepsius’ testimony was equally misleading and it is even contradictory to praise at the same time Lepsius and Nemesis as a whole, because Nemesis assassinated also Sait Halim Paşa and Cemal Paşa, two former Ottoman leaders Lepsius himself publicly called innocent.<sup>44</sup> Concerning the statements of General Otto Liman von Sanders, far from having accused Talat or the CUP in general of “extermination,” they actually described the forced relocation as an understandable security measure in war time and then put the blame for the “cruelties” on local, small civil servants. Liman von Sanders emphasized the fact that he never saw any order of Talat against the Armenians as such.<sup>45</sup>

41 Ara Krikorian (éd.), *Justicier du génocide arménien. Le procès de Tehlirian* (Paris: Diasporas, 1981), pp. 137-138 and 160-161.

42 *Armenian Terrorism and the Paris Trial/Terrorisme arménien et procès de Paris* (Ankara University, 1984), pp. 24 and 48 ; *Terrorist Attack at Orly: Statements and Evidence Presented at the Trial, February 19 - March 2, 1985* (Ankara: Faculty of Political Science, 1985).

43 Christopher Gunn, “Getting Away With Murder. Soghomon Tehlirian, ASALA and the Justice Commandos, 1921-1984,” in Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad (ed.), *War and Collapse* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016), pp. 909-917.

44 Johannes Lepsius, *Le Rapport secret du Dr Johannès Lepsius sur les massacres d’Arménie* (Paris: Payot, 1918), pp. 253-254, 258 and 261.

45 Ara Krikorian (éd.), *Justicier du génocide....*, pp. 127-137.

In such conditions, this is not a surprise to notice that, in dealing with the report of U.S. Major General James G. Harbord (pp. 177-178), Ms. Bruna omits the most embarrassing (for the Armenian nationalists) parts of this document, such as the description of the massacres of Anatolian Muslims by Armenians of the Russian army during the First World War.<sup>46</sup>

### Imaginary “Engagements” And Fictional Loyalties

Far from being a dispassionate description and analysis, the book is a permanent (and deeply negative) judgment of the French policy after the armistice, a judgment mostly based on assertions that are far removed from the truth. On p. 171, the author alleges the existence of “French engagements for the minorities fighting for their survival”; on p. 191, that “France promised to build the Cilician Armenian”; and on p. 201, she claims again the existence of “promises made to the Armenians.” The last allegation is reiterated on p. 218; The Ankara Agreement supposedly meant the breaking of these “promises.” On p. 111, the word “betrayal” is used. No source is provided. In fact, there never was any “promise” or “engagements”. Boghos Nubar (the founder of Ms. Bruna’s party) actually claimed, at the end of 1920, of having received a promise for an autonomous Armenia in Çukurova, in exchange of the recruitment of Armenian volunteers for the Eastern Legion (see below about this unit), but no document proves it. Even the word “Cilicia” is not used in the letter of President of the Ministers’ Council Aristide Briand to Nubar (8 November 1916) or in the speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Pichon after the capture of Jerusalem (27 December 1917). The demands of Archag Tchobanian in June 1915 and of Nubar in October 1916 for a separated “Cilicia” were explicitly rejected and no positive answer followed the demand, in December 1918, for a recognition of the “Integral Armenia.” Also, at the end of 1920, Boghos Nubar was forced to admit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he could provide no evidence.<sup>47</sup> Earlier, in February of the same year, Nubar similarly had to acknowledge in front of Lord Robert Cecil that he had received no written promise.<sup>48</sup> Correspondingly, one of the few French supporters of an Armenia from the Karabakh to Mersin explicitly wrote that Paris promised nothing of this kind and, far from blaming the government for that, he explained that the only persons responsible were the leaders of the

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46 James G. Harbord, *Conditions in the Near East. Report of the American military mission to Armenia* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), pp. 8-9.

47 Extrait du discours de M. Pichon, ministre des Affaires étrangères, à la Chambre des députés, le 27 décembre 1917 ; Le ministre des Affaires étrangères à M. de Selves, président de la commission des Affaires étrangères au Sénat, 28 décembre 1920 ; Id., 13 février 1921 ; Note pour le ministre, 25 décembre 1918, AMAE, P 16670.

48 Avetis Aharonian, “From Sardarapat to Sèvres and Lausanne. A political Diary — Part III,” *Armenian Review*, XV-1, Spring 1963, pp. 57-58.

(Ramkavar) Armenian National Delegation, unable to prove that such a huge Armenia was in the interests of France.<sup>49</sup>

Equally frivolous is the claim of a violation, by the Ankara Agreement, of the duties of France as mandatory power in Syria (explicitly pp. 169-170 and 201; implicitly p. 212). The occupation of Adana, Mersin, etc., by 1918-1919, was accompanied by no engagement regarding the duration of the occupation, the final statute of the territories, or anything related to the minorities. The only promises made to the Assyrians specifically, namely facilities for immigration in Syria and the recruitment of an Assyrian battalion there, were carried out.<sup>50</sup>

False, too, is the claim of the existence of an “Armenian national home under French protectorate” supposed to have been “created” in Çukurova in 1919 (p. 190). As usual, no reference is cited and this “home” is not defined. Such a vague wording did not exist in 1919 and was invented in 1921, as a way to maintain more or less the US President Woodrow Wilson arbitration in spite of the signing of the Gümrü/Gyumri Treaty during the night from 2 to 3 December 1920, a treaty by which Armenia repudiated Sèvres (yet, Wilson officially announced the arbitration three days after this new treaty). During the first months of 1919, High Commissioner François Georges-Picot actually organized repatriation of Armenians forcibly relocated in 1915 from Çukurova and favored their concentration, but, beside the fact he began to change his policy in the middle of the same year—under the double effect of the emergence of the Turkish national movement and of the crimes of the Armenian Legion (see below)—he never announced anything like an “Armenian national home.”<sup>51</sup>

On p. 207, the reader can find a perfect illustration of the saying “as many words, as many errors”: “Ethnographically, in Cilicia, the minorities are united and shape a Francophile majority opposed to the Turanians.” Actually, at the eve of the First World War, the population of the province of Adana had a very large Muslim (mostly Turkish) majority: 73% according to the British High Commission, 83% according to the Ottoman census, 86% according to Justin McCarthy.<sup>52</sup> The Jews, like anywhere else in Anatolia, were loyal to the Muslim Turks and victims of Christian anti-Semitism, for example during the anti-

49 Paul Poulgy, « Le différend franco-arménien en Cilicie — Les hommes de plâtre », *Aiguillon*, 25 avril 1919, p. 4.

50 Engagements pris depuis l’armistice [1921], AMAE, P 16670.

51 Roger de Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France...*, p. 97 ; Jean Pichon, *Sur la route des Indes un siècle après Bonaparte*, Paris : Société d’éditions géographiques, maritimes et coloniales, 1932, p. 215.

52 Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities. The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York-London: New York University Press, 1983), p. 112 ; Meir Zamir, “Population Statistics...”, pp. 90 et 102.

Muslim riots of July and August 1920 in Adana: The synagogue, too, was attacked and plundered.<sup>53</sup>

Concerning the alleged “Francophilia” of the Christians, Colonel Édouard Brémont, chief administrator in Adana from January 1919 to September 1920 and a seemingly reliable source for Ms. Bruna, reported, as early as April 1919, that “the Armenian opinion is turning to America.”<sup>54</sup> Some months later, even the Catholic Armenians asked for an American mandate instead of a French one.<sup>55</sup> Aram Turabian, an independent Armenian nationalist cited in the bibliography of the book reviewed here, and never criticized by its author, blamed the “dementia” of the Ramkavar, which asked for an Armenia from Karabakh to Mersin under the American protectorate—not because Turabian was against such an Armenia, but because he considered the American mandate impossible and such a demand as only able to cause “the collective hostility of the powers.”<sup>56</sup> When the Armenian nationalists understood that the French state was against any Armenian or even Christian separatism in Çukurova and that the American mandate would never take place, they organized a kind of pogrom against the Muslim majority in July 1920, then various attacks and not less than three failed coups, on 2, 4-5 August and 22 September 1920.<sup>57</sup> Even Paul de Rémusat (aka Paul du Véou), felt forced to mention a part of these misdeeds in his book on “Cilicia.”<sup>58</sup>

The French orientation of the Maronites and Assyrians was more real, but their leadership broke up with the Armenian committees on 7 August 1920, in a joint letter “condemn[ing]” the insistence of the Armenian leadership to obtain a Christian Republic in Adana and presenting regrets for having initially supported the failed coup organized by the local Ramkavar leader, Mihran Damadian, on 4 and 5 August.<sup>59</sup> The whole narrative of the allegedly betrayed and united “minorities” is pure fiction.

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53 Le commandant Tommy Martin, gouverneur militaire de la ville et du sandjak d’Adana, à M. le chef du contrôle administratif de Cilicie, 1er août 1920, Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes, ISL/1V/135.

54 Télégramme du colonel Brémont à François Georges-Picot, 10 avril 1919, AMAE, P 16671.

55 Harry N. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry in the Middle East* (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), p. 140.

56 Aram Turabian, *L’Éternelle victime de la diplomatie européenne : l’Arménie* (Marseille: Imprimerie nouvelle, 1929), pp. 66-70. This book of Turabian is precisely the one cited by Ms. Bruna in her work.

57 Tommy Martin, Renseignements n° 178, 7 juin 1920, Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), ISL/1V/222 ; S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 2343, 18 septembre 1920, SHD, 1 BB7 236 ; Le colonel Brémont, chef du contrôle administratif, à M. Damadian, représentant de la Délégation de l’Arménie intégrale, 11 juillet 1920, CADN, ISL/1V/174 ; Paul Bernard, *Six mois en Cilicie*, Aix-en-Provence, éditions du *Feu*, 1929, pp. 59-108.

58 Paul du Véou, *La Passion de...*, pp. 239 and 245. Also see p. 99 for the reproduction of the verdict of the French military justice (23 April 1920) sentencing in absentia Ramkavar leader Moucheq Séropian for conspiracy, fabrication of bombs, etc.

59 CADN, ISL/1V/135.

## A General Misrepresentation Of The French Policy And Its Actors

At the core of Ms. Bruna's thesis, there is the claim of a "dichotomy of the diplomats' opinion and the soldiers' opinion" (pp. 31, 68 and 208-213). Such a dichotomy has simply nothing to do with the historical reality and is so utterly false that some parts of the author's book itself provide evidence of the opposite. Indeed, among her favorite targets, noteworthy are Colonel Louis Mougín and Lieutenant-Colonel Auguste Sarrou (pp. 81, 96-97, 112 and *passim*). Who were they, if not soldiers? Even more incredibly, p. 208, Ms. Bruna puts forth General Henri Gouraud (High Commissioner in Beirut from 1919 to 1923) and Colonel Édouard Brémont (Chief Administrator in Adana from 1919 to 1920), then, defeated by the most overwhelming evidence, she is forced, p. 214, to admit that General Gouraud and his General Secretary Robert de Caix prevailed on Colonel Brémont (who was actually recalled in Paris by order of General Gouraud) and that the outcome of this internal dispute announced the evacuation of Çukurova.

Regardless, the background and the concrete actions of General Gouraud are never explained. Yet, having fought at Çanakkale and against the Germans, he had "known during the war only one chivalrous enemy," namely the Turk.<sup>60</sup> Far from having been against the Ankara Agreement, General Gouraud went to Paris at the end of 1921 and was physically present to support President of the Ministers' Council Aristide Briand during the debate at the Senate on this agreement, this presence causing "loud applause," "cheers on all the benches" and "prolonged applause" when Briand referred to him as a guarantee of the seriousness of the text signed.<sup>61</sup> This is true, and Ms. Bruna is perfectly entitled to mention that General Gouraud would have preferred to maintain, in the Ankara Agreement, the article present in the aborted text of March 1921 concerning the presence of French officers in the active command of the Turkish gendarmerie at Adana, Tarsus, Mersin, Antep, and Killis. But thinking that an agreement could, or should, have been better is quite different from opposing it.

The major misrepresentation of General Gouraud leads to the discussion of the biggest omission of Ms. Bruna's book, namely, her absolute silence on Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the mentor of General Gouraud. General Resident in Morocco from 1912 to 1925 (with a short interruption in 1917, when he was replaced by General Gouraud), Marshal Lyautey called, as early as 1919, for a fair peace with the Turks, as such a peace would ease the French domination in Morocco considerably, and became very interested in the Turkish national movement of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). In good terms with Aristide Briand, Marshal Lyautey played a considerable role in the lobby for the change of the French policy. In

60 Léon Rouillon, *Pour la Turquie* (Paris: Grasset, 1921), p. 55. Also see: René d'Aral, « France et Turquie — La mission du général Gouraud », *Le Gaulois*, 19 mars 1921, p. 1.

61 *Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Sénat*, 30 décembre 1921, p. 2426.

his relations with Mustafa Kemal, Marshal Lyautey used as go-between journalist Berthe Georges-Gaulis, one of the favorite targets of Ms. Bruna;<sup>62</sup> and the same Berthe Georges-Gaulis also acted as an intelligence agent for General Gouraud.<sup>63</sup> Claude Farrère, another firm supporter of the Turks, also attacked by Ms. Bruna, pp. 150 and 158-159 (without specific arguments on the merits of Farrère's reasoning), was closely connected to Marshal Lyautey, was a personal friend of several of his collaborators and defended his work in Morocco by a series of articles in the press.<sup>64</sup> This Moroccan connection is the clearest refutation of the "dichotomy" invented by Ms. Bruna.

Marshal Lyautey is the biggest, but not the only considerable omission in Ms. Bruna's book. Captain Henri Rollin, Chief of the Navy's Intelligence Service for Turkey, the Caucasus, and Southern Russia from 1919 to 1921, is not a cited a single time. Yet, the reports written by him and his collaborators are merciless against the Armenian nationalists, most of the time lucid on the Turkish national movement and explicitly advocating, by 1920, an agreement with Ankara against the expansion of Communism.<sup>65</sup> Beside these two cases, it is remarkable that Ms. Bruna cites the book of Pierre Loti, *La Mort de notre chère France en Orient*, but never the letters of French officers sent to Loti to support his campaign in favor of the Turks.<sup>66</sup> Similarly, the only interesting and somewhat original contribution of Michel Paillarès, one of the main sources of Ms. Bruna, is the account of his interview of officers of the occupation corps of Istanbul, confirming that the preponderant opinion here was in favor of Turkey and very against the Greek and Armenian nationalists (Paillarès reported these conversations with deep regret, of course).<sup>67</sup> In other words, Ms. Bruna perfectly knows that this "dichotomy" is contrary to the historical reality.

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62 À M. Wladimir d'Ormesson, 6 janvier 1919 ; À M. Clemenceau, président du Conseil, 15 juin 1919 ; À M. Georges Leygues, président du Conseil, 21 décembre 1920 ; À M. Briand, ministre des Affaires étrangères, 17 juin 1921 ; À M. Poincaré, 22 janvier 1922 ; Id., 1er mars 1922, in Pierre Lyautey (ed.), *Lyautey l'Africain. Textes et lettres du maréchal Lyautey* (Paris: Plon, volume IV, 1919-1925, 1957), pp. 3-18, 102-112 and 114-120 ; Fuat Pekin, *Atatürk et le maréchal Lyautey*, Nancy : Publications de la Fondation Lyautey, 1961.

63 Berthe Georges-Gaulis, *Les nouveaux nationalismes*, 29 novembre 1919, AMAE, 399 PA-AP 130, dossier 1.

64 Claude Farrère, *Souvenirs*, Paris : Fayard, 1953, pp. 174-176, 228-231 and 247-248 ; Claude Farrère, « Lyautey l'Africain », *La Revue hebdomadaire*, 3 juillet 1920, pp. 3-16 ; Claude Farrère, « Promenades au Maroc », *Le Gaulois*, 2 décembre 1920, p. 1 ; Claude Farrère, « Le Maroc en 1920 — La ville champignon », *L'Information*, 3 décembre 1920, p. 1 ; Claude Farrère, « Le Maroc en 1920 — Casablanca la neuve », *L'Information*, 4 décembre 1920, p. 1 ; Claude Farrère, « Le Maroc en 1920 — Les grands vassaux de la République », *L'Information*, 21 décembre 1920, p. 1.

65 For example: S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 2343, 18 septembre 1920 ; Henri Rollin, La situation en Orient au 1er décembre 1920, SHD, 1 BB7 236 ; S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 2493, 13 avril 1921 ; Henri Rollin, La situation en Orient au 15 avril 1921, SHD, 1 BB7 238.

66 Pierre Loti, *La Mort de notre chère France en Orient*, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1920, pp. 75-76, 197-204, 207-208, 211-213, 235-238, 251-256 262-274 and 276-277.

67 Michel Paillarès, *Le Kémalisme devant les alliés* (Istanbul-Paris: éditions du Bosphore, 1922), pp. 72-79, 82, 91-96, 117 and 119-120.

The climax (if I dare to say) of this falsification is on pp. 52-53, where the author affirms: "A military intervention [against the Turks] is advocated by the military milieu" in Spring 1921, referring to only one telegram written by one officer, General Maurice Pellé, High Commissioner in İstanbul. Yet, in this telegram, he does not advocate a military intervention but a *diplomatic* intervention (a mediation) and "to be efficient," and that such an action "should give to the Turks the satisfaction of their legitimate territorial aspirations: possession of Smyrna, remoteness of the boundary from the walls of their capital city [İstanbul] and, I would add, internationalization of the Thrace" (he *did not* write: "Eastern Thrace"). He also argued that "logically, Greece has no right to be maintained in Asia Minor or Thrace."<sup>68</sup> And there is more. The same Pellé, quickly becoming more favorable to Ankara, allowed in May 1921 the officers of Mustafa Kemal to take weapons and ammunitions in the stocks of the Ottoman army in Istanbul; then, in mid-September, he signed with Kemalist representative Hamid Bey an agreement for the sale of weapons and ammunitions to the Turkish national movement: 100,000 rifles, 1.3 million bullets, one heavy cannon and 194,000 cannons shells, etc.<sup>69</sup> Incidentally, it also proves wrong the claim of Ms. Bruna, p. 262, that all the weapons given to Ankara by France were free of charge.

General Pellé is not the only victim of this dishonest treatment of the sources and facts. Indeed, on p. 99, Ms. Bruna affirms that Raymond Poincaré (President of the Republic from 1913 to 1920, President of the Ministers' Council from 1922 to 1924, then from 1926 to 1929) called Henry Franklin-Bouillon, the main negotiator of the Ankara Agreement in 1921, a "mediocre candidate." Checking the given source proves that these words were not from Poincaré but from one of his biographers, and were only referring to Franklin-Bouillon's failed candidacy to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies in 1928.<sup>70</sup> Trying to use Poincaré against Franklin-Bouillon is even more absurd, as the first convoked the second in September 1922 to congratulate him for having opened the way to a Turkish victory backed by France.<sup>71</sup> Beside these congratulations, the whole policy of Poincaré on the Eastern Question, in 1922, was in favor of the territorial part of the Turkish national pact (by diplomacy, then by a new delivery of weapons to Ankara) and for equality with Greece as far as the minorities rights were concerned.<sup>72</sup> This is ignored on purpose by Ms. Bruna.

68 Télégramme du général Pellé au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 5 avril 1921, AMAE, P 1528.

69 Nur Bilge Criss, *Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923* (Leiden-Boston-Köln: E. J. Brill, 1999), pp. 124-125 ; Shaw, *From Empire to...*, volume III-1, pp. 1434-1435.

70 François Roth, *Raymond Poincaré. Un homme d'État républicain* (Paris, Fayard, 2000), p. 517.

71 « Explosion de joie », *Aux Écoutes*, 24 septembre 1922, p. 4.

72 For instance, please see: Réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, d'Italie et de France, à Paris, pour traiter de la question d'Orient — 2e séance, jeudi 23 mars 1922, pp. 2, 5-8, 12-17 and 20 ; Réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, d'Italie et de France, à Paris, pour traiter de la question d'Orient — 3e séance, jeudi 23 mars 1922, 15h, pp. 11-20, AMAE, 118 PA-AP 62 ; Roger de Gontaut-Biron and L. Le Révérend, *D'Angora à Lausanne, les étapes d'une déchéance*, Paris : Plon, 1924, p. 100.

Even more inexcusable is the cavalier treatment inflicted to Aristide Briand, President of the Ministers' Council from 1921 to 1922, then Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1925 to 1932, who was, in last analysis, the person main responsible, on the French side, for the Ankara Agreement, namely the subject of Ms. Bruna's book. None of the biographies of Briand published since the 1970s (Christophe Bellon, Jacques Chabannes, Bernard Oudin, Ferdinand Siebert, Gérard Unger) is used and the proceedings of the symposium on his foreign policy during the last part (1919-1932) of his life is ignored.<sup>73</sup> The result is a disastrous and laconic development, pp. 94-95, where nothing is explained on Briand's ideas, motivations, and personality. Ms. Bruna is so unfamiliar with him that she writes that Philippe Berthelot was Briand's Chief of Staff. Actually, Berthelot was the General Secretary of the Ministry (a different job) and was appointed to this position *before* Briand became the Minister. The importance of Louis Barthou, Briand's Minister of War and who also was a personal friend of Pierre Loti (even helping Loti to publish articles in defense of the Turks)<sup>74</sup> and Raymond Escholier, a self-described Turkophile<sup>75</sup> and Chief of Staff of Briand, the fact that Briand had read Loti and Farrère on the Turks in 1920,<sup>76</sup> the personal intervention of Marshal Hubert Lyautey and General Maxime Weygand at the same time, etc., all of this is ignored as well.

Ms. Bruna is, alas, only too representative of the Ramkavar historiography. In his foreword for her book, Raymond Haroutioun Kévorkian tries to oppose Georges Clemenceau (President of the Ministers' Council from 1917 to 1920) to his successors, yet it was Clemenceau who appointed General Gouraud and Robert de Caix in Beirut, in 1919, knowing well what their ideas were.

### The Violence That Was And The Violence That Never Was

It is not until p. 212 that the author places a laconic—and entirely positive—description of the Eastern Legion, established in 1916. This unit is presented in the context of a development on the evacuation of Çukurova. Yet, the Eastern Legion had been divided as early as January 1919 between an Armenian Legion and a Syrian Legion, as a result of numerous cases of clashes, threats, rapes,

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73 Jacques Bariéty (ed.), *Aristide Briand, la Société des nations et l'Europe. 1919-1932* (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007).

74 Pierre Loti, *Soldats bleus. Journal intime, 1914-1918* (Paris: La Table ronde, 2014), pp. 39, 228, 232, 316-317, 324 and 331-332 ; Alain Quella-Villéger, *La Politique méditerranéenne de la France. Un témoin, Pierre Loti* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992), p. 172.

75 Raymond Escholier, « En feuilletant les livres nouveaux », *Le Petit Journal*, 27 décembre 1921, p. 4 ; Raymond Escholier, « Les livres nouveaux », *Le Petit Journal*, 14 juin 1923, p. 4.

76 Raymond Escholier, *Souvenirs parlés de Briand* (Paris: Hachette, 1932), p. 168.

and plunder by Armenian legionnaires, in today's Israel, then Lebanon, then in İskenderun.<sup>77</sup>

A comprehensive list of the crimes of this unit would be out of the scope of this article, but some examples are needed to understand the importance of Ms. Bruna's dishonesty. On 16 February 1919, dozens of Armenian legionnaires clashed with Algerian soldiers, and another group attacked the Turkish civilian population, killing, plundering, and burning. The "canons and machineguns" of the French Navy had to be used to put an end to the mess. One sergeant was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor for plunder, two legionnaires were sentenced to ten years, two to eight years, and one to five years in jail. 400 other legionnaires were sent in Egypt in a disciplinary battalion. Twenty civilians were sentenced (between two months and two years in jail, depending on the cases) for dealing in stolen goods.<sup>78</sup> Even Paul de Rémusat, (aka Paul du Véou), one of the favorite sources of Ms. Bruna, felt necessary to describe the events of January and February 1919 in his book, putting a large part of the blame on the incitement by the Ramkavar-dominated Armenian National Union and adding this merciless comment: "We could not count anymore on the Armenian Legion."<sup>79</sup> It means that Ms. Bruna's omission cannot be attributed to genuine ignorance, but to a deliberate will to hide the truth.

Regardless, the most incredible thing in Ms. Bruna's description of the Eastern/Armenian Legion is that it appears in a part devoted to the year 1921. Indeed, the Legion, "this troop of deserters and thieves that dirties the French uniform"<sup>80</sup> was suppressed during the summer 1920, after insistent demands of the officers on the field, for example the two reports of C. Beaujard, the last commander of the Armenian Legion (12 and 17 April 1920) and the supportive note (27 April 1920) of Major General Julien Dufieux, commander of the occupation troops in Çukurova.<sup>81</sup> Yet, one more time, Ms. Bruna perfectly

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77 François Georges-Picot, 2e lettre à M. Pichon, 11 janvier 1919, AMAE, P 17784 ; Télégramme du général Hamelin au ministre de la Guerre, 1er février 1919, AMAE, P 1426 ; Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Lebon au sujet des incidents survenus le 18 novembre au soir à Beyrouth, 30 novembre 1918, SHD, 4 H 3, dossier 5 ; Conseil français des troupes du Levant — Jugement, 27 juin 1919, CADN, 1/SL/1V/183 ; Gustave Gautherot, *La France en Syrie et en Cilicie* (Courbevoie: Librairie indépendante, 1920), pp. 134-136, 141-142 and 146-150 ; Docteur Simon, « Avec le détachement français de Palestine et de Syrie », *La Revue de Paris*, 1er décembre 1919, pp. 552 and 559-560.

78 Rapport du gouverneur militaire d'Alexandrette, 18 février 1919 ; Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Romieu, 28 février 1919 ; Télégramme du général Hamelin au ministère de la Guerre, 21 février 1919 ; Id., 27 février 1919, CADN, 1SL/1V/126 ; Jugement rendu par le conseil de guerre de la Légion arménienne, n° 70, 26 février 1919 ; Id., 6 mars 1919 ; Id., 26 mars 1919, SHD, 11 J 3073 ; Le général Hamelin, commandant les Troupes françaises du Levant, à M. le ministre de la Guerre, 22 mars 1919, SHD, 4 H 42, dossier 6 ; Gustave Gautherot, *La France en...*, pp. 153-166 ; Roger de Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France...*, pp. 54-55.

79 Paul du Véou, *La Passion de...*, pp. 68-70.

80 Le lieutenant Arrighi à M. le général Quérette, commandant la 1re brigade à Djihan, 25 avril 1920, 1SL/1V/173.

81 SHD, 4 H 42, dossier 6.

knows that, as she refers to the box where the reports of Beaujard and Dufieux are, but deliberately avoids any reference to the file where they are located.

Dissimulating the crimes of the Armenian nationalists, the author also perpetuates the myth of the “massacre” of Armenians in Maraş by Turks in 1920, in its most unsophisticated form. Indeed, she writes, p. 200, that in January-February 1920, “the Kemalists attack [sic] Marash” and that “7-8,000 Armenians are killed after the French evacuation of Marash.” Ms. Bruna also refers to this accusation in citing General Dufieux, pp. 193-194. All of this is utterly wrong. The battle for Maraş primarily involved the French forces (Armenian Legion, Senegalese soldiers, Metropolitan soldiers) against the Kemalists of this same city; it was basically a rebellion of the majority of the population against the occupation. The rebellion was caused by the crimes of the Armenian Legionnaires (including burning of villages around the city) and the incompetence of the officer in charge until December 1919, Pierre André (aka Pierre Redan).<sup>82</sup> The book of Redan (who left Maraş in December 1919 and never went back there) is the only source claiming the existence of a “massacre” after the French evacuation (and without providing any proof). Even the vehemently anti-Turkish recollections of Pastor Abraham Hartunian, who was present here in 1920-1921, denies the existence of such a massacre, accusing the Turkish side of killings *during* the clashes.<sup>83</sup>

Now, regarding the claim of “massacre” itself, it is true that General Dufieux believed it in February 1920, namely when he had no contact with his officers in this city.<sup>84</sup> However, in his final report, 34-pages long, written after having heard the officers who fought in Maraş, he blamed the indiscipline and “plunder” by a part of the Armenians but did not refer anymore to any killing of unarmed civilians or prisoners by Turks.<sup>85</sup> Colonel Robert Normand, Chief of the Rescue Unit sent to Maraş never mentioned any “massacre” of Armenians in his book or in his reports on the battle for this city—but he mentioned the arsons by Armenians.<sup>86</sup> Similarly, the General Staff in Paris concluded that “there were no massacres strictly speaking,” but 3,000 Armenians killed in fighting and later by adverse winter conditions.<sup>87</sup>

82 [Commandant Morbieu], Renseignement, n° 10, 2 février 1920, Archives nationales, Pierrefitte, 594 AP 4 ; Commandant Morbieu, Note sommaire sur la situation politique du sandjak de Marasch, depuis l'occupation française jusqu'au soulèvement du 21 janvier 1920, CADN, ISL/1V/166 ; Édouard Bernier, « La question turque — Dans l'attente de la solution », *L'Europe nouvelle*, 28 février 1920, p. 342.

83 Abraham H. Hartunian, *Neither to Laugh nor to Weep* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976) (1st edition, 1968), p. 149.

84 Le général Dufieux à M. le haut-commissaire de la République en Syrie-Cilicie, 9 mars 1920, p. 25, CADN, ISL/1V/166.

85 Ibid. (quotation p. 28).

86 Colonel Robert Normand, Historique de la colonne de secours de Marasch, 15 février 1920, CADN, ISL/1V/166 ; Robert Normand, *Colonnes dans le Levant* (Paris-Limoges: Charles-Lavauzelle & Cie, 1924), pp. 30-48.

87 Note de l'État-major des armées, 3e bureau, 17 avril 1920, SHD, 6 N 197.

## The Ankara Agreement And The Withdrawal

Strangely enough for a book entitled *The Ankara Agreement*, the study of this text and of the withdrawal that followed represent only a minority of the volume (mostly pp. 197-221; and 293-299, where the agreement and its appendices are reproduced). Regardless, this is not the worst problem.

On p. 212, Ms. Bruna claims: “Yet, the Armenian minority has already been the victim of the first genocide of 20<sup>th</sup> century, which implies, for the French soldiers, the certitude that the return of the Turkish armies on these territories will mean, one more time, massacres.” There is hardly a shred of truth in this sentence, and actually, it is not supported by any reference. A critic wonders where to begin. To debunk these allegations in the order of the sentence, the “first genocide of 20<sup>th</sup> century” was, as can be gathered from Germany’s May 2021 statement after the negotiation process between the German and Namibian governments, the extermination of the Herero and Nama tribes in Namibia (directly inspired by the racist theories of Paul Rohrbach,<sup>88</sup> co-founder in 1914 of the Germany-Armenia Society). Furthermore, the “Armenian genocide” label is wrong<sup>89</sup> and, in any case, irrelevant, because as one historian who supports this label observes; (but, it is true, with more nuances than Ms. Bruna) “most of the Armenians of Adana, for instance, were not killed.”<sup>90</sup>

Regarding the opinion of “the French soldiers,” only the late (1937) book of Paul de Rémusat could provide a beginning of justification to Ms. Bruna’s extraordinary claim. Most of the officers concluded that most of the Armenians of Adana, Tarsus, and Mersin emigrated “obeying an order of the committees,” namely the Ramkavar, the Hunchak, and the ARF.<sup>91</sup> In other words, “it is evident that we face a pre-planned scheme, likely organized by the Armenian committees of Cairo and Constantinople.”<sup>92</sup> Actually, the Hunchak newspaper of Istanbul openly asked for emigration and justified itself as follows: “We merely bowed in front of the [opinion] of the National Council of Cilicia [the umbrella organization of the ARF, Hunchak, Ramkavar, and churches], which *unanimously decided emigration* [italics added]. It was in a better place than us to decide, to weigh the pros and cons.”<sup>93</sup>

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88 David Olusoga and Casper Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust* (London: Faber & Faber, 2010), p. 112 and passim.

89 Maxime Gauin, “Uneven Repression: The Ottoman state and its Armenians,” in Edward J. Erickson (ed.), *A Global History of Relocation in Counter-Insurgency Warfare* (London-New York: Bloomsbury, 2019), pp. 115-140 ; Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, pp. 43-149 and 250-257.

90 “Study the Armenian Genocide with Confidence, Ara Sarafian Suggests,” *The Armenian Reporter*, December 20, 2008.

91 Bulletin périodique n° 39, 5 décembre 1921-5 janvier 1922, p. 2, SHD, 4 H 59, dossier 1.

92 Bulletin périodique n° 37, 5-20 novembre 1921, p. 5, SHD, 4 H 59, dossier 1.

93 Extrait du compte-rendu du Service de renseignements de Constantinople, n° 16, 23 décembre 1921, p. 4, AMAE, P 17787.

General Julien Dufieux, in spite of the obvious humiliation he bitterly felt (he was among the officers who defeated the Germans in 1918), answered the Near East Relief (NER), in November 1921, that his “personal impression” was that the Armenian employees of this organization had nothing to fear, until further notice, as a result of the French withdrawal.<sup>94</sup> The NER clearly shared this view; its bulletin explained that the Christian employees of Adana “deserted”<sup>95</sup> and later its official history, far from being pro-Turkish, regardless admitted that “the incoming Turkish officials would grant the organization all necessary facilities as in other relief stations within the Nationalist territory.”<sup>96</sup> In November 1921, too, General Dufieux called “irrational” the fear of the majority of the fleeing Armenians and expressed the hope that at least a part of the Armenians and Greeks would come back, considering that the new Turkish administration could relieve them.<sup>97</sup> Ms. Bruna should know this, as this telegram is in a microfilm she read.

Now, regarding the only appearance of argument from one French officer, not in a contemporary document but in a book published almost 16 years later (as part of Fascist propaganda, as we already saw) namely the book of de Rémusat/du Véou, it is true that it contains one very threatening quotation attributed to one Turkish officer (a quotation reproduced by Ms. Bruna on p. 219). Yet, de Rémusat/du Véou does not provide any source for this quote, and his book contains numerous falsified statements and clumsy lies. To cite only a few striking examples, it was him who invented the attribution to Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) a statement on the 1915-1916 relocations that was actually pronounced by a pioneer of Kurdish nationalism, Nemrut Mustafa Paşa.<sup>98</sup> De Rémusat/du Véou also invented a fake quote of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Kemal (Tengirsenk), on Franklin-Bouillon, supposedly “ready to sign ‘without taking his glasses.’”<sup>99</sup> The very fact that the negotiations took one month is enough to prove how absurd this invention is. Not caring even about plausibility, de Rémusat/du Véou also claimed that the Ankara Agreement suppressed the Capitulations (the special legal statutes for

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94 Le général Dufieux, commandant la Ire division, à Miss Lore, directrice du NER, 16 novembre 1921, CADN, 1SL/IV/160.

95 Nan O. Lowe, “Adana Unit Carrying on Midst Cilician Evacuation,” *Near East Relief*, January 14, 1922, p. 1.

96 James L. Barton, *Story of the Near East Relief. An Interpretation* (New York: The MacMillan, 1930), pp. 147-148.

97 Le général Dufieux, commandant la Ire division du Levant, à M. le haut-commissaire en Syrie et au Liban, commandant de l’armée du Levant, 21 novembre 1921, AMAE, P 17787.

98 Paul du Véou, *La Passion de...*, p. 54 (On p. 13, he also quotes one of the fake documents published in 1920 by Aram Andonian). Same lie in Paul du Véou, *Le Désastre d’Alexandrette* (Paris: Baudinière, 1938), pp. 121-122, n. 1. On this false attribution, please see: James Tashjian, “On a ‘Statement’ Condemning the Armenian genocide of 1918 Attributed in Error to Mustafa Kemal, Later ‘The Ataturk,’” *Armenian Review*, XXXV/3-139, Autumn 1982: pp. 227-244.

99 Paul du Véou, *La Passion de...*, p. 54.

foreigners in the Ottoman Empire) and that maintaining them would have been a solid guarantee for the Christians of “Cilicia.”<sup>100</sup> Yet, the Ankara Agreement was absolutely silent on this subject, as anybody can check in the book of Ms. Bruna herself (pp. 293-299) and anyway, most of the Armenians of the region were not citizens of a foreign country.

Regardless, we have not yet seen the worst. The pp. 216-217 are characterized by a monumental confusion. Ms. Bruna refers to the demand presented by the Vicar of the Catholic Armenian Patriarchate Jean Naslian on 8 November 1921 and inverts two documents. This error will be treated in a moment. For now, let us see the content of the telegram sent on that day.<sup>101</sup> General Pellé reported that Naslian asked to the Kemalists for the exemption of military duty for the Christians, the promise that no forced relocation would be decided, the sending of “an Armenian delegation” of personalities Ankara could trust; to the French, all facilities to emigrate; and to both a full liberty of circulation. Yet, except the delegation, all these demands were accepted; and if there was no delegation as wished by Naslian, joint commissions for the protection of the properties of the emigrants, commissions established with the aim to incite them to go back after some weeks and months. Ms. Bruna should be aware of the existence of these commissions and of their activities,<sup>102</sup> as she read the report of the commission of evacuation and its appendices. This leads to the conclusion that she deliberately hides these facts and then claims that the demands of Naslian had been rejected by the Turks (p. 216).

Now, it is time to check which document she confused with the telegram dated 8 November 1921 (a telegram erroneously cited in her next footnote). This is a telegram of General Gouraud to Paris, summarizing the thesis of Lieutenant-Colonel Auguste Sarrou, who considered that the emigration of Armenians had been “organized in advance by [an] Armenian committee [Ramkavar] whose civilian leaders [were] in Egypt and religious leaders in London.”<sup>103</sup> In other words, Ms. Bruna, by pure lack of care, gave as evidence a document presenting a thesis diametrically opposed to hers.

At the next page (217), however, the main problem is not any error, but an outright misleading presentation of the facts. Indeed, the author presents the demand of the religious Armenian leadership (Gregorian, Catholic, and

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100 Paul du Véou, *La Passion de...*, p. 32.

101 AMAE, P 17785.

102 Capitaine Peulvey, *Compte-rendu en fin de mission*, 16 janvier 1922, pp. 4-5 ; *Rapport du capitaine Bourgon, délégué de la sous-commission d'évacuation sur l'organisation de la commission des biens des émigrés* ; Capitaine Bourgon, *Compte-rendu de la séance du 17 décembre 1921 de la commission des biens des émigrés* ; *Procès-verbal de la réunion de la commission de protection des biens des émigrés de Killis*, le 26 décembre 1921, AMAE, P 17787.

103 *Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères*, n° 1532/10, 23 novembre 1921, AMAE, P 17785.

Protestant) of Istanbul for maintaining the occupation of Adana, without quoting the comment of General Pellé. Yet, this officer noticed “an unusual directive role” played by Zenope Bezdjian, the Protestant leader, a role “that the [numerical] importance of the elements he represents do not justify at all.” General Pellé added that Bezdjian and the Orthodox (Apostolic/Gregorian) Armenian Patriarch were “in constant relations with the English general staff.”<sup>104</sup> Yet, as Ms. Bruna herself explains, the British government was very hostile to this withdrawal (p. 157).

The most incredible falsification can be found on p. 205. Ms. Bruna claims that all the Christian policemen and gendarmes were fired by the new Turkish authorities in Adana, Mersin, and Tarsus, as early as December 1921, and gives as reference a “telegram”. In fact, this is not a telegram but two reports. The report on the gendarmerie actually mentions “fired” gendarmes but crucially specifies that they had been evicted only after persisted in their desire to “leave.” The introductory comment specifies that all the Christian gendarmes resigned right after the salary was paid, roughly when the Turks recovered the control of the gendarmerie. Similarly, the document on the police and its introductory comment explain that all the Christian policemen resigned and did not speak about any pressure exerted on them by the Kemalist authorities.<sup>105</sup>

The description of the situation after the withdrawal is hardly better, it must be said. For example, pp. 220-221 claims that “About 20,000 Armenians [were] victims of the Turkish revenges after the total evacuation of Cilicia.” Nothing is accurate in this claim. The only source provided is a book signed “E. Altıar,” the pen name of ARF leader Avetis Aharonian, a detail Ms. Bruna never gives, although she uses this reference several times (pp. 165, 166, 167, 200, 202, 207, 221, etc.). More importantly, this book was written and published *before* the Ankara Agreement. At the indicated page, or at any other, there is, as a result, nothing about the situation of Çukurova after the evacuation of November 1921-January 1922.

### **The Polemical Alterations Of The Truth Regarding The Kemalist Movement (Outside Çukurova)**

All these false assertions are not enough for Ms. Bruna, who seems to want to demonize by every possible means the Turkish national movement led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and recycles several of the most discredited allegations regarding it. One of her favorite affirmations in this regard is an

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104 AMAE, P 17785.

105 Gendarmerie [1921] ; Instruction concernant l'arrivée de la gendarmerie envoyée par Angora et son entrée en fonction, 30 novembre 1921 ; Police [1921] ; Instruction concernant l'arrivée de la police envoyée par Angora et son entrée en fonction, 30 novembre 1921, AMAE, P 17787.

alleged continuity with the CUP. On p. 185, she writes that Talat and Enver gave to Mustafa Kemal the leadership of the CUP before leaving the Ottoman Empire. As usual, no source is provided. Considering the complicated (to say the very least) relations of Mustafa Kemal with them, particularly Enver (Ms. Bruna herself mentions the tensions, at the same page then at the next one, but without solving the contradiction), this allegation is not only baseless but highly unlikely.<sup>106</sup> Even vaguer is, p. 184, the claim of “Young Turk generals” supposed to dominate the staff of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara. No name or reference is given to justify this daring assertion. Not surprisingly, the name of Rıza Nur, a former member of the anti-CUP Liberal Union who joined the Turkish national movement and was a negotiator in Lausanne, in 1922-1923, is not cited a single time. The fact that Nihat Reşat (Belger), the main person in charge of the public relations (as we would say today) of the Kemalist movement in Paris from 1920 to 1922, also was a former member of the Liberal Union, who had to flee Istanbul in 1913,<sup>107</sup> is never mentioned in the various occasions Ms. Bruna mentions him (pp. 24, 89-90, 102 and 175).

On pp. 89-90, Ms. Bruna repeats the old allegation of “Bolshevism” against the Turkish national movement, basing this claim on a selective quote of Nihat Reşat and the alleged complete dependence of Ankara vis-à-vis Moscow for weapons. Yet, Nihat Reşat's bulletin published in Paris justified the Ankara Agreement, among other reasons, by the common interests of Turkey and France against Soviet Russia.<sup>108</sup> We already saw that Italy gave weapons in 1919, before Soviet Russia and this continued after as well.<sup>109</sup> Nowhere in her book does Ms. Bruna explain how a government which admits pluralism in the parliament and does not suppress private property can be assimilated to Bolshevism. The charge is actually very ironical, coming from an official of the Ramkavar and AGBU, not only because this party supported Joseph Stalin<sup>110</sup> but also because the British branch of the AGBU took part to the circuit of funding for the Communist guerillas in Vietnam until 1953.<sup>111</sup>

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106 Nothing confirms Ms. Bruna's extraordinary claims in, for instance, George Gawrych, *The Young Atatürk. From Ottoman Soldier to Statesman of Turkey* (London-New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013), pp. 62-70 ; Alexandre Jevakhoff, *Kemal Atatürk. Père fondateur de la Turquie* (Paris: Tallandier, 2015), pp. 57-121 ; Shaw, *From Empire to...*, volume I, pp. 61-62, 71, 104-105 and 177.

107 Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, « Talât Paha », *Beyoğlu*, 10 octobre 1936, p. 2.

108 [Nihat Reşat Belger], « Contre l'accord franco-turc — Les ennemis de la paix et de l'Islam à l'œuvre » ; Alfred Jacque (Jacques Kayser), « France et Turquie », *Échos de l'Orient*, 15 novembre 1921, pp. 1 and 4.

109 Rapport hebdomadaire, 31 août 1920, p. 4 ; Id., 9 septembre 1920, p. 10, SHD, 4 H 58, dossier 2.

110 « L'Arménie soviétique a célébré son Ve anniversaire », *L'Humanité*, 6 décembre 1925, p. 1 ; Union nationale arménienne de France and Comité de défense de la cause de l'Arménie turque, *La Cause nationale arménienne* (Paris, 1945) ; Sarkis Atamian, *The Armenian Community* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 314-315.

111 Jacques Despuech, *Le Trafic des piastres* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1974) (1st edition, 1953), pp. 106-109 and 119-120.

The part on the Greek-Turkish war and the İzmir fire is not better than the rest of the book. On p. 180, the author claims that “near 100,000” perished in the fire and the footnote justifying this claim requests the reader to see the Appendix No. 19. Yet, this appendix (p. 311) is made of a gravure made in Athens and of a photo of the fire where not a single corpse is visible. Without completely endorsing the accusation against the Turkish army, regarding the origins of the fire, Ms. Bruna considers it to be the most likely hypothesis (pp. 181-183). One of her main references in this regard is the book published by George Horton, a former U.S. consul in İzmir. This is a more than problematic argument. Indeed, Ms. Bruna has worked in the microfilm P 1380 of the Diplomatic Archives in La Courneuve, which is in itself excellent, but precisely, this microfilm contains the most serious indictment against Horton, namely a report by Admiral Charles Dumesnil. This naval officer expressed “a suspicion that our Consul General [Michel Graillet] is not far from sharing,” namely that Horton knew in advance that the fire would take place: “On September 12, the Consul General of the United States, who remained very quiet, and kept in close contact with his colleagues, ordered suddenly the departure of *all the American citizens* [underlined by Admiral Dumesnil].” Yet, as continues Admiral Dumesnil, Horton had Armenian informants; it seems, as a result, that Horton “knew in advance the danger to the city because of the Armenian or Greek arsonist organizations.”<sup>112</sup>

Another highly problematic aspect in any positive and uncritical reference to Horton is that this man was stridently racist, even for the standards of his country and time. Indeed, according to him, “The Turk [...] is the lowest of Mohammedans intellectually, with none, or at best few, of the graces and accomplishments of civilization, with no cultural history. [...] He destroys but cannot construct.” More generally, “The East is tired of being civilized by superior peoples.” Horton then writes a Nazi-styled hymn to the “Aryan civilization.”<sup>113</sup> Thought this racism does not seem to shock, at any degree, Ms. Bruna, she accuses the Turkish side of “racism” because of the reprisals in the Armenian quarter (p. 183). While the indiscriminate reprisals were inexcusable by nature, these ones in particular were not due to any racist theory but entirely to the participation of Armenian nationalists to the devastation of western Anatolia by the Greek forces and their major role in the İzmir fire in particular.

Indeed, Ms. Bruna reduces the question of the Greek scorched earth policy to the accusation by Turks concerning İzmir city. She completely avoids any discussion of the devastation in place such as Manisa, Afyon, Eskişehir, Aydın,

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112 Qui sont les auteurs de l'incendie ?, 28 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.

113 George Horton, *The Blight of Asia* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill C°, 1926), pp. 209, 211 and 268.

or the villages of the province of Bursa.<sup>114</sup> Yet, these destructions and other crimes are exposed in the microfilm P 1380 where Ms. Bruna has worked.<sup>115</sup> She fails to cite even one of the documents of this kind. Similarly, she avoids saying anything on the publicly admitted participation of Armenian volunteers to the Greek forces in 1922, particularly the unit of “General” Torcom<sup>116</sup> and about their crimes in western Anatolia, well documented in the microfilm she has consulted.<sup>117</sup> Regardless, seemingly deliberate omission is not the worst. Indeed, and one more time, Ms. Bruna distorts (pp. 181-182) what General Pellé wrote. She summarizes his arguments for a criminal origin of the fire; the multiplicity of the fire and the attacks against those who tried to extinguish the fire. But she neither quotes nor summarizes the following sentence: “There are presumptions that the perpetrators are Armenians and Greeks.” She also ignores the explanations of General Pellé on “testimonies” accusing Turkish soldiers to have put fire to buildings. He personally checked these “testimonies” and found material evidence that they were absolutely wrong.<sup>118</sup>

Ms. Bruna's allegations on the coverage of the fire by the French press are equally dishonest: She accuses the newspapers of “defect,” without really discussing what was actually published (p. 182). Yet, not less than five special envoys had been sent by five different newspapers. One envoy affirmed that it was “difficult” to conclude on the origins of the fire, but mentioned the conclusions of the French authorities (an arson perpetrated by Armenians and Greeks) without criticizing them and observed “the unanimity” of the sources on “the barbarity of the Greeks devastating everything during their retreat to Smyrna.”<sup>119</sup> The author cites this article positively but does not quote, or even paraphrase, the sentence on the “barbarity of the Greeks.” One envoy found

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114 Compte-rendu synthétique militaire n° 5 — Atrocités grecques en Asie mineure, 27 septembre 1922, SHD, 20 N 1112 ; Henri Nahum (ed.), *La Grande Guerre et la guerre gréco-turque vue par les instituteurs de l'Alliance israélite universelle d'Izmir*, Istanbul : Les éditions Isis, 2003, p. 70 ; Grace Ellison, *An Englishwoman in Angora*, London: Hutchinson & C°, 1923, p. 74; Rodolphe Haccius and Henri Guénod, « Un document sur les dévastations grecques », *Échos de l'Orient*, 1er février 1923, pp. 493-497 ; Henri Mylès, « L'énigme de Moudania », *Journal des débats*, 20 octobre 1922, pp. 1-2 ; Arnold J. Toynbee, “The Truth About Near East Atrocities,” *Current History*, XVIII-4, July 1923: pp. 545-546.

115 For example, please see: Télégramme de Michel Graillet au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 5 septembre 1922 ; Père Ludovic Marseille, Rapport sur les événements qui se sont passés à Eski Chéhir du 27 août au 2 septembre 1922 ; Télégramme du général Pellé au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 8 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.

116 « Général » Torcom, « La Légion arménienne du général Torcom », in Aram Turabian, *L'Éternelle victime de la diplomatie européenne : l'Arménie*, Marseille : Imprimerie nouvelle, 1929, pp. 146-161. It is not unnecessary to remind, here, that this book of Turabian is cited in Ms. Bruna's bibliography (p. 332). As a result, she cannot ignore the existence of the Armenian Legion led by “General” Torcom.

117 Elzéar Guiffroy, Rapport sur la situation récente en Asie mineure, 27 juillet 1922 ; Extraits de lettres reçues de Smyrne [1922] ; Camille Tourelle, Prise de Smyrne par Moustafa Kemal — Incendie de Smyrne par les Grecs et les Arméniens, pp. 1-2, AMAE, P 1380.

118 Télégramme du général Pellé au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 21 septembre 1922 ; Id., 23 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.

119 Jean-Clair Guyot, « Dans les rues de Smyrne anéantie », *L'Écho de Paris*, 22 septembre 1922, p. 1.

very likely the explanation of the catastrophe by arsons put by Armenians and Greeks.<sup>120</sup> Three envoys accused the Armenian nationalists without hesitation.<sup>121</sup> Detailed articles were published by other newspapers in using such sources.<sup>122</sup>

## Conclusion

This review essay does not pretend to be comprehensive but, at least, it has exposed the most serious cases of manipulations of sources and of deliberate omissions as a part of the factual errors. Such flaws, alas, typify Ms. Bruna's book from the beginning to the end. There is literally nothing to save in the author's work: No new facts, no new and valuable interpretation. At best, it could serve as example of what a historian must always avoid, at any price. Norman Stone wrote the following about Peter Balakian's *The Burning Tigris*; "The book is an insult to its subject."<sup>123</sup> The same may be said here. However, if a professor of literature playing the historian such as Mr. Balakian rarely achieves anything reliable, it is much more disappointing to see more or less the same result from a person received a BA in history, then a MA in contemporary history from Parisian university. Any victory of political fanaticism over scholarship should be viewed with sadness.

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120 Georges Vitoux, « Une journée dans les ruines de Smyrne », *Le Petit Parisien*, 28 septembre 1922, p. 3.

121 « Dans les décombres de Smyrne — Ce sont les Arméniens qui allumèrent l'incendie en abandonnant leur quartier », *Le Matin*, 22 septembre 1922, p. 1 ; Louis Daussat, « Dans Smyrne fumante — Visions d'horreur ! », *Le Petit Marseillais*, 28 septembre 1922, p. 1 ; G. Ercole, « Devant Smyrne en flammes », *L'Illustration*, 30 septembre 1922, p. 279.

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