

REVIEW OF
ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics and International Relations

Facts and Comments

Ömer E. LÜTEM

August 2008 Lessons for the Karabakh Conflict

Araz ASLANLI

The Armenian Question in the Context of the Clash of Civilizations and Geopolitical Interests, Its Impact on Armenia-Azerbaijani Relations and Vision of the Near Future

Emin ŞİHALIYEV

Superior President vs. Submissive Congress: Relations Between Legislative and Executive in the US and its Reflection on the "Armenian Genocide" Bills

Konur Alp KOÇAK

THE KARABAKH FILE

Karabagh Conflict: Still Same Facts

Selçuk KORKUD

Co-Chairmanship System of the Minsk Group

Ali Hikmet ALP

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the Minsk Group

Candan AZER

AVİM CONFERENCES

Commemoration for the 40th Year of the First Victims of ASALA

Christopher GUNN

BOOK REVIEW

no:
27
2013



REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics and International Relations
2013, No 27

EDITOR

Ömer Engin LÜTEM

MANAGING EDITOR

Aslan Yavuz ŞİR

EDITORIAL BOARD

In Alphabetical Order

Prof. Dr. Seçil KARAL AĞÜN	Prof. Dr. Enver KONUKÇU
Prof. Dr. Nedret KURAN BURÇOĞLU (Boğaziçi University)	Ömer E. LÜTEM (Ret. Ambassador)
Prof. Dr. Sadi ÇAYCI (Başkent University)	Prof. Dr. Nurşen MAZICI (Marmara University)
Prof. Dr. Kemal ÇİÇEK (İpek University)	Prof. Dr. Nesib NESSİBLİ (Khazar University)
Dr. Şükrü ELEKDAĞ (Ret. Ambassador)	Prof. Dr. Hikmet ÖZDEMİR (Political Scientist)
Prof. Dr. Metin HÜLAGÜ (Turkish Historical Society)	Prof. Dr. Mehmet SARAY (Historian)
Dr. Erdal İLTER (Historian)	Dr. Bilal N. ŞİMŞİR (Ret. Ambassador, Historian)
Alev KILIÇ (Ret. Ambassador, Director of the Center for Eurasian Studies)	

ADVISORY BOARD

In Alphabetical Order

Ertuğrul APAKAN (Ret. Ambassador)	Prof. Dr. Hasan KÖNİ (İstanbul Kültür University)
Candan AZER (Ret. Ambassador)	Andrew MANGO (Journalist, Author)
Prof. Dr. Peter BENDIXEN (Yeditepe University)	Prof. Dr. Justin MCCARTHY (University of Louisville)
Edward ERICKSON (Historian)	Prof. Dr. Ömer TURAN (Middle East Technical University)
Prof. Dr. Yusuf HALAÇOĞLU (Member of the Parliament)	

PUBLISHER

Halil YENER

Review of Armenian Studies is published biannually

Review of Armenian Studies is a refereed journal. Review of Armenian Studies is indexed in EBSCO and TUBITAK-ULAKBIM databases. Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The editorial board takes into consideration whether the submitted article follows the rules of scientific writing. The articles are sent to two referees known for their academic reputation in their respective areas. Upon their decision, the article will be published in the journal, or rejected. The reports of the referees are kept confidential and stored in the Journal's archives for five years.

Publication Office

Terazi Yayıncılık Bas. Dağ. Dan. Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Abidin Daver Sok. No. 12/B Daire 4 06550 Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 • **Faks:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
www.avim.org.tr

ISSN: 1303-5304

Subscription Office

Hülya ÖNALP
Terazi Yayıncılık Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Süleyman Nazif Sok. No.12/B Daire 2 06550
Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24
Fax: 0 (312) 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Design

Ruhi ALAGÖZ

Printing

Özyurt Matbaacılık
Büyük San. 1. Cad. Süzgül Sok. No: 7 İskitler / ANKARA
Tel: +90 312 384 15 36 **Fax:** +90 312 384 15 37

Printing Date: 21 July 2013

Annual Subscription: 20 US \$
15 TL

Please send your payment to the following bank account:
For TL - Terazi Yayıncılık, Garanti Bankası-Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/6296007
Postal Check Account Ankara/Çankaya/Merkez 5859221

For US \$ - Garanti Bankası- Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/9086957
IBAN: TR60 0006 2000 1810 009 0869 57

Statements of facts or opinions appearing in Review of Armenian Studies are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editor and publisher.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written authorization of the Center for Eurasian Studies.

CONTENTS

(İÇİNDEKİLER)

	Page
Editorial Note	5
<i>(Editörün Notu)</i>	
ARTICLES	7
<i>(MAKALELER)</i>	
Facts and Comments	7
<i>(Olaylar ve Yorumlar)</i>	
Ömer Engin LÜTEM	
August 2008 Lessons for the Karabakh Conflict	59
<i>(Ağustos 2008'den Çıkarılacak Karabağ Dersleri)</i>	
Araz ASLANLI	
The Armenian Question in the Context of the Clash of Civilizations and Geopolitical Interests, Its Impact on Armenia-Azerbaijani Relations and Vision of the Near Future	89
<i>(Medeniyetler ve Jeopolitik Çıkarlar Çatışması Bağlamında Ermeni Sorunu, Ermenistan-Azərbaycan İlişkilerine Etkisi ve Yakın Gelecek Vizyonu)</i>	
Emin ŞİHALİYEV	
Superior President vs. Submissive Congress: Relations Between Legislative and Executive in the US and its Reflection on the "Armenian Genocide" Bills	131
<i>(Üstün Başkan Uysal Kongre Karşı Karşıya: ABD'deki Yasama-Yürütme Arasındaki İlişki ve Bunun "Ermeni Soykırımı" Yasa Tekliflerine Yansıması)</i>	
Konur Alp KOÇAK	
THE KARABAKH FILE	191
<i>(KARABAĞ DOSYASI)</i>	
Karabakh Conflict: Still Same Facts.....	193
<i>(Karabağ Anlaşmazlığı: Hala Aynı Gerçekler)</i>	
Selçuk KORKUD	
Co-Chairmanship System of the Minsk Group	197
<i>(Minsk Grubu Eş Başkanlık Sistemi)</i>	
Ali Hikmet ALP	
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the Minsk Group.....	203
<i>(Dağlık Karabağ Çatışması ve Minsk Grubu)</i>	
Candan AZER	

AVİM CONFERENCES (<i>AVİM KONFERANSLARI</i>)	233
“Regional Integrated Transport Corridors Project” (<i>Bölgesel Entegre Ulaştırma Koridorları Projesi</i>)	235
H.E. Ambassador Fatih CEYLAN <i>Deputy Undersecretary of the MFA of Turkey</i>	
“Turkey’s Energy Strategy and its Contribution to Global Energy Security” (<i>Türkiye’nin Enerji Stratejisi ve Küresel Enerji Güvenliğine Katkısı</i>)	245
Berris EKİNCİ <i>Deputy Director General Energy, Water and Environmental Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>	
“A General Look at Asia and Turkey’s Priorities” (<i>Asya’ya Genel Bir Bakış ve Türkiye’nin Öncelikleri</i>)	249
H.E. Ambassador Naci KORU <i>Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs</i>	
“Turkish Foreign Policy and Asia” (<i>Türk Dış Politikası ve Asya</i>)	260
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI <i>Chair, Department of IR, METU</i>	
Commemoration for the 40th Year of the First Victims of ASALA (<i>ASALA’nın İlk Kurbanları için 40ncı Yıl Anma Töreni</i>)	267
Christopher GUNN	
BOOK REVIEW (<i>KİTAP TAHLİLİ</i>)	275
The Role of Assyrians in the XII and XIII Century Within the Culture of the Armenians in Cilicia (<i>12 ve 13ncü Yüzyıllarda Asurilerin Kilikya Ermenilerinin Kültüründeki Rolü</i>)	275
Assist. Prof. Dr. Yıldız Deveci BOZKUŞ	

We feel proud over the twelfth anniversary of the Review of Armenian Studies. The journal not only covers the Turkey-Armenia relations but also many other topics about Armenians and Armenia.

The main topic of the **Facts and Comments** in this issue is the current relations between Turkey and Armenia. Together with the fact that there has not been any development regarding reconciliation between the two countries, Armenia demands Turkey to recognize the genocide claims. Moreover, Armenia mentions issues that have already been settled a long time ago such as the returning of the properties and paying compensation, which might create new problems. The second topic in Facts and Comments is Serzh Sargsyan's election as the president for a second time despite claims of fraud. If Sargsyan continues with the policies he followed the first five years, the chance to attain the necessary security and cooperation in Caucasus will be low. Last but not least, the 2013 24 April commemoration events in the USA, France, Armenia and Turkey are featured in the article.

Assoc. Prof. Dr Emin Şihaliev from Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences studies the position of the Turkish Civilization among other civilizations and clashes between Western and Turkish civilizations and indicates that the Armenian issue is a consequence of this clash in his article "**The Armenian Question in the Context of the Clash of Civilisations and Geopolitical Interests, its Impact on Armenia-Azerbaijani Relations and Vision of the Near Future**". Moreover, he points out the fact that the Karabakh conflict raises the chance of a war as it hasn't been resolved the last 20 years and examines how such a scenario would influence Azerbaijan.

In his article, **August 2008 Lessons for the Karabakh Conflict**, Araz Aslanlı examines the changes in Caucasia caused by Russia's August 2008 attack on Georgia, brings forward what kind of risks that unresolved problems may introduce in the Caucasus, argues that the Karabakh conflict is in a new phase as Azerbaijan has a stronger military power and it might use its right to defend itself. The article makes a review of the situation in Karabakh as well as the chances for resolution and proposes some suggestions in light of the previous comments.

Konur Alp Koçak examines how the Armenian Allegations influence the legislative activities in the USA in his article, **Congress and Presidency: The Nature of the Legislative-Executive Relationship in the US and its Reflection on Attempts Towards Legislation in Regards to the Armenian Question**. He explains how the President earns the priority of determining the foreign policy

of the country after a struggle with the Congress and that the situation yields undesirable consequences for Armenians.

In the first years of the Karabakh Conflict, Turkish authorities and diplomats showed great efforts to find a peaceful solution for the problem. The Minsk Group which was founded for that purpose and of which Turkey is also a member, handed down its authority to three co-chairmen (the USA, Russia and France). As a result, Turkey's initiatives got weaker and over time disappeared. Although the co-chairmen came up with several suggestions, they were not successful as the co-chairmen lacked the power to impose them on the parties. We decided to publish in our journal the information we could gather on the efforts of the Turkish diplomacy at that time spent in order to resolve the issue. In this issue, articles by three retired Ambassadors who worked on the issue are published under the title the "**Karabakh File**".

Center for Eurasian Studies started to hold some "brain storming" conferences. We begin to publish the transcripts of these conferences in English under the title **AVİM Conferences**.

In this issue, the speech delivered at the conference entitled "**Regional Integrated Transport Corridors Project**" by Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Fatih Ceylan and another speech by Berris Ekinci, Deputy Director General of Energy, Water and Environmental Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled "**Turkey's Energy Strategy and Its Contribution to Global Energy Security**" can be found.

The transcript of our second conference that includes the speech by Ambassador Naci Kuru, Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkey about Turkey-Asia relations entitled "**A General Look at Asia and Turkey's Priorities**" and speech by Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı on Turkish Foreign Policy and Asia are also given in this issue.

It has been 40 years since ASALA murdered two Turkish diplomats, General Consul Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir, and began its monstrous campaign against Turkey. You will find the transcript of a conference speech delivered by **Christopher Gunn** from the Florida State University on the 40th year commemoration of the assassinations of our two martyr diplomats on January 27, 1973 by Gourgen Yanikian in this issue.

Lastly, in this issue a book review by Dr. Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş of the book "**The Role of Assyrians in the XII and XIII Century Within the Culture of The Armenians in Cilicia**" written by the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter Petrosyan is also published.

Best Regards,

The editor.

FACTS AND COMMENTS

(OLAYLAR VE YORUMLAR)

Ömer Engin LÜTEM

Ambassador (Ret.)
Center for Eurasian Studies, Advisor
oelutem@avim.org.tr

Abstract: *This article deals with the development that occurred from December 2012 to the end of April 2013 on Turkey-Armenia relations, the 18 February 2013 Armenian Presidential Election and the commemoration and other activities in France, Armenia and Turkey, including President Obama's declaration on the occasion of 24th of April in the US.*

Keywords: *Turkey, Armenia, United States, France, Armenian Diaspora, Catholicos of Etchmiadzin and Antelias, Presidential Election in Armenia, 24th of April commemoration activities, Serge Sarkisian, Edward Nalbandian, Raffi Hovannisian, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Vincent Peillon, Ara Sarafian, Alexis Govcian*

Öz: *Bu makale Aralık 2012'den Nisan 2013'ün sonuna kadar Türkiye-Ermenistan ilişkilerinde devam eden gelişmeler, 18 Şubat 2013'te gerçekleşen Ermenistan Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi ve Fransa Ermenistan, Türkiye'de gerçekleşen anma etkinlikleri ile ABD Başkanı Obama'nın 24 Nisan'da olaylar hakkında yaptığı konuşmayla ilgilidir.*

Anahtar kelimeler: *Türkiye, Ermenistan, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Fransa, Ermeni Diasporası, Antelias ve Eçmiatzin Apostolik Kiliseleri, Ermenistan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimi, 24 Nisan anma etkinlikleri, Serj Sarkisyan, Edward Nalbadian, Raffi Hovannisyan, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Vincent Peillon, Ara Sarafyan, Alexis Govcian*

ARTICLES

I – TURKEY-ARMENIA RELATIONS

1. The Genocide Issue coming to the Forefront in Armenia’s Policy towards Turkey

Lack of progress on the Karabakh conflict caused non-ratification of Turkey-Armenian Protocols and therefore no implementation. By bringing the genocide allegations to the forefront, Armenia has tried to show its reaction to this situation and attempted to persuade Turkey to abandon its policy on the Karabakh conflict, or at least convince Turkey not to be insistent on this issue. For this purpose, President Sarkisian has started asking Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide allegations. Recalling that the ex-presidents of Armenia Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan were cautious not to make any open requests from Turkey regarding the genocide issue in order not to add a new problem to the essentially tense relations, this approach of Sarkisian presents a change in the policy pursued towards Turkey.

On the other hand, it can be seen that the Armenian President has not only brought the recognition of the genocide allegations forth, but has also tried to make it into one of the main issues of Armenia’s foreign policy. In his speech delivered at the Armenian Haigazian University during his visit to Lebanon at the end of November 2012, Sarkisian has said “Social and economic problems are important, but the most important are vital issues - the right of Nagorno-Karabakh’s people to self-determination, the recognition of the Armenian genocide by Turkey”¹. Therefore, Sarkisian attaches the same importance to the Karabakh conflict as much as to the genocide allegations.

The same issue has also been expressed by Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian not so with the following statement: “The issue regarding the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and regulation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are links of the same chain”².

2. Weakening of Genocide Allegations within Some Diaspora Circles and in the International Sphere

While the recognition of the “genocide” by Turkey is prioritized as part of Armenia’s foreign policy, there are indications that the “genocide

1 “President: Armenia has two Important Tasks- Karabakh Issue and Genocide Recognition”, *News.am*, 27 November 2012.

2 “The International Community Must Recognize the Armenian Genocide, as to its Organizers They Must Show Repentance: The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia”, *Armenpress*, 27 November 2013.

recognition” has begun to lose its importance within the Diaspora and in the academic field.

Harut Sassounian, who is the most read journalist in the US, began to argue that rather than asking for the recognition of the genocide, fulfillment of justice shall be demanded from Turkey. According to Sassounian, the “genocide” has indeed been recognized in the international sphere. However, it is not possible to obligate Turkey for this recognition. Therefore, Armenians shall now focus on fulfillment of justice³. This can only be accomplished through the returning of Armenian territories, reparations and the preservation of the Armenian cultural heritage⁴. Armenians should seek their rights in courts⁵. Until now, the dominant discourse within the Armenian Diaspora was that if Turkey recognizes the “genocide”, its consequences will be reparations, returning of the Armenian properties and even of the territories to Armenia. Now, by putting aside the recognition of genocide, which is the first step, Sassounian suggests directly making demands and to utilize courts for this purpose. Whether or not this is possible is a separate issue that requires long explanations. We should immediately note that there is almost no possibility for such a course to achieve success.

Until now, the dominant discourse within the Armenian Diaspora was that if Turkey recognizes the “genocide”, its consequences will be reparations, returning of the Armenian properties and even of the territories to Armenia. Now, by putting aside the recognition of genocide, which is the first step, Sassounian suggests directly making demands and to utilize courts for this purpose.

William Schabas is the most recognized and respected among the “genocide scholars”. In his book⁶, he considers the 1915 events as genocide without any discussion and uttered the Armenian genocide allegations at every available opportunity, despite the fact that his own criteria - as defined in his book- to define an event as genocide are not applicable to 1915. On the other hand, he has also served as President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars financed by the Armenian Zoryan Institute. However, in an article published at the end of 2012⁷, he mentioned the difficulty of classifying the 1915 events as genocide due to

3 “Restauration de la Justice Plutôt que Reconnaissance; Harout Sassounian Suggère une Formulation Nouvelle”, *Radiolour*, 9 October 2012.

4 “U.S. Based Publisher Urges to Demand For Justice in Genocide Issue”, *Panarmenian.net*, 9 October 2012.

5 “Diaspora Scholar Advocates Push for justice Over Armenian Genocide”, *RFE/RL*, 8 October 2012.

6 William A. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law*, Cambridge 2000.

7 William A. Schabas, “Crimes Against Humanity as a Paradigm for International Atrocity Crimes”, *Middle East Critique*, Volume 20, Number 3, Fall 2011

the necessity of proving there was special intent and has argued that the perpetrators of this event have died, therefore it would be more correct to recognize the 1915 events as a crime against humanity.

It is also seen that the genocide thesis is losing ground in the international arena. Despite all attempts by the Armenians, no resolution has been adopted in the US Congress concerning the genocide allegations. Contrary to what happened in the previous years, the European Parliament has not made any reference to the Armenian “genocide” in its resolutions for the last six years. Again within the last six years, the parliament of only one country (Sweden) has adopted a resolution on this issue and lastly, despite all attempts in France, no law has been adopted concerning the punishment of those denying the Armenian genocide allegations.

Without doubt the genocide allegations have not disappeared and for some time, perhaps for a long time, these allegations will continue to be put forward and will be supported by a great majority of the Armenians. However, it is also clear that these allegations have begun to dissolve and obviously this situation will continue. In such a situation, Armenia’s prioritization of the subject of genocide as the core subject-matter of its foreign policy will create problems for the country itself, because Armenia will have difficulties in finding countries that will support these allegations.

3. President Sarkisian and Relations with Turkey

During the period that we’ve analyzed, President Sarkisian has frequently referred to relations with Turkey in his statements.

After President Sarkisian’s speech delivered at the Beirut Armenian Haigazian University in which he brought the genocide issue to the fore as mentioned above, perhaps under the influence that the genocide issue is no longer among the EU’s issues of priority, has not referred to this issue in the European People Party’s meeting held in Yerevan on November 30 2012 to which President of the EU Commission Manuel Barroso has also attended. However, by indicating that borders with Turkey remain closed, which will be examined in more detail below, he has said that Turkey, seeking membership to the EU, is maintaining an illegal blockade against Armenia and that they are sure that the “last closed border in Europe” must be opened immediately and without preconditions⁸.

⁸ “The Last Cosed Border of Europe Should be Opened Immediately and Without Preconditions, Serzh Sargsyan”, *Armenpress*, 30 November 2012.

President Sarkisian, as the commander-in-chief, has organized a meeting at Armenia's Ministry of Defense on January 15 2013 to which almost the entire state dignitaries have attended, and in that long speech, has given priority to Armenia's defense and the Karabakh conflict, and has also talked about relations with Turkey, the Middle East, Diaspora, Syrian Armenians, Russia and NATO.

By taking its importance into consideration, we are providing the part that concerns Turkey in Sarkisian's speech below⁹.

Speaking about Azerbaijan we shouldn't forget that there is a country in the region which supports unequivocally Baku's anti-Armenian propaganda. The Turkish-Azeri tandem formed under the "One nation, two states" slogan, for over twenty years through the blockade, deepening of the lines of division and rejection of cooperation has been trying to compel Armenia to make unilateral concessions. They have failed and they will fail again.

As a peace-loving, progressive and farseeing nation, we realize the importance of the establishment in the region of the atmosphere of mutual trust to be able to coexist peacefully with our neighbors and develop naturally. With this very comprehension, we initiated the process of normalization with Turkey. Everyone is aware now how it ended and how Turkey withdrew from the assumed obligations, persisting in keeping the last closed border in Europe tightly sealed.

Tension in Turkey is building up. The policy of "zero problems" with the neighbors yielded zero results. It is happening because Turkey is trying to solve all problems with the neighbors at the expense of the neighbors. Today, Turkey is a rapidly developing country which is making impressive progress; however that progression will be deficient and may be dramatically stalled if the Turkish authorities do not seriously review their attitude towards the history of their state and their people. That progression is seriously endangered even now, since Turkey is repeating the same mistakes it made in the past.

Recognition and condemnation of the Armenian Genocide is Turkey's duty before the victims of the Genocide, those who survived and their descendants, before the entire human kind but first of all, it is a duty before its own people. Today, the people of Turkey albeit slowly but

⁹ "President Serzh Sargsyan Held a Meeting in the Extended Format at the RA Ministry of Defense", Press Release, 15 January 2013, <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/01/15/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-participated-at-the-meeting-Ministry-of-Defense/>

have started to question the bogus version circulated by the Turkish authorities for decades, while the most progressive and courageous segment of the Turkish society is speaking out loud about the Armenian Genocide.

For the Republic of Armenia, the recognition and condemnation of the Armenian Genocide is not just a matter of justice and retribution or a moral debt to be paid to our ancestors: it also has a security dimension. I trust without Turkey's sincere repentance and elimination of the repercussions of the Genocide, Armenia's safe existence in the region is endangered.

Let us try to analyze Serge Sarkisian's statements.

It is true that Turkey and Azerbaijan have closed their borders with Armenia and have left this country outside of regional cooperation (i.e. the route of the gas and oil pipelines, the construction of new railroads etc. and the construction of new transit routes in the future) between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey in the South Caucasus. The reason for Azerbaijan acting in this manner is Armenia's occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan and causing approximately one million Azerbaijanis to become refugees by taking advantage of the confusion created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and of the situation where Azerbaijan failed to fully maintain its national unity. On the other hand, Turkey is complainant of Armenia attempting to indirectly reignite the issues that were settled with the treaties of Moscow and Kars in 1921 and with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and of bringing forth new demands such as the recognition of the "genocide". Moreover, Turkey strongly supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with which it has close relations. In short, both Turkey and Azerbaijan have justifications for closing their borders with Armenia and not entering any regional cooperation with this country.

Furthermore, Azerbaijan's application of peaceful methods such as closing the border or bereavement of Armenia from regional cooperation, rather than using force, are all in Armenia's benefit.

Secondly, we must note that it is not correct that the process of normalizing relations with Turkey did not begin by Armenian initiatives. This process has begun with President Gül's congratulatory message sent on 21 March 2008 to Serge Sarkisian after he was elected as President¹⁰. Some expressions in this message, not generally found in usual congratulatory messages, have clearly showed that Turkey wishes the normalization of relations between

10 For the full text of the statement see: Ermeni Araştırmaları, No. 29, pp. 7-8.

the two countries. On this matter, President Gül has said the following: “*I hope your new position will permit the creation of the necessary environment for normalizing relations between the Turkish and Armenian peoples, who have proven over centuries they can live together in peace and concord. I sincerely wish that an atmosphere based on stability, reciprocal trust and cooperation can be established that will contribute to regional peace and prosperity*”. It is after this message that negotiations between the two countries have gained momentum and at the end, on 10 October 2012, the Protocols have been signed in Zurich.

In his speech, Sarkisian expressed that Turkey withdrew from its obligations. With this he must have meant that the Turkish Grand National Assembly has not yet ratified the Protocols. It is noteworthy to shortly dwell upon this problem of ratification that has been quite abused by the Armenians. According to international rules, for an agreement to enter into force, the following stages must be passed. First of all when negotiations end, agreement text is initialed by those conducting the negotiations. Secondly, the agreement text would be signed by the executive power (Governments). Third of all, this text must be ratified by the Assemblies (Parliaments) of the concerning countries. Only when this ratification process comes to an end obligations -in other words, the obligation to conform to the provisions of the agreement- arise. Since the Protocols have neither been ratified by Armenia’s Parliament nor of Turkey’s, at the moment there is no obligation that must be fulfilled.

Turkey sees the normalization of relations with Armenia as “a part of the perspective of providing the region with a complete and comprehensive normalization” and links the normalization process to “concrete steps being taken in the Caucasus towards comprehensive peace”¹¹. Although what these concrete steps were not determined, it could be understood that the evacuation of some of the “rayons” surrounding Karabakh and currently under Armenian occupation will be considered as a sufficient step. On the other hand, Armenia regards normalization of relations with Turkey as a problem existing only between the two countries and does not consider this issue to be related to peace being obtained in the South Caucasus.

Armenian President describes the Turkey-Armenia border as the “last closed border in Europe tightly sealed”. This description, used frequently within the Diaspora press, is not correct. Only in that region apart from the Turkey-Armenia border, the Armenia-Azerbaijan border is entirely shut, the

11 Ahmet Davutoğlu, *2013 Yılına Girerken Dış Politikamız*, (The booklet prepared for the Foreign Ministry’s 2013 Financial Year Budget Bill to be Presented to the Turkish Grand National Assembly), p.79

Georgia-Russia border is partially closed and the Azerbaijan-Iran border is still (as of April 2013) closed.

In his speech, Serge Sarkisian refers to Turkey as a country that is rapidly developing and is making impressive progress. However, he makes unclear statements that rather reflects his obsession with genocide such as that if Turkey “do not seriously review its attitude towards the history of their state and their people” this development can be stalled and that its progression is seriously endangered even now, since Turkey is repeating the same mistakes it made in the past. There is no relationship between Turkey not recognizing the genocide allegations and its development. The most striking evidence of this is that Turkey has developed rapidly the most in the last ten years and just as before, has continued rejecting the genocide allegations.

Another point that is unclear is his statement that Turkey’s recognition of the Armenian “genocide” is its duty before its own people. The Turkish nation has become quite susceptible to the genocide accusations that are constantly brought forth by various circles and is able to display strong reactions to those trying to impose these allegations. In Turkey, where democratic conditions are dominant, it does not seem very likely for a government that would embrace the genocide thesis to win the election or to even remain in power.

In this situation, Sarkisian’s statement that “today, the people of Turkey - albeit slowly- have begun to question the bogus version circulated by the Turkish authorities for decades, while the most progressive and courageous segment of the Turkish society is speaking out loud about the Armenian genocide” is quite exaggerated. Currently, two groups in Turkey support the Armenian genocide allegations. The first of these are some former leftist and newly liberal intellectuals. When observing what is written by this group, it could be seen that since the view that there was no Armenian genocide is defended by “nationalist” circles, the Armenian genocide thesis is utilized as an instrument for the struggle carried out against these nationalist circles. In other words, it is difficult to say that a great majority of the “liberal intellectuals” are actually concerned with the Armenian genocide issue except for this struggle. In fact, it could be seen that some of the liberals try not to use the word “genocide” by taking into consideration the reactions this word creates within public opinion. The second group that supports the Armenian allegations exists within the pro-Kurdish BDP Party. In particular, Ahmet Türk mentions this issue from time to time and apologizes to the Armenians for what the Kurds did in the past. It could also be seen here that rather than entirely embracing Armenian views, they try to utilize the Armenian question in their struggle carried out against the Turkish

Government's unitary Turkish state policy. It is possible that if the efforts towards the settlement of the Kurdish question reach a positive outcome and Turkey obtains internal peace, the support given by the Kurds to Armenian views will disappear or will at least very much weaken.

The weakest aspect of the genocide allegations, in terms of influencing public opinion, is that the concerning events had taken place approximately a century ago. From that date until the present, political order in the region has changed three times, after the First World War, Second World War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Attempting to revitalize the Armenian question after a century, which was settled after the First World War and which threatens the peace in the region, as with the Karabakh conflict, is not an approach that is generally accepted. Therefore, the support given to the Armenian genocide allegations in Europe and in the US generally carries a "moral" aspect. In other words, it is the expression of sympathy felt towards the Armenians who have been removed from the territories they lived on by being relocated and apart from suffering many losses, have also spread to many countries. However, both the Armenian Government and the Diaspora have expectations much beyond "sympathy". These entail Turkey paying compensation for the relocation and also returning the Armenian properties being seized and giving some territory to Armenia. Being able to receive support for these claims is only possible with accepting that the Armenian question is not historical, but also has a "contemporary" significance. Therefore, it has begun to be conveyed recently that the recognition of the Armenian "genocide" also has a security dimension to it. Sarkisian has expressed this point by saying "I trust without Turkey's sincere repentance and elimination of the repercussions of the genocide (compensation, returning of properties and perhaps giving territory), Armenia's safe existence in the region is endangered".

While the recognition of the genocide allegations was in no way mentioned in the Protocols, the parties had recognized the existing border, had established the grounds for extensive cooperation between them and an organization had even been set up that would provide this.

However, there is no connection between the recognition of the genocide allegations and Armenia's safety. The settlement of problems with Armenia will provide security even without the recognition of the genocide allegations. By signing the Protocols, Armenia has already accepted this. While the recognition of the genocide allegations was in no way mentioned in the Protocols, the parties had recognized the existing border, had established the grounds for extensive cooperation between them and an

organization had even been set up that would provide this. But, when it was understood that the Protocols cannot be implemented independently from the Karabakh conflict, Armenia has conveyed the view that if the genocide allegations are not recognized, Armenia's safety will be in danger. Presumably what is expected from this is for some countries and the US in particular to put pressure on Turkey to make some gestures in order to eliminate Armenia's security concerns like for instance, Turkey to open its border without linking it to the Karabakh issue.

In conclusion, the Armenian President's speech of 15 January 2013, which we mentioned and tried to analyze above, does not help in the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations due to the extreme and negative views it entails. In fact, insisting on these points can cause relations to become tense even more.

Following the speech mentioned above, the Armenian President has also made statements that refer to Armenia's relations with Turkey. These are shortly addressed below.

By delivering a long interview on 20 January 2013 to the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)¹², Sarkisian has addressed many issues including the Presidential election nearing by, the economy, migration from Armenia to foreign countries, and Karabakh and in the meantime, has also mentioned Turkey in connection to the genocide allegations. The important parts of Sarkisian's response to the question that the big plans for the centennial of the Armenian "genocide" is compared to a tsunami within the Turkish media, the Turks are in for hard times and is such a tsunami really expected, are provided below:

I have no doubts that the Turks are really in for hard times, because having no desire to face up to history and at the same time showing European ambitions (becoming a member of the EU) cannot be combined easily. If the Turks have the courage and recognize the Armenian genocide as soon as possible, I think our people could have some understanding toward the people of today's Turkey. But as long as the Turks refuse to admit the genocide, moreover continue to deny it, the Armenian people will always bear in mind and constantly consider this fact in its actions. It's not only that we must respect the memory of the victims. The thing is first of all that by admitting the genocide, future genocides are prevented, and also a possibility is created for eliminating the consequences of this genocide. The elimination of the consequences of genocide is not a matter of one day, a year or even 10 or 20 years.

12 "Interview: Sarkisian On Upcoming Vote, Turkish Relations, Nagorno-Karabakh", RFE/RL, 20 January 2013.

In connection to the recognition of the genocide allegations by Turkey, Sarkisian has also said the Turks, indeed, have a complex and don't want to face up to history; they have a complex because of their fraternity with the Azerbaijanis, but their fraternity with Azerbaijan is an obstacle for them.

Regarding the tsunami, he has said,

I don't think it is appropriate to compare the genocide to a tsunami. I don't think that the 100th anniversary is a watershed and I don't think that we are in a 100-meter race, covering a distance of one meter a year, and that upon reaching the 100th meter we will stand or expect any big victory. This is a landmark and we, of course, will reach this landmark. The state of Armenia and the pan-Armenian organizations worldwide will naturally become more active in connection with this anniversary. But to say that we are going to make a storm in the world...it isn't our goal. Our goal is for the Turks to admit the Armenian genocide. I am convinced it will happen. But the sooner it happens, the better, because denying the genocide means continuing to commit genocide.

In a statement issued in the city of Vanadzor during his presidential election campaign¹³, again by referring to the genocide issue, Sarkisian has put forth that Turkey cannot change the process of international recognition of the genocide and condemnation of the world, while in another statement¹⁴ has expressed that he does not expect Turkey to recognize the Armenian “genocide” before the 100th anniversary and has indicated that as long as Turkey continues the policy of denial, they cannot say that there is no danger on the part of Turkey.

During his statements, the Armenian President has also made a mention of the Protocols saying that Yerevan will reject protocols signed with Turkey if Ankara continues protracting ratification of the documents and that in this situation new talks and preconditions are required if Ankara expresses willingness to conclude a new agreement¹⁵.

Furthermore, in terms of the ratification of the Protocols, Sarkisian has said that Armenia will not take any initiative on the development of Turkey-Armenia relations in the near future¹⁶.

13 “Blackmailing Armenia Will Not Work – President”, *News.am*, 30 January 2013.

14 “Serzh Sargysyan: Turkey Will Once Recognize the Armenian Genocide”, *Radiolur*, 31 January 2013

15 “Yerevan May Reject Protocols Signed With Turkey – Armenian President”, *News.am*, 16 February 2013.

16 “Armenia Will Not Take Any Initiative on the Development of Armenian-Turkish Relations in Near Future”, *Armenpress*, 21 January 2013.

Explanations must be provided on some of Serge Sarkisian's views.

The first of these is his statement that Turkey's refusal of the genocide allegations does not combine with its desire to become an EU member or in more simple words, Turkey cannot become a member of the EU unless it recognizes the "genocide". The recognition of any genocide does not exist within the Copenhagen criteria which must be fulfilled in order to become an EU member. On the other hand, genocide has not been brought to the agenda during the negotiations held until now with EU officials regarding membership. Although a resolution of the European Parliament in 1987 had indicated that Turkey's non-recognition of the Armenian genocide could form an obstacle to Turkey's EU membership and there was a reference to this issue in some resolutions of the Parliament from 2000 to 2006, these resolutions are not mandatory, but rather display the Parliament's tendency. Therefore, expecting Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide allegations with the hope of becoming a member of the EU is too much optimism. Moreover, it is difficult to say that the current condition of the EU makes membership to this organization desirable.

The second point is the belief that the recognition of the Armenian "genocide" will prevent other genocides from taking place in the future. This view, brought forth for many years, has a more demagogic value to it, because despite the Holocaust was recognized and strongly condemned by almost all countries in the world, genocides have occurred in Rwanda and Bosnia. Rather than through the recognition and condemnation of past genocides, the prevention of future genocides is possible through democracy, respect to human rights and individuals being educated in the area of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Sarkisian's statement that does not give much hope for the 100th anniversary of the relocation also requires explanation. With the influence of some Turkish writers, there truly is an expectation, especially within the Diaspora, that Turkey is scared of the Armenian activities to be held for 2015 and under this effect, could recognize the Armenian genocide allegations. However, for most of Turkish public opinion, 2015 does not evoke anything else besides the Dardanelles victory.

In Armenia, the coordination of the commemoration activities for the relocation's 100th anniversary has been given to a committee personally chaired by Serge Sarkisian. Despite a period of two years remaining, what kinds of activities this committee will organize is uncertain. The general conviction is that activities similar to those organized each year but more widespread and greater in numbers will be performed. President Sarkisian's

statement regarding this issue that “the State of Armenia and Armenian organizations worldwide will naturally become more active in connection with this anniversary, but to say that we are going to make a storm in the world...it isn’t our goal” confirms this conviction.

During the period being examined, Foreign Minister Nalbandian has also made some statements regarding Turkey-Armenia relations. However, rather than the genocide issue, Nalbandian has dwelled upon the Protocols and has repeated the desire for Armenia to normalize relations with Turkey without any preconditions (in other words, without being linked to the Karabakh conflict) and has also argued that since Turkey did not ratify the Protocols, international law is functioning contrary to the rule of “*pacta sunt servanda*” (agreements must be respected)¹⁷.

A news item in the Zhoghovurd newspaper that Armenian-Turkish negotiations have resumed for quite a long time and are being held secretly with Switzerland’s mediation has been disclaimed at the end of November 2012 by the Spokesperson of the Armenian Foreign Ministry¹⁸. Similarly, press news that Turkey has proposed to Armenia a transportation project that would link Europe and Asia together if a development takes place on the Karabakh conflict has also been denied by the Armenia Foreign Ministry by indicating that Armenia is not conducting negotiations with Turkey in any format¹⁹.

Armenia’s stance on Turkey assisting in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict is also negative. Regarding this issue, Foreign Minister Nalbandian has said that Turkey cannot assume the role of a mediator in the Karabakh conflict settlement and it should not get involved in the process if it seeks to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflict²⁰.

The views of the Armenian President and Foreign Minister mentioned above explain the essence of Armenia’s policy towards Turkey in the upcoming period. In order for them to be remembered better, we are providing them below in short summaries. We have separated these under two headings as the genocide allegations and other issues.

17 “Turkey Rejects Key Precept in International Relations – Armenian FM”, *News.am.*, 27 February 2013.

18 “Armenian, Turkey in No Secret Talks – MFA Says”, *Tert-am.*, 28 November 2012.

19 “MFA: Yerevan Not Holding Talks With Ankara”, *Lurer.com*, 25 February 2013.

20 “FM: Turkey Shouldn’t Get Involved in Karabakh Settlement”, *PanArmenian.Net*, 27 February 2013.

A. Views Concerning the Genocide Allegations

- 1 Turkey's recognition of the genocide allegations is the most important and prioritized issue of Armenia's foreign policy.
- 2 If Turkey recognizes the genocide allegations, the Armenian nation will show understanding towards the Turkish nation. Or else, it will always take genocide into consideration in all its actions.
- 3 Recognition of the "genocide" is Turkey's duty. A segment of the Turkish nation has started believing in the "genocide".
- 4 Turkey is a rapidly developing country. However, that progression can be stalled if Turkey does not review its attitude towards history (if it does not recognize the genocide allegations).
- 5 As long as Turkey does not recognize the "genocide" and eliminate the "consequences of the genocide", Armenia's safety is endangered.
- 6 The recognition of the "genocide" creates the opportunity for its consequences (compensation, territorial claims and returning of properties) to be eliminated.
- 7 Turkey's recognition of the "genocide" cannot be combined with its desire to become an EU member.
- 8 The recognition of the Armenian "genocide" will prevent other genocides from taking place in the future.
- 9 The 100th anniversary of 1915 is not the point where the struggle ends. Attempts for Turkey to recognize the genocide allegations will continue from then on.
- 10 The reasons for Turkey not wanting to recognize the "genocide" are it having no desire to face up to history and its fraternity with Azerbaijan.
- 11 Turkey will not be able to change the process of the genocide allegations being internationally recognized and condemned.

B. Other Issues

- 1 By closing their borders and rejecting cooperation, Turkey and Azerbaijan compel Armenia to make unilateral concessions.

- 2 Armenia has initiated the normalization process with Turkey. But, this process has ended due to Turkey not fulfilling its obligations.
- 3 As long as Ankara continues protracting ratification of the Protocols, Armenia can withdraw its signature. New talks are required from now on for the Protocols which will entail new preconditions.
- 4 By not ratifying the Protocols, Turkey has acted against international law's rule of "pacta sunt servanda" (agreements must be respected).
- 5 Armenia is not conducting any (secret) negotiations with Turkey.
- 6 Armenia will not take any initiative on the development of Turkey-Armenia relations in the near future.
- 7 Turkey cannot assume the role of a mediator in the Karabakh conflict settlement and it should not get involved in the process of resolution of the conflict.

4. Turkey's Stance and Its Proposals

Turkey has not responded to President Sarkisian's statements explained above. This way, it has prevented Sarkisian from gaining an advantage during the election period through demagogic issues being discussed.

On the other hand, Turkey has tended towards resolving the problems that Armenia created with its neighbors not within a bilateral framework, but as a whole with the participation of all concerning countries and through the help of the benefits which will be created by economic cooperation that would be established between them. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, in a speech delivered in December 2012 in a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, has said that the BSCE is making efforts to achieve peace, stability and welfare in the region through enhancement of economic relations and that the more economic relations among member states are strengthened, the easier it will be to solve the frozen conflicts in the region. Davutoğlu has also expressed that they want the UN and the OSCE to be more active for Armenia's withdrawal from the occupied Azerbaijani territories²¹.

21 "Ahmet Davutoğlu: We Want the UN and OSCE to be More Active So That Armenia Withdraws from the Occupied Azerbaijan, Territories", *APA*, 15 December 2012.

The idea of resolving the conflicts by strengthening economic relations has turned into a concrete proposal in Turkey's Integrated Transportation Corridors Project²². Before everything else, this project will be implemented in a time of peace. Within this framework, Armenia must evacuate the 7 Azerbaijani rayons (districts) surrounding Karabakh. After this, Turkey-Armenia and Azerbaijan-Turkey relations will turn back to normal. In other words, diplomatic relations will be established and the borders will be opened.

The idea of resolving the conflicts by strengthening economic relations has turned into a concrete proposal in Turkey's Integrated Transportation Corridors Project . Before everything else, this project will be implemented in a time of peace. Within this framework, Armenia must evacuate the 7 Azerbaijani rayons (districts) surrounding Karabakh. After this, Turkey-Armenia and Azerbaijan-Turkey relations will turn back to normal. In other words, diplomatic relations will be established and the borders will be opened.

Concerning the project itself, Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Federation of Russia will be connected to each other through the unused railways and new railways to be constructed, while at the same time a highway will also be constructed between these countries. New logistical centers and residential areas are also to be built along these routes. Turkey envisages to link regional countries to Europe and Asia. A transportation line between London and Beijing will soon be possible with the conclusion of the Marmararay Project and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad.

Turkey has presented this project to the Minsk Group in Vienna on 8 November 2012 and has received positive reactions.

Turkey has also provided information to Azerbaijan on this project and has emphasized that the project will be implemented after Armenia moves towards peace.

It is understood that the project has also been conveyed to Armenia through the Minsk Group but has not yet received any official response. Armenia still attempts to achieve the North-South line (Russia-Georgia-Armenia-Iran-the Persian Gulf line) in the area of transportation. However, this is not an obstacle to the construction of the East-West line going to Europe.

On the other hand, Armenia has always accepted that the seven rayons surrounding Karabakh belong to Azerbaijan and has indicated that it has

22 For information on this project see: "Turkey Eyes Karabakh Step from Armenia to Open Ways", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 23 February 2013.

occupied these regions for Karabakh's security. Therefore, its withdrawal from these regions should not, in principle, create any problems.

It has not been indicated in the project what kind of status is foreseen for the Karabakh region. Most likely it is planned for the future of this region to be addressed at a later date following the establishment of peace. In essence, the Minsk Group's suggestion is also in this direction.

5. The Joint Statement of the Armenian Archbishops

Within the Gregorian sect to which a great majority of the Armenians belong, the title Catholicos is given to the highest spiritual leader holding the religious post. This title corresponds to the Pope among the Catholics.

The Gregorian Armenians have two Catholicos. The first is residing in Etchmiadzin near Yerevan. The other in Antelias near Beirut.

Both in the area of protocol and religious rank, Etchmiadzin has a priority. However, Antelias does not depend on Etchmiadzin in administrative matters. In reality, there is competition between these two churches in sharing the congregation. Furthermore, while Etchmiadzin gives support to the Armenian Government's policies, Antelias, which is a Diaspora church, is more under the influence of the Dashnaks.

These two churches, whose coming together and working together is not generally seen, surprisingly issued a joint statement on the occasion of April 24 in order to express demands to Turkey to return the confiscated churches and church properties²³.

After shortly summarizing the 1915 events from the Armenian point of view, the statement expresses that the Armenians living under the Ottoman Empire have lost all their personal belongings along with churches, monasteries, holy places, religious and educational centers, cultural and religious artifacts of great value, cross-stones, manuscripts and holy pictures and that Turkey appropriated all of these belongings under the pretext that they were "abandoned properties". By also indicating that 98 years after the Armenian genocide, the current Turkish authorities, the legal successors of the Ottomans, not only deny the genocide, but continue to hold on to the confiscated church properties and religious treasures, they put forward the following requests:

23 Press Release, *Catholicosate of Cilicia*, 24 April 2013.

1. That Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide.
2. That Turkey compensates Armenians for all their losses in human lives and human rights.
3. That Turkey returns the Armenian churches, monasteries, church properties and all spiritual and cultural monuments to their rightful and legal owners, i.e. the Armenian people.

In the statement, it is expressed that they are grateful to all those people and governments who have assisted the deported survivors of the genocide and to all those governments, which have condemned the inhuman acts of the Ottoman Turks and have formally recognized the Armenian genocide.

The statement ends by indicating that on the threshold of the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian genocide, they shall pursue together the rightful and legal demands for justice for the Armenian people.

As we mentioned above it has been observed that recently a movement has emerged especially among some Diaspora circles that the genocide is sufficiently recognized in the international area and therefore, the time has come to demand the elimination of the consequences of genocide (returning of properties and paying compensation etc.) from Turkey. We see above, without going into details, that even President Sarkisian had also referred to the elimination of the consequences of genocide.

The significance of the joint statement of the two Catholicos in this context is that for the first time, detailed and concrete demands were made from Turkey. This way, a new problem has been added to the already loaded agenda of the problems existing between Turkey and Armenia.

II – THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

1. Presidential Candidates and the Results of the Election

The Presidential Election in Armenia was held on 18 February 2013 and as anticipated by everyone, Serge Sarkisian had easily won the election.

The reason for this is Sarkisian not being faced with any strong rival. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first President of Armenia, who had run as candidate again in the 2008 election but had not won, had not participated in the election this time by expressing that he is old. However, it is quite obvious that Petrosyan, who is 68 years old and seems healthy, has another reason and has most likely

decided not to participate in the election after his party received only 7.8% of the votes in the parliamentary election held in May 2012.

Sarkisian's second serious rival could have been Prosperous Armenia Party leader Gagik Tsarukyan. Having participated in the coalition government after 2008 for a long time, having achieved great success by increasing its votes in the May 2012 Parliamentary Election and also gaining great sympathy through his gestures, Gagis Tsarukyan, although conveying the belief that he wants to be candidate, has at the end not stood as one. A meeting held with Sarkisian could have played a role in this situation. There are rumors that Sarkisian warned him on running as candidate because of some problems of his commercial affairs. Tsarukyan being an "oligarch"²⁴ creates the conviction that these rumors could be true.

The Dashnaks, who have participated in almost all elections, have also not presented a candidate this time since their efforts to form a unified political agenda and to have a joint oppositional candidate with other parties did not deliver results. Dashnaks have urged their supporters to go to the polls, not to vote for the ruling party candidate, but to vote according to their conscience or to make their ballot invalid²⁵. However, it could be understood that this party, whose votes had decreased by more than a half (5.6% in the previous parliamentary election) after withdrawing from the government coalition by opposing the Turkey-Armenia Protocols, has not nominated a candidate in order not to be completely defeated in the presidential election.

The percentage of the votes the candidates have received in the election that was held without any incidents, but in which many irregularities had taken place, are provided below²⁶:

- 1 President and Head of the Republican Party of Armenia Serge Sarkisian 58.64%
- 2 Head of the Heritage Party Raffi Hovannisian 36.75%
- 3 Former Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan 2.15%
- 4 Head of the National Self-Determination Party Paruyr Hayrikyan 1.23%

24 Oligarch: Some kind of a businessman who emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the countries forming this Union, who became rich very fast, who gained his wealth partially through illegal methods and who uses this wealth for also political purposes.

25 "ARF Says Vote no for Sarkisian", *Asbarez*, 15 February 2013.

26 "Serj Sargsyan Wins Second Term as President of Armenia", *Panarmenian.net.*, 19 February 2013.

- 5 Political scientist and Director of Hay Radio Andreas Gukasyan 0.57%
- 6 Writer Vardan Sedrakyan 0.42%
- 7 Former Foreign Minister of the Karabakh Region Arman Melikyan 0.24%

As could be seen, five of the seven candidates (Bagratyan, Hayrikyan, Gukasyan, Sedrakyan and Melikyan) have received very few votes. The person among them known to some degree by the public is Hrant Bagratyan, having served as Prime Minister from 1991-1993. However, due to lacking the necessary financial support and organization required for an election, his votes have been few. For not being known or known very little, the others have also not received the necessary support. It must be for this reason that they have resorted to unaccustomed methods in order to draw attention. Andreas Gukasyan has staged a hunger strike, Paruyr Hayrikyan has faced an armed attack, while another candidate, Vardan Sedrakyan, has been arrested for encouraging this attack²⁷.

The candidate drawing the most attention with his conducts and statements has been Head of the Heritage Party Raffi Hovannisian. Hovannisian, being an American Armenian, is Armenia's first Foreign Minister. He has drawn attention with his radical approaches, harsh statements and particularly his hostility towards Turkey while serving as minister. At a time when the Karabakh conflict, which gradually kept increasing and turning into a war, was the most intense, acting in a manner that provokes Turkey rather than trying to prevent this county from totally taking Azerbaijan's side as much as possible has been met with Levon Ter-Petrosyan's reaction and Hovannisian has been removed from duty. After this, Hovannisian has wanted to continue his political life, but has experienced the difficulties of not being an Armenian citizen. Years after he obtained Armenian citizenship during Robert Kocharyan's presidency and then by forming the Heritage Party, has been able to receive 5.76% of the votes in the 2012 election. It is obvious that a leader of a party, who is not even able to receive 6% of the votes during the parliamentary election, has no chance in the presidential election. In this situation, as mentioned above, as a result of Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Gagik Tsarukyan not participating in the election and the Dashnak Party not nominating any candidate, Raffi Hovannisian has received almost all the votes of those opposing Serge Sarkisian.

Concerning why Sarkisian has won the election, it could be seen that just as

²⁷ "New Charges Brought Against Former Presidential Candidate In Armenia", *RAPSI (Russian Legal Information Agency)*, 17 April 2013.

in many countries forming the Soviet Union, the President in power being re-elected as long as he does not encounter great criticisms or opposition has almost become a tradition. This must arise from the fact that the politicians during the Soviet Union held their position for many years. However, apart from this, we must also mention the fact that since the independence of Armenia, Serge Sarkisian has occupied the highest ranks concerning the country's internal and external security, has played a significant role in the Karabakh conflict, and has served as Prime Minister shortly before becoming President; in short, has become a person truly having influence in Armenia within the last twenty years. In the first period of his Presidency (2008-2013), Sarkisian has not had any great successes or had made great mistakes. Although a decline in economic terms has occurred in Armenia, this is a result of the world economic crisis and it seems that Armenia has overcome it. In the area of foreign policy, although Sarkisian, just as his predecessor Kocharyan, has maintained close relations with the Minsk Group Co-Chairs in the Karabakh conflict, he was not able to reconcile with Azerbaijan. On the other hand, he has sought the opening of the borders by establishing normal relations with Turkey and has concluded the Protocols for this purpose despite the Diaspora's opposition, but when Turkey linked the implementation of the Protocols to a positive development taking place in the Karabakh conflict, he had opposed Turkey also. Furthermore, it could be seen that Sarkisian has further improved the already close relations with the Russian Federation, he has extended the duration of the Russian military base in Gyumri to 2044, while on the other hand has attached importance to relations with the European Union and has reached the point of signing an Association Agreement.

2. Foreign Policy Issues during the Election Campaign

As a result of Armenia attempting to occupy the Karabakh region before gaining its independence and entering into a non-declared war with Azerbaijan after its independence, not being able to normalize relations with Turkey due to the genocide allegations and several claims like explicit or implicit territorial claims that come from history and are not valid today and not being able to reach an agreement with its two neighbors in the past twenty years, security and issues of foreign policy have become very important for Armenia today. Despite this, foreign policy issues have almost never been addressed in the presidential election campaigns. The main reason for this is all parties and presidential candidates to a great degree carry the same view regarding foreign policy. This view is that Karabakh is entirely Armenia's territory, or it should be an independent state or be annexed to Armenia. On the other hand, the view that Turkey should recognize the genocide

allegations and should pay compensation for this event, the Armenian properties should be returned and some part of territory should be given to Armenia is generally accepted.

Due to this policy, issues exist such as the border with Turkey that would connect Armenia to Europe remaining closed, the borders with Azerbaijan that would connect it to the Caspian Sea also remaining closed, and Armenia being left outside of oil and natural gas lines and railways and highways projects despite being a country in the region. This situation being to Armenia's disadvantage in economic terms and the harms to Armenia increasing in the following years have almost never been discussed despite their importance. It is inevitable for this situation that could be considered as irrational to create serious problems for Armenia in the future.

President Sarkisian's greatest rival in the election Raffi Hovannisian's views on this matter, apart from those mentioned above, could be summarized as Armenia should officially recognize the Karabakh State and moreover, the Protocols being signed with Turkey in 2009 should be rejected.

3. Irregularities and Frauds in the Elections

The irregularities and frauds taking place in elections in Armenia since gaining its independence is a matter that has been determined by independent international observers. Yet, none of the elections being declared as invalid could be explained by indicating that the irregularities and frauds are not at a level that could change the results of elections. This situation has been criticized by the European Union, member states and the United States and on various occasions, hopes for elections in Armenia to be duly held have been conveyed. Under the influence of these, President Sarkisian has stated many times that utmost attention will be paid during the presidential election for these kinds of incidents not to occur. However, the situation in the current election has also not changed.

Meanwhile, we should note that the irregularities and frauds in the elections can only be to the benefit of the candidate supported by the Government, because all processes concerning the casting of votes is under the inspection of official authorities; in other words, in principle, candidates of opposition cannot benefit from these frauds.

The main irregularities and frauds seen in the presidential election are the following:

- a. Armenian citizens not living in Armenia being included in the voter list

As known, numerous Armenian citizens live and work in foreign countries, particularly in Russia. It is understood that about 1.260.000, a significant portion of them, have not erased their records in Armenia²⁸. According to press news, 500.000 to 700.000²⁹ Armenians' names are found in the voters lists and votes are casted for these individuals also. This takes place with either some individuals, after casting their own votes, casting votes for these people also (multiple vote) or filling the ballot boxes with the same number or fewer number of votes of these individuals (ballot stuffing).

- b. Some individuals casting votes in exchange for money

It seems that this method is used more in rural areas. Some people sell their votes for 1000 Drams (18 Euros)³⁰.

- c. Officials participating in the election campaign and governmental sources being utilized for election campaigns

According to press news, some officials have actively participated in Serge Sarkisian's campaign. However, in order for it not to be illegal, they have temporarily gone on leave. Within this framework, it has been published in the press that nine of the ten deputies and many mayors have left their office during the election, but they have continued to work for Sarkisian to be elected³¹. Moreover, some civil servants and students have also participated in the demonstrations organized for Sarkisian³².

Although these irregularities and frauds in the election in Armenia have been conveyed in the press, no definite information has been provided concerning the proportion of these. This situation makes proving illegal acts more difficult.

28 *Les Nouvelles d'Arménie*, No. 194, p.25

29 "Arménie, Terre d'Eviction", *Libération*, 17 February 2013.

30 Ibid

31 "Les Observateurs de l'OSCE/ODIHR Expriment leurs Préoccupations Concernant l'Utilisation des Ressources Administratives", *Armenews*, 15 February 2013.

32 "Armenia Strange Presidential Campaign", *RFE/RL*, 18 February 2012.

4. Election Observation Groups and Their Reports

As in many countries, elections in Armenia are also monitored by local and more by foreign observation missions. The main missions present in this year's presidential election are the following: CIS Monitoring Mission, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), ICES (Expert Center for Electoral Systems), Independent US Center for Political Monitoring the Choice is yours. Apart from these, the Armenian Bar Association in California shortly known as ABA has also closely monitored the election. Furthermore, some journalists have also closely observed them.

Although it is not possible to give a definite number, it is possible to say that the number of observers have exceeded a thousand. However, it could also be seen that it is not very likely for the observers to easily determine the irregularities and frauds. For the foreigners who do not know Armenian, a great difficulty exists. Moreover, it is seen that many of the irregularities and frauds do not take place during, but after the elections. But still, the observers have witnessed many events.

We must note that the observation missions that are connected to an international organization and submit reports to it, are more influential compared to the others. In this context, the most important organization is the OSCE/ODIHR. This organization has worked together with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the observers of the European Parliament under the name "International Election Observation Mission". The main issues existing in the Post-Election Interim Report issued on February 26 by this mission³³ are the following: Elections were generally well administered and characterized by a respect for fundamental freedoms, contestants were able to campaign freely, media provided balanced coverage, at the same time a lack of impartiality of the public administration, misuse of administrative resources and cases of pressure on voters were of concern. While Election Day was calm and peaceful overall, it was marked by undue interference in the process, by proxies representing the incumbent and some serious violations were observed. It has also been indicated in the report that the voting process was orderly and well organized in majority of the polling stations observed, but observers assessed negatively in 5% of these stations and assessed positively all but nine of the 106 vote counts. Later on in the report, the objections and initiatives of especially the Chairman of the Heritage Party Raffi Hovannisian in the days following the election are

33 "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions", OSCE/ODIHR International election Observation Mission, Republic of Armenia, Presidential Elections, February 18, 2013 <http://www.osce.org/ohchr/elections/99675>

addressed and by mentioning the recounting of voting in some ballot boxes, it is stated that minor discrepancies exist. The complaints made following the election and their assessments are also provided in the report. Another interesting point of the report is that the number (proportion) of those voting for Sarkisian at some polling boxes from which Sarkisian won has been higher than the other boxes. This can be interpreted as these boxes being filled later on with ballots that are to Sarkisian's advantage, but since this cannot be proven, the report only mentions this situation.

Another observation mission, the CIS Monitoring Mission, has said that the Armenian elections were free, open, competitive, and met demands of international norms, that no facts casting doubts in legitimacy of the elections have been registered, but that some minor violations happened³⁴.

In general, the other observation missions also carry this view; in other words, they express that the election has been held legitimately and in accordance with the rules, but that some violations have taken place. The approaches of non-observer groups are more different. For instance, Amnesty International has dwelled upon the irregularities and frauds taking place without questioning the legitimacy of the election and has demanded them to be investigated³⁵.

5. The Stances of Some Countries and International Organizations towards the Presidential Election in Armenia

The congratulation messages sent to President Sarkisian by the presidents of other countries is particularly important in terms of showing that they accept Sarkisian as being the legitimate president of Armenia.

The first congratulation message has been sent by President Putin right after the election where he has conveyed that there is active support by the public for Sarkisian's socioeconomic and foreign policies and has expressed his confidence that Russian-Armenia relations will continue to be strengthened³⁶.

Catherine Ashton, representative of EU's foreign affairs and security policies, together with Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Füle, by making a joint statement, have expressed that they welcome progress made by the Armenian authorities in their efforts to hold the presidential election in line with

34 "CIS Monitoring Mission Calls Armenian Presidential Legitimate", *Vestnik Kavkaza*, 19 February 2013.

35 "Amnesty International Demande Une Enquête Sur Des Cas De Violence Lors Des Élections Présidentielles", *Armenews*, 9 March 2013,

36 "Putin Congratulates Sarkisian", *RFE/RL*, 19 February 2013,

international standards. Also, by referring to some of the irregularities taking place in the election, have expressed their hope for these not to occur again in the future³⁷. On the other hand, by sending a congratulation message to Serge Sarkisian a week after the election, President of the EU Commission Jose Manuel Barroso has said that he welcomes further progress to bring elections into line with international standards and has also indicated that the EU looks forward to develop and strengthen relations with Armenia in the context of negotiations of the EU-Armenia Association Agreement including comprehensive Free Trade Area³⁸.

However, the US's process of congratulating Sarkisian has taken longer.

Right after the election, Spokesperson of the US State Department Victoria Nuland has said that they support the conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR observe mission; in other words, that the election was generally well administered and characterized with respect for fundamental freedoms, but has indicated that there was a lack of impartiality on the part of public administration officials and a misuse of administrative resources³⁹.

At a second stage, US Secretary of State John Kerry has congratulated President Sarkisian for being elected, but has also indicated that they support the conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR report and that they expect the deficiencies of the election to be eliminated. Kerry has mentioned that during Sarkisian's second term as President, the US and Armenia can work together to pursue the democratic and economic reforms critical to increased bilateral trade and investment, has urged Sarkisian to give full support to efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict spearheaded by the Minsk Group and has also expressed that they cannot be satisfied with the status quo⁴⁰.

At the third stage, President Obama has shortly repeated the points mentioned above by sending a congratulation letter on March 2nd 2013. What is new in the message was the President's words that "we also want to continue our work to promote the eventual normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations"⁴¹.

Therefore, in the area of foreign policy, two important messages and in fact some kind of a warning has been conveyed from the US to Armenia. The

37 "Hovannisian Rallies Thousands Against 'Stolen Election'", *RFE/RL*, 20 February 2013,

38 "EU Chief Congratulates Sarkisian", *RFE/RL*, 25 February 2013.

39 "US State Department: Blurred Distinction Between Activities of State and Those of Ruling Party", *Largir*, 20 February 2013.

40 "US Salutes Sarkisian Reelection", *RFE/RL*, 25 February 2013."

41 "Obama Congratulates Sarkisian Re-election", *The Armenian Weekly*, 4 March 2013.

first is the statement that the US Government cannot be satisfied with the status quo despite Armenia's policy of almost not showing any efforts towards the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The second is the importance President Obama attaches to the issue of normalization despite Sarkisian taking the normalization of relations with Turkey off the agenda and replacing it with the policy of making demands to Turkey such as the recognition of the genocide allegations.

With the French President François Hollande being at the forefront, presidents of some other countries have also sent messages of congratulation to Sarkisian.

While many countries have ignored or underestimated the irregularities taking place in the Armenian presidential election, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has stated, with his outspokenness unique to him, that the quality of the election was well below expectations, whereas the Armenian Foreign Ministry has indicated that the quality of information the Swedish Minister possesses is disappointing⁴².

President Gül sending a congratulation message to Sarkisian two days following the election has been criticized in Azerbaijan. While the Azerbaijani Government has remained silent on this issue, voices of objection have been raised from the Azerbaijani Parliament. Deputy Executive Secretary of the New Azerbaijan Party Mubariz Gurbanlı has said that the hasty congratulation amounted to a show of moral, political and ideological support for Sarkisian⁴³. On the other hand, Deputy Ceyhun Osmanlı has stated that it is somewhat strange that a man whose hands are stained with blood of women and children is being congratulated⁴⁴, while Gudrat Hasanguliev has expressed that Turkey supports Armenia, that Sarkisian is one of the perpetrators of the Khojaly genocide and that they will raise the issue (the issue of congratulating) at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation⁴⁵. Moreover, Speaker of the Azerbaijan Parliament Oktay Asadov has said that this event has hurt them, but it should not be exaggerated and that they do not agree with Gudrat Hasanguliev, and that Turkey is a main partner and ally of Azerbaijan⁴⁶.

The reason for the reactions of Azerbaijani statesmen towards President Gül's congratulation message must be that the congratulation message sent to

42 "A Virtual DEbate Between Swedish FM and Armenian Foreign Ministry", *Medimax*, 21 February 2013.

43 "Baku Slams Turkey Over Armenia's Congratulations", *RFE/RL*, 21 February 2013.

44 "Abdullah Gül Acted At Least Naively", *News.Az*, 22 February 2013.

45 "Abdullah Gül Congratulations Causes Discontent at Azerbaijani Parliament", *APA*, 22 February 2013.

46 Ibid

Sarkisian after his election in 2008 had started the process of the Protocols. As known, the Azerbaijanis have opposed the Protocols with the thought that it leaves Azerbaijan on its own to face Armenia.

Ankara has been swift in responding to the reactions received from Azerbaijan. The Foreign Ministry has replied to a question of Azerbaijan's APA Agency regarding this issue in the following manner:

Turkey's President Abdullah Gul's congratulation letter to Serge Sarkisian on his re-election as President was realized in accordance with national traditions. Congratulatory letters were also sent before after the announcement of the results of elections in other countries. Messages in mutual form may be sent in the framework of international rules of politeness. It will be useful to assess the issue as part of its content⁴⁷.

6. Objections Raised Towards the Results of the Election and Its Consequences

As explained above, Sarkisian's election was accepted, although with some hesitations, by the observation missions and presidents of foreign countries have acted in the same manner by sending congratulation messages.

In Armenia, besides those voting for Sarkisian, Sarkisian's election was not considered as valid by arguing that irregularities and frauds have taken place in the election. The strongest objections have been raised by Raffi Hovannisian. Moreover, an important part of the Diaspora has also opposed Sarkisian's election.

Starting with Armenia, these objections are examined below.

a. Raffi Hovannisian's Objections, Claims, Decision of the Central Election Commission, Decision of the Constitutional Court

Right after the election, Raffi Hovannisian has rejected the results of the election by putting forth that it was fraudulent and has insisted that he has won the election⁴⁸. Furthermore, he has wanted President Sarkisian to hand

47 "Türk Dışişleri Cumhurbaşkanı Gül'ün Serj Sarkisyan'a Gönderdiği Tebrik Mektubu Konusunda Açıklama Yaptı" (The Turkish Ministry Made a Statement on the Congratulation Letter President Gül Sent to Serge Sarkisian), A1News, <http://www.1news.com.tr/turkiye/20130222105003946.html>, 23 February 2013

48 "Hovannisian Rejects Official Vote Results", *RFE/RL*, 19 February 2013

power over to the people⁴⁹, for Sarkisian to admit his mistake⁵⁰, and for the votes to be recounted⁵¹. He has also expressed that he is concerned about his family's security⁵².

On the other hand, Hovannisian has started organizing demonstrations in the main Armenian cities and in particular in Yerevan⁵³. He began conducting visits called "victory tours" in the country⁵⁴.

Hovannisian has requested to meet Sarkisian and this meeting has taken place on 21 February 2013. Upon news being published that in this meeting that the President proposed a ministerial post like the Diaspora Ministry to him, Hovannisian has denied them. During the meeting it could be understood that when Hovannisian said that he has won the election, Sarkisian has suggested for him to continue his struggle until the next election⁵⁵. Furthermore, Hovannisian's suggestions for a second round of the presidential election to be held, resignation of the government and the holding of early parliamentary election have also not been accepted by Sarkisian⁵⁶.

Upon reminding Hovannisian through the press that presidents of foreign countries have sent congratulatory messages to Sarkisian, after saying "they can say whatever they want", Hovannisian has indicated that he will continue to consider himself the rightful winner of the February 18 election⁵⁷. Meanwhile, the objection raised by Hovannisian to the Central Election Commission towards the results of the election has also been turned down⁵⁸.

On 10 March 2013, Hovannisian has started a hunger strike to support his demand for the presidential election to be held again. Moreover, he has asked Sarkisian to cancel the starting date of duty of the President that should take place on 9th of April⁵⁹.

49 "Opposition Candidate Calls on Armenia's Incumbent President to Hand Power over the People", *tert.am*, 19 February 2013.

50 "Heritage Leader Urges President-elect Sargsyan to Admit His Mistake", *panarmenian.net*, 19 February 2013; "Heritage to Demand Vote Recount", *Panorama.am.*, 19 February 2013.

51 "Heritage to Demand Vote Recount", *Panorama.am*, 19 February 2013.

52 "R. Hovannisian Concerned About His Family Security", *Panorama.am*, 19 February 2013.

53 "Hovannisian Rallies Thousands Against 'Stolen Election'", *RFE/RL*, 20 February 2013.

54 Press Release Raffi Hovannisian Headquarters, 23 February 2013

55 "Hovannisian: We Did Not Speak About Any Post at the Meeting", *aysor.am*, 25 February 2013.

56 "OSCE/ODIHR Publishes Interim Report", *Armradio*, 2 March 2013.

57 "Hovannisian Condemns West for Congratulating Sarkisian", *RFE/RL*, 26 February 2013.

58 "Hovannisian Condemns West for Congratulating Sarkisian", *RFE/RL*, 26 February 2013."

59 "R.Hovannisian Déclenche une Nouvelle Grève de Faim", *Armenews*, 11 March 2013.

Hovannisian, together with another presidential candidate Andreas Gukasyan, have demanded to invalidate the official results of the presidential election by appealing to the Constitutional Court of Armenia. The court's decision, declared on 14 March 2013, has stated that Hovannisian and Gukasyan have failed to substantiate their allegations. The court has also rejected Hovannisian's demand to declare him the high full winner of the vote⁶⁰.

Hovannisian has not refrained from making statements and organizing press conferences at the Liberty Square where he continued his hunger strike. Meanwhile, he has indicated on 22 March 2013 that the people will rise to change the government and in a letter sent to the President, has asked for the immediate conduct of a new presidential election or the sharing of power between the authorities and the people and has requested for the prosecution of election falsifiers and the appointment of his own candidates to some offices⁶¹. By replying to this letter, President Sarkisian has said that he is ready to form a dialogue with Hovannisian, but that his requests is not in conformity with state authority and has asked him to end his hunger strike⁶².

In response, Hovannisian has suggested to meet with Sarkisian in a square in Yerevan to discuss Armenia's problems in front of the public⁶³. Then, he has started insisting that Sarkisian visits him at the Liberty Square where he continues his hunger strike, but this has also been rejected. Eventually, he has ended his hunger strike on 31 March 2013⁶⁴ and has attended the Armenian Easter ceremony in which Sarkisian and other statesmen were also present.

b. The Diaspora's Approach Towards the Election

The Armenian Diaspora displays an approach that supports Armenia in all areas. This support not only emerges particularly in Armenia's claims from Turkey (recognition of genocide, paying compensation, giving territory etc.) and its claims from Azerbaijan (recognition of the Karabakh region's independence), but also becomes apparent in financial aid being provided to Armenia. The Armenians living in Western countries have adopted democracy and human rights principles of these countries. However, it is difficult to say that much importance is attached to these values in Armenia,

60 "Constitutional Court Rejects Opposition Election Appeals", *RFE/RL*, 14 March 2013.

61 "Hovannisian Calls For Comprehensive Power Sharing", *Asbarez*, 22 March 2013.

62 "La Communication épistolaire entre... Sarkisian et R. Hovannisian Se Poursuit", *Armenews*, 27 March 2013.

63 "Sarkisian Insists on Hosting Talks with Challenger", *RFE/RL*, 27 March 2013.

64 "Sarkisian Ally Upbeat on Dialogue with Opposition", *RFE/RL*, 1 April 2013.

under the influence of the period of the Soviet Union. The dominance of oligarchs in economy and the irregularities taking place in the elections are clear proofs of this situation. Despite this, the Diaspora Armenians have preferred until recently not to openly criticize Armenia in these areas.

As mentioned above, Raffi Hovannisian, who had criticized President Sarkisian with a harsh language and argued that he actually won the election, being American in origin, his criticisms received more attention in Western countries' Armenian Diasporas. A demonstration has been held in front of the Armenian Consulate General in New York to protest the election and those participating have carried posters stating "Diaspora is With the Armenian people" and "No to Election Fraud"⁶⁵. Glendale in California has organized a demonstration protesting the irregularities and frauds in the election and Raffi Hovannisian has spoken to the public through "Skype"⁶⁶.

With a letter sent to President Sarkisian, American rock singer Serj Tankian, who has also composed songs on "genocide", has said "like most diasporan Armenians I have always been reluctant to criticize your government directly and openly but the avalanche of people suffering under your rule due to corruption and injustice is tipping the scale" and has challenged the legitimacy of Sarkisian's victory in the presidential election and has accused him for tolerating corruption. Moreover, Tankian has asked from Sarkisian to make comprehensive reforms, to punish those who committed frauds, to dissolve the Parliament and to make sure that future elections are fair. In an unexpected manner Sarkisian has replied to him in a short time and in summary, has indicated that he is the rightful winner of the election and that the irregularities could not have any significant impact on the outcome of the vote⁶⁷. In the same context, Tankian has sent a second letter to the President, in response the President has almost repeated the same points, while at the same expressing his hope that Tankian will give a concert in Yerevan on the occasion of the Armenian genocide's 100th anniversary⁶⁸.

Opposite to the American Armenians' criticizing attitude, the main Armenian organizations in the US, ANCA (Armenian National Committee of America), which has a Dashnak tendency, and the AAA (Armenian Assembly of America), which represents the wealthy Armenians, have displayed a heavy silence regarding the election⁶⁹.

65 "New York Armenians Protest Fraudulent Elections in Armenia", *Hetq.am*, 24 February 2013.

66 "Overflow Crowd in Glendale Voices Support for People's Movement", *Asbarez*, 4 March 2013.

67 "U.S. Rock Star Questions Armenian Poll Result", *RFE/RL*, 26 February 2013.

68 "Échanges Vigoureux Entre Serj Tankian Et Serge Sarkissian", *Armenews*, 28 February 2013."

69 Thomas de Waal "Political Tremors in the Caucasus", *Foreign Policy*, March 2013.

The Coordination Council in France, which incorporates the Armenian organizations in the country within its own scope⁷⁰, without criticizing Sarkisian and openly referring to the irregularities taking place in the election, by mentioning that political and social difficulties exist in Armenia, which is subjected to the Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade whose economic consequences have started being felt and where one-third of its population is below the poverty line, has indicated that France is in solidarity with Armenia and its people. Furthermore, by expressing his commitment to Armenia, has called for unity to resolve the problems of the country through peaceful and democratic means⁷¹. Despite the organizations only indirectly conveying their reactions, a group called the Armenian Renaissance has organized demonstrations on 8 March 2013 in front the Armenian Embassy in Paris for frauds being committed in the election⁷². With the same purpose, the same group has conducted another demonstration on April 7 in front of the Armenian Embassy in Paris to give support to Raffi Hovannisian⁷³.

The Diaspora's reaction has not only been restricted to the US and France. The Armenian Community in Germany, who generally remains "silent", has issued a declaration that condemns the frauds taking place in the presidential election, indicates that these and some other illegal acts have remained with impunity and states that they are in solidarity with Raffi Hovannisian⁷⁴.

7. Sarkisian Took Office

Sarkisian has assumed office, after taking oath, on 9 April 2013 during an extraordinary session of the National Assembly which took place at the Karen Demirjian Sport and Concert Complex. In the beginning of his long speech delivered there, he has thanked those who cast their votes for other candidates and has said that thereby they have expressed their discontent with the problems existing in the country and by doing so, they have sent a clear message to the authorities, demanding more efficient work and that the message was duly received⁷⁵.

70 Conseil de Coordination des organisations Arméniennes de France

71 Conseil de Coordination des organisations Arméniennes de France, 9 March 2013

72 "Manifestation Devant l'Ambassade d'Arménie A l'Appel de "Renaissance Arménienne", *Armenews*, 7 March 2013.

73 "Communiqué de Renaissance Arménienne", *Armenews*, 27 March 2013.

74 "Armenian Community of Germany Criticizing Armenian Authorities and Expressing Solidarity with Raffi Hovannisian", *Arminfo*, 3 April 2013.

75 "The Newly Elected President Serzh Sargsyan at the Extraordinary Session of the RA National Assembly Assumed the Office of President of the RA", 9 April 2013 <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/04/09/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-assumed-the-office-of-President-of-the-Republic-of-Armenia>

On the other hand, Hovannisian has taken his own presidential oath on the same day at the Liberty Square to which thousands of people attended and with his hand on a copy of the Armenian Constitution, has stated that he would keep working to return power to the people. After the ceremony, Hovannisian has marched towards the Presidential Residence and when the police blocked access, amid clashes 20 people were taken into custody. Later on, Hovannisian and his entourage have proceeded to the “Genocide Memorial” and prayed⁷⁶.

III – COMMEMORATION OF 24 APRIL

As in the previous years, April 24 has also been celebrated this year around the world by the Armenians through various ceremonies and activities.

It is important to emphasize and even to make a separate research on these ceremonies and activities which continues each year without any decreases despite almost a century passing after the 1915 events. Regarding this issue, we can say the following very shortly:

Since almost all the Armenians subjected to the 1915 relocation have died, no personal interests or the necessity to remind the events through the people who experienced the events exist. These activities can only create some psychological relief for the descendants of some of those who were relocated.

For the Armenian Government's political parties and media, 24 April serves as an excuse to criticize Turkey due to historical reasons and for supporting Azerbaijan on the Karabakh conflict and furthermore, to express demands like compensation and others from Turkey.

Except the emotional domain, 24 April activities provide the opportunity to the Diaspora Armenians, who are subject to assimilation in almost all places of the world, to remember or confirm their Armenianness.

24 April creates the opportunity for the Armenian churches within the Diaspora, the political parties and charity organizations to establish close relations with the Armenian communities and also to express their claims from Turkey.

On the other hand, for the Armenian Government's political parties and media, 24 April serves as an excuse to criticize Turkey due to historical reasons and for supporting Azerbaijan on the Karabakh conflict and furthermore, to express demands like compensation and others from Turkey.

76 “Armenia: After Duelling Ceremonies, Opposition at Crossroads”, Eurasianet.org, 9 April 2013.

The 24 April activities conducted this year will be examined by addressing four main countries. These are the US, France, Armenia and Turkey.

1. Commemoration Activities in the US and President Obama's Statement

We will address this issue under two separate subjects as commemoration activities of 24 April and President Obama's 24 April Statement.

A. Commemoration Activities of 24 April

In all places in the US where Armenians live and particularly in California and Massachusetts, 24 April commemoration ceremonies are conducted. Apart from these, demonstrations are organized especially in front of the Turkish Embassy and Consulates General and liturgies are held in Armenian churches. Furthermore, many articles repeating the well-known Armenian views are published in the local press on this occasion. The reason for these activities being so intense is that it gives individuals the opportunity to express and confirm their Armenian identity.

We do not have enough space to provide further information on these activities and since they are repetitions of the already known views, this is not really necessary. However, by taking into consideration its significance, we will shortly address the commemoration ceremony held on April 24 in the Congress.

As each year, a ceremony under the heading "Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day" has been conducted in the US House of Representatives on April 24. It is understood that this ceremony has been organized by the Armenian Caucus in the Congress, main Armenian organizations, the Armenian Embassy in Washington and the Office of the Karabakh Representative⁷⁷. The session of the House of Representatives has started with the prayer of Archbishop Oshagan Choloyan, Prelate of the Armenian Apostolic Church of Eastern United States⁷⁸. Choloyan has expressed that 24 April is the beginning of the genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the first genocide among so many that followed in the 20th century. Then, Representatives in the House of Representatives who embrace Armenian views have delivered statements regarding the meaning

77 "Power Speaking Truth: Members Of Congress Condemn Armenian Genocide Denial", *ANCA Pres Release*, 2 May 2013.

78 "Archbishop Choloyan Offers April 24 Opening Prayer For House of Representatives", *Asbarez*, 30 April 2013.

of 24 April. It could be understood that these statements have continued in the following days, that speeches have also been delivered in the Senate, although fewer in numbers and that around 30 Congress members belonging to both parties have spoken.

Since these commemoration ceremonies are held each year, they actually do not have special importance. However, the number of those speaking and their influences in the Congress determine the outcome of the resolutions submitted to the House of Representatives and/or to the Senate. From this aspect, no significant change has been observed compared to the previous year.

A draft resolution numbered H.RES.227 was submitted to the House Committee of Foreign Affairs on May 20, 2013, entitled “Armenian Genocide Truth and Justice”. As remembered, a resolution has been submitted to each House of Representatives since 2000. None of them were adopted, due, mainly to Armenian governments and relations with Turkey becoming very important for American policies concerning the Middle East. Most probably the fate of H.RES.227 will be the same.

Since these commemoration ceremonies are held each year, they actually do not have special importance. However, the number of those speaking and their influences in the Congress determine the outcome of the resolutions submitted to the House of Representatives and/or to the Senate. From this aspect, no significant change has been observed compared to the previous year.

B. President Obama’s 24 April Statement

The US President issued his traditional statement again this year on 24 April for the occasion of the “Armenian Remembrance Day” and as expected, did not use the term genocide. However, just as in the previous years, by using “Meds Yeghern” (great tragedy), understood to be one of the Armenian words corresponding to genocide, he wanted to at least partially satisfy the Armenians.

The statement made this year shows similarities with that of last year in terms of context and sometimes even word to word and depicts the same themes. Although not directly using the word genocide, by indicating that a full, frank and just acknowledgment of the facts are in the interests of all and that nations grow stronger by acknowledging painful elements of the past, it is indirectly suggested for Turkey to recognize the genocide allegations. On the other hand, it is expressed that the US recognize those “courageous” Turks

and Armenians who have already taken this path and encourage more to do so, with the backing of their government and the US President. What is unclear at this point is which event of the past the Armenians must recognize. Actually, on the path to 1915 and following 1915, the Armenians have committed shameful acts on a broad basis extending from their atrocities in Eastern Anatolia to political crimes. The recognition of these could contribute to a possible Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. However, Armenian public opinion is very far from such an idea.

Armenian atrocities are either ignored or underestimated. On the other hand, political crimes, contrary to all legal rules, are considered as justice being administered.

Despite President Obama's soft language, his statement has received negative reactions from both the Turks and the Armenians.

Executive Director of the Armenian National Committee of America, a Dashnak organization, has put forth that the President's retreat under Turkish pressure comes despite his own pledges to acknowledge the Armenian genocide and that he has worked together in Turkey's denial of truth and ongoing obstruction of justice.

On the other hand, Ergun Kırlikovalı, Chairman of the Assembly of Turkish-American Associations, after providing brief information on historical events in a letter sent to President Obama, has indicated that they mourn the loss of lives of both Turks and Armenians and they do not deny that massacres occurred, but disagree that massacres constitute genocide as defined by the UN Convention. Moreover, it is expressed in the letter that Parliaments of Turkey and Armenia should ratify the Protocols of 2009 and normalize relations between the two nations, parallel with the removal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan and the return of over one million Azeri refugees to their homes.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry, by issuing a statement whose complete text is provided below, has indicated that they regard the President's statement which distorts the historical facts as problematic in every aspect and deeply regret it.

No: 119, 24 April 2013, Press Release Regarding the Statement of US President Barack Obama on the Occasion of 24 April

In his statement issued on 24 April 2013, US President Obama has unfortunately demonstrated this year once again a one-sided approach

which reflects the Armenian views regarding the dispute between Turks and Armenians on the painful part of their common history.

We regard this statement, which distorts the historical facts, as problematic in every aspect and deeply regret it.

Issued under the influence of domestic political considerations and interpreting controversial historical events on the basis of one-sided information and with a selective sense of justice, such statements damage both Turkish-American relations, and also render it more difficult for Turks and Armenians to reach a just memory.

Our expectation from an important ally of Turkey such as the US is not to further deepen the problem, but to provide constructive contributions for its resolution, and to encourage the Armenian side, which avoids objective and scientific research of the issue, to be more realistic and conciliatory.

It should also be known that the pain experienced during the World War I is a shared one and the memory of that period is as sensitive for the Turkish people as it is for the Armenians. Despite the prejudiced attempts to hinder a correct understanding of history, Turkey approaches the issue with self-confidence and an open-mind, and wants the truth to be investigated in all its aspects.

Armenia has shown no reaction to Obama's statement. However, it is normal for the word genocide not being openly expressed in the text to annoy them just as it has disturbed the Diaspora.

This way, just as President Obama's 24 April statement has not pleased the Turks and Armenians owning American citizenship, it has also displeased Turkey and most likely Armenia.

We hope that the issuing of these presidential statements, which puts forth the same views each year, has no function anymore, does not please any of the concerning parties and in fact deepens the disagreement between them, and moreover causes the US President to be criticized. It would be better that these statements be abandoned for the coming years.

2. Commemoration Activities in France

It has been observed that 2015 relatively being a close date and the presidential election in Armenia being held shortly before 24 April, more

importance has been attached to the 24 April commemoration activities in France this year. As a matter of fact, commemoration ceremonies have been organized in almost all places where Armenians live, although the numbers of participants vary, and among them, the ceremonies held in Paris, Lyon and Marseille have been crowded just as in the previous years.

The unpleasant surprise for the French Armenians this year is that President François Hollande, despite the promise he made last year⁷⁹, has not attended the ceremony held in front of the Genocide Memorial (Composer Komitas's Statue) in Paris. Speaker of the Élysée Palace has announced that the President has not been able to attend due to his visit to China. However, the Armenian press has determined that the President had enough time to attend the ceremony on 24 April⁸⁰.

On the other hand, the French Armenians are not pleased with President Hollande, who, despite his promise, is still not taking any initiative for the reenactment of a law that foresees the punishment of those denying the Armenian "genocide". As could be recalled, the main difficulty was that the law adopted in 2012 was cancelled by the French Constitutional Council on grounds that it contradicted the Constitution. Since what kind of a formula the Council will accept on this issue is unknown, no initiative to pass a law is made.

Minister of Education Vincent Peillon, attending the ceremony in front of the Memorial on behalf of President Hollande, has delivered a statement. In short, Peillon has said that 24 April 1915 forms the beginning of the horrible tragedy that struck the Armenian community, that Sultan Mehmed V⁸¹ had given the instruction for the massacre to start against the Armenians, that in a few months two-thirds of the Armenian population had lost their lives, and that this programmed barbarity and the first initiative for systematic annihilation of the 20th century could not be erased from history. He has also said that France characterizes this event as "genocide", that denying this genocide is an insult for the Armenian community, that the French Government does not want anyone to deny what happened and seeks a legal solution for this and that President Hollande has confirmed again his will to continue to work with the Armenian community to fulfill his commitment on this issue. Furthermore, Peillon has indicated that Armenia's children has

79 As the former French President N. Sarkozy had made, François Hollande also visited the Genocide Memorial on 24 April 2012 and delivered a statement there, expressing that if elected as President, he would attend the commemoration ceremony for April 24 each year. See: *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 41. Facts and Comments, p.51

80 "Questions sur l'Absence de François Hollande à la Commémoration", *Armenews*, 25 April 2013.

81 For the first time, it is seen that it has been expressed in a text that Sultan V. Mehmed (Mehmed Reshat) is held responsible for the Armenian relocation. As known and as generally accepted, this responsibility belongs to the Committee of Union and Progress.

become the children of France and that their memory is also France's memory and that it is necessary to transfer this memory to future generations, that school education must assume this transfer.

This speech, which entirely reflects Armenian views and insults Turkish history, has been met with reaction in Ankara. The text of the statement issued by the Turkish Foreign Ministry on this issue is provided below.

No: 124, 26 April 2013, Press Release Regarding the Speech Made by French Minister of National Education Vincent Peillon on 24 April 2013

The speech delivered by the French Minister of National Education Vincent Peillon concerning the events of 1915 in a rally organized in Paris on 24 April 2013 is unacceptable in every aspect.

We strongly condemn the statements of the French Minister of National Education which takes as a basis Armenian allegations regarding 1915. It is particularly unfortunate that such statements which unfairly slander our history and breed hatred belong to a member of the government who is in charge of education.

Politicizing history and the notion of justice in such a way runs counter to the universal values that France itself has played a part in developing and to its own practice of democracy. The French Government's attempt to pass judgment on a nation's past, disregarding the principles of fairness, common sense, impartiality and freedom of expression, can be qualified as a summary execution at the very least. The persistent attitude in France consisting of preventing the expression of other opinions on this matter is highly regrettable.

Our primary expectation is that common sense and political wisdom prevail, bringing to an end the current approach which deals a blow to the long-standing Turkish-French relations and friendship.

It is presumed that the reason for François Hollande not to attend the 24 April commemoration ceremony was to not offend Turkey to which he particularly attaches importance to maintaining good relations. However, the statement made by the Minister of Education, which Hollande sent on his behalf, was perhaps harsher than what Hollande would have said and has drawn a strong Turkish reaction. Therefore, the benefit which Hollande expected from not attending the ceremony has turned into harm. In short, the Armenian Question continues to be detrimental for Turkey-France relations.

3. Commemoration Activities in Armenia

Commemoration ceremonies in Armenia for April 24 are although held all over the country and those in Yerevan are the most important. The same program is repeated each year.

In the evening of April 23rd, a torchlight procession is organized by the Dashnak Party, but to which everyone attends and therefore has somewhat lost its qualification as being Dashnak. A few thousands of people, mostly the youth, march to the Genocide Memorial with torches in their hands. Meanwhile, for certain, Turkish flags are burned. In the previous years it has been observed that Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül's pictures have also been burned down. The Armenian police do not interfere in these acts.

The next day, in the morning of 24 April, the President, with all state dignitaries, visit the Genocide Memorial, stand in a moment of silence there and Archbishop Karekin II says a prayer. Then, the Memorial is opened to public and people, most of the time with flowers in their hands, make this visit. How many persons have visited the Memorial cannot really be determined, because different figures like tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands are expressed in the Armenian press. But, what is certain is that a great number of individuals visit the Memorial. Sometimes Turks are also among them. Some Turks make this visit out of curiosity while some have political reasons. For instance, it has been published in the Diaspora press that this year Yıldız Onen from the DurDe! (Say Stop to Racism and Nationalism) movement has visited the Memorial and placed a wreath⁸².

After the Memorial is visited, the Armenian President either delivers a speech or issues a written statement regarding the meaning and significance of 24 April.

The commemoration ceremony and activities this year have occurred in the same manner. The only significant difference was that the written statement issued by President Sarkisian entailed more important, but more negative points compared to the previous years.

Sarkisian has indicated that one of the native and ancient people of the region has been exterminated or sent into forced exile and that the great majority of them did not even have graves, that the spiritual and cultural assets accumulated through the millennia have been lost. Furthermore, after also saying that material assets have been appropriated by the Turkish state and its peoples and that because of the genocide the Armenians have lost their

82 "International Delegation Commemorates the Armenian Genocide in Istanbul", *AGBU Pres Office*, 30 April 2013.

right to live in their homeland, Sarkisian has expressed that the denial of genocide constitutes direct continuation of that crime and that denial is being carried out in modern Turkey, that it is the duty of the Armenians to realize this matter and bring it to the attention of the international community. Going further, Sarkisian has said that he suggested not to re-open old wounds but to look forward, that their response to this is that Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink were not brought to trial a hundred years ago, but were tried right before their eyes and that for the Turkish as well as the Armenian society this problem (genocide allegations) is current and urgent. Sarkisian has ended his statement by indicating that Armenia, as a state and as a nation, in every corner of the world have been and will be fighting against all and every manifestation of the genocide, be it xenophobia, extermination, nonchalant silence and denial.

It will be useful to further dwell upon the Armenian President's statement. The point drawing the most attention is the effort to accuse modern Turkey of genocide. For this, Sarkisian has adopted the arguments used by the Diaspora for many years. According to this, denial of "genocide" constitutes a continuation of genocide and since Turkey does not accept the genocide, it continues this crime. However, the crime of genocide ends when the acts of exterminating a certain group ceases. The denial of genocide (if such genocide exists) constituting the continuation of genocide cannot be found in any text of international law. This is a formula fabricated by the Armenians and their advocates in order to be able to accuse modern Turkey with genocide, because without accusing Turkey with genocide, the necessary legal basis to claim compensation and if possible territory from Turkey does not exist.

The denial of genocide (if such genocide exists) constituting the continuation of genocide cannot be found in any text of international law.

This is a formula fabricated by the Armenians and their advocates in order to be able to accuse modern Turkey with genocide, because without accusing Turkey with genocide, the necessary legal basis to claim compensation and if possible territory from Turkey does not exist.

On the path to 2015, Sarkisian's statement is important for displaying what kind of a policy Armenia will pursue towards Turkey.

4. Commemoration Ceremonies in Turkey and the Armenian Question and the BDP

A. Commemoration Ceremonies

It could be seen that the 24 April commemoration activities in Turkey have

two differences this year compared to those of the previous years. The first is that by inviting some foreigners, an attempt was made to bring an international aspect to these activities. The second is increasing the number of cities in which the commemoration activities are organized and therefore to try to give the impression that the number of those condemning the Armenian “genocide” in Turkey is increasing.

According to a columnist, commemoration activities have been organized this year, in alphabetical order, in Adana, Ankara, Batman, Dersim (Tunceli), Diyarbakir, Istanbul and Izmir⁸³. However, the leading newspapers have reported the activities in Istanbul. On the other hand, it is understood that the number of people attending the activities in other cities were quite low.

According to the press⁸⁴, 21 “activists” and also some organizations from various countries have been invited to the activities in Turkey. We could mention the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), the European Grassroots Antiracist Movement (EGAM) and the Gomidas Institute in London. The Turkish Human Rights Association organized the activities in Istanbul, together with the Stay Stop to Racism and Nationalism Movement⁸⁵. On the other hand, a French source gives the number of foreigners coming from France as 23 and indicates that apart from the organizations whose names are mentioned above, the organizations of SOS Racisme, UEJF (Union des Etudiants Juif en France = the Jewish Students Union in France), the European Union of Jewish Students, and Collectif VAN (Vigilance Arménienne Contre le Négationnisme = Vigilance Against Denial) have also come to Turkey. A newspaper has written that apart from the French, representatives from Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and the Netherlands also came to Turkey⁸⁶.

Among the foreigners coming to Turkey, Director of the Gomidas Institute in London Ara Sarafian, AGBU Europe Chairman Alexis Govcian, Nicolas Tavityan as representing the Central Office of this organization, EGAM’s Chairman Bejamin Abtan and Chairman of Collectif VAN Séta Papazian’s names draw attention⁸⁷.

In terms of program, the activities held are similar to those organized last year⁸⁸. At noon, a meeting was held in front of the Turkish-Islamic Arts

83 Cengiz Çandar, “24 Nisan Nedir?” (What is 24 April?), *Taraf*, 23 April 2013.

84 *Taraf*, 23 April 2013

85 “Yüzyıllık Yalnızlık Bitiyor” (Loneliness of a Century is Ending), *Taraf*, 24 April 2013.

86 “Taksim’de Anma” (Commemoration at Taksim), *Milliyet*, 25 April 2013.

87 “Communiqué de Presse. “Reconnaissance du Génocide Arménien: Quand la Turquie s’aveillera”, *Collectif VAN*, 26 April 2013.

88 *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 41, pp. 68-41

Museum at Sultanahmet and the Armenian names of the places in Anatolia where the Armenians lived were read there, while Eren Keskin from the Human Rights Association has delivered a speech in Turkish and Director of the Gomidas Institute in London Ara Sarafian has delivered one in Armenian⁸⁹. Approximately 100 individuals have watched this meeting. The second and the main activity in Istanbul was the sit-in at the sidewalk at Taksim Square where the pictures of those being arrested on 24 April 1915 and of some other Armenians were displayed and a declaration was read out in Turkish and Armenian. Around 30 individuals belonging to the People's Liberation Party have protested them at a place nearby⁹⁰.

The number of people attending the activities is important in terms of determining to what extent these activities draw the attention of the public opinion. Although it could be seen that there is more participation compared to the first commemoration meetings organized four years ago, there is no significant difference between the number of people attending this year and last year's meetings. It seems that several hundred people (maybe 500 people) have attended the meeting at Taksim. The pictures published in the press do not support the allegation that the numbers of participants increase each year and that this year it has reached some 2.500 to 3.000⁹¹.

Concerning who have participated in these activities, one could say that as in last year, the former leftists, new liberals, the PKK and some individuals on the same line and a low number of "religious people"; in other words, those giving priority to religious values were present. It could be understood that a few Armenians of Turkey have participated in the activities. This situation has also drawn the attention of UGAB Europe Chairman Alexis Govcian⁹².

Another activity that was organized for 24 April in Istanbul was, just as last year, the visit made to Sevag Şahin Balıkcı's grave, a person of Armenian origin who was murdered while performing his military service. It could be understood that this gesture is made in order to support the view that Sevag was killed for being Armenian and that a link, some kind of a similarity is tried to be drawn between the genocide and this incident. However, the court had ruled that Sevag was not murdered intentionally, but by fault⁹³. It would have been a more correct move to respect the court's decision, to wait for

89 "Names of the Lost Armenian Villages Read in Istanbul Sultanahmet Square", *The Armenian Weekly*, 25 April 2013.

90 "Taksim'de Anma" (Commemoration at Taksim), *Milliyet*, 25 April 2013.

91 Ibid. Also, the number of people participating has been said to be "approximately 2000" in AGBU's declaration of 30 April entitled "International Delegation Commemorate the Armenian Genocide in Istanbul".

92 "Interview avec ... Govcian", *Les Nouvelles d'Arménie*, 24 April 2013.

93 "Er Sevag davasında karar çıktı" (Decision Declared in Er Sevag's Case), *Hürriyet*, 29 March 2013.

the decision of the Court of Appeal and meanwhile, not to abuse the issue from a political aspect. The murder of an elderly Armenian woman in Istanbul last year and some attacks taking place towards the elderly Armenian women in Samatya at the beginning of the year have been introduced by some local and foreign media as an intentional act by Turkey towards the Armenians. Eventually it has been understood that these attacks have been made by a deranged Armenian.

In terms of the activities, what is new this year was declaring Faik Ali Bey, who was Administrator of Kutahya⁹⁴ in 1915, as the “Good Turk”. According to Armenian propaganda, the “good Turks” are those who helped the Armenians and prevented them from being relocated by either hiding them or providing shelter for them or their children depending on the circumstances. It is known all along that these kinds of people exist. The reason for continually placing more emphasis on these individuals is generally to ease the negative reactions created by the hostility towards the Turks and Turkey which sometimes reaches the extent of racism among the Diaspora Armenians and to underline the misdoings of the relocation by indicating that “good Turks” exist also. For this purpose, Faik Ali Bey⁹⁵ who, while serving as Administrator of Kutahya, refused to implement the relocation decision since the Armenians of that town had no harmful activities, has been included among the “good Turks” by his grave in Zincirlikuyu being visited on 24 April.

Among the activities held in others places besides Istanbul, Diyarbakir comes to the fore. For the first time, a ceremony has been organized in this city by the Municipality and the Bar Association in order to commemorate 24 April⁹⁶.

Also, a panel discussion has been held to which Ara Sarafian, Director of the Gomidas Institute and Tahir Elçi from the Bar Association have attended. Elçi has said that shortly after the Armenians were arrested in Istanbul on 24 April 1915, a similar process unfolded in Diyarbakir. According to Elçi, the Kurds also participated in these events confronting the reality of the genocide by them today is inevitable and that the Kurds should support Armenians in the struggle against the state’s ideology and denialism. On the other hand, Ara Sarafian has focused on the process of the destruction of the Armenians

94 Tenant is the authorized person heading an administrative division between a Governor and District Governor that no longer exists today.

95 Faik Ali (Ozansoy), 1878-1950. is the son of Sait Pasha, was born in Diyarbakir. He has served in various administrative duties. Among them are the Administrator of Kütahya and Governor of Diyarbakir. Also, he has served as Undersecretary of the Minister of Interior for some time. Rather than for these duties, Faik Ali Ozansoy is known in Turkey by his poetry. Well known writer Süleyman Nazif (1870-1927) is the elder brother of Faik Ali Bey. Munis Faik Ozansoy (1911-1975), a well-known author and poet of the Republic period and a high rank official is the son of Ali Bey.

96 “Genocide Commemorated in Diyarbakır For The First Time”, *The Armenian Weekly*, 23 April 2013.

of Diyarbakır in 1915 and has noted that he came to Diyarbakır to conduct research on the genocide, and that locals had been very helpful.

According to a Turkish newspaper⁹⁷, Sarafian has made a statement at the Armenian Cemetery in Diyarbakır and then in an interview has said “I can talk freely, I can say whatever I want, no one interferes”. Sarafian, who has indicated that he could not even imagine these from happening a few years ago, has said that Turkey has entered the path of abandoning its policies of denial.

In the meantime, in an interview delivered to the *Hürriyet Newspaper*⁹⁸, AGBU Europe Chairman Alexis Govcian has raised interest. In response to the question of “what kind of statement by Turkey could be considered acceptable in order to close the case (Armenian Question)”, Govcian has said “only saying ‘yes a genocide occurred’ will be enough. That is all. Then we will forgive”. Then, to clarify his statement, he has added that “what we will forgive today are anyhow not the Turkish people. We have no problems with them. What we will forgive is the past events. Our problem is with the period of the Committee of Union and Progress”. Therefore, Govcian has defined the Armenian question as a problem concerning history. Therefore, the “Commission of Historians” which Turkey proposes since 2005 emerges as the most appropriate place where the existing problems will be addressed. However, Govcian has not referred to this commission.

Govcian, who puts the recognition of genocide at the top of Armenian claims from Turkey, concerning the other claims has said it is not necessary for the genocide to be recognized for compensation to be paid, that currently compensation processes are continuing in the US, Germany and even in Turkey, that the state could be called upon on the condition that a title deed and document is shown. (For the moment there is no “compensation process” in Turkey. Some initiatives are observed in the US to start this kind of a process). Concerning Armenia’s territorial claims from Turkey, Govcian has indicated that based on international law, only a state could perform this, that no one in the Diaspora could make such a claim and that Armenia has no such claim at the moment. Concerning territorial claims, Govcian’s statements are correct in the legal area. However, the problem does not lie in the legal, but in the political area. While the Armenian State has no such claim from Turkey, public opinions of Armenia and the Diaspora believe that Eastern Anatolia, which they consider as Western Armenia, should belong to Armenia and they expect this to become true. This issue is the greatest obstacle to peace or reconciliation between the two nations and states.

97 “Ermeni Asıllı Tarihçi: Türkiye’de Yaşadıklarım Devrim” (Historian of Armenian Origin: What I Experienced in Turkey is a Revolution), *Hürriyet*, 3 May 2013.

98 *Hürriyet*, 29 Nisan 2013.

The counter demonstrations or activities taking place against the 24 April activities in Turkey which we tried to summarize above were very few. As mentioned above, the small People's Liberation Party has organized a counter demonstration at Taksim. The same party has also opposed the demonstrations in Izmir by carrying the poster "the Armenian Genocide is a Lie". A short quarrel has occurred between the two sides and has been appeased with the intervention of the police⁹⁹. Although not being directly concerned with 24 April, it has been declared that the International Foundation to Combat the Groundless Armenian Allegations (ASIMDER) organized a rally in the village of Alican on the Armenian border in order to draw attention to the massacres of 1915-1918 committed by the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia¹⁰⁰.

On that subject we would like to emphasize the Turkish Foreign Ministry's reaction shown to the statements delivered on 24 April or to the messages issued. As explained above, the Foreign Ministry has displayed a rather harsh reaction to President Obama's statement whose language was mild and whose content was the same as that of the previous year. The response given to French Minister of Education's statement also carries the same feature. However, no reply has been given to President Sarkisian's 24 April statement that accuses Turkey of committing "the crime of genocide denial" and also to his previous statements that Turkey must recognize the genocide allegations.

The last point we would like to underline concerning the activities in Turkey commemorating 24 April is that despite most of these activities contradicting the beliefs and ideas of a great majority of the Turkish public opinion and also conflicting with official views and policies, they have been carried out by utilizing freedom of expression. Although we have no objection to this, this situation inevitably brings to mind the conditions in Armenia. One wonders, is it possible for a group consisting of Turkish nationalist intellectuals to go to Yerevan and sit by the Liberty Square and commemorate the half million Turks and other Muslims who have been massacred by Armenian gangs in 1914-1920? Can such a meeting be organized in Switzerland? Will it be possible to hold these kinds of meetings in member countries after the European Union Framework Decision is implemented? To what extent does crying for what the Armenians suffered while ignoring the disasters the Turks and other Muslims have experienced comply with a "just memory"?

99 "İzmir'de Soykırım Gerginliği" (The Genocide Tension in Izmir), *Cumhuriyet*, 25 April 2013.

100 "Ermenistan Sınırında Miting Düzenlenecek" (A Rally Will be Organized on the Armenian Border), *AA*, 21 April 2013.

B. BDP's Stance

Despite the highly harmful acts of the Kurds against the Armenians during the 1915 events, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), accepted this situation and stance that embraced the Armenian allegations and with Ahmet Türk being at the forefront, some prominent figures from the BDP had apologized from the Armenians. This approach had created the belief that the BDP, who has almost declared war to the current Turkish Government due to its nationalist thoughts and also the struggle it carries out against the PKK, acted with the purpose of receiving the Armenians' support. While it was expected for the BDP to review its stance mentioned above on the Armenian question or to at least soften it under the influence of the agreement reached recently between the BDP and the Government and the positive atmosphere this created, the opposite has happened and this Party has further emphasized its policy of closer relations with the Armenians.

In a statement issued on 24 April 2013 by the BDP Headquarters, it has been expressed in summary that “today is the day the 1915 Armenian genocide, one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century, is commemorated. 98 years ago, on 24 April 1915, one of the greatest genocides of human history started with the Armenian people being exiled. The Armenian people, due to the dark policies of the mindset of the Unionists of the period, suffered great pain and were taken away from the peoples of Anatolia and Mesopotamia and from their homes”. In the statement it has also been indicated that the pain of this event has continued until today by forming great wounds in the conscience of brotherly peoples and the international community conscience. It has also been said that “the traumas and grievances of the genocide are still fresh in the societal memory, because Turkey has not yet confronted one of the biggest genocides of the 20th century in order to purify society's conscience, it has not come to terms with its own history and has not apologized to the Armenian people by admitting the reality of genocide. One should not forget that confronting and coming to terms with history will also guarantee that the pains will not be suffered again”. Furthermore, it has been indicated in the statement that “the historical consequences of confrontation and coming to terms have been heavy. But, the common will of the peoples of Turkey regarding peace, fraternity and freedom is an expression of hope that similar events will not be experienced. We call upon Turkey to confront its own history, to come to terms with its past and to apologize to the Armenians who have lived in great pain and with the hope that new pains will not be experienced, we pay tribute to the victims of the Armenian genocide”¹⁰¹.

The themes and expressions used in this statement are the same with those of the Armenian militants and create the conviction that most likely, the BDP

101 “Meclis'te İlginç Teklif: Türkiye Soykırım İçin Özür Dilesin!” (An Interesting Proposal at the Assembly: Turkey Must Apologize for Genocide!), *Yeniçağ*, 25 April 2013.

has been inspired or has been suggested by the Armenians. The most important point in the statement is that the BDP has officially described the 1915 events as “genocide”. The second important point is that as a party, it has embraced the idea of apologizing to the Armenians. This way, BDP has arrived to the line desired by the Armenians.

However, regarding the issue of apologizing, it is useful to keep one point in consideration. As known, apologizing does not create a consequence for the apologizing side beyond the moral area. Therefore, Armenian militants do not find apologizing on its own sufficient and also wants Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide allegations. If this recognition takes place, a legal basis will be formed that will support Armenian claims of the returning of properties, paying of compensation and not very likely, but also its territorial claims. It comes to mind that another purpose for the BDP to only apologize is to escape the returning of Armenian properties which it is said a significant amount is in the hands of citizens of Kurdish origin.

On the other hand, BDP, with the signatures of the Parliamentary Group Deputy Chairman Idris Baluken and of some other deputies of the same party, has proposed to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for a commission to be established in order for the 1915 Armenian genocide allegations to be researched. In the justification of the proposal, it has said that the Republic of Turkey has for a long time refrained from taking the necessary steps that will research what happened. As a result, discussions on what happened have always remained on the agenda and an understanding has failed to be reached on the subject and rather than revealing the truth, all sides have used the grievances as an instrument for their own political statements. As long as the necessary steps are not taken regarding a historical confrontation and researching the truth, these grievances will be used for this purpose. It is also clear that the dilemma the state experiences politically will be overcome by confrontation and fulfilling what is necessary. Based on all these, revealing what happened in 1915 require a comprehensive study by the Parliament¹⁰².

The point that needs to be paid attention to is that the BDP has not only submitted a proposal to the Turkish Grand National Assembly regarding the Armenian allegations, but has also another proposal on the researching of unsolved murders. Moreover, by classifying Turkey’s combat against terror as war, it has requested for an article on the determining of war damages and their compensation to be included in the Constitutional draft¹⁰³.

102 “BDP: Soykırım İddiaları İçin Komisyon Kurulsun” (BDP: A Commission Should be Established for the Genocide Allegations), *Milliyet*, 25 April 2013.

103 “BDP Ermeni Tehcirini ‘soykırım’ Olarak Niteledi” (BDP Classified the Armenian Relocation as ‘Genocide’), *Zaman*, 25 April 2013.

In a manner that completes this initiative, in a speech delivered at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Mersin Independent Deputy Ertuğrul Kürkçü, who acts together with the BDP, has given statements that reflects the views of the Armenians regarding the relocation and has moreover offered his condolences to the inheritors of those being subjected to “Meds Yeghern”. He has also indicated that they are determined in revealing the historical events concerning these massacres, that freedom of speech and conscience must be achieved in Turkey and by this way the young generation will escape this burden. Moreover, he has said that it is necessary for the fraternity between the Kurds, Turks and Armenians to be developed and new ways to be found for reconciliation. Furthermore, Kürkçü has also expressed that the Kurds, Turks and Armenians have suffered from the massacres, atrocities and deportation and that the main reason for these cruelties is the policies of great powers to obtain zones of influence. Kürkçü has also said that the activities held in Turkey for April 24 are the beginning of a period of mutual understanding in Turkey¹⁰⁴.

In Kürkçü’s statements, two points in particular draw attention. The first is that he has not uttered the word “genocide” and instead, just like President Obama, has said “Meds Yeghern”. However, BDP uses the word genocide. The second point is that it has referred to a historical truth that is no longer much dwelled upon, the policies of great states to obtain zones of influence, an issue that should also exist among discussions on “genocide”.

104 “Un Député Turc Veut Faire la Lumière Sur le Génocide Arménien”, *Armenews*, 3 May 2013.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Media

A1News

Anadolu Ajansı

ANCA Press

APA

Armenian Weekly

Armenews

Armenpress

Arminfo

Armradio.am

Asbarez

Collectif VAN

Cumhuriyet

DHA

Ermeni Araştırmaları

Haykakan Zhamanak

Hetq.am

Hürriyet

Interfax

Les Nouvelles d'Arménie

Lurer.com

Mediamax

Milliyet

News.am

Nouvelles D'Arménie

PanAm.Net

Radiolour

Radikal

RAPSI (Russian Legal Information Agency)

RFE/RL

Tert-am

Today's Zaman

Vestnik Kavkaza

Zaman

Yeniçağ

Books and Articles

Davutođlu, Ahmet *2013 Yılına Girerken Dış Politikamız*, (Dışışleri bakanlığının 2013 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarısının TBMM Genel Kurulu'na Sunulması Vesilesiyle Hazırlanan Kitapçık),

Schabas, William A. *Genocide in International Law*, Cambridge 2000

Schabas, William A. "Crimes Against Humanity as a Paradigm for International Atrocity Crimes", *Middle East Critique*, Volume 20, Number 3, Fall 2011

AUGUST 2008 LESSONS FOR THE KARABAKH CONFLICT

AĞUSTOS 2008'DEN ÇIKARILACAK KARABAĞ DERSLERİ

Araz ASLANLI

Chairman

QAFSAM – Caucasian Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies
Hazar University Humanitarian and Social Sciences Faculty

aslanly@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The settlement of the Karabakh conflict carries great importance for the future of our region. The conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are the other important ethnic problems in the Caucasus, has for the time being entered a new phase following the August 2008 events. As known, during the war that started on 8 August 2008, Georgia was subjected to the occupation of Russia and following the developments that took place, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with their independences being recognized by Russia and some other countries on the path of entirely detaching from Georgia, and on the condition of entering Russia's full military defense had received many serious de facto results. Moreover, by mentioning the possibilities of the US and Russia coming militarily face to face, scenarios for a "3rd World War" were also brought to the agenda. What took place in August 2008 has shown how serious risks the continuity of non-settlement of ethnic problems in the South Caucasus entails. The existing conditions right before August 2008 in terms of the conflicts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia can also currently be applied for the Karabakh conflict. The region recognized as Azeri territories by the UN and all other international organizations has been occupied by Armenia, peace has not been able to be obtained despite a ceasefire agreement being signed, and the ceasefire is frequently violated. Since the beginning of 2013, Azerbaijan is becoming stronger from the military aspect and expresses that it will not accept the existing situation in any way and that if peaceful methods fail to create solutions, then it could appeal to military means (will use its right to self-defense) in order to defend their legal rights. If a close combat starts in the region, its consequences can flow beyond what is foreseen. What is in question is not only regional destruction, human tragedies being experienced or regional and global projects being performed through the South Caucasus on economics, transportation and other aspects being harmed. In case of a war being rekindled between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the possibility of allies of both countries being drawn into the war is also quite high. In this paper, a comparative evaluation of the current situation of the Karabakh conflict, its settlement and the potential for a war will be made in light of what is mentioned above and suggestions will be provided.*

Keywords: *Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, August 2008*

Öz: *Karabağ sorununun çözümü bölgemizin geleceği için büyük bir önem taşımaktadır. Kafkasya'daki diğer önemli etnik problemlerden olan Abhazya ve Güney Osetya anlaşmazlıkları, Ağustos 2008 olaylarından sonra yeni bir döneme girmişlerdir. Bilindiği gibi 8 Ağustos 2008'de başlayan savaş sırasında Gürcistan Rusya'nın işgaline maruz kalmış, ve gelişen olaylardan sonra bağımsızlıkları Rusya ve diğer bazı devletler tarafından tanınan ve Gürcistan'dan tamamen ayrılma yolunda olan Güney Osetya ve Abhazya yasal ve Rusya'nın askeri savunma sistemine katılması şartı ile de birçok ciddi fiili sonuçla karşılaşmışlardır. Ayrıca, ABD ve Rusya'nın askeri anlamda yüz yüze gelme ihtimali belirtilerek, Üçüncü Dünya Savaşı senaryoları gündeme getirilmiştir. Ağustos 2008'de gerçekleşen olay, Güney Kafkasya'daki etnik anlaşmazlıkların çözülmeden devam edilmesinin ortaya çıkarabileceği ciddi riskleri göstermiştir. Güney Osetya ve Abhazya anlaşmazlıklarının Ağustos 2008'den hemen önceki durumu, şu anda Karabağ anlaşmazlığına da uygulanabilir. Birleşmiş Milletler ve diğer tüm uluslararası örgütler tarafından Azerbaycan toprağı olarak tanınan bölge, Ermenistan tarafından işgal edilmiş, bir ateşkes anlaşması imzalanmasına rağmen barış sağlanamamış ve ateşkes anlaşması sık sık ihlal edilmiştir. 2013 yılının başından beri Azerbaycan askeri anlamda daha güçlü hale gelmekte, mevcut durumu hiçbir şekilde kabul etmeyeceğini ve barışçıl yöntemlerin sonuç vermemesi halinde hukuki haklarını koruyabilmek için askeri yollara başvurabileceğini (kendini savunma hakkını kullanabileceğini) belirtmektedir. Eğer bölgede bir sıcak çatışma yaşanırsa bunun sonuçları tahmin edilenden daha ileri boyutlara ulaşabilir. Söz konusu olan sadece bölgesel bir yıkım değildir. İnsani trajediler yaşanabilir veya ekonomi, ulaşım ve diğer alanlarda Güney Kafkasya genelinde gerçekleştirilen bölgesel ve küresel projelerde aksamalar oluşabilir. Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan arasında bir savaş alevlenirse, iki ülkenin müttefiklerinin de bu savaşa sürüklenme olasılığı yüksektir. Bu makalede Karabağ sorununun mevcut durumuna, sorunun çözülmesine ve bir savaşın ortaya çıkması olasılığına dair yukarıda verilen bilgiler ışığında karşılaştırmalı bir değerlendirmeye ve bazı tavsiyelere yer verilecektir.*

Anahtar kelimeler: *Karabağ sorunu, Azerbaycan, Ermenistan, Abhazya, Güney Osetya, Ağustos 2008*

Introduction

For the answer to the question of “will conflict or cooperation make its stamp to the future of the Black Sea region”, the settlement of the issue of Azeri territories being occupied by Armenia (commonly known as the Karabakh conflict in short) carries great importance. Similarly, the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as the other ethnic conflicts of the region, have entered a new phase for the time being following the August 2008 events. As can be remembered, small-scale mutual attacks that first started have turned into a war between Georgia and Russia on 8 August 2008; while Georgia has wanted to bring under its control South Ossetia, which declared that it detached from Georgia and claimed independence, had all of a sudden been subjected to the occupation of Russia. During this process, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with their independences being recognized by Russia and some other countries on the path of entirely detaching from Georgia, had received legal and on the condition of entering Russia’s full military defense had received de facto many serious results.

As long as a very serious transformation is not experienced under regional and global conditions, the possibility of these problems to ignite is very low and even if an unexpected development takes place and ignites, it most likely will not bring any serious benefit to the side (and especially if this side is Georgia) that opens the first fire. On the opposite, the first side to open fire can even fall into the situation of paying the costs of its damages to a certain degree. Therefore, the main issue that should be dwelled upon in terms of the region is the Karabakh conflict. Bringing an explanation to how risky a process similar to August 2008 is for the Karabakh conflict carries great significance.

Actually, if we observe the issue more widely, the ending of the Cold War and the events of August 2008 constitute two important stages in terms of evaluating the ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus. These two periods have been at a key position in terms of ethnic conflicts arising and the process of their resolution.

Parallel to the Cold War coming to an end and the bipolar world order being abolished, an increase in ethnic conflicts is observed worldwide. Ethnic

The first half of the 1990’s has entailed the years in which ethnic problems have been experienced in both geographies as small-scale conflicts and most of the time as war. Ethnic problems emerging in these geographies have carried the feature of both ethnic and religious minority problems as well as policies of expansionism and aggression.

problems emerging especially in the geographies of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia have occupied world agenda since the second half of the 1980's. The first half of the 1990's has entailed the years in which ethnic problems have been experienced in both geographies as small-scale conflicts and most of the time as war. Ethnic problems emerging in these geographies have carried the feature of both ethnic and religious minority problems as well as policies of expansionism and aggression. Just as these problems have caused basic human rights to become insignificant and economic problems to increase in the regions the problems emerged, they have also threatened regional and international security and stability.

One of the issues occupying world agenda the most in this period has been the "issue of Azeri territories being occupied by Armenia" which is commonly known in short as the "Karabakh Conflict". The strategic importance of the Caucasus for countries waging a struggle for global power, energy resources existing in the Caspian basin, the region being situated on international transportation lines and other reasons have made this issue a center of attraction.

On the other hand, it is possible to classify the August 2008 events in some way as the September 11 of the ethnic problems in the Caucasus. According to some interpreters, the events of 2008, that have brought the world to the brink of a 3rd World War, have radically changed some theses that were valid until then. The 2008 events have been the peak of Russia's payback in the former Soviet geography and at the same time have been a significant indication of non-recognition of borders. The US, for not being able to meet the expectations from it, has caused disappointment among Western advocates and has increased the timidity among leaders of the former Soviet republics in regards to hostility against Russia and favoring the West. Following the 2008 events, Russia-Georgia relations came to a breaking point. Similar to the saying of "Iraq must be rescued from Saddam Hussein" used by the US towards Iraq, Russia has declared that "Georgia must be rescued from Saakashvili". Russia has increased its suggestions towards the countries of South Caucasus that "those wanting to do something in the future must learn lessons from these events".

At least as much as other issues, the August 2008 events have also closely influenced the Karabakh conflict that is for now the only issue bringing the two South Caucasus countries directly face to face. Every development that can take place concerning the alternatives of the conflict's resolution to the resolution processes, to every little detail of the processes have been influenced from these events. In terms of resolution, it has caused hopes to rise in some circles, while in some circles it has caused hopelessness to rise.

Especially the bilateral talks held between Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders, initiatives and explanations of the senior officials of international organizations and great powers, developments regarding the issue within the framework of Western countries-Turkey-Armenia, Russia-Azerbaijan-Armenia and Russia-Western countries, allegations that the steps taken especially by Turkey towards the Caucasus in general and towards relations with Armenia in particular will make significant contributions to the resolution process of the Karabakh conflict and the joint declarations signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia through Russia's mediation have caused the view of "the resolution of the Karabakh conflict is very near" to be frequently mentioned. However, Russia's increasing role which is described by many researchers as the "source of the conflict", inconclusiveness being more at the forefront despite the intensity in talks and conflicts, although small-scale, arising on the Azerbaijan-Armenia front line have drawn attention as negative indications.

In general, it is believed that there are serious lessons to be learned from the August 2008 events for the Karabakh conflict. In order to better understand what these lessons to be learned are, the Karabakh conflict will be examined in detail, later on the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be addressed in general terms. Then, the August 2008 events will be summarized very shortly, while in the end views and proposals on the lessons to be learned will be expressed.

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE KARABAKH CONFLICT

Looking at the conflict's history, we see that the first foundations were based on the policies of great powers concerning the region and in this context, the ethnic migrations in the region. Azerbaijani and Armenian¹ population was observed within state structuring found in the region during the former periods, and wars of ethnic origin did not exist. In particular, Russia constantly becoming stronger since the 18th century, attempting to extend its regional domination and to expand to the south, and in this context, requiring state structuring which it could use in the Caucasus as a base have caused this country to implement ethnic activities in regards to the region.

The agreements signed by Russia as a result of the wars with the Ottomans and Iran during the first half of the XIXth century have formed important stages of changing the region's ethnic structure. The Treaty of Turkmenchay signed in 1828 between Russia and Iran has envisaged for hundreds of thousands of Armenians living on Iranian territories to be migrated to the

1 Azerbaijani Turks or Muslim identity have also been expressed.

area of Karabakh which will remain under Russian control and to today's Armenian territories. Moreover, with the Edirne Treaty signed in 1829 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, approximately 84.000 Armenians have been brought to the area of Karabakh². According to Russian historians, at the end of these processes until the middle of the 1800's, a total of around one million Armenians have been settled in today's Armenian territories and in the Karabakh region³.

After areas where the most Armenians live are formed in the Caucasus, as the second stage an Armenian state has been established in the beginning of the 1900's. The beginning of the 1900's has drawn attention for our issue through two of its features. First of all, during this period, Armenian movements in the north of Turkey and in the Caucasus in general have been supported by foreign powers. Furthermore, another feature that draws attention has been Russia's initiative to weaken the nationalist movements gaining power against the central administration in the Caucasus by bringing them into conflict with each other. The conflicts experienced between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians in the beginning of the XX'th century have to a great extent developed within this framework and the intellectuals of both communities have shown conscience in assessing the issue from this aspect. Thus, while the conflict was frozen with the region existing within the Soviet Union in the following years, it has constantly been emphasized in evaluations made towards the past, that the Tsarist administration had ignited ethnic conflicts in order to protect itself. However, how bizarre is it that the administrators of the same Soviet Union have not refrained from resorting to the tactics of Tsarist Russia during the dissolution process of the Soviet Union⁴.

Meanwhile, another point that must be dwelled upon is the allegations that "Nagorno-Karabakh supposedly belongs to Armenia and has been given by Stalin to Azerbaijan". The general view of communist administrators or other leaders while the Soviet Union was being formed was that "Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan and the Armenian population there did not experience great difficulties, but the region was subjected to provocations from the outside". Despite this general conviction, the problem was constantly escalated and scenarios of Karabakh being separated from Azerbaijan were tried to be applied. The RK (b) P Caucasus Bureau (was formed of the communist parties in the Caucasus republics and only one of its seven members was Azerbaijani) convening on 4 July 1921 had first expressed the

2 *Colonial Policy of the Russian Tzarism in Azerbaijan in 20-60s XIX Century, Part I*, Moskow-Leningrad, 1936, pp. 201, 204; Reşid Göyüşov, *Qarabağın Keçmişine Seyahet*, Baku, Azərbaycan Devlet Neşriyyatı, 1993, p. 75.

3 N. N. Şavrov, *Novaya Ugroza Russkomu Delu v Zakavkazie*, Sankt Petersburg, 1911, pp. 59-61.

4 Araz Aslanlı, *Karabakh Problem – History, Essence, Solution Process*, Baku Nurlar Press, 2009, p.14-16.

view that the mountainous area of Karabakh should be given to Armenia, but with the RKP Caucasus Bureau convening again on 5 July 1921 with the participation of representatives from the RK (b) Central Committee, it had conveyed the view that the mountainous area of Karabakh should remain in Azerbaijan. After all assessments were made, upon the suggestion of Orconikidze and Nazaretyan, it was decided for “Nagorno-Karabakh to remain within the borders of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and for the city of Shusha as an administrative center to be given extensive sovereignty based on matters such as the need of national peace between the Muslims and Armenians, the necessity of economic concern of the regions of Highland and Lowland Karabakh, and the permanent connection of the region with Azerbaijan”⁵.

It can clearly be seen from the originals of the decisions of July 4th and 5th that the allegations frequently mentioned in Armenian sources that “Stalin gave Karabakh to Azerbaijan” are initially incorrect, because when looking at the originals, it can be seen that in the statements existing in the drafts submitted to voting it is mentioned that Karabakh or its mountainous area “should be left within Azerbaijan” (“*Karabax ostavit v predalax Azerbaydjana*” in its Russian original) or “to be given to Armenia” (“*Naqornuyu çast Karabaxa vklyuçit v sostav Armenii*” in its Russian original)⁶. But, if the region had been taken from Armenia and given to Azerbaijan, then on the complete opposite it should have been mentioned that it should be “given to Azerbaijan” or to “remain in Armenia”.

Apart from these, in the period since the formation of the Soviet Union until its collapse, a formation named the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region being established within Azerbaijan, the ethnic density of Armenians being obtained within this formation, and comprehensive preparations for the NKAR to join Armenia continuing inside and outside of the Soviet Union have caused conflicts to exacerbate in the region during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In stages, first of all mutual ethnic hostilities have increased and small-scale conflicts have emerged within the Azerbaijan-Armenia border and within the former NKAR geography in Azerbaijan, whereas these conflicts have turned into war since June 1992. Until this period, due to existing administrations in Azerbaijan not having a positive outlook on the establishment of a national army opposite to Armenia possessing such army, Armenian forces have occupied approximately 5% of Azeri territories. The massacre committed in Azerbaijan’s rayon of Khojaly by Armenian forces on 25-26 February 1992 with the support of the Russian

5 Cemalettin Taşkıran, *Geçmişten Günümüze Karabağ Meselesi*, Ankara, Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1995, pp. 136-137.

6 “İz protokola Veçernego Zasedaniya Plenuma KavByuro ÇK RKP (b)”, *Sovyetleri Birliyi Komünist Partii Merkez Komitesi yanında Marksizm-Leninizm Enstitüsü Merkezi Parti Arşivi*, Fond 64, Op. 2, File 1, p. 118.

366th regiment in the region has caused harsh reactions from numerous foreign states and international organizations⁷, but no proceeding has taken place for those committing this massacre.

Azerbaijan has officially declared that the 366th Russian Regiment in Hankendi has participated in the attack⁸, because the most developed conventional weapons have been used in the attack. These have not existed among local groups in the region, but also among Azerbaijani and Armenian armies just starting to be formed. The Russian side has declared as always that it has nothing to do with the attacks, but 3 Russian soldiers who escaped from the regiment mentioned above, in a press conference organized on 3 March 1992 have confessed that “they were brainwashed and it was wanted from them to fight on the side of the Christian Armenians against the Muslim Azerbaijanis”⁹. Years later, in an interview, Armenian President Serj Sarkisian’s statement that the slaughtering of the Azerbaijani civilians was committed consciously was also met with reaction by the writers of Armenian origin¹⁰.

While mutual attacks continued throughout May, the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers, convening in Helsinki on 24 March 1992, had evaluated the situation in Karabakh and in articles 3-11 of its final declaration, had called for a conference in Minsk of Belarus for the resolution of the conflict. In article 9 of the declaration, as participants of the conference, names of 11 countries consisting of Azerbaijan, Germany, the US, Armenia, Belarus, Sweden, Italy, France, Turkey, and Czech and Slovak Federal Republic have been expressed¹¹. The task of coordinator of the Minsk Conference has been granted to Italy and Italian representative Mario Raffaelli has been appointed as Chairman of the conference. It has been foreseen for the conference to be held in Minsk in July 1992. This initiative of the OSCE has also received support from the UN. In the UN Security Council’s meeting held on 26 March 1992, the decision not to directly intervene in the conflict and to

7 Letter dated 23 April 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights
<http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.Nsf/0/7c3561e40d2d3d07c1256bae00447b7f?Opendocument>; “Nowhere To Hide For Azeri Refugees”, *The Guardian*, 2 September 1993; “The Face Of A Massacre”, *Newsweek*, 16 March 1992; “Massacre By Armenians”, *The New York Times*, 3 March 1992; Thomas Goltz, “Armenian Soldiers Massacre Hundreds Of Fleeing Families”, *The Sunday Times*, 1 March 1992; “Corpses Litter Hills In Karabakh”, *The Times*, 2 March 1992; Jill Smolowe, “Massacre In Khojaly”, *Time*, 16 March, 1992, “Nagorno-Karabagh Victims Buried In Azerbaijani Town”, *The Washington Post*, 28 February 1992;

8 Araz Aslanlı, “Tarihün Günüümüze Karabağ Sorunu”, *Avrasya Dosyası, Azerbaycan Özel*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2001, p. 404.

9 *Hürriyet*, 4 March 1992.

10 “Rober Koptaş yazdı: Hocalı sorumluluğu”, *Agos*, 28 February 2013,
<http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=rober-koptas-yazdi-hocali-sorumlulugu&haberid=4529> (28 February 2013)

11 CSCE Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council 24 March 1992 Summary of Conclusions
<http://www.osce.org/mc/29121> (4 March 2012).

support the OSCE's initiatives was taken¹². The conference has been held under Rafelli's chairmanship with the attendance of representatives of countries to take part in the Minsk Conference in Rome on April 1st 1992. During the same period, the CSCE observation delegation has also visited Baku¹³.

In the conflicts taking place from June 1992-November 1992, Azerbaijani troops have been able to rescue most of the Armenian occupied territories (approximately 3.5 percent) from occupation. However, since the end of 1992, Armenia has turned the war to its own advantage and has increased its occupation of Azeri territories. As a result of the attacks of the Armenian army from 27 March-3 April 1993, Azerbaijan's rayon of Kelbajar has been occupied by Armenia.

The first resolution of the UN Security Council in regards to the conflict has been adopted following this occupation. Resolution 822 has emphasized immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Kelbajar rayon¹⁴. But, with the influence of Armenia's policies of distraction being tolerated by international organizations, this resolution has not been able to be implemented. As a result of this, Armenia has continued to occupy Azeri territories until the end of 1993 and the UN Security Council has continued adopting resolutions that seeks the cessation of these occupations¹⁵.

What remained from 1993 have been the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the UN Security Council's resolutions not implemented, and the OSCE Minsk Group's attempts remaining inconclusive. If we shortly evaluate the UN Security Council's resolutions, one aspect of these resolutions has been their constant emphasis on the inviolability of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, Armenia being a party to the conflict and the requirement of immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the occupied territories. The other aspect of the resolutions has been that no issue has been indicated in regards to Armenia not openly being declared as the attacking country (whereas how logical the allegations that Armenians of the region having no army and military supplies had carried out the attacks with planes, tanks and heavy weapons on their own was obvious. Moreover, Azerbaijan being attacked from both sides, from the

12 Manvel Sarkisyan, *Politiçeskie Problemi Kavkaza i Armeniya. Politika Armenii v Regione* (Kafkasların ve Ermenistan'ın Politik Sorunları. Ermenistan'ın Bölge Politikası), Erivan, Armyanskiy Tsentri Strategičeskiy i Natsionalnıx İssledovaniy, 1998, p. 59.

13 Araz Aslanlı, "Türk Dünyasının Kanayan Yarası: Karabağ", *Yeni Türkiye, Türkler Özel Sayısı* 19. vol., p. 200.

14 UN official website, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/822e.pdf> (4 March 2012).

15 [Resolution 853 \(1993\) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3259th meeting, on 29 July 1993](http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f15a60)
[Resolution 874 \(1993\) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3292nd meeting, on 14 October 1993](http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1684.html)
[Resolution 884 \(1993\) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3313th meeting, on 12 November 1993](http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f16520)
<http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f16520> (4 March 2012).

former NKAR and the Armenian border during the occupation of Kelbajar has also been determined through videos) and in regards to the sanctions to be enforced if Armenia does not withdraw from the occupied territories (as in the example of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait). But the result has been Azerbaijan, which suffered from domestic disturbances and failing to obtain sufficient external military assistance, losing approximately 20 percent of its territories and its territorial integrity seriously being threatened. The period of January-March 1994 has passed by with small-scale attacks and the OSCE and Russia's mediating initiatives.

Although Russia is a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, it gave more supremacy to its own plan and believed that this way it would obtain its earlier influence. The most important among Russia's initiatives were the talks held in Moscow on 18 January 1994 between Russian Foreign Minister Kozirev and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Hasanov and held on 20 January 1994 between Kozirev and Hovanisyan, the Foreign Ministers of Russia and Armenia, the talk held on 4 February 1994 in Hungary between the "Nine of Minsk" and the Swedish new chairman of the OSCE Minsk Conference Yana Eliasson, the signing of a protocol following a meeting held in Moscow on 18 February 1994 between the Defense Ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, and the visits of the Russian Deputy Defense Secretary and the authorized representative of the president to Baku and Yerevan on 28 February-1 March 1994¹⁶.

On 31 March-3 April 1994, the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council President as the representative of the CIS Inter-parliamentary Council and the special delegate of the President of Russia have visited Baku, Yerevan and Azerbaijan's city of Hankendi. On April 9, Armenian forces have started a heavy attack on the rayon of Terter that lasted almost a month. During the CIS Presidents summit held on April 15 in Moscow, Presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have met to discuss the issue. Also during the CIS Presidents Summit, a joint statement has been declared regarding "Nagorno-Karabakh and the events surrounding it".

From 26 April-2 May 1994, the OSCE delegation has visited the region. On 4-5 May 1994 the Kyrgyzstan Parliament and Russian Foreign Ministry has brought the heads of parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan together in Bishkek within the framework of the CIS Inter-parliamentary Council and the former NKAR has brought the representatives of the Turkish and Armenian populations together. During this meeting, as a step towards peace, the "Bishkek Protocol" has been signed on 5 May 1994¹⁷.

16 Aslanlı, "Tarihten Günümüze Karabağ Sorunu", p. 414.

17 *Xalq Qezeti*, 6 May 1994.

In short, by emphasizing in the protocol that the conflicts in the former NKAR and surrounding areas harms the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities and the other communities of the region, that in the CIS Presidents summit held on 14 April 1994 the halting of armed conflicts and a negotiation being reached is supported, the initiatives of the Inter-parliamentary Council and the CIS in this direction, and that the resolutions adopted by the UN and OSCE for the settlement of the conflict must be implemented (before all, resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 of the Security Council), by referring to the protocol signed on 18 February 1994 in Moscow between the Defense Ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, it was indicated that since the night passing from May 8 to May 9, a negotiation was reached on the fire being ceased and for some time, refugees being allowed to return to their homes. An agreement concerning the ceasefire was signed on 9 May 1994 between the Defense Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the representatives of the separatist Armenian leadership in the NKAR. As of 12 May 1994, the ceasefire regime has started being implemented¹⁸.

In almost all problems and conflicts in the world at important points, the Western world (particularly the US), Russia, and Iran have always supported different sides. In regards to this matter, most likely the issue of Azeri territories being occupied by Armenia (the Karabakh conflict) forms the only exception.

THE “RESOLUTION PROCESS” FOLLOWING THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

With the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement, Armenia’s occupying attacks on Azerbaijan territories and the war between the two countries have officially been suspended. Despite the violation of the ceasefire occurring frequently and sometimes expectations that these violations will turn into war forming in the period since the 1994 ceasefire until the present, the ceasefire situation has continued until today.

Meanwhile, we believe that it would be correct to shortly examine the internal and external factors that allowed Armenia to win the war. In almost all problems and conflicts in the world at important points, the Western world (particularly the US), Russia, and Iran have always supported different sides. In regards to this matter, most likely the issue of Azeri territories being occupied by Armenia (the Karabakh conflict) forms the only exception.

18 RESOLUTION 1047 (1994)1 on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta94/ERES1047.htm> (7 March 2012).

Concerning this issue, perhaps the issue of Azeri territories being occupied by Armenia constitutes the only exception. It is bizarre that during the war, Russia's forces and Armenia to which the West never gave up its financial and moral assistance, also received the support of Iran which they referred to as an "Islamic State". On the opposite, the Turkish Republics and states whose populations are Muslim had not provided the necessary support to Azerbaijan and it was even seen many times that they actually supported Armenia. In terms of internal factors, Armenia was also in a better condition. Opposite to Armenia holding the sole power throughout the war, Azerbaijan had always been the setting for power struggles and the existing powers were unable to fully provide the necessary war setting in the country. One point that specifically needs to be emphasized is that to a great extent Russia determines the fate of the wars in the region. No matter how small and weak one side that is supported militarily and politically by Russia is to the other, its success is inevitable. The chance for Azerbaijan, which during the war took a stance towards Russia and attempted to pursue an independent policy and to some extent possesses the image of a pro-Western country image (when presently compared with Armenia, this maintains its validity to a great extent), to gain victory was naturally very low.

The signing of the ceasefire agreement did not mean that the problem had been resolved. The agreement had a very sensitive composition. Additional steps had to be taken for it to be preserved and also for the resolution of the conflict. The period from 1994 until the present became rich with the steps taken in this direction, but most of these steps generally remained inconclusive. There were several reasons for this and these reasons still prevent any kind of peace treaty from being signed.

First of all, public opinions of both countries have always approached the issue of making concessions coldly. The Azeri population argues that the region legally and historically belongs to them. On the other hand, the Armenian population is using the advantage of holding the territories -although through occupation- in its own hands and does not want to let go of the Karabakh region which it sees as a part of "Great Armenia". Armenia had the open support of countries in the region, including Russia's soldiers, and was also supported by Iran. However, Azerbaijan, although not as strong as Russia, was receiving Turkey's support in all other areas besides its full open military support. Another important factor was that Azerbaijan owned natural wealth, whereas Armenia possessed a strong lobby in Western states. Law was on Azerbaijan's side, while Western public opinion was on Armenia's.

In order for the conflict to reach a settlement, the separate efforts of states and those of international organizations have continued in an intensive manner after the ceasefire.

In many international conferences, whether at the summits of CIS and OSCE or including meetings of the Organization of the Islamic Conference held after the ceasefire, or during the visits of Co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group to the region or in almost all talks held by the authorities of both countries with the authorities of foreign countries, the Karabakh conflict has taken its place on the agenda and efforts towards its resolution have been conveyed. Various countries have expressed their proposals for mediation, while these proposals have been received differently by the parties. But the most important part of the initiatives towards the conflict's resolution has been constituted within the group framework of the three countries (US, Russia, France) holding OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairmanship and by their individual efforts. The Co-chairmen have visited the region many times, have held talks with the country's officials regarding suggestions for a solution, have made inspections at the borders and have prepared special declarations for OSCE summits concerning the situation of the conflict. At the first stage, 3 proposals for a solution have been presented by the co-chairmen (peace treaty draft), but since one of them was not accepted by Azerbaijan and the other two were not accepted by Armenia, no negotiation was able to be reached.

These three proposals that had been kept hidden for a long time were named "Package Deal", "Step-by-Step Deal" and "Common State Deal" respectively. Although generally entailing the same provisions, the proposals have also carried significant contrasts. By bringing economic factors to the fore in all three proposals, it has been expressed that peace is necessary for the development of the region, increase of living standards and for foreign investment to arrive to the region. The proposals foresee a Permanent Mixed Commission for the settlement of problems that can arise between Azerbaijan and its region of Nagorno-Karabakh and an Azerbaijan-Armenia Bilateral (or Intergovernmental) Commission to be established. Furthermore, all three proposals emphasize that Armenian armed forces must withdraw to within the borders of Armenia and at the same time indicate that the security forces and police of Azerbaijan cannot enter within the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh without the permission of its authorities.

The first proposal named "Package Deal" brought forth on 17 July 1997 envisaged all the important points concerning the resolution of the conflict¹⁹. According to this, the two agreements must be signed, where one of them would establish the conditions of peace and the other would determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Here, Nagorno-Karabakh is defined as a

19 "Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişesinin aradan qaldırılmasına dair herterefli saziş", *Azərbaycan*, 21 Şubat 2001; "Minsk Group proposal ('package deal')": http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord17_22Keytextsandagreements_2005_ENG.pdf (3 Mart 2013)

governmental institution within Azerbaijan and is indicated that it can possess an army together with police forces.

The “Step-by-Step Deal” presented on 2 December 1997 sought an agreement for first of all peace to be completely settled and conditions for refugees to return to be prepared and then the issues of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and talks on the situation of the Lachin, Shusha and Shaumian cities to be held later on²⁰.

The final proposal submitted on 7 November 1998 and named “Common State Deal” foresaw the formation of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and for this republic to form a common state with Azerbaijan within its borders. In addition, this proposal, compared to the others, conveyed Armenian as the official language of Nagorno-Karabakh and that Nagorno-Karabakh can print its own money if it wishes. Later on in the proposal, articles on the situation of the Lachin corridor and the towns of Shusha and Shaumian and the content and guarantee of the peace treaty were given²¹.

Due to Azerbaijan not accepting the last and Armenia not accepting the first two proposals, as Aliyev expressed in his speech delivered on 23 February 2001 at the Azerbaijani National Assembly, these had become a thing of the past.

Countries Russia, Turkey, Iran and Georgia in the region had, through various occasions, proposed mediation for the settlement of the conflict. From these, the mediations of Russia and Iran had been accepted, Turkey’s proposals had always been turned down by Armenia, while Georgia’s proposals had presumably not been taken seriously. Iran’s proposals following the ceasefire have been rejected this time by Azerbaijan with harsh reactions. Russia has continued its initiatives both through the mutual visits conducted with Armenia and Azerbaijan and also within the framework of the OSCE. In fact, as if to display the importance it attaches to the issue, it has attended all the talks held within the scope of the OSCE Minsk Group not only with its Co-chairman representing the country, but also its Deputy Foreign Minister²².

France has been the country continuing its initiatives for peace the most intensely following the ceasefire. In fact, French President Chirac’s initiatives in 1997 had almost brought the peace treaty. But, L. Ter. Petrosyan being

20 “Dağlıq Qarabağ silahlı münaqişəsinin dayandırılması haqqında saziş”, *Azərbaycan*, 21 Şubat 2001; “Minsk Group proposal (‘step-bystep deal’)”, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord17_22Keytextsandagreements_2005_ENG.pdf (3 Mart 2013)

21 “Dağlıq Qarabağ silahlı münaqişəsinin hərtərəfli həllinin prinsipləri haqqında”, *Azərbaycan*, 21 Şubat 2001; “Minsk Group proposal (‘common state deal’)”, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord17_22Keytextsandagreements_2005_ENG.pdf (3 Mart 2013)

22 Araz Aslanlı, “Tarihtən Günümüze Karabağ Sorunu”, *Avrasya Dosyası Azərbaycan Özel Sayısı*, 2001, pp. 418-419.

overthrown in Armenia and R. Kocharyan replacing him has prevented this process. Let us bear in mind that right before this process, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia had even issued a joint statement in Strasbourg on 10 October 1997, expressing that they are close to a settlement and they have generally accepted the proposals of the co-chairmen²³.

It should also be noted that another important role during the peace process entering a deadlock following Kocharyan's election as the President of Armenia was played by the US which encouraged the presidents of the two states to hold meetings between themselves. This proposal brought forth during NATO's 50th anniversary ceremonies by the US has been met positively by both Russia and France. The two leaders coming together most recently at the UN Summit in 1998 has later on held a talk on 16 July 1999 at the Le Grand Saugy castle near the Lemman Lake in France that lasted for approximately 2.5 hours²⁶.

As a result of the intensive talks held between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia before the OSCE's Istanbul Summit in 1999 and the intensive efforts of international organizations, the expectation for a peace treaty to be signed between the two countries has once again resurfaced. But the terrorist attack taking place right before the summit on 27 October 1999 on the Armenian parliament that resulted in the murdering of the Prime Minister, President of Parliament and 6 deputies has caused this opportunity to also disappear²⁵. Therefore, no serious result has also been obtained from the talk held during the OSCE's Istanbul summit on 18 November 1999 between Aliyev and Kocharyan through the mediation of US President Clinton²⁶.

With the meeting held in Strasbourg in January 2001 due to membership to the Council of Europe and then the meeting held on 4-5 March 2001 in Paris through President Chirac's mediation, the bilateral meetings held between the presidents of the two countries have reached 15²⁷. However, despite the many allegations put forward in the press, a definite solution has not been reached in these talks. Yet still, President Chirac has expressed that the talks have been held in a pleasant atmosphere, that positive developments have

23 "Armenian, Azerbaijani presidents meet", <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/1997/97-10-13.rferl.html> (8 July 2012).

24 "Aliyev-Koçaryan Zirvesi Sonuçsuz", *Türkiye*, 17 July 1999.

25 "Shooting in the Armenian Parliament", <http://www.internews.am/projects/archive/events/index.htm> (8 July 2012); "Attack in Armenia", http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec99/armenia_update_10-27.html (8 July 2012).

26 "Clinton, Koçaryan ile Aliyev'i Buluşturdu", *Türkiye*, 19 November 1999.

27 Araz Aslanlı, "Küresel ve Bölgesel Aktörlerin Son Girişimleri Işığında Karabağ Sorunu: Çözümüne Doğru mu?", *Stratejik Analiz*, April 2001, p. 56.

taken place and that he hopes the peace treaty will be signed in the year they are in²⁸.

Concerning this issue, the most important step of the US, which continued its mediation on various occasions, was the Key-West talks held in April 2001. This meeting organized on 3-7 April 2001, due to some of its features, has been a first in terms of efforts to reach a solution for the occupation of Azeri territories by Armenia. In the official report of “Regarding the Karabakh Conflict’s Past” issued by the US before the talks, for the first time statements have been made that the Armenian army is keeping Azeri territories under occupation. Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, all three Co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group and numerous specialists have attended the talks organized through the mediation of the US Foreign Secretary Powell. After the talk although generally positive statements have been made, it has been indicated that a definite solution has not been reached²⁹. Although it has been declared after the talks by the Co-chairmen that the Geneva talks will be held on 15 June 2001, the Geneva talks have not been able to take place. As the reason for this the parties have said that no progress has been able to be achieved, therefore holding such talks will be meaningless.

In the following years, the talks have increasingly intensified and although no resolution has emerged, the “Paris Principles”, Prague Process”, “Madrid Principles”, “Moscow Declaration” and the “Renewed Madrid Principles” have drawn attention as important steps in regards to the conflict³⁰. All of the points mentioned above have been evaluated differently by the parties to the conflict and mediators in terms of content, the process of emergence and their meaning. Former President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev and the current President Ilham Aliyev have indicated that in case of the talks continuing several times inconclusively, Azerbaijan can also resort to military means in order to rescue its territories from Armenia’s occupation. An agreement has been reached on suspending the talks concerning the conflict especially during the periods when elections will be held in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Among the intensified talks held in the following period, the talk held only between the presidents of the two countries on 2 November 2008 in Russia has resulted in the Moscow Declaration being adopted in regards to “military

28 “FRENCH PRESIDENT THINKS THERE IS A POSITIVE ADVANCE IN KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS”, March 6, 2001, <http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/politics/news/6700/> (18 March 2013); “Facts and Comments”, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=158> (18 March 2013)

29 “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Key West Peace Talks”, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/2098.htm> (19 March 2013); “Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia complete Nagorno-Karabakh talks in key west”, <http://english.pravda.ru/news/hotspots/07-04-2001/40137-0/> (19 March 2013).

30 Araz Aslanlı, “Kafkasya’da Güvenlik ve İstikrara En Büyük Tehdit: Karabağ Sorunu”, Der: Cavid Veliev, Araz Aslanlı, *Güney Kafkasya*, Berikan Yayınevi, Ankara, 2011, p. 190.

means not being resorted to for a resolution”³¹. On the other hand, many talks, including the talk held in October 2009 in Kishinev, have either resulted without reaching any solutions or by agreeing on some minor issues.

For now, the trilateral summits at Astrakhan and Kazan and the OSCE Summit held in Astana in December 2010 have formed the last steps of the attempts for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. On 27 October 2010, a meeting has been held at the Astrakhan city of Russia between President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and President of Armenia Serge Sarkisian through the mediation of the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. After the summit, Medvedev had asserted that “until the OSCE Summit to be held on 1-2 December in Kazakhstan, also through the works of the foreign ministers, an agreement will be reached on the main principles of the treaty” and eyes have turned towards the Astana Summit³². However, this has not been accomplished. Another great expectation has been in regards to the Kazan meeting held on 24 June 2011. Before the Kazan Summit, the atmosphere had heated further with the explanation regarding the issue made during the G-8 summit meeting held in France’s city of Deauville. Leaders of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE Minsk Group Co-chair countries (Russia, US and France) Dmitri Medvedev, Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy have emphasized in Deauville that the time has arrived for all the sides to the Karabakh conflict to take a decisive step towards a peaceful settlement.³³ However, the statement made after the Kazan meeting held closed to the press, had shown that contrary to the expectations a peace treaty based on essential principles had not been signed³⁴. Following the meeting, the first reactions of the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian media along with the media of other concerning countries concentrated upon failure being experienced in Kazan and inconclusiveness continuing.

The most recent meeting (for now) held between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia is the talk held in Sochi on 23 January 2012 again through the mediation of Russia. The three presidents have also issued a joint declaration following this meeting, emphasizing their commitment to the Moscow Declaration of November 2nd 2008 and the Sochi Declaration of March 5th 2011³⁵.

31 “Russia’s Medvedev hosts Nagorno-Karabakh talks”, Nov 2, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL2389234> (13 November 2012).

32 “Summit suspense: OSCE opens meeting in Astana; Karabakh on the agenda”, http://www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/26210/astana_summit_osce_karabakh (13 November 2012).

33 “Joint statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, by the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries at the G-8 Summit, Deauville, France, 26 May 2011”, <http://www.osce.org/mg/78195> (13 November 2012)..

34 “Meeting with Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan”, June 24 2011, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/2462> (14 November 2012).; “Kazan’dan temel ilkeler üzerine anlaşma çıkmadı”, <http://www.1news.com.tr/azerbaycan/siyaset/20110625093754667.html> (14 November 2012)..

35 Meeting with the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia”, January 23, 2012, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3351> (14 November 2012).

Although the Eurovision song contest held in Azerbaijan in May 2012, 2013 being the year for the presidential elections to be held in Armenia and Azerbaijan and other reasons have slowed down the process of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, officials of Azerbaijan and Armenia have continued making harsh statements that threaten the opposite side. During this process, a new dimension called the “Khojaly Airport” has also been added to the issue. Armenia Opening the Khojaly Airport to service on the Azeri territories under occupation and wanting flights to departure from there without the consent of Azerbaijan has increased the tension.

When taking into consideration that the current viewpoints of the public opinions of Azerbaijan and Armenia towards the issue is on completely opposite points, the difficulty in finding a resolution to the conflict can be understood more easily. One of the most important examples of this has been the developments experienced right after the Astrakhan Declaration and the harsh statements made mutually.

Concerning the initiatives towards the issue, it can be seen that due to the viewpoint generally not being correct, the conditions and properties of the region not being evaluated carefully, the history and actual feature of the issue being ignored and similar reasons, proposals for the resolution of the issue actually carry a serious potential for conflict. Although it is clear that the actual feature of the problem is Armenia occupying Azerbaijan’s territories and attempting to extend its borders, this point had not taken place in the resolutions of international organizations for a long time. However, particularly the Council of Europe adopting resolutions in 2005³⁶ and the UN adopting resolutions in 2008 that openly state that Armenia is in the position of being the occupier³⁷, have been considered as encouraging for Azerbaijan, while for Armenia as a result of being entrapped.

THE GENERAL FEATURES OF THE CONFLICTS OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA

The other two important ethnic problems in the South Caucasus are the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In general, in terms of all ethnic conflicts, common and unique characteristics are at issue. However, rather than their unique features, these two conflicts have more common characteristics. At the basis of the South Ossetia issue lies Ossetia, found in

36 The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/EREC1690.htm> (10 December 2012).

37 “General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan, Demanding Withdrawal of All Armenian Forces”, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm> (13 November 2012).

the North Caucasus, splitting into two during the formation of the Soviet Union and South Ossetia being left as an autonomous formation in Georgia and North Ossetia being left in the Russian Federation. The emergence of the problem in its present form has taken place parallel to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The separatist policies of the administration in South Ossetia has further been triggered with the extremely nationalist policies of Georgia's first President Zviad Gamsahurdia and the movement starting in South Ossetia in September-November 1990 has first declared the region's independence, then has started conveying their demands to join with North Ossetia. The Parliament of Georgia, which reached the decision for independence on 20 November 1990, had abolished South Ossetia's autonomy in December 1990 and had decided to put the region directly under the administration of Tbilisi³⁸. This decision of the Georgian Parliament has been rejected by the central government of the USSR.

Despite the appeals of officials of South Ossetia to unite with North Ossetia (and therefore with Russia) starting from 1991 has not been accepted by Russian officials, it is known that Russia had accumulated its troops on the border of North Ossetia and that these troops had entered war with war helicopters and tanks in 18 June 1992 against the Georgian National Guard Units near Tshinvali (later on Russia has given Russian passports to most of the population of South Ossetia). In fact, President of that period Eduard Shevardnadze has described this as an imperialist initiative of Moscow to annex South Ossetia by force. Although the small-scale conflicts starting in the beginning of the 1990's had been brought to an end with an agreement concluded in March 1992, since the beginning of 1992 more serious conflicts was taking place. The administration of South Ossetia, which had received the support of Russia and some part of the local community of the North Caucasus, has been successful in brining almost the entire region outside of the control of the Georgian central administration and this situation has continued until presently. With the agreement signed in 1994, armed conflicts have been brought to an end and later on a peacekeeping force has been deployed to the region³⁹. Despite the conflicts sometimes even reaching the level of war, the ceasefire situation has continued until August 2008.

Concerning the Abkhazian conflict, when looking at its historical origins, although being able to go all the way back to the ancient history of both the region of Abkhazia and more generally of Georgia, it is put forth that the conflict has stemmed from the ethnic structure of Abkhazia being changed

38 "Georgia Conflict History", <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/georgia.aspx> (13 November 2012).

39 Ibid; "UNOMIG Mandate, adopted by the Security Council Resolution 937 21 July 1994", <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext5.php>. (13 November 2012).

by force in the 19th and 20th centuries and different statuses being granted to the region in different periods during the formation of the Soviet Union⁴⁰.

During the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as in the many regions of this empire, nationalist movements in Georgia and in Abkhazia, which is an area of Georgia, have also gradually increased. Political processes have carried radical elements in both Georgia and Abkhazia to power and parallel to initiatives of abolishing Abkhazia's autonomy in Georgia, demands to separate from Georgia have intensified in Abkhazia. Mutual "civilian" steps taken particularly in the beginning of the 1990's (Abkhazia declaring its full independence in 1990 and Georgia entirely abolishing Abkhazia's autonomy in 1992) have rendered a military conflict inevitable under the conditions of that period. By starting the military operation named "Sword" in on 14 August 1992, Georgian military forces have tried to attach Abkhazia to the center. The Georgian army, which had gained serious victories at the beginning, has later on lost the war with volunteer troops of the Confederation of Caucasus Nations and Russian forces stepping in.

Throughout September 1993 the Georgian army was defeated over and over again and since 30 September 1993 the war resulted with Georgia's defeat⁴¹. Abkhazia, from that date until today, has continued to remain outside the control of Georgia's central administration, but its declaration of independence has not been recognized by any state until the events of August 2008.

Saakashvili's rise to power has constituted an important step for both conflicts, because Shevardnadze was not able to prevent separatist movements since the time he was in power and was contented with only freezing the course of events. With the events occurring in November 2003, Shevardnadze has resigned and Saakashvili's period has started in Georgia.

The features of the tactics carried out until August 2008 by Saakashvili's administration towards the conflicts can be listed as follows⁴²:

- a) to eliminate Georgia's problems as soon as possible and to make Georgia an appealing country for those living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by increasing living standards;
- b) to give the message to the people living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that Georgia has no problems at all with them, trying to win those

40 Araz Aslanlı, "Bölgesel ve Küresel Dengeler Açısından Abhazya Sorunu", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, No. 5, Spring 2005, p. 117.

41 "Dünden Bugüne Abhazya Gerçeği", http://www.abhazya.org/abhazya/abhazya_tarihi.htm (13 December 2004).

42 Sinan Oğan, "Kafkasya'da Etnik Çatışmalar Ekseninde Abhazya Sorunu", Der: Cavid Veliev, Araz Aslanlı, *Güney Kafkasya*, Berikan Yayınevi, Ankara, 2011, p. 208.

living in the regions – especially the youth and children- through various activities by inviting them to Tbilisi;

- c) to convince Georgian public opinion and particularly those living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that he is determined in maintaining Georgia's territorial integrity, that he will not abandon this for any reason and that when necessary, although he will certainly not do this, that he will resort to military power;
- d) not to remain alone in the face of Russia's "disturbing" approaches by fully obtaining the support of international organizations and Western states.

For Georgia, this line has continued towards August 2008, but August 2008 has been a very important turning point for the conflicts of Georgia and Abkhazia together with many other issues. In the first days of August, South Ossetia and Russia has accused Georgia, while Georgia has accused the opposite sides of attacking and murdering civilians. The possibility of a war starting in the region has been mentioned. Just then, with Russia's intervention on 8 August 2008, the separatist movement, carried out by Georgia towards South Ossetia in order to maintain Georgia's territorial integrity and constitutional order, has gained a new dimension and the danger of the war spreading all over the Caucasus has emerged⁴³. While all these developments were taking place, in order to regain some of the territories in the Kodori Valley occupied by Georgian armed forces in 2006, Abkhazia has organized attacks on Georgia's military units in the region. With separatist South Ossetia, which Georgia had occupied with a military operation, officially calling on Russia for assistance, the war "to maintain constitutional order" in the region had officially turned into war between Georgia and the South Ossetia-Abkhazia-Russia trio. By signing a document that indicated that there was a "State of War" in the country, President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili had sent it to the Parliament for ratification and the proposal has been adopted by the Parliament. On the other hand, the General Staff of the Russian Federation has persistently alleged that there is no state of war and that they are only trying to rescue their citizens in the engagement zone. The Russian army has not only discharged the Georgian army from the South Ossetia region, but has also advanced towards Tbilisi by occupying the other areas of Georgia and has even gone as far as bombing the area in which Georgian President Saakashvili was present⁴⁴. Russia has also not neglected

43 Sinan Oğan, "Gürcistan-Güney Osetya savaşında cephe genişlerken, Gürcistan kaybediyor...", *Zaman*, 11 August 2008, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=724555> (10 August 2012).

44 "Russian Forces Capture Military Base in Georgia", <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12georgia.html> (10 Augusts 2012).

to attack Georgia through the Black Sea. The possibility of the US and NATO in general to militarily intervene in the process and scenarios of a 3rd World War have been brought to the agenda.

While declaring a “State of War” on the one side, Georgia has also been obliged to request a ceasefire on the other. Despite various initiatives, particularly through the mediation of French President Nicolas Sarkozy the ceasefire treaty has been signed⁴⁵. Meanwhile, US naval ships have anchored at the Georgian harbors by joining the Black Sea through the Turkish straits.

This development has caused Georgia to receive a blow on its efforts towards the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the policy it pursues to remain half finished or even inconclusive. Especially with the effect of the Kosovo process, following this development Russia has also taken practical steps towards detaching Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia on a legal basis. On 25 August 2008, first the Russian Federation Council and then the State Duma have recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia⁴⁶. After Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and the Pacific island nation of Nauru have also recognized these two regions as independent states⁴⁷. Russia’s initiatives to expand this circle have remained limited especially due to the attempts of the US and the EU.

CONCLUSION

In terms of the historical foundations and development processes, the internal and external dynamics, features and the level they exist in, the conflicts of Karabkh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have similarities as well as serious differences between them. Their similarities were greater in the beginning. At the basis of all the conflicts somehow lay Russia. Through Russia’s direct and indirect interventions, these three regions were taken outside the control of the independent states. An important difference was that Azeri territories were occupied by the Armenian army (in other words, by the army of another state possessed by the same ethnic group not being a part of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts), which received the support of Russia.

45 “Georgia and Russia declare ceasefire”, *Guardian*, 16 August 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/16/georgia.russia2> (10 August 2012); “Nicolas Sarkozy defends Georgia peace deal”, *The Telegraph*, 27 August 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/2633048/Nicolas-Sarkozy-defends-Georgia-peace-deal.html> (10 August 2012).

46 “Russia recognises Georgian rebels”, *BBC*, 26 August 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7582181.stm> (10 August 2012).

47 “Chávez Backs Moscow on Rebel Regions”, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/world/americas/11moscow.html?_r=1 (10 August 2012), “Abkhazia and Latin America”, <http://www.mfaabkhazia.net/en/latam> (10 August 2012), “Abkhazia Is Recognized — by Nauru”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/world/europe/16georgia.html> (10 August 2012).

The conflicts were tried to be established upon the contradiction of territorial integrity-determining your own fate. Meanwhile, there were also interesting differences that originated from Abkhazia's historical dynamics and political status, from the 1.5% of the Armenian population in Azerbaijan, right alongside the Armenian state when it existed, attempting to create a state in the area, which the Armenians also accepted to have settled in 150 years ago, and from Russia not allowing statements to be made regarding the independence rights of North Ossetia found within Russia itself with a more crowded population, but supporting the claim for independence of South Ossetia, which is smaller and found in neighboring Georgia. However, in particular the course of Russia-Azerbaijan, Russia-Armenia, Russia-Georgia, Russia-Turkey and Russia-US relations from the Cold War until the present have, as external dynamics, increased the difference between the conflicts.

The August 2008 events entailed the important detail in terms of the differentiation between the conflicts. Russia fully detached the two separatist regions from Georgia and turned them de facto into total states and legally into independent states to a significant degree. The detail that this independence was a "dependent independence" under Russia's control should not be forgotten. Actually it is also a known fact that this point also applies to the so-called formation named "Nagorno-Karabakh" formed artificially upon Azeri territories under Armenian occupation. The point that this area is mostly under the control of Russia and to a significant degree under Armenian control is generally accepted. It is also a painful fact that in terms of military, political, economic etc. factors, the key to the three conflicts is in Russia's hand.

The August 2008 events have generally directed attention to the ethnic problems worldwide and in particular to those in the former Soviet geography. How risky the current situation of frozen conflicts and especially the Karabakh conflict is and the detail that the conflict is not only directly between the parties, but carries the risk of triggering a regional and even global war has emerged in a clearer manner. The multidimensional efforts, including the OSCE Minsk Group and Russia's initiatives in particular regarding the Karabakh conflict have drawn attention.

However, it has also not gone unnoticed that despite the August 2008 events, the intensity in the initiatives towards the resolution of the Karabakh conflict was more an attempt to increase the control of the parties to the conflict. Yet, the most important lesson to be learned from the August 2008 events was that initiatives on their own to keep frozen conflicts under control were insufficient and even deceiving and the truth that no matter how difficult it

is and without doubt has a cost to it, achieving a just and lasting peace as soon as possible was a more accurate option and even a necessity.

It is also observed that regarding the “lessons to be learned”, differences exist between the parties to the conflict and the approaches of the concerning states. With the US at the forefront, they want Western Azerbaijan and Armenia to learn lessons from the August 2008 events. Yet, there is a call to learn lessons that is significantly uncertain and whose messages are unclear. On the other hand, Russia wants everyone besides itself and in particular Azerbaijan and Armenia to learn lessons from the August 2008 events and what is meant by lessons is the following: “if someone tries to rescue their territories despite me or if someone tries to defend themselves without taking me into attention, the end will be disappointment”. It is possible to observe this emphasis in almost all the statements made by Russian officials in the following period. For Armenia, the most important lesson to be learned is that the cost of trying to resolve the conflict through military means (especially despite Russia) will be heavy. On the other hand Azerbaijan has drawn attention to the risks created by the inability to resolve the conflict and that the conflicts presumed to be “frozen” actually constantly carry the risk of war.

Iran believes that the actual lesson to be learned is the disappointment in trusting the West for the conflict to be resolved. On the other hand, by drawing attention to the risks created by the lack of reaching a resolution for the conflict and the door to dialogue remaining closed, Turkey has tried to present a project of peace and stability that comprises the entire region.

Despite these theses having some truth to them, it must be emphasized that the most important lesson to be learned is that there is no issue that nothing can be done despite Russia, because no power, including Russia, possesses unlimited might. (1); although it possesses unlimited might, it is almost impossible to maintain this condition (2); although it might remain in such condition, there is the possibility that it can change its stance towards the conflict (3); although it will never change its stance on the conflict, the possibilities that the other parties and especially the indirect parties to the conflict of Azerbaijan and Armenia might not accept this some day (4); as emphasized above, actually all sides, including Russia, must have learned their lessons. This lesson entails the risk created by the lack of reaching a resolution. Without doubt, the lack of a resolution causes problems to arise in regional security, cooperation, stability and welfare, human rights, democratization and other issues and also regional and global projects, including energy projects, being implemented under more economic conditions. However, it directly threatens peace which is one of the most important values of the existing international system. It not only threatens, but also carries the risk of creating

very serious regional conflicts that can directly or indirectly draw in numerous powers from outside the region. Therefore, in order for a resolution to be reached as soon as possible, completely appropriate to international law and by also taking into consideration regional conditions to a certain extent, initiatives must be intensified.

Despite the Karabakh conflict's struggle for global power, Russia's initiative to specially keep the region under its control, ethnic conflict, religious conflict and having many other dimensions, we presume that actually the most important feature of the conflict is it being a conflict of expansionism and occupation. In order for the conflict to reach a resolution in real terms, the Armenian occupation of Azeri territories must be brought to an end, because the continuation of the occupation causes the conflict to become inextricable. At the same time, the Armenian army has also hypothecated the real owners of the Azeri territories (regardless of their ethnic origins, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Russians etc.) which they are keeping under occupation. In order for the occupation to be ended, either a peace plan must be prepared by international powers and must be implemented as soon as possible or Azerbaijan must drive the Armenian army out of their own borders by using its right to self-defense.

However, just as the settlement of the conflict cannot be based on giving consent to expansionism, counter expansionist movements or responding to expansionism with movements of ethnic cleansing are also not found to be acceptable. In order for the conflict to reach a lasting resolution, Armenia's efforts of expansionism must be prevented, Azerbaijan's territorial integrity must be provided without bringing forth any preconditions, the necessary local administration structuring in Azerbaijan must be realized, and at the same time the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Armenian minority must be guaranteed in accordance with rules of international law.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “Abkhazia and Latin America”,
<http://www.mfaabkhazia.net/en/latam> (10 August 2012),
- “Abkhazia Is Recognized — by Nauru”,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/world/europe/16georgia.html> (10 August 2012).
- “Aliyev-Koçaryan Zirvesi Sonuçsuz”, *Türkiye*, 17 July 1999.
- “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Key West Peace Talks”,
<http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/2098.htm> (19 March 2013);
- “Armenian, Azerbaijani Presidents Meet”,
<http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/1997/97-10-13.rferl.html> (8 July 2012).
- “Attack in Armenia”, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec99/armenia_update_10-27.html (8 July 2012).
- “Chávez Backs Moscow on Rebel Regions”,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/world/americas/11moscow.html?_r=1 (10 August 2012),
- “Clinton, Koçaryan ile Aliyev’i Buluşturdu”, *Türkiye*, 19 November 1999.
- “Corpses Litter Hills In Karabakh”, *The Times*, 2 March 1992;
- “Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişesinin aradan qaldırılmasına dair hertərəfli saziş”, *Azərbaycan*, 21 February 2001;
- “Dağlıq Qarabağ silahlı münaqişəsinin dayandırılması haqqında saziş”, *Azərbaycan*, 21 February 2001;
- “Dağlıq Qarabağ silahlı münaqişəsinin hertərəfli həllinin prinsipləri haqqında”, *Azərbaycan*, 21 February 2001;
- “Düнден Bugünə Abhazya Gerçeği”,
http://www.abhazya.org/abhazya/abhazya_tarihi.htm (13 Aralık 2004).
- “Facts and Comments”,
<http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=158> (18 March 2013)

“FRENCH PRESIDENT THINKS THERE IS A POSITIVE ADVANCE IN KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS”, March 6, 2001, <http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/politics/news/6700/> (18 March 2013);

“General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan, Demanding Withdrawal of All Armenian Forces”, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm> (13 November 2012).

“Georgia and Russia Declare Ceasefire”, *Guardian*, 16 August 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/16/georgia.russia2> (10 August 2012);

“Georgia Conflict History”, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/georgia.aspx> (13 November 2012).

“İz protokola Veçernego Zasedaniya Plenuma KavByuro ÇK RKP (b)”, Sovyetleri Birliyi Komünist Partii Merkez Komitesi yanında Marksizm-Leninizm Enstitüsü Merkezi Parti Arşivi, Fond 64, Op. 2, File 1, p. 118.

“Joint statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, by the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries at the G-8 Summit, Deauville, France, 26 May 2011”, <http://www.osce.org/mg/78195> (13 November 2012).

“Kazan’ dan temel ilkeler üzerine anlaşma çıkmadı”, <http://www.1news.com.tr/azerbaycan/siyaset/20110625093754667.html> (14 November 2012).

“Massacre By Armenians”, *The New York Times*, 3 March 1992;

“Meeting with Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan”, June 24 2011, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/2462> (14 November 2012);

“Minsk Group proposal (‘step-bystep deal’)”, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord17_22keytextsandagreements_2005_eng.pdf (3 March 2013)

“Minsk Group proposal (‘common state deal’)”, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord17_22keytextsandagreements_2005_eng.pdf (3 March 2013)

“Minsk Group proposal (‘package deal’)”; [http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord17_22keytextsandagreements_2005_eng.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord17_22keytextsandagreements_2005_eng.pdf)

[r.org/files/accord17_22Keytextsandagreements_2005_ENG.pdf](#) (3 March 2013)

“Nicolas Sarkozy defends Georgia peace deal”, *The Telegraph*, 27 August 2008,

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/2633048/Nicolas-Sarkozy-defends-Georgia-peace-deal.html> (10 August 2012).

“Nowhere To Hide For Azerı Refugees”, *The Guardian*, 2 September 1993;

“Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia complete Nagorno-Karabakh talks in key west”, <http://english.pravda.ru/news/hotspots/07-04-2001/40137-0/> (19 March 2013).

“Rober Koptaş yazdı: Hocalı sorumluluğu”, *Agos*, 28 February 2013, <http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=rober-koptas-yazdi-hocali-sorumlulugu&haberid=4529> (28 February 2013)

“Russia recognises Georgian rebels”, *BBC*, 26 August 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7582181.stm> (10 August 2012).

“Russian Forces Capture Military Base in Georgia”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12georgia.html> (10 August 2012).

“Russia’s Medvedev hosts Nagorno-Karabakh talks”, Nov 2, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL2389234> (13 November 2012).

“Shooting in the Armenian Parliament”, <http://www.internews.am/projects/archive/events/index.htm> (8 July 2012);

“Summit suspense: OSCE opens meeting in Astana; Karabakh on the agenda”, http://www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/26210/astana_summit_osce_karabakh (13 November 2012).

“The Face Of A Massacre”, *Newsweek*, 16 March 1992;

“UNOMIG Mandate, adopted by the Security Council Resolution 937 21 July 1994”, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext5.php>. (13

November 2012).

16 March, 1992, “Nagorno-Karabagh Victims Buried In Azerbaijani Town”, *The Washington Post*, 28 February 1992;

Araz Aslanlı, “Bölgesel ve Küresel Dengeler Açısından Abhazya Sorunu”, *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, No. 5, Spring 2005, p. 117.

Araz Aslanlı, “Kafkasya’da Güvenlik ve İstikrara En Büyük Tehdit: Karabağ Sorunu”, Der: Cavid Veliev, Araz Aslanlı, *Güney Kafkasya*, Berikan Yayınevi, Ankara, 2011, p. 190.

Araz Aslanlı, “Küresel ve Bölgesel Aktörlerin Son Girişimleri Işığında Karabağ Sorunu: Çözümüne Doğru mu?”, *Stratejik Analiz*, April 2001,

Araz Aslanlı, “Tarihten Günümüze Karabağ Sorunu”, *Avrasya Dosyası*, *Azerbaycan Özel*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2001

Araz Aslanlı, “Türk Dünyasının Kanayan Yarası: Karabağ”, *Yeni Türkiye*, *Türkler Özel Sayısı* 19. vol., p. 200.

Araz Aslanlı, *Karabakh Problem – History, Essence, Solution Process*, Baku Nurlar Press, 2009,

UN official website, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/822e.pdf> (4 March 2012) .

Cemalettin Taşkıran, *Geçmişten Günümüze Karabağ Meselesi*, Ankara, Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1995,

Colonial Policy of the Russian Tzarism in Azerbaijan in 20-60s XIX Century, Part I, Moskow-Leningrad, 1936

Jill Smolowe, “Massacre In Khojaly”, *Time*

Manvel Sarkisyan, *Politiçeskie Problemi Kavkaza i Armeniya. Politika Armenii v Regione* (Kafkasların ve Ermenistan’ın Politik Sorunları. Ermenistan’ın Bölge Politikası), Erivan, Armyanskiy Tsentr Stratejiçeskiç i Natsionalnıç İssledovaniy, 1998,

Meeting with the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia”, January 23, 2012, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3351> (14 November 2012).

N. N. Şavrov, *Novaya Ugroza Russkomu Delu v Zakavkazie*, Sankt Petersburg, 1911

Reşid Göyüşov, *Qarabağın Keçmişine Seyahet*, Bakü, Azərbaycan Devlet Neşriyyatı, 1993,

Sinan Oğan, “Gürcistan-Güney Osetya savaşında cephe genişlerken, Gürcistan kaybediyor...”, Zaman, 11 August 2008,
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=724555> (10 August 2012).

Sinan Oğan, “Kafkasya`da Etnik Çatışmalar Ekseninde Abhazya Sorunu”, Der: Cavid Veliev, Araz Aslanlı, *Güney Kafkasya*, Berikan Yayınevi, Ankara, 2011, p. 208.

The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference,
<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/EREC1690.htm> (10 December 2012).

Thomas Goltz, “Armenian Soldiers Massacre Hundreds Of Fleeing Families”, *The Sunday Times*, 1 March 1992;

Xalq Qezeti, 6 May 1994.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS, ITS IMPACT ON ARMENIA-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS AND VISION OF THE NEAR FUTURE

(MEDENİYETLER VE JEOPOLİTİK ÇIKARLAR ÇATIŞMASI BAĞLAMINDA ERMENİ SORUNU, ERMENİSTAN-AZERBAIJAN İLİŞKİLERİNE ETKİSİ VE YAKIN GELECEK VİZYONU)

Emin ŞİHALİYEV

Assoc. Prof. Dr., Azerbaijan Academy of National Sciences
Nakhchivan State University, Dept. of IR
emin.amea@yahoo.com

Abstract: *There are different views that the worldwide conflict originate from the civilization relationships. This view is analyzed in this article; especially the role of Turkish Civilization in this relationship is researched. Some Western scholars in their analysis see Turkish civilization as part of the Islamic Civilization not an independent entity. However, we think this approach is wrong. In that case, thousand years of pre-Islamic Turkish civilization is ignored. The relationship between Western and Turkish civilizations has always been problematic and this has continued up to date. In this article were analyzed the clash of Western and Turkish civilizations and those reasons coming from the ancient times up to day. Also it is possible to come to such conclusion that, the Armenian question is the result and continuation of this clash. The author characterized the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict not only as a part of the clash of Western and Turkish civilizations, but also as a part of the clash of geopolitical interests. Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the greatest obstacles to security and stability in the South Caucasus. Despite the fact that the Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict started twenty years ago there is no resolution for this conflict and the one is not expected in the near future. Continuing occupation of 20% of the Azerbaijani lands by Armenia increase the likelihood of getting a new war. But what promises the war to Azerbaijan?*

Keywords: *Clash of civilizations, the clash of geopolitical interests, Armenian question, Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict, OSCE Minsk Group, Russia, Iran*

Öz: *Dünyada yaşanan çatışmaların medeniyetlerarası ilişkilerdeki sorunun bir ürünü olduğuna dair çeşitli görüşler mevcuttur. Çalışmamızda bu görüşler analiz edilmiş, bu ilişkilerde özellikle Türk medeniyetinin yeri araştırılmıştır. Bazı Batılı bilim adamları medeniyetleri sınıflandırırken Türk medeniyetini bağımsız bir dal olarak görmezden gelmekte ve İslam medeniyetinin bir parçası olarak sunmaktadırlar. Fakat biz bu yaklaşımın son derece yanlış olduğunu düşünüyoruz. Aksi taktirde Türklerin İslam'dan önceki en az 1000 yıllık tarihi ve medeniyeti silinmiş olur. Batı-Türk medeniyetleri arasındaki ilişkiler tarih boyu hep gergin ve çatışmalı olmuş, günümüze kadar süregelmiştir. Makalede Batı medeniyeti ile Türk medeniyeti arasında geçmişten günümüze yaşanan çatışmalar ve onların sebepleri analiz edilmiş, Ermeni meselesinin de bu çatışmanın bir sonucu ve devamı olduğu görüşüne varılmıştır. Yazar Ermenistan-Azerbaycan sorununu da Batı-Türk medeniyetleri arasındaki çatışmanın bir halkası olarak değerlendirmekle birlikte jeopolitik çıkarlar çatışması bağlamında da ele almıştır. Dağlık Karabağ sorunu Güney Kafkasya'da güvenlik ve istikrarın önündeki en büyük engellerden biridir. Üzerinden 20 seneden çok bir süre geçmesine rağmen çözüme kavuşamayan Ermenistan-Azerbaycan çatışması ne zaman çözüleceği konusunda belirsizliğini sürdürmektedir. Azerbaycan topraklarının %20'sinin Ermenistan tarafından işgalinin sürmesi yeni bir savaşın çıkma olasılığını artırmaktadır. Fakat olası bir savaş Azerbaycan'a ne vadediyor?*

Anahtar kelimeler: *Medeniyetler çatışması, jeopolitik çıkarlar çatışması, Ermeni sorunu, Ermenistan-Azerbaycan çatışması, AGİT Minsk Grubu, Rusya, İran*

Introduction

There is no doubt that in recent years a much debated question is that most wars and conflicts result from a clash of civilizations. Although there are those who think otherwise. Still, in light of the historical realities and analytical findings, it seems possible to prove that there is an ongoing conflict between the Western Civilization and the Turkish Civilization, that the Armenian issue is a byproduct of the conflict, and that the problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan results from the aforementioned Western-Turkish clash of civilizations. Thus we can conclude that current position of the Western countries on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and their double standards policy is completely a result of the conflict between the Western and Turkish civilizations. Yet, in spite of being a derivative of a Western-Turkish civilizational conflict, Armenian-Azerbaijani clash is also a result of a competition between geopolitical interests. In this article, reasons behind the relations between the Western and Turkish civilizations that lead to conflict will be analyzed, the role of Armenian issue within these relations will be defined and lastly Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict within the context of civilizational and geopolitical interests are evaluated.

After famous American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington's book "Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" was published, his remarks on how "the central and most dangerous dimension of the emerging global politics would be conflict between groups from differing civilizations"¹ influenced and even frightened people. Huntington's remarks are perceived in a far more different meaning than the original intention and even criticized by some analysts. It's an undeniable fact that the concept "clash of civilizations" is terrifying. Still, it would also be unjust to deny the term altogether. Today, inter-civilizational relations have an important place in global politics. Leaving aside others, we can certainly hold that there is a clash between the Western civilization and Islam-Turkish civilization. Interestingly, some Western, Russian and Iranian scholars did not categorize Turkish civilizations as a unique one. Neither Samuel P. Huntington's,² nor Arnold Toynbee's,³ Francis Fukuyama's Herald Müller's,⁴ Boris Kuzik's, Yuriy Yakovets's,⁵ Abdul Huseyin Zarrinkub's or others' works or remarks treat the concept of Turkish civilization as an independent branch. Turkish civilization is presented as a part of Islam civilization. Naturally, Islamic

1 Samuel P. Huntington, *Medeniyetler çatışması ve dünya düzeninin yeniden kurulması* (İstanbul: Okuyan Us yayınları, 2005), s. 9.

2 Samuel P. Huntington, *Medeniyetler çatışması...*, s. 9

3 Arnold Toynbee, *İssledovaniye istorii*, (Moskva: ACT, 2010).

4 Harald Müller, *Kültürlerin uzlaşması* (İstanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2001).

5 Boris Kuzik, Yuriy Yakovets, *Tsivilizatsii: teoriya, istoriya, dialog, buduşyeye* (Moskva: İnstitut Ekonomiçeskih Strategiy, T. 1, 2006).

civilization is an essential feature of Turkish civilization. But it is inevitable to accept Turkish civilization as an independent civilizational category like Arab civilization or Persian civilization, despite the fact that it perpetuates Islamic civilization. Azerbaijani scholars such as Rahid Ulusel⁶ and Erestü Habibbeyli⁷ find it inaccurate to include Turkish civilization within the Islamic civilization. That's unquestionably true. Because if we treat the issue from that perspective, we would be ignoring at least a 1000-years past until Turks adopt Islam.

Western-Turkish Clash of Civilizations and the Armenian Issue as a By-Product

After Turks adopted Islam, Western-Turkish civilizational relations developed on a Christianity-Islam basis. Today, Western civilization signifies the Christian world. Likewise, after their adoption of Islam, Turks became the guardian of Islam and they played a significant role in its spread. Thus, Western-Turkish civilizational relations always have been tense and that continues until today.

Metin Aydoğın shows that there is a widespread anti-Turkey and Turcophobic ideology and that is like a historical tradition. Turks' relations with the West are one of 1600-years of conflict and continuous wars. Northern Hun warriors caused the destruction of the Western Roman Empire as they ended the antiquity which was based on a sovereignty of the masses system while they started the Middle Ages. Sultan Fatih Mehmet the Conqueror had put an end to the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) as he laid the ground for the already dissolving serfdom-based Middle Ages. Turks dominated the world for over 1300 years against the West since the collapse of the Western Roman Empire until the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. Turks also resisted 8 separate Crusades by the Europeans and defeated them.⁸

Question comes to mind as to which civilization stands as the carrier for these Crusades: did the Turks resisted these Crusades, or were the Arabs?

Turkish researchers Ali Çimen's and Göknur Göğebakan's views are very clear on that particular question: Crusaders were Westerners who came from far away, but those who fought these Crusaders were Turks from the beginning. It was also Turks who ended the 200-years of Crusaders rule. This long struggle occurred on Anatolian lands located in between the East and

6 Rahid S. Ulusel, *Qloballaşma ve Türk sivilizasyonu* (Bakü: Çaşıoğlu yayınları, 2005), s. 15.

7 Erestü Habibbeyli, *Sivilizasyonların kesişmesinde Türk Dünyası* (Bakü: Elm ve Tehsil yayınları, 2011), s. 38.

8 Metin Aydoğın, *Bitmeyen Oyun: Türkiye'yi Bekleyen Tehlikeler* (İstanbul: Kumsaati yayınları, 2003), s. 181-182.

the West, as Turks and German-Latin Westerners fought to fill the void of power in the region.⁹

The first Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru gives invaluable information on the struggle between the Turks and the Crusaders in his book entitled “Glimpses of World History”¹⁰

In fact, based on analytical findings from the historical processes, it is possible to say that the Crusades were a clash between the Muslim Turks and the Christian German-Latins, although they are categorized as the West’s campaigns against non-Christian peoples. Firstly, it was the Turks who stood in the way of the Christian west in all the crusades. Also, why wasn’t there a crusader unity when Arabs conquered Spain and attacked Europe? That’s because when the crusades began Arabs were in a passive period of their history. If we approach the matter from a realistic point of view, wasn’t it the holy purpose of the crusaders to save Jerusalem? And wasn’t this city in the Arab lands? Why they didn’t feel it necessary to save the holy land during when the Arabs lived their passive period in their history?

Turks were seen not as a community of people, but rather the devil barbarian capable of doing everything evil in Western subconscious mind, as they were already known as the “Scourge of God” in the eyes of the European rulers during the Middle Ages, and in general whole of Europe.

To put it bluntly, crusades were a fight by the Western civilization against the Turkish civilization. Anti-Turkey and Turcophobic crusader mentality is never a coincidence. Turks were seen not as a community of people, but rather the devil barbarian capable of doing everything evil in Western subconscious mind, as they were already known as the “Scourge of God” in the eyes of the European rulers during the Middle Ages, and in general whole of Europe.¹¹

These kinds of mystic ideas and mentality rooted in memories as well as past events helped emerge a fear and a hate psychology against the Turks in the West, while the Muslim Turkish state became the utmost rival and the enemy since the Siege of Vienna and their victorious march, and as a result brought the “Armenian Issue” on the agenda together with other factors as a tool for revenge, thus using it to bring Turkey under pressure. How the “Israel issue”

9 Ali Çimen, Göknur Gögebakan, *Tarihi değiştiren savaşlar* (İstanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2009), s. 111.

10 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Ümumdünya tarihine nezer* (Bakü: Gençlik yayınları, 1986), s. 267-272.

11 Sedat Laçiner, “Ermeni iddiaları ve terör”, *Ermeni sorunu el kitabı*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi basımevi, 2003), s. 103-104.

was brought before the Muslim and the Arabic world, hence the Turkic world (Turkey and Azerbaijan) were blighted with the “Armenian Issue”. These issues are a part of a parallel plan that the Christian Western world are conducting today. They exploit religious and national factors to increase their power and extend it. West exported the once Christian-Jewish conflict to Middle East by turning it into one of a Muslim-Jewish conflict.¹² However, the centuries-old Jewish issues stemmed from an anti-Semite movement rooted in the Christian theology, whereas it is originally an anti-Zionist political reaction to an externally imposed Israel problem by the Muslim people in the region after the WWII. Thus the original aim here is to conceal the Christian-Jewish enmity and replace it with a Jewish-Muslim conflict¹³ Thus the original aim here is to conceal the Christian-Jewish enmity and replace it with a Jewish-Muslim conflict. As was a Jewish-Muslim enmity between Israel and Muslim/Arabic countries created, so was a parallel enmity between Armenians and Turks launched. Thus, the Armenian issue is rooted in the inherited Crusader mentality against the Turks. Today, attitude towards Turkey and Azerbaijan by the Western states is essentially the embodiment of that mentality. Armenian issue is an important part of that hate towards the Turks.

British Prime Minister Gladstone made such remarks the end of the nineteenth century about the Turks: “What was the Turkish race and what is it now? This is not only a problem about Islam, but the fact that Islam integrated with a race’s own character. Since that dark day that Turks stepped on Europe, they have been the major non-human species of the humanity. Wherever they went, they left a huge bloodbath behind them. Wherever their sovereignty reached, civilization was destroyed there”.¹⁴

In 1919, British Lloyd George made these remarks: “As a looter community, Turks are a cancer of humanity and a scar that penetrated in the flesh of lands that they mismanage.”¹⁵

Probably Gladstone and Lloyd forgot about the torture and atrocities the British soldiers committed in India during the same period they made such remarks, so they turn a blind eye to their own actions and judge Turks.

While explaining Europeans’ view of Turks and Turkish history during a lecture at the end of the 1940s in Turkey, renowned German scientist Ord. Prof. Fritz Neumark said: “I should sincerely admit that Europeans do not like Turks and it is not possible for them to like Turks. Hostility towards

12 Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konumu* (İstanbul: Küre yayınları, 2010), s. 380.

13 Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik derinlik...*, s. 381.

14 Sedat Laçiner, İhsan Bal, “İngiltere Ermenileri, lobicilik ve Ermeni Sorunu”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, sayı:7 (2002): s. 79.

15 Metin Aydoğan, *Bitmeyen Oyun...*, s. 185.

Turks and Islam has pervaded into the cells of Christians and the church. Europeans despise Turks because they are Muslims, however, let alone secularism, even if the Turks convert into Christianity they would still consider them as enemies.”¹⁶

These are confessions that have been verbalized very sincerely. Such general expressions not only reflect personal opinions, but the opinions of the states as well. The shadow of the Crusades has wandered over the West for quite a while. The growth of the Turks, who have been a part of Europeans’ agenda since the eleventh century and threatened the security of Europe until the second half of the eighteenth century, has always been against the interest of Europeans. Since the second half of the eighteenth century until 1923, Europeans threatened the security of the Turks and they grew against the Turks.¹⁷

Let us remember the Treaty of Sevres signed on 10 August 1920. According to this treaty, an Armenian state that included Doğubayazıt, Van, Muş, Bitlis and Erzincan in the East and a Kurdistan between Iraq and Syria were to be founded.¹⁸

12 out of 14 points that Woodrow Wilson pointed out in his speech in the American Congress on 8 January 1918 are about the Ottoman Empire: the Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire were to be given sovereignty and the non-Turkish parts were to be given an opportunity to develop autonomously.¹⁹ In light of this and other decisions, Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920 by the Istanbul government. The sixth part of this Treaty was only about the Armenians.²⁰ The Treaty not only gave the Armenians the right to found a state on territories to be taken from the Ottoman Empire, but also provided Kurds in Turkey temporary autonomy in regions where they inhabited densely, which could have resulted in a complete independence later on.²¹ As expected, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was already brave enough to fight to prevent the application of this treaty and they mobilized the National Pact against it.²² Along comes

16 Metin Aydoğan, *Bitmeyen Oyun...*, s. 182

17 Haydar Çakmak, “Avrupa güvenliği ve Türkiye”, (Türk Dış Politikası, Uluslararası III Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu tebliğleri, Ankara: USAK yayımları, 2009), s. 265.

18 Erdal Sarızeybek, *Kurt kaparı* (İstanbul: Pozitif yayımları, 2010), s. 109.

19 Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1990)* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür yayımları, 1991), s. 139

20 Nürşen Mazıcı, *Belgelerle uluslararası rekabette Ermeni sorununun kökeni (1878-1918)* (İstanbul: Gümüş basımevi, 1987), s. 105.

21 David McDowall, “The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review”, *In The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, ed. by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 17.

22 See: Salahi R. Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika* (Ankara: TTK yayımları, Cilt: 2, 1986), s. 86; Şenol Kantarcı, “Tarihi boyutuyla Ermeni sorunu: Başlangıçtan Lozan’a”, *Ermeni Sorunu el kitabı (genişletilmiş ikinci baskı)*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi basımevi, 2003), s. 38.

this question: What might the West have aimed while they were dividing the Turkish territories for the foundation of an Armenian and a Kurdish state? Were the destinies of Armenians and Kurds their business? In our opinion, the answer to these questions should be sought in the revenge of the past inherited from the history, namely the mentality of the Crusades.

In the Treaty of Lausanne signed on 24 July 1923, important steps were taken. Turkey's independence was recognized, her borders were determined and the Treaty of the Sevres was canceled.²³ Turkey decisively stated that she did not have an inch of soil to be given to the Armenians, and if they needed more territories, there were other states with very large territories.²⁴ The achievement attained in Lausanne and the cancellation of the Treaty of Sevres do not mean that the anti-Turkish policies of the West are over. Even though the Sevres was cancelled, the conditions of the treaty are still being pushed to Turkey in every opportunity. On the way of Turkey - European Union relations those conditions are always brought up. Nicholas Sarkozy frequently indicated that "If Turkey is decisive in being an EU member state, she must definitely

One of the leading figures of the European Security policy, weapon control and disarmament, German professor Harald Müller who opposes the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis of Samuel P. Huntington and who deems that rhetoric as deadly believes that it is important to develop the dialogue among civilizations, however, his stance towards Turkey is no different from others. Müller says: "The problems that the minorities in Turkey are facing can be criticized. It is a must that the country makes massive changes before joining the EU. Turkey should be presented an open entry perspective, the conditions should be laid on table in a detailed way and a time plan should be prepared for the negotiations."²⁵ (Müller, 2001: 218-219).

Actually the conditions are pretty obvious. The logic of the Sevres is always on the agenda. The opening of the border gates is originally about the foundation of mutual relations. Let us focus on the Zurich Protocols, which were the cornerstone of the Armenian opening. As is known, the first important diplomatic treaty between Turkey and Armenia was signed on 10 July 2009 in Zurich, Switzerland, despite the fact that it was unnatural. The signing ceremony was attended by the Foreign ministers of Turkey, Armenia and the host country Switzerland as well as the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, French Foreign

23 Ali Aliyev, *Elince yaddaşı* (Bakü: Elm ve heyat yayınları, 2004), s. 170.

24 Şenol Kantarcı, "Tarihi boyutuyla Ermeni sorunu...", s. 39.

25 Harald Müller, *Kültürlerin uzlaşması*, s. 218-219.

Minister Bernard Kouchner and the EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana.²⁶ To focus the attention to a very important matter, the fact that representatives from the above-mentioned large countries joined the Zurich Protocols proves how willing they are for the foundation of Armenia - Turkey relations. Their real focus has not been a genuine will to help for the existence of real, sincere diplomatic relations, but rather has been to support the "unilateral concession" policy that Armenia demands from Turkey; which proves once again the anti-Turkish policies of the great powers as a historical tradition. These are new Crusades. If the shadow of the Crusades is still flying over the West, it is because of the collective subconscious that comes from the past against the Turks and Islam. The Crusades continue today and they continue their struggle against Turks and Islam under different names. One of the appliers of the Crusaders in the region is Armenia, who put forward the territory and genocide claims to Turkey, occupies the 20% of the Azerbaijani land and commits a genocide there. The duty that Armenians have carried out as "Crusaders" against the Turks is nothing new. The fact that Armenians had contacts with the Crusaders coming from Europe and formed alliances against the Muslim communities they lived in created sympathy towards them among the Crusaders.²⁷ Armenians did everything they could for the continuation of the Crusades. They were together with the Crusaders from Istanbul to Jerusalem. For Armenians, Crusaders were saviors. They believed that God sent the Crusaders to save them from the Turks.²⁸

British scientist Carol Hillenbrand writes in her book "The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives" that during the period when the Crusades were going on, Armenians betrayed the Turks and capitulated some castles by themselves in order to gain the sympathy of the Crusaders.²⁹

Prof. Dr. Mehlika Aktok Kasgarli, a retired lecturer from the Sorbonne University also provides valuable information concerning the Armenian-Crusader relations:

...In the sixteenth century, Pope Gregory XIII said during a sermon on "Privilege" in Vatican in the honour of the foundation of the Delegation of Catholic Armenian Priests: '...Among the services and

26 Sinan Oğan, "Türkiye-Ermenistan maçı, protokol, açılım ve Türkiye için riskler", (<http://www.turksam.org/tr/a1870.html>), erişim: 10.11.2009.

27 See: Sedat Laçiner, İhsan Bal, "İngiltere Ermenileri, lobicilik...", s. 73

28 Güray Kırpık, "Birinci Haçlı Seferinde ve Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Türk-Ermeni-Fransız münasebetlerinin benzer yönleri", *Turkish Studies, International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic*, Volume 3/4 Summer (2008): s. 537.

29 Kerol Hillenbrand, *Krestoviye poxodi. Vzglyad s Vostoka: Musulmanskaya perspektiva* (Moskva: Dilya, 2008), 74.

the sacrifices that the Armenian nation provided to the church and Christian authorities, there is one thing that should always be kept alive in our memories. When the Christian princes and the Christian armies went back to reclaim the mausoleum of the Jesus Christ, no nation or no community were as willing as Armenians about helping Christians. They gave their most talented persons to the Crusaders and provided them with animals (horses), food, drinks, accommodation as well as very valuable suggestions and weapons. With all their strength they helped Christians in these holy wars in a heroic and loyal way...

...Then the Armenians had to undergo the Turkish rule and they became their slaves. With a very deep sorrow, we are saying this. No ruling, no pressure has hurt them (the Armenians) so much and insulted the Christian church, religion and prayer manners so much. Although they suffered too much under pressure, many of them could continue to be loyal to our apostolic authority. They resisted every type of disaster and evil.³⁰ (Kaşgarlı, 2000: 33-34).

We see the same type of expressions and approaches in the report that the US President Woodrow Wilson presented to the congress on 24 May 1920: “The American public feels a deep pain for the atrocities that the Armenian public underwent and the hunger, poverty, insecurity and helplessness they are currently suffering... The reason why there is a sympathy towards Armenians among our public stems from naive consciences and the will to see all Christians being saved from insignificance, pain and tyranny and to see them among the free nations in the world.”³¹ The same expressions are seen also in the Treaty of Sevres, the speeches by other US presidents and all the resolutions of the European Parliament. What can the West’s policies towards Turks be, if not the Crusades? Armenians once stood by the Crusaders and today they are willing to carry on with the Crusade methods. By relying on them today, they propose the genocide and territory claims and they occupy 20% of the Azerbaijani soil, another Turkic state.

In this context, if this issue is to be evaluated from the perspective of the clash of civilizations, the policies of the West towards Turkey and even Azerbaijan and the attitude and the double standards that the Minsk Group of OSCE adopts are the result of a Crusaders Union.

30 Mehlika Kaşgarlı, “Haçlı Seferleri ve Ermeniler”, *Türk-Ermeni ilişkileri. 21.yüzyıla girerken tarihe dostca bakış*, (Ankara: AKDYYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi yayınları, 2000), s. 33-34.

31 Ersal Yavi, *1856-1923 Emperyalizm kaskacında Türkler, Ermeniler, Kürtler* (İzmir: Yazıcı yayınevi, 2001), s. 349-350.

Armenia - Azerbaijan Relations and Nagorno - Karabakh Problem in the Context of the Clash of the Western and Turkish Civilizations

Samuel P. Huntington asserts that relations between different civilizations will never be friendly and they will generally be cold and hostile to one another. He divides the clash between civilizations in two categories, namely 1) local or micro level; 2) global or macro level and indicates that the first one refers to the clash between groups belonging to different civilizations and asserts that this is common especially between Muslims and non-Muslims; while in global and macro level refers to the clash between large states of different civilizations.³²

The role that clashes between large states of different civilizations on a global and macro level have on micro level clashes between neighboring states belonging to different civilizations is an undisputable truth. It is possible to observe this role on Armenia-Azerbaijan clash as well. Samuel Huntington also indicated that “As long as Islam remains as Islam (which is what is going to be) and the West remains as West (Christian) the basic clash between these two civilizations will continue in the future just like it did for the last fourteen centuries.”³³ By that he also sent signals that meant the problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan, who belong to different civilizations, will continue..

In fact, the clash between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been going on for the last 20 years and the uncertainty as to when the conflict will resolve is still prevailing. First of all, both countries consider each other as enemies who they will never be able to come together. More than anything this is because of the fact that each side claims that the other side came to Nagorno-Karabakh region after them and they are the legitimate residents.³⁴ However documents prove that the Armenians were forced to move to the area by the Russians with the 15th article of the Turkmençay Treaty signed between Russia and Iran, which later resulted in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Scientist Nikolay Shavrov who was the Russian envoy in Iran at that period provides very valuable information about this issue: “We started the colonization by placing the others, not the Russians in the Southern Caucasus region. After the 1826-1828 wars, between 1828 and 1830, we placed more than 40.000 Iranian Armenians and 84.000 Turkish Armenians in the territories that had the best public areas... More than 1 million out of 1.3 million Armenians in Southern Caucasia as of the beginning of this

32 Samuel P Huntington, *Medeniyetler çatışması...*, s. 306.

33 Samuel P Huntington, *Medeniyetler çatışması...*, s. 312-313.

34 Takayuki Yoshimura, “Some Arguments on the Nagorno-Karabakh History”, p. 58, (http://srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no18/3_yoshimura.pdf), erişim tarihi: 16.01.2012.

century are not the native inhabitants of the region, but rather were placed by us...”³⁵

Armenian historian M.G. Nersesyan also verifies the mobilization of Armenians from Turkey and Iran to Karabakh and Yerevan region after the Turkmençay Treaty: “At the end of 1820s more than 40.000 Armenians from Iran and around 90.000 Armenians from Turkey were made to move to the region...”³⁶

Russian scientist A.P. Liprandi mentioned that Armenians came to Karabakh later³⁷ and he indicated that the issue with them moving to Southern Caucasia is a result of the imperialist policies that Russia applied in the region.³⁸ The information about the immigration policies can also be found in the studies of other Russian scientists such as I.K.Yenikolopov,³⁹ S.V.Şostakoviç⁴⁰ Armenian historian Ç.P.Agayan,⁴¹ V.A.Parsamyan⁴².

If the issue is looked upon from the perspective of historical truth, it is seen that Armenians came to Karabakh after the Azerbaijani Turks and there is no base in asserting that their existence on those territories is legitimate. However it would be unreal to assume that the issue will be solved through the historical truth. Just like the presidents before himself, Serzh Sargsyan already expressed bluntly that “their aim is to never leave the Karabakh region to Azerbaijani authorities.”⁴³

In such an atmosphere, there has been a belief that there will not be reconciliation and peace between the parties. Although a truce was declared in 1994, 20% of the Azerbaijani territories are under occupation. Although the efforts to reach peace has been accelerated with the incentive of the Minsk Group of OSCE, the peace negotiations that have been going on for more than 15 years do not meet the expectations or yield any results. To be able to determine the right way to end the conflict, its underlying reasons and

35 Nikolay Şavrov, *Novaya ugroza Russskomu delu v Zakavkazye: Predstavşaya rasporyadka Mugani inarodtsam* (Baku: Elm, 1911), s. 63.

36 M.G.Nersesyan, *İz istorii Russko-Armyanskih otnoşeniy* (Erevan: izd-vo AN Armyanskoy SSR, 1956), s. 227.

37 A.P.Liprandi, *Kavkaz i Rossiya* (Harkov: 1911), s. 46.

38 A.P.Liprandi, *Kavkaz i Rossiya*, s. 133.

39 İ.K.Yenikolopov, *Griboyedov i Vostok* (Erevan: Aypetrat, 1954), s. 137.

40 S.V.Şostakoviç, *Diplomatiçeskayadeyatelnost A.S.Griboyedova*, (Moskova: izd-vo sotçialno-ekonomiçeskoy literaturi, 1960), s. 154.

41 Ç.P.Agayan, *Rol Rossii v istoriçeskih sudbah Armyanskogo naroda (k 150 letiyu prisoyedineniya Vostoçnoy Armenii k Rossii)* (Moskova: Nauka, 1978), s. 220.

42 V.A.Parsamyan, *Zapadnaya Armeniya vo vremya I. Mirovogo Voyna* (Erevan: Ayastan, 1977), s. 411.

43 “Azerbaijan and Armenia: Peace prospects, Military Realities&the role of the Armenian Diaspora”, Caspian Information Center, no.16, October 2011, pp.1-2, (<http://www.caspianinfo.com/wp-con-tent/uploads/2011/10/OP-No-16-Armenia-and-Azerbaijan-Peace-Prospects-Military-Realities-and-the-Role-of-the-Armenian-Diaspora.pdf>), erişim tarihi: 30.04.2012.

consequences should be evaluated objectively. According to the Armenian side of the story, the conflict has risen up thanks to blockade by Azerbaijan to the self determination of Armenians that live in the Karabakh region.⁴⁴ To defend the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Armenia went into combat and the status-quo began.

Azerbaijan, however, believes that the conflict is as a result of “Hai-Tahd” doctrine, “the Great Armenia” ideology and its occupational policies.⁴⁵

Although the Minsk Group co-chairmen have attempted to create reconciliation with the peace negotiations that have gone on since 1994, they have not been able to make any progress. Because either their suggestions are not accepted by the conflicting parties or if one side accepts the suggestions, the other one thinks of them as completely negative. The three suggestions proposed by the Minsk Group of OSCE are as follows:

The “package resolution” presented in June 1997, “gradual resolution” presented in October 1997 and the “common state” solution that was presented in November 1998. The first two of these resolutions have been rejected by Armenia while the last one has been rejected by Azerbaijan. Apart from these resolutions, a new roadmap to resolution of the conflict was drawn in Madrid, Spain on 29 November 2007 in a meeting between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of the OSCE, which would later be known as “Madrid Principles”.⁴⁶ Another step towards the resolution of the conflict is the Moscow Declaration signed in November 2008. The declaration which was signed by the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev and

Although the Minsk Group co-chairmen have attempted to create reconciliation with the peace negotiations that have gone on since 1994, they have not been able to make any progress. Because either their suggestions are not accepted by the conflicting parties or if one side accepts the suggestions, the other one thinks of them as completely negative.

44 Robert Koçaryan, “İskat Vıgodı v Sglajivanii Protivoretçiy”, *Mejdunarodnaya jizn*, №2 (2003): s. 31-32; Vladimir Kazimirov, *Mir Karabahu. Posredničestvo Rossii v uregulirovanii Nagorno-Karabahskogo konflikta* (Moskva: Mejdunarodniye otnoşeniya, 2009), s. 271; Rafael Avetisyan, *Armeniya v strukture sovremennix mejdunarodnix otnoşeniy Kavkazskogo regiona*, Sankt-Peterburg, 2011, tema dissertatçii i avtoreferata po VAK 23.00.04, (<http://www.dissercat.com/content/armeniya-v-strukture-sovremennykh-mezhdunarodnykh-otnoşenii-kavkazskogo-regiona>).

45 E.A.Şihaliyev, “Psihologičeskaya i Religioznaya Podopleka Armyanskogo Voprosa”, *jurnal “Naslediye”*, Moskova, №6 (48) (2010): s. 48-51; Emin A. Şihaliyev, *Ermenistan-Azerbaycan çatışması sivilizasyonların çatışması bağlamında* (Bakü: Elm ve Tehsil, 2011), s. 106-124; Haleddin İbrahimli, *Değişen Avrasya’da Kafkasya* (Ankara: ASAM, 2001), s. 43-53.

46 Rövşen İbrahimov, “Dağlık Karabağ Sorununun Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Değerlendirilmesi”, *Karabağ: Bildiklerimiz ve Bilmediklerimiz*, Reha Yılmaz içinde (Bakü: Kafkaz Üniversitesi Beynelhalk Münakaşaları Araştırma Merkezi, No: 002 (2010), s. 395

the Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan emphasizes on the resolution of the conflict through peaceful means and in the framework of the international law. Madrid principles of 2007 are also emphasized in the resolution. Madrid principles suggested that Armenians withdraw from territories other than Karabakh that they occupied and then a process towards referendum to be followed in Karabakh. Armenia did not accept the Madrid principles.⁴⁷ Armenia is decisive in not withdrawing the 5 regions it occupied (a few years later another two regions) before the status of the Nagorno Karabakh is determined. Armenia believes that if their army withdraws from the 5 regions it is occupying, it is going to be in a useless situation from a military and geopolitical perspective and the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh will be in danger. Moreover they believe that when they withdraw their defense system on the war zone, in other words, return the 5 regions, Azerbaijan will be militarily advantageous and Armenia will be weak and disadvantageous. Therefore, Armenia refuses to withdraw from the territories that it is occupying. While the Armenian side says that the resolution can only be attained by giving Karabakh independence, Azerbaijan emphasizes that there can be no further resolution than giving Karabakh the right to autonomy.⁴⁸

It is against the international rule that Armenia demands in the first phase the status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined. The status can only be determined after the occupation is over. It seems that the attitude of states and international organizations as to determine which side is wrong and which is right does not reflect the reality. Some UN Security Council Resolutions have been adopted for the ending of the conflict. These are the resolutions numbered 822 dated 30 April 1993, 853 dated 29 July 1993, 874 dated 14 October 1993 and 884 dated 11 November 1993. Although occupying forces are asked to withdraw from occupied territories in these resolutions, the names of the occupying and the occupied states were not mentioned and the occupying party violated these resolutions.⁴⁹

The resolution adopted in the UN General Assembly on 14 March 2008 is the most important decision taken on this subject during the last periods. The resolution has been passed with 39 votes in favor and 7 against and it

47 Elnur İsmayılov, "Türkiye-Ermenistan münasebetleri kontekstinde Dağlık Karabağ münakaşası", *Karabağ: Bildiklerimiz ve Bilmediklerimiz*, Reha Yılmaz içinde (Bakü: Kafkaz Üniversitesi Beynelhalk Münakaşaları Araştırma Merkezi, No: 002, 2010), s. 173-174; Kamer Kasım, "Türkiye'nin Kafkasya Politikası: Fırsatlar ve Güvenlik Problemleri", (Türk Dış Politikası Uluslararası III. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri, Ankara: Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (USAK) yayınları, 2009), s. 63; Emin A. Şihaliyev, Ermenistan-Azerbaycan çatışması medeniyetlerin çatışması bağlamında..., s. 65.

48 Samir Hamitov, "Dağlık Karabağ Münakaşası 2020 Yılında: Barış, Yoksa Müharebe?" *Dirçeliş-XXI asır Dergisi*, № 153-154 (2011): s. 151.

49 Emin A. Şihaliyev, *Ermenistan-Azerbaycan çatışması...*, s. 215; Araz Aslanlı, "Ermenistan'ın Azerbaycan Topraklarını İşgali Sorununun Hukuki Boyutu: Azerbaycan'ın Meşru Müdafaa Hakkı Devam Ediyor mu?", *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, sayı: 9 (2003): s. 104.

emphasizes on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and it demands Armenians to withdraw from the occupied territories. The resolution also includes the displaced people's right to return to their homelands. In the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly, the second article that the Council proposed which demanded that "the Armenian forces must immediately withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territories without any conditions". However the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE, namely Russia, USA and France voted against it, which made Azerbaijan lose its trust in the Minsk Group. If the article had been applied, the conflict would have been resolved by now. However, the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group (Russia, USA and France) proposed balanced territorial integrity indicating that a resolution could only be applied with the consent of Armenia.⁵⁰ (Mustafa, 2008). However there is no term of balanced territorial integrity in the international law. By rejecting the resolution that recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and declared that Armenia is an occupying country, the states that adopted the reconciliatory role openly prove that they support Armenia. Although Azerbaijan indicated many times that the conflict's peaceful resolution can only be attained through international law in all official and unofficial dimensions, the forces which try to appear as if they are willing for the resolution of the conflict find it more realistic for the parties to make compromises and emphasize that there may be no winning side of the resolution of this conflict and if the international law is not followed then the parties should reach a common agreement. In which dimension can this agreement happen? In other words, should Azerbaijan make compromises for its occupied territories or should it be in mutual collaboration with Armenia in order to be the demilitarized state of the 21st century? Of course, this is not a realistic way to resolve the issue. In addition, it seems highly unlikely that Armenia will withdraw voluntarily from the territories it occupied. Azerbaijan has announced that it will not have any kind of relations with Armenia unless they withdraw from the territories occupied.

In other words, the incentives that the Western nations take for the resolution of the conflict yield no results. As a matter of fact, the real reason why these incentives yield no results is that the policies of these states are vague. Although the USA, France, the UK, Germany and other Western countries recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, they do not accept the fact that Armenia is an occupying country, they do not demand it to withdraw from the territories it occupied. On the contrary they find it more realistic for the conflicting parties to reconcile between themselves and they view the issue from the perspective of the Minsk Group of OSCE. If the parties

50 Aziz Mustafa, "Arabuluculardan Yeni İkiyüzlülük", *Zaman Gazetesi*, 19 Mart 2008.

themselves are going to resolve this issue, it is not possible to understand which duty the Minsk Group of OSCE is carrying out.

Despite the fact that the Western states declared they recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, their approach towards the occupational policies of Armenia and Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is evaluated within the framework of the Minsk Group of OSCE. The indecisiveness of co-chairmen of European states and especially other western states of the Minsk Group -the USA and France-, their reactions towards the UN Security Council's decisions (March 2008), prove the double-standard policies of the West and behind this approach there are deep-rooted reasons. It is the truth that "the Armenian factor" is a pressure tool that Russia can use both politically and economically against the states in the region and states concerned. Russia uses Armenia as a balance factor against Turkey's, the USA's, NATO's and the European Union's policies on Caucasia and thanks to Armenia it keeps its political and militaristic existence in Caucasia. With the military bases it has in the region, it keeps Azerbaijan and Georgia under control and it takes the necessary measures against a possible intervention that might be carried out from the South. On the other hand, Russia considers the Caucasian states as its previous provinces and therefore cannot tolerate the independence of Azerbaijan or its taking part in the energy projects. Moreover, Russia is protecting and arming Armenia to teach a lesson to Azerbaijan. Therefore it may be understood that Russia supports Armenia against Azerbaijan. However, the indecisiveness of the West about the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and its reaction against the UN Security Council resolution demanding Armenia to withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani lands prove the incomprehensible policies of the West. If the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is considered as a local conflict, the double standard policy of the West might not be understood, but if the issue is evaluated from a global point of view, the real reasons will appear.

First, let us evaluate the conflict in a local framework. The conflict of Armenia-Azerbaijan is frozen for one reason: the opposite attitudes of the conflicting sides. Both sides are in "a game with a result of zeros". If the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is recognized, Nagorno Karabakh will have to give up its "de-facto" independence and Armenia will have to give up the ideal of "Great Armenia". If the "de facto" independence of Nagorno Karabakh transforms into "de jure" independence, then Azerbaijan will have lost a great part of its territories and its territorial integrity will be destroyed. For this reason, the attitudes of the co-chairmen of OSCE other than Russia are unclear. In other words, the Western states always have to balance the steps they take towards one side with another step towards the other side. The states that are not the co-chairmen of OSCE always evaluate the problem

from the framework of the Minsk Group of OSCE and they want to have mutual sincere relation with both states. However while other Western co-chairmen - the USA and France - demand that the conflict be resolved in a peaceful manner, they blatantly react to the decisions of the UN Security Council. For them, the priority is reconciliation between the conflicting parties. American specialist in Southern Caucasus conflicts Tomas Ambrosio has expressed the attitude of the USA about the conflict clearly: "If an agreement cannot be reached between the parties, the attitude of the USA will not change. When other international and local problems are taken into consideration, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict does not have a lot of importance."⁵¹

Ambrosini also made remarks about the future of the peace negotiations: "Even though some meetings materialize behind the close doors, from the outside they look different. During these meetings, the parties make their own suggestions, and in case there is no reconciliation, they look as if they will fire the war again. Then the parties return to their own countries and accuse the other party and express sorrow over the fact that they could not reach the consequent phase on the resolution of the conflict. There is no doubt that the current heads of states of the Minsk Group countries and their successors will face the same issues and problems. The successors of their successors will be in the same situation. To be more specific, the current situation, or at least the peace negotiations that are going on, is better than the parties to open fire to one another. In my opinion, the parties and mediators will continue with this diplomatic tradition."⁵²

The approach of the European states including France as one of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group to the situation Azerbaijan is in has taken the shape of a clash between Western- Turkish civilizations rather than only an Armenia-Azerbaijan clash. For this reason, it would be more correct to review the issue from a clash of Western-Turkish civilizations in the framework of the global "Armenian issue" rather than a local framework.

Although the prolongation of the conflict between Armenia-Azerbaijan stems from the Caucasian policy of Russia, it is in a complete accordance with the interests of the West. The Western states evaluate the Armenian issue from a national, religious and psychological point of view and indirectly support the Christian Armenia.

51 "Amerikalı analitik Dağlıq Qarabağ münakaşasının halli ile bağlı bedbin prognoz verib", (<http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=228962>).

52 İbid

Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Problem in the Context of Conflict of Interests

a) The review of the problem in the context of Russia's geopolitical interests.

The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has a special dimension for Russia's geopolitical priorities and interests. It is not possible to think of the conflict without Russia. Politician Vefa Guluzade said: "If the root of the problem that enslaved the Azerbaijani people is observed, it can be seen that the Azerbaijani Turks are the victims of the Russian national ideology of world domination, while the Armenians are one of the tools by which this domination is materialized.⁵³ As a matter of fact, for a long time Russia has been working for there to be unrest in Azerbaijan, and to gain back its old influence on Azerbaijan and make Azerbaijan once again one of its colonies. For this purpose it supports Armenia. However the real duty of this state as one of the members of the Minsk Group of OSCE is to work for a permanent and just peace to dominate between the two states. Let us remember once again the second article of the resolution that was approved on 14 March 2008 concerning "the Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan" in the 62nd session of the United Nations General Assembly. When the resolution was put to vote in the UN General Assembly, Russia was one of the 7 states that voted against it.⁵⁴ The fact that Russia was on the opposite front proves that Russia does not intend to materialize a peace mission. There is no doubt that as a state that created the conflict itself, Russia will not be willing for the resolution of the conflict without attaining its own demands and interests. One of the issues mentioned here is that it is no coincidence that Russia as one of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE was added to the orbit of the conflict. More specifically, by getting itself added to this orbit, Russia declared once again that the key to resolve the issue is in its hands. More than anything, Azerbaijan is an important target for Russia. Obedience by Azerbaijan will help close the door to Turkey from the Turkic world, which will increase Russia's influence on the Turkic world once more. An independent Azerbaijan is an important gate in terms of relations among the Turkic World for political, moral, national and also economical thanks to the rich energy sources it has and it has the role of a corridor towards and from the West. However a dependent Azerbaijan will help the relations to be closed off within the Turkic World which then could lead it to integrate once more with Russia politically making it vulnerable to oppression. The

53 Vefa Guluzade, *Geleceğin Ufukları* (Bakü: Azərbaycan yayınları, 1999), s. 101.

54 Kamer Kasım, "Origins and consequences of the Karabakh conflict", (Basic principle for the settlement of the conflicts on the territories of the GUAM States, Baku: 15-16 April, 2008), pp. 66.

geopolitical reasons that make Azerbaijan attractive for Russia can be counted as follows:

- By keeping Azerbaijan in the sphere of influence, Russia can spread its influence to the Near East and the Central Asia; moreover it could use Azerbaijan as a strategic air force military base.
- By keeping Azerbaijan in the sphere of influence, to make the West dependent on itself economically.
- To avoid having to purchase strategic resources from foreign markets, owning the natural resources of Azerbaijan, which is prosperous.
- By having an influence on Azerbaijan, to split the Turkic World and to prevent Turkey from influencing the Turkic World.

As Russian military was taken out of Azerbaijan and Russia had no confidence in Georgia, Armenia has transformed into the only agent of Russian interests and aims.

However when Azerbaijan refused to conform and avoided building Russian bases on its territories and declined the demands of Russia, Russia lost its trust in Azerbaijan and misused its role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict by legalizing its military existence in Armenia and applied political pressure on Azerbaijan.

Armenia believed that this was a wonderful opportunity and in a way capitulated itself to the hands of Russia. It sees itself as Russia's geopolitical operation arena in the Caucasus and the "applier" of Russia. Because it believes that without Russia it would not be possible to breathe in this atmosphere. This can be compared to artificially-founded Israel's situation in the Middle East, which cannot breathe were it not for the USA. As Russian military was taken out of Azerbaijan and Russia had no confidence in Georgia, Armenia has transformed into the only agent of Russian interests and aims. Armenia has an inclination to continue occupying Azerbaijani territories so long as such policies of Russia continue.

Russian strategist Aleksandr Dugin reviews the importance of Armenians and Armenia: "Armenians are a Christian people who could comprehend their geopolitical connections with Russia very well. Armenians reside on strategically very important territories as the road to Azerbaijan and Central Asia pass through Armenia and Karabakh. Yerevan has transformed into a significant ring that breaks Turkey off the intercontinental lands⁵⁵

55 Aleksandr Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım* (İstanbul: Küre yayımları, 2004), s. 78.

Together with this very true and logical approach, it is also possible to review the Armenian geopolitics from Russia's point of view as follows:

- To use Armenia as a balance element against Turkey's policies on the USA, NATO and the EU;
- To keep Azerbaijan and Georgia under control by keeping its political and military existence in the Caucasus thanks to Armenia and the bases it has in the region;
- To have the chance to be able to create ethnic conflicts in the region by way of using Armenia and Armenians;
- To transform Armenia into a watchdog of Russia's political and economic interests in the region;
- In general, to take the necessary precautions against interventions that may be carried out from the south by way of defending and controlling the Caucasus..

To observe the issue more broadly, the "Armenian factor" is not only a political but also an economic tool for pressure against Georgia and Azerbaijan. This is mostly because Russia cannot bear the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan and their energy projects.

After Russia understood that it is not possible to keep the Western capital away from the Caspian Sea, it tried every way to get the Azerbaijani oil flown through its own territories. In order to demonstrate that the Northern route is much more secure, Russia started the War of Chechnya and then it could get the Baku-Novorossiysk approved initially as an oil export route by way of pressuring the Western countries and oil companies. Russia also asserted that there might be serious ethnic and political problems in the region and it started a huge campaign against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Together with this very true and logical approach, it is also possible to review the Armenian geopolitics from Russia's point of view as follows:

- To use Armenia as a balance element against Turkey's policies on the USA, NATO and the EU;
- To keep Azerbaijan and Georgia under control by keeping its political and military existence in the Caucasus thanks to Armenia and the bases it has in the region;
- To have the chance to be able to create ethnic conflicts in the region by way of using Armenia and Armenians;

- To transform Armenia into a watchdog of Russia's political and economic interests in the region;
- In general, to take the necessary precautions against interventions that may be carried out from the south by way of defending and controlling the Caucasus.

To observe the issue more broadly, the "Armenian factor" is not only a political but also an economic tool for pressure against Georgia and Azerbaijan. This is mostly because Russia cannot bear the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan and their energy projects.

After Russia understood that it is not possible to keep the Western capital away from the Caspian Sea, it tried every way to get the Azerbaijani oil flown through its own territories. In order to demonstrate that the Northern route is much more secure, Russia started the War of Chechnya and then it could get the Baku-Novorossiysk approved initially as an oil export route by way of pressuring the Western countries and oil companies. Russia also asserted that there might be serious ethnic and political problems in the region and it started a huge campaign against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.⁵⁶ Despite all the pressure Azerbaijan refused to change its oil policy and was able to maintain its national rights on the natural fortune that it had. On the other hand, on 27 June 2007, the European Commission has agreed three countries from the Black Sea region (Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania), Hungary and Austria to Materialize the Nabucco project. This project was a pipeline that would transport as much as 30 billion m³ natural gas a year from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria.

Alternative energy projects were not convenient for Russia, the biggest exporter of oil and gas to world markets and especially to Europe. The real issue that disturbed Moscow was the fact that its chance to put political and economic pressure on former Soviet Republics and European countries diminished and it would no longer profit as much as it used to from the transit charges.⁵⁷ After evaluating all of the above, Russia decided to take action in order to gain back its previous influence as one of the largest powers in the world. Both to prevent the materialization of alternative energy projects and to make Europe economically dependent, on 8 August 2008, Russia attacked Georgia and created two artificial independent states on its territories by

56 Ali Hasanov, *Çağdaş Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Azerbaycan'ın Dış Politikası* (Bakü: Azerbaycan yayınları, 2005), s. 672.

57 Nika Chitadze, "Gürcistan-Rusya Savaşının Ardından Güney Kafkasya'da Güvenlik", *Türk Dış Politikası. Uluslararası III. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, Ankara: Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (USAK) yayınları, 2009), s. 123-124.

destroying its territorial integrity. This can also be considered as the heaviest response to the West.⁵⁸

Georgian researcher Nika Chitadze explains Russia's attack on Georgia by Moscow's will to monopolize the energy transport from Asia to Europe,⁵⁹ and to control the pipelines on Georgian and Azerbaijani territories.⁶⁰

By this way, Russia both tried to prevent the materialization of the energy projects creating a medium for serious ethnic and political tensions both in Azerbaijan and Georgia, it supported the separatist powers in both regions and it increased the number of Russian military bases in Armenia. By the same token, Armenia needed Russia's military support for any military intervention that might come from Azerbaijan or Turkey.

Since 1991 Armenia has been attaching utmost importance to military relations with Russia and the country got full support from Russia for the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories as well. After Armenia became an independent country, it developed its military ties within the framework of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) especially with Russia and within this context, it took part in the Collective Security Treaty Organization which the member states of CIS signed in Tashkent on 15 May 1992 and got the accepted legislation ratified in the Armenian Parliament on 7 October 2002.⁶¹ A memorandum called "General Aspects of Integrated CIS activities" that the CIS heads of states signed was also supported by Armenia. On 10 February 1995 Armenia accepted the treaty "Collective Security Concept Among the member states of Treaty of Collective Security" and in November 1995 Armenian Parliament ratified it. Within the framework of CIS, Armenia is represented in two military organs namely "Air Defense System Coordination Committee" and "Military Technical Committee".⁶²

The basis for the military cooperation between the two countries was formed when the Armenian and the Russian Presidents signed the Moscow Treaty which covered the legal status of the Russian armed forces that were deployed in Armenia on 21 August 1992.⁶³ The military cooperation between the two countries developed even more during the management of the Armenian head

58 Nika Chitadze, "Gürcistan-Rusya Savaşının Ardından...", s. 125.

59 Nika Chitadze, "Gürcistan-Rusya Savaşının Ardından...", s. 129.

60 Nika Chitadze, "Gürcistan-Rusya Savaşının Ardından...", s. 132.

61 Natsionalnoe Sobranie Armenii Ratifiçirovalo Ustav Organizaçii Dogovora o Kollektivnoy bezopasnosti, (<http://www.newspb.ru/allnews/155192/>).

62 Hatem Cabbarlı, *Ermenistan-Rusya İlişkileri veya Rusya'nın Bir Eyaleti "Bağımsız Ermenistan"* (Ankara: ASAM yayınları, 2004), s. 21

63 Emin Arif Şihaliyev, *Kafkasya Jeopolitiğinde Rusya, İran, Türkiye Rekabetleri ve Ermeni Faktörü* (Ankara: Naturel yayıncılık, 2004), s. 113.

of state Petrosian and various military agreements were signed. Until 1992, the 7th Defence Army of the Former Soviet Union remained in Armenia. Around the middle of the same year, 16th and 17th divisions of the 7th Defense Army were handed down to Armenia. In accordance with the conditions of an agreement signed between Armenia and Russia on 21 October 1994, Russia was allowed to build two military bases in Gyumri and Yerevan.⁶⁴ As a matter of fact, these military bases were already present in Armenia even before the Soviet Union collapsed. However after Armenia declared independence, there was uncertainty concerning the legal status of the bases. As Armenia considered the bases as the guarantor of its national independence, it did not create any problems for Russia on this issue. In August 1997, the Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian signed the Agreement for Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Russia. The second article of the agreement is as follows: "...If the agreeing parties confront or undergo any type of armed attack, they will start negotiations with each other, provide security and act together for the protection of the security".⁶⁵

The third article indicates: "...If the peace and security of the agreeing parties is threatened by a state or a group of states, the agreeing parties will assist each other including military assistance in accordance with the 51st article of the UN agreement on providing peace and security."⁶⁶

In 2000, another agreement was signed between the parties that proposed handing over the military base in Gyumri to Russia for 25 years together with its real estate unrequitedly with the possibility of an extension of 5 years if the parties demand.⁶⁷ On 20 August 2010, Russia extended the duration of the military bases in Armenia until 2044.⁶⁸

According to what comes out of these agreements, if Azerbaijan attempts to take back its occupied territories by using its own legal rights, it will confront military intervention from Russia. Russia's military presence in Armenia has enabled Russia to intervene in political events not only in Armenia but all over the Caucasus. Today, Armenia has 29 military posts in total with 12 posts in Gyumri, 4 in Ahuryan, 1 in Ashtarak, 7 in Yerevan, 1 in Kapan and 2 in Nubareshen.⁶⁹ If the locations where the Russian military bases are

64 Marat Kenjetaev, "Oboronnaya Promishlennost Respubliki Armeniya", <http://cast.ru/russian/publish/1997/oct-dec/1.html>

65 Hatem Cabbarlı, *Ermenistan-Rusya İlişkileri...*, s. 21

66 Hatem Cabbarlı, *Ermenistan-Rusya İlişkileri...*, s. 22

67 Dina Malışeva, "Problemı Bezopasnosti na Kavkaze", (http://www.ca-c.org/online/2001/journal_rus/cac-01/05.malishr.shtml).

68 Elhan Şahinoğlu, "Rusya-Ermenistan askeri işbirliğine karşı Türkiye-Azerbaycan işbirliği", (<http://www.21yyte.org/tr/yazi.aspx?ID=5350&kat1=1>).

69 Marat Kenjetaev, "Oboronnaya Promishlennost Respubliki Armeniya", (<http://cast.ru/russian/publish/1997/oct-dec/1.html>).

placed is observed, it will be seen that 14 bases were deployed in regions that are near the border with Turkey.⁷⁰ This gives Armenia the chance to focus on Azerbaijan in terms of martial means by diminishing its security needs over the Turkish border.⁷¹ Armenia did not settle with that and it deployed the some of the signal units that left Georgia on 22 December 2002 on its own borders. These units were handed over to Russia's Commandership of South Caucasus Military Units.⁷²

Since the signing of the agreements between Armenia and Russia for military cooperation, Russia assists Armenia with weaponry and ammunition. In accordance with the information we received through the "Media Forum", only in 2008 the weaponry assistance was worth as much as 800 million dollars.⁷³

As it is one of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE, Russia's attitude is unacceptable for its moderator role. Russia is both moderating between the conflicting parties and arming the Armenia. Moscow's share in Armenia's weapon export is 96%.⁷⁴ This figure reveals Russia's role since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict started. However Russia claims that its actions are the results of its commitments as a member of Collective Security Treaty Organization and they have nothing to do with its activities in the Minsk Group of OSCE. Russia even expressed that Azerbaijan would be receiving the same assistance were it a member of the Organization as well. As can be seen, Azerbaijan is blamed for the whole situation in a sarcastic way. The fact that Armenia is a part of the Organization while occupying 20% of the Azerbaijani territories makes it impossible for Azerbaijan to be a part of it. By being a member of Collective Security Treaty Organization and deploying the Russian military bases on its own territories, Armenia protects itself both from Turkey and Azerbaijan and guarantees the security of Nagorno-Karabakh.⁷⁵ So, from whom will Azerbaijan protect itself by being a member to the same organization? From Armenia and Russia?

Also after the incidents that arose between Russia and Georgia in August, Moscow headed towards closer military cooperation with Yerevan. By taking

70 Hatem Cabbarlı, *Ermenistan-Rusya İlişkileri...*, s. 22.

71 Hans-Joachim Schmidt, "Military Confidence Building and Arms Control in Unresolved Territorial Conflicts", (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, PRIF-Reports No. 89, 2009), p.11.

72 Hatem Cabbarlı, *Ermenistan-Rusya İlişkileri...*, s. 22.

73 Rusya'nın Ermenistan'a verdiği 800 milyon dolarlık yeni silahların listesi su yüzüne çıktı, (http://www.mediaforum.az/articles.php?lang=azp&age=00&article_id=20090108032400605).

74 Paul Holtom v.d. "Trends in International Arms Transfers 2011", SIPRI, March 2012, (<http://books.spri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1203.pdf>, erişim tarihi: 13.09.2012).

75 See: Robert Smigielski, "Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement Following the Russia-Georgia Conflict", *Polish Institute of International Affairs*, no.10 (10) (16 February 2009), p. 19-20.

this step, Russia shown that the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is against its own interests. Were it otherwise, Russia would not have sold weaponry to Armenia that was worth 800 million dollars. This movement does not serve for the purpose of the peace in the region, on the contrary, it created a medium for rising tensions and instability. In general, Moscow's remarks on foreign policy shows that it still considers the former territories of the Soviet Union and the Caucasus as its own geostrategic interest region. In this regard, Russia has a key position in the Caucasus, hence the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

b) The review of the problem in the context of Iran's geopolitical interests

Despite the fact that the Azerbaijani people are Muslims and historically and culturally has similarities to Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran implicitly supported Armenia's military aggressions towards Azerbaijan. This attitude is because of the concerns that a stable Azerbaijan could interfere with Iran's own national integrity. The concern that Iran is feeling, namely opposing the Azeri nation is because of Iran's tendency to be against ethnic tensions. The number of Azeris that live in Northwestern Iran is twice the number of Azeris that live in Azerbaijan -according to some estimates 30 million-. This fact scares Iran of a potential separatism among its own Azeris.

One of the most important strategists in the world, Zbigniew Brzezinski indicates that "If Azerbaijan succeeds in a stable political and economic development; the Iranian Azeris will adopt the idea of a greater Azerbaijan."⁷⁶

As Iran intends to prevent this scenario from happening, it deems a weak Azerbaijan essential for its own existence.⁷⁷

With tendencies to integrate within southern Azerbaijan and Northern Azerbaijan, Iran's regional policy requires strengthening Armenia. Armenia is also a factor that protects Southern Azerbaijan from the influence of the Turks.⁷⁸ In other words, as Iran believes that Turkey would play an important role in a possible request for independence among its population with a Turkic origin, it is developing its ties with Armenia rapidly.

76 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası: Amerika'nın Önceliyi ve Bunun Jeostratejik Gereklere* (İstanbul: Sabah yayınları, 1998), s. 122-123.

77 Vüsal Gasımlı, Zaur Şiriyev, Zülfiye Veliyeva, *İran-Ermenistan ilişkileri, Jeopolitik Gerçeklik Versus Siyasi iddialar* (Bakü: 2011), s. 27.

78 Nazmi Gül, Gökçen Ekici, "Azerbaycan ve Türkiye ile Bitmeyen Kan Davası Ekseninde Ermenistan'ın Dış Politikası", *Avrasya Dosyası, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Azerbaycan Özel*, Cilt: 7, sayı: 1 (2001): s. 390.

Another reason that approximates Iran to Armenia is that Armenia is the only Christian neighbor of Iran. In accordance with the “Dialogue of Civilizations” thesis of Muhammed Hatemi, one of the old presidents of Iran, the country intended to show the good relations between the two countries as a brotherhood example and by this way make the Iranian fundamentalism seem more moderate.⁷⁹

The major reasons why the Armenia rapidly developed its relations with Iran are because of the embargos that Turkey and Azerbaijan applied on Armenia and because it was isolated from the regional transportation projects and relations. As Armenia is a landlocked country with no access to the sea, Iran is one of the spots from which it can open to the world. This is an unchangeable reality enforced by the geography where Armenia lies. In the first years of its independence, Armenian Minister Rouben Yegoryan defined the Iranian-Armenian cooperation in these words: “Iran is our future. Our most important priority is to develop roads and sea routes that have connections with Iran. This will enable us to reach Iran’s markets and the ports on the Persian Gulf.”⁸⁰

Iran-Armenia relations develop on the following major points and they shape the strategic cooperation policies between the two states:

- Both Armenia and Iran think of each other as a gate opening to the outside world from political and economic points of view
- Strategically valuable projects have been materialized between the two countries
- Increasing integration tendencies in South and North Azerbaijan and the problem this creates on Iran-Azerbaijan relations
- Increasing integration efforts by Turkey and Azerbaijan in every field, hence the need to balance Turkey’s position in the region
- Iran and Armenia were left out in the projects that would carry Azerbaijan’s energy resources to the world markets
- Iran’s intention to benefit from the strong Armenian lobby in the USA and Europe against the Jewish lobby carrying out activities against Iran

79 Nazmi Gül, Nazmi, Gökçen Ekici, “Ortak Tehdit Algılamaları Ve Stratejik İttifaklığa Doğru İlerleyen İran-Ermenistan İlişkileri”, *Stratejik Analiz*, Cilt:2, sayı:22 (2002): s. 43.

80 Mesut Çaşın, “İran Silahlı Kuvvetleri”, *Avrasya Dosyası*, ASAM yayınları, cilt:2, sayı:1 (1995): s. 48.

Although Armenia has good relations with Iran, who gains more and more power in the region, focuses even more on research to develop uranium, is usually referred to when problems in the Middle East are mentioned, challenges global powers. In the event that the USA attacks Iran, Armenia is well aware of the fact that its economy will be hit harshly. Aleksandr Iskenderyan, the head of the Caucasian Institute, indicates that Yerevan is quite uncomfortable about this situation. He expresses that the economic existence of Armenia depends on Iran and a possible attack on Iran would bring nothing positive for Armenia.⁸¹

Serzh Sargsyan mentioned his discomfort about a possible case of attack on Iran by the USA, which he believed would bring about heavy consequences for the Armenian economy, with these words: “Iran is a very valuable country for Armenia. Not only because we lived together for centuries and we are neighbors to one another, but also for other reasons Iran is very important for us. The truth is that Iran is one of the two countries thanks to which we are in contact with the rest of the world. If Iran confronts any problems that would be as if Armenia’s trachea narrows”⁸²

International pressures around Iran and tensions with Iran-West relations drags Armenia’s future into a dead-end. For its own future, Armenia has to review its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia should withdraw from the territories it is occupying and should quit the assertions it puts forward. Only this way it can save itself from an economic collapse and take part in the energy projects in the integration process. Otherwise, Armenia will have to resist economic pressures from Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Ruben Safrastyan, the head of the Institute of Eastern Languages in the National Science Academy of Armenia, specified that in case military operations against Iran start, Azerbaijan would benefit from the situation by getting approval from the Western states and the USA and he deemed Azerbaijan as a threat.⁸³

If Iran confronts problems and Armenia gets weak as a result, it would be for Azerbaijan’s interests without any doubt. However, the idea that the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is dependent upon the tensions between Iran, the USA and the Western states is not completely true. Because such a resolution was not even included in the plans of the USA and the Western states. From an economic point of view, it is true to consider

81 Ermeni politologlar: “İran’la müharebe başlayacağı tegdirde Gerb Dağlık Karabağ münakaşasını herbi yolla hell etmek için Azerbayacan’a yaşıl işig yandırıcag”, (<http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=265501>).

82 Эхо Москвы/Передачи/Интервью/Четверг,27.01.2011: Серж Саргсян, президент Армении. <http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/744902-echo.phtml>

83 Ermeni politologlar: “İran’la müharebe başlayacağı tegdirde Gerb Dağlık Karabağ münakaşasını herbi yolla hell etmek için Azerbayacan’a yaşıl işig yandırıcag”, (<http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=265501>).

Azerbaijan as a threat. Azerbaijan specifies in every opportunity that it increased the tools for pressure against Armenia by its own means and it will continue doing so.⁸⁴

It would be useful to mention an important issue here. Azerbaijan has never taken part in the policies of some states such as the USA and Israel against Azerbaijan. It harshly denounced such policies and kept the interests of the state and the nation at the base. According to some information that was achieved, the USA and Israel had planned to benefit from Azerbaijan as an “attack starting center” during a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear reactors. However Azerbaijan knew that such an action would yield negative consequences in the region and it openly expressed that it will not allow the use of its territories in such an event.⁸⁵

Iran tries to demonstrate its good relations with Armenia as an example to the brotherhood of Islam and Christianity and it accuses Azerbaijan of forming good relations with Israel and the USA and betraying the religion of Islam. However Iran is willing to cooperate with Armenia in every field even though Armenia displaced around million people occupies 20% of Azerbaijan, a member of the Islamic civilization, and it uses the holy buildings as armouries.⁸⁶ This figure proves that Armenia is not a country that can be sacrificed in terms of Iran’s geopolitical interests.

Possibility of Use of Force by Azerbaijan

Although a truce was reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994 about Armenian occupation of 20% of the Azerbaijani territories, since then there is a vague situation as “neither war nor peace” between the two states. Armenian political scientist Artem Vartanyan analyzed the vague and complicated relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia defined the conflict as “**a problem that burns without flames but rather smouldering**” and he indicated that the problem would still not be solved for a long time. However Vartanyan suggests that Karabakh should be given under the Russian mandate first for 20 years or a longer period and a referendum should be held in the region afterwards for the final solution of the matter.⁸⁷ In other words, Vartanyan finds it more realistic to leave the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to Russia’s monopoly. Without any doubt, though this is the personal

84 Elnur Aslanov. Devletin düşmanları barede, yahut Prezidentin konuşmasında dair sözardı. <http://www.gun.az/tribune/56526.print>

85 Ömer Kocaman, “ABD ve İsrail Azerbaycan’dan yardımını umuyorlar”, (<http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat=5&yazi=788>).

86 Musa Gasimov, *Azerbaycan’ın harici siyaseti (konsepsiyon meseleleri)* (Bakü, Mütercim, 1997), s. 77.

87 Artem Vartanyan, “Problema uregulirovaniya konflikta v Nagornom Karabahe i rol mejdunarodnykh organizatçiy”, Moskva, 2011, tema dissertatçii i avtoreferata po VAK 23.00.04, (<http://www.dissercat.com/content/problema-uregulirovaniya-konflikta-v-nagornom-karabakhe-i-rol-mezhdunarodnykh-organizatsii>).

opinion of the author, it actually reflects Armenia's foreign policy. On the other hand, Azerbaijan supports that the problem should be taken out of Russia's monopoly.

While Samir Hamitov, an Azerbaijani political scientist, defined the problem as a “**labyrinth**”⁸⁸ another Azerbaijani foreign policy specialist thought of the problem as the “**Palestine syndrome**”⁸⁹ These are evaluations that we find very true and right.

As a matter of fact, while the labyrinth has an entrance, it is very difficult to find the exit and the paths within it are very complex. The statuses of the entrance and the exit become equal as long as the right path is not found. Therefore there is no other way than wandering within the labyrinth until the exit is found. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is just like a labyrinth.

If the development process of the peace negotiations since the 1990s and the 20th century is looked through, it will be seen that whenever Azerbaijan begins to seek alternative resolutions for the conflict as a result of the uncertainty of the resolution process, either Armenia or the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE try to gain back Azerbaijan's trust by offering new suggestions. At the consequent phase of the negotiations, when the Armenian side pulls away, all of the process goes back to the same uncertainty. Since 1994, the year a truce was reached, the same uncertainty has continued. It is highly possible that the problem will continue in line with this scenario. The fact that the Minsk Group of OSCE was not able to make any progress, the resolution process has had a never ending uncertainty and turned into a “Palestine Syndrome” or “Kashmir Syndrome” causes anxieties such as the problem might continue for a long time or a sudden war may break out. How would a possible war affect Azerbaijan's future? It is not possible to guess the result of the war before it even started. Armenia's alliance with Russia hence the balance of power against Turkey and Azerbaijan in the region drives Azerbaijan to be more careful about a possible military move.⁹⁰

The fact that the Minsk Group of OSCE was not able to make any progress, the resolution process has had a never ending uncertainty and turned into a “Palestine Syndrome” or “Kashmir Syndrome” causes anxieties such as the problem might continue for a long time or a sudden war may break out.

88 Samir Hamitov, “Dağlık Karabağ Münakaşası...”, s. 156.

89 Zaur Şiriyev, “Azerbaycan'ın Karabağ politikası ve stratejik vizyonu”, *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Cilt:6, sayı:12 (2011): s. 112.

90 Gayane Novikova, “Implications of the Russian-Georgian War in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Limited Maneuverability” Caucasus Edition, (<http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/implications-of-the-russian-georgian-war-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-limited-maneuverability>), erişim tarihi: 18.09.2012.

According to some analysts, for Azerbaijan to be able to start a military move, the country should first ensure Russia's impartiality. For this purpose, Russia should be given political, military or economic compromises, it should be recognized as a party in energy transport and production, it should be provided a military base within the Azerbaijani territories and Azerbaijan should be a member to the Collective Security Treaty Organization.⁹¹

If it is taken into consideration that Armenia, occupying 20% of the Azerbaijani territories is a member of this organization, it is not possible for Azerbaijan to be a member of it under any circumstances. By joining this organization, Armenia intended to protect itself from Turkey and Azerbaijan. So, by joining the same organization, from whom will Azerbaijan protect itself? From Armenia or Russia? Moreover, Russia's stance on the Karabakh matter did not change even though Azerbaijan joined the CIS, rented the Gebele Radar Base to Russia and cooperated with Russia in the field of energy. In other words, No compromise that Azerbaijan will give to Russia will make Russia change its attitude towards the problem.

Some analysts believe that Azerbaijan does not have the ability to materialize an extensive military operation against the occupation of its territories.⁹² As a matter of fact, with its developing economy and military power, Azerbaijan has an incomparable superiority against Armenia. Azerbaijani army has the power to dismiss the Armenian forces from its occupied territories. If this conflict was only an Azerbaijani-Armenian one, then Azerbaijan could have materialized it. Here, it is enough to remind that Russia provided Armenia weaponry worth 1 billion dollars illegally and Armenia extended the period of Russian military deployment on its territories until 2044 with an agreement signed in 2010. The most important article of the new agreement is that the military bases of Russia would protect the security of Armenia. If Azerbaijan attempts to retrieve its occupied lands from Armenia by using its legal rights, it will confront Russia's military intervention.

It is not realistic to assume that Azerbaijan would receive military and political assistance from foreign states. Azerbaijan's trust in the West has already been weakened with the indecisiveness of the Minsk Group of OSCE and the double-standard approach of some states. Azerbaijan saw Russia's power and the best example to the West's untrustworthy friendship in the Russia-Georgia war the last time. The real purpose of the attack was for Russia to be able to demonstrate that it could still play hard. The Russian

91 Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Krzysztof Strachota, "Nagorno-Karabakh-conflict-unfreezing" Center for Eastern Studies, p.6, (<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-10-26/nagornokarabakh-conflict-unfreezing>), erişim tarihi: 18.09.2012.

92 C.W.Blandy, *Azerbaijan: Is War Over Nagorny Karabakh a Realistic Option?*, Advanced Research and Assessment Group. Caucasus series 08/17, (United Kingdom: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, May 2008), p. 7.

military had collapsed in 1990s and Russia had to renew the image of its army. It also intended to prove to former Soviet states that the alliance with America and the guarantees it would provide had no value. It was a small attack against a small state, but it was an attack against a state that was highly close to the USA. The unresponsiveness of the USA in the operation and the disregard of Europe surprised both the region and the Eastern Europe. The message that the USA sent was limited to diplomatic notes and it proved that the USA was too far and Russia was too close and as long as the USA kept its soldiers in the Middle East, its attitude would be the same.⁹³ Russia took this decision assuming that the real interests of the USA were in the Middle East rather the Caucasus region.

George Friedman, the author of countless articles on national security, geopolitics, and intelligence and the founder of STRATFOR, world's leading intelligence company, believes that it is senseless that the USA makes so many promises to Georgia. Friedman believes that Georgia would not provide the USA a lot of gaining. In other words, he believes that the US strategy in Georgia should not be followed any more. This is a strategy that remains from the Americans' understanding that such positions are without any risks and expenses. In a period when risks and expenses rise, the US should manage its expenses more carefully and it should accept that Georgia is more of a loss rather than a gain.⁹⁴

Georgia's dependence on Russia may create a domino effect on Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is in the position of a key supplier for the southern corridor, hence the energy diversity of Europe. This fact indirectly limits Russia's political influence on European matters. Therefore, if Russia takes more courage with the regression of the US and especially with its successful move to control Georgia, it might use its widened freedom of movement to intimidate Azerbaijan. Under such conditions, Azerbaijan will not have the tendency to challenge a reanimated Russia.⁹⁵ Azerbaijan already lost its confidence in the West, which made promises to Georgia that it could not keep. Azerbaijan knows that it does not have any support, and in the event that it enters into a war with Russia would influence its future with serious conditions. On the other hand, in the event that Azerbaijan starts military operations to protect its territorial integrity, it might have serious problems with integration with Western states and international institutions working for the democratization of the world. This is because the resolution of the conflict with war is not accepted by any international institutions of which Azerbaijan is a member.

93 George Friedman, *Gelecek 10 Yıl* (İstanbul: Pegasus yayınları, 2011), s. 169-170.

94 George Friedman, *Gelecek 10 Yıl*, s. 182

95 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Stratejik Vizyon: Amerika ve Küresel Güç Buhranı* (İstanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2012), s. 111

Otherwise, it might result in freezing or cancellation of Azerbaijan's membership in these institutions. However, if Armenia and other states leave no choice to Azerbaijan, a war can be preferred despite everything. The resolution of the conflict in the legal framework is limited. In such a situation, the power factor gains momentum. However, this requires a long time. To retrieve its occupied territories, Azerbaijan should wait for the appropriate strategic conditions. Otherwise, to start a war without preparations can cause a serious chaos in the country. If Azerbaijan could not declare an absolute victory over Armenia, if the war lasts longer than planned and the casualties increase, there would be disapproval in the country. Foreign interventions would increase the disapproval and in the end, there would be an atmosphere of confusion and chaos. In this case, Azerbaijan could face ethnic problems as in the beginning of 1990s and the independence of the country could be under serious threat. For this reason, Azerbaijan should first complete its military education, be completely ready for a long-lasting war, be able to resist long-lasting economic and political sanctions and wait for the appropriate strategic conditions. When would such strategic conditions come along? Answering this question is pretty difficult.

In our opinion, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict will continue as a truce for a long period. There will always be uncertainty as to when the problem would be solved and Azerbaijan will start seeking alternative solutions again. Armenia and the Minsk Group of OSCE co-chairmen will make new propositions and in the consequent phase, Armenia will pull away again. Then the situation will turn into uncertainty once again. Armenian and Azerbaijani heads of states or foreign ministers will have talks on different dimensions, and before every talk, new remarks will be made as to how hopeful they are and how high their expectations are, but in the end no results will have been reached again. Therefore the truce will continue. Under these conditions, it might be concluded that the time is on Armenia's side. A new generation in Azerbaijan is growing that never experienced the Karabakh war. Forgetfulness is threatening Azerbaijan greatly. Armenia foresees that the occupation will be permanent within this process. There is no doubt that time gave the Armenians the opportunity to gain more power on territories they occupied. Armenia increased its military power with weaponry it received from Russia and other states and it turned into a militaristic state. However, no matter how much Armenia developed its military power, it is in an economically- backwards state. Even though Armenia keeps Azerbaijani territories under occupation, it has not had the chance to own the territories it occupied for reasons such as economic recession, demographic decrease and recognizing of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan by other states even though they do not pronounce that Armenia is an occupying force. Armenia turned into the slave of the territories that it kept under the

occupation. More precisely, Armenia got weaker, economically backwards and dependent while it intended to enlarge, grow and gain strength.

In conclusion, it is seen that the time is not on Armenia's side. Even though this state is keeping the Armenian territories under occupation, it cannot be considered as a winner as the occupation drove the country into economic and demographic recession and the double standards policy also influenced it. The most obvious proof of this is the fact that Armenia still has not been able to internalize the territories it is occupying and over time it turned into the slave of those. As a result of this, Armenia left itself outside of the integration process and the energy projects. Azerbaijan, however, developed economically despite the occupation and became the economic leader of the region. It is possible to assume that the conflict will continue in line with the "long term truce" scenario. It cannot be said that Azerbaijan is completely comes out of this problem as a winner, but at least when compared to Armenia, time is on Azerbaijan's side and it is increasing its means of economic pressure.

While Azerbaijan supports the peaceful resolution of the conflict, it indicated that it would not make any compromises on its territorial integrity and it would consort to the military means as the last option if necessary. Especially the fact that the Military Doctrine of Azerbaijan canalizes the defense spending to the use of the army's tactical and strategic capacity and the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was deemed as the primal national subject created reactions among the international community. Although Armenia considered the increase in Azerbaijan's military spending as a political maneuver, when Azerbaijan adopted the Military Doctrine on 8 June 2010 proved that Azerbaijan is not bluffing. In the Military Doctrine, it is stated that if military intervention is inevitable in line with geopolitical realities for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, such an intervention will be carried out. It is also stated in the Doctrine that international problems are not supported in ways that are against the international law and in line with the rights that the international law provides Azerbaijan, military force will be resorted to save Nagorno-Karabakh and 7 regions around it from Armenian occupation and this issue has been repeated continuously in the document.⁹⁶

Conclusion

It is a reality that a deep conflict between the Western civilization and Turkic

⁹⁶ For further information, see: Azərbaycan Respublikasının Herbi Doktrinası, Azərbaycan Respublikasının Milli Meclisi, 08 Haziran 2010. <http://meclis.gov.az/?/az/law/183#comment>

civilization has been continuing for centuries. Just like in the past, today, the shadow of the crusades is wandering over the West and the war against the Turkic civilization is continuing under different names. The Armenian issue that is always on the agenda of the Western states, the genocide claims, the West's pressure on Armenia-Turkey relations as well as the indecisiveness of the international institutions and the Minsk Group of OSCE and a double standards approach to the conflict are all proof of this. Without any doubt, also the Cyprus issue, PKK factor and other factors are a part of this. Even though the hostility towards Turks that is inherited from the past looks as if it is more towards Turkey rather than Azerbaijan, in reality both countries are in the same situation. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict should be reviewed from the perspective of the global Armenian problem rather than as a local problem. On the other hand, while Armenia carries out the duties given to it without questioning as the puppet of the West, Azerbaijan constitutes a hindrance against the materialization of the West's interests. In this perspective, no progress has been made by the OSCE Minsk Group for the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

One of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia, approaches the problem completely within the framework of its own interests. Russia is both undertaking the mediator role between the conflicting parties and arming Armenia. As mentioned, Russia's share in Armenia's weapon export is as much as 96%. This figure proves the role Russia played from the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict until today. Russia's move is unacceptable considering its mediating role. However, Russia clearly declared that the key to the conflict is in its hands by intervening in the conflict. It is not right to evaluate the situation only as an "Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict" If this was really an "Armenian-Azerbaijani" conflict, the Azerbaijani side would have resolved the issue itself either peacefully or with a war. Judging from these evaluations, it can be concluded that it is not completely up to the states of Armenia and Azerbaijan to determine the "War and Peace" issue. Various pressures and the "Armenian issue" inflicted upon Turkey and Armenia stem from the traditional strategies of Russia, the USA and European states and the clash of the civilizations. Behind the Armenian issue, Armenian terrorism and the ongoing bloody murders, there is neither the real independence of the "poor" Armenian people nor their future. Throughout the history, the real aim of these states was to earn a state and a nation that would be dependent to them and serve them and this potential was discovered in Armenia and the Armenian nation. Today, the powers that are interested in the Armenian issue abuse the issue for their own geopolitical, economic, national and religious interests.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agayan, Ç.P. *Rol Rossii v İstoriçeskih Sudbah Armyanskogo Naroda (k 150 Letiyu Prisoyedineniya Vostoçnoy Armenii k Rossii)*. Moskova: Hayka, 1978.

Aliyev, Ali. *Elince Yaddaşı*. Bakü: Elm ve Heyat yayınları, 2004.

Amerikalı analitik Dağlıq Qarabağ münakaşasının halli ile bağlı bedbin prognoz verib, (<http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=228962>).

Armaoğlu, Fahir. *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1990)*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür yayınları, 1991.

Aslanlı, Araz. “Ermenistan’ın Azerbaycan Topraklarını İşgali Sorununun Hukuki Boyutu: Azerbaycan’ın Meşru Müdafaa Hakkı Devam Ediyor mu?”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, sayı: 9 (2003): ss. 94-117

Avetisyan, Rafael. *Armeniya v strukture sovremennıx mejdunarodnıx otnoşeniy Kavkazskogo regiona*, Sankt-Peterburg, 2011, tema dissertatçii i avtoreferata po VAK 23.00.04, (<http://www.dissercat.com/content/armeniya-v-strukture-sovremennykh-mezhdunarodnykh-otnoshenii-kavkazskogo-regiona>).

Aydoğan, Metin. *Bitmeyen Oyun: Türkiye’yi Bekleyen Tehlikeler*. İstanbul: Kumsaati yayınları, 2003.

“Azerbaijan and Armenia: Peace prospects, Military Realities&the role of the Armenian Diaspora”, Caspian Information Center, no.16, October 2011, pp.1-2. (<http://www.caspianinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/OP-No-16-Armenia-and-Azerbaijan-Peace-Prospects-Military-Realities-and-the-Role-of-the-Armenian-Diaspora.pdf>), erişim tarihi: 30.04.2012.

Azerbaycan Respublikasının Herbi Doktrinası, Azerbaycan Respublikasının Milli Meclisi, 08 Haziran 2010. <http://meclis.gov.az/?/az/law/183#comment>

Blandy, C.W. *Azerbaijan: Is War Over Nagorny Karabakh a Realistic Option?*, Advanced Research and Assessment Group. Caucasus series 08/17. United Kingdom: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, May 2008.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Büyük Satranç Tahtası: Amerika’nın Önceliyi ve Bunun Jeostratejik Gerekleri*. İstanbul: Sabah yayınları, 1998.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Stratejik Vizyon: Amerika ve Küresel Güç Buhranı*. İstanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2012.

Cabbarlı, Hatem. Ermenistan-Rusya İlişkileri veya Rusya'nın Bir Eyaleti "Bağımsız Ermenistan". Ankara: ASAM yayınları, 2004.

Chitadze, Nika. "Gürcistan-Rusya Savaşının Ardından Güney Kafkasya'da Güvenlik", *Türk Dış Politikası. Uluslararası III. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, Ankara: Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (USAK) yayınları, 2009, ss. 120-135.

Çakmak, Haydar. "Avrupa Güvenliği ve Türkiye", *Türk Dış Politikası, Uluslararası III Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu tebliğleri*, Ankara: USAK yayınları, 2009, ss. 259-274.

Çaşın, Mesut. "İran Silahlı Kuvvetleri", *Avrasya Dosyası*, ASAM yayınları, Cilt:2, sayı:1 (1995): ss.27-50.

Çimen, Ali, Gögebakan, Gökür. *Tarihi Değiştiren Savaşlar*. İstanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2009.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet. *Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*. İstanbul: Küre yayınları, 2010.

Dugin, Aleksandr. *Rus Jeopolitiği Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*. İstanbul: Küre yayınları, 2004.

Eho Moskva/Peredaçi/İntervyu/Çetverg, 27.01.2011: Serj Sarkisyan, prezident Armenii. <http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/744902-echo.phtml>

Elnur Aslanov. Devletin düşmanları barede, yahut Prezidentin konuşmasında dair sözardı. <http://www.gun.az/tribune/56526.print>

Ermeni politologlar: "İran'la müharebe başlayacağı tegdirde Gerb Dağlık Karabağ münakaşasını herbi yolla hell etmek için Azerbayacan'a yaşıl işig yandıracag", (<http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=265501>).

Friedman, George. *Gelecek 10 Yıl*. İstanbul: Pegasus yayınları, 2011.

Fukuyama, Frensis. *Konets İstorii i Posledniy Çelovek*. Moskva: ACT, 2004.

Gasimov, Musa. *Azerbaycan'ın Harici Siyaseti (Konsepsiyon Meseleleri)*. Bakü, Mütercim, 1997.

- Guluzade, Vefa. *Geleceğin Ufukları*. Bakü: Azerbaycan yayınları, 1999.
- Gül, Nazmi, Ekici, Gökçen. “Azerbaycan ve Türkiye ile Bitmeyen Kan Davası Ekseninde Ermenistan’ın Dış Politikası”, *Avrasya Dosyası, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Azerbaycan Özel*, cilt: 7, sayı: 1 (2001): ss. 367-392.
- Gül, Nazmi Gül, Ekici, Gökçen. “Ortak Tehdit Algılamaları Ve Stratejik İttifaklığa Doğru İlerleyen İran-Ermenistan İlişkileri”, *Stratejik Analiz*, cilt:2, sayı:22 (2002): ss. 37-43.
- Habibbeyli, Erestü. *Sivilizasyonların Kesişmesinde Türk Dünyası*. Bakü: Elm ve Tehsil yayınları, 2011.
- Hamitov, Samir. “Dağlık Karabağ Münakaşası 2020 Yılında: Barış, Yoksa Müharebe?” *Dirçeliş-XXI asır Dergisi*, № 153-154 (2011): ss. 146-159.
- Hasanov, Ali. *Çağdaş Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Azerbaycan’ın Dış Politikası*. Bakü: Azerbaycan yayınları, 2005.
- Hillenbrand, Kerol. *Krestoviye Poxodi. Vzgljad s Vostoka: Musulmanskaya Perspektiva*. Moskva: Dilya, 2008.
- Holtom Paul, v.d. “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2011”, *SIPRI*, March 2012, (<http://books.spri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1203.pdf>, erişim tarihi: 13.09.2012).
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Medeniyetler Çatışması ve Dünya Düzeninin Yeniden Kurulması*. İstanbul: Okuyan Us yayınları, 2005.
- İbrahimli, Haleddin. *Değişen Avrasya’da Kafkasya*. Ankara: ASAM, 2001.
- İbrahimov, Rövsen. “Dağlık Karabağ Sorununun Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Değerlendirilmesi”, *Karabağ: Bildiklerimiz ve Bilmediklerimiz*, ed. Reha Yılmaz içinde, ss. 395-438. Bakü: Kafkaz Üniversitesi Beynelhalk Münakaşaları Araştırma Merkezi, No: 002 (2010).
- İsmayılov, Elnur. “Türkiye-Ermenistan münasebetleri kontekstinde Dağlık Karabağ münakaşası”, *Karabağ: Bildiklerimiz ve Bilmediklerimiz*, ed. Reha Yılmaz içinde, ss. 169-177. Bakü: Kafkaz Üniversitesi Beynelhalk Münakaşaları Araştırma Merkezi, No: 002 (2010).
- Jarosiewicz, Aleksandra, Krzysztof Strachota. “Nagorno-Karabakh-conflict unfreezing” *Center for Eastern Studies*, p.6,

(<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-10-26/nagornokarabakh-conflict-unfreezing>), erişim tarihi: 18.09.2012.

Kantarıcı, Şenol. “Tarihi Boyutuyla Ermeni Sorunu: Başlangıçtan Lozan’a”, *Ermeni Sorunu el kitabı (genişletilmiş ikinci baskı)*, ss. 1-46. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi basımevi, 2003.

Kasım, Kamer. “Origins and Consequences of the Karabakh Conflict”, *Basic principle for the settlement of the conflicts on the territories of the GUAM States*, Baku: (15-16 April 2008): pp. 64-68.

Kasım, Kamer. “Türkiye’nin Kafkasya Politikası: Fırsatlar ve Güvenlik Problemleri”, *Türk Dış Politikası Uluslararası III. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, Ankara: Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (USAK) yayınları, 2009, ss. 61-76.

Kaşgarlı, Mehlika. “Haçlı Seferleri ve Ermeniler”, *Türk-Ermeni ilişkileri. 21. yüzyıla girerken tarihe dostca bakış*, ss. 29-36. Ankara: AKDITYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi yayınları, (2000).

Kazimirov, Vladimir. *Mir Karabahu. Posredničestvo Rossii v Uregulirovanii Nagorno-Karabakhskogo Konfliktu*. Moskva: Mejdunarodniye otnoşeniya, 2009.

Kenjetaev, Marat. “Oboronnaya Promişlennost Respubliki Armeniya”, (<http://cast.ru/russian/publish/1997/oct-dec/1.html>).

Kırpık, Güray. “Birinci Haçlı Seferinde ve Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Türk-Ermeni-Fransız Münasebetlerinin Benzer Yönleri”, *Turkish Studies, International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic*, Volume 3/4 Summer (2008): ss. 531-548.

Kocaman, Ömer. “ABD ve İsrail Azerbaycan’dan yardımını umuyorlar”, (<http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat=5&yazi=788>).

Koçaryan, Robert. “İskat Vıgodu v Sglajivanii Protivoretçiy”, *Mejdunarodnaya jizn*, №2 (2003): ss. 28-34.

Kuzık, Boris, Yakovets, Yuriy. *Tsivilizatsii: Teoriya, İstoriya, Dialog, Buduşyeye*. Moskva: İnstitut Ekonomičeskikh Strategiı, T. 1, 2006.

Laçner, Sedat, Bal, İhsan. “İngiltere Ermenileri, Lobcilik ve Ermeni Sorunu”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, sayı:7 (2002): ss. 71-124.

- Laçiner, Sedat, “Ermeni iddiaları ve Terör”, *Ermeni sorunu el kitabı (genişletilmiş ikinci baskı)*, ss. 95-122. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi basımevi, 2003.
- Liprandi, A.P. *Kavkaz i Rossiya*. Harkov: 1911.
- Malışeva, Dina. “Problemı Bezopasnosti na Kavkaze”, (http://www.cac.org/online/2001/journal_rus/cac-01/05.malishr.shtml).
- Mazıcı, Nurşen. *Belgelerle Uluslararası Rekabette Ermeni Sorununun Kökeni (1878-1918)*, İstanbul: Gümüş basımevi, 1987.
- McDowall, David. “The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review”, *In The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, ed. by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, pp. 8-25. (London: Routledge, 1992).
- Mustafa, Aziz. “Arabuluculardan Yeni İkiyüzlülük”, *Zaman Gazetesi*, 19 Mart 2008.
- Müller, Harald. *Kültürlerin Uzlaşması*. İstanbul: Timaş yayınları, 2001.
- Natsionalnoe Sobranie Armenii Ratifitçirovalo Ustav Organizaçii Dogovora o Kollektivnoy bezopasnosti, (<http://www.newspb.ru/allnews/155192/>).
- Nehru, Cevahirlel. *Ümumdünya Tarihine Nezer*. Bakü: Gençlik yayınları, 1986.
- Nersesyan, M.G. *İz İstorii Russko-Armyanskikh Otnoşeniy*. Erevan: izd-vo AN Armyanskoy SSR, 1956.
- Novikova, Gayane. “Implications of the Russian-Georgian War in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Limited Maneuverability” Caucasus Edition, (<http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/implications-of-the-russian-georgian-war-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-limited-maneuerability>), erişim tarihi: 18.09.2012.
- Oğan, Sinan. “Türkiye-Ermenistan maçı, protokol, açılım ve Türkiye için riskler”, (<http://www.turksam.org/tr/a1870.html>), erişim: 10.11.2009.
- Parsamyan, V.A. *Zapadnaya Armeniya vo Vremya I. Mirovogo Voyna*. Erevan: Ayastan, 1977.
- Rusya'nın Ermenistan'a verdiği 800 milyon dolarlık yeni silahların listesi su yüzüne çıktı. (http://www.mediaforum.az/articles.php?lang=azp&age=00&article_id=20090108032400605).

- Sarızeybek, Erdal. *Kurt Kapanı*. İstanbul: Pozitif yayınları, 2010.
- Sarkozy, Nicolas. *İtiraflarım*. İstanbul: Karakutu yayınları, 2008.
- Schmidt, Hans-Joachim. "Military Confidence Building and Arms Control in Unresolved Territorial Conflicts", Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, *PRIF-Reports* No. 89, 2009.
- Smigielski, Robert. "Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement Following the Russia-Georgia Conflict", *Polish Institute of International Affairs*, no.10 (10), 16 February 2009
- Sonyel, Salahi R. *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*. Ankara: TTK yayınları, cilt: 2, 1986.
- Şahinoğlu, Elhan. "Rusya-Ermenistan askeri işbirliğine karşı Türkiye-Azerbaycan işbirliği", (<http://www.21yyte.org/tr/yazi.aspx?ID=5350&kat1=1>).
- Şavrov, Nikolay. *Novaya Ugroza Russkomu Delu v Zakavkazye: Predstavşaya Rasporyadka Mugani İnarodtsam*, Bakü: Elm, 1911.
- Şostakoviç, S.V. *Diplomatiçeskaya Deyatelnost A.S.Griboyedova*. Moskova: izd-vo soţialno-ekonomiçeskoy literaturı, 1960.
- Şihaliyev, E.A. *Kafkasya Jeopolitiğinde Rusya, İran, Türkiye Rekabetleri ve Ermeni Faktörü*. Ankara: Naturel yayıncılık, 2004.
- Şihaliyev, E.A. "Psihologiçeskaya i Religioznaya Podopleka Armyanskogo Voprosa", *jurnal "Naslediye"*, Moskova, №6 (48), (2010): ss. 48-51.
- Şihaliyev, E.A. *Ermenistan-Azerbaycan Çatışması Sivilizasyonların Çatışması Bağlamında*. Bakü: Elm ve Tehsil, 2011.
- Şiriyev, Zaur. "Azerbaycan'ın Karabağ Politikası ve Stratejik vVzyonu", *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, cilt:6, sayı:12 (2011): ss. 88-117.
- Toynbi, Arnold. *İssledovaniye İstorii*. Moskva: ACT, 2010.
- Ulusel, Rahid S. *Qloballaşma ve Türk Sivilizasyonu*. Bakü: Çaşioğlu yayınları, 2005.

Vartanyan, Artem. “Problema uregulirovaniya konflikta v Nagornom Karabahe i rol mejdunarodnih organizatçiy”, Moskva, 2011, tema dissertatçii i avtoreferata po VAK 23.00.04, (<http://www.dissercat.com/content/problema-uregulirovaniya-konflikta-v-nagornom-karabakhe-i-rol-mezhdunarodnykh-organizatsii>).

Vüsal Gasımlı, Şiriyev, Zaur, Veliyeva, Zülfiye. *İran-Ermenistan İlişkileri, Jeopolitik Gerçeklik Versus Siyasi iddialar*. Bakü: 2011.

Yavi, Ersal. *1856-1923 Emperyalizm Kıskaçında Türkler, Ermeniler, Kürtler*. İzmir: Yazıcı yayınevi, 2001.

Yenikolopov, İ.K. *Griboyedov i Vostok*. Erevan: Aypetrat, 1954.

Yoshimura, Takayuki. “Some Arguments on the Nagorno-Karabakh History”, (http://srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no18/3_yoshimura.pdf), erişim tarihi: 16.01.2012.

Zarrinkub, Abdol Hoseyn. *İslamskaya Tsivilizatsiya*. Moskva: Andalus, 2004.

SUPERIOR PRESIDENT VS. SUBMISSIVE CONGRESS: RELATIONS BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE IN THE US AND ITS REFLECTION ON THE "ARMENIAN GENOCIDE" BILLS

(ÜSTÜN BAŞKAN UYSAL KONGRE KARŞI KARŞIYA:
ABD'DEKİ YASAMA-YÜRÜTME ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ VE BUNUN
"ERMENİ SOYKIRIMI" YASA TEKLİFLERİNE YANSIMASI)

Konur Alp KOÇAK
GNAT Research Center,
International Relations Specialist

Abstract: *In this study, rather than focusing on whether Armenian allegations reflect the truth or whether the issue constitutes genocide, how the nature of the US political system reflects on the legislative attempts in regards to the Armenian allegations is examined. Within this framework, the nature of legislation-execution when important foreign policy matters are in question is studied and how the president takes the lead and dominates the issue in the process of foreign policy specification. In the study, it is advocated that the President and the Congress go through a struggle to specify the foreign policy, the Presidents come out of the struggles as winners, the presidents approach the Armenian issue in a more different manner than the members of the Congress and this approach prevents the enactment of a bill that Armenians expect. While the study presents the influence of the political system on foreign policy decisions, it also reveals how the foreign policy decision making mechanism works in a presidential government. The results demonstrate that the nature of the legislative-executive relations is another factor determining the outcome of the Armenian attempts.*

Keywords: *US Congress, Armenian Genocide Allegations, Legislative-Executive Relations, US Foreign Policy, US President*

Öz: *Bu çalışmada, Ermeni iddialarının gerçeği yansıtmıyıp yansıtmadığı, yaşananların soykırım suçunu oluşturup oluşturmadığı gibi hususlar değil, ABD siyasî sisteminin içinde bulunduğu durumun, Ermeni iddialarını dile*

getiren yasama faaliyetlerine nasıl tezahür ettiği incelenmektedir. Bu çerçevede, önemli dış politika meseleleri söz konusu olduğunda, ABD siyasî sisteminde yasama ve yürütme organları arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl şekillendiği irdelenmekte, dış politika belirleme sürecinde Başkan'ın üstünlüğü nasıl ele geçirdiği ve bu alana egemen olduğu açıklanmaktadır. Çalışmada, Başkan ve Kongre'nin dış politikanın belirleyicisi olma yönünde bir mücadeleye giriştiği, bu mücadeleden Başkanların galip çıktığı, Başkanların Ermeni iddialarına Kongre üyelerinden farklı bir şekilde yaklaştığı, bu yaklaşım farklılığının da Ermenilerin beklediği bir kararın/yasanın kabulüne engel olduğu savunulmaktadır. Çalışma, siyasî sistemin dış politika kararlarına etkisini ortaya koyarken, Başkanlık sisteminde dış politika karar alma mekanizmasının nasıl işlediğini de gözler önüne sermektedir. Varılan sonuçlar göstermektedir ki, yasama-yürütme ilişkilerinin niteliği de Ermeni girişimlerinin akıbetini belirleyen önemli etkenlerden biridir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD Kongresi, Ermeni Soykırımı İddiaları, Yasama-Yürütme İlişkileri, ABD Dış Politikası, ABD Başkanı

Introduction

Since the US political system is founded on the principle of “separate forces sharing power” every power entrusted to each branch has delicately been balanced with the powers of the other branches while each branch has been assigned with the task of suppressing the extremities of the others. The possibility of any branch becoming principal within the system and particularly the creation of a dominant central administration have tried to be prevented.

Writers of the constitution, who find the assembling of all authority and power under the monopoly of a single person (monarch/king), as is the case of Great Britain, dangerous from the aspect of individual liberties,¹ have tried to ease their concerns with the legislative, executive and judiciary having “separate but equal” powers.² In the political and administrative sense, these branches are separate from each other, but looking from a functional perspective, each one has the means to influence the others through the mechanism of “checks and balances”. However, within the US system in which the branches can have an impact on the others, some disputes could arise concerning the use of certain powers between the Congress and Presidency. This situation manifests itself especially in foreign policy issues and in cases of emergency.

Within the US system in which the branches can have an impact on the others, some disputes could arise concerning the use of certain powers between the Congress and Presidency. This situation manifests itself especially in foreign policy issues and in cases of emergency.

According to the US Constitution, there is sharing of authority and coordination between the President and Congress in determining foreign policy.³ However, it has been observed many times that disagreements have emerged on the sharing of authority between the legislative and executive bodies even regarding the clearly written points (such as the declaration of war) in the Constitution. In such situations of disagreements, it could be seen that the executive branch increases its powers against the legislature, intervenes in the sphere of activity of the legislative organ and that therefore the influence of

1 One of the founding fathers, James Madison, defines the legislative, executive and judiciary power being gathered in the hands of a single person or group as *tyranny*, regardless of whether this person or group came through dynasty or through election and argues that the US political system must be capable of preventing this. For further information: James Madison, “The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power among Its Different Parts”, (Federalist Papers No. 47), *Independent Journal*, 30 January 1788.

2 Charles O. Jones, *Separate but Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency*, New Jersey, Chatham House Publishers, 1995, pp. viii-ix.

3 Louis Fisher, “Foreign Policy Powers of the President and Congress”, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 499, (September 1988), p.149.

the Congress is restricted.⁴ Although this situation has weakened the fact that the Congress is an important actor in determining foreign policy, it has not eradicated it.

Although the Constitution entails the sharing of power between the legislature and executive body, besides some exceptions, the conviction that foreign policy lies within the President's realm of authority is continually becoming stronger.⁵ In particular, there are interpretations that some decisions of Presidents having to pursue a more assertive foreign policy during the Second

Despite many legislative attempts of the Congress, an important reason for the bills recognizing the so-called Armenian genocide not yet being adopted is the change the legislative-executive relationship in the US has undergone in favor of the executive branch. This change has brought forth a "superior President" together with a "submissive Congress" in foreign policy.

World War and the Cold War have significantly decreased the Congress's impact in the process of foreign policy making.⁶ Views on this manner have reached a climax during President Bush's term following the September 11 attacks.⁷ It could be viewed that justifications such as "national security" and the "protection of national interests" offer a source of legitimacy for the Presidents, especially during times of crises, to extend their authorities to the final point, while the Congress has refrained from taking an effective stance in regards to long-termed, wide-ranging and confidential issues of foreign policy.⁸

While the influence of the Presidents in foreign policy is gradually increasing, it is inevitable for the loss of influence of the Congress to have reflections on many areas. Within this framework, bills incorporating the Armenian genocide allegations entail an appropriate case study for understanding how the Congress has weakened in the process of shaping foreign policy, because the struggle between the Congress members who bring the proposals to the agenda and the Presidents who prevent their adoption is a concrete manifestation of the race for supremacy between the two institutions in foreign policy matters. The Presidents have always come out victorious from this rivalry until now and

4 Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Presidency and Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5, (Winter 1991), pp.124-125.

5 William C. Olson, "The US Congress: An Independent Force in World Politics?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, (July 1991), p.547.

6 Steven S. Smith, Jason M. Roberts and Ryan V. Wielen, *The American Congress*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.293-295.

7 Jack Goldsmith, *The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration*, New York, W.W. Norton, 2009.

8 John Haskell, *Congress in Context*, Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 2010, pp.302, 310-314.

has displayed the limit of the Congress in its power in determining foreign policy.⁹ One of the main allegations of this paper emerges at this very point: Despite many legislative attempts of the Congress, an important reason for the bills recognizing the so-called Armenian genocide not yet being adopted is the change the legislative-executive relationship in the US has undergone in favor of the executive branch. This change has brought forth a “superior President” together with a “submissive Congress” in foreign policy.

Based on this conviction, the inability of Congress to enact a resolution regarding Armenian genocide allegations so far is examined irrelative to the authenticity/credibility of both Armenian and Turkish historical theses or the effect of Turkish and Armenian lobby activities on the Congress. The genocide bills under analysis are assessed within the scope of legislative-executive relations in the US. This approach is believed to allow for the issue to be observed from a different perspective.

This paper is organized as follows. In the *first* section, the relationship between the legislative and executive powers in the US political system will briefly be analyzed within the framework of the mechanism of “checks and balances” which allow harmonious functioning between the powers. The *second* section addresses the balance between the legislative and executive branches in a narrower scope and establishes how this balance is formed in the area of foreign policy and how this balance changed to the disadvantage of the Congress over time. The *third* section studies the legislative initiatives concerning the Armenian allegations as a case study which concretizes the reflections of theoretical information provided in the first two sections in practice and how the Presidents have caused these initiatives to fail. In the *conclusion* section, by taking into notice the relationship between the Congress and Presidency, forecasts are conveyed regarding the outcome of similar efforts in addition to concluding remarks.

1. Congress and President in the Constitution

It is noteworthy that in response to a question of “You served under eight different Presidents, didn’t you?” Samuel Rayburn, who served as Speaker of the House of Representatives for 17 years, said “I did not serve *under* any President, I worked *with* eight Presidents”¹⁰ With this response, Rayburn has emphasized that the President and Congress are in no hierarchic order. Indeed, constitutional provisions prevent the legislative and executive organs to

9 Donald A. Ritchie, “Congress Confronts the Armenian Genocide”, Jay Winter (ed.), *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.276-293.

10 Donald A. Ritchie, *The U.S. Congress: A Very Short Introduction*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p.86.

establish an authority over each other and make cooperation between the two organs necessary. However, it is disputed whether the situation in practice, particularly in the area of foreign policy, is truly like this.

Although it was envisaged for the Congress and President to have equal power when the Republic was first established, the authority in the area of foreign policy of Presidents, who never abstained from intervening in legislation, surpassed the Congress's power over time. In fact, no longer being an area in which the Congress and President must act together, foreign policy has started being addressed under the President's exclusive authority. In order to show why the balance between the President and Congress was ruined and how the Congress became passive in foreign policy decision making, the basic characteristic of the system founded during the establishment of the Republic must first be brought to light.

1.1. Separation of Powers in the US Constitution

In the theory of constitutional law, there are two main forms of administration. The first is the system of "unity of powers" where the administering power is organized as a whole and there is a centralized administration, the second is the system of "separation of powers" where the administering power is used by more than one and different institutions. The subtypes of the separation of powers system, by differing from each other in terms of the characteristics of the relationship between the legislative and executive institutions, take the name either of parliamentary or presidential system.

In the US, which is accepted as the best example of the presidential system, the Congress and Presidency have turned into an institution holding the identity of an entity and "body" separate from each other. The staffs of the two bodies are different from each other. Separate from each other, the legislative and executive bodies take office through different methods and by direct popular election. The Congress and President resume office independent from each other and this situation is the fundamental factor that maintains the "separation and equality" of the powers sharing their authorities.¹¹

In accordance with the principle of separation of powers, legislative, executive and judicial activities on a federal level of administration have been shaped in theory as separate, but equal and interdependent. All governmental activities of public organizations are carried out within the framework of the principles of responsibility towards the President and later on rendering account to the

11 Günsev Evcimen, "Başkanlık Hükümeti Sistemi: 'Ratio Politica'sı ve Türkiye", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 47, No. 1, (1998), pp.317-318.

Congress.¹² According to the Constitution, the Congress makes laws, the administration or President implements the laws and the Supreme Court and other federal courts, by interpreting and implementing the laws, concludes the cases tried in federal courts. Although executive power is essentially gathered in the hands of the President, the Congress establishes the ministries and various committees, deciding on their task, authority and sources, system of personnel, appointing of administrators and the term of office of committees.¹³

The government which does not emerge from the Congress has no political responsibility towards it. The President cannot be dismissed by the Congress for the policies it pursues. The President is not responsible towards anyone. While the Congress cannot force the President to resign, likewise the President has no right to abolish the Congress. The powers' being "separate but equal" has made such a structure necessary.¹⁴ Therefore, the separation of powers in the US system, compared to that in the parliamentary system, is stricter. While the parliament lies at the center of all political activities within parliamentary systems, this is not the case in the US system. The power not being concentrated on only one body makes it necessary for a sensitive type of communication and coordination to be established. Since this is the situation, the system functions productively when the legislative, executive and judicial branches compromise; or else, it could reach a deadlock.¹⁵

In the event of the principle of separation of powers being violated by any organ in the system, it will be up to the Supreme Court to resolve the problems that could arise. For instance, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who tried to implement many measures in the 1930's to combat economic crisis, had fallen into dispute with the Supreme Court many times and the Court prevented some of the President's legislative attempts. Upon this, in order to discharge the judges appointed before his term aged 70 and above and to work together with those he appoints himself, Roosevelt has sought for a law to be adopted which would restructure the Court. This time however the Congress has come into play; by not accepting the law sought by the President, it has shown that the President's authority has a limit.¹⁶

Another example that sheds further light on the function of the separation of

12 Uğur Ömürgönülşen, "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde Kamu Yönetimi", Birgül Ayman Güler (ed.), *Kamu Yönetimi Ülke İncelemeleri*, Ankara, İmge Yayınevi, 2009, pp.318-319.

13 *Ibid.*, p.319.

14 *Ibid.*, p.318.

15 Hasan Fendoğlu, "Başkanlık Sistemi Tartışmaları", *Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü*, (November 2010), p.16.

16 Brian Duignan (ed.), *The Executive Branch of the Federal Government: Purpose, Process, and People*, New York, Britannica Educational Publishing, 2010, pp.240-248.

17 U.S. Supreme Court, *Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For the ruling of the court see: <http://supreme.justia.com/us/343/579/case.html>

powers within the US system is the *Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer*¹⁷ case filed upon President Harry S. Truman seizing the steel plants in the country with the allegation that during time of war, the supreme military command had granted him the authority of determining production of steel. In this case, the Supreme Court has ruled that the President being charged with implementing the laws does not give him the authority to enact laws, that the President could only provide suggestions to the Congress for the enactment of laws he sees necessary, that the President has no right to seize private property unless a law is made in the Congress in this direction and that by reaching such a decision, the President has exceeded his constitutional authority.¹⁸ This way, the principle of each law having a unique function as one of the main determinants of the separation of powers has been underlined in this case.

Another decision indicating that the President's power is limited was taken in 1974 in the case of *United States v. Nixon*.¹⁹ Within the context of the Watergate Scandal investigation, President Nixon had developed an argument based on justifications of the separation of powers and the privacy of communication of high level officials that Presidents have some privileges and had abstained from providing the documents requested from him to the prosecution office. By emphasizing the importance of the principle of separation of powers in maintaining the border drawn between the organs, the Court has ruled that separation of powers principle can under no circumstance immunize the Presidents from judicial procedure.²⁰ After all, the Court had decided on the documents requested from the President to be given and Nixon was obliged to resign from presidency. Moreover, an important point exists in the ruling regarding the President's authority in foreign policy. By referring to a domestic policy-foreign policy distinction, the decision states that when the President's authority is the point in question, his authorities in foreign policy is stronger than those in domestic politics and accepts that the executive power will be more privileged in national security, intelligence and military issues.²¹

The domestic policy-foreign policy distinction made in the abovementioned ruling concerning the President's authority also exists in political science literature. It is argued that the President is a more pronounced actor in foreign policy, but the Presidents are not as equally powerful against the Congress in domestic politics. Within this framework, the theory that there are "two

18 David L. Hudson, "What is an Example of a Separation of Powers Problem?", *The Handy Law Answer Book*, Canton, MI, Visible Ink Press, 2010, p.14.

19 M. J. C. Vile, "Separation of Powers", *Encyclopedia of the American Constitution*, Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst (eds.), New York, Macmillan Reference, Vol. 5, 2000, 2nd ed., pp.2381-2385.

20 U.S. Supreme Court, *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For the ruling of the court see: <http://supreme.justia.com/us/418/683/case.html>

21 Michael A. Genovese and Robert J. Spitzer, *The Presidency and the Constitution: Cases and Controversies*, New York, Palgrave Macmillian, 2005, pp.99-103.

separate presidencies” in domestic and foreign policies come to the fore. Aaron Wildavsky, the prominent representative of this view, has provided the first example of the “two presidencies theory” by saying that “*the US has one President, but it has two presidencies; one presidency is for domestic affairs and the other is concerned with defense and foreign policy*”. This view, which indicates that the Presidents attain what they wish in regards to an issue of foreign policy which they are determined about, explains that the Presidents are not successful to this extent in issues of domestic policy and links this situation to the developments taking place after 1945, rather than to the Constitution.²²

Partially due to constitutional provisions and partially because of some judicial decisions and the obligations brought forth by the international system especially after the Second World War, the Presidents have started being perceived as the person “unitarily” responsible for the structuring of foreign policy.²³ However, constitutionally, the Congress has also been organized as a powerful organ equipped with significant authorities.

1.2. Distribution of Responsibilities Between the Legislature and Executive

With the statement “*all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives*”, the first section of the Constitution’s first article show that the Congress, formed of two chambers, will use all its legislative powers. The second section of the same article indicates the structure of the House of Representatives and the qualifications requisite for becoming a representative, while the third section entail certain provisions concerning the Senate. Powers of Congress are listed in section eight of the first article.

The first section of the Constitution’s second article entails the provision that “*the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America*”. The Constitution also lists the President’s tasks and powers, but does not assign any specific tasks of governance to his deputy, cabinet or other federal officials. In the second article of the Constitution, the following provisions exist regarding the President’s powers:

(Section 2) *The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the*

22 Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies: Presidential Power is Greatest When Directing Military and Foreign Policy”, *Society*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (1966), p.7.

23 *Ibid.*, pp.9-12.

opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.

(Section 3) *He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.*

Despite the provision in the first article of the Constitution on “all legislative powers” being granted to the Congress, it should be reminded that the President also has a significant legislative role: the President can veto any draft law approved by the Congress and if two-thirds of the majority from both chambers do not override the veto, the proposal cannot receive a statutory provision. Furthermore, in their annual and special speeches delivered in the Congress, the Presidents could also propose for the legal regulations, which they deem necessary, to be put into practice. This situation arises from forming public opinion and motivating members of Congress towards legislative actions, whereas the executive power has no authority to prepare a draft law. The origination of all laws from Congress is a natural consequence of the separation of powers being implemented in a strict manner.

Another point which is as important as the President being “*head of*

government” should also be underlined. According to the second section of Article two of the Constitution mentioned above, the President is head of the army and navy and is the commander-in-chief. This authority, as will be emphasized later on, provides a great advantage in guiding foreign relations, because based on being “head of government” and “commander-in-chief”, Presidents argued that the Constitution gives them an advantage in determining and conducting foreign policy.

At this point, it will be noteworthy to recall the thoughts of Hamilton, one of the founding fathers, regarding what kinds of differences the President would have from the King of Great Britain. Hamilton indicates that the King has a supreme power that determines all foreign relations on its own, whereas the US President will share its power with the Senate, a wing of legislation, in foreign relations.²⁴ This idea brought forth by Hamilton has been internalized in the US Constitution and the small number of provisions expressed in the Constitution regarding foreign policy has not been exempt from the principles of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances”. Therefore, authorities within foreign policy have been imprecisely shared between the legislative and executive departments.²⁵

The powers of the President and Congress have been specified in the US Constitution and although a limit has been drawn for each in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, it is not possible for the departments to work entirely independently from each other, because the “checks and balances” mechanism allow the departments to influence each other and forces the legislature and executive to establish a harmonious relationship among them.

1.3. Balance between the Legislative and Executive According to the Constitution

Founding fathers, who have found one of the branches dominating the entire system dangerous in terms of individual liberties and are concerned with the system falling towards this, viewed the checks and balances mechanism as a measure that would prevent the degeneration of the system. Due to this mechanism, neither the Congress possess unlimited authority in the area of legislation, nor does the President has the opportunity to act totally independently from the Congress on determining executive power.²⁶ While

24 Alexander Hamilton, “The Real Character of the Executive”, (Federalist Papers No. 69), *New York Packet*, 14 March 1788.

25 Louis Henkin, “Foreign Affairs and the Constitution”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 2, (Winter 1987/1988), pp.284-285.

26 Michael Foley and John E. Owens, *Congress and the Presidency: Politics in a Separated System*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996, pp.2-3.

separation of powers require a hierarchy between organs, divergence, specialization in a certain area and independence from the others, checks and balances, as an important constituent of the US system, create equality, cooperation and mutual dependence.²⁷

In *federalist papers*, the system of checks and balances has been argued to be the means to restricting government power and preventing its misuse. Checks and balances is a mechanism included into the system for one of the powers not to extremely strengthen to the disadvantage of the others, one of them being restrained by the others when required and therefore, for power not to be concentrated upon a single organ, which almost has the function of providing assurance. James Madison, among the founders of the Constitution, consider a strong separation of powers, which would cause the powers not to have any influence on each other, as “the principle of separation of powers not being able to be completely implemented” and argue that each department should have constitutional control over each other.²⁸

The function of this mechanism is as follows: the power to set rules, which is the main function of Congress, could be restrained by the President’s veto power. Policies of legislation to reach their purposes and to be implemented depend on the President’s execution of these rules and the Congress using the resources allocated to be spent for this purpose. On the other hand, the impact of policies of legislation depend on the Congress approving the appointments to be made to high-level positions (for instance ambassadors, judges of supreme courts) which will put these policies into practice, the appropriation of financial resources for the implementation of these policies and allocation of resources in areas to be determined by the executive power, and the ratification of treaties if the implementation of these policies concern international relations, because the third paragraph of the second section of the second article of the Constitution state that the President could use his powers like making treaties and appointing ambassadors with the “advice and consent” of the Senate.

The requirement for an international treaty to be approved by the Senate before entering into force through the President’s signature constitutes a good example of the “checks and balances” effect legislature has over the executive organ. In order not to encounter a situation where the candidate nominated by the President for a supreme court will not receive approval, due to the checks and balances mechanism Presidents have to negotiate with senators and determine the possibilities of receiving approval beforehand. In fact, in some situations

27 *Ibid.*, pp.334-335.

28 James Madison, “These Departments Should Not Be So Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other”, (Federalist Paper No. 48), *New York Packet*, 1 February 1788.

it could even be the case where Presidents put forward those individuals who are more likely to receive approval before their own preferences, having to give up on the real candidates.²⁹

At this point, it would be appropriate to bring to mind that the situation named as divided government is able to take the checks and balances mechanism a step further. It is evident that the party, to which the President is a member, remaining a minority in both or either wings of Congress could disrupt the decision making process. In fact, Woodrow Wilson, President during and after the First World War (1913-1921) who, by aspiring from parliamentary systems, maintained close cooperation with the leaders in Congress and was able to direct legislation, encountered difficulties after his party became minority in the Congress in 1918. Wilson, who had achieved many successes in activities of legislation during his first years in office, has failed in convincing the Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty, to which he was a party, and the Covenant of the League of Nations.³⁰ In situations where the divided government is the case, the Congress has the opportunity not to take the President's initiatives into consideration and even to counterattack. For instance, with the re-adoption of a law with a two-thirds majority in Congress that was vetoed by the President, the President could be deprived of the ability to restrain the Congress.³¹

Concerning checks and balances, it is also noteworthy to mention the Congress's function of inspection. The impeachments in the Senate following the investigation conducted by the House of Representatives, is the process of federal executive and judicial members being inspected, questioned and penalized by the Congress if necessary. These decisions, not being able to be appealed, are reached with a two-third majority in the Senate and if the person being tried is found guilty, the punishment given is being "removed from duty".³²

The examples mentioned show the importance of the legislative and executive organs working together in harmony and fulfilling their duties to the system in

29 Ritchie, *Ibid.*, pp.90-91.

30 *Ibid.*, pp.85-88.

31 Republican Richard Nixon, who served as President between 1969 and 1974, had to work together with a Congress in which the Democrats were a majority. Nixon, who vetoed the War Powers Resolution that was adopted in Congress during the period of unrest created by the Watergate Scandal and the Vietnam War, with the resolution being re-adopted by a qualified majority (2/3) in Congress, has not been able to use his veto power once again and has not been able to prevent a bill which he did not desire to become law. (More detailed information concerning this resolution is mentioned in the second section of this paper)

32 Until now, the Senate has addressed nineteen cases, eight people all judges have been punished for being found guilty. President Andrew Johnson in 1868 and President William J. Clinton in 1999 have been tried in the Senate following the investigation of the House of Representatives and both have been found not guilty. For more information see: "The Senate's Impeachment Role," *United States Senate*, http://senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Senate_Impeachment_Role.htm#1

functioning well. Incidents in which the Senate does not approve a treaty³³ or a person suggested by the President to become an ambassador not being appointed for failing to receive approval have been experienced in the past.³⁴

Since this article focuses on the reflections of the balance tried to be established between the legislature and executive on determining of foreign policy, it is necessary to observe what kinds of responsibilities and powers constitutional provisions place on the Congress and President in the area of foreign policy. Therefore, in the next section, powers and responsibilities the President and Congress possess in the area of foreign policy is studied within the framework of the Constitution. Then, the situation of its exercise is addressed, explaining that a competition exists between the President and Congress in the area of foreign policy, where in some situations the Congress, while in others the President is the dominant power in determining foreign policy. Within this context, it is emphasized that the Cold War and September 11 Attacks present an appropriate setting for extending the President's powers and limiting the Congress's influence and that Presidents make use of their powers, although at the risk of exceeding them by interfering in the legislative process.

2. The Role of the President and Congress in Foreign Policy

The US Constitution indicates by which organ some specific tasks and powers concerning foreign relations will be performed. However, no clear statement being expressed in the Constitution regarding under which organ's control foreign policy will be in has caused constitutional debates, disagreements and sometimes crises.³⁵ Edward S. Corwin, writer of the most read and referenced source on this issue, describes this situation in the Constitution as "*an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy*".³⁶

33 Until now the Senate has not approved the ratification of 21 international treaties. Some treaties have not gone beyond the committee's process, while some have been withdrawn by the Presidents after comprehending that they will not be able to receive approval. For further detail see: "Treaties," *United States Senate*, <http://senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#1>

34 The approval of a senior official takes place through the voting occurring after some questions are posed in the concerning commission of Congress orally and in writing. Each senator has veto power on this issue; if a senator indisputably opposes appointment, that appointment is not made. In order to ease the drawbacks created by this system, Presidents are able to temporarily appoint ambassadors based on the 3rd paragraph of the 2nd section of the Constitution's 2nd article. Those appointed this way must receive approval from the Senate before legislative session ends. Francis J. Ricciardone, nominated as candidate by President Obama for the US Embassy in Ankara, being prevented by Senator Samuel Brownback for not using the term "Armenian genocide" could entail an example to this issue. Ricciardone was assigned to Ankara by Obama while the Congress was in recess and had replied to the questions of senators a second time in August 2011 at the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. Ricciardone, whose temporal status was removed after the voting in the Senate, has been able to be officially appointed in September 2011. For information on appointments while in recess see: Henry B. Hogue, "Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions," *CRS Report for Congress*, RS21308, March 12, 2008. For Ricciardone's appointment see: "Senate Panel Approves Controversial Nominee to Serve as Ambassador to Turkey; Menendez, Boxer, Risch Oppose", *ANCA Press Release*, September 13, 2011.

35 David G. Adler, "The Constitution", *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, Alexander DeConde... [et.al.], Vol. 1, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 2nd ed., 2002, p.323.

36 Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers*, New York, New York University Press, 1957, p.171.

2.1. Constitutional Provisions

From a general approach, it is envisaged that in the Constitution, the Congress and President are co-equal entities in foreign policy and both will act together in harmony. In fact, by expressing in a speech delivered in the Congress that *"the Congress shares power and responsibility in foreign policy"*, President Ronald Reagan has indicated that these two organs work together in the process of determining foreign policy.³⁷

The provisions on issues relating directly to foreign policy are about the declaration of war, the forming and use of armed forces, appointment of foreign representatives and the making and ratification of international treaties. While some of these have been granted exclusively to one foundation, some entail the sharing of power and cooperation between two foundations. For instance, according to the constitution, declaring war is an authority granted only to the House of Representatives:

Founding fathers have viewed the power to declare war as one of the most important authorities monarchs possess and have granted this power not only to a single person, but to the Congress in which the people is represented.

"To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water..."³⁸

Furthermore, the House can also indirectly contribute to the shaping of foreign policy by using its power of purse regarding issues of the preparation of the budget and the allocation of funds. For instance, the House of Representatives reaching a negative decision on allotting funds for financial aid to be provided to a military operation conducted abroad or to a foreign country, is inevitable to have an impact, although indirectly and limitedly, on the foreign relations of the US.

Founding fathers have viewed the power to declare war as one of the most important authorities monarchs possess and have granted this power not only to a single person, but to the Congress in which the people is represented. At this point, the sensitivity the writers of the Constitution feel towards power being vested in the executive organ has played an important role. However, this situation does not mean that significant power has not been granted to the President, as the Constitution mentions an important duty the President is to fulfill by himself in times of the Congress declaring war:

37 Fisher, *Ibid.*, p.154.

38 Section 8 of Article 1 of the US Constitution.

*“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States”*³⁹

Apart from these powers granted exclusively to the House of Representatives and the President, important authorities have also been given to the Senate in foreign relations. The Senate plays an important role in the preparation and ratification of international treaties: According to the second section of Article 2, the Senate is responsible for giving “advice and consent” to the President on making treaties and appointing diplomatic officials, provided a two-thirds majority is reached. In other words, Presidents are not able to use the power to make international agreements or to assign a person to a foreign representative office on their own and are required to form cooperation with the Senate.⁴⁰

Although it was envisaged in the Constitution for the Senate to start an initiative by making suggestions to the President, generally Presidents bring treaties to the Senate for ratification after concluding them.⁴¹ As a matter of fact, the duty given to the Senate is not only about providing consent to the President that it is appropriate to ratify the treaty. However, even during the early years of the Republic, with first President George Washington making treaties with local Americans without the advice and consent of the Senate and submitting the final text to the Senate for ratification, this constitutional provision has started being eroded. In other words, rather than being a foundation that gives advice to the President, the Senate has become a foundation that ratifies the treaties made by the President.

When studying the Constitution, it could be understood that foreign policy is not left to the exclusive dominance of a single institution. Therefore, in the context of constitutional regulations, it is not quite easy to answer the question of “who is making foreign policy?” Justice Robert H. Jackson, in a famous essay on political authority under US Constitution, has said that the Constitution has not been able to establish a clear distribution of duties in the area of foreign policy by saying “*there is a zone of twilight in which [the president] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain*”.⁴²

39 Section 2 of Article 2 of the US Constitution. Alexander Hamilton, in *Federalist Papers*, indicate that the power to be Commander-in-Chief granted to the President could only be valid if the Congress grants such power and therefore, it is actually the Congress who has a say in the commanding of the army. According to Hamilton, the President could only get involved after an armed struggle starts and when compared with the power of the English King, the President’s power remains very limited. Alexander Hamilton, “The Real Character of the Executive”, (*Federalist Papers No.69 New York Packet*, (14 March 1788).

40 Hubert H. Humphrey, “The Senate in Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (July 1959), pp.525-526.

41 Michael J. Glennon, “Senate and Foreign Policy”, Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst (eds.), *Encyclopedia of the American Constitution*, Vol. 5, New York, Macmillan Reference, 2000, 2nd ed., pp.2361-2363.

42 Henkin, *Ibid.*, p.285.

Similarly, James P. Richards, complaining about the Congress’s role in foreign policy being overlooked and the existence of a false but widespread perception that the executive power conducts foreign policy on its own, believes that this uncertainty forms the basis for an endless struggle between the Congress and President in the process of making foreign policy.⁴³

Although the Constitution has not been able to draw a clear framework, there are three points American constitutional scholars agree upon to a great extent: 1) Daily foreign policy activities have been addressed by authors of the Constitution in the area of the executive organ. 2) Except for responding to sudden armed attacks, the use of armed forces against foreign countries is not within the authority of the executive, but in the power of the Congress. 3) The Congress’s ability to control legislative activities and financial resources invites the Congress to get involved in the foreign policy process concerning issues of foreign policy that require these.⁴⁴

The general consensus on the three points mentioned above has not been adequate in eliminating the uncertainty on what kind of function separation of powers will have in the area of foreign policy. Therefore, three different approaches have emerged on who will make foreign policy. While one group asserts that the President is the determining power in foreign policy⁴⁵, another group argues that it is the Congress who controls foreign policy. Those in the third group believe that the Congress has the final say, but that sharing of power which is balanced with the executive organ is necessary.⁴⁶ This much is certain that constitutional provisions have laid the foundation for the President and Congress to compete against each other to obtain dominance in foreign policy.

2.2. Struggle for Supremacy in Foreign Policy

It worth mentioning here that there are two opposite views regarding how much power the President should have. The first one, called the “constitutional” theory of the presidency, argues for limited presidential power and is represented by Abraham Lincoln. The other view, namely the “stewardship” theory of the presidency, argues for expansive presidential power. The following passage of Theodore Roosevelt is well known for its clear indication of rationale behind expansive presidential power:

43 James P. Richards, “The House of Representatives in Foreign Affairs”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 289, No. 1, (1953), pp.66-67.

44 Anthony G. McGrew, “Foreign Policy and the Constitution: Invitation to a Perpetual Institutional Struggle”, Richard Maidment and John Zvesper (eds.), *Reflections on the Constitution: The American Constitution after Two Hundred Years*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989, p.176.

45 Baker Spring, “Who Makes The American Foreign Policy?”, *The Heritage Foundation Research Report*, (April 29, 2011), <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/who-makes-american-foreign-policy>.

46 McGrew, *Ibid.*, pp.176-177.

... My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be done many things not previously done by the President and the heads of the departments. I did not usurp power but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power...⁴⁷

Richard Grimmett, who studies the power of the President and Congress in directing US foreign policy, indicates that in some periods the Congress dominates foreign policy, while in others Presidents come to the fore overshadowing the Congress. Grimmett puts it as follows:

The roles and relative influence of the two branches in making foreign policy differ from time to time according to such factors as the personalities of the President and Members of Congress and the degree of consensus on policy. Throughout American history there have been ebbs and flows of Presidential and congressional dominance in making foreign policy.⁴⁸

As the US isolating itself from European politics could also be understood from the second half of the 19th century being mentioned as “congressional government”,⁴⁹ this period corresponds to the years in which the Congress was very active. Although the President had obtained the opportunity to forge ahead once again in the struggle for supremacy with the start of the First World War, the Senate not ratifying the Versailles Treaty, which was completed by President Wilson, had ended the President’s relative superiority and until the Second World War, Congress domination has been experienced once again.⁵⁰

The Congress’s activity in the period between the two wars has come to an end with the Pearl Harbor Attack and Franklin D. Roosevelt has taken control of foreign policy by almost completely ignoring the Congress. For instance, the policy of forcing the Allies to surrender and the agreement reached with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at Yalta has personally and completely been the President’s choice and the Congress has had no significant effect in determining this policy,⁵¹ because Roosevelt has argued that the

47 “William Howard Taft: Limited Presidential Power” *Encyclopaedia Britannica: the American Presidency*, <http://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9116971>

48 Richard F. Grimmett, “Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress”, *CRS Report for Congress*, RL30193, (1 June 1999), pp.1-2.

49 Woodrow Wilson has given the title “*Congressional Government*” to his book he wrote in 1885 and in which he argued that the Congress has become an extremely strong institution.

50 James M. Lindsay, “Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (September 2003), p.533.

51 Ambrose, *Ibid.*, p.124.

President should be able to act in a manner he/she finds appropriate unless the constitution and laws forbid it and has brought a new perspective to the power and authority of the executive organ.

In order to overcome the economic difficulties of the 1930's, Roosevelt has assumed the role of leadership and by making use of this opportunity, has raised the executive power to a stronger position than it ever was,⁵² Roosevelt's practices in broadening the President's powers have entailed an example for the Presidents succeeding him. The conditions created by the Second World War and the Cold War have gradually weakened the decisiveness of the Congress within foreign policy. The President has started playing such a great role in deciding on foreign policy that when the American community is currently asked the question “who is making foreign policy?” most of the answers will be “the President”.⁵³

2.2.1. The Second World War and the President's Increasing Authority

During the 1930s, the combination of the Great Depression and the memory of tragic losses in First World War contributed to pushing American public opinion and policy toward isolationism which meant non-involvement in European and Asian conflicts and non-entanglement in international politics,⁵⁴ In fact a Neutrality Act has been enacted in Congress four times in the 1930s and it has received great acceptance among public opinion.⁵⁵ Therefore, different ways have been pursued to not enter the war that started in Europe, but also to support England due to US interests.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who delivered a speech in Congress shortly before the outbreak of the war, through his statement regarding the policy of isolation has expressed an idea that was widespread among the American people in that period:

True, we do live in a foreshortened world in which, compared to Washington's day, time and space are relatively annihilated. But I still thank God for two insulating oceans; and even though they be foreshortened, they are still our supreme benediction if they be widely and prudently used...

52 Şaban Tanıyıcı and Birol Akgün, *Amerikan Başkanlığı: Cumhuriyetten İmparatorluğa*, Ankara, Orion Kitabevi, 2008, pp.97-98.

53 Lindsay, *Ibid.*, p.531.

54 “American Isolationism in the 1930s”, *US Department of State Office of the Historian*, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/AmericanIsolationism>

55 In order to prevent the US from being included in the latest developments in Europe, the Congress has drawn up neutrality acts four times in 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1939. For detailed information see: “The Neutrality Acts, 1930s”, *US Department of State Office of the Historian*, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/Neutrality_acts

*We all have our sympathies and our natural emotions in behalf of the victims of national and international outrage all over the globe; but we are not, we cannot be, the world's protector or the world's policeman*⁵⁶

After the start of the Second World War, the US has begun to elude from its isolationist approach. While 64 percent of the community favored the maintenance of peace in May 1940, this ratio has decreased to 32 percent right before Pearl Harbor (December 1941).⁵⁷ The Pearl Harbor Attack occurring right when the community showed less reaction to the idea of entering war has greatly changed the US's stance on not interfering in European affairs.⁵⁸ Even Vandenberg, one of the leading isolationists, describes the Pearl Harbor attack as "the day isolationism ended".⁵⁹ The attack has caused the US to re-enter European diplomacy and the US has found itself in a war that has lasted until 1945. However, when the war ended, another one has started: the Cold War.

During the Cold War period, the US has tried to channel world policies as the founder and dominant actor of many international organizations like NATO, United Nations, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In this time span, the US has undergone institutional changes as required by its new role. In this sense, the first change that comes to mind is the Executive Office of President, established in 1939, being enlarged to a great extent.

The rapid increase in the number of officials working at the White House, comprised of those who the President trusts and works very closely with particularly on issues like determining a hidden agenda as necessitated by the Cold War, has provided a great advantage to the President in the process of determining policy and has greatly reduced the President's need for ministries and other public institutions.⁶⁰ In short, Presidents have highly evaded their dependence on other institutions due to expert staff incorporated within their scope. This situation has made it easier for the President to come to the forefront in determining foreign policy. Presidents who reach a more autonomous position with their own staff have started increasing their influence in making decisions concerning foreign policy. Then, the administrative structure of the executive organ has started being broadened. Within this framework, the National Security Act of 1947 has allowed the President to gain a central role in determining foreign policy by deciding on establishing a

56 Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, p.385.

57 *Ibid.*, p.392.

58 *Ibid.*, p.393.

59 Manfred Jonas, "Isolationism", *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, Alexander DeConde... [et.al.] Vol. 2, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 2nd ed., 2002, p.347.

60 Justin S. Vaughn and José D. Villalobos, "White House Staff", *New Directions in the American Presidency*, Lori Cox Han (ed.), New York, Routledge, 2011, pp.123-124.

National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.⁶¹

These new foundations responsible towards the President have been characterized as the President’s “mini Foreign Ministry”. It has also been observed that from time to time the close advisors of the President have played more significant roles than the secretaries. For instance, despite the objections of Secretary of State George Marshall, President Truman has decided on recognizing Israel in 1948 by taking the advice of his close advisor Clark Clifford, known also for forming the Truman Doctrine.⁶² It could be seen that the US deciding to take the stage among world states by abandoning its isolation policy and its policies in this direction have strengthened the presidential system and the role assumed by the President within this system.⁶³

Over time policy decision makers and public opinion have become used to the idea that the Cold War could constitute a threat to US interests at any time and therefore foreign policy should be formed by expert staff. The thought that Congress cannot be as successful as the President in protecting national interests has made it easier for Presidents to establish dominance in this area, because especially during the first years of the Cold War, the American community had believed that Soviet threat could only be confronted with a strong President and had found it necessary for authority to be under the control of the executive branch.

The idea that the President is more authorized than Congress in determining foreign policy or that it is legitimate for the President to dominate this field is also widespread among Congress members⁶⁴. Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s statement that “*the Constitution gives the President exclusive priorities in international relations... there is no practical way for us to take those priorities from him*” is considered as an important indication at this point.⁶⁵ In fact, there are even those who believe that Congress members experience an “inferiority complex” towards the President due to their ineffectiveness.⁶⁶

61 Meena Bose, “The Presidency and Foreign Policy”, *New Directions in the American Presidency*, Lori Cox Han (ed.), New York, Routledge, 2011, pp.180-181.

62 Albert Bowman and Robert A. Divine, “Presidential Advisors”, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, Alexander DeConde... [et.al.], Vol. 3, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2nd ed., 2002, p.185.

63 Ömürgönülşen, *Ibid.*, p.319.

64 John T. Rourke, “Congress and Cold War”, *World Affairs*, Vol. 139, No. 4, (Spring 1977), p.259. As a result of questions posed to 82 Congress members in a survey conducted in 1969 as mentioned by Rourke, only four members have thought that the Congress should strive to have equal power with the President. According to Rourke, this is an important reason for Congress members leaving foreign policy to the President’s realm of authority.

65 John T. Rourke, “Congress, the Executive, and Foreign Policy: A Propositional Analysis”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (Spring 1980), pp.183-184.

66 John F. Manley, “The Rise of Congress in Foreign Policy-Making”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 397, No. 1, (1971), p.70.

Another reason for Presidents being more actively concerned with foreign policy is due to the privilege and supremacy they possess in the field of intelligence. All intelligence units sharing the information they have with only the President as to keeping it hidden from public opinion provides the President an advantage in determining foreign policy and in particular, in determining policies of defense and security.⁶⁷ Moreover, it is indicated that the belief of intelligence units that rather than long-term goals of the country, the priorities of Congress members is to win elections again in the short run, has created an approach that Congress members cannot be trusted.⁶⁸

A reason for Congress losing its influence in foreign policy issues concerning national security is based on the election system, because Congress members work in line with the community's expectations as possible and in order to be re-elected, spend a significant amount of their time on fulfilling their responsibilities. House of Representatives members in particular organize election campaigns biennially that require large financial resources and spend most of their working hours in electoral districts in order to receive the support they need.⁶⁹

Candidates for Congress who believe remaining indifferent to the electorates' requests and expectations as a sufficient reason for losing the elections, consider addressing local problems more of a priority than dealing with national issues.⁷⁰ When taking into account that 80-90 percent of members of the House of Representatives have been re-elected in the following elections, it becomes clear that the representatives have not been able to remain insensitive to the requests in the electoral districts.⁷¹ (This situation, as will be addressed later on, is very important for Armenian Genocide bills.)

Congress members not having enough knowledge on foreign policy issues has also emerged as an important factor in the Congress putting more emphasis on domestic policy issues. The Representatives, who prefer to work more on issues that concern the electorates, believe that foreign policies requiring expertise and intelligence should be determined by the President who has a specialized team in this area.

67 Haskell, *Ibid.*, pp.316-317.

68 Jennifer D. Kibbe, "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Approaches to Solving the Problem", *Prepared for presentation at the 2009 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*, Toronto, Canada, (5 September 2009).

69 David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974, pp. 13-19 and 81-82; Rourke, *Congress, the Executive, and Foreign Policy*, p.183.

70 Kay King, "Congress and National Security", *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)*, Special Report, No. 58, (November 2010), p.9.

71 Haskell, *Ibid.*, p.102. Based on the information provided by Haskell, the ratio of deputies re-elected in the 23 elections held from 1964-2008 for the House of Representatives ranges from 85 to 98 percent. That is to say, the number of deputies keeping their chairs in the Assembly with a total of 435 members ranges from 370 to 426.

Presidents, who put forth that very important threats have been encountered during the Cold War period concerning security, has played a more active and effective role in determining foreign policy. According to one interpretation, although the Congress wanted to have a role in complicated foreign policy issues, it has not wanted to be responsible as much. As a result of Presidents acting more willing, while Congress members act more timid, the President’s significance has relatively increased in foreign policy and the Congress has lost its influence in this area.⁷² Hence, while President Truman, who served in the early years of the Cold War, applied in Korea the doctrine which was referred to with his name and was based on surrounding communism everywhere, he never consulted the Congress.⁷³ While bringing the US into the Korean War, President Truman has also not found it necessary for the Congress to declare war.

Dwight D. Eisenhower replacing Truman has also served in a period where the race for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles had gained momentum and in which the fear caused by Pearl Harbor was intense and instead of consulting the Congress on certain foreign policy issues, has only notified the Congress after taking the decisions he pleased. For instance, Eisenhower allowing the CIA to conduct secret operations for the overthrowing of the governments of Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 has been kept hidden from Congress (and therefore public opinion).⁷⁴ Eisenhower who said that “*I prefer to be relieved of duty than to fail in protecting America’s vital interests*”, has clearly shown his sensitivity in the issue of national interests and that he will know no bounds to exceeding his powers if necessary.⁷⁵

As could be seen from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs Invasion, John F. Kennedy, who took the chair of President in the early 1960’s in which the Cold War was felt the most intensely, has also shaped foreign policy without almost not requiring the Congress at all,⁷⁶ because during this period, the Congress had taken an approach towards leaving the administration of politics entirely to the President. Presidents in return have highly benefited from the Congress’s partisan approach and its support given to the President.

Following the 1940’s, the Presidents starting to act without paying attention to Congress and pushing the limits of their powers has been considered as Presidents acting like “emperors” and a concept called “imperial presidency”

72 John T. Rourke, *Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study of Interaction and Influence 1945-1982*, Boulder, Co., Westview, 1983, p. xv.

73 Ambrose, *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.

74 Duignan, *Ibid.*, p.260.

75 Robert Accinelli, “Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (1990), p.332.

76 Ambrose, *Ibid.*, pp.125-126.

has emerged. For instance, Arthur Schlesinger, in his popular book he has given this title, by drawing attention to the policies in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and to the structuring in the office of Presidency of the Nixon and Johnson governments, he has defended that the President has exceeded his limits drawn out in the Constitution and has become an uncontrollable power.⁷⁷

2.2.2. The Vietnam War, War Powers Act and the Congress's Search for Authority

As a result of increasing concerns felt after the legislative branch lost its function, Congress members have started legislative activities directed towards limiting the President's authority. As expected, initiatives with the purpose of making the Congress more effective, have wanted to be prevented by Presidents. However, by turning the President's gradually increasing dominance within foreign policy upside down, the Vietnam War has caused the establishment of a more balanced legislative-executive relationship in this area and the Congress to reach a more effective position in foreign policy just as was the situation before the 1940's.⁷⁸

It is a general conviction that the Vietnam War has caused trauma among American community and has pushed the Congress in actively being involved in foreign policy.⁷⁹ It is not a coincidence that the "War Powers Resolution" (WPR) emphasizing that the President and Congress must act together in the process of determining foreign policy (particularly in situations of using military personnel) has been adopted at a time when Nixon's prestige was shattered due to the Watergate Scandal.⁸⁰ The WPR is somewhat a brake that the Congress has tried to bring against the increasing powers of the President. The Congress has merely declared to the President that he should also join in the process of determining foreign policy.

The WPR which is a concrete indication of the Congress members' reaction towards their President, who pays no attention to them, is based on the justification that a policy of using military power could only be implemented with the approval of the Congress⁸¹. In order to limit the President's authority and confirm that the Congress has a say in foreign policy and national security,

77 Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1973.

78 Manley, *Ibid.*, pp.60-63.

79 Lee H. Hamilton and Michael H. Van Dusen, "Making the Separation of Powers Work", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Fall 1978), p.17.

80 Hamilton and Van Dusen, *Ibid.*, pp.18-19.

81 James Meernik, "Congress, the President, and the Commitment of the U. S. Military", *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 3, (August 1995), pp.377-392.

the Congress has adopted this act with a majority⁸² enough to prevent the President from vetoing it.

The Resolution’s first paragraph of the second section entitled “Purpose and Policy” emphasizes that the use of US military forces could only be possible through the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President, while the third paragraph of the same section indicates that the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief can only be used in situations where the Congress declares war, specific statutory authorization is granted or an emergency is created by attack on the US. The third section of the Resolution confirms that the President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress in introducing armed forces into hostilities.

In short, the WPR emphasizes that the President’s powers are not endless, that the Congress has a say in foreign policy and the legislative and executive organs have the power to control each other according to the Constitution.⁸³ However, the aforementioned Resolution has failed in limiting the Presidents as expected. No President until now has accepted that the Congress could draw a limit with this Resolution, which they allege to be contradictory to the Constitution.⁸⁴

The Presidents who ignored the Congress while determining foreign policy and intervening in the legislative organ have also continued after the adoption of this resolution. For instance, when the military operation directed towards Serbia in 1999 had come to the agenda, President Clinton, by expressing that foreign policy is within his area of authority as President and does not require Congress approval, has seen no harm in ignoring the Congress and commanding the armed intervention of US military forces through his own initiative.⁸⁵

Grimmett, who researches how conformingly Presidents act to the WPR, indicates that the Presidents act as if this resolution does not exist and that in

82 In a situation where a resolution passing through both wings of Congress is adopted with a two-thirds majority, it is not possible to be vetoed by the President. The WPR has received two-thirds majority in both wings and President Nixon, who was believed to certainly veto it, has not been able to use his veto power.

83 Richard F. Grimmett, “The War Powers Resolution after Thirty-four Years”, *CRS Report for Congress*, RL32267, (10 March 2008).

84 John O. McGinnis, “Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers”, *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 56, No. 4, (1993), pp.293-294.

85 Geoffrey S. Corn, “Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers Resolution,” *William and Mary Law Review*, Vol. 42, No. 4, (2001), pp.1186-1190. Upon Clinton deciding to participate in the Kosovo operation without consulting the Congress, 39 members of Congress have sent a letter to the President expressing that this decision is contradictory to the Constitution and the WPR and that Congress approval is necessary. Following this initiative that failed to pursue the President in abandoning his decision, California Representative Thomas J. Campbell has filed a lawsuit against Clinton, but the court has ruled that the Congress has indirectly accepts the President’s decision by allocating resources to the military operation and therefore, the accusation directed towards the President cannot be accepted.

practice the resolution is far from maintaining a balance between the legislative and executive branches.⁸⁶ Consequently, similar to Truman entering the Korean War in 1950 without a declaration of war, George H. W. Bush when entering Iraq in 1991, Clinton when entering Serbia in 1999 and lastly George Bush when entering Iraq and Afghanistan expressing that Congress approval is not required to organize a military operation, displays that the WPR has not attained its purpose, because it is clear that based on the Constitution and the WPR, these kinds of military operations require Congress approval.

President Bush's approach that became concrete with his statement before the Gulf War of "*I don't think that a decision of Congress is required*"⁸⁷ is not an exception but has become the common approach of all Presidents serving after 1945. Following Truman's example, no President has required the Congress's declaration of war.⁸⁸ Despite the US entering into hundreds of armed conflicts, there being a declaration of war by the Congress only five times until now is a clear indication of this.

The legislative-executive balance being corrupted within the area of foreign policy authorities has gained more clarity following the September 11 attack. President George Bush has started a period in which the President, tried to be constrained after the Vietnam War, once again dominated foreign policy and has in fact caused the President to turn into an incontestable authority.

2.2.3. September 11 and the President's Supreme Authority in Foreign Policy

The Bush Administration, who argued that after September 11 the US was under a major threat, that laws prepared for ordinary periods were not sufficient for such extraordinary times and that the President could resort to all kinds of means in order to protect his country and people, has been criticized with this stance for violating the principles of sharing of power and making joint decisions in foreign policy as emphasized in the Constitution.

Vice-President Dick Cheney, the leading name within the Bush administration who is behind the attempts directed towards broadening the President's power and area of authority, has said that there has been an erosion of the President's power and capabilities after the Vietnam War, that this situation entails an obstacle to the President performing his duties and that the President cannot

86 Richard F. Grimmett, "War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance," *CRS Report for Congress*, RL33532, (23 September 2010).

87 Michael J. Glennon, "The Gulf War and the Constitution", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2, (Spring 1991), p.84.

88 Ritchie, *Ibid.*, p.97.

be in a position where he submits to the Congress’s requests.⁸⁹ Eventually, the White House has declared following September 11 that it will refrain from applying the laws which would harm the authority of the administration.⁹⁰

Vice-President Dick Cheney’s aide David Addington is also shown as one of the ideologists of the “unitary executive” theory which defends that the President could take one-sided decisions and cannot be confined by the Congress or judicial bodies⁹¹. With the conviction that the President making a request to the Congress to take a decision means that the President has no sufficient power, he has tried to keep the Congress outside of foreign policy issues as much as possible.⁹²

President Bush’s legal advisors have argued that when national security is in question, the Congress has no power to restrict or control the President since the President is “commander-in-chief” and “chief of state”.⁹³ According to the Bush administration, the President has an inherent and an unlimited authority on the point of deciding on foreign policy and the use of armed power.⁹⁴ Allegations in this direction have once again revived the “imperial presidency” discourse.⁹⁵ It has been argued that within the context of President Bush’s “war on terror”, his stance that it is even legitimate to torture the prisoners belonging to Al-Qaeda by completely ignoring the Geneva Convention entails the most extreme point of imperial presidency.⁹⁶

The Bush Administration’s allegations that the executive branch cannot be confined have also been the subject of some cases tried in the Supreme Court. For instance, in the case of *Hamdi et al. vs. Rumsfeld*, US citizen Yaser Hamdi, caught in Afghanistan in 2002 on charges of being a Taliban member, and brought to the US, has been arrested for an unknown period based on the view that the arresting of a military official is legitimate. During the trial, Hamdi’s father had argue that his son’s essential human rights have been violated, whereas the Bush Administration has asserted that the President, based on his title of “commander-in-chief”, could order the arresting of anyone he finds to

89 Gordon Silverstein, “Bush, Cheney, and the Separation of Powers: A Lasting Legal Legacy?”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 2009), p.878.

90 John Yoo, “How the Presidency Regained Its Balance”, *The New York Times*, 17 September 2006.

91 Dana Milbank, “In Cheney’s Shadow, Counsel Pushes the Conservative Cause”, *The Washington Post*, 11 October 2004. p.A21.

92 Goldsmith, *Ibid.*, pp.99-141.

93 Goldsmith, *Ibid.*, p.97.

94 David G. Adler, “Presidential Power and Foreign Affairs in the Bush Administration: The Use and Abuse of Alexander Hamilton”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3, (September 2010), pp.531-543.

95 Timothy S. Boylan, “War Powers, Constitutional Balance, and the Imperial Presidency Idea at Century’s End”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 2, (June 1999), pp.232-249.

96 James P. Pfiffner, *Power Play: The Bush Presidency and the Constitution*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2008, p.149.

be an enemy combatant and neither the Congress nor the legislation have the right to interfere.⁹⁷

The Supreme Court, by finding Hamdi to be justified, has ruled that the decision to arrest him is groundless, but at the same time has indicated that the President has wide ranging powers within the context of war on terror. Sandra Day o'Connor, one of the judges of the trial, by expressing that the war will not grant unlimited powers to the President although the Congress has granted authority, has said that the Bush Administration abuses the “war on terror” justification and has exceeded the limit of authority bestowed to him by the Congress.⁹⁸

Within the framework of the allegation that the Bush Administration has unlimited power, through the “statement of administration policy”, many bills have been threatened to be vetoed by the President with the idea that it will harm the “unitary executive”. For instance, bill numbered 965, due to entailing a deduction in the funds allocated for the US soldiers serving in Iraq, has been criticized by the President for “endangering national security” and it has been declared that unless the requested changes are made, the President will veto the bill when it is submitted for signature.⁹⁹ President Bush’s presidential statements he frequently uses are clearly entering within the authority of the Congress and the separation of powers being disregarded. This approach must be recognized as the concrete indication of the executive attempting to disable the Congress by intervening in legislation.

Executive orders emerge as another instrument which the Presidents use in order to impose their own policies on the Congress. Executive orders, “based on the constitutional power granted to them for being head of government”, are orders issued by Presidents for the concerning units of the executive branch. To give an example to executive orders, one of the first points that come to mind is executive order no. 9066 issued by President Franklin Roosevelt.¹⁰⁰ With this order issued by the President following the Pearl Harbor attack approximately 112.000 people of Japanese origin living in the West of the US have been subjected to forced migration.¹⁰¹

97 Genovese and Spitzer, *Ibid.*, pp.215-223.

98 Fred Barbash, “Supreme Court Backs Civil Liberties in Terror Cases”, *The Washington Post*, 28 June 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11657-2004Jun28.html>

99 “Statement of Administration Policy: S.965-U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act”, (27 March 2007).

100 “Executive Order 9066 - Authorizing the Secretary of War To Prescribe Military Areas”, 17 February 1942, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc_large_image.php?doc=74

101 *Toyosaburo Korematsu*, an American citizen of Japanese descent, being forced to migrate, had been arrested by the FBI in 1942 for remaining in a region which was determined as being a military area. On grounds that executive order no. 9066, which formed the foundation for him being displaced, was racial discrimination, Korematsu had appealed to the Supreme Court for the order being contradictory to the Constitution and the case was concluded on 18 December

These kinds of practices, which could be considered as intervention in the power of the legislative organ, being resorted to more frequently recently is an important factor in the Congress losing its function and power. While the number of orders issued after 1945 is around 6000,¹⁰² 300 executive orders being issued only by the Bush Administration will be helpful in understanding what is meant by "unitary executive".

There is another instrument which Presidents use to fulfill their legislative powers: executive agreements. Executive agreements are international texts which create the same effects as treaties. Its difference from treaties is that it does not require the Senate's "advice and consent" and solely depends on the decision of the executive.

By preferring to make executive agreements, Presidents do not give the Senate the opportunity to use its constitutional right and are able to resolve international relations within the range of their own powers without bringing them to Congress. This way, no situation is experienced where the Senate does not give approval and the agreement found appropriate by the President is able to be implemented in a short manner. In fact, executive agreements cannot be distinguished from treaties in terms of bringing international liabilities to the US.¹⁰³ A serious increase in the number of executive agreements has taken place following September 11.

What is important here is that resort to this method has become more widespread after the Second World War. While executive agreements accounted for one third of all international agreements in the early years of the Republic, during the period after the Second World War 90 percent of the agreements were prepared as executive agreements.¹⁰⁴ These numbers show that the Congress in the post-war period and especially the Senate having the authority to ratify treaties are not able to use a right accorded to them and that the President has broadened his power in international relations.

To sum it up, although it was wanted for the President to have unquestionable

1944. It was ruled in the decision that "Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because the US is at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion and felt constrained to take proper security measures. Therefore there is no contradiction to the Constitution on the basis of racial discrimination". The decision has emphasized that in extraordinary war situations, the government has the right to change its citizens' places. U.S. Supreme Court, *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214, (18 December 1944), For the text of the decision of the case see: <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case& court=us&vol=323&page=214>

102 "Executive Orders", *The American Presidency Project*, University of California, Santa Barbara, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/executive_orders.php

103 John Yoo, "Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements", *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 99, No. 4, (February 2001), pp.757-852.

104 Yoo, *Ibid*, p.758.

superior power in foreign policy at a time when the Constitution was being prepared, based on the thought that it would not be legitimate for the Congress to restrict Presidents for being the highest authority of the executive and the commander-in-chief of armed forces, Presidents after the Second World War have not refrained from putting their bilateral decisions into practice. Even more, Presidents have argued that it is legitimate for them to intervene to the legislative body in situations they deem necessary. When national security is the point in question, this stance of Presidents has become harsher and they have tried to direct the Congress in line with their own desires and intentions.

Although it was wanted for the President to have unquestionable superior power in foreign policy at a time when the Constitution was being prepared, based on the thought that it would not be legitimate for the Congress to restrict Presidents for being the highest authority of the executive and the commander-in-chief of armed forces, Presidents after the Second World War have not refrained from putting their bilateral decisions into practice.

Many policies implemented during the Cold War period and during the period of war on terror after September 11 personally being prepared by Presidents strongly confirm this finding.

Apart from the requirements of foreign policy agenda, factors such as the President being more in the limelight, personally representing his country abroad, negotiating international treaties and public opinion regarding the President as the most legitimate actor among the determinants of foreign policy have contributed to the President's significance in foreign policy to increase.¹⁰⁵ When the Congress's willing approach to leave decisions concerning foreign affairs to the President joins with the Presidents' will to bring this area under their own dominance, in time the Congress has lost its influence which it was able to maintain until the 1930's. In fact, there

are even those who argue that the Congress had totally submitted to the President.¹⁰⁶

Parallel to national security based issues such as the Cold War and "war on terror" gaining significance, it could be seen that the significance of Presidents in determining international relations has increased while on the opposite Congress members focusing more on local problems and requests received from electors have indirectly caused the Congress to lose power in foreign policy. Although in the Constitution it states that foreign policy should be conducted through the balance achieved between the legislative and executive

105 Ralph G. Carter, "Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior: Persistent Patterns of the Postwar Period", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Spring 1988), pp.349-350.

106 Haskell, *Ibid.*, p.303.

organs, it is clear that this balance has been disrupted after the Second World War. It is certain that this development will affect the US’s foreign relations, because a great number of Congress members reaching a decision together and the President and a group close to him making a decision will cause very different results to be obtained.

While it does not seem very likely for Presidents to pursue a policy that will be to the disadvantage of national interests in order to win elections again, it is more likely for Congress members to act in accordance with their own interests by thinking not on an international dimension but within a local framework, because Representatives and Senators wanting to be re-elected is accepted as an indisputable fact. Hence, House of Representatives member Frank Smith, by saying “*all members of the Congress have a primary interest in being re-elected. Some members have no other interest*”, has displayed the importance of personal interests for Congress members. Therefore, it is possible that sometimes Congress members will put their personal interests before national interests.¹⁰⁷ In short, the power of the presidency has grown despite the Constitution granting few enumerated powers to the President. Times of war and domestic crisis such as the Great Depression and September 11 incidents have caused the powers of the presidency to grow. Moreover, Congress has sometimes assisted this growth with delegations of power to the executive branch.¹⁰⁸

The exploration above posits that the President has reached the position of being the only determinant of foreign policy. On the other hand, the Congress has developed an inclination to act in accordance with the decisions reached, to support the President by enacting the laws he wants and for foreign policy to be conducted over parties, to accept the executive’s superiority in this area.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the primary source in foreign policy decision making has emerged as the Presidency, whereas the Congress has generally had to follow the President in the process of policy making concerning issues of vital importance and to act in accordance with the President’s will.

If this finding is taken into notice, it will be plausible to expect Presidents to oppose a legislative activity which they believe will have repercussions on US national interests. In the case study which will be addressed based on this conclusion in the next section, by means of opposing the “Armenian genocide” bills/resolutions which they classify as “a development that will put American

107 James M. Lindsay, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp.2-5.

108 Sue Burum, “Constitutional Theories of Executive Power: Effects on Current and Future Decision Making in the Executive Branch and on the US Supreme Court”, *National Social Science Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 2, (2010), p.32.

109 Randall Woods, “Bipartisanship”, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, Alexander DeConde... [et.al.] Vol. 1, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2nd Edition, 2002, pp.155-163.

interests into danger by harming relations with Turkey”, Presidents display their dominance in determining foreign relations. By means of this case study, the difficulty in determining foreign policy when national interests are in question, and the struggle between the legislative-executive are tried to be concretized.

3. Congress and President within the Framework of “Genocide” Resolutions

Bills which argue that “1.5 million Armenians have died due to the relocation decision taken during the Ottoman Empire and this constitutes a crime of genocide; the US must recognize these deaths as genocide and determine its foreign policy according to this”, is an important element of relations in the US-Turkey-Armenia triangle.

Diplomatic relations between countries are shattered during the discussion of each bill in the committee. Turkey underlines what kinds of difficulties will emerge for the US if such a bill becomes a law, whereas Armenia argues that if the bill is adopted, the US will have taken a step that will constitute an example for the entire world. The Armenian diaspora, by finding a sponsor each year without ceasing to pursue this issue, shows effort in bringing the bill to the Congress; on the opposite, by emphasizing the difficulties to be created for the US with such a law, Turkey makes the suggestion for the President to take the bill off the Congress’s agenda. This situation, which shows that the two countries approach the matter very differently, cause the issue to remain unresolved and for the bills to appear on the agenda once again.

Congress members, who especially represent the regions in which the densest number of Armenians live, appear more willing in submitting the bill to the Congress in accordance with the Armenian claims and expectations, while US Presidents, by referring to the possible repercussions of such a law, try to prevent the adoption of the bill by intervening in the legislative process.

Only five of the tens of bills/resolutions referred to the commissions until now have been able to be adopted in the committee and none of the initiatives have been able to receive a statutory provision. Many times the President and/or cabinet members have openly called on the Congress to drop the bill from the agenda. The process has each time resulted according to what the Presidents want, the process has not been able to be completed and therefore, the bills have become null and void.

The endless attempts of the Congress to adopt a law concerning the Armenian genocide allegations and the Presidents’ determination in preventing this

constitute a concrete reflection of the struggle between the legislative and executive departments to dominate foreign relations. If it is recalled that in the previous section it was said that the Presidents had domination in foreign policy and made decisions according to national interests rather than personal ones, it will be understood why the Presidents have opposed the genocide bills which they consider as "a law that will put the US's vital interests in the Middle East to jeopardy".

On the other hand, it is thought that the Congress members who bring the bills to the agenda calculate the Armenian votes which have significant influence in the narrow zoned electoral system. For instance, Californian Representative Republican James Rogan who has no specialization in foreign policy, presenting a bill in 2000 which foresees the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations is linked to him entering a difficult election race and the polling district being the place which harbors the most concentrated Armenian population in America.

Ret. Ambassador Ö. Engin Lütem also defends that the bills are to please the Armenian voters. According to Lütem, although many errors of facts in the justification section of the bills were brought to the attention of the House of Representatives by Turkish organizations and people for over ten years, these reactions being ignored show that the purpose of the bills is rather than addressing the facts, to satisfy the Armenian community in the US.¹¹⁰

In the following pages an analysis of the constantly renewing legislative attempts of Congress members and the approach of the Presidents to prevent this exist and the background of the Armenian genocide allegations, the bills entailing these allegations, how the issue is addressed during the legislative process and the Presidents' reactions towards these initiatives are studied.

3.1. Genocide Resolutions Coming to the Agenda of the Congress

The Armenian diaspora has firstly led to resolutions being adopted in states which recognize the "genocide" with the idea that these will form a basis for their activities in the Congress. Following these resolutions adopted in states, the primary goal of the Armenian diaspora has been for a resolution to be adopted in the Congress or for a law to be enacted in this direction. Attempts for this have not been able to reach the ultimate goal yet. However, the resolutions of years 2000, 2005, 2007 and 2010 mentioned below have been adopted in the concerning commission of the House of Representatives.

110 Ömer E. Lütem, "ABD'de Yeni Karar Tasarıları," *Center for Eurasian Studies*, 17 June 2011.
<http://www.avim.org.tr/degerlendirmetekli.php?makaleid=4843>

3.1.1. H.Res.398/H.Res.596 and the Clinton Administration

Resolution numbered H.Res.596, submitted by Californian Representative George Radanovich, is almost the same as H.Res.398 entitled “Training on and Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide Resolution”, which was submitted by the same Representative to the House of Representatives on 18 November 1999 and then referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The difference between the resolutions in terms of content is that apart from resolution 398 verifying that “the US records holds documentation on the Armenian genocide”, it also foresees US diplomats working in the field of human rights to be provided with training on the “Armenian genocide”.¹¹¹

Resolution 398 has been transferred to the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights on 15 February 2000 and a session has been held on 14 September 2000 regarding the resolution.¹¹² In this session, (Ret. Ambassador) Gündüz Aktan and Prof. Dr. Justin McCarthy have given presentations against the resolution. Gündüz Aktan had called on the Armenians to bring their allegations to the Hague Justice Portal.¹¹³ On the other hand, McCarthy had proposed for Ottoman, Russian and Armenian archives to be opened and researched by historians.¹¹⁴ Democrat Representative Tom Lantos from California and Republican Representative Dan Burton from Indiana have also been among the leading persons opposing the resolution.

In the hearings taking place in the subcommittee, pro-Armenian historians have said that there is no need for Turkish archives to be opened and that based on existing information there is already an agreement that genocide has been committed towards the Armenians. On 21 September, the subcommittee has decided to submit the resolution for voting to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Committee has addressed the resolution on 28 September, but the resolution has partially been softened due to the strong opposition of some Congress members and its discussion has been delayed to a week later.¹¹⁵

Radanovich, the sponsor of H.Res.398, has partially amended the resolution and submitted it to the House of Representatives once again. This way, H.Res.596 replacing H.Res.398 has been discussed on 3 October 2000 in the Committee and as a result of the voting, has been adopted with 24 votes against 11. Following this development it has been put on the calendar to be addressed

111 “H.Res.398: United States Training on and Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide Resolution,” *106th Congress*. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-106hres398ih/pdf/BILLS-106hres398ih.pdf>.

112 “Washington’la Kritik Günler”, *Milliyet*, 13 September 2000, p.17.

113 “Cem: Lahey Pazarlığına Girmeyiz”, *Milliyet*, 17 September 2000, p.24.

114 “Erivan’a Hodri Meydan”, *Milliyet*, 16 September 2000, p.13.

115 “Tasarı Duvara Tosladı”, *Milliyet*, 29 September 2000, p.15.

in the House on October 4 and a report has been issued by the Committee regarding the resolution. Apart from the justifications of the resolution, reasons for representatives opposing the resolution have also been mentioned in the report and views on Turkish-American relations have been listed.

The resolution has been put on the agenda to be discussed in the House on 19 October. On the day the meeting was to be held, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert had received a letter hours to the voting from President Clinton and had removed the resolution off the agenda of the House. Not only had Hastert prevented the resolution, which he also personally supported, from being addressed, but also requested from the leader of the Republican Party which had a majority in the House for it not to be brought to the agenda again during the 106th Congress.¹¹⁶

Also with the effect of warnings received from Turkey, it has been observed that US President Clinton has shown efforts to remove the resolution from the agenda. In the letter he sent to Hastert in which he expressed he feels deep concern, President Clinton who wrote "*I fully understand how strongly both Turkey and Armenia feel about this issue. Ultimately, this painful matter can only be resolved by both sides examining the past together*", has also written "*I urge you in the strongest terms not to bring this Resolution to the floor at this time*", clearly expressing that he does not have a positive view on the Congress's attempt.¹¹⁷

In his letter, Clinton has emphasized that the addressing of the resolution in the House will create grave concerns for American "national security". Clinton, who expressed that the US has significant interests in the region which he defined to be a "troubled region of the world", has warned that the improved relations between Turkey-Armenia could be harmed if the resolution is considered¹¹⁸. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton has also sent a letter to Hastert expressing "*we must show our feelings of gratitude to Turkey which has provided support to the Operation Discovery from the North and the operations in the Balkans*". Gerald Ford and (Ret. General) Brent Scowcroft, having served as national security advisor to George W. H. Bush, have also been among those sending a letter to Hastert, by warning him that the US will seriously be harmed if the term "genocide" is used.¹¹⁹

116 "Clinton Durdurdu", *Milliyet*, 20 October 2000, p.12.

117 After the bill was removed from the agenda of the House upon Clinton's "national interests" justification, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, in a letter sent to the President had thanked him by saying "*I convey to you my gratitude for your letter which had a great impact*". "Ecevit'ten Clinton'a Şükran Mektubu", *Milliyet*, 21 October 2000, p.21.

118 For the full text of the letter President Clinton wrote to Hastert on 19 November 2000 see: <http://www.anca.org/596-hastert.html>

119 "Former US National Security Adviser Opposes US Resolution on Armenian Issue," *Turkish Daily News*, 14 September 2005; "Ermeni Tasarısı Amerikan Çıkarlarına Aykırı," *VOA News*, 12 September 2005.

In the letter written in response to the mentioned letter, Hastert has said “*The President has raised grave national security concerns, he has requested that the House not consider H.Res.596... I have acceded to this request*”. By expressing that he personally supports this resolution being brought to the House floor, Hastert has stated “*The President believes that passage of this resolution may adversely impact the situation in the Middle East and risk the lives of Americans. This is not an idle request... We must take these concerns into consideration...*”¹²⁰

In short, a resolution supported by many members of Congress has been taken off the agenda due to the President’s warnings that “it will harm national security”. It is apparent that Clinton, who although not has used the word “genocide” at all in his 24 April Statements but indicated many times that 1.5 million Armenians have died in the years 1915-1923, has opposed the resolution for reasons such as national interests, Turkish-American relations and Turkish-Armenian relations.

In the first section of this article it was indicated that Congress members gave more importance to short term foreign policy issues and issues which took voter requests into account rather than national security and long term issues of foreign policy. By brining to mind this issue, it must be underlined that the date on which the Representatives brought the resolution to the agenda occurred right before the elections to be held in November 2000. As a matter of fact, by saying that “*the resolution is not an attempt against Turkey, it is only a struggle to win the very critical indecisive Armenian voters in some electoral districts*”, American historian Prof. Justin McCarthy, who spoke to the Milliyet newspaper, has declared that what took place was actually based on a calculation of votes.¹²¹ Moreover, Hastert, who was Chairman of the House at that time, starting to work at a lobby company that defends Turkey’s interests following his retirement, strengthens McCarthy’s idea.

Similarly, the *American Journal of International Law*, which commented on the resolution, has written that Democrat Representative from California James E. Rogan, as one of the sponsors of the resolution, has launched such a genocide campaign in order to be re-elected from one of the regions in which the greatest number of Armenian-Americans live, but that he has not been able to be re-elected since the resolution did not pass into law.¹²² This evaluation also points out that those supporting the resolution viewed it as investment in the election.

120 For the full text of the press release of 19 November 2000 by Hastert that he removed the resolution from the agenda see: <http://www.anca.org/596-hastert.html>

121 “Tarihden Korkmayın”, *Milliyet*, 28 September 2000, p.15.

122 “Defeat of House Resolution on Armenian Genocide”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 95, No. 2, (April 2001), pp.396-397.

This failure has not been able to halt Armenian endeavors. Resolutions with similar scope have come to the agenda in the 2000's by finding more sponsors each year and some have succeeded in passing from the Committee. The first examples to these are H.Res.316 and H.Con.Res.195 that were adopted on the same day in the Committee on Foreign Affairs in September 2005.

3.1.2. H.Res.316, H.Con.Res.195 and H.Res.106 and the Bush Administration

Resolution H.Res.316 entitled "Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution"¹²³ which calls the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the US reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian genocide, has been presented to the House of Representatives on 14 June 2005 by George Radanovich who was also sponsor of similar initiatives before.

H.Con.Res.195, "urging the Government of the Republic of Turkey to acknowledge the culpability of its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, for the Armenian Genocide and engage in rapprochement with the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian people"¹²⁴ by another prominent Armenian advocate Representative Adam Schiff has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives in June 2005.

Both proposed bills, similar to the ones before, have alleged that 1.5 million Armenians were subjected to genocide and this "genocide" was the first of the 20th century. The explanation supporting the genocide allegations and the resolutions referring to law and documents call upon the President to commemorate the victims of the Armenian genocide. Therefore, it could be seen that the resolutions also serve the purpose of the President declaring that he recognizes the genocide which is the second goal of the diaspora.

The two resolutions have been addressed in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on 15 September 2005. Most of the deputies speaking during the session have made statements that support the resolutions

123 "H.Res.316: Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution" *109th Congress*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hres316ih/pdf/BILLS-109hres316ih.pdf>

124 There is a provision in H.Con.Res.195 that does not exist in the others. According to this, if the Republic of Turkey acknowledge the culpability of the Ottoman Empire for the "Armenian genocide", engage in rapprochement with Armenia and meets certain criteria of the EU, the Congress will support the accession of Turkey to the EU. In other words, the Congress conditions its support for Turkey's EU membership to the recognition of the Armenian "genocide". "H.Con.Res.195: Commemorating the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923, urging the Government of the Republic of Turkey to acknowledge the culpability of its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, for the Armenian Genocide...", *109th Congress*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hconres195ih/pdf/BILLS-109hconres195ih.pdf>

and has emphasized that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), had not allowed US forces to open a front from Turkey to Iraq on 1 March 2003.¹²⁵

Although it is possible to evaluate the consecutive preparation of the resolutions as Armenian groups accelerating Congress activities in this period, it cannot be overlooked that the situation of Turkish-American relations back then also had great influence, because the discourse that the March 1 Bill being approved by the GNAT had put US interests in Iraq into danger has become stronger during this period among Congress members. A clear indication of this situation is Tom Lantos, who had strongly supported the Turkish side against the resolution in 2000, (despite emphasizing that technically the events cannot be classified as “genocide”) declaring that he changed his stance due to the March 1 Bill.¹²⁶

During the talks, Committee Chairman Republican Henry Hyde, by stating “*it is said that if these resolutions are adopted, relations with Turkey, as one of the allies in the key position, will be harmed... Denial of that fact cannot be justified on the basis of expediency or fear that speaking the truth will do us harm*”, he has argued that the resolution should be adopted. Republican Representative Christopher Smith, by saying that “*friends would not allow its friends to violate human rights or commit crimes against humanity*”, he has implied that rejecting the resolution would not suit friendship. At the end, resolution 316 has been adopted with 40 votes against 7 and resolution 195 has been adopted with 35 votes against 11.¹²⁷

Sponsor of resolution 195 Adam Smith who took the floor after the voting in the House has assessed the sudden adoption of both resolutions in the Committee on Foreign Affairs as “a significant incident”; has said that the only obstacle the Congress faces is Turkey’s resistance and by referring to the March 1 Bill, has argued that Turkey did not fulfill the requirement of being a close ally. Schiff, who has asked the question “*while recognizing the events as genocide in Sudan which is politically a weak country, not recognizing what Turkey did as genocide for being a powerful and brother country be the policy of the US?*”, has expressed that he wants the resolution to be ratified and adopted in the Assembly as soon as possible.¹²⁸

These developments which took place in 2005 show that it is difficult to say that for a resolution to be adopted in Congress concerning the genocide allegations, the Armenian diaspora is the only determining element, because it

125 “Turkey Rejects U.S. Troop Proposal”, *CNN*, 01 March 2003.

126 “Ermeni Tasarıları Komisyondan Geçti”, *VOA News*, 15 September 2005.

127 “Sword of Damocles Dangling Over Turkey”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 22 September 2005.

128 Congressional Records, House of Representatives, H8063-8064, 15 September 2005.

could be seen that the condition of Turkish-American relations also play an important role in determining the approach of Congress members towards the resolution. At times when Turkish-American relations are on good terms, the influence of the Armenian lobby decreases, whereas when relations are tense, the Armenian lobby's chance to convince the Representatives increase.¹²⁹ Within this framework, it could be observed that Turkish-American relations becoming tense as a result of the March 1 Bill makes the adoption of resolutions easier.¹³⁰ None of the resolutions adopted in the Committee being adopted with a great difference in votes of 40 against 7, as was the case in 2005, confirms this.

However, whether the resolutions will be addressed in the House has not been able to gain clarity at the time of the voting. But it has been understood that due to the strong opposition of the Bush Administration, the resolutions, which were adopted shortly after with a significant majority, would not be brought to the agenda of the House. As in year 2000, the statements received from the Presidency and initiatives towards halting the legislative process have again been successful and the resolutions have not gone beyond being approved in the Committee.

Attempts for legislation in regards to the Armenian "genocide" during President Bush's term have again come forth on the agenda in 2007 by surpassing the level of Committee. This time, a different situation has existed in Congress, because as a result of the general elections held at the end of 2006, political balances have changed and the majority in the House of Representatives has passed from the Republicans to the Democrats. Therefore, Democrat Nancy Pelosi, former leader of the minority party and one of the leading Armenian advocates, has served as Speaker of the House of Representatives as the leader of the majority party.

As a result of this change in the Congress, apart from Nancy Pelosi, the prominent supporters of the Armenian diaspora Senator Harry Reid, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, who was elected as President later on, became more influential within the 110th Congress. For this reason, in the comments made right after the November 2006 elections, the idea that the new Congress will create a more difficult situation for Turkey and Turkish-American relations would be tensed was dominant.¹³¹ Adam Schiff's statement following the election that "*I believe we have seized the greatest chance in the*

129 Sedat Laçiner, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Ermeni Faktörü", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 11, No. 2, (August 2005), pp.109-111.

130 "Politics Appears to Play Grand Role in US Acceptance of Armenian Genocide Resolutions", *Hürriyet Daliy News*, 16 September 2005.

131 "New US Congress to Pose More Troubles for Turkey", *Turkish Daily News*, 9 November 2006.

last ten years for the adoption of an Armenian genocide resolution”¹³² must be evaluated in this context.

As soon as the 110th Congressional term started, so have new initiatives for the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations. It could be seen that in the emergence of such initiatives, apart from the strengthening of the group in Congress which supports Armenian claims, the Hrant Dink murder also plays a role, because American citizens of Armenian origin have assessed the murder of Hrant Dink has a development that confirms the necessity of genocide resolutions being adopted and have called on President Bush not to prevent the resolutions to be brought to Congress.¹³³

Hence, H.Res.102, which condemns Hrant Dink’s assassin and calls upon Turkey to conduct an investigation to reveal the criminals¹³⁴, has been submitted to the House of Representatives 12 days after Dink’s murder on 29 January 2007. On 30 January 2007, H.Res.106, again prepared by Democrat Representative Adam Schiff which foresees the President’s recognition of the Armenian genocide has been taken to the House of Representatives and remitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the same day.¹³⁵

Adam Schiff has taken the floor in the House of Representatives on 23 April 2007 and delivered a five minutes’ speech. Beginning with a statement that 24 April will be the 92nd anniversary of the Armenian genocide, Schiff has said that the Ottoman Empire subjected 1.5 million Armenians to genocide on the pretext of war, that it is wrong to refrain from this resolution on this issue for Turkish-American relations further suffering, that the claim that the timing of the resolution is problematic since Turkey is striving to develop its relations with Armenia has lost credibility with the Hrant Dink murder and that thousands of pages of evidence documenting the atrocities exist in US archives.¹³⁶

The aforementioned resolution has been discussed in the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 10 October 2007 and as a result of the voting held, has been adopted with 27 votes against 21. Right before the voting, promptings were made to President Bush that the resolution should not be approved and in case of it being approved, the Speaker of the House was warned not to bring the

132 “Change in US Congress Boosts Prospects for Genocide Resolution”, *Turkish Daily News*, 27 December 2006.

133 “Dink’s Murder a Reminder of Need for Genocide Recognition, US Armenians Say”, *Turkish Daily News*, 22 January 2007.

134 “H.Res.102: Condemning the Assassination of Human Rights Advocate and Outspoken Defender of Freedom of the Press, Turkish-Armenian Journalist Hrant Dink on January 19, 2007”, *110th Congress*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hres102ih/pdf/BILLS-110hres102ih.pdf>

135 “H.Res.106: Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution, *110th Congress*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hres106ih/pdf/BILLS-110hres106ih.pdf>

136 Congressional Records, House of Representatives, H3756, 23 April 2007.

resolution to the House floor.¹³⁷ The foreign press has assessed the adoption of the resolution as Pelosi defying President Bush.¹³⁸

In the 24 April statements of George Bush, serving as President for eight years, by calling out to his Armenian citizens, he has tried to placate them by expressing that they have been subjected to forced migration and massacre in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. Although he was pressured to categorize Armenian deaths as genocide,¹³⁹ he has never used this word. The stance he took when proposals to recognize the genocide came to the Congress agenda in 2005 and 2007 has been quite different than that of members of Congress.

The Bush Administration’s different approach to the Armenian genocide allegations than Congress members has once again emerged during the Ambassador crisis experienced between the President and the Senate,¹⁴⁰ because Bush had dismissed Ambassador to Yerevan John Evans, who had classified the Armenian deaths as “genocide” in contradiction to the US Government’s official policies, from duty in May 2006¹⁴¹ and had nominated Ambassador Richard Hoagland, who denied the genocide allegations, as candidate. However, Hoagland was not able to take office since the Senate did not approve this candidate in December 2006 as a result of the attempts of Senators who support the Armenian allegations.¹⁴² Despite the objections received from Congress, President Bush had presented Hoagland to the Senate’s approval again in January 2007, again failing to receive approval.¹⁴³

In 2005 and 2007, by presenting their national interests as a justification, the

137 “Gül Warns Bush Over Armenian Bill”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 10 October 2007; “Turkish Parliament Warns the US Congress on Resolution”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 8 October 2007.

138 “Congress Defies Bush on Armenian ‘Genocide’ Status”, *The Independent*, 11 October 2007, p.32.

139 As 24 April, accepted as the anniversary of the genocide, nears, pressures upon the Presidents to recognize the genocide allegations increase and requests are made for the Presidents to categorize the deaths as genocide in their 24 April statements. Within this framework, it has been seen many times that Congress members have sent a letter to the Presidents. Among them, the letter sent to President Bush in April 2005 by 32 Senators and 175 Representatives is significant, because Senator Barack Obama elected as President in 2008, Vice President Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton serving as Foreign Minister in the Obama Administration has been among those signing the letter. For details see: “Bush’a ‘Soykırımı Tanı’ Mektubu”, *BBC Türkçe*, 20 April 2005. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2005/04/050420_armenian_us.shtml

140 “Genocide Question Hits Home: Use of the Term by the Former U.S. Ambassador to Armenia Sets Up A Battle in Congress”, *Los Angeles Times*, 7 January 2007.

141 Evans, appointed as Ambassador to Yerevan by President Bush in August 2004, by saying “I will today call it (the 1915 events) the Armenian genocide” in a speech delivered in February 2005, has displayed a different stance than the official policy, because he has emphasized that this is not the official policy of the US, but is his own personal opinion. But still, the American Foreign Service Association has cancelled giving a prize to the Ambassador based on this justification. By taking the floor on 13 June 2005 at the House of Representatives, one of the Congress members Frank Pallone, who is close to the Armenian diaspora, has conveyed the disappointment felt due to the Association’s decision and has argued that Evans has been punished only for speaking out the truth. For details see: Congressional Records, House of Representatives, H4373-4374, 13 June 2005.

142 “Bush’s Nominee for Envoy to Armenia Fails to Win Senate Approval”, *Turkish Daily News*, 21 December 2006.

143 “Bush Re-nominates Controversial Ambassador Despite Armenian Protests”, *Turkish Daily News*, 11 January 2007; “Senator Threatens to Block Bush’s New Pick For Ambassador to Armenia”, *Turkish Daily News*, 25 April 2008.

Bush Administration has objected to the initiatives towards the recognition of the genocide that came to the Congress agenda and has tried to prevent the adoption of resolutions. President Abdullah Gül expressing in his letter sent to President Bush his gratitude for his attempts to prevent the recognition before the voting to be held in October 2007 and his warnings that bilateral relations will be harmed have found reaction within the US government. For instance, right before the Committee meeting held on October 10, Bush has warned the Committee members by saying “*This resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings and its passage would do great harm to our relations with a key ally in NATO and in the global war on terror*”.¹⁴⁴

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has also considered the adoption of the resolution as an initiative that will disrupt the Middle East peace process. On the other hand, by bringing to mind that 70 percent of the shipment to Iraq was conducted through Turkey, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has displayed

his opposition to the resolution by saying that an important supply line would be lost. In a statement made to the Congress members, General David Patreus, commanding US military power in Iraq, has made the warning that the passage of the resolution will cause Turkey’s support to come to an end.

From the statements of the Department of State and President Bush himself, it could be seen that while wars continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration has evaluated the negative consequences that could arise in the case of bilateral relations with Turkey being strained due to resolutions concerning the Armenian genocide allegations, as an issue of “national security”.

Apart from steps taken by the existing administration towards preventing the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations, eight former Secretaries of State have sent a letter to Nancy Pelosi, making the warning that the resolution should not be brought to the House agenda. By saying that “*passage of the resolution would harm our foreign policy objectives to promote reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. It*

would also strain our relations with Turkey, and would endanger our national security interests in the region, including the safety of our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan... Passage of this resolution could quickly extend beyond symbolic significance. The popularly elected Turkish Grand National Assembly might react strongly to a House resolution, as it did to a French National Assembly resolution a year ago. The result could endanger our national security interests in the region...” the secretaries of State have warned Pelosi, Speaker of the House. This letter, which referred to Turkey’s strategic importance, is a clear

144 “Bush Warns Congress not to Recognise Armenian ‘Genocide’”, *Guardian*, 10 October 2007.

indication of the concerns of these figures, who served at the peak of diplomacy, regarding their national security interests.

From the statements of the Department of State and President Bush himself, it could be seen that while wars continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration has evaluated the negative consequences that could arise in the case of bilateral relations with Turkey being strained due to resolutions concerning the Armenian genocide allegations, as an issue of “national security”.

Hence, results obtained in 2007 from a public opinion poll conducted in the non-governmental organizations of *Terror Free Tomorrow* and *Ari Foundation*, have displayed that the possibility of the passage of a resolution regarding the Armenian genocide allegations being adopted causing the US to encounter serious problems is not an unfounded concern, because 83 percent of those participating in the poll have indicated that in case such a resolution is adopted, they will strongly oppose Turkey’s assistance to the US in Iraq, 78 percent have indicated that they will boycott American products, 79 percent have said that they will strongly support the Turkish Government reacting to the US and 73 percent have expressed that the positive conviction towards the US will turn in the opposite direction.¹⁴⁵ These results, which display that the Turkish community strongly opposes a likely genocide motion, have also been conveyed by Turkish officials and the US has been warned many times by referring to Turkey’s importance.¹⁴⁶

The explanations in this direction have left the supporters of the Armenian resolution to face political risks and have forced them to take a step back. A week after the adoption of the resolution in the Committee, by reporting to the *New York Times* that she is unsure whether the motion will be voted upon in the House, Pelosi has indicated that a step can be taken backwards.¹⁴⁷

As a result of pressures to prevent the motion increasing, the prominent deputies sponsoring resolution have sent a letter to Pelosi, suggesting delaying the date of the resolution being brought to the House floor to a later date and in effect, Pelosi has not been able to bring it to the agenda.¹⁴⁸ In short, as was the case before, a motion receiving great support in the House of Representatives has once again become null and void by means of the US President and Turkey’s warnings. Furthermore, considering the Bush administration’s general approach, it seems reasonable to assume that it will

145 “Poll: Turkish Views on U.S. Congress Armenian Resolutions”, *Terror Free Tomorrow*, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Terror%20Free%20Tomorrow%20ARI%20Movement%20Final%20Report.pdf>

146 “Turk Warns Against House Genocide Motion”, *The New York Times*, 15 October 2007.

147 “House Speaker Now Unsure if Armenian Genocide Motion Will Reach a Vote”, *The New York Times*, 18 October 2007.

148 “Vote on Armenian ‘Genocide’ Resolution Put Off”, *CNN*, 25 October 2007.

veto any resolution concerning the “Armenian genocide” to be adopted in the Congress.

It could be seen that resolutions on the Armenian genocide allegations, which found great support in the Congress during Bush’s period, have also been prevented by the President based on justifications that it will harm Turkish-American relations and endanger American national interests. This way, the superiority possessed by Presidents over the Congress (or the ineffectiveness of the Congress as decisive) regarding issues of foreign policy and national security has once again emerged. A similar process was also experienced during the period of Barack Obama.

3.1.3. H.Res.252 and the Obama Administration

Initiatives concerning the Armenian genocide allegations which Clinton in 2000 and George Bush in 2005 and 2007 had to put up a struggle against have also come to the Congress agenda during Barack Obama’s period.

Obama winning the Presidential election in November 2008 has slightly increased the Armenian diaspora’s hopes for a bill to be adopted in the Congress. Also with the rise in expectations that the Jewish lobby, whose support was previously received by Turkey, will no longer support Turkey due to some developments experienced in Turkish-Israel relations, the genocide allegations has once again come to the agenda with H.Res.252 of the 111th Congress.

H.Res.252, prepared by Adam Schiff and brought to the House of Representatives on 17 March 2009 by 148 co-sponsors, also envisaged the President’s affirmation that the Armenian genocide was documented in US records. This resolution called “upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the US reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing and genocide documented in the US record and in the President’s annual message commemorating the Armenian genocide issued on April 24 to accurately characterize the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1,5 million Armenians as genocide”.¹⁴⁹

Similar to the earlier initiatives, before and after the discussion of this resolution, tensions have occurred in Turkey-US relations. The Turkish Government has requested from the US President to apply pressure for the resolution not to be brought to the House floor and has emphasized that if the

149 “H.Res.252:Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution”, *111th Congress*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hres252ih/pdf/BILLS-111hres252ih.pdf>

US Government fails to prevent the adoption of the resolution, Turkey will take some steps against US interests.¹⁵⁰ Despite the reactions received from Turkey, the resolution has been addressed in the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 4 March 2010. With the voting taking place in the Committee with a total number of 46 members of whom 27 are Democrats and 19 are Republicans, the resolution has been adopted with 23 votes against 22. On the Republican side, 13 deputies have voted against, 6 have voted in favor; from the Democrats side 9 deputies have voted against and 17 have voted in favor of the resolution.¹⁵¹

The adoption of the resolution in the Committee has, as expected, drawn Turkey's strong reactions. Turkey, calling upon its Ambassador in Washington to Ankara for "consultation", has declared that if the resolution is adopted in the House, Turkish-American relations will seriously be harmed. Messages have been conveyed to President Obama on the sensitivity of the issue and similar to the earlier initiatives have called on him to prevent this resolution.¹⁵² On the other hand, Armenia has declared that it is pleased with the adoption of the resolution which they consider as a step taken towards the prevention of crimes against humanity.¹⁵³

From the aspect of Turkey, the situation has somewhat been different this time compared to the earlier legislative activities, because President Obama, Vice-President Biden and Secretary of State Clinton are individuals who have previously declared many times that they will recognize the "Armenian genocide". The concern this created has further grown with Obama categorizing the Armenians deaths as "*Meds Yeghern*" in his 24 April statements, because this concept, which means "Great Crime", is accepted by the Armenians as an equivalent of genocide. Although not using in his statement the term "genocide", which is a legal term, has partially comforted Turkey, Obama indicating that his personal opinion has not changed has created the conviction that he still regards the events of the past as "genocide".¹⁵⁴

A point that must be underlined regarding H.Res.252 is that President Obama, Vice-President Biden, Secretary of State Clinton and Speaker of the House Pelosi have promised beforehand that they will recognize the "Armenian genocide". All of them are individuals which the Armenian lobby trusts and

150 "Furious Turkey Threatens to Downgrade US Links after Vote on Armenian Genocide: Strategic Partnership at Risk despite Obama's Attempts To Stop Congress Resolution", *The Guardian*, 6 March 2010.

151 "ABD'deki Ermeni Tasarısı Kabul Edildi", *CNN Türk*, 6 March 2010.

152 "Washington Büyükelçisi Ankara'ya Çağrıldı", *Ntvmsnbc*, 4 March 2010; "Soykırım Tasarısı Kabul Edildi", *Radikal*, 05 March 2010.

153 "Ermenistan Karardan Memnun", *Ntvmsnbc*, 05 March 2010,

154 "Obama 'Soykırım' Demedi: ABD Başkanı 1915 Olayları İçin Bu Yıl da 'Büyük Felâket' İfadesini Kullandı", *Haber Türk*, 23 April 2011.

believe will work towards the adoption of the resolution. For instance, Obama has written a letter to Secretary of State Rice to show that the US had to convey its reaction when Bush dismissed US Ambassador to Yerevan John Evans from duty for classifying the 1915 events as “genocide and had to recognize the events as genocide. Obama, emphasizing US-Armenian relations during the election campaign, had made a promise on 19 January 2008 on his own personal website to recognize the Armenian deaths as “genocide”.¹⁵⁵

Thus, different than the former administrations, the Obama Administration has displayed a clear stance against the resolution right from the beginning. Although diplomatic sources indicate that the adoption of the resolution will greatly damage bilateral relations and Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, Secretary of state Hillary Clinton and high-level officials of the Department of State have not shown much great efforts until the final day. The warning made before the meeting in the Committee of Secretary of State Clinton on the likely negative consequences of the resolution, by calling Committee Chairman Democrat Howard Berman by phone, has also remained inconclusive. Moreover, due to the tensions experienced in relations with Turkey, the Israeli Government and the Jewish lobby and organizations in the US have this time displayed a passive stance.¹⁵⁶

By referring to the Protocols between Turkey and Armenia and expectations that relations between the two countries will develop, Obama, although in a weak and belated manner, has intervened for resolution 252 not to be adopted. Right after the voting held in the Committee, Secretary of State Clinton has indicated that they will “work very hard” so that the resolution is not addressed in the House floor, while another member of the State Department, by saying “we believe it will stop where it is”, has implied that the resolution will not be able to pass on to the next phase such as being addressed in the House floor.¹⁵⁷

The possibility of the resolution adopted in the Committee being taken up in the House has also not been taken seriously within Turkish public opinion and it was believed that as a result of the pressure received from the President, it would not be submitted to the House.¹⁵⁸ Thus, the resolution recorded on the House of Representatives’ calendar on 22 September 2010 has not been taken to the House floor. Although Pelosi, having to withdraw from being Speaker of the House with the Republicans winning the majority in the Congress in the November 2010 elections, had made one last attempt to bring the resolution to

155 For the letters Obama sent to President Bush and his other statements concerning the “Armenian genocide” could be retrieved from the website (www.anca.org) of the Armenian National Committee of America.

156 “Ermeni Tasarısı Kabul Edildi”, *Sabah*, 04 March 2010.

157 “Official: Armenian Genocide Resolution Unlikely to Get Full House Vote”, *CNN*, 06 March 2010.

158 “Suat Kımıkhoğlu: Genel Kurul’a Gelmeyecek”, *NTV (live phone connection)*, 04 April 2010.

the House floor before completing her duty in December 2010, she has not been able to be successful.¹⁵⁹

Looking at the Obama Administration, it could be said that perhaps the most efficient staff was on duty for the adoption of a resolution that records the Armenian genocide allegations. No matter how much a positive outlook the Obama administration has towards the Armenian allegations, the strategic importance of Turkish-American relations and US's national interests in the Middle East have gained priority and the statements received from the Presidency and the State Department have prevented the resolution from being taken to the House floor. Again the diaspora's expectation has not been fulfilled and just as the Bush and Clinton administrations, the Obama Administration, which they very much trusted, has also not refrained taking initiatives to prevent the resolution.

The pressure of the Obama Administration, by causing H.Res.252, carrying the signatures of 149 deputies, to fall off the agenda has shown that Turkish-American relations are more important and prioritized than the Armenian claims. Independent from which party the President belongs to or whether or not he embraces the Armenian allegations, this situation indicates that the Presidents approach this issue differently than Congress members in terms of "national interest".

President Obama who, while he was Senator and throughout his candidacy as President, promised many times that he would recognize the Armenian deaths as "genocide", but did not keep his promise after taking the Presidential seat and moreover, taking steps to prevent the legislative activities in this direction is an important matter. This situation is a natural consequence of Congress members, while being able to tend towards local and personal interests, approaching it from a different perspective as a result of the person taking the presidential seat thinking on a national and global level.

Conclusion

The US Constitution, drawn up with the philosophy based on cooperation and negotiation between departments, has in Neustadt's words, created "separate institutions sharing power". This situation has created an appropriate foundation for disputes in directing foreign policy. Especially in situations that entail the use of armies, disagreements have arisen between the legislative and executive in the determining of foreign policy.

159 "Soykırım Hamlesi Sonuçsuz", *Ntvmsnbc*, 17 December 2010.

The vagueness in the Constitution regarding foreign policy issues, various mistakes and negligence in the practices and certain resolutions of the Supreme Court have caused disagreements to arise in the sharing of power between the legislative-executive. These disagreements, due to the executive being able to adopt resolutions that are not factionalized in a more practical and easier way, have caused the Presidents' powers to broaden and the Congress to fall into a passive position in times of difficulty. When foreign policy and national interests were in question, the checks and balances mechanism did not fully serve its function and a struggle for power and to be effective has occurred between the President and Congress.

During the periods of the Second World War and the Cold War, justifications such as national interests and security, sudden attack, combating communism and nuclear arms race have paved the way to the Presidents having more authority. Both the Congress refraining from reaching decisions on such critical matters and the Presidents not willing to share issues requiring privacy with Congress have resulted in the Presidents supremacy in foreign policy. On the other hand, the Congress has tried to be helpful for the President by supporting the Presidents' decisions, not creating the perception to the world that there is a disagreement between the legislative-executive branches and reaching foreign policy goals determined by the President by adopting laws suitable to the Presidents' expectations. A great part of the post-Second World War period has passed with "superior President-submissive Congress".

On grounds that the "commander in chief" title granted to them by the Constitution has bestowed them some kind of superiority in foreign policy, Presidents during the Cold War period have considered foreign relations, tried to be kept far from domestic political conflicts and local requests, within their own exclusive authority. As a result of this, when the possibility of a resolution being adopted in Congress that would not be approved by the President or a resolution wanted by the President not being adopted emerges, Presidents have not refrained from intervening in Congress.

On the other hand, since the Watergate Scandal and the Vietnam War created a negative atmosphere against the Presidents in the 1970's, it has paved the way for the Congress to re-enter into a power struggle and take some steps towards restricting the Presidents (as in the case of WPR). From that date onwards, it has become difficult to say that the Congress is entirely under the effect of Presidents in the area of foreign policy. With the Cold War coming to an end, the Congress has gained relative effectiveness. However, following the terrorist attacks on September 11, the President has once again gained the opportunity to become a superior authority and has utilized it in the best possible way.

Bush Administration defending that the application of the regulations prepared for ordinary situations in extraordinary conditions will not be healthy, the allegation that the situation they are in forces the Presidents to be the sole authority in foreign and security policy and the conviction that they could even resort to illegal means (like torture) for the sake of national interests have caused the Congress to fall into a secondary and submissive position once again and the executive to act like the only authority.

The struggle for power between the President and Congress becomes concrete with the bills regarding the Armenian genocide allegations, because Congress members, by acting in accordance with personal and local interests most of the time, bring the Armenian allegations to the agenda before the elections, whereas the Presidents think on a broader dimension and try to prevent legislative initiatives based on the justification that such a bill could endanger the relations of the US with the entire Middle East and their vital interests. Due to relations between Turkey, which supported the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the strategic importance vested in it, and the US, being perceived by Presidents as an issue of national security, Presidents who convey that damage done to Turkish-American relations will harm US national interests, have opposed motions concerning the “Armenian genocide” based on these justifications.

The aforementioned “Armenian genocide” bills clearly show that there is a basic difference between the approach of Congress members and the Presidents towards the issue. As mentioned in the first section of the paper, as a result of a narrow zonal election system and the financing of campaigns being based on donations, the Representatives holding elections once every two years is very sensitive to the requests of the electorate. This situation forms the basis for them giving importance and priority to “national interests” rather than to “personal political interests”. In this case, it seems reasonable for Representatives to carry the requests of the electorate to the Congress agenda in order to be re-elected and to obtain financial support. Those preparing the bills coming from provinces in which the Armenian population is dense further strengthen this thesis. California Representative James E. Rogan, who sponsored such a motion but not able to achieve its adoption, failing to be re-elected is also meaningful in this sense.

Within this framework, all of the resolutions mentioned above being passed through the House of Representatives and the Senate not displaying a similar stance is noteworthy. Another point that draws attention is that members of the House of Representatives who submit the bills adopted in the Committee to the Congress are mostly from the California, the State where the Armenians are most populated. Although similar genocide resolutions were brought to the

Senate, none of them have been approved in the Committee. Apart from Senators becoming more authorized in the area of foreign policy, also their election through the ballot vote in nearly all states, rather than the Representatives to come from narrow districts, also plays a role in creating this difference, because the Armenian population which the Senators are subject to in the election system has a negligible role. Also with the effect of being elected for six years instead of two years like the Representatives, Senators who are able to remain more insensitive towards Armenian claims, have not yet signed any bill/resolution to be adopted in the concerning committee until now.

The best example that shows that the approaches of Congress members and the President are very different lie in the difference between the stance of

The condition of Turkish-American relations and the dependence of the US on Turkey will be one of the elements of Presidents determining the fate of bills likely to come to the agenda.

Barack Obama while he was senator and his approach after taking the Presidential seat. Senator Obama had worked towards the genocide allegations being officially recognized and had made promises to the Armenians many times during the Presidential election campaign, but after assuming Presidency he neither used the word “genocide” in his statements, nor did he take any initiative for the genocide resolutions to be adopted. On the contrary, just as the

President Bush and Clinton, President Obama also applied pressures for the bills not to be enacted.

The condition of Turkish-American relations and the dependence of the US on Turkey will be one of the elements of Presidents determining the fate of bills likely to come to the agenda. It is apparent that the negative atmosphere created by the March 1 Bill has immediately received response in the Congress and that despite President Bush’s initiatives of prevention, the two separate resolutions have suddenly and with a serious difference (40 against 7, and 35 against 11 votes) been adopted in 2005. Tom Lantos, who in 2000 heavily criticized the resolution which recognizes the Armenian allegations and voted against it, based on the negative consequences the rejection of the March 1 Bill will create, changing his stance in favor of the Armenians while the resolutions were being discussed in 2005 clearly display that Turkey-US relations is one of the main determinants of the outcome of the resolutions.

The point that must be underlined in this context is that all of the bills adopted in the Committee have taken place after 2000. Four of the five bills passed by the Committee being adopted in 2005-2010 also draw attention and this must be considered as the indirect effect of US-Turkey relations, which was harmed after the March 1 decision of the Turkish Parliament, on the resolutions.

Apart from what the reasons are for Congress members preparing such resolutions or the Presidents attempting to disrupt these activities, the Congress still not being able to achieve the bills it wants despite the tens of initiatives it undertook display the Congress's limited role in foreign policy. Through the motions, the Congress has taken steps that will directly affect Turkish-American, Turkish-Armenian and Armenian-American relations and that will indirectly affect Middle East and Caucasian policies, but such a development that could create a widespread effect has been prevented by the Presidents. The interventions of the Presidents constitute a significant example which displays that the Congress has remained ineffective in directing US foreign policy and the presidential power has become of an encroaching nature.

While these cases are obvious, the possibility of the Armenian genocide bills being adopted in the Congress in the short run seems weak. The resolutions, that so far failed to be addressed in the House, passing through the stages of being accepted by the senate and approved by the President, will not depend only on the Armenian lobby. As long as Turkey's strategic importance continues and Turkish-American relations do not enter a deep depression, it does not seem very likely that the resolutions will be supported by the Presidents. At least this is what the incidents occurring until now show. It is also clear that some representatives make calculations of votes through the bills and will continue to do so from now on; therefore, similar legislative initiatives might be repeated.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

News/Newspaper Articles

- “ABD’deki Ermeni Tasarısı Kabul Edildi”, *CNN Türk*, 6 March 2010.
- “Bush Renominates Controversial Ambassador Despite Armenian Protests”, *Turkish Daily News*, 11 January 2007.
- “Bush Warns Congress not to Recognise Armenian ‘Genocide’”, *Guardian*, 10 October 2007.
- “Bush’a ‘Soykırımı Tanı’ Mektubu”, *BBC Turkish*, 20 April 2005.
- “Bush’s Nominee for Envoy to Armenia Fails to Win Senate Approval”, *Turkish Daily News*, 21 December 2006.
- “Cem: Lahey Pazarlığına Girmeyiz”, *Milliyet*, 17 September 2000.
- “Change in US Congress Boosts Prospects for Genocide Resolution”, *Turkish Daily News*, 27 December 2006.
- “Clinton Durdurdu”, *Milliyet*, 20 October 2000.
- “Congress Defies Bush on Armenian ‘Genocide’ Status”, *The Independent*, 11 October 2007.
- “Defeat of House Resolution on Armenian Genocide”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 95, No. 2, (April 2001), pp.396-397.
- “Dink’s Murder a Reminder of Need for Genocide Recognition, US Armenians Say”, *Turkish Daily News*, 22 January 2007.
- “Ecevit’ten Clinton’a Şükran Mektubu”, *Milliyet*, 21 October 2000.
- “Erivan’a Hodri Meydan”, *Milliyet*, 16 September 2000.
- “Ermeni Tasarıları Komisyondan Geçti”, *VOA News*, 15 September 2005.
- “Ermeni Tasarısı Amerikan Çıkarlarına Aykırı,” *VOA News*, 12 September 2005.
- “Ermeni Tasarısı Kabul Edildi”, *Sabah*, 04 March 2010.
- “Ermenistan Karardan Memnun”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 05 March 2010.

- "Former US National Security Adviser Opposes US Resolution on Armenian Issue," *Turkish Daily News*, 14 September 2005.
- "Furious Turkey Threatens to Downgrade US Links after Vote on Armenian Genocide: Strategic Partnership at Risk despite Obama's Attempts to Stop Congress Resolution", *The Guardian*, 6 March 2010.
- "Genocide Question Hits Home: Use of the Term by the Former U.S. Ambassador to Armenia Sets Up A Battle in Congress", *Los Angeles Times*, 07 January 2007.
- "Gül Warns Bush Over Armenian Bill", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 10 October 2007.
- "Turkish Parliament Warns the US Congress on Resolution", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 8 October 2007.
- "House Speaker Now Unsure if Armenian Genocide Motion Will Reach a Vote", *The New York Times*, 18 October 2007.
- "New US Congress to Pose More Troubles for Turkey", *Turkish Daily News*, 09 November 2006.
- "Obama 'Soykırım' Demedi: ABD Başkanı 1915 Olayları İçin Bu Yıl da 'Büyük Felâket' İfadesini Kullandı", *Haber Türk*, 23 April 2011.
- "Official: Armenian Genocide Resolution Unlikely to Get Full House Vote", *CNN*, 6 March 2010.
- "Politics Appears to Play Grand Role in US Acceptance of Armenian Genocide Resolutions", *Hürriyet Daliy News*, 16 September 2005.
- "Senate Panel Approves Controversial Nominee to Serve as Ambassador to Turkey; Menendez, Boxer, Risch Oppose", *ANCA Press Release*, 13 September 2011.
- "Senator Threatens to Block Bush's New Pick For Ambassador to Armenia", *Turkish Daily News*, 25 April 2008.
- "Soykırım Hamlesi Sonuçsuz", *Ntvmsnbc*, 17 December 2010.
- "Soykırım Tasarısı Kabul Edildi", *Radikal*, 05 March 2010.
- "Statement of Administration Policy: S.965-U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act", 27 March 2007.

- “Suat Kınıklıoğlu: Genel Kurul’a Gelmeyecek”, *NTV (live phone connection)*, 04 April 2010.
- “Sword of Democles Dangling Over Turkey”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 22 September 2005.
- “Tarihten Korkmayın”, *Milliyet*, 28 September 2000.
- “Tasarı Duvara Tosladı”, *Milliyet*, 29 September 2000.
- “Turk Warns Against House Genocide Motion”, *The New York Times*, 15 October 2007.
- “Turkey Rejects U.S. Troop Proposal”, *CNN*, 01 March 2003.
- “Vote on Armenian ‘Genocide’ Resolution Put Off”, *CNN*, 25 October 2007.
- “Washington Büyükelçisi Ankara’ya Çağrıldı”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 04 March 2010.
- “Washington’la Kritik Günler”, *Milliyet*, 13 September 2000.

Books, Journals, Archival Materials

- Accinelli, Robert. “Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (1990).
- Adler, David G. “Presidential Power and Foreign Affairs in the Bush Administration: The Use and Abuse of Alexander Hamilton”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3, (September 2010).
- Adler, David G. “The Constitution”, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, Alexander DeConde... [et.al.], Vol. 1, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2nd ed., 2002.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. “The Presidency and Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5, (Winter 1991).
- Barbash, Fred. “Supreme Court Backs Civil Liberties in Terror Cases”, *The Washington Post*, 28 June 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11657-2004Jun28.html> (21 April 2013).
- Bose, Meena. “The Presidency and Foreign Policy”, *New Directions in the American Presidency*, Lori Cox Han (ed.), New York, Routledge, 2011.

- Bowman, Albert and Divine A. Robert. "Presidential Advisors", *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, Alexander DeConde... [et.al.], Vol. 3, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 2nd ed., 2002.
- Boylan, Timothy S. "War Powers, Constitutional Balance, and the Imperial Presidency Idea at Century's End", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 2, (June 1999).
- Burum, Sue. "Constitutional Theories of Executive Power: Effects on Current and Future
- Carter, Ralph G. "Congressional Foreign Policy Behavior: Persistent Patterns of the Postwar Period", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Spring 1988).
- Congressional Records, House of Representatives, H3756, 23 April 2007.
- Congressional Records, House of Representatives, H4373-4374, 13 June 2005.
- Congressional Records, House of Representatives, H8063-8064, 15 September 2005.
- Corn, Geoffrey S. "Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers Resolution," *William and Mary Law Review*, Vol. 42, No. 4, (2001).
- Corwin, Edward S. *The President: Office and Powers*, New York, New York Univ. Press, 1957.
- Decision Making in the Executive Branch and on the US Supreme Court", *National Social Science Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 2, (2010), p.32.
- Duignan, Brian (ed.), *The Executive Branch of the Federal Government: Purpose, Process, and People*, New York, Britannica Educational Publishing, 2010.
- Evcimen, Günsev. "Başkanlık Hükümeti Sistemi: 'Ratio Politica'sı ve Türkiye", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 47, No. 1, (1998).
- Executive Order 9066 - Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, 17 February 1942, Available at:
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc_large_image.php?doc=74
- Fendoğlu, Hasan. "Başkanlık Sistemi Tartışmaları", *Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü*, (November 2010).

- Fisher, Louis. "Foreign Policy Powers of the President and Congress", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 499, (September 1988).
- Foley, Michael and John E. Owens. *Congress and the Presidency: Politics in a Separated System*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996.
- Genovese, Michael A. and Robert J. Spitzer. *The Presidency and the Constitution: Cases and Controversies*, New York, Palgrave Macmillian, 2005.
- Glennon, Michael J. "Senate and Foreign Policy", Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst (eds.), *Encyclopedia of the American Constitution*, Vol. 5, New York, Macmillan Reference, 2nd ed. 2000.
- Glennon, Michael J. "The Gulf War and the Constitution", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2, (Spring 1991).
- Goldsmith, Jack, *The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration*, New York, W.W. Norton, 2009.
- Grimmett, Richard F. "Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress", *CRS Report for Congress*, RL30193, (01 June 1999).
- Grimmett, Richard F. "The War Powers Resolution after Thirty-four Years", *CRS Report for Congress*, RL32267, (10 March 2008).
- Grimmett, Richard F. "War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance," *CRS Report for Congress*, RL33532, (23 September 2010).
- H.Con.Res.195: Commemorating the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923, urging the Government of the Republic of Turkey to acknowledge the culpability of its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, for the Armenian Genocide..., *109th Congress*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hconres195ih/pdf/BILLS-109hconres195ih.pdf> (22 March 2013).
- H.Res.102: Condemning the Assassination of Human Rights Advocate and Outspoken Defender of Freedom of the Press, Turkish-Armenian Journalist Hrant Dink on January 19, 2007, *110th Congress*. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hres102ih/pdf/BILLS-110hres102ih.pdf> (13 March 2013).
- H.Res.106: Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution, *110th Congress*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hres106ih/pdf/BILLS-110hres106ih.pdf>

- H.Res.252: Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution, *111th Congress*. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hres252ih/pdf/BILLS-111hres252ih.pdf> (21 March 2013).
- H.Res.316: Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution, *109th Congress*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hres316ih/pdf/BILLS-109hres316ih.pdf>
- H.Res.398: United States Training on and Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide Resolution, *106th Congress*. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-106hres398ih/pdf/BILLS-106hres398ih.pdf> (03 March 2013).
- Hamilton, Alexander. "The Real Character of the Executive", (Federalist Papers No. 69), *New York Packet*, 14 March 1788.
- Hamilton, Lee H. and Michael H. Van Dusen. "Making the Separation of Powers Work", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Fall 1978).
- Haskell, John. *Congress in Context*, Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 2010.
- Henkin, Louis. "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 2, (Winter 1987/1988).
- Hogue, Henry B. "Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions," *CRS Report for Congress*, RS21308, (12 March 2008).
- Hudson, David L. "What is an Example of a Separation of Powers Problem?", *The Handy Law Answer Book*, Canton, MI, Visible Ink Press, 2010.
- Humphrey, Hubert H. "The Senate in Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (July 1959).
- Jonas, Manfred. "Isolationism", *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas*, Alexander DeConde... [et.al.] Vol. 2, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 2nd ed., 2002.
- Jones, Charles O. *Separate but Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency*, New Jersey, Chatham House Publishers, 1995.
- Kibbe, Jennifer D. "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Approaches to Solving the Problem", *Prepared for presentation at the 2009 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*, Toronto, Canada, (05 September 2009).

King, Kay. "Congress and National Security", *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)*, Special Report, No. 58, (November 2010).

Kissinger, Henry A. *Diplomacy*, New York, NY, Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Laçiner, Sedat. "Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Ermeni Faktörü", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 11, No. 2, (August 2005).

Lindsay, James M. "Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (September 2003).

Lindsay, James M. *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Lütem, Ömer E. "ABD'de Yeni Karar Tasarıları," *Center for Eurasian Studies*, 17 June 2011. <http://www.avim.org.tr/degerlendirmetekli.php?makaleid=4843> (28 April 2013)

Madison, James, "The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power among Its Different Parts", (Federalist Papers No. 47), *Independent Journal*, 30 January 1788.

Madison, James. "The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances between the Different Departments", (Federalist Papers No. 51), *Independent Journal*, 6 February 1788.

Madison, James. "These Departments Should Not Be So Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other", (Federalist Paper No. 48), *New York Packet*, 1 February 1788.

Manley, John F. "The Rise of Congress in Foreign Policy-Making", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 397, No. 1, (1971).

Mayhew, David R. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, New Heaven, Yale University Press, 1974.

McGinnis, John O. "Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers", *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 56, No. 4, (1993).

McGrew, Anthony G. "Foreign Policy and the Constitution: Invitation to a Perpetual Institutional Struggle", Richard Maidment and John Zvesper (eds.), *Reflections on the Constitution: The American Constitution after Two Hundred Years*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989.

- Meernik, James. "Congress, the President, and the Commitment of the U. S. Military", *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 3, (August 1995).
- Milkis, Sidney M. and Michael Nelson. *The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-2000*, Washington DC, CQ Press, 2000.
- Olson, William C. "The US Congress: An Independent Force in World Politics?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, (July 1991).
- Ömürgönülşen, Uğur, "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde Kamu Yönetimi", Birgül Ayman Güler (ed.), *Kamu Yönetimi Ülke İncelemeleri*, Ankara, İmge Yayınevi, 2009.
- Pfiffner, James P. *Power Play: The Bush Presidency and the Constitution*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
- Richards, James P. "The House of Representatives in Foreign Affairs", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 289, No. 1, (1953).
- Ritchie, Donald A. "Congress Confronts the Armenian Genocide", Jay Winter (ed.), *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Ritchie, Donald A. *The U.S. Congress: A Very Short Introduction*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Rourke, John T. "Congress and Cold War", *World Affairs*, Vol. 139, No. 4, (Spring 1977).
- Rourke, John T. "Congress, the Executive, and Foreign Policy: A Propositional Analysis", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (Spring 1980).
- Rourke, John T. *Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study of Interaction and Influence 1945-1982*, Boulder, Co., Westview, 1983.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. *The Imperial Presidency*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1973.
- Silverstein, Gordon. "Bush, Cheney, and the Separation of Powers: A Lasting Legal Legacy?", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 2009).
- Smith, Steven S., Jason M. Roberts, and Ryan V. Wielen. *The American Congress*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Speaker's Press Office, "Regarding the Armenian Genocide Resolution", United States House of Representatives, Washington D.C., available at

<http://www.anca.org/596-hastert.html> (23 April 2013)

Spring, Baker. “Who Makes The American Foreign Policy?”, *The Heritage Foundation Research Report*, (April 29, 2011), <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/who-makes-american-foreign-policy>. (22 April 2013)

Tanıyıcı, Şaban and Birol Akgün. *Amerikan Başkanlığı: Cumhuriyetten İmparatorluğa*, Ankara, Orion Kitabevi, 2008.

Terror Free Tomorrow, “Poll: Turkish Views on U.S. Congress Armenian Resolutions”, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Terror%20Free%20Tomorrow%20ARI%20Movement%20Final%20Report.pdf> (22 March 2013)

The American Presidency Project, “Executive Orders”, University of California, Santa Barbara, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/executive_orders.php

The United States Senate, “Treaties”, <http://senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#1> (24 April 2013)

The United States Senate, “The Senate’s Impeachment Role,” http://senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Senate_Impeachment_Role.htm#1 (24 April 2013)

U.S. Supreme Court, *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214, (18 December 1944), <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=323&page=214>

U.S. Supreme Court, *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). <http://supreme.justia.com/us/418/683/case.html> (23 April 2013)

U.S. Supreme Court, *Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), <http://supreme.justia.com/us/343/579/case.html> (23 April 2013).

U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “American Isolationism in the 1930s”, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/AmericanIsolationism> (21 April 2013).

U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “The Neutrality Acts, 1930s”, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/Neutrality_acts (20 April 2013).

Yoo, John. “Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements”, *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 99, No. 4, (February 2001).

THE KARABAKH FILE

(KARABAĞ DOSYASI)

The Karabakh Conflict has continued since the 1990s until today without resolution. During the initial years of the problem, Turkish authorities and diplomats spent serious efforts for a just resolution for the conflict. Information on those efforts is very few in our country. We decided to publish the information we could gather about those efforts. In this framework, articles by three retired ambassadors who worked on the issue are published under the title the “Karabakh File”.

The first article entitled “Still the Same Facts” was written by retired Ambassador Selçuk Korkud who was the head of the Turkish delegation in the Minsk Group from June 1992 until August 1993. In this article Mr. Korkud indicates that together with the co-chairmen, Armenians from Karabakh and Azeris were also invited to the Minsk Group when it was founded back in May 1992, that the Armenians adopted an uncompromising and irreconcilable attitude, that the utmost achievement during that period was realization of an agreement on the terms of reference of the team which would monitor the cessation of hostilities, however that the Armenian attacks continued and as a result, %20 of the Azerbaijani territories was occupied and around 1 million Azerbaijanis became refugees. Mr. Korkud also expresses that after a short while Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, the USA, Russia and France continued their work, although with no significant results achieved.

The second article entitled “The Co-Chairmen System of the Minsk Group” was written by retired Ambassador Ali Hikmet Alp. Between 1989 and 1997, Amb. Alp served as the Permanent Representative of Turkey at CSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). Since the Minsk Group, which was founded for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, worked under the mandate of OSCE, he closely followed the activities about the issue. Still representatives from Ankara attended the Minsk Group. Mr. Alp explains how the Minsk Group delegated its duties to the three co-chairs (USA, Russia and France). As it was known by then that these three countries would avoid taking decisions that would put Armenia into a hard position, the co-chairmen system was not an appropriate system for the resolution of the conflict. As a matter of fact, the co-chairmen have not been able to make any progress in the last twenty years. Turkey should have rejected this system together with Azerbaijan. However, as Mr. Alp expresses in his article, Turkey approved the co-chairmen system for unknown reasons.

The third article was written by retired Ambassador Candan Azer and is entitled “Nagorno Karabakh and the Minsk Group”. As a member of the Turkish Delegation taking part in the Minsk Group meetings, Mr. Azer watched the activities of the Group closely. In his long and detailed article, he provides a brief history of the Karabakh conflict, after which he explains the ongoing clashes at the time and the negotiations for a truce and a resolution of the problem between the parties. He also mentions the attitudes of the countries in question as well as the personalities of some negotiators themselves. Our opinion is that the article by Mr. Azer will be a valuable resource for future academic studies about Karabakh.

KARABAKH CONFLICT: STILL SAME FACTS¹

(KARABAĞ ANLAŞMAZLIĞI: HALA AYNI GERÇEKLER)

Selçuk KORKUD
Ambassador (Rtd.)

Yes, since the start of the Karabakh conflict nearly a quarter of a century elapsed, but we are still facing the same tragic facts and no solution is in sight.

In such circumstances it may be perhaps useful to recall the events of the early nineties, the important OSCE effort for a negotiated, peaceful solution within the so-called Minks Group, a Group which was conceived by the way mainly on our initiative and in fact by my insistence-as the senior member of our team- on the need to provide for the initial stages of the negotiations less formal and more flexible conditions, before going to a rather more solemn conference in the Belarus capital. The situation we were facing then obviously necessitated the urgent adoption of some important emergency measures in order to pave the way towards the expected result.

Thus the Minsk Group was created in May 1992 during the Helsinki meeting of the OSCE, with the participation of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the United States of America, Italy assuming the chairmanship as the host country.

Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives of Karabakh were also invited on an informal basis.

The Group's task was clear enough. In conformity with the decisions approved of the OSCE bodies, therefore also by the Armenians, it had to define the required measures to ensure the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from Lachin-a key Azeri town

¹ This article is largely based on a previous article written by Ambassador S. Korkud for the first issue of Perceptions-SAM's journal of international affairs, dated March-May 1996. Its title was "Nagorno-Karabagh Conflict-Some Facts."

situated on the line of communication between Karabakh and Armenia- and Shusha (a town in Karabakh historically and culturally very dear to the Azerbaijanis, being hometown of many Azeri poets, composers, intellectuals), both illegally occupied by the Armenians in defiance of the said decisions.

It all started quite well at the historic Villa Madama overlooking Rome, generously put at the disposal of the Group by the Italian chairmanship. But in spite of this rather encouraging atmosphere, the participants soon realized that the talks were heading towards a deadlock.

The difficulties stemmed mainly from the uncooperative attitude of the Armenian side. The Armenian representatives pursued defiantly obstructionist tactics together with the representatives of the Armenian inhabitants of Karabakh, who after a two months long empty seat policy, came to Rome only to state that they could not accept equal treatment with the representatives of the Azerbaijanis of Karabakh and asked for national status.

Such conditions were of course incompatible with the relevant CSCE decisions and, therefore, unacceptable to Azerbaijan. It was obvious that matters relating to the status question were not included into the mandate of the Minsk Group and these had to be dealt with in the Minsk Conference. So through acrimonious polemics between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the talks stalled while fighting continued in the field. Nevertheless, in the session of March 1993, the Group was able to realize an agreement on the terms of reference of the team which would monitor the cessation of hostilities. This was of course rather a small step but could be a breakthrough in the process. Unfortunately, these expectations were short-lived.

At the following session, out of the blue, the group received the news of Armenian occupation of another Azerbaijani city, Kelbajar, situated in the north west of Karabakh. This was of course a deliberate blow to the whole process, a most unwelcome happening. In fact, from then on the Armenian offensive continued in and around Karabakh, resulting in the occupation of 20% of Azerbaijani territory, with around one million refugees who are still enduring their harsh fate, before the unseeing eyes of the international community.

At present Azerbaijan is the losing side of course, mainly because of its military inability, but certainly not because of lack of bravery. Contrary to the Armenians, Azerbaijanis did not get the support they needed. Or throughout the whole process, they showed their willingness to find a

peaceful compromise, in particular by agreeing to participate in the Minsk Conference in spite of the openly ambiguous positions of the Armenians to say the least. In the meantime, they had to defend their legitimate rights. Surely, they did not deserve such an outcome.

The Minsk Group still exists today. Though its chairmanship changed. USA, France, Russia are now co-chairmen. Several encounters took place between the leaders, without any tangible result.

There is a de-facto ceasefire on the ground. But clashes occur on the ceasefire line with loss of life for both sides. This is nothing else but a dangerous stalemate.

The Armenians cannot feel secure in such elusive conditions, surrounded by vast, empty, lifeless lands. The illegal occupation of Azeri territories is quite obviously a blatant violation of all international principles. Certainly no-one can and no-one did condone such a situation.

The Armenians cannot feel secure in such elusive conditions, surrounded by vast, empty, lifeless lands. The illegal occupation of Azeri territories is quite obviously a blatant violation of all international principles. Certainly no-one can and no-one did condone such a situation.

To conclude a positive note.

Karabakh -a Turkish name meaning “black vineyard”- with its 4392 square miles, can very easily become a “trait-d’union” between the two countries, even a touristic land and provide a basis for a peaceful and prosperous coexistence for all those talented peoples. The present state of affairs cannot continue indefinitely. Even the worse expansionist ambitions should have a limit. Statesmanship must prevail and put an end to this cruel nightmare for the benefit of all concerned.

CO-CHAIRMANSHIP SYSTEM OF THE MINSK GROUP

(MINSK GRUBU EŞ BAŞKANLIK SİSTEMİ)

Ali Hikmet ALP
Ambassador (Rtd.)

The “Minsk Group” works of the CSCE, established to settle the Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, is conducted since 1994 through means of “Co-chairmanship” constituted by representatives of the US, France and Russia. While questioning how this arrangement that has no other example within CSCE has emerged, we also interviewed retired Ambassador Ali Hikmet Alp who served until 1997 as Permanent Representative of Turkey since 1989, when the CSCE had gained character of being a permanent organization rather than being a series of conferences.

In summary, the Ambassador told us the following:

“A foundation like “Co-chairmanship” does not exist within CSCE rules. Its emergence must perhaps be seen as one of the interesting games of the history of diplomacy. As to the background of the story, the idea of finding a peaceful solution to the conflict that arose between Azerbaijan and Armenia due to the occupation of Karabakh was put forward within the framework of “CSCE principles, commitments and provisions” in the “corridors” when a meeting was convened in Helsinki in 1992 with the participation of several countries (Belarus, US, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan and Armenia as the parties). That year CSCE had achieved great success in finding a common foundation in East-West relations, but it was a process whose continuity was not connected to a system and convened with unsteady periods. Therefore the conference that was proposed on a serious issue like a member country occupying the territories of another member country and then was later on named the “Minsk process” could have been an arrangement formed not right in the middle of CSCE, but on its corner or under its “protection”. Since those putting forward this idea believes that Turkey and Azerbaijan will object due to the nature of the CSCE, before Turkey they have made contacts with the actual party, the Azeri Delegation. The young and talented Azeri diplomat, who became

Deputy Minister later on, came to me during the conference and explained to me the issue. I told him that I will cite what he said to our Minister Hikmet Çetin, but that since CSCE rules on these issues have not yet been determined, the proposal should be approached cautiously and that our participation is a precondition for its acceptance. When the Azeri diplomat, who I for the time being find it inconvenient to give his name, said that the participants have not yet been determined, that they want our participation, but that heads of committee accepted this proposal and my answer to this was “I think he rushed it, how was it that you quickly received instructions in such short time”, he said that the Chairman made his decision. Their Chairman was Ambassador to Bonn who for some reason tried to remain distant to us and who sent his assistant instead of personally talking to our Minister. It was also obvious from his statements that despite being an expert in bargaining in daily life, he was not experienced in international diplomacy. After meeting with our Minister Hikmet Çetin, I told him that he holds the same opinion. The Azeri delegation must have not shown any attempt to change the promise they made because in addition to Armenia, despite the objections of the Russian Federation, raised underhandedly, there is no other way than to try to put ourselves among the participants. We accomplished this, but a crippled born child was given to the hands of the CSCE.

Actually perhaps the best way would have been for Azerbaijan to seek within the UN Security Council rather than in the CSCE which had no sanction power and in fact did not even have a status of organization. Albeit, the Security Council confirmed that Karabakh is within the territories of Azerbaijan, but that too took the easy way out. It did not go beyond listening to the reports of the Minsk Group, which is considered as the master of the issue, and giving proposals for a peaceful solution. Of course apart from the Russian Federation, which had interests in the continuation of the conflict and which insisted on the sending of troops consisting only of Russian soldiers to be deployed between the two sides, the US and EU Westerners also did not clear Azerbaijan’s path. As known, those years were the period of “Russia first” policy which Deputy Minister Talbott had to change later on. I know that Ambassador Jack Maresca, who was a US delegate back then, was held under pressure by American senators and was subjected to complaints.

The Minsk Group, given the task of providing an agreement or at least common suggestions, during the international conference presumed to continue for 15 days with an imaginative design in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, was thereby established. The first chairmanships of the group were granted firstly to Finland and then Sweden who had no special interests in the conflict. Both countries assigned their most talented diplomats for this

task. Although introducing some unacceptable proposals, they have worked with seriousness and patience. Turkey did the same. It helped the Azerbaijanis.

We do not have the opportunity to go into details here. I attended a small part of the following conferences. There is quite some detail in my beloved colleague Candan Azer's book entitled "Southern Caucasus from Father to Son". Ambassador Ömer Ersun also wrote articles which convey his own experiences.

Let me be content here with touching upon the reasons for the Group's failure. Even in the situation of a small possibility for an agreement emerging, the Armenians of Karabakh have broadened their occupations by mounting a new attack with all kinds of support by Armenia. According to statistics of the United Nations, more than 900,000 Karabakhians and Azerbaijanis in the neighboring region have been exiled. There are several reasons why Azerbaijan has not been able to counter these attacks with success. Azerbaijanis during the period of the Soviet Union, opposite to the Armenians, were kept apart from the army and did not have much military leadership or culture. In fact, the Russian forces had left their weapons to Armenia and to the Armenian militia of Karabakh while withdrawing. Of course the domestic politics in Azerbaijan also did not help them in recovering. With the occupation of five Azeri provinces, the problem quit being a disagreement on Karabakh and frankly turned into a policy of gaining territory, of broadening for Armenia and they sold this to the community and world public opinion as a security requirement. It is clear that in the majority of Western public opinion, although not openly spoken out, an idea of "let us not give the poor Armenians such a hard time, after all the Turks have occupied their territories" exists. This belief, also benefitting from the propagandas of "genocide", has also provided the governments of countries, which have significant or influential Armenian minority, the ease of being an advocate of Armenia.

It is clear that in the majority of Western public opinion, although not openly spoken out, an idea of "let us not give the poor Armenians such a hard time, after all the Turks have occupied their territories" exists. This belief, also benefitting from the propagandas of "genocide", has also provided the governments of countries, which have significant or influential Armenian minority, the ease of being an advocate of Armenia.

This Group convened for two years, formed various formulas and the deployment and logistical details of the peacekeeping force foreseen to be

sent were even planned, but no further progress took place apart from the ceasefire agreement accepted in 1992 between the two sides.

Apparently, the governors of international policy felt disturbed by the Finn and Swedish diplomats being too objective and did not support them enough. The Westerners abstained from directly confronting the Russian Federation. Apart from the Soviet Union period, Ambassador Kazimirov, the Russian representative back then, displayed approaches that surpass the diplomats of the most violent imperialist periods of Tsarist Russia. It was said that he took orders in the CSCE not from the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry, but from the Minister of National Defense General Grachev. The Finn and Swedish diplomats did not receive enough support; no pressure was exerted on Armenia, who occupied the territories of its neighbor, to the extent observed in other examples.

Righteously, Turkey supported Azerbaijan in the Minsk Group. Apart from our friendly relations, Azerbaijan was right. It was obvious that we would not accept an agreement that foresaw Karabakh's de facto separation from Azerbaijan through misleading and artificial regulations. It would not have been possible for Germany to strongly lend support despite our objective stance on this issue. I suppose that Russia and the Westerners agreed on a "co-chairmanship" system in order to limit the powers of this group and take a short cut. The draft of assignment they accepted gave the initiative and even the powers to the chairmen within the Group's task. Even the voting system was uncertain.

Since I returned to the CSCE conferences after attending the first meeting held in Rome I do not know the details of the developments taking place later on. But I witnessed how this system was accepted or was pushed into being accepted during the Budapest Summit in 1994. During the summit, our head delegate was Tansu Çiller and I was her assistant in the Conference due to my position of the head of delegation. In the preparatory works made before the conference of Heads of State or Government, the Minsk Group also convened. Ambassador Kazimirov, being one of the passionate implementers of the "near abroad" policy, finally spilled the beans and now clearly said that unless Russia's mediation and the sending of a compound peacekeeping force consisting of Russian forces is not accepted, he will not accept the Chairman's proposals conveyed in the report. The summit starts at 10.00 o'clock the next day and to meet with friends at 9 o'clock I walked towards the room reserved for our delegation near the conference room. A while later I came across the Azerbaijani advisor mentioned above. When he asked with a sullen face whether I knew of what happened, I asked what happened. He said that the Minsk Group's chairmanship was given to the US, France and

Russia as three co-chairmen. When I said this cannot be possible, we will not accept this, he said “Ali you say this but you accepted it already” and I asked him who gave approval from us. He said it was “our Prime Minister’s advisor”. As a matter of custom and honesty, the delegations attending the group should have been informed at least a day before and their intentions became clear since they did not. Those accepting this from us came from the center and in principle, must have received the necessary orders.

In theory, everything has not ended. Although a rarely used method, we thought that opening such a decision at the conference could create the opportunity to prevent it. For this, the issue must have been considered of high importance and the Prime Minister must have personally intervened. We were not able to obtain this opportunity, because although the Chairman could be convinced in an hour, it was not possible to call the Group to convene again and they had not brought the issue to the agenda of the General Assembly. When the Azerbaijanis, which is the actual side, did not express their objections during the conference, without any discussion on this bizarre arrangement, it was included in the final document as the “President’s statement” instead of a decision. According to procedures, since no one objected from before, the Chairman’s statement meant it was a decision. In short, with a method frequently observed in international conferences, it is almost impossible for them to agree on a common point such as the US, France and the Russian Federation. Exerting effective pressure on the sides was left to the three countries’ initiative or mercy. But still, during the period in which I intervened, I could say that the US Delegation was the delegation acting the most neutral among these three countries. I believe that the main reason for this is the difference in strategic goal between the US and Europe. A similar situation was experienced during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. An arrangement similar to the Minsk Group was also present there, but it did not have multiple chairmen.

The co-chairmen still continue to work. I have no doubt on the efficiency and even the good will of the diplomats on duty, but eventually those making a decision are not diplomats, but are governments. Annual reports continue to be presented to the CSCE Group and the Security Council. Of course the chairmen are also changing every two years. God knows for how many more years it will continue to convene. If it was not for Azerbaijan’s petroleum, the problem would already have been resolved to Azerbaijan’s disadvantage.

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE MINSK GROUP

(DAĞLIK KARABAĞ ÇATIŞMASI VE MINSK GRUBU)

Candan AZER
Ambassador (Rtd.)

Before addressing the attempts for a solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the context of the formation created with a decision of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and named the “Minsk Group”, it will be useful to first shortly address the history of the conflict.

History

Karabakh is a region of approximately 18.000 km² found between Azerbaijan’s rivers of Kura and Aras, in the east of Lake Sevan in Armenia.

On the other hand, Nagorno-Karabakh is the territory covering the mountainous upper areas of Karabakh of approximately 4.388 km². Therefore, the region is referred to as Mountainous Karabakh or Nagorno-Karabakh. With the belief that it describes the region more correctly, we preferred the name Nagorno-Karabakh.

This is the region which is the subject of dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenians argue that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to them ever since ancient histories. However, historical facts show that this allegation is groundless.

Since the Armenians show the old ruins of the church in the region as evidence for their allegations, it would be appropriate to address this issue before anything else.

The first determinable habitants of the territories of the Southern Caucasus forming the country of Azerbaijan today were the Albans. Just as there are

theses which argue that an ethnic bond exists between the Albans and today's Albanians, there are also scholars who put forth that this thesis is wrong. The ethnic characteristics of the Albans are irrelevant to our subject. The reason for mentioning the Albans is the unique architecture these Christian people used in the construction of the church. This architectural feature refutes the Armenians' allegations that based on history they have rights over the region. In other words, these old church ruins invalidate the allegation that the region "belongs to the Armenians ever since ancient histories". This thesis carries no other meaning than being one of the attempts of the Armenians directed towards exploiting religion in the Christian world.

In this context, the Armenian allegation that Turkish and Islamic monuments in the region are so few that no attention is paid to them could be responded by drawing attention to the fact that there is no mosque in Athens which had remained under Ottoman domination for almost four centuries. Destroying has always been easier than building.

Although the Armenians' assertions that since the 4th century, Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to the "Kingdom of Great Armenia" is correct, the region has always remained under the domination of others in the following centuries. The domination over the region has passed on from the Christian Albans to the Arabs, Mongols, Safavid Iran of Turkish origin, and the Turks. The region's name is a combination of Turkish and Persian: Kara-bakh.

Since the 11th century, the Seljuk Turks have started to dominate the region.

Hasan Celal Davla (1214-1261) from the Seljuk Hans has established the Jalali Dynasty. Those from the Jalali Dynasty have left behind many works of art. The Dynasty has displayed the ability and capacity to continue following Timur Leng's Mongol invasion.

It is due to the presence of the Jalalians, who have blood relations with the Ottomans, that during the expedition made to Iran in 1514 Yavuz Sultan Selim has been able to pass the winter in Karabakh. The area has entered the administration of other Turkmen rulers in the 15-16th centuries.

These rulers have created various Khanates on the territories which form Azerbaijan today. The main ones are Ganja, Revan, Sheki, Baku, Kuba, Derbent, Nakhchivan, and Karabakh Khanates.

The Karabakh Khanate has been established in 1747 by Panah Ali Khan from the Javanshir Tribe. The city, whose current name is Shusha, was initially named Panahabad in honor of the Khanate and the name of its founder. His

son Ibrahim Halil Khan, who replaced him after his death, has turned Panahabad into a civilized city. This beautiful city, whose monuments belonging to that period are still standing, has also raised many poets and composers.

As a result of the attacks Russia undertook in order to bring the Southern Caucasus under its domination, all the Khanates have been seized by the Russian Tzar. Finally, the Karabakh Khanate has entered within Russian domination with an agreement signed on 14 May 1805. Iran has accepted this situation in 1813 with the Treaty of Gulistan signed with Russia.

Russia has not trusted the local community of Turkish origin living on the territories it dominates. Therefore, it was necessary for a population to be created which Russia can trust. The opportunity Russia sought in this area was provided by the victories it gained during the wars waged with Iran in one year and the Ottoman Empire the next.

The Turkmenchay Treaty signed in 1828 between Iran and Russia has also granted the people living on the territories of the two countries the right to mutually migrate to wherever they want.

Based on this point, Russia has drawn around 70.000 Armenians living in Iran to their own territories through some privileges bestowed to them. These Armenians who migrated to Russia were settled in Yerevan, Nakhchivan, Ganja, Shamahi and the regions of Karabakh afterwards. The most extensive settlement has been made to Yerevan and Karabakh.

With the Treaty of Adrianople signed with the Ottoman Empire a year later, Russia has pushed the Ottoman Empire into accepting the articles of the Turkmenchay Treaty. This way, the article on population transfer has gained validity. Utilizing the opportunity provided by the conventional situation, Russia has transferred many Armenians, particularly those living in Erzurum, Kars and Bayazit, to their own territories by tempting them.

The number of Armenians who migrated or forced to migrate from the territories of Iran and the Ottoman Empire to current Armenian territories and Karabakh are conveyed to be around 130,000. The mountaineous sections of the region have been found suitable for a majority of those settled in the Karabakh Khanate.

Considering the data on population, it can be seen that according to a census conducted by Russian military officials in 1823, the Muslim population in Karabakh was 91% and the Armenian population was 8.4%. Census verified

that even after receiving extensive immigration due to opportunity created by the treaties of Turkmenchay and Adrianople, the population of Muslims reduced to 64.8% while the Armenians were still around 34.8%.

On the other hand, according to another census conducted at the end of the century, we can see that the Armenians population increased up around 53.3%.

The migration from Eastern Anatolia to Armenia also continued during the First World War. In accordance with the Relocation Law of 1915, while many Armenians in these territories have been transferred to Ottoman territories remaining outside the battleground, a major portion of Armenian population emigrated to Russia. According to presumptions, approximately 420.000 Armenians have migrated to Russia in this period.

The armed struggle carried out by the Armenian Government, where the Dashnaks are dominant, in order to conquer the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur, has continued until the Red Army's occupation of Southern Caucasia in 1920.

During the period of Russian domination, tension between Azeri Turks and the Armenian population has never been absent. This tension has reached its climax during the Russian Revolution of 1905.

Just as the entire Southern Caucasus during the years of the First World War, Nagorno-Karabakh has also witnessed the conflicts of the Ottoman, English and local powers.

Nuri Pasha's "Islamic Army" has reached Baku in 1918 by passing through Azerbaijan's regions in its west of Kazakh, Ganja, Nukha, Akdam, Jebrail, and Karabakh. Meanwhile, vicious conflicts were taking place between the Azeri Turks and Armenians in Karabakh. By intervening into the situation, Nuri Pasha drove the Armenians back. The city of Stepanakart, under the occupation of the Armenians, has been rescued as a result of a tough war through the local forces joining Nuri Pasha at Susha, which possesses an arduous strait. This way, effective Azeri domination has once again been established. Thomson, the commander of the English forces entering Azerbaijan upon the Ottomans losing the World War and Nuri Pasha withdrawing, has caused Retired General Andranik to abandon its attempts to seize Nagorno-Karabakh, whose "two-thirds of its population is constituted by the Azerbaijanis".

The armed struggle carried out by the Armenian Government, where the Dashnaks are dominant, in order to conquer the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur, has continued until the Red Army's occupation of Southern Caucasia in 1920.

The Armenians' claims on the two regions mentioned above have also not settled during the Soviet Union period.

The ownership of the region has for a long time kept the Soviet rulers occupied. For instance, one of the initiators of the Bolshevik movement in the Caucasus, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, from an Armenian origin, has stated that the region being annexed to Armenia will serve "the Armenians' ambitions to enlarge" and in a conversation held with Stalin in the beginning of the 1920's before the Red Army's occupation of the area, he has indicated that Karabakh cannot be given to Armenia. As justification for his view, Mikoyan has indicated that "the community never and in any way had a common past with Armenia" and such an annexation will "be the equivalent of being deprived of the right to live which originated from Baku".

In the first years following Soviet Russia's domination of the Southern Caucasus, the Armenians have persistently continued their claims for the regions of Nakhchivan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur to be annexed to them.

As a result, Soviet Russia has signed an agreement with Azerbaijan and Armenia in December 1920. With this agreement, although Armenia's claims on Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh were rejected, Zangezur was annexed to Armenia. With the region being given to Armenia, Nakhchivan was torn from its mother country Azerbaijan and the possibility of Nakhchivan connecting Turkey and Azerbaijan to each other has been eliminated. On the other hand, although Azerbaijan, under the administration of Nerimanov, has declared that it does not see any harm in Nakhchivan to be given to Armenia; it has abandoned this as a result of the public opinion poll conducted in 1921 where 90% of the population has said that they want to remain connected to Azerbaijan.

Armenia's annexation of Zangezur did not suspend its attempts to annex Nagorno-Karabakh. Various conferences were held and several delegations sent due to the tension generally originating from Armenian outbursts in the region in 1921-1923. In the end, Nagorno-Karabakh was given an autonomous status in 1923 and on the condition of its sovereignty remaining in Azerbaijan, the "Autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh Region" has been declared in November 1924. Its capital has been moved from historical Sussha to Stepanakert.

While the region's status was confirmed with the 1936 constitution of Soviet Russia, its name was changed into "Autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh Region" (NKAR).

In order to create “Great Armenia” existing in the minds of the Armenians, annexing Nagorno-Karabakh to their territories was a primary goal. Obtaining the majority of the population in the region over time was a factor strengthening its hand.

Moreover, the Armenians who did not have the opportunity to fulfill their goals despite their attempts in 1923 and 1936 did not give up and in the 1960’s and 1970’s they have brought their claims once again to the agenda. However, the result was defeat: the 1977 Soviet constitution made no change to the article stating that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan.

The Moscow administration in despair, faced with the events gradually increasing, has appealed to a measure on 25 July 1990 non-existent in the Soviet constitution and has decided to disband the armed forces of the two countries.

Gorbachev’s “transparency and restructuring” period came during that time. The Armenians pressing Moscow by finding support with Russia becoming more flexible and the attempts of its effective and powerful diaspora in many Western states, have started concentrating on the issue with an increasing intensity, have organized various demonstrations and eventually have resorted to violence in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Moscow administration in despair, faced with the events gradually increasing, has appealed to a measure on 25 July 1990 non-existent in the Soviet constitution and has decided to disband the armed forces of the two countries. Upon the Armenian violence continuing despite this measure, Azerbaijan has cut its natural gas transmission in August 1990 and then have placed total embargo, including transformation.

The following month, it has dispatched military units to Russia, which had deployed military units to borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and then to Azerbaijan and Armenia in November.

By issuing a statement in March 1991, Gorbachev had confirmed that Nagorno-Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijan and has called on the parties to negotiate.

The Armenian attacks have also gained a terrorist characteristic in May 1991 with 53 people dying as a result of the bombs exploding which were placed in trains in Baku. Armenian terror, which has occupied a place in world literature for carrying out the first city terror and massacring Turkish state officials, has now come to the fore in Baku with this event.

Armenia, alarmed with Azerbaijan declaring its independence on 30 August 1991, has suggested the governing council in Nagorno-Karabakh and

Goranboy (Shahumian) in its north to declare independence. The local administration following this suggestion has declared “independence” on 31 August.

With 16 Azerbaijan Turks losing their lives on September 17 during the Armenian attacks, the two countries have signed on September 23 the declaration which foresees the settlement of the problem through negotiations and the establishment of a buffer zone on the borders.

However, a while after this agreement, on 20 November 1992, upon a helicopter carrying Spokesman of the Azerbaijan Presidency Osman Mirzaev, Mayor of Shusha Vagif Caferov and officials of Russia and Kazakhstan being crashed over Nagorno-Karabakh and 26 people losing their lives, the softening emerging in the relations between the two countries have been replaced with an increasing sternness.

In such a situation, in order to prevent the increase in disagreement, a stir has emerged in the international sphere.

In this context, the first institution put emphasis on is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

“The Minsk Group”

It was understood that CSCE, formed in the 1960’s as a result of the works continuing for tens of years of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries in order to ease the East-West tension, would be an appropriate forum. Indeed, CSCE had developed in time and had contributed to an atmosphere of dialogue being created between the two pacts. The institution which was foreseen to turn into a platform that would contribute to security and cooperation being developed between the member countries following the dissolution of Soviet Russia, could have assumed the function of finding a settlement to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Changes were even made in the rules of establishment and function that would serve this purpose. (The institution has after a while turned into an organization and taken the name “Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe” – OSCE)

With these ideas in mind, a group of countries in which we also exist, have brought the issue on 30 January 1992 to the organization to which Azerbaijan and Armenia had just become members and it was decided for a reporter mission to be sent to the region.

This way, the disagreement on Nagorno-Karabakh had entered the agenda of international forums.

However, it appeared that the Armenian attacks were increasingly becoming intense. In this context, the massacre known in history as the Khojaly Massacre had emerged on 25-26 February. The horrible protests in Khojaly are clearly explained, absent from any feeling of embarrassment, in the book “Revival of Our Souls” of Zori Balayan and “For the Sake of Cross” of Daud Kheyrian who had participated in the protests.

The point that must immediately be indicated is that it was clear that Armenia had studied its international relations lesson well. Armenia had calculated that international organizations have no sanction power and that countries in the position to be able to intervene would not do so with the influence of various factors. They had the support of the powerful and effective Armenian lobbies in countries like the US and France. On the other hand, Russia was struggling with its own problems. Moreover, it was known that Russia’s heart was with Armenia. However, Turkey, as the only country that could directly intervene to the benefit of Azerbaijan, was aware that the correlation of relations did not make such an intervention easy. Furthermore, the Russian forces stationed in Armenia also had to be taken into consideration in this equation. Widespread rumors that some soldiers from these Russian forces have fought on the side of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and in some situations, have acted as leaders in the operation were also not absent. In time it became obvious that these rumors were not groundless. The statements made in the court by six “special forces” (spetsnaz) from the Russian 7th army stationed in Armenia caught in September 1992 by the Azerbaijani border patrols had displayed that Russian troops have fought on the side of the Armenians*.

Armenia had made good use of this general situation indicated with thick lines. In making use of the situation, the contribution of their personnel was great. For instance, Foreign Minister Hovanissian who is a US citizen was an expert in international relations. History professor Gerard (Jirair) Libaridian who was Ter-Petrosyan’s International Security Advisor was also a US citizen and knew the US policies well.

The Armenians were acting accordingly to the saying of “dogs bark, the caravan keeps on making way”.

Faced with this negative atmosphere, OSCE has adopted two decisions to find a solution to the disagreement.

The first of these was to send a second observer mission to the region on 19-23 March 1992. The second decision was the one dated 24 March which aimed

* For detailed information on the Russian troops entering the war see: Thomas Goltz’s article named “Letter From Eurasia: Hidden Russian Hand” published in fall 1993 in the “Foreign Policy” journal. (pp.92-116)

at the CSCE Council of Ministers to get to the core of the problem and find a solution.

Although the official name of the decision adopted by the Council of Ministers during a meeting held in Helsinki is “Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh”, since it was envisaged that the final conference would be held in the capital of White Russia, the decision has been referred to as the “Minsk Conference” and the group formed with this decision as the “Minsk Group”. This decision carries such importance that it must be emphasized.

Before anything else, the events taking place during the writing process of the decision must be addressed. As a rule of CSCE, Troika formed by the chairman-in-office, the former chairman-in-office and representatives of three countries to assume the next chairman-in-office, attends all the works of the conference and writing as a presidency council. The Czech and Slovak Republic who was Chairman back then, Germany as the former Chairman and Sweden to assume Chairmanship in the next period automatically became members of the writing committee. Naturally, Azerbaijan and Armenia as parties to the disagreement also entered the committee. Russia and France also joined. The joining of England was prevented by Armenia on grounds that “England was mistreating them after the First World War”. Despite all insistent initiatives and attempts to join, as a result of German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher resisting with the same determination, we were unable to join the Writing Committee.

Since we closely knew Azeri Foreign Minister Sadik Sadikov who was to join the writing committee, we did not expect him to make any positive contribution. However, we indicated to Sadikov and the First Secretary of that period Araz Azimov that they must absolutely oppose a statement like “representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh” to being added to the decision, that such a statement existing in the text of the decision could form the beginning of a development extending to the future recognition of the so-called independence Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed. The second point we put emphasis on was to make sure that Turkey would join the working group to be formed.

In the decision it was recorded that a conference convened under the auspices of the CSCE will be a suitable forum aimed at the achievement of peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and that the conference will be convened in Minsk. It has also indicated that the US, Germany, Azerbaijan, White Russia, Czech and Slovak Republic, Armenia, France, Sweden, Italy, Russia and Turkey attending the conference was also found appropriate. In the decision text, the statement of the Chairman of the Conference, after consulting the participant countries, of “the elected and other representatives of Nagorno-

Karabakh as interested parties would be invited to the Conference” unfortunately also existed. The chairmanship of the conference was given to Italy.

Although not clearly stated in the decision, it was found appropriate for the representatives of the mentioned countries to organize a conference under Italy’s presidency in order to address the Conference preparations. Italy appointed politician Mario Rafaelli to this position.

In the weeks following this decision, CSCE undertook a series of activities “to prepare the preliminary meeting” like the visits to the region of chairman-in-office Czech and Slovak Republic’s Foreign Minister Dienstbier, a pre-delegation in order to make the contacts of the observer mission easier, and Rafaelli appointed as Conference Chairman.

While the CSCE’s preparations to send a delegation to the region continued, the historical city of Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh where the Azeri Turks constitute the majority and is the last population center under their control which resembles a fortress not penetrated fell on May 9.

The day Shusha fell, Rafaelli came to Ankara. This visit took place after his visit to the region. Therefore, we wanted to listen to his impressions and what he foresees. It was seen that he was quite confused. Actually, more than himself, his deputy Ambassador Sica spoke more. To be honest, this first contact with the Presidential Delegation did not very much encourage us. We explained to him our views and approach in a loud and clear manner: the conflicts must stop, the territories occupied must be evacuated and an agreement must be reached on the autonomy to be given to Nagorno-Karabakh on the condition that it remains under Azeri domination.

A short while after Rafaelli leaving Ankara, we received the news that the Lachin Corridor had fell to the hands of the Armenians. The Lachin Corridor carries strategic importance for providing a direct connection from Armenia to Azerbaijan, because the Armenians taking hold of this corridor had obtained the opportunity to be able to send all kinds of supplies they wish to Nagorno-Karabakh over land without encountering any obstacles.

As an odd twist of fortune and a pre-messenger of its mission’s failure, Shusha had fell and the Lachin corridor had passed to the hands of the Armenians while Rafaelli was coming to Ankara.

The next stop of the goal of enlarging the territories under occupation of the Armenians, who gained more encourage by easily seizing Shusha whose occupation was seen as impossible, was the region of Lachin.

The attack on the area of Lachin had started on 17 March and the area had been captured by them the following day. With the advantage of inspecting the corridor, now the entire Lachin region had easily fell under their occupation and therefore, the means of logistic support was fully guaranteed.

Again meetings were held upon this occupation and statements were made. One of the main two statements is the joint statement of Turkey and France. France, where there was no doubt that it approached Armenia's enlargement with sympathy, condemning the attack, raiding and sabotage with us resembled crocodile tears. The second was the statement of Chairman-in-Office of the European Community (EU) Portugal condemning the attack in a harsh manner.

Meanwhile, in one of the CSCE meetings, Armenia vetoed a declaration on 21st of May which confirmed that Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory and condemned the attacks.

On the other hand, the Minsk Group somehow could not convene, because while the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (ANK) expected to attend the meeting as an independent state, as the "concerning party" they resisted for not being invited on an equal level with the Azeri representatives of the region. This resistance also found support from the opposition parties in Armenia. Another factor increasing the ANK's resistance was the opposition in Yerevan forcing Ter-Petrosyan to recognize ANK's independence. In his statements, Ter-Petrosyan insisted on his thesis that the issue should be resolved through negotiations and reconciliation and as a result of the pressures intensifying on the ANK, it has been possible for the Minsk Group to convene.

After attacks, occupation, resistance and statements, the turn has finally come to the Minsk Group's meetings.

The first meeting was held in 1-5 June 1992 in Rome.

We went to the first meeting with a large delegation: Our Ambassador before the CSCE, expert on the issue and multilateral diplomacy Ali Hikmet Alp, well known figure of multilateral diplomacy Ambassador Selçuk Korkud, myself, Daryal Batıbay responsible of international organizations at the center and some young colleagues.

Nadir Hüdaverdioğlu Mehtiyev was heading the Azerbaijani delegation. He was member of the Azerbaijani Assembly and President of the Human Rights Commission. The foreign language he knew was Russian. Mehtiyev, whose actual profession was chemical engineering, said that he did not know why he was appointed to this task and that he had no international experience. Araz

Azimov who was First Secretary back then and Tevfik Zülfiyarov were also in the delegation. After Elçibey coming to power, Foreign Minister Tevfik Kasimov started to personally attend the Minsk Group meetings. After Elçibey left his Presidential seat, the President's deputy Vefa Gülizade, having a diplomatic origin, usually chaired the Azerbaijani delegation.

The Armenian delegation consisted of names such as Christian Der Stepanian, Jirair (Gerard) Libaridian, and Souren Zolyan. Stepanian was purely an enemy towards the Turks who worked as a teacher in France. Libaridian who is a history professor had chaired the Zoryan Institute, a Dashnak institution, in Boston. Due to divergence of views, he had later on withdrawn from membership to the Dashnak Party. While continuing his works at the university in the US, he had been invited by Levon Ter-Petrosyan for the task and had assumed the position of the President's Foreign Policy Advisor. His historical knowledge on the "Armenian facts" was complete. He was determined, but at the same time possessed a soft manner. It was possible to speak to him. Some changes took place in the Armenian delegation in the other sessions. Stepanian withdrew from delegation, David Shahnazarian joined. Shahnazarian, born in Armenia, was also the President's foreign policy advisor.

The head of the Russian delegation was Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, purely a representative of the Soviet Russia diplomacy. He had specialized on Latin America. Since he did not know English, he was spoken to through a translator. He was a tough negotiator. According to him, the only person who knew the truth and the facts was himself.

Ambassador John (Jack) Maresca, the absolute leader of the US delegation, was an ambitious negotiator who had formerly served as Permanent Representative at the CSCE. He did not refrain from showing that he knows the position of the country he represents in the international field.

Since the representatives of the other countries generally remain only as listeners, their delegations are not mentioned. Among these countries, for France it is difficult to say that despite being ambitious, it has shown any presence in the meetings since its heads of delegation constantly change. France's presence in the Group started being felt in 1993 after the appointment of Ambassador Helene Dubois.

Since the first meetings of the Minsk Group, it became clear that Mehtiyev neither really knows the issue nor does he have experience in international contacts. Moreover, despite Russia, France and in the beginning the US within the Group being prone to Armenia, it was Azerbaijan which was attacked. It could not be said that Italy, assuming chairmanship, was also acting neutral.

Since Chairman Rafaelli, who in the mean time was waiting to be appointed to the Foreign Ministry, was waiting for the news to arrive to him, efficaciously Ambassador Sica was chairing the meeting.

With the guise of the “concerning party”, there were the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (ANK) and the Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijanis (NKA). The “ANK delegation” had a command of the issue. It interfered in almost all statements and expressed views. They constantly acted in consultancy and interdependence with the Armenian Delegation. On the other hand, the NKA Delegation was entirely aggrieved. Just as they gave the impression that they do not even know why they are in the meeting, it seemed that they also were not in contact with the Azeri Delegation. It could not be said that it was easy for our attempts to form a dialogue with him were successful due to the problem of language, because members of the NKA Delegation did not know their mother tongue and there was no one in our delegation who knew Russian.

It was obvious that our mission would be difficult.

In 1992, the Group held a total of seven meetings where five of them were official, two were unofficial. The meetings passed with discussions on how they would attend the negotiations held between the ANK and the NKA. The Armenian delegation insisted on the opportunity to be given to the ANK to express their views. We, together with the Azeri delegation, absolutely opposed this. In the end although an agreement was reached on the “concerning two parties” to express views through the Chairman, this solution did not satisfy the NKA.

Although the Minsk Group’s main function was to make the determining of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh easier, the main issue was left aside due to the continuing conflicts and occupations and concentration was given to how the conflicts could be ended.

Kazimirov believed that the essential purpose was to obtain a ceasefire and he was not flexible on his view. For Russia, the essential purpose was to obtain a ceasefire and to somehow maintain its presence on Azeri territories, from where he believed his forces would soon be withdrawn, on a basis of international legitimacy. (Eventually the Russian forces have been withdrawn from the area of Nakhchivan in 1992 and from the whole of Azerbaijan in the Spring of 1993).

The observers, whose deployment was inevitable for the protection of the ceasefire, could have formed a good opportunity for Russia. Of course, in order to conceal the purpose, Kazimirov was referring to the forces of the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) being sent as observers. In the current conditions, there was no one who did not know that within the CIS, no other country besides Russia could deploy an observer to Nagorno-Karabakh. The term “CIS observer” was actually used as a cover for the “Russian soldier”.

A general evaluation made by an author on Russia’s approach to the Southern Caucasus is striking:

Although it is doubtful that Russia knows the difference between ‘protecting peace’ and ‘obtaining peace’, it considering itself as the gendarme of Soviet Russia territories is without doubt. Despite Moscow being the “poser of problem” in the Southern Caucasus, it is apparent that it wants to assume the role of ‘protecting peace’. As long as disagreement continues to exist in the Southern Caucasus, the concern for ‘providing peace’ will dominate Russia’s policy towards the region. If it cannot be obtained through peace, mediation and attempts to protect peace, it must be expected for Russia to resort to the methods of “obtaining peace” of the 19th century.

We believed in case this ceasefire did not work hand-in-hand with the evacuation of the occupied territories and the creation of conditions for the displaced persons to return their homes easier, it will cause the occupations to strengthen. Furthermore, we also expressed that among the observers of the ceasefire, our soldiers should also exist. As expected, the Armenian delegation strongly opposed the view that Turkish soldiers should exist among the observers. Kazimirov also supported the Armenian view through different, various excuses.

The Armenian side neither supported a ceasefire, nor an evacuation.

Maresca believed that the CSCE rules should be applied. However, no one but specialists like himself knew what these rules were. The US Representative giving the impression that he does not have full knowledge on the background of the issue and the goals pursued also did not quite take a dim view towards the Russian proposal at the beginning.

In the meetings, academic discussions were being held on how “territorial integrity” and “self-determination”, two conflicting principles of international law, could be associated with Nagorno-Karabakh. We were arguing that the first principle was a rule forming the basis of law, while “self-determination” was used as an instrument after World War II in order to give independence to the colonies and was a term that fulfilled its purpose.

The views confined to a few paragraphs above had filled the days and sessions.

Following Elcibey coming to power, Azerbaijan achieved partial success on the front. Martakert, occupied before, was rescued and some progress was made in Goranboy.

Under the conditions back then, Azerbaijan's success in the military area was an extraordinary development. How was it that the Azeri soldiers who had constantly withdrawn on the front could rescue some territories under occupation? An emergency meeting was held. When a break was taken during the meeting, Maresca said that he wants to meet me in private. When stepping aside, I told Maresca, who said that the success was achieved with the intervention of the Turkish soldiers, that this is not true, it could be the contribution of American officers of US oil companies who are said to be deployed in the region. When receiving the response of "I don't even care about your thought" and replying to him with "we don't care about your proposal either", our relations with Maresca were tense for some time. Truly, back then, there were sayings that some retired officers of US oil companies were assigned in order to help in the creation of the Azerbaijani army and that they also provided consultancy services on the front.

In the meetings, academic discussions were being held on how "territorial integrity" and "self-determination", two conflicting principles of international law, could be associated with Nagorno-Karabakh. We were arguing that the first principle was a rule forming the basis of law, while "self-determination" was used as an instrument after World War II in order to give independence to the colonies and was a term that fulfilled its purpose.

Returning back to the meeting, a call for a ceasefire was made in haste and an intensive effort was undertaken for it to be complied with. To evaluate the result of these efforts, an unofficial meeting was held on July 17. In the period between, bad news had started being received again from the front.

After Kazimirov indicated in a victorious general manner that he is in contact "with all parties to the conflict including the ANK", he conveyed that Ter-Petrosyan was applying pressure on the ANK to bring the conflicts to a stop. This way, he proved that the conflicting side is not Armenia, but the ANK. Moreover, the Russian representative also said that he gave an action plan with a timetable to the conflicting parties. According to it, the conflicting parties will cease fire, form a demilitarized zone among their selves, will pull their heavy weapons to outside the area of conflict and will deploy observers. In

short, at the end of this progressive process, the ceasefire will be taken under inspection and the observers will start work.

The discussion intensified on the applicability of the plan. The modalities of the Minsk Conference convening if the plan is accepted were also addressed. Some representatives argued that the conference be held without any preconditions, while others argued that it should convene after its application to the ceasefire was guaranteed.

We indicated that the ceasefire is a phase, the timetable should entail the evacuation of the occupied territories concurrently through the ceasefire, and that the conference being organized without evacuation taking place will amount to giving credence to the occupiers and to putting down roots on the territories under occupation.

At the end, it was decided for Chairman Rafaelli to conduct another visit to the region for an assessment of the situation.

In the “Progress Report” published by CSCE in 1992, the situation was remarkably summarized in one sentence:

Mario Rafaelli continues its tireless efforts to advance the peace process.

In reality, the continuous acts were the Armenian attacks.

This way, year 1993 was arrived.

In this year, the regions of Akdere, Kelbecer, Akdam, Fuzuli, Cabrail, Horadis and Zegalan were also occupied. The territories being occupied corresponded to 20 % of Azerbaijan. The Azeri Turks on the territories falling under Armenian occupations were only able to save their lives by running away. At the end, nearly one million people had become migrants (deserters) on their own territories. Efforts for peace also continued.

Now we can look at the developments.

It had become clear that stopping the attacks and the evacuation of the occupied territories through the efforts of the Minsk Group would not be possible.

There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Armenians were in euphoria of victory for easily achieving success. They did not even receive a warning that conveyed the message that serious sanctions would be applied.

At the first stage to maintain its position in the Southern Caucasus and then to

strengthen it, Russia was using this crisis as an instrument. Without doubt, the issue of Azeri oil being sold without passing through Russia being on the agenda also played a role in this. Moreover, the possibility that Turkey's influence in the region could increase also strained the minds.

On the other hand, the attention and efforts of the US and Western European countries had concentrated on the dissolving Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the activities of the Armenian diaspora in these countries to form public opinion in favor of them were also continuing without rest. Despite all its power and superiority, it was a well known fact that the US could not at the same time struggle with two great crises.

Under these conditions, by getting the US on our side and also including Russia in the issue, we could have perhaps obtained a result.

With these thoughts, in order to put the idea of Turkey, US and Russia to form a trilateral initiative, which we have been emphasizing for some time, the CSCE meeting organized in Paris in the beginning of January formed an appropriate forum. Russia's influence over Armenia and the ANK was apparent. Foreign Minister Kozirev could have convinced them that our aim is not to alienate Russia from the region and that if we can act together, common efforts could be shown to bring an end to the attacks and evacuate the areas occupied. We could have achieved this by bringing the US on our side. Eagleburger, who was US Secretary of State back then, had worked by Kissinger's side and was a diplomat famous for his talents, who could research the issues in depth and who had a strategic vision.

Before the meeting of Çetin-Eagleburger, we had a long private talk with Maresca on January 12. I explained to him openheartedly our thoughts concerning the developments in the region and our expectations regarding the future and I told him that we want to see the US by our side. I also indicated that Azerbaijan is in favor of close relations being established, including giving the US a significant share in managing rich oil resources and marketing it to the world. By referring to concrete events, I said that the Armenians in Yerevan and Stepanakert have neither planned the developments in Nagorno-Karabakh on their own, nor have they put them into practice on their own. I also added that we expect them to support the trilateral initiative which we foresee.

After listening with patience, Maresca said that a trilateral initiative could be beneficial and that behind Armenia's harsh and violent approach, the support they received from Russian Minister of Defense Grachev could also play a role. Since these statements indicated a positive change in Maresca's views, it

was pleasing. The tension arising between us during the dispute in Rome was also eradicated.

Çetin met with Eagleburger the next day. Eagleburger, known for being extremely intelligent, was as sharp as a needle and assumed the task of examining the grounds together with the Russians. Now if Russia would accept it, a Trilateral Initiative would enter the process.

Meanwhile, the Minsk Group held its first meeting on February 22 in Rome. It convened in two stages. ANK and NKA did not attend the first stage. The ceasefire, timetable for withdrawal and determining the terms of reference of the observers to be deployed in the region were the main agenda items. Water continued to be treaded. It was clear that the Armenians had no intention to retreat. When it became obvious that a compromise cannot be reached on the timetable, attempts started concentrating on the terms of reference of the observers. Despite it not being certain which countries would send observers, when the time comes and they are deployed if a compromise is reached, the rules they have to follow would be in their hands. To be honest, for us, tying the rules the observers would have to follow to a basis without the timetable for withdrawal was not determined, was the same as tying the car in front of the horse. When the other countries were willing, we did not oppose it. We also convinced Azerbaijan.

The meeting lasted for days. The deadlocks were surpassed on 28 February Sunday evening and on the condition of the ANK and NKA representatives as the “concerning party”, the terms of reference was accepted. The next day the meeting’s second stage took place. ANK representative talked at length as if publicly sermonizing. The Armenian delegation’s silencing attempts also did not help. We did not address the ANK. Representatives of the US and Russia made explanations. Sica also displayed an attempt. Eventually he unwillingly accepted the terms of reference. This way, in the first year of its establishment, the Minsk Group had determined the rules the observers would be following. Neither a date for a ceasefire nor a timetable for withdrawal existed. Issues like the number and nationality of the observers to be deployed were also unclear. In summary, the task was up to three horseshoes and one horse.

On March 6, our Foreign Minister conducted a one day visit to Azerbaijan. Our aim was to provide information on the “Trilateral Initiative” and to get their views. In the talk held with President Elcibey, Foreign Minister Tevfik Kasimov and Vefa Gulizade were also present. Elcibey welcomed our initiative warmly and was particularly highly pleased with the possibility of the US dealing with the issue closely.

In the middle of the month, a meeting was held in Geneva with the attendance of the US, Russia and ourselves. Kazimirov once again proved his creativity unique to himself. Despite us repeating tens of times that the beginning of the settlement of the issue lies in the concept of “ceasefire/evacuation”, he appeared with a timetable regarding the ceasefire and the deployment of observers. We also had a suggestion with a timetable. Through the support of Maresca, addressing the timetable which also foresees evacuation was accepted. Representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia also attended the session on the following day. After the first hours of the session passing with discussions on method, they turned to the essence of the issue. It was a pleasant surprise that in the next day’s session, progress without any problems was made on the timetable until the article on the evacuation of the Lachin area was addressed. However, the Armenians were not in favor of the evacuation of the Lachin region. Another point which raised difficulties was the Armenians not accepting to remove its heavy weapons in the region. As long as those weapons remained there, it would be a dream for the Azeri Turks, who had fled by losing their feelings of trust, to return to their homes. We insisted that in order for an atmosphere of trust to be created in the region, the removal of these weapons was necessary.

It was a pleasant surprise that in the next day’s session, progress without any problems was made on the timetable until the article on the evacuation of the Lachin area was addressed. However, the Armenians were not in favor of the evacuation of the Lachin region. Another point which raised difficulties was the Armenians not accepting to remove its heavy weapons in the region. As long as those weapons remained there, it would be a dream for the Azeri Turks, who had fled by losing their feelings of trust, to return to their homes. We insisted that in order for an atmosphere of trust to be created in the region, the removal of these weapons was necessary.

After the session held in Russia’s representative in Geneva, Kazimirov invited me together with Selçuk Korkud to a special meeting. After we drank our teas, Kazimirov removed a bundle of papers from his bag and started reading them. His translator also conveyed what he said. According to what he said, our Foreign Minister Çetin went to Moscow with a sudden decision and met with Kozirev. We have no information about this visit. Our addressee reading the proceedings of Çetin-Kozirev put forth that Çetin only accepted a first step that foresees the ceasefire. I cut in and indicated that the ceasefire and evacuation cannot be separated from each other like the two sides of a coin. I constantly explained that the views conveyed in the meetings are not personal, that after being addressed in the Ministry we also received the approval of the Government and that Turkey does not change

its views from the morning until the evening. He put the proceedings of the talk back into his bag.

Since the principle of “nothing is considered to be accepted as long as everything is accepted” forms the basis of the operation mode of CSCE, we returned empty-handed from the Geneva conference where important progress was made. Despite this, it was decided for the meeting to convene again at the end of the month.

When departing from Ankara to go to Geneva together with the Azerbaijani delegation, we received the news that the Armenians had attacked the Kalbajar region in the north of Nagorno-Karabakh where the Azeri Turks constituted 98% of the population.

The first session was held in our Embassy in Geneva. In the session to which Libaridian did not attend, Shahnazaryan represented Armenia and explained at length that his country has nothing to do with the attack and that it was conducted by the ANK. The second session was held on April 2nd in the US Embassy after receiving the news that Kalbajar was occupied. Negotiations came to a deadlock. Maresca indicated that under the current conditions, he did not know what was to be negotiated and that the meetings must be suspended and he criticized the Armenians in a harsh language. We indicated that two weeks, although distant, ago a gleam of hope had emerged, but with the recent attack we lost our hope.

The Russian, in a wiseacre manner, made a statement meaning to say “it was meant to be”. He did not complain about the situation. We were already suspicious of Kazimirov after the visits made to Yerevan and Stepanakart after each meeting. After these visits, we had to cover again the small distance obtained in the meetings that lasted days and hours. This time, we had fallen way behind the distance covered.

The meeting ended in such a situation.

Upon this attack and occupation, we tried to convince the United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution. When this was not possible, we had to be satisfied with the statement made by the Term President on April 6. In the statement, “the serious concern felt with relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia increasingly deteriorating” was indicated. This sentence was affirmative with showing that the disagreement existed between the two countries. However, the indication that Kalbajar was “occupied by local Armenian forces” also existing in the statement fell behind our expectations since it reflected the approval of the thesis that Armenia had nothing to do with

the military operation. Though in the statement it was also expressed that Kalbajar was a territory of Azerbaijan and the principles of respect to the countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability of borders were confirmed, but it was not indicated that the side violating the borders was Armenia.

Upon Kalbajar's occupation, we suspended all kinds of transportation to Armenia.

We tried to fill the space left by the Minsk process, which was suspended de facto after this last occupation, by giving emphasis to the Trilateral Initiative we were working on for some time.

For this purpose, we utilized the opportunities created by various international meetings. In the period after Kalbajar, after coming together for the first time with the representative of the US and Russia on April 26 at a CSCE conference in Prague, we passed to Moscow on April 28. Kazimirov continued to maintain his ordinary stance. He both accepted and rejected our proposal formed together with the US. At the end he said that he accepts it, but how much could this be trusted?

We found it beneficial for the Security Council to adopt a decision so that it would strengthen our hand in our attempts for a Trilateral Initiative. The US also assisted. In the end, on April 30, a resolution was adopted. The resolution was parallel to the President's Statement on April 6. Armenia was not able to be designated as the attacker. Furthermore, the immediate ending of the conflicts in order to achieve a ceasefire and the evacuation of occupied Azeri territories, including Kalbajar, was called upon in the resolution. This was a positive development, because not only a ceasefire was mentioned, but evacuation was also foreseen.

Meanwhile, Armenia requested for explanatory information to be provided on some points of the Trilateral Initiative and the ANK wanted the security measures to be taken after the evacuation to be enriched.

The point reached made another trilateral meeting necessary. Kazimirov, who had rejected our former proposals, again rejected our proposal to host the meeting. In despair, once again we made our way to Moscow together with Ambassador Volkan Vural. We first held a bilateral talk with Kazimirov. He acted quite insistent on his view which only foresees a ceasefire. When we decided to cut the talks after this, our addressee relaxed and indicated that an evacuation can also be foreseen. However, in the trilateral meeting held with the attendance of US representative Maresca, he spilled the beans and said that

he does not support the Trilateral Initiative. Maresca's harsh response was also not useful.

Was all that time and effort going to waste? We did not give up.

In the beginning of June, it was decided for the representatives of the three countries to come together in Rome under the chairmanship of Sica. When Maresca having gone to Baku and Yerevan was not able to catch up with the first meeting, we held a bilateral talk with Sica on June 2nd. Sica's impressions unfortunately strengthened our conviction on Russia's stance.

A great part of the meeting of June 3rd under Sica's chairmanship passed with listening to Kazimirov's lengthy speech delivered in order to present his new proposal. We started the session on the next day again by listening to his statements. At one point, he went as far as to request authority to be given to Russia to conduct a military intervention. We already knew what Russia wanted: Authorization to intervene in order to resolve the conflict in which it also had a share in its emergence. It wanted to assume the roles of both a creator of conflict and a resolver. Naturally, we, together with Maresca strongly opposed this. Although it regressed after this, what lay behind consciousness was now out in the open.

Just when a negotiation was being reached on a timetable that could be accepted by nine countries, when a rebellion erupted in Azerbaijan against Elcibey, the consequences of this had to be waited for.

Meanwhile, Maresca arrived to Ankara on July 14. The purpose of his visit was to exchange views on the timetable to be formed by nine countries of the Minsk Group, apart from Azerbaijan and Armenia, for the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council regarding the occupation of Kalbajar.

Following these contacts, no progress was made in the meeting held in Rome on July 22nd, because on the 2nd day of the meeting, the Armenians had attacked Agdam, the city strategically important for transport to Baku with a population exceeding 100.000. This way, they had paved the way to Baku.

The Armenians were fearlessly attacking, occupying and banishing the local community from their homes.

They were so reckless that they had attacked Agdam on the next day right after Minsk Group Chairman Rafaelli's visit to the region on 9-13 July, including Stepanakert, in order to provide information on the timetable formed by nine countries to implement the Security Council's resolution. The ANK had

previously played another game on Rafaelli. They had prevented him from coming to Stepanakert through Baku on grounds that “the entire road was mined” and by causing him to pass through Yerevan, had conveyed the message that “they have no business” with Azerbaijan. By accepting this situation, the Minsk Group Chairman had committed a serious blunder. Just as ANK authorities indicated to Rafaelli, who reached Stepanakert through Yerevan, that military considerations dominate their approach and are disinterested with diplomatic initiatives, by first approving the draft and then saying that they signed it on a personal basis, they had in some way also ridiculed the Minsk Group in Rafaelli’s presence.

In the letter sent to the Security Council Term President on this issue, Rafaelli indicated that on the point reached, the point to resolve the conflict through diplomatic initiatives has been exceeded and had pointed out the necessity to apply political pressure.

As a result of the intensive efforts we undertook together with Pakistan, whose term membership had started, the Security Council adopted a new resolution on July 29. In this resolution, where the main points existing in the former resolution were repeated here, all occupying forces were demanded to withdraw from Agdam and the other occupied Azeri territories “immediately, completely and unconditionally”.

Looking from the aspect of international law, this resolution signified an important stage. Although not clearly expressed, it was confirmed that Nagorno-Karabakh was Azerbaijani territory and the immediate, complete and unconditional evacuation of territories under occupation was demanded. However, despite all our efforts, the resolution did not entail the threat of sanctions. Therefore, this resolution was also bound to be ignored.

Eventually, that is what happened.

With the losing of Jabrail, Fizuli and Kubatli in August and Zengelan in September, the west of Azerbaijan had entirely entered under Armenian occupation.

The occupation of these regions had also created the additional problem of “deserters” of 100-150.000 people.

Haydar Aliyev who assumed the office after Elcibey, who saw that at the stage reached the Minsk Group had lost its function and left his seat as a result of the rebellion, was forced to seek the solution at different doors. Aliyev adopted the approach that the first goal must be to stop the conflicts in order for

Azerbaijan to recover its war power and with the idea that it is in a leading position, wanted Russia to show efforts in this direction. This was a stroke of fortune for Kazimirov.

Aliyev went to Moscow on September 5 and signed the document for Azerbaijan to join the CIS.

On the other hand, the Minsk Group decided on continuing in Paris the drafting works of the timetable which foresees the evacuation of some regions under occupation and the partial lifting of the embargos put by Azerbaijan.

The meeting held in Paris brought forth a timetable. It was a meaningful development, because apart from the ceasefire, although in a restricted manner, it also entailed evacuation. Based on this, for each area evacuated by the Armenians, Azerbaijan will incrementally open the roads it closed and put the natural gas pipeline that it had cut into operation. Despite Armenia responding positively with some comments, Azerbaijan did not approve it since it did not foresee the evacuation of Shusha and Lachin.

While trying to determine a new date for a meeting to convince Azerbaijan, a short-term ceasefire, that would be extended later on, was made through the mediation of Russia. Through the initiative of the US, who took action upon this development, the Security Council adopted a new resolution on 14 October. In the resolution, respect to be shown to Azerbaijan's sovereignty and territorial integrity was reaffirmed and parties were called upon for the achieved ceasefire to be made permanent, but there was no statement that envisaged the evacuation of the occupied territories. The resolution also wanted the timetable formed within the Minsk Group to be accepted. However, compared to the former resolutions, evacuation not being mentioned undoubtedly meant that there was a regress. Furthermore, indicating the necessity for the timetable, which had not been ratified due to Azerbaijan's objection, to be accepted was also a negative message to Baku.

In the end, a meeting was held again in Vienna in the beginning of November in order to eradicate Azerbaijan's hesitations and a new timetable for implementation was prepared. While Armenia responded positively to the timetable, the ANK declared that in principle they accept it, but that an official status different than that of NKA must be granted to them.

Before expressing our own view, we met with the Azerbaijani delegation. We said that this timetable will constitute a beginning, that it will at least allow some regions to be rescued from occupation, and that since the initiatives taken until now no such comprehensive development had taken place and we

indicated that there is no harm in it being accepted. Gulizade, heading the Azerbaijani delegation, said that we might be right, but that his instruction is for it not to be accepted.

By delivering a short statement, Gulizade emphasized that the main reason for Azerbaijan not accepting the proposal is the loss of trust in the Minsk process.

Despite Azerbaijan's negative vote, the "timetable" was accepted by nine countries. According to it, seven occupied regions (Kubatli, Zengelan, Fuzuli, Agdam, Akdere, Jabrail and Kelbecer) outside the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region would be evacuated until the Minsk Conference convened. Due to Lachin being the region which provides the transportation between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, it was not possible to include it in the timetable.

When it was supposed that the meeting had ended, Kazimirov talked almost an hour assuming that we negatively influenced the Azerbaijani delegation. In his speech, before referring to any country by its name, he also said that "it will not be allowed for the conflict to be used as an instrument in implementing expansionist goals and various interests". In response to Kazimirov, we said that the existence of those who harbor a policy of resolving the issue and therefore regaining the position lost and to resolve the problem they created their selves through their own methods can be observed in current news items and comments and that this must somehow be prevented.

The meeting ended in this atmosphere. It was doubtful whether the Armenians would comply with the timetable accepted. In case of it being applied, the occupied territories outside the Autonomous Region would be evacuated and a very important step would be taken towards the settlement of the problem. It was not possible to achieve the evacuation of Lachin which ensured transportation between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. It was obvious that the Armenians wanted to keep Lachin and Shusha in their hands as "war prizes".

In the case of the Armenians complying with the timetable, Russia's influence would weaken. However, since after each meeting of the Minsk Group where progress was achieved the situation deteriorated after Kazimirov's contacts by going to Yerevan and Stepanakert turned into an ordinary situation, again a similar development could also be expected.

The result obtained was presented by Minsk Group Chairman Rafaelli to the CSCE and the Security Council's Term President.

The timetable was published on November 10 as the Security Council's document. Then, the Council adopted a new resolution. In this resolution, the evacuation of the occupied areas was once again expressed and called on the parties to resolve the conflict in accordance with the "timetable" accepted in Vienna by nine countries within the framework of the Minsk process.

With the idea that the Security Council's resolution could form a new incentive, the proposal for the Minsk Group to convene before the CSCE Council of Ministers on November 30-December 1st was unable to take place due to Russia's decision not to attend. Including an article concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in the Council of Ministers' resolution text also failed to be achieved, because the Armenian delegation objected to the article on "respect to be shown to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity" by wanting the principle of "self-determination" to also be included. Despite Armenia openly conveying its intention this way, we could not find support for our insistent claims directed towards a statement in regards to "respect to be shown to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity", confirmed in the Security Council resolutions, violating the text. The Russian delegation remaining silent in the talks held over Nagorno-Karabakh was also meaningful. At the end, a statement foreseeing the resolution of the conflict within the framework of the Minsk process was included in the Presidential Statement.

Russia preventing the Minsk Group from convening once again and remaining silent in the Council meeting signified that its intention to resolve the conflict on its own and as it knows was becoming stronger.

Armenia, which knew that it cannot successfully implement its plans on Nagorno-Karabakh without Russia's assistance and support, continues to pay its debt to Moscow by allowing two divisions of Russian soldiers to be deployed on its territories and seeking security in Russia under the garb of CIS. However, Russia has not fulfilled its goal of re-deploying its soldiers in Azerbaijan. In order to fulfill this purpose, Russia has taken an initiative in the meeting held in Moscow in February 1994 to which the Defense Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia attended. According to this, ceasefire was to be declared, the soldiers of both sides were to withdraw 15 km. away from the engagement zone and the Russian forces were to be deployed in the region as "disengagement forces". However, since the proposal gave the opportunity for Russian forces to enter Azeri territories once again, it was rejected by Aliyev.

On the other hand, the ceasefire signed in 1994 still continues.

Due to the ceasefire signed without envisaging evacuation, Azerbaijan's 20% of territory has not been rescued from occupation and almost one million

deserters exiled from these territories have not been able to return to their homes.

With the achievement of the ceasefire, the Minsk Group has virtually lost its function. In essence, multiple attendance meetings have also been ended over time. In its place, a system of “Three Co-chairmen” has been instilled. In accordance with this system, formed from the representatives of the US, France and Russia, these representatives of the three countries from time to time come together, forming some proposals and presenting these to the countries “directly being a party” as a requirement and to the interested members of the Minsk Group as information.

The election of countries forming the trilateral co-chairmanship is also in our opinion striking. Expecting the US and France not to remain under the influence of the powerful Armenian diaspora in their countries would most probably be optimism. However, it also should not be expected for them to display a neutral approach appropriate to equity on the face of Russia’s well known stance towards the Southern Caucasus and especially towards Armenia.

Independent Azerbaijan’s first President Mutallibov had no intention of forming an army. On the other hand, Elcibey was unable to form an army due to his inabilities as a ruler.

Eventually, the Three Co-chairmen system, just as the Minsk Group, has also not achieved any significant success until now.

It might be useful to look back and examine the reasons for Azerbaijan losing this war.

Azerbaijan had no national army. It was impossible for the armed groups in various segments to act under a unity of command. It is also a known fact that these groups called “deste” acted waywardly. Moreover, the Armenians obtained some of the weapons in their inventories from the regions they occupied. An Armenian officer, in an interview delivered to an American journalist, has said in a mocking manner “the Government’s job in Baku is difficult, because they are arming both their own armed forces and also us”. Independent Azerbaijan’s first President Mutallibov had no intention of forming an army. On the other hand, Elcibey was unable to form an army due to his inabilities as a ruler.

Indicating some factors in addition to this main element is also necessary to see the picture as a whole.

As if the Armenian officers serving in combatant classes (infantry, cannon, tank, fortification) within Russian armies also serving in these attacks was not enough, it is known that many officers and soldiers from the disintegrating Soviet army joined the Armenians with their weapons. Including Nagorno-Karabakh into their territories as the first goal of the policy of enlargement had been instigated for tens of years and the Armenian soldiers trained in this direction have been successful on the front.

The west has remained insensitive towards the attack and inhuman treatments towards Azerbaijan. Here, the effective role of the Armenian diaspora should be underlined and it must be recalled that more attention was given to the events taking place in the disintegrating Yugoslavia at that time.

The Russian factor has also been to Azerbaijan's disadvantage. The point that should be emphasized is that the concern that after Armenia, its loyal friend in the region, gains full independence it could detach from it has worried Moscow, because Russia has carried the concern that such a development can seriously shatter its position in the region and can cause its interests to be harmed and has pursued a preventive policy for such a development. In order to implement its policy, Moscow has utilized the Armenians in Stepanakert more than the Levon Ter-Petrosyan government in Yerevan.

Another point that must be added to the picture is that in parallel to the increase of the opportunity for Azeri energy resources to be marketed through Turkey, the war has intensified. All the occupied regions being areas where the oil pipeline can pass through is interesting from this aspect. (In the end, the oil pipeline has followed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan line).

Within this framework, the article named "Maneuver in the Narrow Oil Field" published in September 1993 in the "Moskovskiye Novosti" journal, sheds light on some facts:

...the war in Nagorno-Karabakh has long since been found to spill outside definitions of the communities long since determining their own fate, territorial integrity, democracy, and ethnic or religious solidification. In its sixth year, it has been understood that the reason for the war remaining hidden had actually gone beyond Azerbaijan and Armenia and that Russia, US, United Kingdom, and Iran had the intention of re-sharing regions in the world where oil is found. The problem is also not directly connected to the oil reserves in Azerbaijan. The problem is Azerbaijan's key position strategic wise in the oil fields of Eurasia. It forms the only option for Azerbaijan which is situated right in the center of the zone, for Chechnya possessing treatment

facilities for crude oil, and for Central Asia whose energy resources are abundant to head towards the West without passing through Russian territories in order to reach the spectacular oil reserves extending from Tyumen (West Siberia) to the Persian Gulf... This is where attempts of rival powers to seize a country like Azerbaijan that could entail a leaping point originate from...

Even if the occupation continued, the Armenians could not form domination over this territory. Just as the Azeri Turks abandoned the occupied areas and their homelands, the Armenians withdrew from this area due to the further deterioration of living conditions.

At the end, there has been no winner of the war.

It is not easy to answer the question of “how can the problem be resolved in the future?” However, the maturing of conditions that will cause the Armenians to “go as they came” will form a firm basis for settlement and opposite to Azerbaijan developing and becoming stronger each day in all areas, Armenia is growing poorer. Deterrence emerging in this situation is important for Azerbaijan. When the time comes, it will be possible to benefit from the power of deterrence without actively resorting to weapons. Moreover, it is a rule that international law has generally accepted that an operation conducted to rescue territories under occupation is not considered an “attack”. However, as long as it is not necessary, it would be better if this opportunity is not resorted to. In case of being left desperate and being used, the limits of this option must carefully be determined. But the point that should not be overlooked under this option is Russia. Russia, who has a defense cooperation agreement with Armenia, supporting Armenia carries the danger of the tension to rise and even to spread.

Furthermore, it is also important to keep the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the viewpoint of the world in consideration. Therefore, it could be understood that under today’s conditions, it is difficult for Azerbaijan to establish direct dominance over Nagorno-Karabakh again. We believe that giving comprehensive sovereignty to the region on the conditions of the elimination of the invalid independence declaration delivered by the ANK and the evacuation of the occupied territories remaining outside Nagorno-Karabakh can form the framework of a permanent resolution. The permanent resolution to emerge will have to be guaranteed with an international document and it is believed that at this point, the article regarding Nakhchivan in the Kars Treaty and more preferably in the Moscow Treaty is a factor that must be taken as reference.

AVİM CONFERENCES

(AVİM KONFERANSLARI)

In 2013, the Center for Eurasian Studies started to hold “brain storm” conferences about various international issues given by specialists and attended by a prominent audience.

We publish the transcripts of the speeches delivered at these conferences in the “AVİM Conferences” section of our magazine.

In this edition there are two conferences.

The first conference is titled “Regional Integrated Transport Corridors Project”, delivered in Ankara Palas on 3 May 2013 by Ambassador Fatih Ceylan, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the same conference, Berris Ekinci, Deputy Director General of Energy, Water and Environmental Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a speech on “Turkey’s Energy Strategy and Its Contribution to the Global Energy Security.”

The second conference was held on 11 June 2013 in Ankara Palas as well. In this conference a speech entitled “A General Look at Asia and Turkey’s Priorities” was delivered by Ambassador Naci Kuru, Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkey. A second speaker, Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, Chair of the Department of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University, delivered a speech about how Asia became a priority for Turkey recently and how the continent offers more opportunities than Europe.

The Center for Eurasian Studies will continue holding conferences and publish the texts in its journals.

“REGIONAL INTEGRATED TRANSPORT CORRIDORS PROJECT”

(BÖLGESEL ENTEGRE ULAŞTIRMA KORİDORLARI PROJESİ)

**May 2, 2013
Ankara Palace**

**“Laying a Solid Ground for Partnership, Prosperity and Peace in
South Caucasus”**

**Presented by
H. E. Ambassador Fatih CEYLAN
Deputy Undersecretary of the MFA of Turkey**

AVİM Director Ret. Ambassador Alev Kılıç:

Esteemed guests, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of the Eurasian Research Center (AVİM), honored and pleased to welcome you to a presentation on the transport and energy corridors of Turkey to the East, to Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond. Eurasian Research Center (AVİM) is a think-tank which currently focuses on the role of Turkey at the masses of Eurasia, at an era when we start to witness the shift of gravity of global economy and politics from the West to the East. In this context, today's presentations by Ambassador, Deputy Undersecretary of the MFA of Turkey, H. E. Fatih Ceylan is highly significant. The title, the topic sounds technical. However, the essence is very much economic and political. It is another testimony to the role Turkey's getting ready presumes describing the Balkans and the Caucasus establishing the nexus of Eurasia. We appreciate deeply the presence of Deputy Undersecretary Ambassador Fatih Ceylan and also Ms. Berris Ekinci the Director General for Energy Issues of MFA to make a complementary presentation to clear the picture. The energy corridors that Turkey will come to the life. As regards the logistics, what we envisage is the presentation by Ambassador Fatih Ceylan for approximately half an hour to be followed by a presentation by Ms. Ekinci for another fifteen minutes. And then we'll have a coffee break and after fifteen minutes we'll have a Q&A session. I thank you very much for being here and it is a pleasure to invite Deputy Undersecretary Ambassador of MFA Ambassador Fatih Ceylan and his presentation on the Regional Integrated Transport Corridors Project.

Ambassador H. E. Fatih Ceylan:

I will try to present you a holistic concept which based on the railroads and highways and the transportation of energy resources which Ms. Ekinçi will concentrate on. Let me give you a background of you why we initiate such a project. Back in 2010, there was a SEKA summit meeting in Istanbul, in June 2010, whereby we had undertaken the presidency of SEKA which we will hand over to China, next year, in 2014. There President Gul had a meeting with President Aliyev, President Nazarbayev and President Putin. And he connected the idea of generating a Caucasus Development Fund to enhance the infrastructure in South Caucasia. The genesis of this concept was very ambiguous, but what we try to do is to integrate this Caucasian Development Fund with this transportation links in the region. I will not develop on the importance of this region, which is gaining importance day by day, in almost all spheres the geopolitical, geo-economics, and what have you. So, it is a very important region in strategic terms. And then we will look at the instant developments particularly in terms of energy and transport routes. And you can see the challenges associated with this strategic importance. The region, in our opinion is, extremely important for the region's stability and peace as well as Eurasia. But of course there are challenges in this region which we must all face. The first challenge that we confront with when we look at the region is, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I will not see enough the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, because we have to have a holistic view of these protracted conflicts or frozen conflicts, which is the old terminology.


Starting with Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and its history, but today, we will focus on the region, against the background of Nagorno-Karabakh. First of all, what you would like to achieve in the region is, regionally owned and regionally driven peace stability. We started our elaboration in September 2010. When this idea of Caucasus Development Fund was floated in SEKA meeting, trying to get into the terrain of how we can connect first and foremost regional countries. Taking account of the implications of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict certainly. And the first fundamental principle that we adopted was, the current status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh is neither sustainable nor acceptable. So no war, no peace, is not an option for Turkey. Therefore we have for a country which is sustainable normalization throughout the region. Let me clarify what we mean by full and sustainable normalization. This full normalization, should cover both trends. That is the normalization track between Turkey and Armenia. And also the normalization track between Armenia and Azerbaijan. These are reinforcing processes and it would be artificial to divide these processes to compartmentalize these processes. Otherwise, it would be impossible to reach a sustainable normalization. Normalization in one track does not mean

normalization the other track. So there must be reinforcing processes and interlocking processes, which we hope to generate a sustainable result covering the whole region. We are all aware of the fact I believe that always seen, has been concentrating on this issue for almost two decades. But we have no results which is unfortunate. What we are trying to do of course, throughout efforts by introducing such, solid projects. Not only confined to the region, but beyond, is to reinvigorate The Minsk process and tried to lay a solid ground for what we call peace prosperity and partnership in the region. This would be regionally owned and regionally driven effort. Which we believe should include Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia certainly when we talk about South Caucasia. So what we need is some innovative ideas to prepare the grounds for full and sustainable normalization. So, we started thinking in terms of connecting the region through railroads and highways to change the status quo. (See Map 1) The status quo is unacceptable. That’s what we have been saying for many years. But it is not only Turkey saying that the status quo is unacceptable or unsustainable. When we look at the close past focusing on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, The Minsk Group projects at the high sense, set it in very cut terms that the status quo is unacceptable. And they are still saying the same thing. But the fundamental question here is, if this is set at the highest levels, what should we do about it? To solve this protracted conflict. Our idea is, to introduce projects which would prepare the

The status quo is unacceptable. That's what we have been saying for many years. But it is not only Turkey saying that the status quo is unacceptable or unsustainable. When we look at the close past focusing on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, The Minsk Group projects at the high sense, set it in very cut terms that the status quo is unacceptable.

ground for a sustainable peace. When we look at the landscape now, we already have some projects, like Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan; Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum. And now there is another one coming, which I will elaborate more at the later stage in my presentation. And that is Baku-Tbilisi-Kars. So what we need at the very beginning of this project, is to concentrate on the region first and foremost. The critical component that is off concern from Turkey to Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. So we carried out an inductive approach focusing on how we can connect these three countries. Certainly, with a direct link to Russia and also including Georgia. And then, onwards, we found out that, it would not be sufficient to focus solely on this local context. And further, we elaborated this concept, the better the understanding is that, this goes far beyond its local vision. And it has connections with the Far East, starting from the Far East, going out to London the Western direction and going to the politics in the Northern direction. Our Foreign Minister, in September 2010, in a speech at Harvard Kennedy School, that he had a dream, he would like to go by car


**Map 1:
Proposed Corridors and Logistics Centers**



from Kars to Yerevan and from Yerevan to Baku. The need for overcoming the barriers, that to have a peace in the region. So we doubt this partnership, prosperity, peace; 3P+ which we will talk about. What we are trying to do through this concept is, to encourage first and foremost regional cooperation. We would like to suit as a regionally owned, initiative in having vital and vibrant connectivity. Starting among Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, an extending in the East world and the West world bounds. We concentrated on this transportation part and then when we look at the transportation of course, again it will not be sufficient to concentrate on the railroads. But one must have a holistic view. Railroads reinforced by highways and also seaports. So you must have an integrated project. But of course the first step should enhance the efforts to upgrade the existing transportation infrastructure projects coupled with highways that passes through this East-West corridor what we call. That requires certainly regionalized partnerships. I'd not need to elaborate more on the prosperity side of it. Because, once you increase the economies of scale, like connecting countries, starting from Caucasia including the European dimension and Eastern dimension, there is certainly a revival of economic and commercial links and interests. Throughout this past era, so what we will encourage is people to people contacts, at a proper stage, and conditions are right, opening all closed doors, there by overcoming the current barriers. That certainly requires, regional ownership, but we need to have a gained game changer of course bring about such a result. So now, I can more comfortably going to my subject, which is the Modern Silk Road. That connects Seoul, Beijing to London, and also Seoul, Beijing to Nordics, Scandinavian countries

through the vital project. As I told you before, we started from the South Caucasus, trying to contribute towards the solution of this protracted conflict and the Nagorno-Karabakh and they ended up in China, Seoul and London. Let’s have a look at this railway and highway connections in the South Caucasus in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. What we did is, to introduce the idea of having transportation link between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan if you look at the map. The upper part is the Northern, let’s call it the mini-Northern corridor and lower part is the mini-Southern Corridor. One railroad, one highway and the mini-Southern corridor, below. Again one railroad and highway connection. The mini-Northern corridor in the region, in the regional context is Dogukapi-Kirkovan-Delican-Baku; that is the railway and the lower one, the Southern one, Dogukapi, Yerevan, Nakhchivan, Baku. The highway as a concept we have a highway connection between Dogukapi, Gyumri, Yerevan, Dilucu, Nakhchivan, Lachin, Agdam and Baku. (See Map 2) Of course, it’s not a comprehensive concept as far as the linkages I concerned and I am giving you this piece of information, assuming that one day we will achieve full mobilization on all tracks, Turkey-Armenia and Armenia-Azerbaijan tracks. So, this is a kind of post-peace project that we are proposing. But we have to start now. Think about what we could all do through such solid projects. Once we achieve peace, sustainable peace in the region. And we also thought that it would be a wise idea to have logistics centers along these routes in Turkey, in Azerbaijan, in Armenia supporting this connectivity. Thereby increasing the economies of scale and making people believe that it’s in their interests to have peace in the region. We did discuss this project with different partners last year. When we have this contexts, we always received positive

Map 2:
Corridor 3: Highway Between Dogukapi & Baku




feedbacks. Of course, I did present this concept to the European Union in July 2012 to different European countries. I urged to develop similar projects in order to contribute towards the settlement of this long-lasting Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Now, let's come to the bigger picture. The bigger picture is Modern Silk Road, which connects Seoul, Beijing, Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, from Azerbaijan to Turkey and to London. And starting from Samsun going up to the Nordics. This is not a TRACECA by the way. This far beyond the TRACECA. The critical component of this project, currently is Baku-Tbilisi-Kars and Marmaray. These critical components will be finalized this year. Baku-Tbilisi-Kars towards the end of 2030 there will be an experimental train transportation on this route. And Marmaray we expect, is to be inaugurated on the 29 October, this year. Kazakhs are building airports, China is investing

While we are concentrating on this Middle Corridor, on this Modern Silk Road, we are not ignoring the Southern part of it which could connect Turkey through Iran to Lahore, to the subcontinent, which means, have a connection with South East Asia. Certainly,

starting from Beijing. They will come to Ürümqi, from Ürümqi to Kazakhstan, From Kazakhstan to Akdag Airport. And from Akdag to Alat port in Azerbaijan. Alat is very close to Baku. From Baku to Kars; when you come to Kars, you are in Europe. We are also investing ourselves. Tremendously enhancing modernizing our own railroad systems. Baku also proposed this to have a connection with the North. That is the classical route of transportation. Which is unfortunately one thousand five hundred kilometers longer than the middle corridor. Of course, there are different climatic conditions in the Northern

Corridor which impedes transportation for certain periods throughout the year. Whereas in the middle corridor, you don't have such a climatic barrier and this middle corridor will be much safer. Parallel to that, we also elaborated how we can connect the subcontinent including Afghanistan to Turkey which we call the Southern Corridor. We are running experimental trains starting from Istanbul going up to Lahore. We are trying to reduce the length of this journey. There are three or four experimental trains in this Southern Corridor, what we have as an idea, of course, depending on the evolution of relations between Pakistan and India. This link could be extended from Lahore to Amritsar. And once you reach Amritsar, you can reach Mumbai. So, while we are concentrating on this Middle Corridor, on this Modern Silk Road, we are not ignoring the Southern part of it which could connect Turkey through Iran to Lahore, to the subcontinent, which means, have a connection with South East Asia. Certainly, we have been having a series of intensive consultations with our counterparts in Central Asia and trying to integrate our Central-Asian partners including Afghanistan to this Middle Corridor. We did talk to Kyrgyz authorities, cause there will be a connection between Kyrgyzstan and Kashgar

**Map 3:
MODERN SILK ROAD – MIDDLE CORRIDOR**




in China. We have a consultation period with our Turkmen friends. Cause there is another port, Turkmenbashi port, which is also critical, which we are trying to integrate in this Middle Corridor. (See Map 3) We will continue with our efforts to finalization of this route is not enough in itself. You have to have customs harmonization, tariff harmonization and what have you to make it feasible. We are also deploying efforts, towards its, harmonization in customs, in tariffs, transit passages and what have you. So, we are not neglecting the other critical component in making transportation through this road much more feasible. Now let's concentrate on the opportunities, challenges. This is certainly an alternative route, which one thousand five hundred kilometers shorter than the Northern Corridor. And then we look at the climatic conditions comparatively to Amritsar much better. Because of the current atmosphere in the region, talking about this Southern Corridor to Istanbul, going through Iran and to Pakistan, there are less political risks in the short-term if we make use of this Middle Corridor. We did not neglect to have connections between this Middle Corridor with the Northern Corridor and also the Southern Corridor, so we did not act selfishly by introducing ideas which would affect connectivity between this Middle Corridor and the Northern and Southern Corridors. I'll talk about Marmaray, of course, this is very important. Our aim is to make it up rational in October 2013 and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars towards the end of this year. That is the ultimate goal. I think that would change the landscape in this region, in many terms. Now, let's look at the benefits that it would bring to the regional countries first and to our partners in the West. For Turkey, of course, by

introducing these linkages, this connectivity among various countries. We will benefit from the economies of scale that will be generated as a result of the finalization of this transportation link. We hope that it would present a solid framework for a final and sustainable settlement. Particularly, in Nagorno-Karabakh and we will get Armenia. Armenia, you know, it is out of all regional projects. If it takes concrete steps towards the normalization of its relations with Azerbaijan, there is a probability that Armenia will also be included in this regional and beyond regional connectivity. Which means an opportunity to enhance the living conditions of its own people to benefit from economies of scale. We will not exclude a link between Armenia and Russia. We talked about this with the Russians. They found it extremely interesting, this project. But said that this has political aspects and we said “Yes it has political aspects, certainly.” and political aspect is to have full and sustainable normalization in the region and Russia should also deploy its efforts during the process. This is regionally driven and regionally owned project with wider ramifications for many countries. When we look at Azerbaijan, my dear friend here, Faik Bey is here, from our perspective, what Azerbaijan would benefit, we are trying to have a connection, a direct connection between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan. A short connection between Turkey and the West. Increasing the prospects of Azerbaijan becoming a transit hub on the East-West Corridor and the North-South Corridor again, economies of scale. And certainly, helping Azerbaijan efforts to diversify its economy, non-oil exports. But above all, to have sustainable peace, with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict left behind it. When we look at Russia, these are our constrictions of course. The countries concerned should make their own assessments and analysis. But this is our perception. Russia has huge investments in Armenia. Armenian economy is dependent on Russia. But there is no return from these investments. So, that would provide Russia an opportunity to have reinvestments. From its investments that it has in Armenia. It will also open the door for further aspects in North Caucasia by making this North-South Corridor an active reinforce by logistics centers. So, that would also Russian efforts in North Caucasia. Russia is too logistics bottlenecks: One is Abkhazia and the other one is Armenia-Azerbaijan. By the completion of Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, I think, it would be in the interest of Russia. To overcome this bottleneck that it is facing in South Caucasia. If we can achieve these connectivity between Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. Our friends in the EU, are trying to increase the feasibility in the region, to have this Eastern partnership policy. I hope they will achieve progress in implementation of this Eastern partnership policy. But I am not sure if there any solid projects like the one that I am sharing with you today. Unfortunately they don't. OSCE, I think it's extremely important for OSCE to find the solution for overcoming at least one protracted conflict which I believe to have positive repercussions on the other protracted conflicts in the region. That's Abkhazia, South Ossetia. Although they have their own intrinsic

mechanisms. It’s important for OSCE to implement its conflict prevention mechanism to demonstrate that this is off-use. At this mechanism is important and its functional. I talked about our, potential gains. As I told you before, we are certainly having extensive consultations on making it a real project with our Kazakh and Afghan friends. China is doing its role. We also talked about the project with the United States. They were impressed. They think that this would be a “game changer” in the region. Of course, we do believe that it is a “game changer” in the region. So let’s see, I think their main pre-occupation for how we can connect Afghanistan to the outside world. This is also our pre-occupation. We talked it with our Uzbek friends, there is an available connection between Hayratan-Mazar-ı Sharif and its operation. (See Map 4) So we are also keeping Uzbekistan in contributing this connectivity. But we are also talking with Kyrgyz and Tajiks. Tonight I have a flight to Tajikistan and I will talk about this project. How we can connect Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to this Middle Corridor. This is one of the agenda that I will talk to my Tajik friends, tomorrow. We have regular context with the European representatives on Lefort. We have numberless meetings. One or two years ago we had talks with Switzerland in the context of this confidence building measures. So, we will continue with our efforts to implement and to revive the Modern Silk Road connecting it to the North, to the South, to Western Europe, to the Nordics and to Scandinavia. So, as a conclusion, what we are trying to do by introducing such solid concepts and projects and we will continue to

Map 4:
CENTRAL ASIA



such projects and the other fields. We will share it with our partners and friends. We are encouraging first and foremost regionalized partnerships. Starting from South Caucasus we are contributing towards the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which should be based on full normalization and sustainable peace and prosperity. And for this reason, we have given our priority to infrastructure regional transportation projects. It is our aim to create prosperity in this region by promoting economic gravitation and integration. People to people contexts are very important and we do believe that once there is economies of scale that will also help people come together and enhance their living conditions.

“Turkey’s Energy Strategy and its Contribution to
Global Energy Security”

(Türkiye’nin Enerji Stratejisi ve Küresel Enerji Güvenliğine Katkısı)

Presented By
Berris EKİNCİ

Deputy Director General
Energy, Water and Environmental Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Berris Ekinci:

I would like to thank Ambassador Kılıç and AVIM for inviting me to this event. This is a great pleasure and honor for me to be here today. As it has been stated earlier by Ambassador Kılıç and Ambassador Ceylan, I will focus on Energy Corridor Projects. As you can see Turkey has a geostrategic location between countries and consumer markets. On the other hand energy demand security is as well important for the producer countries. So at that point we believe that Turkey will play an important role. Because some of this oil and gas, we believe has to be directed to the North to Turkey. We have been talking for some years now on another project which is the South-North energy pipeline system. From Iraq to South energy corridor which would include both natural gas and oil pipelines which would be transporting the resources from the whole of Iraq. So, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline project this was not a subtle project anymore of course. It is operational since 2006 and this is as well a very important project for Turkey and for as well the countries with we have put in this project, Azerbaijan and Georgia. So it can transport one million barrel of oil per day and it is transporting the oil from the field in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea of the field Azeri Çirak-Gunesli. BOTAS, Turkish Pipeline Company is having talks with the Azeri’s counterparts with regards to increase the capacity of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. So, this is at a project stage and this is Samsun-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, which is aiming a transporting both Russian and Caspian oil. From Samsun directly to Ceyhan. We are developing BTC pipeline as well as, with regards to this project, the issue of the Turkish trades, the transportation of oil through the Turkish strait plays an important role. Because, our aim is to bypass as much as possible the transportation of oil through the Turkish straits. So this is natural gas pipeline, which is as well operational from Russia, the Blue Stream pipeline. Which is of course, contributed a lot to our energy supply, security. As you know Russia is our biggest provider in terms of natural gas and we are importing natural gas from Russia to different routes. One is the Blue Stream and the other one is the Western Line. As you know, in the last couple of years, there had been

some issues related to the Western Line and during those times, we had Russia increasing its natural gas exports to Turkey through the Blue stream. This is another product of cooperation with Azerbaijan this is the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline. Which is as well operational and it transports the natural gas from a field called Shahdeniz in Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea as well. And this is a field you have been hearing a lot during the last couple of months. We are talking about the second phase of the Shahdeniz field and the second phase will be producing an additional 16 bcm of natural gas and 10 will be transported to Europe through Turkey and 6 to Turkey itself. So, this is the Turkey - Greece interconnector is implemented and we have been exporting

We have designed with our Azeri friends and another pipeline project, which is the Trans-Anatolian pipeline project, which will begin at the Turkish-Georgian border as a matter of fact, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, the leg of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum which comes until the Georgian border will be as well expanded by the Shahdeniz Consortium.

natural gas to Greece for a couple of years. And this is a very important interconnector because as a matter of fact, for the first time, the Caspian gas has been exported to the Western markets, to Greece, to a different route. The Greece-Italy connection has not established yet. It may be postponed. Since, nowadays, there is much more talk about the Trans-Adriatic pipeline. So, this is the larger picture, one most of the projects, TANAP Project is the most important one, nowadays. So, the TANAP Project, as you know in 2009, we have signed with 4 other countries an intergovernmental agreement and Nabucco natural gas pipeline, with regard to the Nabucco Project. Unfortunately, this has not

been possible and the consortium to find the necessary gas for the project. Since, the energy supply security and energy needs are very important for Turkey and Europe. You just stated our strategic location, then we decided to sit down and have discussions with Azerbaijan. And we have designed with our Azeri friends and another pipeline project, which is the Trans-Anatolian pipeline project, which will begin at the Turkish-Georgian border as a matter of fact, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, the leg of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum which comes until the Georgian border will be as well expanded by the Shahdeniz Consortium. And there will be a totally new pipeline in Turkey which will begin at the Turkish-Georgian border and will end. It will be decided in the coming months; in June will be ending either at the Turkish-Bulgarian border or the Turkish-Greek border depending on the decision of the Shahdeniz Consortium. So, this will be a pipeline of 32 bcm capacity, of course, it will begin with a lower capacity as you have stated the Shahdeniz phase two will be producing around 16 bcm. 10 will be towards Europe and 6 to Turkey itself and this pipeline is important because, it will as well, carry not only the Shahdeniz gas, but in the future it will carry other gas which will be produced

in the Caspian Sea, in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea, in the other fields. At a later stage, we very much hope and there is probation to this in the intergovernmental agreement. As a later stage, we very much hope that Turkmen gas as well will be linked to this pipeline. So, there will be creating another route for Turkmenistan and it will assist to their energy demand security as well. Since, they are exporting to Russia as well as China. So, TANAP is on track and waiting in June, Shahdeniz Consortium to take the decision with regards to the Trans-Adriatic pipeline or the Nabucco-West. As you know, Turkey as I have stated, one of the significance of the Nabucco Project, so we are present in the Nabucco-West. We believe that the strategic aspects have to be taken into account. Another important decision with regards to these projects would be taken at the end of this year, again by the Shahdeniz Consortium. This is linked with the sanction of the Shahdeniz phase two. Because without the sanction of the development of phase two, it will not be possible to produce that gas to delivered to the relevant markets. As you see from the projects, Turkey, of course in the 70s, we have the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and with the solution of the former Soviet Republic, then came into the picture, the Caspian countries and also the Caucasian Azerbaijan. So, we have realized projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum. Nowadays, there are additional projects that we are working upon, which will originate from the Caspian region. Iraq is very important, so there will be new projects, and also we believe that there will be a direction taken towards to Turkey from Iraq. In our energy security, especially natural gas, Iran plays an important role, after Russia, Iran is our second provider. The most important countries for us in terms of natural gas, Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. We are as well importing energy from a couple of countries. Of course another game-changer maybe in region will be the Eastern-Mediterranean. This as well increases the important of Turkey as a transportation corridor and as an energy center. Because, when you look with regards to the energy demand increase, Turkey emanates as one of the markets with the highest growth-rate in energy demand. Energy demand rises second after China. So, this very important for companies when they design their projects and pipelines. So for the Eastern-Mediterranean gas as well. The most plausible market would be Turkey and beyond Turkey, European markets. This brings us of course to Ceyhan. As I said the Iraqi oil comes to Ceyhan, the Azeri oil comes to Ceyhan, in the future we very much hope that the Kazakh oil and some of the Russian oil as well will come to Ceyhan. And now, there will be additional, oil coming from Iraq to Ceyhan. Of course, we are talking about East-Med natural gas. So this gas as well coming to Ceyhan. We are also having some projects, building energy plants in Ceyhan for transforming this already very important center into an energy hub in the Eastern-Mediterranean region and which will become as well the second biggest energy terminal after Rotterdam in Europe. Thank you very much.

“A GENERAL LOOK AT ASIA AND TURKEY’S PRIORITIES”

(ASYA'YA GENEL BİR BAKIŞ VE TÜRKİYE'NİN ÖNCELİKLERİ)

**June 11, 2013
Ankara Palace**

**Presented By
H.E. Ambassador Naci KORU,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey**

**Excellencies,
Dear Guests,
Ladies and Gentleman,**

It is a great pleasure to be here and address such a distinguished audience.

At the outset I would like to thank Ambassador Alev Kılıç, Director of the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) and all those who have contributed to this meeting and wish them every success.

I wish to share with you my views as to where Asia today is heading and Turkey’s policies and priorities towards this region, with a particular focus on Asia-Pacific, Russia, Caucasia and Central Asia.

Let us make a tour d’horizon to remember the dynamics which shapes the ongoing change in Asia.

The world is approaching a turning point of truly historic proportions with an unprecedented speed.

Asia lies at the epicenter of this global change; and “the Asian reality” has created a new state of affairs in world geopolitics.

The rapid modernization and expansion of Asian economies is acknowledged as one of the most impressive developments in the economic history of the world.

The driving force behind this momentous change is nothing but information technologies, innovations, mass production and creative ideas.

As Thomas Friedman says, birds are flying back to Asia after almost 200 year-break.

In this vein, we have to keep in mind that people in the region tend to have a much longer historical worldview than is commonly found in the West, so 200 years comparatively a short period of time in the history of thousands years long civilizations.

Although historical trends are by definition slow to emerge, could anyone imagine that such a global shift would take place in less than half a century in the human history?

Today Asia has become a center of attraction. Western travel agencies are in race to send their customers to the glamorous cities and resort places in Asia.

We hardly see any big western company which does not have a branch or headquarters in this ever-booming and ever-expanding Asian markets.

Can any business or company in the West- be it small or large- function without a Chinese connection or a Chinese product on its shelves? I doubt it.

In the last 20 years we all witness new cities, new hi-tech roads, new bridges, new factories and new grandiose universities are rising in the heart of Asia.

Asia has once again rejuvenated itself in the history.

Today, the region is characterized by self-confidence.

Caravans, which once carried China's silk, India's spice and Yemen's coffee were enriching the world economic, social and cultural life in the past.

Today, various pipelines carrying Russian, Turkmen, Kazakh and Azerbaijani hydrocarbon resources, and similarly, Japan's Mitsubishi, Toyota, Honda, Sony and Panasonic; South Korea's Kia, Hyundai, Samsung and LG, India's IT technology, software and Bollywood, China's massive and competitive production; yoga, meditation and sushi, off-shoring and Gangnam Style are doing the same thing.

It was not until 1980 that any investor in the West woke up to a day with a primary focus on the Asian Stock Exchange news.

This has dramatically changed over the course of last 30 years. Today, any change in the indices of Hong Seng, Nikkei or ASX100 can impact decisions of Dow Jones, NASDAQ, FTSE investors.

Though the Asian states constitute one of the most diverse regions of the world, it also represents a group of countries that is increasingly interdependent and aware of common interests.

Particularly since the devastating Asian financial crisis in 1997, these countries have been strengthening their regional alliances and interactions.

In fact, the increasing interdependence is the answer to those who assert that economic and political rise of Asia Pacific nations will be a threat to the global balance of power.

Dear Participants,

The Atlantic was once the center of the global economy with Asia and the Pacific at the periphery, now this is in the process of being turned on its head.

Asia becomes a game-changer of the global order.

The focus of the all global powers and rising powers, including Turkey, is shifting to Asia Pacific region.

The rise of Asia or the dawning of Asian miracle definitely is not by accident.

Just look at how far the region has come.

The spectacular economic rise of Asia Pacific has led many to describe the phenomenon as “the Asian miracle”.

Japan and Asian dragons, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, doubled their incomes every eight years between 1960 and 1985.

By 1990, more than 650 million people in East Asia had been lifted out of poverty, leaving less than 10 percent of the population in that category, compared with 25 percent in Latin America, and more than 50 percent in Africa and on the Indian subcontinent

Over the past decade alone, Asia has grown by more than 7% a year.

30 years ago, Asia represented less than 20 % of global GDP and the US 30 %. However, today Asia's share of world GDP jumped from 20 to 30 %, living standards rose sixfold, and an incredible half billion people pulled themselves out of poverty.

Asian Development Bank forecasts that the Asian share in the world GDP will scale up to 51% by mid-century.

This means that, nearly 3 billion more people will be lifted out of poverty in the next 35-40 years.

Currently, the engine of this spectacular change is surely in the helm of China and India.

The World Bank statistics shows that China's economy has grown 10 times in the last 30 years. IMF predicts that in purchasing power parity terms, China's economy may surpass that of the United States by 2016.

The World Bank statistics shows that China's economy has grown 10 times in the last 30 years. IMF predicts that in purchasing power parity terms, China's economy may surpass that of the United States by 2016.

More recently, during the dark days of the global financial crisis, it was Asia that kept the flame alive, accounting for about two-thirds of global growth.

According to IMF data, from 2005-2010, in purchasing power parity terms, while Eurozone grew by an accumulated 15% and US by 16%; India and China grew by 67% and by 88% respectively.

If China could ensure increase in wages parallel to its GDP growth, its middle class could swell to 50% of its population in just 10 years.

This means, more than half of China's population will be able to drive better cars, live in better houses, travel more, and consume more and high-toned.

This is a grandiose economic and social change, which deeply influences demand-supply, import-export and credit-finance equation of the world economy.

Likewise, India, the other leading actor in the region, is predicted to become the world's third largest economy well before the middle of this century.

A similar economic and social change may also take place in India in the years to come.

These figures themselves display that the peace and prosperity of Asia for the decades ahead is not only critical for Asia itself but it is now equally critical for the global economy as well.

If the potential is harnessed fully through appropriate policies and a strategic vision, Asia will certainly play a far greater role in world affairs.

The Indian poet Tagore talked about the “opening of a new chapter in history” after a period of turmoil. “Perhaps that dawn will come from this horizon, from the East where the sun rises” he said.

Despite its rise and immense potential, it would be fair to say that Asia is not a risk free continent as the others.

Economic and political choices have also had a dramatic impact on the environment in Asia Pacific.

Likewise, India’s population alone is more than the overall population of North, Central and South America.

In the coming years, combating poverty and managing migration into overburdened megacities will continue to challenge most of the Asia Pacific countries.

Furthermore, there has been a rapid urbanization throughout the region that led to new demographic challenges.

The population of China alone is about three times of the total population of the EU member states.

Likewise, India’s population alone is more than the overall population of North, Central and South America.

There are more Muslims in South Asia than the whole Middle East.

Last but not the least, the world’s fastest growing economies, the fastest rising military expenditures, the fiercest resource-allocation competitions and the most serious hot spots can all be seen in Asia.

The Korean nuclear issue; the Taiwan Straits; the East China Sea; the South China Sea; the Thai/Cambodian border; Myanmar’s civil conflicts in its border areas could be mentioned as some examples.

Furthermore, the outstanding dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, as well as unresolved areas on India’s border with China; plus problems related

to Afghanistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Chechnya are waiting to be solved.

Dear Participants,

The historical, political, economic, and cultural dynamics within Asia have been so varied and complex that many analysts do not dare to examine the region as a whole.

Therefore, I would like to briefly touch upon four main protagonists in Asia, mainly Asia-Pacific, Russia, Caucasia and Central Asia in a conventional term.

Let me briefly start with The Asia-Pacific which constitutes one of the strategic pillars of our multi-dimensional foreign policy.

We intend to enhance and institutionalize our cooperation with the countries in the region.

Our Ministry has been working on a new Asia-Pacific Strategy. It is based on political, economic and people-to-people engagement with the regional countries.

Our new strategy paper contains concrete goals, means and resources.

We are working for the completion of the legal framework and the establishment of consultation mechanisms in our bilateral relations.

In addition, we assist some developing and the least developed countries through TIKA by devising concrete projects.

In this framework, our efforts in order to establish institutional relations with ASEAN since 2008 gave positive results, and Turkey became a party to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in July, 2010 in Hanoi.

Our Ambassador to Jakarta has been accredited to ASEAN. Now our new goal is to establish Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN.

Our main tools for increasing bilateral cooperation are effective use of mechanisms like joint economic commissions and business councils.

Enhancing its presence in the region, Turkey has opened embassies in Myanmar and Sri Lanka in 2012, to be followed by Cambodia and Brunei in the near future.

During the last decade, high-level bilateral visits with the Asian countries have intensified significantly.

Furthermore, Turkey has increased the number of scholarships allocated to the countries of the region and initiated youth exchange programs.

Our main carrier, Turkish Airlines, has also been increasing its destinations and flight frequencies in the region.

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) has enhanced its development projects, especially in the LDC’s and Pacific Island countries.

Dear Guests,

Our relations with Russia are among the top priorities of our multi-dimensional foreign policy.

Russia is currently our second main trade partner with a total volume of 34,2 billion dollars.

We import two thirds of our natural gas and one tenth of our oil demand.

We are in the process of further cementing our cooperation in the field of energy with the construction of Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. With its estimated cost of 22 billion dollars, Akkuyu is one of the biggest projects in our history.

Mutual investments have surpassed 10 billion dollars each, excluding Akkuyu NPP. The accumulated worth of the works realized by Turkish construction companies in Russia is estimated around 40 billion dollars.

We hosted over 3.6 million Russian tourists last year, staying as top destination for Russian tourists.

In light of this dynamic outlook, we decided to institutionalize the bilateral relations and established the High Level Cooperation Council in May 2010.

This Council, headed by our Prime Minister and the President of Russia, convenes once a year to overview the general course of the relations, and make the fine-tunings where needed.

We are in the process of further cementing our cooperation in the field of energy with the construction of Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. With its estimated cost of 22 billion dollars, Akkuyu is one of the biggest projects in our history.

The nature of our relations with Russia does not fall short of strategic one especially in terms of the dynamics in Eurasia.

South Caucasus constitutes one of strategic aspects of our foreign policy.

The region lies at the intersection of major energy and transport routes of Eurasia.

We are very much mindful of the fact that stability in this region is crucial for stability in Eurasia as a whole.

That is why our foreign policy is directed at changing the existing political landscape by putting into motion new dynamics favouring peace, dialogue and region-wide cooperation and ownership.

We are fully committed to develop good relations based on mutual respect with all our neighbours.

South Caucasus is home to three of the four protracted conflicts of the OSCE area, namely Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Transnistria.

These protracted conflicts have undeniable negative impacts on regional security and stability. Moreover, these conflicts have also prevented the region from realizing its full potential of cooperation.

Turkey will continue to spend effort to contribute to the peaceful resolution of these conflicts on the basis of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova in the years ahead.

It is clear that there is an urgent need for comprehensive and sustainable normalization in South Caucasus in order to build an atmosphere of peace, stability and prosperity.

In order to move beyond the status quo, we need to work on a new vision, a vision of partnership, prosperity and peace.

In this context, Turkey's proposal on the establishment of Caucasus Security and Stability Platform (CSCP) is worth mentioning.

Trilateral Ministerial Meetings Mechanism established between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran as well as between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia is yet another regional cooperation scheme set into motion by Turkey to promote regional cooperation, which will certainly contribute to peace and stability.

Turkey has also developed massive regional cooperation projects with its partners so far such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway project.

And now, Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline is en route to realization.

We enjoy excellent bilateral relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia.

As a reflection of our interest in the full and comprehensive normalization in the region, we would also like to take our relations with Armenia forward pending the emergence of conducive political conditions.

Our economic relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia are also deepening.

Today, Turkey’s trade volume with these countries is over 5 billion US Dollars. Mutual investments, on the other hand, have reached 16 billion US Dollars.

The total value of the construction projects undertaken by the Turkish companies is over 7 billion US Dollars.

We share common ethnic, cultural, historical and linguistic ties with the Central Asian countries. This affinity has served as a valuable foundation for the development of our bilateral relations.

We believe that secure, democratic and market economy oriented Central Asia will better serve the interests of the region as well as the world. With this in mind, we will continue to support them in becoming more stable, democratic and prosperous societies.

We work for increasing and diversifying the areas of cooperation with the Central Asian countries through various tools, including high level visits, effective use of existing mechanisms, such as joint economic commissions, transportation commissions and business councils.

In this regard, we upgraded our relations with some of them through strategic partnership agreements and High Level Strategic Cooperation Council mechanisms.

At the moment we have the High Level Strategic Council mechanisms with

We believe that secure, democratic and market economy oriented Central Asia will better serve the interests of the region as well as the world. With this in mind, we will continue to support them in becoming more stable, democratic and prosperous societies.

Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and the Cooperation Council with Tajikistan.

We have also close partnership with Turkmenistan and promising cooperation with Mongolia in various areas.

Turkey offers Central Asia an important partnership in terms of economic and business ties. Turkey's trade volume with the Central Asian countries was around 7,3 billion USD in 2012 and the direct investment by the Turkish companies have reached 4,5 billion USD.

Furthermore, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) has been very active in the region.

In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that the loans given to the Central Asian countries through Turkish Eximbank have reached the level of around 1,8 billion USD.

With more than 2000 registered Turkish companies and several thousand joint ventures with local partners, Turkey is one of the leading trade partners of the Central Asian countries.

To give an example, our construction companies have undertaken projects worth of around 50 billion USD in the region.

Another example of our fruitful cooperation is education. There are Turkish universities as well as many private and state schools across the region. In the last 21 years more than 100 thousands students have graduated from these schools and universities.

During the last 21 years, we have not only developed our bilateral relations with the countries of the region, but also we have created multilateral platforms such as Turkic Council, Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking States (TURKPA), Joint Administration of Turkic Arts and Culture (TURKSOY) and Turkic Academy in Astana and Turkic Heritage Foundation in Baku.

Turkey will continue to hold the Chairmanship of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) for a renewed term until June 2014.

In parallel to our support for the integration of these countries with the Euro-Atlantic institutions, we support the development of OSCE values and broadening of its activities in Central Asia.

Therefore, Turkey played a leading role in encouraging active participation of those countries in OSCE.

As a Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Turkey will continue to work closely with its Central Asian and other member states.

Dear Participants,

I want to conclude my speech with the Chinese philosopher Zhuangzi’s words. He once said: “The wise man looks into space and does not regard the small as too little, nor the great as too big, for he knows that, there is no limit to dimensions.”

No individual is too small to be part of Asia’s success. And no aspiration is too big. Asia’s dream belongs to all Asians.

As the region goes from success to success, I believe that Asia’s leadership in the global economy will go from strength to strength. And, we, as Turkey, wish to be a leading partner of this process

Thank you.

“Turkish Foreign Policy and Asia”
(Türk Dış Politikası ve Asya)

Presented by
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Chair,
Department of IR, METU

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı:

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

It was a great pleasure for me now to address to you to change, its change reviews and I hope that I can contribute for the debate a little bit from academic perspective. What we have is diplomatic perspective and it shows how Turkey’s trying to get more involved in global politics that Turkey is a global player, it is also my thesis and I will elaborate a little more about this.

In 1949, ladies and gentlemen, the Turkish government was invited to the first Afro-Asian Conference and the Turkish government has rejected this with the argument that Turkey does not belong to Asia, that Turkey is a European country. From where to where. So, this identity that Turkey was not an Asian country, but Turkey is a European country was related of course to the modern Turkish republic in the early 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. But today, Turkey has an Asia-Pacific strategy was approving how the statemind, how Turkish foreign policy is also ready to reflect or to show flexibility and to adapt new conditions and it is good so. That Turkey is more or less considered now by all Asian countries as an emerging economic player, but also political and cultural player since early 1990s in particular. We are here in this room, some people among us like Mr. Seyfi Taşan, Director of Foreign Policy Institute, intellectual mentor in Turkey, we have been debating in the 1990s, whether we should call these Central Asian countries, Turkish states or Turkic states. So we did not know what it means. If we call them Turkish states, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, what so ever, how they would react. We said Turkic states. So, it was the invention from Professor Metin Heper, in the 1990s, in his writings, we should call them Turkic states, because they are not Turkish. They have Turkish language, we have kinship but they are not Turkish states. It reminds us of course, to the definition of Barry Buzan, when he was writing an article on the late 1990s, calling Turkey and Japan as Westernistic states. Westernistic states means that you have political values, the state structure of the western countries but culturally or religiously you are not European. So, this is very

interesting, though. Westernistic country Turkey and Japan are called Westernistic countries.

In 1950s, when Turkey was applying for NATO, Turkey was not invited to be part of NATO, it was creating very big dissapointment here in this country. The argument in 1950’s, by Norway and Denmark for example, we have been against the Turkey membership into NATO. They said, what hell the Turks are looking for in NATO? They do belong to a different culture and religion. Today, Turkish European Union membership dabates, some people again in this academic life brings to debate, Turkey is not accepted or is not going to be accepted into European Union, because Turkey has a different culture and religion. Last week I was in Vienna and I would like to share with you this thing. You know, Ukraine is on the way to try to be a part of NATO and the Euopean Union and Stefan Füle, the joke is telling, was asked by the Ukranian diplomat, who is dealing with European Union affairs, when Ukraine is going to become a member of European Union? And Füle have answered, “Oh, don’t worry we take you, but first, we take Turkey into the European Union. And “When you take Turkey to the European Union?”, the answer was, “Never!” So, this type of argumentations are academic excercises but, the fact is that Turkey is indeed one of the countries, at the moment, which is trying to be with the European Union. Not only here, but also entire world politics. I do not oversee the fact that Turkey is overstretching and having over-self-confidence at the moment which could be very dangerous, if it is not well managed. But the fact that, Turkey is moving to this part of the world is a new one and we have to take it very seriously. Because it is not only the Turkish desire to extent to go there to have more dialogue, but it is also the other fact from those countries. China, India, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam. It was a desire from those countries that Turkish play a role. So, it is not one-sided-love. In this case, Turkey wants to play an important role and Turkey is demanded by the others. There is one reality, we have neglected of course several years this part of the world due to the Cold War conditions. Not because that Turkey did not have interest in those countries, but because the world’s structure was not allowing Turkey to do this. And now, as we see, this region is getting priority for Turkish foreign policy within this multi-lateral structure and then this very important point, I will say for the coming years. Paul Kennedy, is well-known to everyone, is writing actually, in this book, “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers” the interaction between economy and security. The more you get economically well-off, the more you pay for your security. So, the more Turkey’s well off economically, the more Turkey is demanded of course not only be secure, bu also transfer this security to the neighboring countries and to the other parts of the world. Anyone, who deals with the Ottoman history or with the modern history of Turkey, they would see that Turkey has been on three continents present. This is why many people call it,

“Neo-Ottoman Nostalgia” in literature. But Turkey is now having more opportunities to go to certain areas. Not only by Turkish Airlines, which is one of the greatest airlines in the world now. but also with culture, economy and more trades. So, Turkey is not one of the permanent power centers, but Turkey is one of the emerging centers together with China, together with Brazil, India and some other new emerging countries. Also Turkey is among G-20 and when you look at G-20, many Asian countries are there and this is opening Turkey a new window of opportunity from Australia to New Zealand, from Sri Lanka to many other Asian countries and I think more and more the Turkish presence, I make now predictions for the future, more and more Turkish presence will be seen in those countries. Not only as the opening of the embassies, in Myanmar, in Brunei, in Cambodia, in Vietnam, people go there. Turkey is making profit of this globalization proces and Asia is providing Turkey this opportunity much better than Europe in this framework because we are already in Europe, we are practically in there. But this part of the world is a new field and this new field can bring Turkey, many many advantages if it is managed well.

To academics, I would like to mention here within this context, of course, that Turkey has been always a bridge between Europe and Asia. This is the classical mainstream way of thinking. But it is true. I mean, we can not deny that the Ottoman intellectuals and now even today they try to transfer this modernity from Europe into the Islamic countries. It was before Mahadir Muhammad from Malasia, who said that Islamic world has to live a renaissance, but also Turkish president now, former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, who said that Islamic world has to change and has to go to new relations and Turkey is one of the leading examples. Some countries say yes and some countries say no. Turkey is not fitting in our concept. But whatever it is, Turkey is modernising herself with another important country, this is Russia and I think Russian modernization and Turkish modernization both are European problem. You can not ignore this modernization process of these countries, whether it is authoritarian, democratic, less democratic, semi-democratic, deficit democratic, whatever it is. But, this processes can not be neglected. To academics I mentioned, one is Kishor Mahbubani from Singapore, who has been writing first and article but later on a very interesting book, “Can Asians Think?” When the book was dated is was 1990s and it was early 2000s writing another one and Kishor Mahbubani is representative of Singapore to United Nations, he evolves one of the leading intelectuals actually to sat that Asia is coming, Europe, and America should take it in a very serious way.

Another point is here, Professor Ferguson, who is very contraversially (55.50) he has published actually two books, 2010 and 2012, “The West and the Rest” and the other one is the “Decline of the West”. The begining of the twentieth century, is talking about the West is experiencing a deep crises not economic

sense alone, but also in philosophical and political and cultural field. China is the emerging power and it is not by incident that Chinese president and American president met last week, in California and they have been talking this non-official pictures spreaded to the world, we used actually to get pictures from Soviet leaders or Russian leaders, but now Chinese leaders, now coming into the picture and I think this is very important to see how this Asia is coming. But, one point I would like to mention here. When we say Asia, we may not see this part of the world alone non-European culture. But it is Budizm, Taoizm and Islam, Christianity, I mean, you have been voting for Tagore, Tagore was telling, this is to be read in Barry Buzan’s book, security, he says, Indian culture is composed of three civilizations: Hindu, Muslim and Christianity. So India, in this framework, important to be seen as that you have given the numbers and figures. European, we have numbers, figures, that India is going to be the third largest economy in the world in a few years. I think the Turkish position and I underline here my thesis again. Turkey is not strong alone. When we think that Turkish is now moving, we may say that Turkey is not alone. No, Turkey is doing this with the European Union. Turkey is negotiating with European Union. Turkey is possible candidate for the full membership into the European Union and since 2005, since the negotioations officially started, Turkey is an expensive country, we are not anymore a poor country. even in the numbers but also in the eyes of the other European countries. This is probably few point that Turkish Prime Minister is right, when he was speaking on last Friday in İstanbul, in the figures, Turkey, at the moment very important for the European big projects and this is concerning the investment and the invention for the future. But at the same time, ladies and gentlemen, Turkey is stronger with Russia. Russia and Turkey, 3.6 million people last year from Russia, this year, inshallah it will be more. So it means, the Russian and the Turks, for the first time, they experience a very interesting pshychology they do not have concept of enmity, both countries are trying to develop themselves, even some under authoritarian according to European criteria of course. Structures, but whatever it is, Turkey and Russia are two important players in Asia, in Caucasia, and in Central Asia anyway. So, I think, Turkey is number four in Russian foreign trade and Russia is number two in Turkish Foreign Trade. And this Russian-Turkish relations, I would like to mention that, one should take it much more seriously than ever before. I do not say that Turkey is leaving the West, no no, it is not. Turkey is staying in the West remaining in the West, and will act with the West. Also, in the long run, if it would not have been the case, then Turkey should have left already all the European institutions. On the contrary, Turkey not only wants to remain in it, but also expand it and is doing I would say very aggressive diplomatic even in this framework. Lastly, Turkey is the strongest with the United States of America. The Turkish security is provided by America, the latest visit of Turkish Prime Minister to America as proved once again the policy leading from behind is

also covering Turkey and the USA will act together in Asia. All together in Asia-Pacific. Anyway. So, Turkey is then having China, Russia and America. With those big powers, Turkey is trying to get somehow new type of relations and present there. I underline that Turkey is not a big power, not providing technology, not providing big economic achievements, etc. But, Turkey is a manager, player and I think it is good it is like Ronaldo. He is a good player I mean, whether your place is Manchester United or Real Madrid. It does not matter. He is shooting the goals, you know. which Club is buying him, the more they pay, the best he will play. Turkey is exactly what I said, Turkey is a player. Player has much more self-confidence. Increasingly self-confidence. I would say, for the next generation in Turkey, this is my prediction, Turkey is today, 76 million. In 2025, we will be 90 million people. With 90 million people, Turkey will be, after Russia, will be second biggest European country. Populated and the population we see on the streets more than 70% of people under 35 years old. With such a young dynamic generation and Turkey can do many things. If there is no mismanagement. I underline this, because the political management is very important but, the pessimist. I am optimist, but the pessimists always the people are better educated but I keep my optimism, because I think countries like Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, even Australia, South Africa. They come now more and more into the international politics and G-8 can not run the war as before. So, they need more talk, they need more delegation of power and Turkey is number 16 developing economy at the moment in the world. If it is going to be like this, in ten years time, Turkey most probably number eleven in the world economy. At the moment Turkey is the sixth biggest economy in the European context. This topic today, I am going to finish, this actually providing a new vision for Turkish foreign policy. Whether this is successful or Turkey is going to be successful to reach the expectations is another question. But Turkey is undertaking such steps, undertaking such a vision, it is important. Many people are surprised in the world. How Turkey can do this? In Islamic world anyway. There is no other country, like Turkey, which can be democratic on the one hand and developed on the other hand. At least 78% in a year without being a full-member of European Union. So it is important. It means on the one hand European union negotiations are going on, but on the other hand Turkey's economy is doing well. So, Turkey is a part of European Union. I would say, Zbigniew Brzezinski in his articles early 2000s, it was the time that, so every European country had 25000 per capita income. Turkey would have joined at that time in 2002, European Union countries should have sixteen thousand dollars. But it was 35000 dollars at that time Turkish per capita. They also around 11000, it means, Turkey would directly contribute for the European welfare. So, this is maybe, what makes Turkey much more self-confident. Turkey is not looking from the perspective of a poor country, Turkey is looking from the perspective of young businessman, who is extending, who is inspiring, who is willing to

make more of it. I think this is the key of the generation to change. Asia is providing this. I think the Turkish generation and the Asian’s new generations. They have first time such an opportunity to come and to talk with each other and discover. Common point, how they can reach and also they are technologically developed and they understand each other. This is what we need so much actually in today’s world. Today’s world structure, does not reflect the real power of the world. It is not anymore acceptable. But we can not change it. It was a Hungarian diplomat, who said for several times that, if you look into the mirror in the morning, it does show you ugly. It is not the problem of the mirror. Problem is you. The world does not look so bad, but the mirror is showing something wrong. Then the mirror has to be changed. It means the system which we have. It is not anymore solving the problems of the world. Can the Asia countries do this? I don’t know. Can Turkey do this? I don’t know. But the fact is something has to be changed. Thank you very much.

COMMEMORATION FOR THE 40TH YEAR OF THE FIRST VICTIMS OF ASALA

(ASALA'NIN İLK KURBANLARI İÇİN 40NCI YIL ANMA TÖRENİ)

Christopher GUNN
Florida State University

**January 27 2013
Washington DC.**

Where do the murders of Mehmet Baydar and Bahadır Demir fit into the larger picture of modern Armenian terrorism?

Typically, the assassinations of General Consul Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir, on January 27, 1973, are treated as merely one of three events in a timeline, spread over ten years, that bring us inevitably to the radicalization of the Armenian diaspora, and in particular its youth, and the violent terrorist campaign against the Turkish Government, Turkish citizens, Turkish business interests and, eventually, anyone in their way, that began in 1975.

The first event was the organized, worldwide commemorations and anti-Turkish demonstrations that took place in the spring of 1965 to mark the 50th anniversary of the events of 1915. This reawakened the dormant and suppressed Armenian nationalism and their grievances against the Turkish government.

The second event was the assassinations of Mr. Baydar and Mr. Demir by Gourgen Yanikian. The act itself, and his challenge to other Armenians to “wage war on representatives of the Turkish government,” not only served to emboldened those in the diaspora who had become frustrated with political and other non-violent methods, but stimulated and strengthened the resolve of the entire international diaspora as well.

The third and final event took place in the United Nations in the spring of 1974. A paragraph, specifically labeling the events of 1915 as the “first case of genocide in the twentieth century,” was deleted from a report on the prevention of genocide that was submitted to the UN Commission on

Human Rights. This was a paragraph that many Armenians had spent months advocating and lobbying for.

And so, the story goes, the extreme frustration this deletion caused within the Armenian community, the rising assertiveness of the Armenian diaspora since 1965, and the relatively well publicized murders of the Turkish diplomats in 1973, all came together at some point in late 1974 to produce Armenian terrorism.

I have been working on the subject of Armenian terrorism for close to three years now, and I can tell you that there are number of things wrong with the story that I have just laid out, too many, in fact, to cover in 15 minutes.

The “Re-Emergence of the Armenian Question: April 1965 – January 1973

It is certainly true that the Armenian question re-appears from out of nowhere in early 1965.

The demonstrations on April 24 in Beirut drew nearly 85,00, and close to 100,000 participated in Yerevan. In Armenia, these demonstrations led to Soviet permission to hold annual public commemorations of April 24th, and to construct a memorial to the victims and territories lost to Turkey in 1915.

Here, in the United States, there were large demonstrations in New York, Washington and Los Angeles, and the major news organizations provided substantial coverage to the Armenian question for the first time in decades.

Although they would attract less and less national attention in the following years, these protest demonstrations by Armenian-Americans continued, and became increasingly more aggressive and anti-Turkish in nature.

In April 1971, for example, 2,000 Armenians protested outside the Turkish consulate in Los Angeles. In April 1972, they actually managed to confront General Consul Mehmet Baydar directly with a list of demands.

And in November 1972, over 50 Armenians were arrested after they disrupted and harassed the guests at a Turkish-American Society function at a Beverly Hills Hotel.

Book and pamphlet publishing also increased. In the decade prior to 1965, 15 items were published or republished in English on the Armenian question. 25 were published by Armenians in 1965 and by the end of 1972, that figure had reached close to 70, not including reprints of Ambassador’s Morgenthau’ Story and The Forty Days of Musa Dagh.

There was also a marked increase in the attention being paid to the events of 1915 in the U.S. Congress. Although it had rarely been mentioned during the 1950s, the coverage in the spring of 1965 was extensive: over 22 instances between April 4th and May 6th, involving over 40 U.S. Congressmen.

Finally, in addition to these demonstrations, publications and congressional speeches, in 1967 the Armenian-Americans in California successfully obtained permission to build a monument to the Armenian Martyrs of 1915.

However, even considering the prevailing atmosphere and environment, especially in California, the “re-surgence” or “re-emergence” of the Armenian question does not explain why Gourgen Yanikian sought justice by murdering two innocent two men. Or, by extension, the murders that would follow in 1975 and beyond.

A Much Longer History of Violence

There is, however, a much deeper and darker side to this re-awakening of Armenian nationalism and the re-emergence of the Armenian Question that is often overlooked.

And I would argue that the deaths of Mr. Baydar and Mr. Demir were not only, or merely, the first two of the thirty-one Turkish diplomats who would be assassinated because of the frustrations of the Armenian diaspora but also a link between 10 murders in the early 1920s and the 29 in the late 1970s and 1980s that illustrates a sustained culture of violence within the Armenian diaspora. A culture that has glorified and venerated individuals who carried out attacks on ethnic Turks and which is visibly evident in the years leading up to the Yanikian murders and the assassinations in Vienna and Paris in October 1975.

This culture of violence has two components. The first is simply the honoring of any Armenian who avenges the Armenian people through the murder.

The second is the practice of dehumanizing the Turkish people through either racial or religious hate speech and holding all Turks, past, present and future, collectively and individually responsible for the events of 1915.

The second component is well known: the constant repetition of the language and terms used in the 19th century, and earlier, to negatively stereotype Turks: barbarians, savages, horde, rapists, etc., and the attributing of all the positive aspects and achievements of the Ottoman Empire to its Christian (i.e., Armenian and Greek) subjects.

That many of the Armenian publications in this period also endeavored to prove the guilt and responsibility to all Turks for the events of 1915 may not be as well known, but certainly would not surprise.

It is the first aspect, however, the practice of honoring and venerating violence within the diaspora, which is less well known, but extremely critical in explaining both the Yanikian murders and the many more that would follow. In order to analyze this in more detail we have to go back to the end of World War I.

The ARF, Nemesis and Tehlirian

Between March 1921 and April 1922, Armenians operating Europe and the Caucasus assassinated Talat Pasha, Cemal Pasha and other prominent Ottoman officials and Armenian traitors. Known as Nemesis, this operation was orchestrated by members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in the United States and operated for 13 months, killing at least 10 individuals: 7 Turks, 1 Azeri and at least two Armenian traitors.

The most famous of the Nemesis agents was Soghomon Tehlirian, the young man who shot and killed Talaat Pasha in broad daylight on a busy street in Berlin (March 15, 1921) and who would later be found not guilty by the German jury who heard his case.

The key to his acquittal was in convincing the jury that he was so traumatized from witnessing the massacre of his entire family and village in Erzincan in 1915, that he was compelled to obey a vision of his dead mother who commanded him to avenge her, and his families' honor, by murdering Talaat.

While it certainly swayed the opinion of the court in 1921, we now know that Tehlirian's entire defense, his entire life story from 1915 to 1921, was deliberately fabricated by the ARF's lawyers in order to secure an acquittal from the court.

Regardless, Tehlirian instantly became a national hero and a revered figure within the Armenian diaspora, and was the honored guest of the diaspora throughout the world in 1922.

In the press and the literature, Tehlirian disappeared for the next 38 years, but re-emerged at the time of his death in May 1960 in California. Under the name of Saro Melikian, his obituary appeared in both the New York Times and The Times of London, and both articles reaffirmed his heroic status as the avenger of the Armenian people for the crimes of 1915.

Shortly thereafter, a multi-part series on the life of Soghomon Tehlirian appeared in the *Armenian Review*, and was followed by another in 1962. In 1965, to coincide with the 50th anniversary of 1915, the first book detailing and glorifying Tehlirian's role in the assassination of Talaat, and the indisputable righteousness of his cause, was published.

The book, at best, was an attempt at historical fiction, but was written and packaged as if it were Tehlirian's autobiography. Filled with crusade-like language and innuendos, it situates the Armenian question at the center of an epic struggle between good and evil.

Four years later, in 1969, a monument was erected in a Fresno, California cemetery to commemorate his life and the contributions and sacrifices he made to the Armenian nation.

In the 40 years since Yanikian's assassination of Mr. Baydar and Mr. Demir, it has become clear that the mythical status and reverence allotted to Soghomon Tehlirian within the Armenian community had a much more profound impact on Yanikian than simply the re-emergence of the Armenian question.

Poor, alone and disgraced, Yanikian wanted to secure his place in Armenian legend while he still could. And he had not only read the book on Tehlirian, he had even written to its author to applaud the quality of its content, and had met with him on at least one occasion.

January 27, 1973

On January 27, 1973, Gourgen Yanikian, after months of careful planning and preparation, invited Mehmet Baydar and Bahadir Demir to lunch at a Santa Barbara hotel.

Instead of giving them the painting and currency he had promised, Yanikian shot and killed them both at point-blank range. He then called the police, reported the murders, and sat down calmly to wait for the police to arrive.

Yanikian had every intention of being caught and, like the trial in Berlin, turn his legal proceedings into a means through which to both publicize the Armenian version of the events in eastern Anatolia in 1915 and to indict the Turkish government for these alleged crimes.

What unfolded was essentially an almost flawless theatrical re-enactment of Tehlirian's 1921 trial, right down to the fabricated testimony.

Yanikian plead “not guilty” to murder, arguing that he did not kill two men, but that he “destroyed two evils,” and never exhibited any remorse for the taking of innocent lives.

Like Tehlirian, Yanikian claimed he was tormented by memories of an early twentieth century childhood in Eastern Anatolia. Born in Erzurum in 1895, his family barely escaped the massacres of Abdul Hamid II by fleeing to Kars.

He watched his brother murdered by two Turks in 1903, lost over 20 family members during World War I and its aftermath, and witnessed, firsthand, thousands of victims of the deportations while he was a member of one of the Armenian Volunteer Units in the Russian Army.

In the days preceding the double murder, he claimed that he was visited by apparitions of his murdered brother, and had promised this ghost that he would avenge him.

Like Tehlirian, the defense strategy employed by his lawyers attempted to show that the horrific scenes that Yanikian had witnessed as a child had caused “lasting trauma,” which, when combined with the pain caused by Turkey’s continued denial of the atrocities, left him mentally impaired.

The whole act was carefully constructed so Yanikian could portray himself as yet another victim, turned war hero, turned Armenian Avenger, like Soghomon Tehlirian.

The final FBI report on Yanikian, a comprehensive and thorough 600-page document, however, tells a much different story.

It shows a deranged, broke, and humiliated individual desperately looking for attention, redemption and a chance at glory at the end of his life.

To make sure that both he and the incident received the attention he believed it deserved, Yanikian mailed a 120-page manifesto to a numerous politicians, leaders, and news agencies, and mailed out over 400 letters to Armenians around the world, calling on them to wage war on Turkey and all representatives of the Turkish government.

Almost every pertinent aspect of his life that came out in the Santa Barbara courtroom was either refuted or made questionable, by the FBI report.

There is absolutely no evidence that Yanikian was ever concerned with the Armenian question before 1967 (the year he read the book on Tehlirian), that he was born Erzurum, visited Kars, or even volunteered in an Armenian

regiment. The records show he was born in Tabriz, Iran, and was in Moscow for the duration of the war.

But having studied the Tehlirian case, Yanikian would have known that this didn't necessarily matter. He would have known that his story, his justification for the murders, would be unquestionably accepted by the diaspora. A point proved by the funds donated to Yanikian's legal defense fund by Armenians from around the world.

Unlike the Armenian diaspora, however, the jury in California was either not convinced of Yanikian's story or felt that the events at the turn of the century had no bearing on a murder case in 1973, and the jury found him guilty of two counts of First Degree Murder.

Conclusion

In conclusion, therefore, Gourgen Yanikian was much more than simply the first assassin of many during the 1970s and 1980s, or the inspiration for modern Armenian terrorism. He was a vital link between the ARF's assassins of the early 20th century and the generation of Armenian terrorists that emerged in 1975.

Yanikian proved that 60 years removed from the events of 1915, the diaspora would now support, both morally and financially, the assassination of any Turk and that carrying out these death sentences made one an instant hero, whether or not the victim was a diplomat, spouse or even a child. This was the end result of the cult of violence that had been nourished and encouraged within the Armenian communities around the world.

Less than a week after the murders, an article in the New York Times stated that it would be "an act of insanity" for Yanikian to hold Mr. Baydar or Bahadir Demir responsible for any alleged crimes that occurred in 1915.

Tragically, what the author of that article did not know was that the situation was much worse. In reality, thousands of Armenians had been conditioned to hold all Turks responsible for the alleged crimes of 1915, and many would soon follow Yanikian in his "act of insanity."

LEVON TER-PETROSYAN'S BOOK TITLED
Ասորիների Դերը Հայկական Կիլիկիոյ
Մշակութային
Կեանքում ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերում
**(THE ROLE OF ASSYRIANS IN THE XII AND
XIII CENTURY WITHIN THE CULTURE
OF THE ARMENIANS IN CILICIA)**

(12 VE 13NCÜ YÜZYILLARDA ASURİLERİN
KİLİKYA ERMENİLERİNİN KÜLTÜRÜNDEKİ ROLÜ)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Yıldız Deveci BOZKUŞ

Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Human and Social Sciences Faculty,
Eastern Languages and Literatures,
Department of Armenian Language and Literature
ydbozkus@ybu.edu.tr

Abstract: *In this article the book written in Eastern Armenian and French by Armenia's former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and whose title in Armenian is Ասորիների Դերը Հայկական կիլիկիոյ Մշակութային Կեանքում ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերում (The Role of Assyrians in the XII and XIII Century Within the Culture of the Armenians in Cilicia) will be examined. In this context, how Syrian and Armenian relations are addressed and which issues are emphasized in the book will be evaluated.*

Keywords: *Armenians, Assyrians, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the Armenians in Cilicia.*

Öz: *Bu çalışmada Ermenistan 'in eski devlet başkanı Levon Ter Petrosyan tarafından Doğu Ermenice ve Fransızca¹ olarak kaleme alınan ve Ermenice adı Ասորիների Դերը Հայկական կիլիկիոյ Մշակութային Կեանքում ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերում (XII ve XIII Yüzyılda Kilikya Ermenileri Kültüründe Asurilerin Rolü) olan eseri incelenecektir. Bu kapsamda söz konusu eserde Süryani ve Ermeni ilişkilerinin nasıl ele alındığı ve hangi konular üzerinde durulduğu hususu değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Ermeniler, Süryaniler, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Kilikya Ermenileri.*

1 We've observed that throughout the text of the book, Ancient Armenian that is also known as "Krapar" as well as Eastern Armenian was used.

Introduction

This book, whose title in Armenian is *Ասորիների Ռերը Հայկական կիլիկիոյ Մշակութային Կեանքում ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերում* (The Role of Assyrians in the XII and XIII Century Within the Culture of the Armenians in Cilicia), has been written by Petrosyan at a time when the Soviet Union had not yet dissolved and has been published in Venice due to the political conditions the country was in. Moreover, since the book has not been translated into Turkish or into other languages until now, it is noteworthy to say that it entails quite important data regarding the history of Syrian-Armenian relations and that these data have not yet been used until now in international literature. From this aspect, it could be said that the book contains original content and presents some important clues concerning the past of Syrian-Armenian relations.

Within this framework, after the book's stylistic features are first examined in this article, some information will be provided on the author of the book Petrosyan's life and his works. Then, how he has addressed the relations between the two communities regarding that period in his book will be tried to be evaluated. How the political, cultural, religious and social dimensions of Syrian-Armenian relations of that period have been addressed in the book will also be tried to be presented. Furthermore, the issue of how the Syrians are perceived in Armenian sources and whether a change has taken place in this perception during the historical period will also be tried to be brought to light. In this sense, based on the religious dimension of Syrian-Armenian relations and the historical background of the two communities, how the Armenian and Syrian communities have lived together in the past will be tried to be explained. Moreover, the issue of which sources Petrosyan used when preparing this book will also be included within the scope of this article and when preparing this article, the Eastern Armenian version of the book, the official language of the Armenian Republic today, will directly be used.

The Stylistic Features of the Book

The eastern Armenian section of the book written by Levon Ter-Petrosyan consists of 80 pages. At the end of the book, there is also a summary written in French consisting of 6 pages. It has been published in 1989 in Venice by *U. L. U. U. L.* publishing house.

This book, written in Eastern Armenian, is comprised of six chapters. The titles of these chapters in English are as follows;

- Ասորիների Դերը Հայկական Կիլիկիոյ Մշակութային Կեանքում ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերում (The Role of Assyrians in the XII and XIII Century Within the Culture of the Armenians in Cilicia)
- Ասորական Աղբիւրները ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերի Հայ-Ասորական Հարաբերութիւնների Մասին (Armenian-Assyrian Relations in Assyrian Sources in the XII and XIII Century)
- Միկայել Ասորի, Ժամանակագրութիւն (Assyrian Mikael Chronology)
- Անանուն Եղեսացի, Եկեղեցական Ժամանակագրութիւն (Church Chronology by an Anonymous Writer from Urfa)
- Բար-Հեբրեուս, Եկեղեցական Ժամանակագրութիւն (Bar Hebreus, Church Chronology)
- Ամփոփում (Summary)

Who Is Levon Ter-Petrosyan

Petrosyan, Former President of the Republic of Armenia whose name in Armenian is Լևոն Տէր-Պետրոսյան, was born on 9 January 1945 in the city of Aleppo in Syria. Petrosyan, who came to Yerevan together with his family in 1946, started elementary school here and by specializing in the Arab language and literature, graduated in 1968 from the Oriental Studies Department at Yerevan State University's Faculty of².

By going to Leningrad in 1972, Petrosyan completed his higher education there and graduated from Leningrad University. Petrosyan, giving his doctoral thesis in 1987 again in the same university, worked as a junior researcher from 1972-1978 at the Manuk Abeghyan Institute of Literature.³

He has worked as a Scientific Secretary in 1978-1985 at Matenadaran (Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts) and as a Senior Researcher there in 1985. Petrosyan who is fluent in Armenian, Russian, French, English, German and Arabic, is also in command of many dead languages. Having written over 70 scientific research papers until now, Petrosyan is especially in command of Armenian medieval translated literature and has many works on

2 Levon Ter Petrosyan's official website: Լևոն Տէր-Պետրոսյան, Կենսագրություն, <http://www.levonpresident.am/?lang=arm>

3 Լևոն Տէր-Պետրոսյան, Կենսագրություն, <http://www.levonpresident.am/?lang=arm>

Armenian-Assyrian cultural relations published in Armenian, French and Russian⁴.

When looking at Petrosyan's political identity, it is possible to say that he has a profile different than the other administrators in Armenia. In this context, when he had come to power in 1991, he had given indications that he would take important steps regarding four issues in particular. According to this, he has aimed to develop a market economy, democratization, and to conduct a realistic foreign policy independent of liabilities of traditional Russian dependence⁵.

The resignation of Petrosyan, brought forward by researchers to have a more positive image compared to the administrators in the other Soviet countries, has been interpreted by many segments as a coup which is the continuation of the "velvet revolutions" said to be carried out by Western states⁶.

Ասորիների Դերը Հայկական Կիլիկիոյ Մշակութային Կեանքում ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերում (The Role of Assyrians in the XII and XIII Century Within the Culture of the Armenians in Cilicia)

It could be seen that by mentioning the geographical features of the Cilician Armenian state in this section, some information is provided on relations with neighboring countries and this way, a general introduction of the issue is made⁷.

In the passage that directly mentions Armenian-Assyrian relations in the book, this period has been recorded as XII and XIII centuries and it has been emphasized that close relations exist between the two communities⁸. Moreover, the book also addresses the cooperation existing between Armenia-Assyrian churches and the writings that were made in order to improve this. The book Petrosyan prepared by particularly examining the writings belonging to this period, also has rich content due to its footnotes and bibliography⁹. It could be seen that in the preparation of the book, Petrosyan has especially utilized sources by translating from the languages he is fluent in. Furthermore, it is seen that manuscripts in the Matanedaran library in Yerevan, French writings,

4 Լեվոն Տեր-Պետրոսյան, Կենսագրություն, <http://www.levonpresident.am/?lang=arm>

5 Stephan H. Astourian, *From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia*, Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series, University of California, Winter 2000-2001, p.1.

6 Stephan H. Astourian, *Ibid.* p.1.

7 Լեւոն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ասորիների Դերը Հայկական Կիլիկիոյ Մշակութային Կեանքում ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերում*, Կենետիկ Ս. Լազար, 1989, p.5.

8 Լեւոն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid.* p.6.

9 Լեւոն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid.* p.7.

journals, Armenian sources, Armenian Church records, Greek writings, chronology and bibliographies, American sources, Arabic sources, religious writings, Assyrian sources (Psalm, Bible etc.), manuscripts in the library of Jerusalem, manuscripts in monasteries, and data found in letters have also been used in this book.

Apart from Assyrian-Armenian relations, it could be seen that information on Armenian-Turkish relations and the policies of Greeks towards the Armenians and Assyrians have also been provided in Petrosyan's book. For instance, while mentioning in one section of the book that Krikor Diga requested aid from Great Mikhail against the Turkish armies, it could be seen that the Turks have been mentioned here¹⁰.

Another piece of information regarding Armenian-Assyrian relations given in the book is the information existing in the writings between the religious leaders of both communities. Based on this information, King Levon, upon the request of the clergy of the Cilician Assyrian monastery, has arbitrated in the 1210's for the Ikona sultanate to accept Ohannes XIV accepted as the patriarch of the Yakubi Church¹¹.

While Petrosyan's work has addressed the relations between the two communities, some information has also been provided on which areas the Assyrians and Armenians were active in that period. Within this framework, he has recorded that in 1244, the Yakubi Assyrians have started played an active role in architecture works in Cilicia and have started the construction of churches, bridges and religious sites in various places¹². However, the interesting point here is that apart from the Yakubi Assyrians' own religious centers in places like Sis, they have engaged in similar activities for the Armenians in Rumkale. This section has also mentioned that in 1250, Armenian catholicos Konstantin I (1221-1267) had made a request to Ignatius II to also give room for the Armenians in the Harran Church. Petrosyan, indicating that that they accepted this request despite the Yakubians not wanting it, has also put forth that the Yakubians have not kept their word and that this situation has angered King Hetum I (1226-1270)¹³.

Furthermore, we can also see in the book that Ignatius, following his death, has left some part of his wealth to the Armenians through King Hetum. Hereby, Petrosyan has also argued that this wealth actually forms the Armenian Church's territories in the Eastern side¹⁴.

10 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, s.8.

11 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, s.9.

12 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, s.9.

13 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, s.10.

14 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, s.10.

In this book, from which we also learn that the fall of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia has affected the patriarchate in Sis, we see that year 1292 is a turning point for the Yakubi Church.

By indicating that the Yakubi Church has separated into three patriarchates during this period, Petrosyan has expressed that their centers are in Sis, Malatya and Mardin and that two more patriarchs named Mikhail III (1313-1349) and Parseh (1349-1387) have come to duty in Sis after Mikhail Barsuma. Also, he has pointed out that in the first half of XIII century, the Sis patriarchate carried great importance within the Yakubian Church and that in the same period the authorities of the Patriarchate had exceeded its limits. He has written that these authorities are not only confined to the West, but has also reached Azerbaijan and the cities of Tabriz and Maragheh in Iran. However, he has also indicated that the Patriarchate of Sis has not been able to survive for too long after the fall of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia¹⁵.

Petrosyan has mentioned that in 1349, a series of developments has taken place within Armenian-Assyrian relations. According to this, he has expressed that Parseh or Kapriyel has been selected as the “Antakya and Assyrian Patriarch” to the city of Sis of Cilicia. He has written that in the same period after the collapse of the Mar Barsuma monastery Patriarch Konstantin had moved his valuable manuscripts from the monastery’s library to Sis¹⁶.

Based on this information, it is possible to say that relations between the Yakubian Church and the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia in the XII and XIV centuries were at quite an advanced level.

Petrosyan has mentioned that in the XII and XIV centuries, the Yakubians have completely entered the within the property of the Armenians and that the Armenian kingdom and catholicos in particular have played a great role in relations with the Yakubians and even more in their practical choices. Petrosyan has connected the reason for this situation with the majority of the Assyrian population in Cilicia¹⁷. However, in the following page of his book, the affect of Mongolian and Tatar attacks in the Assyrian population in Cilicia to rise has also been mentioned¹⁸.

In the book which also contains some data regarding the Assyrian religious centers within Cilician borders, it is mentioned that apart from the monasteries belonging to the Assyrians, there are also five bishoprics and that these are

15 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid.*, p.12.

16 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid.*, p.12.

17 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid.*, p.12

18 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid.*, p.13.

Adana, Anazarpa, Ceyhan, Sis and Darson. It has also been indicated that apart from these, there are also Yakubian bishoprics of Maraş, Raban and Kesun belonging to the Assyrians and connected to the Armenian kingdom¹⁹.

Information regarding the relations of Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks and said to belong to Aykeksi is perhaps one of the points drawing the most attention, because it has been put forth that despite these three communities living together, they have lost respect and love towards each other. Therefore, the comparison made by Aykeksi between the Christians and Muslims is quite important²⁰.

Based on the information of Aykeksi, we can see that relations between the Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks have come to a breaking point in this period. In fact, later on in the book it is seen that Aykeksi has clearly made a call for the conflict between these communities to be ended as soon as possible²¹.

According to Petrosyan, Aykeksi's call has created a positive affect among the Greek, Assyrian and Armenian bishops. Accordingly, it has been recorded that the bishops, by complying with Aykeksi's call, have determined their own boundaries and have come to an agreement not to interfere in the others during religious ceremonies. However, it has also been put forth that the same effect has not taken place for the public²². Therefore, it has been pointed out that the disagreement arising between the Armenians and Assyrians in 1166 requires attention for displaying the conflict between the churches of both communities²³.

Furthermore, by explaining that the translations from Assyrian to Armenian appeal more to the public contrary to their originals, it could be seen that some examples of these translations are provided in the book. But, it has also been conveyed that some of the translations are not quite understood due to the language and method used. The first of these is the one which entails Doctor Abu Sait, but it has been written that since the language of the scientists are far from being understandable, they have not been able to explain this piece of work by efficiently using the words needed. It has also been indicated that Abu Sait's small manuscripts have been translated, most of his works concern humans and animal nature and that the lives and treatments of people and animals have been the subjects of his works²⁴.

19 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.13.

20 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.15.

21 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.15.

22 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.16.

23 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.16-17.

24 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.19.

Another work that has been translated is Priest Matta's "Thee Girls from the Levra Race". Moreover, it has been indicated that King Selevgius's work of "The City of Urfa and its Establishment" has also been translated²⁵.

In this book where various information regarding Priest Iso also exist, it has been indicated that priest Iso was a student of doctor Hasan from Malatya, later on settled in Cilicia and served the king and later on in 1244-1245, led to the construction of the Saint Mar-Barsuma church in the city of Sis²⁶.

While indicating that many scientific and technical writings have been translated from Arabic to Armenian especially in the XII century in Cilicia, some examples to these are also provided in the book. According to this, it has been said that among these writings, many books written during the 1st Hetum period (1221-1270) by doctors named Ishahak Ibn Abial Farac and Ibn Gasis regarding horse treatment, engraving of steel and astrology have been translated in 1299 into Armenian²⁷.

Perhaps the most allegation of the book in the scientific sense is the statement that the greatest role in the settling of Arab culture in Cilicia and spreading countrywide has been through the translation of the Assyrians²⁸.

In a reference made from a manuscript numbered 725 at the Mesrop Mashtots Library in Armenia, it is indicated that the translation works of the Assyrians and Armenians created results visible to the eye in South Armenia's city of Mayfarkin in the XI century and that these were affective all over Cilicia in the following years²⁹. It is also mentioned that in accordance with the requests of the public, philosophical works have also been translated in the following years in order to particularly meet the necessities. It has been recorded that the works of the Greeks and Assyrians in Cilicia were presented to the public by Armenian writers recompiling them word to word and Armenian writers in this area were Krikor Vigayaser, Nerses Shnorhali, Nerses Lampronatzi, Vartan Areveltzi etc³⁰.

According to Petrosyan, among the reasons for many pieces of writing being translated from Arabic into Armenian first comes Asuristan being a neighbor country and then the Assyrian population in Cilicia has also had a significant influence³¹.

25 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.20.

26 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.22.

27 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibid*, p.24.

28 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *Ibidi*, p.25.

29 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.25.

30 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.26.

31 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.26.

In a section in the book concerning comments on Armenian-Assyrian relations, it has been written that the period when relations between the two communities were the most intense was the XII and XIII centuries. It has been argued in this section that this period is the most dense and efficient term of relations between the two communities. It is also pointed out that relations of these two communities living together in cities and villages within the geography of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia have also had a great influence on Cilician culture³².

In the chapter titled “Armenian-Assyrian Relations in Assyrian Sources in the XII and XIII Century”, it is seen that three main sources have been utilized. These sources are the works entitled “Chronology” of Assyrian Mikhail, “Chronology” of Ananun from Urfa, and “Cilician Chronology” of Bar Hepsos. Even though the histories of the Great Hayk, Armenian State of Cilicia, North Asorik Armenian Principality and the Armenian Church are addressed in these works, it is possible to say that in essence “Armenian-Assyrian” relations in the XII and XIII centuries are taken as a basis³³.

According to Petrosyan, the translations made from Assyrian to Armenian not only shed light on the belief, duty of the two communities and mutual behaviors towards each other in terms of history and politics, but also address the different views between the two sides and their economic struggles³⁴.

Chronology of Assyrian Mikhail

It is seen that in this chapter of the book some information is provided on the religious worships of the Armenians and Assyrians. In this context, it is seen that how the great fasting is experienced and welcomed in the two communities is addressed³⁵.

Another matter addressed in the book deals with where the Armenians and Assyrians migrated when the Greeks seized the region of Cappadocia from the Arabs. From this aspect, the book puts forth the fact that just as in the 19th century, the Armenian population was also subjected to migration in the 11th century³⁶.

As can be understood from the paragraph above, it could be said that the defeat

32 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.43.

33 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.44.

34 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.45.

35 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.46.

36 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.46.

of the Greeks has caused the Assyrians and Armenians to migrate. However, another important aspect of the book is that it mentions the Greeks' policies directed towards the Armenians and Assyrians. In relation to this, it has been conveyed that the Greeks have slaughtered the Armenians and Assyrians and have constantly disturbed them³⁷.

In the book where the cruel policies of the Greeks towards the Armenian and Assyrian communities are widely expressed, it is seen that how the two communities have resisted the Greek cruelty and the issues to which they objected have also been mentioned. It is expressed that the Greeks have applied various unjust policies towards the Armenians and Assyrians and therefore, some Armenian spiritual leaders have been arrested. By stating that the authority gap that emerged made the Turks' work easier than the Greeks, it has been recorded that the administration of the region of Cilicia evacuated by the Armenians has been shared between the Greeks and Turks³⁸.

“Cilician Chronology” of Bar Hephreos (Ohannes 12 Patriarch Years 1130-1137)

In this section of the book, in summary it has been stated that the Armenian Catholicos, in a fetwa he prepared, has humiliated the Assyrians for making the sign of the cross on dough and drinking honey, butter and wine despite a mouse falling in them. It has been put forth that this piece of writing is kept in the Cilician Armenian monastery under the name Trazark, but when Bar-Antreas heard that the Armenians read this writing and ridiculed it, he prepared a plan to get rid of this writing. According to this, by disguising himself, Bar-Antreas entered the Armenian monastery and refuted this writing, putting a new writing in its place among the Armenian books. It is also mentioned that upon this, Bar-Antreas was caught and taken to the Catholicos where the Catholicos has tore both his own and Bar-Antreas's letter³⁹.

Patriarch Mikhail's Years 1166-1199

The most important of the information provided on the period of Patriarch Mikhail is seen to be the divergence of views emerging on the issue of religious feasts as mentioned before in the previous sections. According to this, it is seen that another agreement was experienced in 1197 due to the Great Easter Feast. It is recorded that the feast celebrated by the Jews on March 14 came on the

37 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.49.

38 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.50-51.

39 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.61.

29th week of February. However, it is also mentioned that the Greeks celebrated it on the next day and started the Great Lent on February 10. The Assyrians, Armenians and Gypsies celebrated the feast the Sunday following that Sunday which falls on April 6 and the great Lent started on February 18. Therefore, it is understood that every 95 years these kinds of differences are observed in the dates of feasts and this emerges as a problem between communities. However, it is also seen that with this situation comes several conflicts. It is expressed that due to these differences in dates, the Iberians who saw that the Armenians also did not celebrate the feast like their selves, this time burned Armenian churches and murdered four people. Upon hearing this, the Armenians have formed a force consisting of 40.000 people and have declared war on the Iberians⁴⁰.

Patriarch Ignatius II Years 1222-1252

Among the issues addressed during the period of Patriarch Ignatius first comes the Orthodox Church constructed in Rumkale upon the Patriarch's request. Apart from this, it has also been recorded that the Patriarch has also led to the construction of the Virgin Mary Church established next to the Armenian Church in Sis. It has been indicated that when the Egyptians burned Sis down in 1249, the big churches of the Armenians were also burned and destroyed, but the Assyrian churches faced no damage from this. It has also been noted that apart from churches, the Patriarch also led to the construction of a bridge on the Catit river near Antrian and the river flowing to the city of Mamaestia in order to provide moral and material support to the monasteries being damaged⁴¹.

In this section, it has also been pointed out that the Armenians have had several claims from the Patriarch and again the churches came at the top of these claims. According to this, it has been mentioned that the Armenian Catholicos, coming to see the Patriarch, wanted from the Patriarch a part of the church in Harran to be given to the Armenians. However, it is also mentioned that the Patriarch was not quite willing to give room for the Armenians⁴².

It is seen that in the sections of Tiyonisyus 7 and Ohannes 15 Patriarchs' Years (1253-1263) and the Period of Patriarch Ignatius 3 (1264-1282), some information have been provided on the visits of the patriarchs and the talks they held.

40 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.65.

41 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.68.

42 Լեինն Յ. Տեր-Պետրոսեան, *a.g.e.*, s.69.

Conclusion

It is seen that the book has been prepared by greatly utilizing Assyrian, Greek, and Armenian works. It could be said that the translations made in Cilicia by the Assyrians from Arabic and Assyrian to Armenian have established the foundation for Arab culture being established in Cilicia in the scientific field.

In general, it could be said that emphasis is put on the information that the Assyrian population living in attachment to the Kingdom of Cilicia lived together with the Armenians in peace and tranquility.

It is understood that during the period of the Kingdom of Cilicia, the city of Sis, for the Yakubians, became a management center for Yakubian churches.

Concerning the subject, information from different writers has also been provided frequently regarding how the Armenians and Assyrians have lived together in unity, solidarity and peace.

It could be seen that some interactions have taken place between Armenian and Assyrian culture in areas of science, literature, medicine and religion. Many Assyrian works being translated into Armenian and these translations receiving broad repercussion among the Armenian community have caused some affects to emerge within Armenian culture towards Assyrian culture.

It can be said that some Assyrian scholars like Abu Said have settled in Cilicia, have conducted their works with the title of doctor, philosopher and astrologist and this has left some influences in that period on Armenian culture in Cilicia.

Particularly in the XIII'th century, it could be seen that countless works have been translated from Arabic and Assyrian into Armenian. It is understood that some translations have especially found more favor than their originals among Cilician Armenians.

It can also be seen that both the Assyrian and Armenian communities have generally suffered more from the policies the Greeks applied on them and therefore, they have collaborated with each other from time to time. However, it is possible to say that the main point of conflict between the two communities in that period concerned religious issues.

The book can be assessed as a highly significant reference source for the Armenians and Assyrians, particularly in terms of the medieval ages. It could be said that the work being translated into Turkish and into other languages will be beneficial for academicians working within different disciplines.

In conclusion, in terms of the book being prepared by being based on extremely original sources and entailing quite detailed information concerning the period, it is possible to say that it carries the feature of being the first in its field. Furthermore, in terms of Assyrian-Armenian relations shedding light especially on the medieval period, it is possible to consider this book of Petrosyan, which has been prepared by almost referring to more than one source in each line, as one of the main reference sources for scholars wanting to research this issue.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

H. Astourian, Stephan, *From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia*, Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series, University of California, Winter 2000-2001.

Տեր-Պետրոսեան, Լեւոն Յ., *Ստորիների Դերը Հայկական Կիլիկիոյ Մշակութային Կեանքում ԺԲ-ԺԳ Դարերում*, Վենետիկ Ս. Լազար, 1989. (Levon Y. Ter-Petrosyan, *Asorineri Deri Haykakan Kilikioy Mşakutayin Keankum JB-JG Darerum*, Venetik S. Lazar, 1989.)

Levon Ter Petrosyan's official website: Լեւոն Տեր-Պետրոսյան, Վենսագրություն, (Levon Ter-Petrosyan, *Kensagrutyun*)
<http://www.levonpresident.am/?lang=arm>

CALL FOR PAPERS: REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES

The Review of Armenian Studies was established with the aim of publishing papers of a high standard of quality to stimulate inter-disciplinary debate between academics and practitioners on issues falling within its scope of research. The Review of Armenian Studies invites paper submissions on any topic related to Armenian Question.

The peer-reviewed Review of Armenian Studies journal is published twice a year. Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The journal's language is English. Review of Armenian Studies accepts scientific research that has not been previously submitted to another journal for publication. Submissions must be written in accordance with the principles of scientific writing and standards put forward by the journal and with a straightforward language.

Since 2001, 26 issues of Review of Armenian Studies had been published. Previous issues include contributions from prominent academics (including Prof. Justin McCarthy and Prof. Guenter Lewy) as well as leading historians and accomplished students engaged in the field of historical, political and social research on the Armenian Issue.

Review of Armenian Studies is indexed by the EBSCO and TÜBİTAK/ULAKBİM.

Topics

Although we welcome any contributions related to the Armenian Issue, some major topics may well include the following titles.

- Politics of Armenia
- Armenian History
- Culture and Socio-politics in Armenia
- Regional and international politics of Armenia
- Turkey-Armenia Relations
- Armenia- Iran Relations
- Armenia's relations with the States in Caucasus region
- US-Armenia Relations
- Armenia's Relations with the EU

Manuscript Submission

Please submit manuscripts via e-mail to Aslan Yavuz Şir

ayavuzsir@avim.org.tr or info@avim.org.tr

Manuscripts should range from 3,000 to 13,000 words and be approximately 10-30 single-spaced pages in length including footnotes and bibliography. Articles must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1 1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially.

The title page of the article should include the following information:

- Manuscript title
- Names and affiliations of all contributing authors
- Full address for correspondence, including telephone and email address
- Abstract: please provide a short summary of up to 300 words.
- Keywords: please provide 5 key words in alphabetical order, suitable for indexing. Ideally these words will not have appeared in the title.

We are now welcoming contributions for the 28th issue of this journal.

Complete submissions are due November 1, 2013.

The editorial office will make every effort to deal with submissions to the journal as quickly as possible. All papers will be acknowledged on receipt by email.

- Home
 - Subscribe
 - Contact
 - Press
 - Site Map
 - Links
- ABOUT ORSAM**
- RESEARCH AREAS**
- Iraq
 - Iran
 - Palestine-Israel
 - Lebanon
 - Gulf of Basra
 - Turkey-Middle East
 - Caucasus-Middle East
 - Think Tanks

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS


Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's Visit to Lebanon and Turkey's Relations with Lebanon



When we look at Turkey's relations with Lebanon from the past to the present, we see that these relations have developed on the basis of cooperation and, at times, conflict. However, since 2005, we have seen Turkey's relations with Lebanon develop rapidly in the fields of economy, politics and security.

more

Northern Iraq Notes II: Sulaymaniyah Observations



All the PUK authorities we interviewed said that the elections were a big gain for democracy. Probably, the reason for these statements isn't only the development of democracy. We got the impression that the Change List, formed by the PUK's veteran leaders, may reunite with the PUK.

more


Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations: How to Switch from Brotherhood Slogans to Strategic Partnership?



It is time to develop a closer relationship. By adding block into place each year, a common future that is based not only on bureaucrats and politicians but also on the entire nation and with the aim of improving friendship, peace and prosperity between Turkey and the Azerbaijan will be built.


more

The Importance of the Turkey-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) High Level Strategic Dialogue Meeting



According to the GCC members, Turkey is the

The Importance of the Turkey-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) High Level Strategic Dialogue Meeting



According to the GCC members, Turkey is the

more

ORSAM REPORTS

IRAQ'S PIVOTAL POINT: TALAFAR



THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PIRACY: THE SOMALIA CASE AND TURKEY'S POSITION



ARCHIVE

EVENTS

ORSAM-TRT Cooperation for the Documentary of Turkish Straits




The topics of the documentary film include the the issue of Turkish Straits.

ORSAM Middle Eastern Studies Summer School Completed




ORSAM held a summer school program from July 1-15, 2009.

Tal Afar Conference in Istanbul




A conference was held on "Tal Afar: From the Invasion to the Present." on June 13, 2009 in Istanbul.

Obama's Middle East Policies Discussed



New American Policies and the future of Turkish-American relations were a topic at the meeting.

The Priorities of Turkey's Iraq Policy Evaluated



A brainstorm was arranged at ORSAM seeking to answer the question: "What should the

more

- ORSAM GUEST**
- Prof. Raymond Hinnebusch** evaluated Syrian foreign policy and Turkey-Syria relations. According to Hinnebusch Syria values relations with Turkey for several reasons.
- Rıza Çolak**, Representative of the Iraqi Turkmen Front in Talafar: "There is no such thing as Sunni-Shite conflict in Talafar. We are all brothers and sisters."
- Christer Asp**, The Kingdom of Sweden's Ambassador to Ankara, assessed Turkey-EU relations and Turkey's changing role within the international system.
- Mohammed bin Nasser Hamad Al-Wohabi**, Ambassador of the Sultanate of Oman, stated that Turkey is a stabilizing and balancing element in the Middle East.
- Baodad Amreyev**, Kazakh

Your Link to Middle East



ORDER FORM

Name : Address :
Last Name :
Telephone :
E-mail :

Subscriptions

- Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal - 4 Months Annual 25 TL ~~27~~
 Review of Armenian Studies Journal - 6 Months Annual 15 TL ~~16~~
 Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal - Per Year Annual 9 TL

Ordering of Single Volumes

- Book of Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler 15 TL
(Extended version and 2nd edition)
 Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal – Latest volume (volume 44) 9 TL
 Review of Armenian Studies Journal – Latest volume (volume 27) 9 TL
 Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal – Latest volume (volume 13) 9 TL

Ordering of Previous Volumes

- Previous volume/volumes of Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal Each is 5 TL
 Previous volume/volumes of Review of Armenian Studies Journal Each is 5 TL
 Previous volume/volumes of Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal Each is 5 TL

* To receive your order, send the form with your receipt.

Contact

Address: Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12 Daire: 2 06550 Çankaya / ANKARA
Telephone: 0312 438 50 23 • **Fax:** 0312 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Account Number:

Terazi Yayıncılık Garanti Bankası A.Ş. Çankaya /Ankara Şubesi
Account No: 181 /6296007 **IBAN No:** TR960006200018100006296007

Postal Check Account No: 5859221

AVİM Türkmeneli İşbirliği ve Kültür Vakfı
AVRASYA İNCELEMELERİ MERKEZİ

Ana Sayfa | Hakkımızda | Yayınlar | Yazarlar | Linkler | İletişim | **ENGLISH**

Kafkasya ve Ermeni Sorunu | Balkan Araştırmaları | Asya Araştırmaları | Avrupa Araştırmaları

Yorum / Notlar / Duyurular | Makale Arşivi

SARKOZY ERMENİSTAN'DA I - 12 Ekim 2011
Ömer Engin LÜTEM

FRANSA VE ERMENİ İDDIALARI - 4 Ekim 2011
Dr. Deniz ALTINBAŞ

RUS BÜYÜKELÇİNİN SIRPLARA HİTABESİ - 30 Eylül 2011
Dr. Erhan TÜRBEDAR

AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ MAHKEMELERİNDE AÇILAN TAZMİNAT DAVALARI ÜZERİNE - 27 Eylül 2011
Aslan Yavuz ŞİR

SIRBİSTAN KOSOVA SİYASETİNİ SORGULUYOR - 26 Eylül 2011
Dr. Erhan TÜRBEDAR

Makale Arşivi

Günlük Bülten Üyeliği
E-Posta Adresiniz Üye Ol

Günlük Bülten Tarih Seçiniz Git

Kafkasya ve Ermeni Sorunu

- SEN ÖNCE KENDİNE ÇEKİ DÜZEN VER"
- "500 BİN ERMENİ VARSA 500 BİN DE TÜRK VAR"
- ÖN SEÇİMDEN ERMENİSTAN TEZİ ÇIKTI
- DOÇ.DR.EROL KURKÇUOĞLU: "BİR TÜRK TARİHÇİSİ OLARAK SARKOZY'YE SESLENMEK İSTİYORUM"
- AZERİ-ERMENİ CEPHE HATTINDA ATEŞES İHLALİ
- BAK ŞU KONUŞANA:NICOLAS SARKOZY (İHSAN BAL)
- TÜRKİYE'YE YAKIN AUBRY Mİ ERMENİ YANLISI HOLLANDE Mİ?
- SARKOZY'NİN PES DEDİRTEN GEREKÇESİ

Balkan Araştırmaları

- GÜL: ARNAVUTLUK'A HER TÜRLÜ DESTEĞE HAZIRIZ
- BOSNA'DA KÜLTÜR MERKEZİ AÇTI
- KUVEYT, KOSOVA CUMHURİYETİNİ TANIDI
- KOSOVA İLE AB KOMİSLONU VİZELERİN KALDIRILMASINI ARALIKTA GÖRÜŞECEK
- BOSNA'DA SAVAŞAN LİBYALI ÜLKESİNE GÖNDERİLDİ
- YUNANİSTAN, BATI TRAKYA'YA VİZESİZ GİRİŞ İÇİN ÇALIŞIYOR
- YUNANİSTAN, TROYKA İLE UZLAŞTI
- SIRBİSTAN'DAKİ ETNİK BULGARLAR DEĞİŞİM KONUSUNDA İYİMSER DEĞİLLER
- MAVROYANNIS KIBRIS SORUNUNU DEĞERLENDİRDİ

Irak

- IRAK ASKERİ PKK'NIN PEŞİNE DÜŞECEK
- ELEKTRİK BAKANLIĞINA, KERİM AFTAN GETİRİLDİ

Asya Araştırmaları


- RUSYA: "ABD'Yİ ORTA ASYA'DA İSTEMİYORUZ"
- FRANSA KAZAKİSTAN'A VİZEYİ KOLAYLAŞTIRIYOR
- ASYA ÜLKELERİ KUVEYT'TE TOPLANDI
- GÖNÜLLÜ TÜRK DOKTORLARI ÖZBEKİSTAN'DA GÖNÜLLERİ FETHETTİ
- AVRASYA'NIN ENERJİSİ KAZAKİSTAN'DAN

Avrupa Araştırmaları

- FRANZİS SOSYALİSTLERİ ARASINDA "SOYKIRIM YARIŞI!"
- AB MEDYASI: "BASIKLAR TÜRKİYE'NİN İMAJINI BOZUYOR"

Dünyadan Seçme Haberler


ABD: "İSRİL'E BİLGİ YOK"



"NATO'nun radar sistemindeki bilgiler İsrail'e paylaşılmayacak." Amerikan yönetimi bu bilgiyi bir kez daha teyit etti.

Devamı için ...


"KOMŞU'DA GREVLER DALGA DALGA YAYILIYOR"



Yunanistan'da, mali krizle mücadele temelinde uygulamaya konulan reformlar çerçevesinde alınması kararlaştırılan yeni sert önlemlere toplumun her kesiminden gelen tepkiler her geçen gün artıyor.

Devamı için ...


SLOVAKYA PARLAMENTOSU'NDAN RET



Slovakya parlamentosu Avro Bölgesi'ndeki borç krizi için hayati önemde görülen Avrupa Mali İstikrar Fonu'nun genişletilmesi planlarını reddetti.

Devamı için ...

TİMOŞENKOYA 7 YIL HAPİS



Ukrayna'nın eski başbakanı, yolsuzluk yaptığı gerekçesiyle suçlu bulundu. Mahkeme Timoşenko'yu 7 yıl hapis cezasına çarptırdı.

Devamı için ...

MAKEDONYA'DA NUFUS SAYIMI