

REVIEW OF
ARMENIAN STUDIES

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Facts and Comments

Ömer E. LÜTEM

The Psychological Dimension of the Armenian Question

Assist. Prof. Dr. Deniz ALTINBAŞ

A Problem in Turkey-US Relations in the 1980's:
Armenian Draft Resolutions

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RECENT DOCUMENTS



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The most significant development in Turkey-Armenia relations today is, without doubt, the two protocols signed between the two countries on 10 October 2009. The first protocol concerns the establishment of diplomatic relations and the second is on determining areas of cooperation and establishing an organization for this purpose. The entire **“Facts and Comments”** being the first article of our Journal, has been dedicated to the developments related to the protocols, starting with their signature to the suspension of their ratification by Armenia.

Armenians who have spread to many countries during and after the First World War, have started to be assimilate over time and the protection of their identity become their main problem. Within this framework, inspired by the Jewish Holocaust, the Armenians have alleged that they have been subjected to a genocide which, resulted to hostile feelings to emerge against Turkey and Turks, especially among the Diaspora Armenians. These feelings have caused an **“Armenian Terror”** to develop, especially in 1970 and 1980, aiming to murder Turkish diplomats for the sake of the **“Armenian Cause”**. Despite historical and political law aspects of the Armenian Question being well known, the psychological dimension of this question which is necessary to understand the behavior of especially the Diaspora Armenians has not been thoroughly researched. In the article entitled **“The Psychological Dimension of the Armenian Question”**, **Assist. Prof. Deniz Altınbaş** has examined issues such as the past traumas and psychological situations of all the parties: Armenians of Armenia, Armenian Diaspora, Turkish Armenians, Turks who defend the Turkish **“official view”** and Turks who apologize from the Armenians claiming that they feel guilty.

The Armenian Community in the US works towards resolutions to be adopted in the US House of Representatives and the Senate for being an important step of the international recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations. However, as a result of Turkey strictly opposing to such a resolution and the American governments, although with some reservations, supporting Turkey, adoption of such a resolution has not yet taken place up to now despite numerous attempts. In the article entitled **“A Problem in Turkey-US Relations in the 1980’s: Armenian Draft Resolutions”**, **Dr. Sibel Kavuncu** has examined the developments taking place in 1980 in this issue.

An interview conducted with Prof. Ahmet İnsel and author Michel Marian was published as a book in France entitled “Dialogue sur le tabou arménien” (Dialogues on the Armenian Taboo). **Ambassador (Rtd.) Pulat Tacar** has studied the main views expressed in this book along with his own comments in an article entitled “**Notes on Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Armenian**”. This article also sheds light on which conditions are required for an event to be considered genocide according to the UN 1948 Genocide Convention.

Efforts to find a settlement for the Karabakh conflict have continued for approximately fifteen years. The existing differences in views between Azerbaijan and Armenia, mainly on what the status of Karabakh will be in the future, have prevented a resolution to be reached on this conflict so far. However, the Minsk Group, under the co-chairmanship of the three major powers (US, Russia and France), is constantly striving to reach a settlement. In his article entitled “**Recent Developments Regarding the Karabakh Question**”, **Halit Gülşen** has addressed the developments in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict from 2006 until today.

Sincerely

The Editor

FACTS AND COMMENTS

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Abstract: *Developments after the signature of the Turkish-Armenian Protocols, Armenian Constitutional Court's Decision concerning the Protocols, Turkey's objections, Pressures on Turkey for its ratification of the Protocols, some countries' parliaments resolutions recognizing Armenian genocide allegations, suspension of the Protocols by Armenia.*

Key Words: *Turkish-Armenian Protocols, Armenian Constitutional Court, US House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, Swedish Parliament, Turkish Grand National Assembly, Serge Sarkisian, Edward Nalbandyan, Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton*

Since Turkey-Armenia Protocols have been the only focus of the relations between the two countries and the developments within Diaspora for the last seven months (December 2009-June 2010), just as during the previous six-month period, this "Facts and Comments" will be consecrated to this subject.

I – PRESIDENT SARKISIAN'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 10, 2009

The discussion of the meaning of the most important articles of the Protocols signed after prolonged and difficult negotiations on 10 October 2009¹ has started almost on the same day of their signature.

Following the signature, while no statements have been made in Turkey on the Protocols and their content due to it being a secondary issue for the Turkish public opinion, on the date the Protocols were signed, President Sarkisian has issued a statement as an address to the people of the Republic of Armenia and to all Armenians.²

1 See: Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 33-34, p.56,56

2 10 October 2009. <http://www.president.am/events/statements/eng/?year=2009&id=51>

The Armenian President has expressed that for the past several months, the attention of Armenia and the Armenians worldwide was focused on the ongoing process of the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations, the world saw and understood that when it comes to the normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations, they have to deal not just with Armenia with its three million population, but with the ten million Armenians, and that contrary to some slogans, the Armenian nation is united in its goals. Sarkisian has also indicated that they are trying to put on a normal track the relations with a country where under the Ottoman rule their nation fell victim to the policy of genocide, that the scars of the genocide have not healed and that there is no alternative to the establishment of the relations with Turkey without any precondition.

Expressing that the concern of individuals and some political forces is caused by the different interpretation of certain provisions of the Protocols and their historic mistrust towards Turkey, Sarkisian has insisted on the following points:

“1. No relations with Turkey can question the reality of the patricide and the genocide perpetrated against the Armenian nation. It is a known fact and it should be recognized and condemned by the whole progressive humanity. The relevant sub-commission to be established under the intergovernmental commission is not a commission of historians.”

“2. The issue of the existing border between Armenia and Turkey is to be resolved through prevailing norms of the international law. The Protocols do not go beyond that.”

“3. These relations cannot and do not relate to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is an independent and separate process. Armenian does not regard the clause of the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders contained in the Protocols as in any way related to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.”

“4. The Armenian side will give an adequate reaction if Turkey protracts the process of ratification or raises conditions for it. Armenia undertakes no unilateral commitments though these Protocols and does not make any unilateral affirmations. Armenia is signing these Protocols in order to create basis for the establishment of normal relations between our two countries. Hence, if Turkey fails to ratify the Protocols within a reasonable timeframe and does not implement all the clauses contained herein within the provided timeframe or violates them in the future, Armenia will immediately take appropriate steps as stipulated by the international law.”

It could be seen that with this statement, President Sarkisian has aimed to express that the concerns and likely threats existing in Armenia and the Diaspora will be taken into consideration, that the developments contradictory to the national interests will be prevented and that no difference of views exists on this matter between Armenians.

Contrary to Turkey, since the Protocols were heavily criticized in Armenia and much more in Diaspora, it was normal for the Armenian President to issue a statement that would provide assurance for the public opinion. With the thought that the statement only concerns Armenian public opinion, including Diaspora, the Turkish media has almost never dwelled on it. However, this statement has gone beyond only providing assurance and the views put forth by Sarkisian have created some understandings different from those of Turkey regarding the Protocols. These could be listed as follows:

a. Turkey is completely against the genocide allegations being accepted by the parliaments of foreign countries. She wants the 1915 events to be examined by historians and other specialists. This should be the main task of the Sub-Commission on the Historical Dimension Commission foreseen in the Protocols. Therefore, it is meaningless to say that this sub-commission is not a commission of historians, as the Armenian President pretended.

b. Sarkisian has presented the border between the two countries as a problem which needs to be resolved. But, this issue has already been resolved with the Moscow and Kars Treaties signed in 1921. Moreover, the parties have confirmed the mutual recognition of this border in the First Protocol.

c. There is no mention of the Karabakh conflict in the Protocols. The Armenian President, without referring in this part of his statement to the protocols, has put forth that Turkey-Armenia relations are not and will not be linked to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. However, not only due to its relations with Azerbaijan, but also because the Karabakh conflict prevents peace and cooperation in the Southern Caucasus, it is normal for Turkey to be concerned with both of the issues and to try to contribute to their resolution. Turkey moving in this direction is not contradictory to the Protocols.

d. The expressions in the President's statement that the provisions on territorial integrity and inviolability of borders is not related to the Karabakh conflict almost constitute a confession of guilt, because Armenia has violated the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Karabakh, which according to international law, belongs to Azerbaijan.

e. The points mentioned in the 4th paragraph in Sarkisian's statement are for satisfying firstly the Dashnaks and then the Armenian public opinion and Diaspora. Implying that they could refuse the Protocols on the same day they were signed is at least bizarre.

Considering the points stated above, it is seen that diverging views still continues related to the main issues such as genocide allegations and mutual recognition of borders between the two countries. Highly different opinions also exist on the Karabakh issue. While Turkey is waiting for significant progress in the resolution of this conflict in order to implement the Protocols, Armenia is insisting that no relationship exists between the Protocols and the Karabakh conflict.

It is known that from the start, Armenia follows a policy of “normalization without preconditions” with Turkey. This means establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey and opening the Turkish border without giving anything in return. In other words, Armenia will not give any concession on the three issues mentioned above, i.e recognition of borders, genocide allegations and the Karabakh issue. Armenia has followed this policy almost since 1992. During the negotiations of the Protocols, Armenia has conveyed the idea that, except the Karabakh conflict, changes could take place in the other two issues mentioned above. However, it has rejected these changes being openly reflected in the articles of the Protocols. President Sarkisian's statement delivered the same day the Protocols were signed shows that their stance has not changed at all.

There are several reasons for Armenia to act in such a way.

The idea that Armenians have deliberately been massacred firstly by the Ottomans, then Turks and that they have been subjected to genocide is a deeply rooted belief in Armenia and Diaspora. Even if it is not correct, following a policy which would contradict this belief and conclude an agreement with Turkey is at least in the midterm not possible for any Armenian government.

Although not widely spread, there exists a belief in Armenia and Diaspora that Eastern Anatolia is actually Western Armenia. However, despite objections, Armenia's recognition of the existing border is possible for the Armenian government which possess a great majority of the Parliament and for President Sarkisian who has come to power by gaining 52 % of the votes.

Even if not historically correct, there also exists a deeply rooted belief in both Armenia and Diaspora that Karabakh is Armenian or that it belongs to Armenia. Moreover, considering that Karabakh and Azerbaijan “rayon's” surrounding this area being conquered through war and that Robert Kocharian and Serge Sarkisian, being

among those conducting the battle, have been or is the president of Armenia for the last twelve years, it is highly difficult for Armenia to make concessions regarding the Karabakh issue, unless they are exposed to great pressure or military defeat. Regarding Turkey's situation on the Karabakh issue, Armenia has opposed Turkey's contribution to its resolution all along for the reason that it has non-hesitantly supported Azerbaijan's policy.

Examining the points mentioned above from the angle of the Protocols, we can conclude the following:

a. The Karabakh Conflict

The Karabakh conflict is not mentioned in the Protocols. During the negotiations, there is no doubt that Turkey has insisted on the Karabakh conflict being touched upon in the Protocols even if as a statement of good will. However, Armenia considering its refusal as “sine qua non” (without which it could not be) and that Karabakh is not a bilateral problem between Turkey and Armenia, Turkey has accepted the omission of this issue in the text. Furthermore, it could be understood that regarding the Karabakh conflict, Turkey has included in the Second Protocol the statements that “the common purpose of both States is to cooperate for enhancing regional stability and security and reiterating their commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional international disputes and conflicts on the basis of the norms and principles of international law”, whereas the Armenian side has seen no harm in this text since the word Karabakh has not been mentioned and this text has brought a definite obligation.

Interestingly, President Sarkisian has not found this section of the Second Protocol to be related to the Karabakh conflict, but the statement in the First Protocol on “territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers”. However, for Turks, most likely this provision firstly concerns Turkey. As mentioned above, despite the Moscow and Kars treaties defining the borders in a definite matter, Armenian public opinion and Diaspora still have the belief that Eastern Anatolia belongs to Armenia. On the other hand, since the Karabakh area and the “rayon's” surrounding it belongs to Azerbaijan according to international law, it is normal that the provision of “territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers” also concerns Azerbaijan.

When Armenia rejected the mentioning of the Karabakh conflict, even only as a wish for its resolution being incorporated into the Protocols, Turkey was obliged to resort to not ratifying the Protocols as long as a significant development takes place in the Karabakh conflict's resolution. Since no provision exists in the Protocols regarding the date of ratification and even no indication of them having to be ratified as soon as possible, this action of Turkey is not contradictory to the Protocols.

In the beginning, Armenia has underestimated this stance of Turkey. In response to the journalists asking President Sarkisian what he thinks of Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement that Turkey's borders will not be opened (in other words, that the Protocols will not be ratified) before Armenia ends the occupation of its forces, he has said that Azerbaijan public opinion is the target of this statement.³ However, this stance of Turkey concerns Armenia more than Azerbaijan public opinion, because the main purpose of Armenia signing the Protocols is for the Turkish border to open and Turkey has linked this to the Karabakh conflict.

Following the signing of the Protocols, especially Prime Minister Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu have continued, at every appropriate opportunity, to link the ratification of the Protocols and the Karabakh conflict. This has highly disturbed Armenia and statements on creating normal relations with Turkey without any pre-conditions have increased. Moreover, it has been observed that Armenia has complained about Turkey to the US, Russia and the European Union (EU) regarding this subject and has been met with understanding. In fact, EU authorities such as the US and Russia have also expressed with a cautious language that normalization should not be linked to preconditions and in particular, that a link should not be created between Karabakh and the ratification of the Protocols. However, these have not evoked any change in Turkey's stance. In conclusion, Turkey's formula of "Karabakh resolution = Turkey opening its borders" has created a pressure on Armenia and as will be explained further on, has formed the main reason for Armenia suspending the Protocols.

b. Genocide Allegations

Genocide allegations are being put forth both to accuse the Ottomans and to form the basis of some claims from today's Turkey, which prevents a true reconciliation to develop between Turkey-Armenia and Turkish-Armenian peoples. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for the genocide allegations to be resolved. However, Armenians have never approached this subject from this angle. Furthermore, a majority has believed that the recognition of genocide allegations is vital for their claims such as returning of properties, compensation and territory to be given to Armenia and therefore, have rejected discussing the "genocide truth". This utopian attitude is the main reason for this problem still not being able to be resolved today.

In a letter sent to President Robert Kocharian on 13 April 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan had proposed the following: "...forming a group comprised of historians and

3 *Aysor.am*. 13 October 2009.

other specialists of our two countries to investigate the developments and events related to the 1915 period by researching all the archives of not only Turkey and Armenia but also all relevant third countries and report their findings to the international community". In the letter, "an initiative in this direction will shed light on a controversial period of history and will serve as a step towards the normalization of relations between our countries" has been stated as the purpose of this proposal.⁴ The point that requires attention here is that "genocide" has not been mentioned and reaching a decision on whether the events constitute genocide has not been requested. The issue at hand is only for the events of that period to be researched and the findings to be presented to the public. There really is a great necessity for the events of that period to be examined impartially and scholarly. Armenians and pro-Armenian historians have attempted to conclude that genocide took place by examining some adverse events of that period and based on this, have started to put forth some claims against Turkey. As mentioned above, this has prevented a reconciliation to develop between the two countries.

Robert Kocharian has not responded directly to Turkey's proposal. About three years later, advocating for the establishment of normal relations with Turkey, President Sarkisian has stated in June 2008, a few months after coming to power, that "a recommendation is made by Turkey to form an expertise committee which would examine the historic facts of the genocide. We are not against any examination, as examination does not mean to doubt the real facts"⁵ and has opened the way to meetings being held on the Protocols.

After extensive negotiations, the following provision has been included in the Second Protocol:

"the sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations, in which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take part."

The point here that requires attention is that the text is very ambiguous. In particular, neither the genocide, nor the "developments and events of 1915" expressed in 2005 in Prime Minister Erdoğan's letter being mentioned draws attention. An agreement also needs to be reached on which events a scientific examination of the historical records and archives will take place. Rightfully, the Turkish side will want this examination to take place for the 1915 events, because this is the controversial issue.

4 *Review of Armenian Studies* No.7-8, p.133

5 *Review of Armenian Studies*, No. 18. p.8

The Armenian side has remained silent for some time about this issue, but was obliged to take a stance against the heavy criticisms coming especially from the Diaspora, such as the genocide truth being open to discussion and has put forth that not the genocide itself, but the results of genocide will be examined in this sub-commission. What these genocide results are have been identified by Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisyan and Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan: The properties left behind by the relocated Armenians and the compensation to be given to the genocide victims' descendants.⁶ Later on, according to some press reports the restoration of historical monuments in Turkey belonging to Armenians should be considered within this framework. In President Sarkisian's statement of 10 October 2009 mentioned above, this issue has been touched upon by stating that the genocide truth cannot be questioned and the indication that the related sub-commission is not a commission of historians. In other words, since the sub-commission will deal with the returning of properties, compensation and the restoration of historical monuments, it will not be a commission of historians.

It is obvious that these views of the Armenian side in no way accords with Turkey's insistence on the "developments and events of 1915" being examined. It could be observed that Armenian views are not leading to solutions for any of the existing problems, but could also create new ones.

The point which should be emphasized here is that the issue of properties left behind by the relocated Armenians has been resolved with the Treaty of Lausanne and according to this Treaty, compensation is not a part of it. Another point is that it is not possible for Armenia, established in 1918, to represent the Armenians under Ottoman citizenship in 1915.

Historically, since the "1915 events" is the main problem between Turkey and Armenia, it is quite natural for the Sub-commission on the Historical Dimension to address these events. In an interview, Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has expressed that historical facts should be searched based on historical documents, that historical facts and war of propaganda are different notions, until now what is observed was a war of propaganda for political purposes, the sub-commission will take the matter to the right place, in other words research based on historical data will be made and what they want through this commission is to reach a "just memory" and not a one-sided memory. The Minister has also said that he is self-confident and knows the archives.⁷

6 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 33-34, p. 18

7 "Turkey's Davutoğlu Links Armenia Rapprochement with Karabagh", *Al Jazeera*, 27 October 2009.

c. Recognition of the Borders

The article in the First Protocol on the recognition of borders is exactly as follows: *“The Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia) confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law”*

This text is also ambiguous, but logically, it means that the border was recognized in the past and now this recognition is being confirmed. The statement of “relevant treaties of international law” in the text must be referring to the treaties of Moscow and Kars, because no other international treaty exists on this subject. Thus, one could conclude that no problem exists on the mutual recognition of the border between the two countries. On that matter, President Sarkisian’s October 10 statement expressing that *“the issue of the existing border between Armenia and Turkey is to be resolved through prevailing norms of the international law. The Protocols do not go beyond that”*, cannot be understood. This is because this statement does not indicate that the existing border is being recognized, but means that a border dispute exists between Turkey and Armenia which needs to be resolved. We will explain what these words of Sarkisian means when we study below “the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia.”

As can be seen, with President Sarkisian’s 10 October statement, Armenia has made some remarks about the Protocols; as Turkey could in no way accept these remarks, the protocols have lost their significance on the day they were signed.

On the other hand, in a paradoxical manner, Armenians have hoped that Turkey will ratify the Protocols. For instance, President Sarkisian has said that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speech delivered a day after the Protocols were signed addressed the Azerbaijani public opinion.⁸ Erdoğan has expressed in that speech that Turkey will not say “yes” to the occupation of Azeri territories, will not accept injustice done to Azerbaijanis, that their following move will be determined within the framework of the speech he delivered in the Azerbaijan Parliament, and that he finds the opening of the Turkish border a process parallel to the Karabakh conflict developments.⁹

The hostility of the public opinion, Government and Parliament of Azerbaijan towards the Turkish-Armenian Protocols is well known. However, it must not be overlooked that this hostility could also be seen in Turkey most of the time. CHP and MHP in the Turkish Grand National Assembly have strictly opposed the Protocols. In addition, it has frequently been heard that although not openly expressed, some

8 *Aysor.am*, 13 October 2009.

9 “Hükümet: Soykırım En Büyük İftira” (Government: Genocide is the Greatest Accusation), *Radikal*, 11 October 2009.

deputies of the ruling party oppose the Protocols also. In a speech delivered in the Parliamentary group, Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement that "if the problems existing between Azerbaijan and Armenia are resolved, our public will embrace the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations. The ratification of the Protocols by the TGNA will be much easier"¹⁰, has put forth the opposition of the public opinion and some members of the Parliament.

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has expressed that the Protocols will have a positive impact on the stability of the South Caucasus and particularly on the Armenian-Azeri dispute, to end the occupation of the Azeri territories by Armenia and that it will facilitate the ratification process in the parliament, but if there is deterioration of the situation then the members of parliament will have a negative tendency to vote. He has also stated that they want to prepare the political and psychological ground, that some progress in peace talks is needed, because Azerbaijan is a strategic ally, and that this subject is almost a domestic issue in Turkish foreign policy.¹¹

On the other hand, it can be seen that the Protocols are not supported by Turkish public opinion. In January 2010 in Turkey, in response to the question "Do you Support the Armenian Overture?" 63.5% of the subjects have given the answer no.¹² Those who have answered yes made up 20%, while those gave no as an answer constituted 16.5%. As can be seen, the proportion of the no answers is extremely high and is most likely the result of the belief that Azerbaijan will be negatively affected by the "Armenian Overture". The result of this in the political sphere is as mentioned above, the possibility of the TGNA ratifying the Protocols to be little if any.

The situation is rather different in the Armenian polls. The proportion of those in favor of all kinds of contacts with Turkey to increase (approximately 30%) is almost equal to the proportion of those opposing such contacts. In contrast, around 40% have remained indecisive.¹³ In response to the question of whether the Protocols are good or bad for Armenia, those answering "good" have been 36%. In short, Armenian public opinion does not support the Protocols either. The reason for this is the President, government and a majority of the opposition parties in the Parliament expressing that the Protocols will not be linked to any preconditions, that the issue of Turkey-Karabakh cannot be addressed and that "genocide" will not be open to discussion. Despite this, 40% of the people remaining indecisive shows that

10 "Protokol Onayında Karabağ Unutulmaz" (Karabakh Cannot be Forgotten in the Ratification of the Protocols), *Hürriyet*, 14 October 2009.

11 "Turkey's Davutoğlu Links Armenia Rapprochement with Karabagh, Makes Case for Historical Review", *Al Jazeera*, 27 October 2009.

12 "Önce Açıldık, Sonra Çakıldık" (First We Opened, Then We Crashed), A&G Araştırması, *Akşam*, 16 January 2010.

13 "Un Sondage Arménien Montre un Faible Appui Populaire au Rapprochement Avec la Turquie" *Armenews*, 9 April 2010.

Armenian public opinion, compared to Turkish public opinion, can easily change its stance in the future.

In the months following the signing of the Protocols, Armenia's officials constantly reiterating that normalization must be without any preconditions, the Protocols are not related to Karabakh and that "genocide" will not be open to discussion, has jeopardized the future of the Protocols.

During a visit to the US in December 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan has met with Obama to also discuss the issue of the Protocols. On this subject, Obama has stated that he has "congratulated the Prime Minister on some courageous steps that he has taken around the issue of normalization on Turkish-Armenian relations, and encouraged him to continue to move forward along this path".¹⁴ However, based on some news, President Obama has asked the Prime Minister for the TGNA to ratify the Protocols.¹⁵ On the other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan has started pressing representatives in his meeting with President Obama that having more impetus in the Minsk process is going to have a very positive impact on the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia.¹⁶ Thus, Erdoğan has indicated that Turkey draws a link between the Karabakh conflict and the Protocols.

During his visit to Moscow in January 2010, Prime Minister Erdoğan has discussed the issue of the Protocols and has requested from Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev to take on more responsibility in the Karabakh issue. In the meantime, he has also expressed that Turkey-Armenia reconciliation and the Karabakh conflict settlement are interrelated.¹⁷ However, right before their meeting with Erdoğan, Prime Minister Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have touched upon the difficulty of dealing with these two issues together.¹⁸

Despite the support Armenia gained from the US, Russia and the EU that no link should be drawn between the normalization of relations with Turkey and the Karabakh conflict, as Turkey did not change its stance, concerns started to be created among Armenian officials. President Sarkisian has stated that "if Turkey protracts the process of ratification, Armenia, as I have already said, will take without delay corresponding steps envisaged by international law", implying the possibility of

14 "Remarks by U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey after Meeting on December 7", *Asbarez*, 7 December 2009.

15 *Zaman*, 8 December 2009.

16 "Remarks by U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey After Meeting on December 7" *Asbarez*, 7 December 2009.

17 "I Call On Russia to be initiative in Karabagh Issue: Erdogan", *News.am*, 15 January 2010.

18 "Russia Tells Turkey to Drop Karabagh Linkage", *Asbarez*, 13 January 2010; "Rusya'dan Ermenistan Çıkışı", *Sabah*, 14 January 2010.

Armenia to withdraw from the Protocols.¹⁹ On the other hand, Armenian Speaker of the Parliament has said that Armenia won't ratify the Protocols before Turkey does.²⁰ Finally, President Sarkisian has stated that a legislation change will take place which allows the Protocols, if necessary, to be withdrawn from the Parliament without ratification.²¹

Moreover, a new approach of President Sarkisian on the subject of genocide allegations has been observed. In a speech at the Republican Party Congress of which Sarkisian is the leader, he has stated that "the signing of the Armenian-Turkish Protocols and the establishment of relations with Turkey does not mean to abandon or forget the Armenian Genocide. On the contrary through the establishment of relations with Turkey, interaction with the Turkish public it will be possible to expedite the process of recognition in Turkey and all over the world".²² As can be seen, President Sarkisian has expressed that after the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations, the issue of Turkey's recognition of the genocide allegations will continue to be tackled and the Turkish nation could assist them in this process. This approach shows that the embracing of Armenian views by a few intellectuals in Turkey has been overestimated and the Turkish government and public opinion completely rejecting the genocide allegations has been ignored.

Just as during the Soviet period, prime ministers in today's Armenia are concerned mainly with economic issues. Foreign affairs are governed by the president and the foreign minister. Therefore, Tigran Sarkisyan who has almost never talked about Turkey-Armenia relations, perhaps under the effect of the criticisms targeting him in the economic sphere, has given harsh, yet somewhat meaningless replies in response to the questions of a Turkish journalist.²³ I quote some of these replies without making any comments:

"If the TGNA submits a statement entailing the Karabakh pre-condition or another during the ratification process of the Protocols (?) this will mean that the agreement between the two sides will become ineffective, the Protocols will become null and void, we'll retreat to the beginning"; "Turkey's intervention will not support, but will hinder the Karabakh conflict"; "Despite this reality (in relation to Karabakh not existing in the Protocols), if Turkey still puts forth pre-conditions, Armenia will have the freedom to do the same. What I mean is as the Armenian side, setting the

19 "Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at 12th Convention of Republican Party" Noyan Tapan, 30 November 2009.

20 "Armenia Won't Ratify Protocols Before Turkey Says Speaker", *Asbarez*, 24 December 2009.

21 "Sargsyan About Obama's Efforts", *Largir.am*, 10 December 2009.

22 "Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at 12th Convention of Republican Party" Noyan Tapan, 30 November 2010.

23 "TBMM, Karabağ Önkoşulu Sunarsa Süreç Başa Döner" (If the TGNA Puts Forth the Karabakh Precondition the Process will Return to the Beginning), Cansu Çamlıbel, *Hürriyet*, 18 December 2009.

genocide and opening of the border as pre-conditions for negotiations”; “Today, the Armenians in Turkey should have been at least a few million”; “According to this, it is much more important for the people (Turkish nation) to surrender the truth, sooner or later the government will follow. The Turkish nation must overcome their psychological complexes, this is the only way they could become an EU member.”

II - THE ARMENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION OF 12 JANUARY 2010

According to Article 100 of Armenia’s Constitution, the Constitutional Court shall, prior to the ratification of international treaties, determine the compliance of the commitments stipulated therein with the Constitution. The Protocols signed on 10 October 2009 have been submitted by President Sarkisian to the Constitutional Court on 19 November.²⁴

With a decision dated 12 January 2010, the Constitutional Court has found the Protocols to be in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia.

On 18 January, the Constitutional Court has made public the legal grounds for this decision. Upon examining this eight-page text, it could be seen that through interpretations, some articles of the Protocols have been restricted and some pre-conditions have been set.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey has made the following statement:²⁵

“No: 14, 18 January 2010, Press Release Regarding the Recently Published Grounds of the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court on the Protocols between Turkey and Armenia

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia has declared its decision of constitutional conformity on the Protocols between Turkey and Armenia signed on 10 October 2009 with a short statement on 12 January 2010. The Constitutional Court has recently published its grounds of decision. It has been observed that this decision contains preconditions and restrictive provisions which impair the letter and spirit of the Protocols.

24 “Armenia Submits Protocols to Constitutional Court: What Next?” The California Courier Online, 26 November 2009.

25 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-14_-18-january-2010_-press-release-regarding-the-recently-published-grounds-of-the-decision-of-the-armenian-constitutional-court-on-the-Protocols-between-turkey-and-armenia.en.mfa

The said decision undermines the very reason for negotiating these Protocols as well as their fundamental objective. This approach cannot be accepted on our part.

Turkey, in line with its accustomed allegiance to its international commitments, maintains its adherence to the primary provisions of these Protocols.

We expect the same allegiance from the Armenian Government.”

As can be seen, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has put forth that the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court entails preconditions contradicting the content and spirit of the Protocols along with restricting some its provisions, therefore the main purpose of the Protocols is impaired and this approach is unacceptable.

Before studying the content of the Constitutional Court’s Decision, let us try to explain why such a decision has been taken which has changed the essence of the Protocols. During the preparation of the Protocols, a full agreement has not been reached on some issues, but due to the desire to conclude the Protocols as soon as possible, some articles have been written down ambiguously; in other words, what they mean have been open to interpretations. The Decision of the Constitutional Court has put forth this explanation for the Armenian side. According to Article 102 of the Armenian Constitution, the decisions and constitutions of the Constitutional Court are final. This puts the Decision of the Constitutional Court at a much higher level than the Protocols. For Armenia, implementing the Protocols in conformity with the Decision of the Constitutional Court is compulsory by law.

Rather than indicating the conformity of the Protocols with the Constitution with a short text, why had the Constitutional Court adopted a long text entailing some interpretations and restrictions? There are two reasons for this. Firstly, as mentioned above, it was to make legal the Armenian views on some ambiguous articles. Secondly, it was to eliminate the objections raised towards the Protocols within the Armenian public opinion and the Diaspora through the Decision of the Constitutional Court. They must have thought that this way, the Protocols would be ratified in the Armenian Parliament without many objections.

Regarding the content of the Decision of the Constitutional Court, the following main points draw attention:

a. Referring to Article 11 of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia of 1990 which is part of the Armenian Constitution, it states that the provisions of the Protocols cannot be interpreted or applied in a way that would contradict the

provisions of this Declaration. Article 11 states the following: “the Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.”

(Since the genocide allegations are considered to be true in this text, discussing whether the 1915 events are genocide or not by the Sub-commission on the Historical Dimension mentioned in the Second Protocol will not be in conformity with the Constitution. Therefore, the question comes to mind of what the function of this Sub-commission will be. The answer would be for this sub-commission to discuss issues such as the returning of Armenian properties left behind by relocated Armenians, compensation payment to Armenian descendants, and the conservation of Armenian monuments, like churches, in Turkey. In the meantime, we should mention that Turkey does not have to address these issues which have already been settled with the Treaty of Lausanne.

b. Western Armenia mentioned in Article 11 stated above refers to Eastern Anatolia. This way, by implying that some areas of Turkish territory belongs to Armenia, an indirect claim is put forth over these territories. In other words, the Armenian Declaration of Independence does not recognize the border between the two countries.

However, in the First Protocol, the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the “relevant treaties of international law” has been confirmed. In this situation, a divergence exists between this provision in the First Protocol and the Declaration of Independence.

Without touching upon this divergence at all, the Decision of the Constitutional Court states, in summary, that the commitment upon the opening of the common border is related to the willingness of Armenia to resolve legal-organizational and institutional issues connected to safeguarding the normal operation of border checkpoints. In other words, the common border has been recognized for the operation of border checkpoints. From this, one can conclude that this recognition is only for operational purposes and does not mean that Turkey’s territorial integrity is being recognized. In other words, at the right time in the future, Armenia could claim territory from Turkey by putting forth that they have historic rights.

As known, the border between the two countries has been determined with the Treaty of Kars dated 13 October 1921. This treaty has not been mentioned in the Decision of the Constitutional Court; on the other hand, it has been stated in the Decision that international treaties can have legal effect for Armenia only if they are in line with the provisions of Article 6 of the Constitution; in other words, could

be considered valid. On the other hand, Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution states that International treaties that have been “ratified” are a constituent part of the legal system of Armenia. Just like all the treaties concluded during the period of the Soviet Union, the Treaty of Kars had not been ratified by the Armenian Assembly, because this ratification was the task of the Soviet Union parliament.

Is the Treaty of Kars, although not ratified by the Armenian Parliament, valid today? The answer to this question is positive.

The Treaty of Kars is valid for the following reasons:

- *In a statement issued on 21 December 1991 at Almaty by Azerbaijan, Armenia, White Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine which had disintegrated from the Soviet Union, it was declared that these states would “fulfill their responsibilities arising from the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union.”*

- *Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties affirm that a succession of states does not affect a boundary established by a treaty or the obligations and rights established by a treaty concerning boundaries.*

- *Article 62/a of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties foresees that a fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty if the treaty establishes a boundary.*

- *The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations also states that fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty if the treaty establishes a boundary.*

- *From 1991 when Armenia has declared its independence until now, Armenia has not made any statement indicating that the Treaty of Kars is invalid.*

- *On the contrary, although seldom, there are statements by Armenian statesmen that the Treaty of Kars is valid. The last of these statements belongs to Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan. In an interview given in 2006 to a newspaper²⁶, Oskanyan has stated that “We, as the Republic of*

26 The interviewer is Leyla Tavşanoğlu, *Cumhuriyet*, 10 December 2006.

Armenia, have never acted as not recognizing the Treaty of Kars, nor have we replaced the Treaty with another. As a part of the Soviet Union, we have always indicated that we are the descendants of all international treaties concluded during the Soviet period.”

For the reasons mentioned above, there is no doubt that the Treaty of Kars is still valid based on international law.

For whether or not this situation contradicts Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution, the following could be said. Just as the entire Constitution, this Article is also valid for the period after 1995 when the Constitution had first come into force. In other words, the Armenian Constitution cannot be applied to the Treaty of Kars signed in 1921.

Although this is the situation from the aspect of international law, it can be seen in the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court that the Treaty of Kars has been rendered invalid without its name being mentioned and the border between the two countries has only been recognized for the operation of check-points. The decision of the Constitutional Court is definite and binds all Armenian citizens. In opposite, it does not bind Turkey, the Turks, nor any foreign countries and people. However, since this decision forms a legal basis for Armenia to demand territory from Turkey, Turkey's ratification and implementation of the Protocols is not in conformity with its interests as long as this decision exists.

c. On the other hand, it is stated in the Decision of the Constitutional Court that the mutual obligations in the Protocols are exclusively of a bilateral interstate nature and cannot concern any third party or the relations with such third party. This way, it has been indicated that the Protocols cannot be related to the Karabakh conflict in any way. There is no direct mentioning of Karabakh in the Protocols. However, the points in the Second Protocol “to cooperate for enhancing regional stability and security and the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes and conflicts on the basis of the norms and principles of international law” concerns the Karabakh issue indirectly. But, the Constitutional Court has not touched upon these subjects at all. On the contrary, as mentioned above, President Sarkisian has not found the provision of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders mentioned in the Protocols to be related to the Karabakh conflict in any way.

According to the Decision of the Constitutional Court, there are two main points in the Protocols which have to be put into practice. The first is the opening of the border; the second is the establishment of diplomatic relations. The other provisions in the Protocols could only create legal results when the border is opened and diplomatic relations are established. Indirectly, this means that without

the border opening and diplomatic relations being established, the cooperation mentioned in the Second Protocol will not take place.

Following these ideas which we have attempted to summarize, the Decision of the Court has stated that the obligations stipulated by both Protocols have been found to be in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia.

As will be explained below, upon the objections of Turkey, some countries have conveyed ideas that what is important is that the Constitutional Court has found the Protocols to be in conformity with the Constitution and that the other points in the decision does not change this conformity. However, upon reading carefully the text, it can be seen that the Decision has been taken “based on the outcome of the examination of the case and taking into account the legal positions set forth in the Decision”. In other words, the Protocols have been found to be in conformity with the Constitution on the condition that the observations stated in the Decision concerning the Karabakh issue, genocide allegations, recognition of the border and some other minor points are taken into consideration. In short, according to this Decision, the two countries cannot address the Karabakh conflict within the framework of implementing the Protocols. Moreover, the Armenian Government will not be able to discuss the genocide allegations with Turkey. The mutual recognition of the border between the two countries will not mean that Turkey’s territorial integrity is recognized etc.

In conclusion, it can be seen that with the Decision of the Constitutional Court, Armenia has tried to change the Protocols and in particular, has almost eradicated the two most important issues for Turkey (genocide allegations and recognition of the border) and has aimed at transforming the Protocols into an instrument for the establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of the border. This way, the Protocols have lost their balance i.e. to be useful instruments for both countries. On the other hand, we can observe that there has been a retreat to the very beginning of the Turkey-Armenia normalization process, to the situation before the signing of the Protocols; in other words, to “point zero”.

The reactions in Turkey towards the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court could be summarized in the following way. At the top of the reactions is the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose full text has been given above. The Foreign Ministry has observed that the Constitutional Court Decision contains preconditions and restrictive provisions which impair the letter and spirit of the Protocols and has also expressed that the decision undermines the very reason for negotiating the Protocols as well as their fundamental objectives, and has stated that this approach cannot be accepted. The statements clearly shows that the normalization process of Turkey-Armenia relations cannot continue if no

amendments are made on the Court Decision or if it is not rendered ineffective in a way the normalization process of Turkish- Armenian relations could not be continued.

On this matter, Prime Minister Erdoğan has expressed his reaction by stating that Armenia has attempted to perform an operation on the text of the Protocols already signed, that if this is not corrected then the process will be hindered, and that Armenia-Azerbaijan relations cannot be alienated from this process.²⁷

After explaining to Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan the points of the Decision of the Constitutional Court which contradict the Protocols, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has expressed that a new situation has arisen, that the Court's Decision has wanted the status quo to be maintained and that whether or not this will be accepted depends on the political will of the Armenian Government.²⁸ In response, in a press conference, Nalbandyan has accused Turkey and stated that “if Turkey does not ratify the Protocols and continues to use an ultimatum language, sets preconditions and keeps coming up with obstacles to the process, the negotiations will remain inconclusive.”²⁹

According to the news in the media, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will prepare a legal document on the new situation created by the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court and send it to Switzerland, which acted as the mediator during the negotiations, along with Minsk Group members of the U.S., Russia, and France.³⁰ The purpose of this initiative is to obtain a written legal guarantee from Yerevan that no amendments have been made on the Protocols and that the process continues as it is.³¹ The following events showed that Yerevan has not given any guarantee.

Among other initiatives concerning this matter, we can mention the phone call of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressing that Armenia needs serious advice on their “loyalty” (loyalty to their signature). The same message was also conveyed to Swiss authorities.³²

In a written statement, the U.S. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Philip Gordon

27 “Ermenistan Operasyon Yapmaya Kalkışıyor” (Armenia is Attempting to Make an Operation), *Hürriyet*, 21 January 2010.

28 “Ermenistan Operasyon Yapmaya Kalkışıyor” (Armenia is Attempting to Make an Operation), *Hürriyet*, 21 January 2010.

29 “Nalbantyan: Türkiye Süreci Baltalıyor” (Nalbandyan: Turkey is Paralyzing the Process), *Milliyet*, 23 January 2010.

30 “Türkiye Şikâyet Notu Hazırlıyor” (Turkey is Preparing a Complaint Note), *Haber Türk*, 21 January 2010.

31 “Türkiye Ermenistan’da Hukuki Garanti İstiyor” (Turkey Wants Legal Guarantee in Armenia), *Zaman*, 27 January 2010.

32 “Ermenistan’la Krizde ABD Devrede” (US in the Crisis with Armenia), *Radikal*, 23 January 2010.

has expressed his government's stance on the crisis developed as a result of the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court as follows: "The Court decision permits the Protocols, as they were negotiated and signed, to move forward parliamentary ratification, and does not appear to limit or to qualify them. We are confident that both Turkey and Armenia take their commitment to the Protocols seriously, and we urge timely ratification of the Protocols by both countries".³³ Therefore, a divergence of views has developed between the U.S. and Turkey regarding the Protocols. In response to a question on this subject, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has said that only the "continuation" of the process is important for the U.S., while the "successful continuation" of the process is important for Turkey.³⁴

On the same day, in response to a question on this subject, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has expressed that they support the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement process, that they are against linking this to other processes (like Karabakh), that the parties should abide by the agreements taken previously, and that Russia is trying to help as much as possible, but that the settlement of this issue is directly linked to Turkey and Armenia.³⁵

On the other hand, Switzerland which took on an important role as mediator for the Protocols, has not wanted to interfere in the crisis arising from the Constitutional Court's Decision. An official of the Foreign Ministry had expressed that they are looking forward to the ratification of the Protocols, but have declined making any comments on the issue.³⁶

The Decision of the Constitutional Court has been welcomed in Armenia. Dashnaks who had shown great efforts for the rejection of the Protocols, has now supported their ratification by putting forth reservations based on the Court Decision.³⁷ However, it has been realized that to do so, a law amendment is necessary. On the other hand, since such ratification will amend the Protocols, it will most probably not be accepted by Turkey and this will lead to allegations that Turkey is rejecting the Protocols.

The Decision of the Constitutional Court has also been criticized by the opposition parties in Turkey and has created an occasion for them to reiterate their stance concerning the Protocols. The leader of CHP Deniz Baykal has commented that the Protocols have lost their validity and the AKP's overture in foreign affairs

33 "U.S. Praises Armenian Court Ruling on Turkey", *RFE/RL*, 22 January 2010.

34 "Eleştirileceğiz Diye Tutum Değiştiremeyiz" (We Will Not Change Stances Because We Will be Criticized), *Zaman*, 30 January 2010.

35 "Russia's Only Link is Participation in Protocols' Signing Ceremony: Lavrov", *News.am*, 22 January 2010.

36 "Switzerland Didn't Confirm Turkish Disinformation", *Tert.am*, 26 January 2010.

37 "Dashnaks Slam U.S. Praise of Armenian Ruling on Turkey", *RFE/RL*, 25 January 2010.

performed as a show has been a fiasco. On the other hand, the leader of MHP, Devlet Bahçeli has stated that with this Decision, Armenia's stance contradictory to international law and their hostile approach towards Turkey has once again been emphasized and that in this situation, the government must withdraw the Protocols from the TGNA, must declare that these documents are invalid and apologize from the Turkish nation.³⁸

At the end of January, a meeting held in London for Afghanistan has enabled Ahmet Davutoğlu to meet with Hillary Clinton and Edward Nalbandyan to discuss the Protocols. While Hillary Clinton has made no comment, Nalbandyan has defended that the Decision of the Constitutional Court is not in contradiction to the Protocols and it is understood that Armenia has no intention to provide any guarantee that with the Court Decision, no amendments have been made to the Protocols.³⁹

Meanwhile, Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioğlu, the Foreign Minister Deputy Undersecretary, was charged to convey Turkey's views on the Court Decision, especially its legal aspects, to Switzerland and the U.S., both countries having played a significant role in the signing of the Protocols. No explanation has been given on Sinirlioğlu's visits to these countries; based on news from the media one can say that Ankara has requested a written text or a strong declaration at the high-level to eliminate the concerns caused by the Court Decision.⁴⁰ However, as Armenia has insisted on its stance, the initiatives that could be undertaken by the U.S. and Switzerland on the continuation of the normalization process of Turkey-Armenia relations has practically no chance to be accepted by Armenia.

III – INITIATIVES TO PRESSURE TURKEY

As already known, the process of preparing and signing of the Protocols to establish normal relations with Turkey and initiate cooperation had caused President Sarkisian to face criticisms within the Diaspora, Armenia and even within the Republican Party which he is the leader. President Sarkisian has responded to these criticisms by some speeches and especially has dwelled upon the recognition of the border with Turkey and the establishment of a Sub-commission on the Historical Dimension. The Constitutional Court's 12 January decision has been a legal answer

38 "Ermenistan Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin Kararı ile Protokol geçerliğini yitirdi" (the Protocol Lost its Validity with the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court), *Haber-Türk*, 21 January 2010.

39 "Washington Ankara'nın Protokol Endişesine Mesafeli" (Washington Keeps its Distance from Ankara's Concern over the Protocols), *Zaman*, 29 January 2010; "Ermenistan'la Ipler Londra'da Gerildi" (Tensions with Armenia in London), *Hürriyet*, 29 January 2010.

40 "Türkiye Ermenistan'dan Güvence Verilmesinde Israrlı" (Turkey is Persistent on Armenia Giving Guarantee), Ankara News Agency, 11 March 2010.

to these criticisms by not recognizing in a definite manner the existing border and making the Sub-commission on the Historical Dimension nonfunctional.

The third criticism has been Turkey linking the ratification of the Protocols to the Karabakh conflict. Despite Armenia expressing that the Karabakh issue is not mentioned in the Protocols, that no link exists between the establishment of normal relations and the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, and although Armenia being supported by the U.S., Russia and the EU, Turkey has not changed its stance on that subject. Armenia has resorted to some pressure in order for Turkey to change its policy or at least to adopt a more flexible position.

President Sarkisian has tried to achieve this by making some statements. On the other hand, conscious that Turkey is very sensitive to the genocide allegations, he has worked with the Diaspora so that the parliaments of some countries adopt resolutions which recognize the genocide allegations. It is interesting that Armenians have tried to change Turkey's stance on the Karabakh issue, rather than its positions on recognition of the existing borders and the sub-commission on the Historical Dimension. Armenia's direct or indirect initiatives to apply pressure over Turkey could be summarized as follows.

1. Some Statements of President Sarkisian

After the reactions in Turkey towards the Decision of the Constitutional Court, President Sarkisian has attempted at every chance to defend its views on the Protocols and even though with a moderate language, has started to criticize Turkey. A few examples are given below.

a. The Message Sent to President Gül While Passing Through the Turkish Airspace

While passing through the Turkish Airspace to make an official visit to England, in a message sent to President Gül and at the same time given to the media, President Sarkisian has touched upon Turkey-Armenia relations and has expressed the following: "A situation when words are not supported by deeds gives rise to mistrust and skepticism, providing ample opportunities to counteract for those, who oppose the process, time is working not for but against the process".⁴¹ Here, the statement of "a situation when words are not supported by deeds" could be taken as a criticism towards Turkey for bringing the Karabakh conflict on the agenda despite

41 "Serzh Sargsyan: when Words and Deeds Are At Variance, Mistrust Emerges", *PanArmenian.Net*, 9 February 2010.

it not existing in the Protocols and “those who oppose the process” could be understood as Azerbaijan. In his response to this message, President Gül has expressed that he agrees with the idea of standing behind words and supporting words with deeds. Moreover, by stating that “concluding this historic process will require honoring our commitments in their entirety as well as displaying adequate political courage and vision”, he has invited Sarkisian who seemed as surrendering to the pressures of the public opinion, in particular the Dashnaks, to act more courageously.⁴²

On this occasion we would like to note that a President passing through the airspace of a foreign country sending a short courtesy message to the President of that country is customary. However, discussing in a courtesy message the existing problems is very unusual.

b. The Chatham House Speech

In the speech⁴³ delivered at Chatham House on 11 February 2010 during his visit to England, President Sarkisian has stated that the time of closed borders and ultimatums has passed, Armenia is committed to the process of normalizing relations with Turkey, the Armenian Parliament will not fail to ratify the Protocols in case Turkey does, he is going to instruct his staff to submit the Protocols to the Armenian National Assembly as soon as he returns to Armenia, that the Armenian Parliament will ratify the Protocols in case Turkey ratifies them without preconditions, if, as many suspect, it is proven that Turkey’s goal is to protract rather than normalize relations, they will have to discontinue the process, everyone knows that Turkey has put forth preconditions for the settlement of Karabakh and attempts to link these two processes will undermine both the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations and the talks on the Karabakh issue, a rapid normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations will positively stimulate and set an example for the settlement of Karabakh, and that he is going to invite President Aliiev to the potential opening ceremony of the Armenia-Turkish border. At this point, we should note that inviting President Aliiev to the opening ceremony of the Turkish-Armenian border when the Karabakh issue has not been settled yet will most likely be interpreted as an insult by the Azerbaijani President.

In our opinion, the most important part of President Sarkisian’s speech is his statement that they will have to discontinue the normalization process if necessary. Although at first sight this seems as a bluff, it could be seen that the President has

42 <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/pages/president/Speechesw/archive/?id=4060>

43 http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/news/inthenews/20100210_president.eng.pdf

been under the influence of the requests from the Diaspora and Armenian national movements to abandon the Protocols. Eventually, as will be explained later on, he has taken the decision to freeze (or suspend) the Protocols.

An important step taken towards temporarily or permanently abandoning the Protocols when deemed necessary has been to amend the related law on 23 February 2010, allowing for the suspension or termination of agreements signed before their entry into force.⁴⁴ This way, Armenia will have responded to Turkey keeping the Protocols for a long time at the TGNA without ratifying them. In other words, as long as Turkey sustains the Protocols in its Parliament, Armenia will not have to do the same.

There is no doubt that this approach of Armenia is an escalation. Armenia has strongly started to convey the message that if Turkey does not ratify the Protocols soon, then Armenia will withdraw from them. In fact, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been compelled to state that Washington supports the quick and unconditional ratification of the Protocols.⁴⁵ The well known English weekly “The Economist” has written that Turkey has been isolated, that her most important ally the U.S. is on Armenia’s side and that Russia does not support Turkish-Armenian relations being linked to the Karabakh conflict.⁴⁶

During a visit to Kiev for the oath-taking ceremony of the President of Ukraine, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has met with President Sarkisian for about an hour and discussed the relations of the two countries,⁴⁷ but it has been understood that there has been no change in the stances of both sides. In this meeting being described as “tense” by a source,⁴⁸ President Sarkisian has emphasized the following points according to his press bureau: “The Present process has to be brought to its end in shortest time; otherwise Armenia will have to withdraw its signature from the Protocols. Turkey can by no means be involved in the Karabakh process as it is rendering military assistance to one of the conflicting parties. Nothing prevents Turkey even before the Protocols have been ratified from opening the border”.⁴⁹ Especially this last point shows that the opening of the border has become a kind of obsession for the Armenian side. Although no explanation has been given, it could be seen that Ahmet Davutoğlu has explained to the Armenian President once again why the normalization process has been linked to the Karabakh conflict.

44 “Armenian Parliament Ratifies Law on Nullifying International Treaties”, *Asbarez*, 24 February 2019.

45 “Armenia Again Threatens to Scarp Turkey Accord”, *RFE/RL*, 26 February 2010.

46 “Zero Progress”, *The Economist*, 18 February 2010.

47 “Ankara Erivan Protokollere Bağlı...” (Ankara Yerevan is Dependent on the Protocols...), *Cnn Türk*, 25 February 2019.

48 “Armenia Again Threatens to Scarp Turkey Accord”, *RFE/RL*, 26 February 2010.

49 “Sezh Sargsyan: Turkey Must Be The First To Make Steps”, *News.am*, 25 February 2010.

c. The Deir ez Zor Speech

President Sarkisian has made an official visit to Syria towards the end of March and has also travelled to Deir ez Zor.

Deir ez Zor (shortened is Zor) is at an air distance of 100 km. to the Iranian border, 400 km. to Damascus and 200 km. to Mardin. During the Ottoman Empire, Zor was a “sanjak” an independent district. Its small population was mainly comprised of nomadic Arab tribes. It was an arid area, but with the Euphrates River passing through it, if the necessary investment was made, it could have turned into a granary. In 1915, the Ottoman Government had decided to relocate the Armenians in this area. When the genocide allegations had first been put forth, Zor was not mentioned very much. Later on and from the 1990’s onwards, a slogan was created expressing in short that “they expelled the Armenians to the deserts to annihilate them” and this small town and the surrounding area become one of the symbols of the genocide allegations.

It could be seen that the main purpose of President Sarkisian to travel to Zor, which is quite far from Damascus, was to deliver a speech here and criticize Turkey. Dedicating a large part of his speech to the genocide allegations is almost a kind of message sent to Turkey insulating that if the Protocols are not ratified as soon as possible, the genocide allegations will continue to increase.

In his speech, besides the usual genocide discourse, Sarkisian has also touched upon the Protocols⁵⁰ and has expressed that in spite of all that happened, they are ready to establish normal diplomatic relations with “modern” Turkey, to have open borders and economic relations, and to make efforts towards building confidence between the two peoples. Then, he has stated that they do not accept references to Turkish-Armenian dialogue in attempts to avoid the recognition of the Armenian genocide, that it is irrelevant to cite some Commission of Historians since the Turkish-Armenian Protocols provide for merely a governmental sub-commission on the historical dimension, and that he assumes everyone understands what it means and what the difference is. As can be seen, not only is the Armenian President attempting to create an incomprehensible difference between the historical dimension of the relations of the two countries and history or historical events, but also expects this to be understood by everyone.

50 “Serzh Sargssyan: Deir Ez Zor is the Auschwitz of the Armenians”, *Armradio.am*, 24 March 2010.

d. Commemorative Speech for President Wilson at the Washington Cathedral

As will be further explained below, during his visit to Washington to meet President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan, President Sarkisian has visited on 12 April the graveyard of the former U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, (1856-1924) who had drawn the map of the territories to be given to Armenia in the Treaty of Sevres, and later has delivered a speech at the Armenian Cathedral in this city to pay tribute to Wilson.⁵¹

By granting Armenia large territories of Eastern Anatolia where the Armenians were a minority constituting only 18 % of the total population and some parts of the Black Sea shore, President Wilson is a person still arousing negative connotations within the Turkish public opinion. On the contrary, within Armenia and the Diaspora, he is considered as a kind of a hero along with the U.S. Ambassador to Istanbul Henry Morgenthau. On the other hand, visiting of Wilson's graveyard by Armenian presidents travelling to Washington is not merely out of formality. Therefore, there must be a special purpose for President Sarkisian's visit. This purpose could be to satisfy Diaspora Armenians by making a gesture which at the same time would not please Turkey.

In his speech in the Cathedral, Sarkisian has referred to Wilson as the person who revived the dream of lost homeland (Eastern Anatolia) and articulated the demand for the international recognition of the Armenian genocide.

President Sarkisian has stated that when the Protocols were signed, some people expressed concern that it would slow down or temporarily freeze the initiatives for the international recognition of the genocide allegations, but it proved out that those concerns were groundless. With this, he has referred to the draft resolution of H.Res.252 of the House of Representatives, the resolution of the Swedish Parliament recognizing the Armenian genocide, and similar initiatives which will shortly be explained below. In short, while Sarkisian has tried to implement the Protocols on the one hand, on the other he has indirectly expressed that they are working towards the recognition of the genocide allegations by some countries' parliaments.

President Sarkisian has also expressed that during the last few months, Turkey has tried to drive a wedge between the Motherland (Armenia) and Diaspora and to create an impression that Armenia and Diaspora have two different views, but that there is no divergence of opinions between the Motherland and the Diaspora, that there is one United Armenian nation and it stands for its just cause.

51 "Remarks by Serzh Sargsyan at the Washington Cathedral in Tribute to President Woodrow Wilson", 12 April 2010; <http://www.president.am/events/statements/eng/?id=59>

After expressing that they are ready and willing to have normal relations with all their neighbors, but that they will not abide by imposed settlement and diktat, the Armenian President has stated that he has met with Prime Minister Erdoğan that morning and that their position has been very clear: Turkey cannot talk to Armenia and the Armenians around the globe in the language of preconditions. They will not tolerate it. They will not subject the veracity of the genocide to scrutiny in any format, and they do not believe that Turkey can play any positive role in the process of negotiations on the Karabakh conflict settlement.

These words which mean that all of Turkey's requests have been rejected, shows at the same time that the Armenian President has abandoned the Protocols. In fact, as will be explained below, ten days later Armenia has officially declared that the ratification process of the Protocols have been suspended.

Another event which is worth mentioning here on President Woodrow Wilson is the decision of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars to present the Woodrow Wilson Award for Public Service to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.⁵² The Diaspora media had published articles which were highly critical of the Center's decision.

It has been observed that within the period under examination, President Sarkisian has been careful in explaining Armenia's stance towards the Protocols in the interviews given to foreign journals and news agencies. We do not have enough space to separately touch upon these, but in essence, we can say that Sarkisian has put forth the same views expressed above. The most important of these interviews can be found in the footnote.⁵³

In summary, the main purpose of President Sarkisian's speeches mentioned above and the interviews given is to make Turkey feel that the genocide allegations could increase further and thus, for her to change its stance towards the Karabakh conflict, or at least to adopt a more flexible approach. Its second purpose is to dismiss the criticisms targeted at him in Armenia and the Diaspora for the Protocols being prepared and signed. He has not been able to change Turkey's stance, but has earned appreciation in Armenia and the Diaspora.

52 "Davutoğlu To Be honored With Woodrow Wilson Award", *Tert.am*, 25 March 2010.

53 "President Serzh Sarsyan Responds to Questions Raised By Journalists", 12 October 2009, <http://www.president.am/events/press/eng/?year=2009&id=39>; "Interview of the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan to Al Jazeera News Network", 12 February 2010, <http://www.president.am/events/press/eng/?id=39>; "President Serzh Sargsyan's Interview with Le Figaro", 11 March 2010, <http://www.president.am/events/press/eng/?id=44>; "President Serzh Sargsyan's Exclusive Interview to Eornews", 20 March 2010, <http://www.president.am/events/press/eng/?id=45>; "Interview of the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan to the German Der Spiegel Weekly", 5 April 2010, <http://www.president.am/events/press/eng/?id=47>

2. Talks on the Draft Resolution on the Armenian Genocide in the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs

With the concern that the U.S. will set an example for other countries, Turkey is quite sensitive towards the genocide allegations coming from this superpower. As expected, the first attempt to pressure Turkey to change its stance on ratifying the Protocols has emanated from the U.S.

The draft resolutions foreseeing the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations within the American Congress has a long history. We had provided detailed information on these draft resolutions in our previous journals. We should note here that a draft resolution relating to this subject has been submitted to each of the legislative periods (House is renewed once every two years) approximately for the last ten years. These drafts have been prevented by the U.S. governments who have taken into consideration Turkey's strong oppositions. However, this has not been easy at all and sometimes, the interventions of the U.S. presidents have become necessary.

Lastly, a few months after the House of Representatives election taking place in November 2008, an Armenian genocide draft resolution had been submitted to the Assembly on 17 March 2009.⁵⁴ This draft was the same as the one submitted in the previous term. We will not provide information here on this draft which has previously been examined in depth and whose inaccuracies have been revealed⁵⁵ in our journal.

The same draft resolution has been submitted to the Senate on 21 October 2009 by Senator Robert Menendez who is well known for protecting Armenian interests. At the end of June 2010, only 16 senators have become cosponsors for this draft resolution. The absolute majority in the Senate is 51.

This draft has been pending in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for almost a year. Since the Chairman of the Committee elected from California Howard Berman openly and without any reserve supports Armenians views, it has been understood that the purpose of this pending has been to wait for an opportune moment for voting. As a matter of fact, after the decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court just at a time when Turkey-Armenia relations have become tense, Berman, most likely upon the request of Californian Armenians, has stated that the draft resolution will be put up for voting on March 4,⁵⁶ It could be said that

54 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 32, p.26-28

55 Kemal Çiçek, "Ermeni Yasa Tasarısının İçeriği ve İddialara verilen cevaplar" (Content of the Armenian Draft Resolution and the Responses Given to the Allegations), *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 23-24, pp. 103-118.

56 "Genocide' Bill To Test US-Turk Ties", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 9 February 2010.

the U.S. State Department also has a share on this because while the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court was highly criticized by Turkey, State Department officials had adopted the Armenian view which expresses that the Constitutional Court Decision does not constitute an obstacle to the ratification of the Protocols by the parliaments of both countries. Upon Turkey insisting on their own view, voting for the draft resolution has been brought to the agenda. The message tried to be conveyed is very clear: Unless Turkey ratifies and implements the Protocols, this draft resolution will be adopted by the House of Representatives.

However, past events show that Turkey has not surrendered to these pressures and has even counteracted in some way. If the House of Representatives had adopted the draft resolution, in return, Turkey would have most likely withdrawn the Protocols from the TGNA. Furthermore, the denouncing of the Protocols could have even been possible. On the other hand, since the US wants to cooperate with Turkey relating to the problems of Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan and most importantly the missile defense project, if the draft resolution is adopted, it would be possible for this cooperation to partly or entirely come to an end. This situation is not to the advantage of the U.S., Armenia and to a lesser degree Turkey, because not only could the adoption of the draft resolution by the House of Representatives delay the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations for many years, but will also create new problems between Turkey and its great ally U.S. for practically no valid reason. Moreover, it will also increase anti-Americanism which already exists in Turkey.

There are two reasons for why the U.S. State Department has not intervened in the voting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The first is to intimidate Turkey for not listening to the U.S.'s suggestions on the Protocols, but in order to prevent the dangerous situation mentioned above, everything will be done to prevent a voting in the full House. The second reason is to satisfy, even partially, the US Armenians who have adopted a negative stance towards President Obama who had not kept his promise of recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations after being elected, despite stating that he would recognize it during his election campaign.

Based on the experiences of previous years, it was thought that the so-called draft resolution would be easily adopted in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. However, despite the Chairman of the Committee Howard Berman talking in favor of the draft, granting an extensive time limit for the voting and even leaving his seat to search for members in the corridors who would vote in favor of the draft, the draft resolution had been adopted with 23 votes against 22 with only one vote difference.

This incident has turned into a crisis between Turkey and the U.S. The Turkish Ambassador to Washington Namık Tan who had just been taking his post a few

days earlier was recalled to Ankara. Prime Minister Erdoğan issued harsh statements. Issues like the cancelling of tenders in relations with the U.S., the discussing of the future of the Incirlik base and withdrawing of Turkish troops from Afghanistan have begun to be discussed in the media.⁵⁷ Due to limited space, we will no focus on the adoption of H.Res.252 by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but we will concentrate on a new situation arising from the voting of this draft resolution.

Despite the draft resolution being adopted with one vote difference, it could be seen that in fact, a kind of equality of votes exist, because the American Samoa representative voting in favor of the draft has no right to vote in the House of Representatives according to the status of Samoa and could only vote in committees. This situation shows that for the first time, the possibility of rejecting a draft resolution entailing Armenian genocide allegations exists in the House of Representatives. Therefore, although the approval of the draft resolution has been a success for the Armenians, it could also indicate that a period of defeat has started for the Armenian resolutions for the future.

The next step is for the draft resolution to be discussed and put up for voting in the House. When this will take place depends on Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. Just as Berman, Pelosi has been elected from California and also defends Armenian views. It could be understood that at a time when the chance of adopting the draft resolution is at its highest, she will put the draft on the agenda of the House for voting.

The best way to find out the possibility of these types of draft resolutions being adopted is to look at how many co-sponsors exist. About a year ago on March 17, 2009, when the draft was submitted to the House, the co-sponsors had exceeded a hundred in a very short time, but then had remained at around 130. On the day the draft resolution was put up for voting, this number was 137 (On the last day of June when this article was written, this number has reached 143). Since the absolute majority is 218 in the House of Representatives, at least 76 more cosponsors are needed for the adoption of this draft resolution and to obtain this is not easy. If a majority of the members of the House of Representatives believes that this draft resolution will not significantly harm Turkish-American relations, then the chance of the adoption of the draft will increase; if not, this chance will decrease. Just as before, the essential factor in the decision of the members of the House of Representatives will be President Obama's and Foreign Minister Clinton's stances towards this draft resolution. If they openly express that they oppose it, there is almost no change for the draft resolution to be adopted.

57 *Hürriyet*, 5 March 2010.

As there will be an election in November for the House of Representatives, it is possible that the American Government will lean towards the Armenian requests with the concern for votes.

On this subject we should also mention that the same draft resolution was also presented to the US Senate on 21 of October 2009. As for today, there are 16 co-sponsors. The absolute majority in the US Senate is 51 with the Senator.

3. The Resolution of the Swedish Parliament

In Sweden, there is a relatively small but active Armenian community. In this country, there also exists Syriacs migrating from Turkey and a smaller group of Chaldeans who all support, in principle, the Armenian genocide allegations and even pretend that they have also been subjected to genocide.

Swedish Armenians have attempted many times that a resolution foreseeing the recognition of the genocide allegations be adopted, but have not been successful mainly due to the opposition of Swedish Governments.⁵⁸

A genocide draft resolution was submitted to the Swedish Parliament in order to put pressure on Turkey to ratify the Protocols. The Swedish Government had opposed this draft from the beginning and the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission in his report to the Parliament had suggested that the draft should not be adopted. However, unexpectedly and with only one vote difference, the Parliament adopted the resolution on 11 March 2010 and Sweden became the 20th county to recognize the Armenian genocide allegations.

It is necessary to underline that this resolution is not binding. In other words, it does not create any legal consequences for neither Turkey nor Sweden. Therefore, it has no effect other than merely reflecting the views of the members of parliaments who have voted in favor of it. However, this resolution will further strengthen the existing belief, especially in Western countries, that the Armenians have been subjected to genocide in 1915. Even though the resolution has no legal consequence, it can be seen that it entails much more extreme positions when compared to the resolutions adopted by other parliaments. First of all, this resolution puts forth that not only Armenians, but also Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans and Pontus Greeks have also been subjected to genocide in the Ottoman Empire. No other parliament has alleged that genocide has been inflicted upon these ethnic groups. Secondly, in the resolution, it is requested from the Swedish Government to take initiatives in order to persuade Turkey in accepting the

58 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments", No. 5, p. 12; No. 22, p.50; No. 30, p. 31; No. 32, p. 54,

“genocide” conducted towards Armenians, Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans, and Pontus Greeks. This provision has also not been put forth by any of the other parliaments. Last of all, in the resolution it is also required from the Swedish Government to take initiatives within the European Union and United Nations so that Turkey will accept that “genocide” has been inflicted upon these five ethnic groups. This is also a first.

Minister of Swedish Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt has opposed the resolution, stating that historical events should not be judged at political level, but should be left to the interested parties to discuss it, while also saying that the resolution has been adopted despite the contrary opinion of the Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs and that it has failed to be adopted unanimously. This way, the Minister has wanted to convey that the resolution carries no great importance. Moreover, he has also emphasized that this resolution will not contribute positively to the ongoing process of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia.

Although it has not been openly stated, the Swedish Government has not been pleased with the resolution adopted by the Parliament, because it could negatively influence the cooperation between Turkey and Sweden which has greatly developed in the recent years.

Turkey’s reaction to the resolution has been quick and strong. Prime Minister Erdoğan has cancelled his visit to Sweden which was to take place a week later, and Turkey’s Ambassador to Stockholm Zergün Korutürk has been recalled to Ankara for consultations.

However, the Swedish Government has reiterated on every opportunity that they oppose the resolution. Calling Prime Minister Erdoğan by phone, the Swedish Prime Minister Frederik Reinfeldt has said that he was sorry for this resolution and that the government absolutely does not share in this resolution, that it has arisen from domestic political calculations, that he will fulfill what is necessary so that this resolution does not effect the relations of both countries, and that the Swedish Government will continue with utmost energy to support Turkey’s EU membership process.⁵⁹ After this attitude of the Swedish Government, relations between the two countries have improved and Ambassador Korutürk has returned to his post.

By providing information to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the TGNA on the resolutions adopted by the US Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Swedish Parliament, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has stated that he will not accept that the Government was late to counter these

59 “İsveç Beklenen Telafi Edici Adımları Atıyor” (Sweden is Taking the Expected Steps to Compensate), *Radikal*, 17 March 2010.

resolutions and that the necessary steps have not been taken in time. However, from now on for that kind of matter, they will not only target the governments, but also the parliaments.⁶⁰

4. Other Developments

Apart from the events mentioned above, initiatives taking place in many countries for the recognition of the genocide allegations have been witnessed. All of this taking place after the signing of the Protocols shows that there is no coincidence and a campaign organized by the Armenian Diaspora is being conducted with the support of Armenia. We will furnish information on the most important of these in the next issue of our journal. Here, we will only indicate what types of initiatives have taken place and in which countries.

The Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany had unanimously adopted a resolution in 2005 which did not entail the word “genocide”, but recognized in an indirect manner the Armenian genocide allegations.⁶¹ This year, in a motion issued by the Left Party deputies, it was asked whether the 1915-1916 massacres towards the Armenians are considered genocide according to the UN 1948 Charter.⁶² Moreover, on the German ARD channel, a documentary entitled “Aghet” has been broadcasted reflecting mostly the Armenian views on the 1915 events.⁶³

On 29 March 2010, a meeting has taken place at the House of Lords in England for the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations and which aimed to declare April 24 as genocide remembrance day. However, after the Speaker of the Government Baroness Kinnock has taken an opposing stance, the matter has been closed without resorting to voting.⁶⁴

Leader of the Meretz Party which has worked all along towards Israel’s recognition of the Armenian allegations, Haim Oron’s (or Auron) proposal to open a general meeting on this subject has been adopted in the Parliament with 12 votes against 8. The proposal will firstly be taken on by one of the commissions of the Parliament.⁶⁵ The general belief was that taking into consideration the complexity of Turkey-

60 “Hükümeti Değil, Parlamentoları Hedef Almalıyız” (We Must Not Target the Government, but the Parliaments), *Hürriyet*, 16 March 2010.

61 Ömer Engin Lütem, “Facts and Comments”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 16–17 pp. 66–72

62 “Almanya Parlamentosunda 1915 Soru Önergesi” (1915 Resolution in the German Parliament), *AGOS*, April 2010.

63 “Aghet- Un Genocide: Les Turcs d’Allemagne Fulminent”, *Armenews*, 20 April 2010.

64 “Lordlar Kamerası Ermeni İddialarına Geçit Vermedi” (House of Lords Did Not Allow the Armenian Allegations), *Zaman*, 1 April 2010.

65 “İsrail Parlamentosu Ermeni İddialarını Görüşmeye Açıyor” (The Israeli Parliament is Opening the Armenian Allegations to Discussion), *Milliyet*, 29 April 2010.

Israel relations, Knessett will not adopt such a resolution. However, after the raid to the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara carrying some supplies for the Gaza Palestinians and killing of 9 Turkish citizens on this ship by Israeli commandos, the relations of the two countries deteriorated dramatically. Turkey has been severely criticized in Israel which could lead to a favorable vote in the Knessett.

Bulgaria's conservative party of Order, Law and Justice has submitted to the Parliament on 18 March 2010, a draft resolution foreseeing the condemnation of the Armenian "genocide".⁶⁶ Since Turkey has close relations with Bulgaria in many areas, the possibility of this resolution being adopted is quite low.

The Catalonia Parliament of Spain has adopted a resolution which accepts the Armenian genocide allegations. However, President of the Catalonia Government Jose Montilla has apologized on this issue in a letter sent to Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁷ The Catalonia Party ERC within the Spanish Parliament has also presented a draft resolution on the same issue. According to Spanish media, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Angel Moratinos has met with President of Parliament Jose Bono asking him to not allow the adoption of this draft resolution.⁶⁸

The oppositional Radical SRS Party has submitted a draft resolution to the Serbian Parliament which condemns the Armenian genocide. It is likely that this initiative has originated as a response to the attempts of the Serbian Parliament to adopt a resolution which defines the Srebrenica events as genocide.⁶⁹

A draft resolution has also been submitted to the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the same purpose. The Leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats Drago Kalabic has stated that if the parliament does not adopt this resolution, then the Bosnian Serb Republic People's Assembly will adopt a similar one.⁷⁰ According to news, Prime Minister of the Serbian region of Bosnia-Herzegovina Milorad Dodik has made a declaration for the recognition of the Armenian "genocide".⁷¹

The Kiev City Council in Ukraine has requested from the Ukraine Parliament to officially proclaim April 24 as "the Commemoration Day of Armenian Genocide victims."⁷²

66 "Bulgarian Party Submits Declaration For Parliament To Condemn Genocide", *Asbarez*, 18 March 2010.

67 "Turkish Ministry Notes Catalanian Leaders's Apology For Armenian Resolution", *Anadolu Agency*, 11 March 2010.

68 "Spanish Government Does Its Utmost Not To Approve Genocide Bill", *News.am.*, 23 March 2010.

69 "Armenian Genocide Resolution Submitted to the Serbian Parliament", *Armradio.am*, 27 March 2010.

70 "Bosnian Serbs to Adopt Armenian Resolution if Sarajevo Declines- MP", *Times.am*, 14 April 2010.

71 "Bosnian MPS to Adopt Declaration for Armenian Genocide Recognition", *BalkanInsight.com*, 7 April 2010.

72 "Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada Urges to Proclaim April 24 As the Day of the Armenian Genocide Victims", *anorama.am*, 29 April 2010.

The Labor Party in Holland has submitted a draft resolution to the Parliament foreseeing the recognition of the Armenian “genocide”. In the draft resolution, it has been expressed that it is necessary for Turkey to recognize the Armenian “genocide” in order to join the European Union.⁷³

The Armenian Delegation in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly has signed a declaration which requests the international recognition and condemnation of the Armenian “genocide” and this text has collected around twenty signatures. In the Armenian media, this incident has been reflected as if the Armenian “genocide” has been recognized and condemned by the Assembly.⁷⁴ Since the number of members of this Assembly is 269, it could be seen that the collected signatures have not even reached 10 %. On this note, we would like to remind that currently the President of the Parliamentary Assembly is a Turk (Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu).

As expressed above, the only aim of these initiatives is to apply pressure over Turkey to change its stance towards the Protocols, in particular, to get Turkey to abandon linking the ratification of the Protocols to the Karabakh conflict. This has not taken place and there has been no change in Turkey’s stance. Moreover, these initiatives to pressure Turkey have increased its distrust towards Armenia and have made it more difficult to achieve reconciliation.

IV – ATTEMPTS TO RESCUE THE PROTOCOLS

Through some well known Turkish columnists invited to Yerevan at the end of March,⁷⁵ the Armenian Government’s policies and their expectations concerning the Protocols have tried to be conveyed to the Turkish public opinion.

On this occasion, the lady U.S. Ambassador to Yerevan has hosted a dinner and one of President Sarkisian’s assistants Vigan Sarkisian has been able to meet with the Turkish columnists.⁷⁶ In short, Sarkisian has complained about Turkey linking the Protocols to the Karabakh conflict and has even accused Turkey of not keeping its word. He has stated that they cannot wait until the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, they cannot tolerate this from the political point of view (meaning domestic politics), that this delay has hardened Azerbaijanis stances within the Karabakh

73 “Turkey, The Genocide and the European Union”, *Azg*, 28 April 2010.

74 “PACE Statement Recognizes and Condemns Armenian Genocide”, *Tert.am*, 29 April 2010.

75 According to the information provided by Mehmet Ali Birand on 30 March 2010 to *Posta* newspaper, this meeting has been organized by İstanbul Kültür University Global Political Trends Center. USAID has been the sponsor, in other words, the US Government has done this.

76 Mehmet Ali Birand, “Erivan, Ankara’dan Bir Açıklama Bekliyor, Yoksa Protokolleri İptal Edecek” (Yerevan is Waiting for an Explanation from Ankara or else Will Annul the Protocols), *Posta*, 30 March 2010.

negotiations, they cannot allow the pending of the Protocols in their Parliament for a long time, and that Turkey will either take a new step or will abolish the Protocols. It is understood that what he means by a new step is for the TGNA to ratify the Protocols or Turkey to declare that the Protocols have been suspended based on “domestic reasons”. Armenia will ratify the Protocols if Turkey does and suspend them if Turkey does not. Although what he meant by “domestic reasons” is not explained, it could be understood that this entails the rumors that Turkey will not ratify the Protocols before the parliamentary elections expected to take place in 2011. The point that requires attention here is that Turkey does not have any “domestic political” considerations for not ratifying the Protocols; the only reason put forth is the Karabakh conflict. According to the way of thinking of Vigran Sarkisian, the conclusion can be drawn that Turkey will ratify the Protocols after the parliamentary elections. However, if the Karabakh conflict has still not been resolved even after the elections, then Turkey’s ratification of the Protocols should not be expected.

The important point in this meeting is that Vigran Sarkisian’s words have proved to be correct. As will be seen further on, in a speech delivered on April 22, President Sarkisian has declared that they have suspended the ratification of the Protocols.

Another point is what the Armenians have gained by notifying Turkish columnists that they could suspend the Protocols. Their intentions have been announced by the columnists. However, almost no one has been concerned about the suspension of the Protocols and almost no one has asked the ratification of these documents by the TGNA as soon as possible. On the contrary, a negative atmosphere towards the Protocols has prevailed within the Turkish public opinion.

However, in order to rescue the protocols which have been concluded after lengthy consultations taking place for many years and which have been jeopardized with the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court, Turkey has started a new initiative. As the special envoy of Prime Minister Erdoğan, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioğlu has taken the Prime Minister’s letter to Yerevan and met with Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan and President Serge Sarkisian. According to press reports, the letter stated that Turkey supports the Protocols, reconciliation of Turkey and Armenia is better off compared to their disagreements and that it is necessary to continue the negotiations taking place on what can be done to remove the obstacles confronting the normalization process of the two countries.

Relating to the letter, Prime Minister Erdoğan has made the following statement:

“We will always show our devotion to the Protocols signed in Switzerland. Unless an extraordinary situation develops, it is out of the question for us to take a step back and Turkey does not seek to impose the records of our

historical memory upon others. However, no one should be struggling to impose their own records of their memory upon Turkey either. If each country does their own share of work within the framework of this understanding, which we have always expressed and still express that the resolution through a historical commission will be very appropriate...we will do what we have to; but achieving this through the lobbies in the parliaments of different countries will not create any gains. On the opposite, it will complicate the process.”⁷⁷

Based on the statements, the conclusion could be reached that apart from the Karabakh conflict, matters related to the collective study of the 1915 events and attempts on the resolutions to be adopted by the parliaments of some countries have also been expressed in the letter.

As a result of the contacts made by Ambassador Sinirlioğlu, the meeting of Erdoğan and Sarkisian on 12-13 April in Washington during the Nuclear Security Summit has been agreed upon. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made the following statement in relation to this subject on 7 April 2010:

“Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioğlu has conducted a visit to Yerevan on 7 April 2010 as the special deputy of Prime Minister Erdoğan. Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu has been received by Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan and has presented Prime Minister Erdoğan’s written letter to President Sarkisian.

During the meetings, the phase which has been reached within the normalization process of Turkey-Armenia relations has been addressed; despite the commitment to the process and the difficulties endured, the understanding towards the importance of not losing the obtained window of opportunity has been mutually acknowledged.

Turkey believes that the normalization process will also contribute to maintaining comprehensive peace, security and stability in the Southern Caucasus. In the meetings, exchange of views has also taken place relating to this matter.

On the other hand, it has been agreed upon that Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Sarkisian will come together on 12-13 April 2010 in Washington during the Nuclear Security Summit.”⁷⁸

77 “Erdoğan: Geri Adım Atmayız” (Erdoğan: We Will Not Take a Step Back), *Anadolu Agency*, 7 April 2010.

78 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-17_-7-nisan-2010_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu_nun-bir-soruya-cevabi.tr.mfa

We should also note that after Yerevan, Sinirlioğlu has travelled to Baku and provided information about his meeting with President Sarkisian.⁷⁹

Meanwhile, it has been presented in the media that the Chairman of the Armenian National Assembly Ovik Abrahamyan has stated that the Protocols will be submitted to the Armenian Assembly for ratification.⁸⁰ Perhaps, what was expected from such an initiative was to put Turkey in difficult position. Indeed, in a situation where Armenia has ratified the Protocols but Turkey has not, Turkey would confront a difficult situation. However, the Protocols were not addressed in the Armenian Parliament. Most likely, this news was generated in order to influence Turkey before Sinirlioğlu's visit. Yet, it brought no effect.

Armenia's view of parliaments of both countries to ratify the Protocols without linking it to preconditions like the Karabakh conflict and within a reasonable timeframe has in general been adopted by other countries and the European Union. High Representative of the Foreign Affairs of the EU, Catherine Ashton, has made an announcement regarding this subject.⁸¹ In a press conference held with Foreign Minister Nalbandyan during a visit to Armenia, Stefan Füle the commissioner for enlargement of the European Commission, has repeated that the EU backs ratification of the Turkey-Armenia Protocols without preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe. He has then stated that "good relations with neighbors are very important in the framework of any country's entry to the European Union". Since these statements were conveyed in Armenia and within the context of normalizing Turkey-Armenia relations, in one respect, it meant that unless Turkey establishes normal relations with Armenia, it cannot become a member of the European Union. Speaker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have identified Turkey's stance with the following statement delivered the next day (April 7):

"With the zero-problem policy with its neighbors applied effectively, Turkey has shown the importance bestowed upon good neighborly relations.

In the process of normalizing relations with its neighbor Armenia, right from the start, Turkey has displayed a strong political will within the framework of regional peace, stability and harmony. This strong will is also due to the necessity to establish comprehensive peace, stability, tranquility and prosperity in the Southern Caucasus.

79 "Bir Mektup Da Bakü'ye" (A Letter to Baku), *Star Gazete*, 9 April 2010.

80 "Ermenistan Sürprize Hazırlanıyor" (Armenia is Preparing for the Surprise, *Hürriyet*, 7 April 2010.

81 "ABD'den Ermenistan ve Türkiye'ye Protokoller Onaylansın Çağrısı" (The USA's Call on Armenia and Turkey to Ratify the Protocols), *Tert.am/tr*, 6 April 2010.

Turkey does not need to be reminded of this mission which she has undertaken."⁸²

Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Sarkisian held a meeting on 12 April 2010 in Washington, which lasted around 1,5 hours. In his statement delivered after this meeting Prime Ministry Speaker Kemal Öztürk expressed that the two leaders agreed upon both the continuation of the process for the Protocols and to that end the common work of the foreign ministers.⁸³

On the other hand, President Sarkisian has stated, "in my meeting with the Prime Minister of Turkey, I expressed our unchanging stance on three issues. The first is that Turkey cannot pursue a dialogue with the Armenian administration and nation by putting forth a precondition. The second important issue is that no matter what the framework and format is, we will not make the 1915 "genocide" a subject of discussion. Our third significant principle is that Turkey cannot assume a positive role in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict and cannot act as a mediator."⁸⁴

On this matter, Foreign Minister Nalbandyan has stated that Prime Minister Erdoğan has tried to raise the Karabakh issue in the meeting, but got an adequate response that Turkey-Armenia reconciliation cannot be linked with the Karabakh peace process and that there is no ground to discuss the Karabakh issue, because Turkey cannot mediate the Karabakh peace process. Moreover, he has expressed that Armenia will make no concessions for the sake of normalizing relations with Turkey; while on the other hand; indicating that linkage of the normalization processes and the Karabakh issue will hamper both and that this opinion is also shared by Minsk Group Co-chairs.⁸⁵

In a press conference, Prime Minister Erdoğan has expressed that he has confirmed his commitment to the Protocols, has given the message that both sides must remain dedicated to the spirit of the Protocols which aims to normalize relations with Armenia and bring peace to the Caucasus, and that in response to Sarkisian's request for Turkey to start the ratification process of the Protocols, he has stated "we are committed to our word given with the Protocols. However, for the ratification of the Protocols in the Parliament, a suitable atmosphere must exist. If the Protocols come to the TGNA just when the parliaments of the US and Sweden are adopting resolutions one after another, they will be rejected. Right now, the conditions are not yet suitable". Furthermore, by reminding Sarkisian of the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court and the amended law providing the

82 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-16_-7-nisan-2010_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu_nun-bir-soruya-cevabi.tr.mfa

83 "İpler Kopmadı" (Ties Have Not Been Cut Loose), *Hürriyet*, 13 April 2010.

84 "İpler Kopmadı" (Ties Have Not Been Cut Loose), *Hürriyet*, 13 April 2010.

85 "If Turkey Miscalculated, it's Their Affairs", *News.am*, 14 April 2010.

possibility to cancel the Protocols, Erdoğan has said that a question mark appeared in the minds of the public and that the agreement of “silence” achieved in February between Turkey and Armenia with the mediation of the US has collapsed. Erdoğan has requested from Sarkisian to refrain from statements which could hamper the process.⁸⁶ Also, in the speech delivered in the opening of Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University, the Prime Minister has especially touched upon the genocide allegations:

“We are against making the sorrows suffered in the past an instrument of politics based on a single point of view and in a biased way... We reject the 1915 events to be presented as genocide and some parliaments deciding on this to be unjust and one-sided, we also reject this approach. The discipline of history, historians and archives are those which will shed a light on historical events. History cannot be written in parliaments, cannot be judged in parliaments.”

Apart from these statements, Prime Minister Erdoğan has also expressed that he has proposed the establishment of a joint historical commission to President Kocharian in 2005, but has not received a reply. On the other hand, the Prime Minister has said that the judgment of history by the parliaments is not to anyone’s advantage and is never to the benefit of Armenia.⁸⁷

What could be arrived at from these statements is that both sides have maintained their stance. Turkey has not changed its decision on not ratifying the Protocols without at least a significant development taking place in the Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, it has been expressed that, the Protocols cannot be ratified by the TGNA during a period when parliaments of some countries have adopted resolutions recognizing the genocide allegations. Moreover, it has been emphasized that the law, providing for the Protocols submitted to the Parliament to be annulled, has not been considered as a constructive step. On the other hand, Armenia rejects Turkey linking the Protocols to the Karabakh conflict, its contribution to the settlement of this conflict, and the discussion of the 1915 events.

As indicated above, the two countries have maintained their existing stances and thus, have not been able to achieve any development on the Protocols. But, they have decided to continue the process of normalization and have agreed upon their foreign ministers to continue their collective work for this purpose.

During his visit to Washington, President Sarkisian has also met with President

86 “Protokoller Meclis’e Şimdi Gelirse Reddedilir” (If the Protocols Come to the Parliament Now They Will be Rejected), *Sabah*, 13 April 2010.

87 “Sarkisyan Görüşmesinden Sonra 1915 Mesajı” (1915 Message After Sarkisian’s Meeting), *CNN*, 13 April 2010.

Obama. In a statement from the White House on this visit, it has been declared that “The president commended President Sarkisian for his courageous efforts to achieve normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey and encouraged him to fulfill the promise of normalization for the benefit of Armenian people. Armenia and Turkey should make every effort to advance the normalization process.”⁸⁸ This announcement puts forth that President Obama attaches great importance on the normalization process between the two countries. On the other hand, the statement of President Sarkisian’s bureau regarding this meeting is very short saying that the parties have spoken out on the normalization process, the Karabakh conflict and Armenia-US relations.⁸⁹

Prime Minister Erdoğan has also met with President Obama. According to the statement issued from the White House, President Obama has congratulated Erdoğan on some courageous steps that he has taken around the issue of normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations, and has encouraged him to continue to move forward along this path.⁹⁰ On the other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan said to the journalists concerning this meeting, that he does not expect President Obama to use the word “genocide” in his 24 April statement, has discussed with the President the letter he has sent (on 7th of April) to President Sarkisian, moreover, has addressed the issue of the Turkish border gate along with Azerbaijan’s stance and that the foreign ministers of both countries will continue their tasks concerning the normalization process.⁹¹ According to a newspaper, Prime Minister Erdoğan has also explained to President Obama Turkey’s tasks to create peace in the Caucasus (and the Middle East). On the other side, President Obama has stated that he will do his utmost best for the Minsk Group to be more active and to accelerate the settlement of the Karabakh conflict.⁹² It could be understood that the main reason why the Karabakh conflict, which does not directly concern Turkey, has had great importance in the meeting is because Turkey has linked the ratification of the Protocols to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, or at least to important developments on that field.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Hillary Clinton have met in Washington during the Nuclear Security Summit. It could be said that the main subject of this meeting was the ratification of the Protocols and the opening of the border. Concerning this subject, a newspaper has written that the withdrawing of troops from the regions surrounding Karabakh and the opening of the border

88 “Obama Discuss Turkey, Karabagh with Sarkisian”, *RFE/RL*, 13 April 2010.

89 “Obama Discuss Turkey, Karabagh with Sarkisian”, *RFE/RL*, 13 April 2010.

90 “Remarks by Obama and Erdogan After Meeting on December 7”, *Asbarez*, 7 December 2009.

91 “Gizli Ajandam yok, Her Şeyim Açıktır” (I Don’t Have a Private Diary, Everything is Out in the Open), *Hürriyet*, 15 April 2010.

92 “Obama’dan Karabağ Sözü” (Obama’s Karabakh Promise), *Hürriyet*, 14 April 2010.

simultaneously have been laid on the table.⁹³ The point requiring attention here is that the complete settlement of the Karabakh conflict is not being expected and the opening of the Turkish border is based on the withdrawing of Armenian troops from some of the seven Azeri rayons surrounding Karabakh.

In a statement issued by the Spokesman of the US State Department Phillip Crowley after a conference held in Washington with some Turks and Armenians, the US's stance has been expressed as follows: "to ratify Protocols, normalize relations, open borders". Crowley has stated that there are difficulties for both countries for the ratification of the protocols in their Parliaments, it involves emotion on both sides, risk on both sides and they will continue to work constructively with Armenia and Turkey to try to see this process through."⁹⁴

The meetings held in Washington have displayed that the US government has undertaken serious efforts, especially for the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations and to that end, the only real mediator role has been assumed by the US. Despite its close relationship with the region, a positive contribution or an action to obstruct this process has not been displayed by Russia. Looking from the outside, Russia is in a position of an observer. However, most likely, Russia ensures that their interests are not harmed by this process through using their significant influence over Armenia. President Sarkisian going to Russia to meet President Medvedev before returning to his country acts as evidence for this.

V – THE SUSPENSION OF RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOLS

In a statement delivered before his meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan in Washington, President Sarkisian had expressed that they have reached their decision concerning Turkey and would declare their decision when the time comes.⁹⁵ What this decision is has been understood ten days later. On that subject, three parties forming the Government of Armenia have issued the following joint statement on 22 April 2010:⁹⁶

"During the past two years the Armenian President with the support of political majority in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia carried out consistent steps in the direction of the establishment and

93 "Obama'dan Karabağ Sözü" (Obama's Karabakh Promise), *Hürriyet*, 14 April 2010.

94 U.S. State Department: There Are Things Armenia and Turkey Have Committed To Do", *PanArmenian.Net*, 17 April 2010.

95 "24 Nisan Baskısı" (24 April Pressure), *Hürriyet*, 11 April 2010.

96 Armenian Parliament, 22 April 2010. http://www.parliament.am/news.php?cat_id=2&NewsID=3890&year=2010&month=04&day=22&lang=eng

development of Armenian-Turkish relations without any preconditions. The USA, the Russian Federation, France, Switzerland rendered their great support to that process. Several countries around the world positively reacted to that initiative emphasizing its unique significance for the establishment of regional stability and for resolving the existing issues through civilized dialogue.

However, Armenia's consistent steps and the international community's expectations constantly clashed with Turkey's inconsistent and evasive position and the continuous policy of proposing preconditions, which led to a stalemate in the process of the ratification of Armenia-Turkey Protocols, signed on October 10, 2009 in Zurich, within reasonable timeframes.

The political majority in the National Assembly of Armenia considers unacceptable the Turkish side's stance, particularly, the latest statements by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which make the ratification of the Protocols directly dependent upon the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh-Azerbaijan conflict. At the same time, taking into account that Turkey's refusal to ratify the Protocols within a reasonable timeframe makes any further continuation of their ratification process in the Armenian Parliament senseless at this stage, the country's ruling majority considers it necessary to suspend that process and remove the discussion of the issue from the agenda of the RA Parliament's four-day sessions until the Turkish side is ready to further continue the process without preconditions."

The important points appearing in this text are the following: Turkey is being accused of having an inconsistent and evasive position and for putting forth preconditions. It expresses that Prime Minister Erdogan making the Karabakh peace process a precondition of ratifying the Protocols is unacceptable. It indicates that since the Protocols are not ratified within a reasonable timeframe, then any further development will not be possible. Last of all, it states that "until the Turkish side is ready to further continue the process without preconditions", the Protocols have been removed from the agenda of the parliament. (In fact the Protocols continue to remain on the agenda of the Parliament, but will not be put on the agenda of the meetings).

By delivering a televised speech on the same day,⁹⁷ President Sarkisian has stated that they are not ready to continue the normalization process without preconditions, the reasonable timeframe has elapsed for the ratification of the Protocols, Turkey is trying to pass over the 24th of April and the current phase of the normalization

97 "Turkey Not Ready To Continue Armenia-Turkey Process: RA President", *News.am*, 22 April 2010.

process has been exhausted. By pronouncing the names of Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitri Medvedev, and mentioning the name of some other personalities in European organizations, Sarkisian has expressed that they have urged him to continue the process rather than to discontinue it and that out of respect for them, has decided not to exit the process for the time being, but to suspend the procedure of ratification of the Protocols. The Armenian President has also stated that they shall retain the signature under the Protocols, their political objective of normalizing relations with Turkey still remains valid, and that they shall consider moving forward when they are convinced that there is a proper environment in Turkey and there is a leadership in Ankara ready to reengage in the normalization process.

Another point drawing attention in the statement is that while President Sarkisian has expressed gratitude to President Gül for political correctness displayed throughout this period, he has not mentioned Prime Minister Erdogan at all. Another interesting point is the President expressing gratitude to those Turkish intellectuals (some people who support Armenian views, with the genocide allegations being at the forefront) that have struggled for the restoration of historical justice and share their grief.

In short, Armenia has suspended the ratification process of the Protocols. However, this decision has not actually created any change in the existing situation, because as a response to Turkey's refusal to ratify the Protocols before any significant developments taking place in the Karabakh conflict, the Armenians had already expressed that they would not ratify the Protocols until Turkey does. Therefore, the statements delivered on April 22 have not carried any significance beyond confirming the actual situation.

Since it has not created any change, why has this decision been declared in a rather striking way? The reason for this must be searched among Armenia's domestic political balances and its relations with the Diaspora. The Protocols signed with Turkey were confronted with criticisms from both the Dashnaks and the opposition parties. Within the Diaspora, these criticisms have become much stronger. However, if the Protocols were to be ratified just after their signature and the Turkish border gate opened, this would be considered a great success for President Sarkisian. Yet, as explained earlier, when Turkey linked the ratification of the Protocols to the Karabakh conflict, both the Government and the President in Armenia were put in a difficult position. The suspension of the ratification process of the Protocols was aimed at eliminating this difficult situation when possible.

On the other hand, Turkey and in particular, Prime Minister Erdoğan has tried to be held responsible for the suspension of the Protocols in the statements of the

coalition partners and President Sarkisian. This is the reason why President Sarkisian has expressed his gratitude to President Gül, while not mentioning the Prime Minister. Moreover, words exist in Sarkisian's statement which implies that a change of "leadership" in Turkey is expected so that the issue of the Protocols will once again be addressed.

Another purpose of the suspension was to influence President Obama's 24 April statement. Just as last year, it was expected that President Obama would also praise this year the collective efforts of Turkey and Armenia to normalize relations, therefore President Obama would not use the word "genocide" in order not to disrupt the friendly relations existing between the two countries. According to Armenian expectations, since the Protocols were suspended and negotiations would not take place in the short run which would bear results, in other words, since Turkey-Armenia relations continued to be problematic, no reason existed anymore for President Obama not to use the word "genocide". However, that did not happen. As will be explained below, the President did not use this word in his statement.

How Armenia's suspension of the Protocols has been received in Turkey could be summarized as follows. After expressing that the status quo in the Caucasus is not to anyone's benefit and peace and cooperation should be dominant in this region, the President Gül has gone on to state that he does not think the normalization process between the two countries has stopped and that a "silent diplomacy" is required for some time in their relations with Armenia.⁹⁸ Prime Minister Erdoğan has stated that it is up to the Armenian officials to decide how to manage the ratification process of the Protocols and that Turkey is not in the position to make any remarks concerning this issue. He has also expressed that Turkey's stance towards the ratification process is already known and how to reach comprehensive peace in the region has been clearly explained to all concerning parties.⁹⁹ Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has indicated that it is a unilateral decision taken by Armenia and the positive side of it is that the process of normalization is continuing, and has conveyed his hope for the creation of the appropriate political setting in Armenia and Turkey as soon as possible and the continuation of the process from where it was left off.¹⁰⁰ Leader of MHP Devlet Bahçeli has requested the immediate withdrawal of the Protocols from the TGNA.¹⁰¹

Spokesman of the US Foreign Ministry Philip Crowley has expressed that they

98 "Statüko Kimseinin Yararına Değil" (Status Quo is Not to Anyone's Benefit), *Haberler.com*, 24 April 2010.

99 "Kendilerinin Bileceği İş", *Milliyet*, 23 April 2010.

100 "Davutoğlu: Ermenistan'ın Tek Taraflı Kararı" (Davutoğlu: Armenia's Bilateral Decision), *Haberler.com*, 23 April 2010

101 "Protokolleri Geri Çekin" (Withdraw the Protocols), *Ortadoğu*, 25 April 2010.

have been encouraged that neither side has walked away from the process, that some time is needed to perhaps create some new momentum which allows the process to move forward, and that the Armenians had hinted to them that they were prepared to do this and so they have not been surprised by the announcement.¹⁰² The Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko has stated that they hope the two countries will manage to overcome the present difficult situation and create conditions for full-scale normalization of relations which is in the interests of all states in the region.¹⁰³ On the other hand, according to a statement attributed to the French President, Sarkozy has welcomed the Armenian President's readiness to adhere to the process of normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations, despite difficulties which the two sides have encountered in the process of ratification of the Protocols.¹⁰⁴ Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, has stated that the EU reiterates its call to both countries to continue their dialogue and remain committed to the process of normalization without preconditions and a reasonable timeframe.¹⁰⁵

The side suspending the normalization process of Turkey-Armenia relations is Armenia. Under normal conditions, although even with a mild language, Armenia should be criticized. However, this decision of Armenia has not surprised anyone, including Turkey. As a matter of fact, this situation shows that the concerning countries are not very hopeful of this process and are pleased with the process not being completely eliminated.

VI – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

1. President Obama and President Sarkisian's 24 April Statements

The advisers of the White House have approached this year's 24 April statement of President Obama from the angle of US-Turkey relations and not from the point of view of Armenians which have been mentioned above. Therefore, in order not to create any tension, they have organized a text which is very similar to last year's statement and which does not entail the word "genocide" in English. Meanwhile, there has been no concern in Turkey that the US President would act in any other way and even more, as we have mentioned above, Prime Minister Erdoğan has stated that he does not think the US President's statement would entail the word "genocide". This certainty of the Prime Minister could be explained by President

102 "U.S. State Department – Armenia Has Not Ended Process", *Armtown.com*, 23 April 2010.

103 "Russia Hopes For Normalization of Armenian-Turkish Relations", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, 23 April 2010.

104 "US, France Praise Armenian Move on Turkey", *RFE/RL*, 23 April 2010.

105 "Eu 'Pleased' With Armenian Caution On Turkey", *RFE/RL*, 27 April 2010.

Obama giving guarantee to him regarding this subject in the meeting held in Washington in April. In short, just as the former Presidents before him, when President Obama has also been compelled to make a choice between the very active Armenian community in his country and the strategically important Turkey, he has preferred Turkey.

The size and context of the President's statement delivered this year, it is very similar to that of 2009. The same subjects have been addressed by attempting to use different words.

Just as last year, the essential purpose of this year's statement has also been to refrain from using the English word of genocide, not to condemn Turkey and at the same time, to overcome, as far as possible, the negative feelings and reactions which could arise among US Armenians. Therefore, just as last year, "Meds Yeghern", the Armenian word of genocide has been used; the President has repeated that his opinion on the 1915 events has not changed. On the other hand, he has put forth that 1,5 million Armenians have been massacred during the last days of the Ottoman Empire, although without providing any evidence. The President has indicated in his statement that he has been encouraged by the dialogue among Turks and Armenians, and within Turkey itself, regarding this "painful history". Different from last year, "the Turks who saved the Armenians in 1915" have been saluted. However, in contrast to last year, support for the efforts of Turkey and Armenia to normalize their relations have not been mentioned.

Moreover, again just as last year, the President has almost reserved half of his statement to praising the American Armenians by mentioning their contributions to the US economy and their strengthening of American democracy. It is difficult to believe that the small Armenian community could bring significant contributions to the US. However, the 24 April statements of American Presidents are documents of domestic politics and do not directly address Turkey, but American citizens of Armenian origin.

Looking at it from this point view, these statements are losing importance for Turkey, but no matter what, since a biased approach is taken for a historical event, these statements are not acceptable for Turkey. In fact, in the press release of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose complete text has been given below, it has been expressed that the President's statement has been received with regret. On the other hand, by using a milder language, Prime Minister Erdoğan has underlined the word "genocide" not being pronounced and that President Obama is well aware of Turkey's sensitivities.¹⁰⁶ Considering the foreign policy angle, it could be said

106 "Soykırım Yerine 'Büyük Felâket' ('Great Tragedy' Instead of Genocide), *Zaman* 25 April 2010.

that President Obama's statement has not created any new question in a period where some problems already exist between Turkey and the US.

Regarding the statement issued by President Obama, the Turkish Foreign Ministry has put forth the following press release:¹⁰⁷

“Written statements issued regularly each year on the 24th of April by the Presidents of the United States has been repeated by President Obama this year as well.

We deeply regret this statement which reflects an incorrect and one-sided political perception.

The toughest enemy of the historical facts is subjective memory records. No nation has the right to impose its memory records on another nation.

Third countries neither have a right nor authority to judge the history of Turkish-Armenian relations with political motives.”

The text of President Obama's statement could be found in the “Recent Documents” section of our journal.

Just as each year, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian has again issued a statement this year on April 24.¹⁰⁸ In this address, the point drawing the most attention is that the 1915 events were the result of the Ottoman Empire fulfilling its program of annihilation of Armenians. These words have been used in order to determine that genocide has taken place in conformity with international law and also to hold one responsible. The positive side of this statement is that in contrast to previous years, it has not drawn any linkages between the 1915 events and today's Turkey. Meanwhile, expressing gratitude to those in Turkey who have supported the Armenians in their struggle puts forth that the Turkish Governments and public opinion will not accept the genocide allegations and the only hope left is Turkish liberal intellectuals. As can be seen from the number of those participating in the demonstrations held in Istanbul on April 24, this group is very small. Their demonstrations not only fail to convince the Turkish public opinion, but also created some negative reactions for themselves and for the Armenian allegations.

It is interesting that neither President Obama, nor President Sarkisian has touched upon the Protocols and their future, which in fact constitutes the most important

107 “Press Release Regarding the Statement Issued by President Obama”, No: 90, 24 April 2010
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_90_24-april-2010_press-release-regarding-the-statement-issued-by-president-obama.en.mfa

108 “President Sargsyan's Address on the 95th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide”, *Armradio.am*, 24 April 2010.

issue of Turkey-Armenia relations. This shows that at least in a short term, no progress will be achieved towards the Protocols. Since Turkey has linked the ratification of the Protocols to the Karabakh conflict, it is also possible to say that no progress is expected for this conflict to be resolved either in the short run.

2. Debates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly

Two days after Armenia's suspension of the Protocols, the Republican People's Party had proposed that a general debate took place in TGNA on 24 April 2010 to discuss Turkey's strategy of overcoming the Armenian allegations.¹⁰⁹

Istanbul Deputy Dr. Şükrü Elekdağ, a retired Ambassador and former Under Secretary of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his intervention has said that the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court has put forth some preconditions, which in short invalidate the treaties of Kars and Moscow, provide legitimacy of Armenia's claims over Eastern Anatolian territories, declare "genocide" being an indisputable reality which is why the Sub-Commission on the Historical Dimension cannot be addressed, and has stressed that the Protocols could not be linked to the Karabakh conflict. Elekdağ, indicating that the decisions of this Court are final and irrevocable in accordance with Article 102 of the Armenian Constitution, has expressed that for this reason, the possibility of the ratification of the Protocols by the TGNA is null and is therefore imperative to immediately withdraw them from the TGNA and throw them into the waste basket.

Hasan Murat Mercan, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, talking on behalf of the Justice and Development Party speaking against bringing this issue to the agenda, has stated that Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has provided detailed information to the TGNA and to the leaders of the political parties. Furthermore, he has expressed that since these kinds of matters are closely followed worldwide, talking about it in TGNA is not to anyone's benefit, and if the strategy of overcoming the Armenian allegations is to be discussed, then it must be conducted in a closed session or during the visits made to the concerning commissions or opposition parties.

Ankara Deputy Deniz Bölükbaşı, a former Ambassador, delivering a long speech on behalf of the MHP and criticizing the government, has expressed that the Protocols have become null and void and has called on the government to immediately withdraw them from the TGNA, while also declaring that MHP

109 TGNA, Tutanak Journal, 93. Birleşim, First Session, 24 April 2010; <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem23/yil4/ham/b09301h.htm>

supports the general proposal of the Republican People's Party for debating this issue.

Following the speeches delivered by some other deputies talking on their behalf, the proposal of CHP has been put up for voting and has been refused.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has intervened in the TGNA two days later on 26 April 2010, and after providing detailed information on the Protocols, has expressed that their aims regarding this subject are the following:¹¹⁰

1. Turkey-Armenia relations will normalize, just as relations with other neighboring countries have.
2. Parallel to this, the Azerbaijan-Armenia dispute will be resolved, including ending of occupation of the Azeri territories and just as the Turkey-Armenia border, the Azerbaijan-Armenia border will also open. This way, a corridor will be formed from Erzurum to Central Asia.
3. It will not be allowed for this issue to be developed in the shadow of any other issue, especially Turkey-Armenia relations or be overshadowing any other relations.
4. Turks and Armenians will not only learn to share their sorrows, but also their common history.

After the speech of the Foreign Minister, speeches have been delivered on behalf of parties or individuals. We do not have enough room to go into details of these. However, we will shortly mention one of the speeches, since it has gone beyond the TGNA's general tendency. Batman Deputy Bengi Yıldız, talking on behalf of the Peace and Democracy Party, has referred to the 1915 Armenian relocation by stating that "it is possible to purify and repair social conscience towards historical tragedies only by confronting history and asking for apology from the victimized people". He has concluded by stating that they believe this problem could be resolved through peaceful dialogue, without permitting anyone to discuss Turkey's international borders. If we must interpret this statement, it is possible to say that the territories claimed by Armenia from Turkey also encompass a part of the territories identified as Kurdistan according to the Treaty of Sevres.

110 TGNA, Tutanak Journal, 95. Birleşim, First Session, 26 April 2010; <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem23/yil4/ham/b09501h.htm>

Another point which deserves mentioning is that at a time when Constitution amendments were intensively discussed in the TGNA, the question of the Protocols which no longer carry urgency due to Armenia suspending them is so intensely debated: this is an indication of the importance bestowed upon relations with Armenia.

After the suspension of the ratification of the Protocols, President Sarkisian, has begun to criticize Turkey on every opportunity. For instance President Sarkisian has said in an interview delivered to Ria-Novosti Press Agency at the end of April that Armenia has not entirely closed the doors on the Protocols, but that genocide allegations could not become a matter of discussion, because it has already been examined enough and has been based on documents and that the issue of abolishing the consequences of genocide (such as returning of properties to Armenian descendants of those being relocated, giving compensation to them) could be addressed.¹¹¹

In his contacts in Brussels with authorities of NATO and the European Union towards the end of May, President Sarkisian has also mentioned Turkey and the Protocols. First, he has expressed that Turkey has left no other choice for Armenia but to freeze the ratification process of the protocols by putting forth preconditions and breaking the agreed terms. Then, he has indicated that Turkey has ruined its reputation of being a reliable partner. Moreover, he has stated that Armenia would only be glad if Turkey could meet all the standards for EU membership as this means dealing with a more reliable and stable country with values close to theirs.¹¹²

In another speech delivered to representatives of the Armenian community in Brussels, President Sarkisian has stated that recently, Armenians have become a target of hatred language and when a leader of a neighboring state says that the Armenians in his country must be deported for the sole reason that they are Armenians, he cannot but help to remember what happened in 1915, and that in Rwanda similar statements have paved the way for violence.¹¹³ It could be understood that the Armenian President has referred to Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement that Armenian citizens working illegally in Turkey could be sent back to their country, but that this has not taken place due to humanitarian considerations. There is no doubt that considering sending illegal workers in Turkey back to their countries as some kind of deportation is a great exaggeration.

In the beginning of June, in Rostov-on-Don in Russia, Serge Sarkisian met with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and had a meeting with local Armenians. On

111 "L'Interview du Président Sarkissian à l'Agence Russe Ria-Novosti", *Armenews*, 1 May 2010.

112 "President Sargsyan Reaffirms Armenia's Disposition in Brussels", *Panorama.am*, 31 May 2010.

113 "At Villa Empain President Sargsyan Made a Statement" <http://news.president.am/events/statements>

this occasion, the Armenian President said that Turkey is not ready to ratify the protocols, it constantly brings forward new preconditions, it tries to penetrate into the Karabakh issue, which obviously has nothing to do with them, and has added that at this moment, Armenia has nothing to talk about with an unreliable partner who constantly breaks the agreements reached.¹¹⁴

These statements of the Armenian President have drawn criticisms in Turkey. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Burak Özügergin has stated that such harsh statements would neither help Armenia nor the process of normalization itself and that Turkey has a regional vision that focuses on the normalization process and the solution of the Karabakh problem, which also aims to create stability and welfare in this region.¹¹⁵

However, President Sarkisian has neglected to take into consideration the reactions of the Turkish side and has continued his criticism. Lately, in a speech delivered at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation on 26 of June in Berlin, regarding the protocols and their relations with Turkey, he has asked “Why our initiative didn’t succeed” Turkey has backed out of its commitments and not only failed to ratify the signed Protocols, but has also gone back to its pre-negotiation position, to the language of preconditions, diktat and even threats. And today, the last closed border in Europe, the Armenian-Turkish border remains closed. Undoubtedly, the obstruction of the normalization process by the Turkish side can be explicated by the inability and unwillingness of that country’s political leadership, probably also by their various political calculations. The analysts will probably add the factor of the Azeri pressure. Some Western analysts have been trying to convince me that it is a temporary matter, for the internal, pre-election consumption. Perhaps it is, the time will show. However, a deeper analysis brings about one conclusion: In our region the approach of solving one’s problem at the other’s expense is deeply enrooted, the approach “I am strong, I will be setting the terms” is still very much alive. Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy yields zero results. This will continue as long as Turkey will be searching for the benefits in the clash of interests in our region rather than in their coalescence.¹¹⁶

The Armenian President surely knows that it is not that kind of harsh statement that changes the position of Turkey. Therefore, most probably the President is not addressing Turkey, but the Diaspora, and to begin with the Dashnaks the ultra nationalist circles of his country in order to put an end to the criticism which is still going on and if possible to be praised for bashing Turkey.

114 “Sarkisian Rules Out Turkish Role in Karabagh Talks”, *RFE/RL*, 2 July 2010.

115 “Turkey Calls on Armenia to Avoid Harsh Words”, *WorldBulletin.net*, 27 May 2010.

116 <http://www.president.am/events/statements/eng/?id=66>

VII – CONCLUSION

In the present article, we have tried to explain the phases undergone by the Turkey-Armenia Protocols, starting from their signature to their suspension.

Right now (end of June 2010), just as in Turkey, the subject of the Protocols have also lost their importance in the agenda of Armenia. This situation shows that there is not much hope for the future of the Protocols.

Summarizing the stances of both parties, Armenia, in essence, has chosen to evade or even to get rid of the Protocols which they had signed in order to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey and to open the Turkish border gate. The reason for this is the strong criticism of the Protocols in Armenia and in particular in the Diaspora. On the other hand, Armenia has not accepted Turkey's linking of the Protocols to positive developments in the Karabakh conflict. When the pressures on Turkey to ratify the Protocols as soon as possible without linking it to this conflict has failed in creating any results. The Armenian President has felt obliged to abolish the Protocols, but upon the request of USA, Russia and the main countries of the European Union, has preferred to suspend their ratification process "sine die" (for an unknown time).

Turkey had signed the Protocols in order to open a new page by ending the historical disputes with its neighbor Armenia. As a jest out of their goodwill, she has taken some initiatives in order to "revive" the Protocols, despite the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court and in particular, the articles of that Decision relating to the recognition of borders and historical issues, but has not obtained any results. Turkey still attempts to contribute to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict within the framework of security and cooperation in the Caucasus and expects that if this conflict starts to be resolved, it will have a positive impact on their problems with Armenia.

There is no doubt that any positive development in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict will significantly contribute to the improvement of Turkey-Armenia relations. Yet, Karabakh is not the sole dispute between the two countries. The definite recognition of the existing border between the two countries and studying the 1915 events in the Sub-Commission on the Historical Dimension are indispensable for Turkey. However Armenia, very imprudently, has prevented such a study with the Decision of the Constitutional Court.

In conclusion, it could be observed that normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations has currently reached a deadlock and it is very difficult to revive the Protocols due to some ambiguous provisions existing in them and the Decision of

the Armenian Constitutional Court. Therefore, to normalize Turkey-Armenian relations, the most reasonable action would be to hold new negotiations in order to elaborate a new text of the Protocols which will avoid ambiguities and contain precise dispositions.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

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Abstract: *The political, diplomatic, historical, sociological and legal aspects of the problem known as the “Armenian question” is being researched and analysed from different points of view. However, the psychological dimension which is the most important field in solving the problem is lacking. The paper deals with the past traumas and psychological situations of all the parties: Armenians of Armenia, Armenian diaspora, Turkish Armenians, Turkish people who defend the Turkish “official view”, Turks who apologise from the Armenians claiming that they feel guilty, and the Western world which puts pressure on Turkey. As it is defended that the basis of the problem lies in psychology, the solution is not focusing on the future, but on overcoming the past traumas.*

Keywords: *Mourning, social trauma, chosen trauma, time collapse, transferred memory*

In social disciplines such as political science, international relations and sociology, which deal with humans and human behaviors, the science of psychology is utilized frequently. As a result of using psychology in social sciences entailing “humans”, new sub-branches have emerged such as “social psychology” and “political psychology”. Social psychology is the scientific field that seeks to understand the nature and causes of individual behavior in social situations.¹ On the other hand, political psychology assesses the factors which form or affect social psychology and which entail macro issues such as group behavior, decision making and emotional status, along with micro issues such as racism, nationalism, genocide, radicalism and religious fundamentalism.

The common area of interest for both political scientists and psychoanalysts is to explain how humans behave in a group and understand how diplomacy will play a role in their arrangement. However, in reality, the human mind works primitively and the psychoanalyst is aware of this situation. On the other hand, political scientists believe that humans behave in a civilized manner.²

¹ Robert A. Baron vd., *Exploring Social Psychology*, Third ed., Allyn and Bacon, Boston vd., 1989, p. 6.

² Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, Istanbul, 2007, pp. 262–263.

The issue known as the “Armenian question” puts forth that the Armenians have been subjected to genocide in 1915 by the Ottoman government and thus, wants the Republic of Turkey to accept these events as “genocide” and compensate for the losses. While the European/Western/Christian world supports the Armenians, they pressure the Turkish government to apologize for what they have done by making them confess that it is “genocide”. The formal view and majority opinion which could be entitled as “the Turkish side” has expressed that a tragedy does exist which could be explained by treason or situation of war, but this is not genocide and this could be proven by all kinds of documents and that even their archives are open to anyone who want to conduct research on this subject. Despite a majority opinion existing in Turkey, a group of liberal intellectuals defend that what was conducted against Armenians was genocide and apologize at least on their own behalf. The actors of this situation constituting the “Armenian question” which needs to be evaluated are the Armenian diaspora, Armenians of Armenia, Turkish Armenians, the Turkish community, the apologizing group in Turkey and the Westerners.

The Armenian question is in fact an issue which firstly concerns historians and jurists. However, due to the significance of its political dimension, political scientists and international relations specialists also examine this matter. The aspect of this subject which is the least researched, but is actually the most important is its psychological angle. In particular, social psychologists and experts of political psychology must address the Armenian question. Subjects such as the development of Turkey-Armenia relations, Armenians making peace with Turks and the view point of many European countries towards Turks and Turkey are directly related to the psychology of societies. The point which makes this branch the most important is the necessity to know the psychological state well for the resolution of problems within political, legal, social and all other areas, or at least to normalize the dialogues taking place. In other words, unless the psychological condition is repaired or a successful psychological preparation is done, no progress can be achieved in the Armenian question.

The Armenian Diaspora

Dealing with the Armenians as a whole will be an incorrect way to start for all kinds of evaluations. The reason why they have been separated into groups consisting of the Armenian diaspora, Armenians of Armenia and Turkish Armenians is, because all three groups have completely different life styles, interests and psychologies.

The group referred to as the “diaspora Armenians” represents Armenians living outside the territories of Armenia, Turkey and Iran. The group which fosters severe

hatred and hostility towards the Turks, which strongly defends the “genocide” thesis and which is worth being psychologically examined due to their non-ending enmity for 100 years is the diaspora Armenians.

The cause of the intensity of the Turkish hostility is related to the serious identity crisis the diaspora is in. although a majority live in more developed and rich countries than Armenia and Turkey and live under better social and economic conditions, they contain fewer rights than Armenians in Armenia and Turkey in developing themselves within cultural areas such as language, religion and education.³ Even though they could rescue their identity and culture by moving to Armenia, the economic conditions there are a serious obstacle for the diaspora to return to their motherlands. Since they suppose that if they adopt the identity of the country they live in and are a citizen of, they will altogether lose their Armenian feelings by becoming assimilated, they believe that their identities and cultural beings are under risk. The “glue” which will bind the Armenians together so that they will not be eliminated through assimilation, is the “genocide” experience and the intensive feelings related to this experience. Therefore, the only thing which in fact keeps the diaspora Armenians alive or maybe even forms and binds them together has emerged as psychology of victimhood and Turkish hostility.⁴ Essentially, it is even possible to put forth that what has made the Armenians Armenian is relocation, because the diaspora Armenians have been raised with the explanations of the 1915 events and have clung to each other through the tragedies endured by their ancestors.

Not leaving the sorrows suffered at the past and obsessively bringing them to the present is an unusual psychological problem. Mourning is an involuntary human reaction to changes that occur when the loss of possessions an individual feels positively or negatively connected to takes place. This reaction brings with it some gains. The mourner feels a new surge of energy that may be expressed towards new projects or new personal attachments. Although mourning marks a loss, it also brings a kind of new power. Without mourning, human beings cannot accept the change arising from losses taking place in the past. After mourning takes place following a great sorrow, the person returns to their everyday life as if the experience of loss has never taken place.⁵ Mourning is a much deeper psychological problem than feeling pain. The loss is accepted and after realizing

3 Erol Göka, “Ermeni Sorununun (Gözden Kaçan) Psikolojik Boyutu” (the Psychological Dimension of the Armenian Question), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 207.

4 Erol Göka, “Ermeni Sorununun (Gözden Kaçan) Psikolojik Boyutu” (the Psychological Dimension of the Armenian Question), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 206.

5 Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies & Allies*, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1988, pp. 155, 158.

this reality, one will continue their ordinary life. For instance, the “Megali Idea” of the Greeks is a kind of mourning, because the belief exists that the lost territories will be regained.⁶

Most of the time, problems will arise during the process of mourning. For instance, after sudden, unexpected or gruesome sorrows, the process of mourning will be skipped and there will be a return to the ordinary life. In this situation, the normal sadness and anger necessary for the grieving person to accept the sorrow will take place as if it never happened.⁷ “To be able to mourn is to be able to change. To be unable to mourn, to deny changes, carries great risks to the individual and to the organization”,⁸ Examining the mourning processes of groups is very important. This is because, if a group has not been able to mourn for a past loss, concepts of “apologizing” and “forgiving” will not be effective.

When societies cannot finish their mourning processes due to the losses being great, if the events experienced have not been able to be mourned or not been able to be connected to an outcome, the task of completing this psychology left half finished could either consciously or unconsciously, be passed on to the next generation: “I was not able to mourn, you continue”, “I was insulted, you save my honor”, “I was weak, you take my revenge” etc. which are explained by “passing on of traumas between generations”, creates shared tasks among the new generation in which no one knows how it has developed.⁹

At the basis of the necessity to have enemies and allies lies a great group interaction whose borders have been drawn by the emotions of love and anger.¹⁰ The task of passing on and sustaining traumas between generations could after some time, become the basis of nationalistic obsession on which identity could be based upon after assuming an ideological structure. Although the new generations have not experienced the 1915 events, they are able to accept the events which are located in their minds in the way their adults have told them as if they personally have experienced them and this way, are able to continue the passing on between generations.¹¹

6 Fatih Türkmenoğlu, An Interview with Vamık Volkan, *Milliyet Newspaper*, 23 September 2007.

7 Vamık D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies & Allies*, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1988, p. 160.

8 G.H.Pollock, “The Mourning Process and Creative Organizational Change”, *Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association*, No. 25, 1977, p. 29 being cited by Vamık D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies & Allies*, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1988, p. 179.

9 Feride Cem, İş'te Portre: Vamık Volkan (There's the Portrait: Vamık Volkan), *Sabah İşte İnsan*, 28 December 2008.

10 Vamık D. Volkan, “Official and Unofficial Diplomacy: An Overview”, *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*, Vamık D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, Demetrios A. Julius (der.), Lexington Books, Toronto, 1991, p. 8.

11 Vamık Volkan, “A Psychopolitical Approach for the Reduction of Ethnic or Other Large-Group Regression”, Center for Development Research (ZEF Bonn), Facing Conflicts, 14–16 December 2000 being cited by Haluk Özdemir, “Diaspora Ararat'ı Ararken: Ermeni Kimliği ve Soykırım İddiaları” (When the Diaspora is Searching for Ararat: Armenian Identity and Genocide Allegations), *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 14–15, Summer-Fall 2004.

Real memories of the traumas belong to the adults. Memories belonging to a person could not be passed on to someone else, but an adult could store images of traumas in a child's mind. Despite those children having no experience related to trauma, they have become a place of "storage". The purpose of the person storing these images is to eliminate the burden of his concerns by imposing the disturbing images upon others. This way, a psychological gene, affecting the feeling of identity, will also be provided to the child. It is highly difficult for these people to escape the situation they are in, because the person abandoning their task of being storage after becoming an adult will mean that their identity has changed. More importantly, it also means that the individual has broken the connection with whoever has made him storage or in other words, has killed that person psychologically. Therefore, the person will display great effort to recover.¹²

Apart from "mourning", there is a second concept which is necessary to address in order to understand group psychology. Vamik Volkan's concept of "chosen trauma" stands for the mental representative of the feeling of humiliation, pains, losses and despair experienced during the argument taking place in the past in the relations between two groups. As a determinant of identity, "chosen trauma" has great significance in the large group's life. The Czechs remembering the Battle of Bila Hora of 1621 each year is an example. Following this battle, the Czechs have been under the domination of the Hapsburg Empire for 300 years. The American Lakota Indians never forgetting the massacre of 1890 could also be an example of "chosen trauma".¹³

Another point which Vamik Volkan has drawn attention to is that whether "chosen trauma" has really been experienced or not is not very important for the so-called group. Rather than the reality of the trauma, its function is regarded as more important. "Chosen trauma" will be accepted in the process to keep the group identity alive and to develop an emotional tie between the group members and its accuracy will not be questioned.¹⁴ Perhaps it is for this reason that the initiatives in Turkey like creating a historical commission, opening the archives for examination, and denouncing of fake documents is somehow never valued. In relation to this, rather than what the experienced events are, how they are perceived and what kind of trauma it has created has become much more important than its dimension of truth. Observing the events in Turkey as a series of tragedies in which pains have been mutually suffered rather than genocide, or proving the atrocities committed by the Armenians upon Muslims, do not contain much significance for

12 Vamik Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (gev.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 219–220.

13 Vamik Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 211.

14 Vamik Volkan, *Politik Psikoloji (Political Psychology)*, Ankara Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Yayınları, Ankara, 1993, p. 70.

the Armenian diaspora. Even if it was not regarded as genocide, the Armenians would have thought that relocation alone was a tragic event.¹⁵

Another important concept is “time collapse”. It represents the shocking effect created when the trauma is suddenly triggered or willingly brought to the agenda, even if hundreds of years have passed, because it is as if the event has recently happened and has been experienced by that population.¹⁶ The awakened feelings when the “chosen traumas” are reactivated are alive as if the trauma has just taken place. The memories of the past, emotions felt at that moment and hopes for the future are intertwined through a “time collapse”.¹⁷

When a new danger is created by “others”, in order to reinforce the group identity of today’s generation and to confront the threat, groups having “chosen trauma” revives their “chosen trauma”. This rekindles the flames of the assignments which have to be fulfilled. Therefore, a resistance against settling group disputes through peaceful means takes place from time to time.¹⁸ The functions of the tasks set through “chosen trauma” could change over time. Although the assignment itself will not be eradicated, its goals could change. For instance, trauma could change into an exaggerated psychology of legitimacy. Exaggerated legitimacy puts forth that the group has the right to possess what they desire. For instance, irredentism is an ideology of political legitimacy.¹⁹

The reason for others to believe what the Armenians have made up could also be due to imposing exaggerated legitimacy. The allegations put forth by Armenians through documents, which most of them have been proven to be fake later on, are acknowledged by the Western world without questioning it, checking it or researching it. What is more interesting than the genocide allegations is that Armenian historians have declared themselves as the founders of the Urartu state and the world public opinion have instantly accepted the allegations without questioning them.²⁰ Despite the materials used in propagandas being fake most of

15 F. Sevinç Göral Alkan, “Psikoloji ve Psikanaliz Penceresinden Türk-Ermeni Meselesi: Mağduriyet Psikolojisi ve Büyük-Grup Kimliğinin Etkisi” (Turkish-Armenian Question within the Frame of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Psychology of Victimhood and the Effect of Big Group), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 217.

16 F. Sevinç Göral Alkan, “Psikoloji ve Psikanaliz Penceresinden Türk-Ermeni Meselesi: Mağduriyet Psikolojisi ve Büyük-Grup Kimliğinin Etkisi” (Turkish-Armenian Question within the Frame of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Psychology of Victimhood and the Effect of Big Group), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 218.

17 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 305.

18 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 239.

19 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 240.

20 Birsen Karaca, “Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yaratılan Ermeni İmajı” (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments), *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165–166.

the time, due to some ignorance by the Westerners and identifying a scapegoat suiting their purpose, it has immediately been effective. The reasons for Europeans to immediately adopt the problems related to Turkey are explained under a separate title given below. However, there is also a social dimension to the issue. For instance, Habermas defends that a democratic discussion platform in modern societies are regressed through the development of the cultural industry and that it is shaped with manipulation, not with the rational exchange of views of the public. What Baudrillard tries to convey with “hyper reality” is that reality is actually just made up of images. In other words, we do not perceive reality, but perceive the images presented to us as reality. According to Baudrillard, a new reality composed of media images has emerged.

Some massive disasters could leave psychological effects. For instance, many individuals possess a condition known as “post-traumatic stress disorder”. This concept means that a person exposed to trauma remembers the past experience at unexpected times and re-lives that event. Among the problems resulting from massive traumas are also new social extreme occupations, change in the existing cultural traditions, establishment of monuments as objects of common links, and passing on of traumas from generation to generation.²¹

The impacts of traumas upon society could be very big. Following great traumas, new shared factors emerge. In other words, the most important component of identity which is shared and which ties the society together is the trauma experienced. This way, the existing cultural norms are also changing. The effects and results of this trauma are passed on from generation to generation through transfer, undergo change during these transfers, and sometimes subside or sometimes become stronger.²² While the emotional side of the events is forgotten or lose their effect when passed on from generation to generation, published books, pictures and documents are useful in preserving the memory. Although the number of narrators decreases, documents make it impossible to forget.²³

Archeologist Mehmet Özdoğan who has explained thinking of the past as a course of action unique to human beings, has separated this into two categories of “epical past” and “scaled concrete”. Epical past is a flat reality where reality and rumors have intermingled and lacks depth. Within this view point, it is not necessary to prove what has taken place in the past. What is important is to

21 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars), Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 137, 139.

22 Vamık Volkan, Vamık Volkan’s Political Psychology Seminars-2, Bahçeşehir University, 24-28 September 2007, <http://www.ekopolitik.org/public/printnews.aspx?id=1304>

23 Osman Sağırılı ve Cemil Yıldız, “Ermenilerin hayat Felsefesi Herkesle Kavga Etmek” (Armenians’ World View is to Fight with Everyone), “Küs Komşu Ermenistan” (The Offended Neighbor Armenia) article series, *Türkiye Newspaper*, 28 April 2010.

believe the rumors. However, thinking of the past is as important as being a part of the belief system.²⁴

The approach that even the most personal memories are formed only out of the communication and interaction of social groups²⁵ conveys that what we have to remember and forget is dictated by society. For the functioning of the mechanism which allows individuals and societies to forget and remember, social organizations like family and schools operate. The controlling instrument of this mechanism which is sometimes realized and sometimes is not recognized at all by individuals and societies, are things which acknowledge actions such as sins, shames, prohibitions, rewards, and ceremonies. History of humanity is filled with the successes and failures of the efforts to create a new social memory.²⁶

One of the most effective functions used to prevent human beings from forgetting is cinema, because cinema comes at the forefront of the most appropriate instruments to display the exaggerated and made up discourses. The 1919 movie shot with the support of Armenians in the U.S. entitled “Crucified Armenia and Auction of Souls” is accepted as the first of the examples which have addressed the Armenian allegations.²⁷ In all movies addressing the Armenian allegations, it is displayed that psychical violence has been inflicted upon Armenians during relocation. In order to strongly establish the motif of violence in the minds of the audience, it is crucial to repeat these types of scenes. Explaining violent actions by exaggerating them allow these types of scenes not to ever be forgotten by attaining a legendary attribute. It is possible to show the examples of incidents which are impossible to forget and which highly effects the audience, such as teenage girls stripped naked and forced to play, in the movies of “Skylark Farm” and “Ararat”

24 Mehmet Özdoğan, “Tarih Öncesi Arkeolojisine Giriş” (Introduction to Archeology before History), *Atlas/Arkeo*, No. 1, 2002, p. 10 being cited by Birsan Karaca, “Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları” (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach) dated 25–26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

25 Jan Assman, *Kültürel Bellek (Cultural Memory)*, Ayrıntı, İstanbul, 2000, p. 40 being cited by Birsan Karaca, “Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları” (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach) dated 25–26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

26 Birsan Karaca, “Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları” (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach) dated 25–26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

27 Ali Özuyar, Erciyes Üniversitesi-Neveşehir University-II International Social Research Symposium (EUSAS-II), “XIX.Yüzyılda Ermeni Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu ve Büyük Devletlerin Politikaları”, <http://www.soykirimgercegi.com/default2.asp> being cited by Birsan Karaca, “Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları” (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach) dated 25–26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

by pouring gas over their friends and burning them, cutting off the heads of human beings in almost all these movies, and shoeing human beings in the movies “Mayris” (Mother) and “Ararat”.²⁸ Meanwhile, no one thinks about the fact that even the smallest horseshoe is too big for a human being’s foot.

Exaggerations and fictions about the “other” or the “stranger” entails the purpose of consolidating and keeping feelings alive by reinforcing that the stranger is the enemy so that it will never be forgotten. The definition of a stranger starts from birth. The actual identity of the stranger does not matter; what matters is “who the stranger is not”. The response to the stranger is a function of the process differentiating “mother” from “not mother” or the “good” mother from the “bad” one who cannot contain the child’s needs.²⁹ While differentiating between enemy and friend, the affect of the differentiation existing between “stranger” and “acquaintance” is significant. For instance, although the term “barbaric” actually means stranger or someone not belonging to us, it has started to be widely used as “enemy” and later on “cruel, butcher”.

The differentiation of enemy and friend lies at the basis of creating identity.³⁰ The only tie keeping the Armenian diaspora together is Turkish hostility and the revenge of “genocide”. However much this linking tie appeals to feelings and however much it is intense, it will be that much connective and the identity will be that much strong. Therefore, Turkish hostility, sorrowful stories, psychology of victimhood, the desire for revenge and the goal of the “genocide” being acknowledged are the elements keeping the diaspora together as an Armenian community.

While examining the subject of social traumas, generally, the method of psychoanalysis which aims to bring the forgotten past to the consciousness is used. The mind chooses the events and if not sorted out through psychoanalysis, will enter into a tendency of distortion. It is necessary for the mind to select someone guilty and to judge him. Today’s Armenian mind is based on transmitting the events over five generations. During transmission, some changes take place. Transmitted memory exaggerates what has happened to Armenians, while displaying the Turks as monstrous.³¹ While no sickly hostility, grudge or

28 Birsen Karaca, “Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları” (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach) dated 25–26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

29 Vamık D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies & Allies*, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1988, p. 18

30 Vamık D. Volkan, “Official and Unofficial Diplomacy: An Overview”, *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*, Vamık D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, Demetrios A. Julius (ed.), Lexington Books, Toronto, 1991, p. 7.

31 Gündüz Aktan, “Bellek ve Tarih” (Memory and History), 18 April 2006, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, pp. 184–185.

resentment existed in the explanations of the first generation Armenians who directly lived through the relocation, the dimension of the story has changed by including fictional events into the explanations of the following generations. Anger, disappointment, fury, pain and sadness exist among those subjected to relocation, but no fury exists towards Turkish hostility. Anger and fury, emerging as they have drifted apart from reality and real history, have started to take on a morbid form.

While some diaspora Armenians are born in Turkey, some have some kind of relation with Turkey and Turks, and some of their families have important ties with Turkey, some have no links with Turks at all. Those having the most hateful and radical thoughts are those having no ties with Turks who do not recognize the real Turks and only know them through the stories told. The explanations put forth in a meeting of French Representative of the Dashnaksutyun Party Armand Samelyan and a Turkish journalist openly displays the weight of psychological trauma. Samelyan, who has stated that he has not felt any pain and remained indifferent while watching on television the Turkish children being left under the wreckage and dying during the 1999 earthquake, has also expressed his awareness that this condition is not normal. However, Turks are the guilty ones again, because according to the representative of the Dashnaksutyun Party, Turks have destroyed his feelings of pity and has made him become inhuman. In his interview given to the journalist who was the second Turkish person he had spoken to all throughout his life, he has stated that internal settlement is still continuing, but that rather than being an inheritor of those responsible for “genocide”, it is better to be in the position of a victim, although with a distorted psychology.³²

The intense of anger and hatred could distance the individuals from thinking within the framework of mentality and from reality. Just as regarding all the Turks as a terrible monster, not accepting the clear truths is also a problematic situation. For instance, one of the issues Armenians struggle to accept is the deaths of Turks and Muslims in the same period which are much higher than Armenian deaths.³³ When the Turks mention the Armenians’ share in these deaths, these views are rejected by Armenians. Armenians, who put forth that these deaths have resulted from diseases, starvation and difficult nature conditions, do not accept that Armenian deaths could have also resulted from these reasons. This is because, in Armenians’ minds, only the Turks have killed the Armenians.

32 Cansu Çamlıbel, “Diasporanın Haletiruhiyesi” (the diaspora’s Psychological Situation), *Hürriyet*, 18 April 2010, p. 7.

33 Justin Mc Carthy, *Muslims and Minorities*, New York University Press, New York, 1983, pp. 133, 134. The author has shown that 2.462.250 people have died which constitutes 18% of the entire Muslim population in Anatolia between 1912-1922 based on statistics.

Another problem which could arise during the process of mourning is the obstinacy of mourning. In this situation, a passing on between generations takes place. A generation which has not been able to mourn, usually unconsciously passes on this unfinished business to its progeny. The real trauma passed on by the generation which has not been able to defend themselves against it and which have victimized it, has psychologized and mythologized it. Historical truth has been replaced by emotional narrative. This way, a group's view point becomes altogether one-sided.³⁴

For instance, the number of Armenian deaths has constantly increased over time, much more intense violent actions have been added to the tortures, massacres and rapes, good Turkish images conveyed seldom have entirely been eliminated and inclusions of concentration camps, gas chambers and execution by collectively shooting everyone has taken place. Into these inclusions, stories such as Ottoman authorities promising Kurds that if they kill Armenians, they will be given territory, and Turks using Armenian gravestones for toilets has been added.³⁵

In articles addressing the Armenian question with the purpose to have a psychological influence, Birsen Karaca has put forth that writers have made special efforts to depict everything belonging to Turks negatively and have even gone further and used the art of exaggeration. Moreover, they have put these forth within the framework of their own mental designs and not as a result of research and examination. This way, they have ensured that the target group has perceived fiction as reality. In these texts, the Turk is "absolutely bad" and the Armenian is the "absolute victim, slave, miserable". Karaca defends that the reason for attempting to display Armenians as miserable in such an exaggerated way is to weaken the just truths of the causes of the Armenian relocation. More openly, activities like cooperating with the enemy, massacres, terrorist actions, and gangs have tried to be reflected as forced actions resulting out of Armenians' "despair".³⁶

By observing the proposal of Armenians during the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) organized in the U.S., how pathologic the psychology of the diaspora is could be seen: "*We will construct a very big monument. We are collecting money for years for this monument. On this monument, how Turks are bad human beings will be written. If you apologize from us right here, the monument will still be constructed, but then Turks being less bad will be written.*"³⁷ In addition to the explanation of this grave situation provided

34 Vamık D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies & Allies*, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1988, p. 176.

35 Julia Pascal, "A People Killed Twice", *The Guardian*, 27 January 2001.

36 Birsen Karaca, "Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yarattılan Ermeni İmajı" (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments), *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165-166.

37 Feride Cem, İş'te Portre: Vamık Volkan (There's the Portrait: Vamık Volkan), *Sabah İşte İnsan*, 28 December 2008.

above, it is useful to remember Auden's thesis: "If we had not possessed hatred toward the "others" within the distinction between "us" and "others", then we would not have any love directed to ourselves."³⁸ This thesis not only explains the situation of the Armenian diaspora, but also in particular violent, racist and discriminatory approaches of those living within societies containing the crisis of identity and feelings of guilt such as the Western European nation.

Being aware of the situation they are in, Armenians have some helping suggestions to escape this situation. The group victimizing themselves will expect their losses to be recognized by others, in particular, by its opponents. It is significant for the enemy to recognize the group's mourning and suffering.³⁹ According to Armenians, since Turks do not accept the "genocide", Armenians cannot overcome the trauma and still live in the past. Since Turkey's denial does not free the Armenians from the past, it prevents them from focusing on the future. Therefore, in order to become normal again, the Armenian society is connected to its enemy. Being dependent on its enemy for normalization⁴⁰ could further increase the hatred of the Armenians.

Armenians' extensive group identity is closely linked to the Turks' extensive group identity and in fact, cannot exist independently from the Turks. Therefore, the two Armenian identities of "victim" and "victimized" must exist internally together.⁴¹ The Armenian diaspora identity being established upon Turkish hostility, but on the other hand, the necessity for Turks to recognize the "genocide" in order for Armenians to free themselves from the past traumas is a sensitive matter seen as a paradox. Is confessing "genocide", apologizing and fulfilling the compensation requests of Armenians by Turks a result that must be desired by Armenians? From now on, which issue and which purpose will act as glue which will keep the Armenian diaspora together? Will it be possible to find another factor as strong as Turkish hostility and the recognition of "genocide" for them to stay together or protect their identities? What is interesting is that perhaps Turkey's recognition of the "genocide" will eradicate the Armenian identity and allow diaspora Armenians to assimilate. Considering that the primary reason for Armenia to remain standing is the existence of the diaspora whose population is much higher than Armenians', the assimilation of diaspora Armenians might bring the end of the state.

38 W.H.Auden, "The Sea and the Mirror", J. Heath-Stubbs ve D. Wright (der.), *The Faber Book of Twentieth Century Verse*, Faber & Faber, Winchester, Mass, 1947, p. 36 being cited by Vamık D. Volkan, *Kanbağı. Etik Gururdan Etik Teröre (Bloodie, from Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terror)*, Bağlam, İstanbul, 1999, p. 37.

39 Vamık D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies & Allies*, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1988, pp. 172, 173.

40 Gündüz Aktan, "Ermeni Olaylarının Psikolojisi" (The Psychology of Armenian events), 2 February 2002, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa'da Irkçılık ve Türkiye'nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey's EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 52.

41 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek. Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 203-204.

Another interesting and paradoxical situation has emerged when the Turks have stated to the Armenians “we understand your pain”. Considering that half of the Turkish population is immigrants, it is possible to express that they can understand the Armenians regarding half lived lives. However, it could be seen that Armenians have rejected Turkish initiatives of empathy. In the meetings of Armenians and Turks taking place in the U.S., the truth that the Turks have come from families migrating to different areas in the Ottoman Empire has been stated. Armenians cannot even imagine that Turks suffered too.⁴² During his observations of the TARC meetings, Vamık Volkan has expressed that the Turks openly accept that Armenians have suffered a great tragedy in 1915, but whenever they show sympathy to Armenians’ pain, they are driven back. He has also stated that even when Armenians openly request from Turks to understand their sorrows, they do not accept their sympathy.⁴³ Putting forth that great concern develops among Armenians when Turks show empathy for the 1915 events, Volkan has explained the reason for this concern as Armenians not wanting to lose the title of “the world’s number one victim”, thus they regard Turks trying to understand them as people competing against them and damaging their social identities.⁴⁴ According to Volkan, the key will be to find an empathetic understanding that they all have suffered.⁴⁵

According to Vamık Volkan, the issue of the Armenian “genocide” has now become a “psychic reality”. In psychoanalysis, a concept explaining the development of an idea stands for a person’s perception of how an event starts and develops by using the desires, fears, and spiritual defenses within them. This way, proofs which could change this situation will not create any changes. Today, “genocide” has especially become a “psychic reality” for Armenians.⁴⁶

Armenians of Armenia

Armenia, with its troublesome geography, is a country having greater and stronger neighbors and suffering from security problems.⁴⁷ Being caught between regional

42 Douglas Frantz, “Unofficial Commission Acts to Ease Turkish-Armenian Enmity”, *The New York Times*, 9 July 2001.

43 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek. Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 205.

44 Feride Cem, İş’te Portre: Vamık Volkan (There’s the Portrait: Vamık Volkan, *Sabah İşte İnsan*, 28 December 2008.

45 Douglas Frantz, “Unofficial Commission Acts to Ease Turkish-Armenian Enmity”, *The New York Times*, 9 July 2001.

46 Feride Cem, İş’te Portre: Vamık Volkan (There’s the Portrait: Vamık Volkan, *Sabah İşte İnsan*, 28 December 2008.

47 F. Sevinç Görül Alkan, “Psikoloji ve Psikanaliz Penceresinden Türk-Ermeni Meselesi: Mağduriyet Psikolojisi ve Büyük-Grup Kimliğinin Etkisi” (Turkish-Armenian Question within the Frame of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Psychology of Victimhood and the Effect of Big Group), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 216.

powers like Iran, Turkey and Russia, Armenia is a backward country suffering from poverty. Armenia has no neighbors in which they have friendly relations with. This country not only has corrupt relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, but also has tensions with Iran and Georgia relating to minority problems. We must recall that Armenia's political independence is limited and is to a large extent, under the control of Russia. Within their asymmetrical relations with Russia which takes on a brotherly position, the problem of settling accounts of the past with Russians exists. When the facts that Armenia is among the countries where the most immigration has taken place and the diaspora is larger than the population of the whole country is included into the above mentioned negative conditions, it is possible to reiterate that Armenia has the necessary conditions for the Armenian population to assume a psychology of victimhood. The thing which keeps the troubled Armenians standing and maybe the only thing which prevents them from giving up is once again understood to be Turkish hostility.⁴⁸

At the basis of not providing any space for good memories of the Turks and transmitting only the bad memories most of the time by mounting them, is the fact that the Armenian identity has been abstracted from the Turkish identity. This condition could be explained as "separation of identity".⁴⁹ For instance, following the great earthquake of 1988 in Armenia, the hostile neighbor Azerbaijan's proposal to aid Armenians by donating blood has been rejected. The point which Armenians have opposed has been the mixing of bloods, since blood represents identities.⁵⁰

No matter how victimized Armenians display themselves, in many of their sources, articles exist which defend how combative, strong, durable and successful a nation Armenians are. Their strategic plans and the pride they take in the numbers of Turks they have killed in their conflicts with Turkey during the Ottoman period could be found in many documents. At the same time, a "rebellious community" image of the Armenians exist which is displayed with rebellion motifs.⁵¹ Karaca addresses the incompatible human image of the Armenian community found in Armenian literature and in particular, emphasizes the "crazy" image used by man of letters William Saroyan regarding Armenians. Compared with other

48 Osman Sağrılı ve Cemil Yıldız, "Ermenilerin hayat Felsefesi Herkesle Kavga Etmek" (Armenians' World View is to Fight with Everyone), "Küs Komşu Ermenistan" (The Offended Neighbor Armenia) başlıklı yazı dizisi, *Türkiye Gazetesi*, 28 April 2010.

49 Birsen Karaca, "Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları" (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach) dated 25–26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

50 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 145.

51 Birsen Karaca, "Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yaratılan Ermeni İmajı" (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments), *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165–166.

communities, Saroyan puts forth that Armenians are not as comfortable about who they are and what their purposes are and have been in competition right from the start. Stating that the Armenians are crazy, but know how to suppress their angers, Saroyan defends that properties the other nations have such as obedience, simplicity, seriousness, harmony, enthusiasm, respect, ability, courtesy, and not being demanding do not exist in Armenian society.⁵²

The area which the Armenians inhabit has been in turmoil throughout history and especially has been used as a battlefield by large states. Therefore, the Armenians' political lives have lacked stability. Most often, historians have shown this instable environment as the reason for Armenians to change direction through radical ideas. Among the Armenians' decisions of change, radical experiences have taken place, even extending to switching sides on battlefields. It has been put forth that even 364 years ago during the battle between Persians and Byzantines, Armenians have changed sides when they saw that Persians are much stronger.⁵³

In documents related to Armenians and written by them, it can be seen that properties such as victimhood which gives them power or prideful traits like being rebellious and competitive has not only been touched upon, but also their insulting attributes have also frequently been expressed. According to Karaca, Armenians remaining unresponsive to the unfavorable articles written about them constitute a separate topic of examination.⁵⁴

In sociology, the view that the period of being indifferent to the messages conveyed by mass communication tools or accepting what is presented without questioning is highly dominant. Directly accepting the messages in a passive way, without questioning or criticizing them at all is called the "hypodermic model". The Frankfurt School also calls this the "numbing model", because bombardment of information destroys and numbs the abilities to think about the goal freely and within an extensive framework, and to question and critically approach the matter. In the interpretative model which is the opposite of this, the target group is able to compare the information provided to them with those in other sources and show reactions.

52 W. Saroyan, *Paris-Fresno Güncesi 1967-68*, Aras, İstanbul, 2001, p. 57 being cited by Birsen Karaca, "Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yaratılan Ermeni İmajı" (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments) , *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165-166.

53 G.H.Sarkisyan, *Ustanovlenie feodalnogo obşçestvennogo stroya i padenie drevnearmyanskogo gosudarstva*, bkz.M.G.Nersisyan, *İstoriya armyanskogo naroda*, Yerevan, 1980, p. 94 being cited by Birsen Karaca, "Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları" (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach) dated 25-26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

54 Birsen Karaca, "Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yaratılan Ermeni İmajı", (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments) , *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165-166.

On the other hand, Armenians are actually in a position of a “cheated community”. The Roman Empire has asked for the Armenians support against the Persians and despite obtaining their support, has not fulfilled their commitments to the Armenians. Similarly, the Westerners have also taken advantage of the Armenians while trying to destroy the Ottoman Empire, but then have abandoned them. Perhaps, the Russian have taken advantage of the Armenians the most for their own interests. The independence promised to the Armenians has been obtained only after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and has not even been entirely achieved. Even today, Western countries, by using Armenians, try to block Turkey’s membership to the European Union and in fact, harm Armenia. Therefore, Armenians are in the position of “a nation being used by great powers for their own interests and then being abandoned without being significant enough for those powers to fulfill their commitments”. It is unclear how aware the Armenians are of this, but it cannot be possible for them to not feel the psychological discomforts of this situation. Looking from this angle, the Ottomans seem much more innocent when compared to Russia or the West.⁵⁵

The point in which Armenia is at an advantage over the diaspora is disinformation power being at the hands of the state. In the Armenian national archives, thousands of documents exist in which the names of those killed in hundreds of villages in Turkey are written one by one. When Turkish journalists visiting the archives have asked for the original copies from the authorities, they have been told that the documents are real. However, when said that pens have started to be used in 1943, whereas the documents are written in pen, it has been put forth that the authorities have changed the subject.⁵⁶

Karaca displays the information provided in the “Armenian History” book, organized for elementary seventh grade students in Armenia:

“Christians under Turkish domination in which the Armenians also exist, were accepted as the oppressed society - subjects having no rights. They were devoid of all types of fundamental rights and the security of their lives and assets. Under the anarchic conditions dominant in the country, the Armenian peasants could one day lose everything their earned by working under difficult conditions for many years.”⁵⁷

55 Birsen Karaca, “Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yaratılan Ermeni İmaj”, (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments), *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165–166.

56 Osman Sağırlı ve Cemil Yıldız, “Ermeni Arşivlerine Girdik Orijinal Belge Yok” (We Entered Armenian Archives, no Original Documents Exist), “Küs Komşu Ermenistan” (The Offended Neighbor Armenia) article series, *Türkiye Newspaper*, 26 April 2010.

57 Hayots patmutyun, Hanrakrtakan dprotsi 7-rd dasarani dasagirk, Hmbagrutyam. Prof. V.Barhudaryani, ‘Luys’, (Yerevan, 1999), ec. 59 being cited by Birsen Karaca, “Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yaratılan Ermeni İmaj” (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments) , *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165–166.

In this example of disinformation, the facts that the subjects have not only consisted of non-Muslims, that “*millet-i sadıka*” (loyal nation) has been used for Armenians and that an honorable status has been given to Armenian citizens have tried to be erased.⁵⁸

Although the psychological processes of groups are similar to those of individuals, they differ particularly in the cases of reaction to losses. Feelings of anger and pain shared by a group may reach an uncontrollable pitch.⁵⁹ Although this condition could be eligible for diaspora Armenians, it may also be possible for Armenians of Armenia.

Karaca reminds us of several headlines found in *Ortadoğu* newspaper on 5 September 2005: “Young Armenian couple in Lebanon applying to go to Turkey for their honeymoon were confronted with the danger of being banished by the church”, “Armenian Minister of Culture emphasizing that it is necessary to look towards the future all together, was identified by several individuals as a traitor to his country for his words entailing peaceful messages”, “Van Kirkorian of the TARC was threatened by radical Armenians and narrow minded extensions of the Dashnak administration for taking place within the Commission. Kirkorian, taking his children and wife along with him, was forced to move to another state in the U.S.”⁶⁰

Research has shown that having incorrect information regarding Turkey has increased as the level of education has risen. This proves the parallelism between the increase in being able to obtain informative sources and disinformation becoming open.⁶¹ Disinformation is information whose truth is not important, which is even incorrect most of the time and which is tried to deliberately be spread in order to serve for a particular purpose. The existence of a common external threat allows the society or community to cling to each other, while also keeping them alive by keeping the society awake. The Armenian administration attempts to keep the weakened state alive through the “Turkish threat”.

58 Birsen Karaca, “Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yaratılan Ermeni İmaj” (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments), *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165–166.

59 Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies & Allies*, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1988, pp. 164–165.

60 Birsen Karaca, “Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları” (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach dated 25–26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

61 F. Sevinç Göral Alkan, “Psikoloji ve Psikanaliz Penceresinden Türk-Ermeni Meselesi: Mağduriyet Psikolojisi ve Büyük-Grup Kimliğinin Etkisi” (Turkish-Armenian Question within the Frame of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Psychology of Victimhood and the Effect of Big Group), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 219.

Existing differences in lifestyles, psychological status and interests between Armenians in Armenia and diaspora Armenians has led to tensions between the two societies. For Armenians in Armenia, the urgent and primary subject is not “genocide”, but the normalization of relations. This way, the border will open and the country suffering from heavy poverty will achieve economic prosperity. Since the diaspora Armenians have a rather economically prosperous life, they are not able to entirely understand their cognates in Armenia. It is known that in order to protect their identities and presence, diaspora Armenians rely much more on the genocide allegations than those in Armenia. Therefore, for the diaspora, “genocide” is always the primary issue. When rapprochement or negotiations take place between Turkey and Armenia, diaspora Armenians apply pressure over Armenia not to make concessions for the “genocide” issue and not to take a step back. The Armenian diaspora’s “genocide” obsession actually has a negative impact on Armenia.

Theses stating the exact opposite of this also exists. For instance, in an interview conducted with students studying Turcology in Armenia, it has been revealed that the primary issue is not the opening of the border, but the recognition of the “genocide”. The students have indicated that the problem cannot be resolved by apologies, because it is a territorial issue. Moreover, according to those participating in the interview, Eastern Anatolia is Western Armenia.⁶²

On the one hand, diaspora Armenians create discomfort for not being able to realize the condition of those living in poverty in Armenia, while on the other they continue to keep their distance from this poverty. In other words, while wanting the Armenian community and state to “struggle”, they continue to lead a prosperous life style and remain distant from helping out. At this point, it is necessary to remind you that they are very different from the Jewish diaspora who personally participated in the struggle by going to Israel.⁶³ For the sake of their identity crisis, while strengthening their identities by utilizing the “genocide” issue without being disturbed, the Armenian diaspora harms Armenia. In other words, while Armenia has aimed at constructiveness in their relations with Turkey, diaspora’s approach has been more destructive in their relations with Turkey.

Armenians in Armenia exist who are aware of the harms brought to their country by the pressures of the diaspora and Western intervention. For instance, Director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies Richard Giragosian has

62 Osman Sağırılı and Cemil Yıldız, “Sizinle Uğraşmak için Türkoloji Okuyoruz” (We are Studying Turcology to Struggle Against You), “Küs Komşu Ermenistan” (The Offended Neighbor Armenia) article series, *Türkiye Newspaper*, 27 April 2010.

63 Gündüz Aktan, “Bir İlk (1)”, 15 May 2002, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşina Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 67.

put forth that with the drafts adopted by parliaments of countries other than Turkey and Armenia, this problem cannot be resolved. According to Giragosian, these drafts are not the product of the Armenian government's work, but more of the Armenian diaspora and it is an action of European countries who want to punish Turkey by accusing them and driving them into a corner. Expressing that this brings with it more harm than benefit to both countries, Giragosian has stated that the place to resolve the "genocide" allegations is not the parliaments of third countries.⁶⁴

Apart from the differences between Armenians in Armenia and diaspora Armenians, clear differences even exist among the Armenians in Armenia in their approaches towards Turkey. Next to the more furious and strict political approaches of Yerevan Armenians, it could be seen that the approach in Gyumri has been more friendly, peaceful, and has primarily aimed at the opening of the border by getting rid of upsetting issues.⁶⁵

Turkish Armenians

As known, Turkish Armenians, together with Iranian Armenians, are not included in the diaspora group. Just like the diaspora, Iranian Armenians also having hostile attitudes and feelings towards the Turks, makes them no different than the diaspora within a psychological category. On the other hand, the Turkish Armenians must be evaluated as a third category since they are not a diaspora and are different than the diaspora and Armenians in Armenia.

Among a majority of Turkish Armenians, feelings of anger, resentment and revenge can be seen. For the Armenians, the subject of genocide is a newly raised issue which has not "yet" drawn many supporters. For the Turkish Armenians, as much as Armenianness, Turkishness is also an identity they take pride in. When the Turkish Armenians say "us", they include the whole of the Turkish society in that category. Turkish Armenians who participate in religious holidays as much as national holidays, also carry out celebrations in their schools. On significant days like the Republic Day, just as a majority of the other schools, they hang Turkish flags and commemorate Atatürk.⁶⁶

Either due to the society they live in or the pressures of diaspora Armenians, Turkish Armenians have several problems. During the period of ASALA terror, as

64 Osman Sağırlı and Cemil Yıldız, "Ermenilerin Toprak Talebi Yok" (Armenia has no Territorial Requests), "Küs Komşu Ermenistan" (The Offended Neighbor is Armenia) article series, *Türkiye Newspaper*, 23 April 2010.

65 Oya Eren, TRT1 News, *İzlenim News*, 2 March 2010.

66 *Tercüman Newspaper*, 29 October 2006.

a result of the negative approaches and pressures exhibited towards Armenians in Turkey, the community had retired into themselves, while some hid their identities by changing their names.

While the members of the terrorist organization or supporters are responsible, directing the offense and anger to the whole of the Armenian community is a problematic approach. Although limited, Turkey can come under the influence of foreign ideology and actions such as racism, discrimination and intolerance, which do not belong to these territories. It should be emphasized that those adopting these types of deviant views have come from extreme nationalists or fundamentalists.

It could be seen that Turkish Armenians are on the road of assimilation. Although negative conditions forcing them to assimilate, such as the ASALA terror, do not exist anymore, it is interesting to see that they willingly prefer to assimilate. The similarity of Armenian culture and life style to Turkish culture is a factor which makes their assimilation much easier. Yet, even just changing names means that they have been assimilated. On the other hand, the remaining factor of religion has remained to be an issue not being considered too much by Muslim Turks.

The greatest problem of Turkish Armenians is living as a closed society, although willingly, and assimilating. A second problem is, again willingly, existing within restricted areas for job opportunities. Based on all Turkish citizens being equal in front of law, although they do not have any legal restrictions, they do not prefer to work at governmental levels. It is known that invisible, implicit and indirect pressures, mocks, and belittling exist in society even if in small amounts. Armenians not feeling comfortable with their names, ethnic origin, language, religion, and culture, unexceptionally in all places and situations, is a great problem for them. If the equality in front of law of all citizens of the Republic of Turkey cannot be fulfilled due to this equality not entirely existing at a social level, then it is possible to refer to a great and significant problem. It must be reminded within the framework of social awareness that it is not the Armenians having Turkish citizenship which anger should be directed towards by the people of Turkey who are subjected to pressures from almost the whole world because of the Armenian question and who are constantly accused in the international sphere, despite thinking that they do not deserve this at all.

A much greater problem is the approach of diaspora Armenians and Armenians in Armenia, who inflict greater pressures than the Turks in Turkey, towards themselves. The diaspora, who do not regard the Turkish Armenians as real Armenians, believes that due to remaining silent towards being suppressed, being forced to assimilate and being insulted, they lead a dishonorable life. No interpretation of the “genocide” issue developing recently has emerged as another

reason for Turkish Armenians being accused of remaining indifferent. Here, the responsibility is in the hands of the Turkish state and Turkish nation who must take protective and defensive initiatives against insults and accusations directed towards their own citizens.

The Psychology of Turkish Armenians⁶⁷

Upon observing the group psychology of Turks, it could be seen that in general, attitudes towards a certain race or nation and in particular, feelings like resentment, anger, and hostility towards the Armenians do not exist. Most of the time, Turks have listened to stories of Armenian massacres, tortures and disloyalty with pain and sorrow. However, during transmitting what is described, passing on of hatred and racist feelings towards the Armenian nation has either consciously or unconsciously not taken place. On the contrary, shared moments with Armenians and neighborly relations filled with love have been described with great passion. While describing what happened, the Turkish side has not blamed Armenianness and the Armenians, but only those Armenians committing the massacres. Despite the disasters suffered throughout history, negative racism does not exist among Turks.⁶⁸ The reason for the existing differences between Armenians and Turks who have suffered great pains is that an identity crisis exists, despite it being true that Turks have been faced with problems concerning their identities from time to time.

In public opinion polls, much less hostility can be seen in Turks' stances towards the Armenians. It is not possible to talk about a concept called the "Turkish view", because the view point of the Turkish society is not homogenous. As much as those who resent Armenians, all kinds of individuals also exist among Turks who approach Armenians with sympathy and observe them without any discrimination.⁶⁹ Those regarding the Armenians as an enemy are not only a small minority, but also come from radical groups.

On the Armenian side, it could be seen that the approach towards Turkey is not homogenous. According to the whole of the Armenian diaspora and a majority of the Armenians in Armenia, almost all Turks are enemies. Moreover, it is out of the question for Turks who approach Armenians negatively to be radical about many other issues also. According to the moderates, their problem is not with the Turkish

67 "Türkiye Türkleri" (Turkish Turks) entails Turks living in Turkey. Since the Armenians living in Turkey and having Turkish citizenship are dealt with under another title, they are not included in this group.

68 Lale Şıvgın, An interview with Vamık Volkan, *Tercüman Newspaper*, 23 November 2007.

69 F. Sevinç Göral Alkan, "Psikoloji ve Psikanaliz Penceresinden Türk-Ermeni Meselesi: Mağduriyet Psikolojisi ve Büyük-Grup Kimliğinin Etkisi" (Turkish-Armenian Question within the Frame of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Psychology of Victimhood and the Effect of Big Group), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 220.

community; their hatred is directed towards the Turkish state since it has both caused these massacres to take place and has denied them.

Another important point is the approach taken towards those having counterviews. In countries like France and the U.S. where the Armenian diaspora is the most powerful, the authors of books which defend that “genocide” has not taken place cannot find any publishing house to publish their books. Furthermore, these individuals who defend the counterviews are even sometimes threatened. The same goes for Armenia. Not a single book could be found in the county which reflects the Turkish side’s view and no articles have been written in this direction. Looking at Turkey, it is seen that books and articles defending the “genocide” are written freely and censorships and pressures on those defending counterviews do not exist.

It is known that Turks have been driven from the Balkans and the Caucasus to Anatolia, have been ripped away many times from the territories they live on, and have been subjected to various atrocities. One cannot say that the pains experienced by the Turks are any different from the Armenian relocation. However, a significant difference of the Turks is that despite everything they have suffered, they do not possess any general feelings of resentment towards the nation or race which have committed atrocities towards them. Looking at the genetic memory, it could be seen that Turks tend to forget the atrocities inflicted upon them and is a society which looks towards the future. While the Turks are raising children for the future without hatred and hostility, Armenians are raising the new generations towards the past based on “transferred memory”.⁷⁰ For instance, during the TARC meetings, Turkish participants have recalled that they are also the children of those driven from their homes by Christians. While the Turks have not mourned or complained about their exiled ancestors, the Armenian life is built on not forgetting.⁷¹

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, problems of identity have arisen in almost all over the world. When the equilibrium between the Communist world and the Western world has been abolished, a majority of the nations have started directing the question of “who are we” to their selves. Vamık Volkan puts forth that the question of “who are we” has emerged when empires have collapsed and colonies have been abolished, for instance, when the Ottoman Empire has collapsed and the period of colonization of India and Africa have come to an end. While searching for responses to the question of “who are we”, firstly ethnic, then religious identities have emerged.⁷²

70 Gündüz Aktan, “Ermeni Olaylarının Psikolojisi” (The Psychology of Armenian Events), 2 February 2002, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 52.

71 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 208.

72 Lale Şıvgın, An interview with Vamık Volkan, *Tercüman Newspaper*, 23 November 2007.

One of the problems of Turks is their silence related to what happened to those Armenians living on Ottoman territories when the Ottoman Empire started to collapse. However, Turks do not maintain their silence only on the Armenians, but also on what happened to their selves. Armenians link the reason of Turks remaining silent to Turkish feelings of guilt. However, according to Volkan, the actual reason is Turks not mourning over their losses emerging with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks whose territories have shrank, who have been driven away from their homes, and who have been murdered, have not been able to mourn over what they experienced. In Volkan's evaluations, the person who has prevented the Turks from mourning over the pain of losing their empire, reputation, power, homes, territories and loved ones has been Atatürk. By linking the reason of remaining silent over the pain and losses experienced to new Turkey and its creator being "almighty", Volkan has conveyed that there was not time to grieve over painful memories.⁷³

On the other hand, when new Turkey was being established, war was not waged only against foreigners, but also against Turks who were adherent of sultans. Therefore, the sultan and Ottoman images have been perceived negatively by Turkish citizens of new Turkey. In the first years of modern Turkey, when value was only bestowed upon some selected aspects of the Ottoman pasts, the others have been denied. Thus, it should be stated that the silence of Turks regarding the 1915 events is in essence a part of a general silence.⁷⁴

Turks not being able to mourn over the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is important for establishing the basis of today's psychology. Vamık Volkan has expressed that despite mourning not being able to take place, the Turkish nation has found its power to exist with the new Turkish identity and nationalist feeling created by Atatürk. Since it entails the principle of "peace with the world", the so-called feeling of nationalism is not negative like it is in the West.⁷⁵ Stating that the Turks have just started looking at what they lost, after a long time a new leader has not been able to replace the charismatic leader following his death, Volkan has assessed this as a natural process.⁷⁶

No matter how much memory the Turks have full of victories and heroism, they also always take on a defensive position. Since Turks regard themselves as targets for attacks in almost all areas within the international sphere, it could be observed

73 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 205, 207, 208.

74 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 205, 207, 208.

75 A. Tarık Çelenk, An interview with Vamık Volkan, *Ekopolitik*, 28 January 2009.

76 Fatih Türkmenoğlu, An interview with Vamık Volkan, *Milliyet Newspaper*, 23 September 2007.

that they are sensitive to issues on taking defense and remaining defensive. At the basis of this is the extent of unfair criticisms and prejudices towards the Turks and Turkey. Therefore, the defensive and doubtful approaches within the Turkish community are not that unfair.

Looking at why and how prejudices develops, it is put forth that various factors such as direct intergroup conflict, social categorization, early learning experiences and several aspects of social cognition have an impact.⁷⁷ Regarding Turkish prejudices, it is possible to provide an example with David Hotham's⁷⁸ words:

“... Everything the Turks did have immediately taken the form of savagery in the eyes of Europeans, although the same has also been done to others. Taking into consideration the commotion aroused by the Armenian massacre within the framework of numerous massacres initiated by other nations throughout history, and the prejudices emerging from Turkish hostility whose roots go back to the past would be honesty.”⁷⁹

The Psychologies of Armenian Apologizers in Turkey

The “official” view in Turkey acknowledges that the experienced events are a tragedy and expresses that they share the pain, but that “genocide” does not exist among the events. The Turkish “official view” also explains with officials on every level that these allegations are ready to be shared and proven with all types of documents. Those stating that the archives should be open to everyone, that historians from all over the world should examine the archival documents, and even that whether the events constitute genocide or not should be addressed by an international court to be established are Turkish authorities who defend the “official view”.

Different than regions in the U.S. and France where the Armenia diaspora is most influential and many European countries where strict censorships towards Armenia and the freedom of expression exist, not only could articles and books be published in Turkey which defends the opposite of the official view and puts forth that genocide has been inflicted upon the Armenians, but also views related to this subject could be mentioned in various television programs, newspapers and conferences. Just in the 1980's an undersecretary for foreign affairs had already

77 Robert A. Baron vd., *Exploring Social Psychology*, Third Ed., Allyn and Bacon, Boston vd., 1989, pp. 110 vd.

78 David Hotham has worked as a reporter of a foreign news agency for a long time in Turkey, later has worked towards a book entitled “The Turks”.

79 David Hotham, *Türkler*, Mehmet Ali Kayabal (trans.), Milliyet Yayınları, İstanbul, 1973, p. 247 being cited by Gürbüz Evren, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi Işığında Ermeni Sorunundaki Çıkar Odakları (Benefit Rooms in the Armenian Question in Light of Colonial History)*, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2002, p. 239.

stated that 300,000 Armenians could have died in 1915 and that this was a great tragedy.⁸⁰ Therefore, there is no taboo in Turkey on the discussion of the Armenian question; on the contrary, this taboo exists in Western countries.

The most difficult and bizarre group to psychologically understand among the actors of the Armenian question is the Turks who assert that the Armenian “genocide” has taken place and who have apologized from the Armenians by saying that the only offender is the Turks. When a century has passed over the 1915 events, holding the generations of today responsible is meaningless. Similarly, how convenient it is for the following nations to apologize for what took place in the past is also a matter of discussion. While those who have directly caused the sorrows have not apologized and when this is impossible to take place, the apology of the subsequent generations would not be appropriate. Firstly, no one can be held accountable for crimes committed by their ancestors. Secondly, the generations of today are not required to apologize and even if they do, it would not have any legal consequences.⁸¹

More importantly, it is a one sided and double sided matter of apology. Based on real examples from history, the Germans apologizing from the Jews unrequitedly seem meaningful. Since the Jews have not harmed the Germans and are even unable to defend themselves, they could be described as absolute innocent. Therefore, one sided apology is meaningful. In the Armenian question, although the pains are asymmetric, they are mutual.⁸² Armenians do not accept any responsibility and do not apologize. Even more, they oppose the word “tragedy” being used for the 1915 events, because according to them, this word conveys that both sides have suffered pains, but no one is responsible for it.⁸³

Within this context, Turks apologizing seems both meaningless and abnormal. Groups in Turkey finding themselves guilty or being compelled to display themselves as guilty have initiated a campaign of “we apologize” in 2009. Two days later, those being responsible for the 1915 events have launched an “I expect an apology” campaign with the excuse that Armenians exist among them also. In a short period of time, the figure for those who expect an apology has been more than four times that of those who have offered it.⁸⁴ In Istanbul’s Taksim Square on 24

80 Gündüz Aktan, “Vah Vah!”, 20 December 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 163.

81 Ömer Engin Lütem, “Facts and Comments”, *Review of Armenian Studies*, No. 18, 2008, p. 20.

82 Gündüz Aktan, “Tarihle Yüzleşmek (4)” (Facing History), 14 May 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 132.

83 Gündüz Aktan, “Tehcirin Başlangıcı” (Beginning of Relocation), 19 March 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 94.

84 Ömer Engin Lütem, “Facts and Comments”, *Review of Armenian Studies*, No. 18, 2008, p. 21.

April 2010, a commemorative meeting for the Armenians has been organized. Only a very small part of the participants of this meeting have consisted of Armenian or other minority groups, but the majority has consisted of Turks in Turkey. During the meeting, only the Armenians have been commemorated, but the Turkish nation who has suffered sorrows, whose state has been destroyed, who has lost territory, who has given many losses during the war and whose civilians have been massacred, has not been found “worthy” of suffering pain and being commemorated. The unusual point is that sorrow has not been felt for both sides, but only for the Armenians.

The process of mourning is especially important in politically induced situations. Mourning might not only take place for one’s own group. It is possible to grieve for the enemy and his losses also. However, due to existing tensions and hostilities between the groups, grieving cannot take place.⁸⁵ According to Levinas’s ethical understanding, it is only possible to feel empathy to our near surroundings and to those being a part of us. Based on this assertion, Gündüz Aktan has defended that the Turks accepting the “genocide” with their feelings of pity must be explained as fooling one’s self or hypocrisy. It has been put forth that in psychological approaches, there is no possibility of groups making empathy without mourning over their own tragedies. The reason for this has been explained as the blockade created by the undisclosed pains of individuals not giving the opportunity for others to feel their pains. What kind of an emotional state it is for a community to give priority to others without feeling their own pains⁸⁶ seems as a pathological case which must be examined.

Gündüz Aktan has explained the contradicting psychology of the old leftist/new liberal intellectuals in an interesting way. While this group has fought in their early life against the imperialist West and “servant” Turkey in order to rescue Turkey within the framework of a revolutionary leftist ideology, they have been subjected to the state’s atrocities on the one hand and have been abandoned by the non-supporting society on the other. Despite this leftist group’s opposition towards the West, the West has protected this group on behalf of human rights and freedoms during a period where the group has faced injustices. The West being on their side, while being viewed as an enemy and waging war against until recently, has created a contradiction. This group has believed that if Turkey does not completely become Western, then they will not be able to survive. Therefore, Western hostility has been abolished; on the contrary, Western followership has emerged. Within the

85 Vamık D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies & Allies*, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, New Jersey and London, 1988, p. 164.

86 Gündüz Aktan, “Ahlak, Vicdan ve Soykırım” (Ethics, Conscience and Genocide), 12 April 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, pp. 107, 106.

efforts to change society of this group which has no longer been referred to as “leftist”, but “liberal”, a strange hostility towards the state and nation also exists due to the injustices and traumas experienced in their early life.⁸⁷ For old leftist / new liberal intellectuals, “from a Western viewpoint”, it is seen that the recognition of “genocide” is a principle of morality. In Aktan’s words, just as the Franz Fanon’s colonial intellectuals, Turks who defend “genocide” internalize the West’s racism and apply racism towards their own nation.⁸⁸ In other words, it is possible to say that the old leftists opposing the West are today using “kingship rather than acting as a king” with the title of liberal/democrat.

Orhan Pamuk’s words and the experiences following them also seem psychologically interesting. With the emergence of a “hero” like Orhan Pamuk, the “dark event” which the Turks “refrain from confronting” has lost its existence as a taboo and a stage where reality has been openly displayed towards the Turks has been perceived. Within this stage, the reactions of those getting angry at Orhan Pamuk also exist. The understanding of primitive nationalist and freedom of expression has not developed and the society being far from Western values have attacked this “hero”. The play has ended with the West protecting this “hero” from his own community and reproaching his backward society. While evaluating this incident, Gündüz Aktan has defended that the major problem is that “no icon exists in order to break up this iconoclast”.⁸⁹

The psychology of Turks apologizing in Turkey seems greater than the other sides of this problem, because this time, more than one problem exists. The injured and defensive identity in question is one which blames itself, sees itself as the only offender, sanctifies the West and even sees the solution of all problems as changing under the West’s instructions.

Another interesting point is how useful these apologies will be. Will Turkey pleading guilty and apologizing cause all promises to them to be fulfilled, such as opening the doors of membership to the European Union? With what kinds of thoughts do the apologizers take on such a great responsibility? What is more important than all these is the reactions of Armenians. Are they really ready to hear words of “I’m sorry, I’m guilty”? Actually, it will be very difficult for the Armenians to hear the apologies of “others’ and to forgive them, because it requires

87 Gündüz Aktan, “Henüz Amaçlarına Ulaşamadılar (2)” (They Have Not Yet Reached Their Aims), 31 May 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 139.

88 Gündüz Aktan, “Soykırım: Yeni Gelişmeler (2)” (Genocide: New Developments), 3 November 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 161.

89 Gündüz Aktan, “Vah Vah!”, 20 December 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 162.

change to take place within the existing large group identity. This will create a common concern.⁹⁰

The Psychology of the West

To assume that the Armenian question only exists between Turkey and Armenia is a great mistake. The impact and role of all countries referred to as the West or Europe on what has taken place and the events following it are significant. Europe has not just caused the First World War, which has led to the 1915 events and provoked the groups, but later on has also taken part in the events with its desire to identify the events as “genocide” and to punish the “offenders”.

The examination of Europeans’ psychology has not only been deemed necessary for being a part of the issue, but also for Europe being the continent where the most crimes against humanity have been committed. Genocide is a practice originating from Europe and is a part of Europe’s history and culture. Starting with the Middle Ages, numerous genocides such as anti-Semitism, inquisition, slavery, imperialism, witch hunting, the slaughter of lepers, scientific racism and similar examples have been seen. Furthermore, the views of great thinkers of the past such as Aristo, Kant and Hegel have provided a legitimate basis for racism.

European history is full of eradicating foreign elements or groups seen as marginal. Although it is possible to consider discriminatory actions towards differences or weaknesses in the European continent as part of the Greek era, it would be more correct to consider the beginning of cruelty and extermination in the 11th century. Firstly, Jews, homosexuals, lepers and prostitutes have been regarded as dangerous for society from time to time, have been accused for different reasons and have been subjected to cruelty. Regarding differences as “marginal”, thus “dangerous”, and eliminating them somehow have existed in European history for centuries.⁹¹

Based on European thought, harmony must be achieved within the society consisting of individuals; for this to take place, those being different must be cast out of the society.⁹² Europeans, who had believed that foreign and different groups clearly visible constitute threat, have conducted their process of elimination through methods of assimilation or extermination. For instance, they have exterminated the Jews, which the Europeans believed would never assimilate.

90 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 202-203.

91 For a scientific research on this subject see: Robert I. Moore, *La Persecution Sa Formation en Europe X.-XIII. Siècle*, Catherine Malamoud (trans.), Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1991.

92 Robert I. Moore, *La Persecution Sa Formation en Europe X.-XIII. Siècle*, Catherine Malamoud (trans.), Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1991, p. 135.

Genocide is the final point of racism. Within the ideology of racism, only othering is not present, the demonization of the other also exists. Just as genocide, the mother land of racism is also Europe. It could be seen that within the history of Muslims and Turks, a European type of racism entailing hostility has never existed.⁹³

The point which has made Europeans worthy enough to be examined psychologically is not European history being a history of racism, genocide and cruelty, but is the accusations directed towards other societies, despite having such a negative history. Europeans who have become the most ferocious defenders of human rights today, apply pressure over other societies which is most of the time highly exaggerated and have even gone out of line and defended the terrorists and murderers.

At the basis of political culture which has caused the Jewish genocide holocaust, lays anti-Semitism which has been present for at least 1000 years.⁹⁴ Regardless of whether being good or bad and no matter which culture or tradition they come from, Europeans have thought that the “Jews are Jews”.⁹⁵ The Crusades have also entailed the Jewish genocide.⁹⁶ Jews have been deported from England in 1291, France in 1394 and 100 years later from Spain.⁹⁷

The holocaust carries a particular significance among all other crimes committed against humanity in European history. The reason for accepting the massacres of Jews as a turning point is finding Europeans guilty for the first cruelty they have inflicted. In fact, not only Germany, but the whole of Europe which has not allowed the Jews to enter their country, have enslaved and tyrannized them, or have handed them over to Hitler’s Germany has been held responsible. Due to this guiltiness, following World War II, Europe has made great progress in human rights, minority rights, and rights of groups accepted as marginal like homosexuals. However, this progress has sometimes entailed exaggerated peculiarities. For instance, denying the Jewish genocide and even opening it to discussion on whether it really took place or not, or underestimating the experiences is a crime in Europe today. The reason for this is not to allow anti-Semitism in order to prevent a great disaster such as the holocaust from taking place again.⁹⁸

93 Gündüz Aktan, “Soykırımın Kurtulanlar (2)” (Survivors of Genocide), 1 December 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 160.

94 Gündüz Aktan, “Tarihle Yüzleşmek (4)” (Facing History), 14 May 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 132.*

95 Robert I. Moore, *La Persecution Sa Formation en Europe X.-XIII. Siècle*, Catherine Malamoud (trans.), Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1991, p. 108.

96 Yusuf Besalel, *Yahudi Tarihi (Jewish History)*, Üniversal Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 70, 71.

97 Robert I. Moore, *La Persecution Sa Formation en Europe X.-XIII. Siècle*, Catherine Malamoud (trans.), Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1991, pp. 53, 54.

98 Gündüz Aktan, “İnkarcı Kim?” (Who is the Denier?), 17 January 2006, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 176.

It is possible to explain the Armenians' accumulation of hatred and anger, which has gone as far as Armenians resorting to terror or distorting the truth with great lies. However, it seems more difficult to enlighten the reasons for Europe's insistence on the recognition of the Armenian "genocide" and the accumulation of negative feelings going as far as giving support to terror and punishing those who attempt to open the "genocide" to discussion. It is possible to say that the common aspects of both groups is the crisis of identity and their common interests is Turkish hostility, or in a more moderate language, Turkish opposition.

Although not as important as the holocaust, another factor which is effective in the protection of minority rights following World War II is psychology of victimhood. By means of Erol Göka's concept entitled "fake victimhood",⁹⁹ those being oppressed by the international community attracting attention and this attention yielding results has set some groups in motion. Oppressed groups or those feeling oppressed such as Romans, Kurds and Armenians have taken advantage of Europeans' favoring¹⁰⁰ the oppressed through their psychology of guilt. Based on psychological analyses, those benefiting from the advantage of the oppressed are in fact those being strong and responsible for the victimhood of others, because this idea puts forth that they try to purge their own crimes this way.¹⁰¹ A clear example is those causing World War I and being responsible for the experienced tragedies are today accusing Turkey of "genocide". Just as the Armenians and Turks have not caused this war, they have also been among the communities suffering the most sorrows.

The most interesting allegation put forth by Europeans and Armenians together is that Hitler has learned genocide from Turks. The allegation that the Turks have first committed "genocide" against Armenians and that Hitler has taken this as an example is to the benefit of Armenians and Germans. While the Armenians have strongly gone down in history as "the first nation to face genocide", Germans have reduced their burdens of responsibility and crime. This way, genocide has not longer been considered as a method belonging to Germans / Europeans. On the other hand, by simplifying "genocide" this way, the thought that "in history, genocide has been committed in all periods, in all places" has been adopted.¹⁰²

99 Erol Göka, "Ermeni Sorununun (Gözden Kaçan) Psikolojik Boyutu" (the Psychological Dimension of the Armenian Question), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 205.

100 F. Sevinç Görül Alkan, "Psikoloji ve Psikanaliz Penceresinden Türk-Ermeni Meselesi: Mağduriyet Psikolojisi ve Büyük-Grup Kimliğinin Etkisi" (Turkish-Armenian Question within the Frame of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Psychology of Victimhood and the Effect of Big Group), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 213.

101 Erol Göka, "Ermeni Sorununun (Gözden Kaçan) Psikolojik Boyutu" (the Psychological Dimension of the Armenian Question), *Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*, Ömer Engin Lütem (ed.), Extended 2nd edition, Terazi Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009, p. 205-206.

102 Gündüz Aktan, "Artan Sorunlar" (Increasing Problems), 21 January 2006, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa'da Irkçılık ve Türkiye'nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey's EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 172.

Communities confessing, apologizing or being found guilty, have also started putting forth that the same crime has been committed by others. This psychology is similar to the effort of finding an accomplice, because many European countries being guilty of genocide have started pressuring Turkey by stating “you confess your crime just like we did”. Among the top of the most obvious examples of these types of countries is Switzerland. Shortly after being found guilty of crimes like turning down the Jewish refugees during World War II, ill treating them, and making them work as slaves, the Parliament of Switzerland has adopted the resolution foreseeing the recognition of the “genocide”. This action could be assessed as accusing Turkey, which they regard as the “other”, in order to evade their wounds or making Turkey the scapegoat with the purpose of defending themselves towards their own racist tradition.¹⁰³ It is also necessary to note that Switzerland is a state composed of three separate national minorities, fears fragmentation and due to this fear, prefers to remain outside the European Union and also finds the defense of rights of minorities all over the world very important for their own internal balance.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, in comparison to other Western countries, the Swedish Parliament which has committed a serious crime against humanity of sterilizing, according to law, ethnic groups who they find to be different or who they do not want to mix with, has accepted the Pontus Romans, Chaldeans and Syrians together with the Armenians as nations being subjected to genocide by the Ottomans.

It could be seen that in all Western countries which strongly accuse Turkey of the Armenian “genocide” and which recognize it, a history of crime against humanity which is tried to be covered up exists. Sterilizing initiatives of Belgium in the Congo, France in Rwanda and Algeria, the Greeks in Cyprus, Greece in Western Thrace, Holland in Srebrenica and Indonesia, and Sweden against the Sami and the “ordinary race” in their own country, along with the treatments of all imperial powers towards origins of Africa could be shown as examples of crimes against humanity such as genocide and massacres. Some of these countries still not confessing their crimes increases their feelings of guilt and makes them more aggressive in accusing other countries. Moreover, in order to conceal what has taken place, some countries like France see these periods as a necessary and positive part of their history.

Although Europe seems like a developed civilization which should be taken as an

103 Gündüz Aktan, “Asıl Sorun” (The Main Problem), 3 April 2002, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği* (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership), Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 61; “İsviçre ve Ermeni Meselesi”, 28 July 2005, pp. 144–146.

104 Gündüz Aktan, “Artan Sorunlar” (Increasing Problems), 21 January 2006, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği* (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership), Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 172.

example for their freedom of expression, putting aside the crimes it has committed in the past or the rejecting of these crimes, it silences those arguing that genocide has not taken place towards the Armenians and only allows those supporting the “genocide” to talk. In the meetings held in European countries, the opponents of “genocide” are not invited and even if they are, their rights to ask questions are restricted.¹⁰⁵ In meetings open to the press, restrictions have been brought on only the Turkish press. It is known that some academicians and politicians have been punished in European countries for denying the “genocide”. News has been published that in France, a 13 year old Turkish student has been suspended from school for rejecting the “genocide” and more interestingly, has been requested to prepare homework on the “genocide”.¹⁰⁶ The contradicting essential point is that Europeans who punish those opposing the “genocide” in their countries resents those criticizing the supporters of “genocide” in Turkey.

The connection between the Armenian question and Europe is not only limited to the psychology of victimhood or the search for a partner in crime. Although not clearly seen, the religion dimension of the issue is also important. Armenians mention at every opportunity that they are the first “state” to formally accept Christianity. By showing the common area they possess, Armenians try to seem sympathetic to the Christians who are powerful within the international system. In this context, they have frequently presented themselves to the public with the image in articles that they are “victims who have sacrificed themselves for the Christian world”. However, in different articles, it is seen that the Armenians have used Christianity as an instrument to become a state. Therefore, this contradicts the image of a nation choosing to be victims for the sake of Christianity.¹⁰⁷

The common ground of Christianity is not only beneficial to Armenians, but to the interests of the whole Christian community. This way, instead of the Armenians, the West could show the Christians as the victims of “genocide”. For the Westerners, it is very important that the Muslims have committed genocide against Christians, because genocide which has originated from the Western world and which is known to belong to this world has become a “general” phenomenon. Therefore, it has been revealed that genocides have not only been committed by

105 Gündüz Aktan, “Henüz Amaçlarına Ulaşamadılar (1)” (They Have Not Yet Reached Their Aims), 28 May 2005, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşina Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 135–137; “Bil Bilseler” (If Only They Knew), 27 September 2005, pp. 147–149.

106 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/12974305.asp?gid=229> being cited by Birsen Karaca, “Yeni Bir Toplumun Bellek Oluşturma Çabalarına Ermeni Senaristlerin Katkıları” (Contributions of Armenian scenarists to Form a New Social Memory), the invited spokesman to the education program entitled *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri: Disiplinlerarası Yaklaşım* (Turkish-Armenian Relations: an Interdisciplinary Approach) dated 25–26 December 2009 and organized by the Political Psychology Institute.

107 Birsen Karaca, “Ermeni Kitle İletişim Araçlarında Yaratılan Ermeni İmajı” (The Armenian Image Created in Armenian Mass Media Instruments), *Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal*, No. 14, 2004, pp. 165–166.

Europeans and the crime has once again been relieved by sharing the responsibility with others.

The only matter which is notable at this point is not the relieving of the crime. At the same time, directing this crime towards the Turks is as significant. Racist thoughts and feelings of hatred of the West are generally directed towards the Turks. However, when psychologically evaluating it, it is seen that the Europeans attempt to “deplacé” (change places) these thoughts; in other words, try to change their direction. By trying to impose their feelings on the Turks, they are able to think in a way such as “Turks are racist, they possess racist hatred towards the Kurds, after all they had done the same to Armenians”. With these theses, they are able to strengthen their thoughts.¹⁰⁸

It must be reminded that decisions of some Western countries which recognize the “genocide” or which considers the denial of “genocide” as a crime lacks a legal basis and therefore, is not very binding. At the basis of these decisions or legislative article types of points come domestic political games or psychological gains. Just as the Armenian diaspora being dependent on Turkish hostility in order to exist without assimilating, a psychological issue has developed where it seems that the West is dependent on Turkey in order to confess their sins.¹⁰⁹

Genocide, which is the final stage of racism, must be analyzed by Europeans at a psychological level. However, by sometimes emphasizing principles such as human rights or democracy for effect, Europe tries to conceal their genocide history, culture and psychology. The point reached today is no matter how developed the principles of human rights and democracy are in Europe compared to many other places in the world, it remains incapable of protecting all people. Racism, discrimination, cultural genocide, extreme rightist and neo-nazi political activities still strongly existing in Europe is a situation which must be taken notice of.

Conclusion

It seems that the solution of the problem known as the Armenian question exists in the facts based on historical documents or judicial interpretations. This idea which rationally seems correct has lost its validity in the real world. Other non-concrete factors such as domestic and foreign policies, economic relations, money, and

108 Gündüz Aktan, “Artan Sorunlar”, 21 January 2006, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 172.

109 Gündüz Aktan, “Fransa ve Soykırım” (France and Genocide), 13 June 1998, *Açık Kriptolar. Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları, Avrupa’da Irkçılık ve Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği (Open Cryptos. Armenian Genocide Allegations, Racism in Europe and Turkey’s EU Membership)*, Aşına Kitaplar, Ankara, 2006, p. 17.

interests also exist within this issue. However, the essential and primary concern in the lowermost layer of this problem is psychological. Without fulfilling the psychological settlement and treatment of all parties taking part in this issue, it seems difficult to reach a solution.

The sides not recognizing each other and therefore, not understanding each other's psychologies is an important problem. Turkish-Armenian dialogue remaining restricted and the two sides not closely knowing each other causes others to intervene and complicates the solution. By stating that "we have been dependent on Switzerland in order to hold each other's hands", Giragosian, Director of the Armenian Center for National and Strategic Studies, has drawn attention to the consequences of permitting other actors to intervene.¹¹⁰ Another example such as the sides coming together in Washington and not in one of the participating countries to the problem signifies the discontinuity of dialogue and insufficient relations and shows that the solution of the problem is more difficult than it seems.

Examining the Armenian question with a psychological approach, how inaccurate it is to propose leaving the past behind and focusing on the future emerges. The concept known as "time collapse" which has been thoroughly explained above has made the resolution of battles more complex, because in formal diplomacy, what is requested from the participants is to "not go the past, remain in the present". However, mentioning past traumas and allowing feelings to be brought to light is sometimes necessary.¹¹¹ Covering up feelings and issues related to the past, not mentioning them and putting them aside is not what is important. The correct behavior is to distinguish past experiences from the problems of today and be able to leave them where they belong in the past. Only this way will the present problems be able to be discussed in a more realistic way.¹¹²

Strict and hostile stances seen throughout the dialogues of groups suffering from long-term battles can be softened. Therefore, due to accusations and mutual arguments, the structure of the discourses could be changed to all sides explaining their stances. Then, real and successful negotiations could come about. What must be done is to create an "enlargement of time", bring the reflections under examination, identify hidden emotions and fantasies, change the idea of black-white and encourage them to start mourning.¹¹³

110 Osman Sağırlı ve Cemil Yıldız, "Ermenilerin Toprak Talebi Yok" (Armenians Have No Territorial Requests), "Küs Komşu Ermenistan" (The Offended Neighbor Armenia) article series, *Türkiye Newspaper*, 23 April 2010.

111 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 305.

112 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 306.

113 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme (Killing on Behalf of Identity a Research on Bloody Wars)*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 315.

Even if the past is discussed and revealed, feelings of hatred and anger are exposed, accusations are made and mourning takes place, an environment of healthy discussion and dialogue might still not develop. This is because, the reason of Armenians' existence is victimhood of "genocide" and other matters related to this. In order for Armenians to accept the empathy, apology and understanding of Turks, problems on the Armenian identity must also be abolished. The factor identifying who the Armenians are today as a group is the cruelty they have suffered to a great extent.¹¹⁴ Since the recognition of this cruelty by the group deemed guilty could mean that the Armenians will be eliminated, it is necessary for a process such as establishing the identity on different grounds, which even seems difficult in the medium term.

The idea of a group or its leader apologizing from another group could be difficult to achieve if the necessary foundation is actually prepared. To be forgiven will only be possible if the sorrowful group has mourned enough. The essential issue which should be focused on here is to not only participate in apologizing, but also to aid in the task of mourning. To settle big stubborn group battles without going into details and devoting a long time does not seem very sufficient.¹¹⁵

Related to the Armenian question, many groups with different psychologies such as accusations, announcements of offenders, punishments, apologies, waiting for an apology, turning down apologies, empathies, and individuals being concerned due to empathy exist. The anecdote in Osman Sağırlı and Cemil Yıldız's article series composed of their visit to Armenia and their interviews humorously summarizes the problem of "who will bring who to account from whom":¹¹⁶

"While passing in front of a restaurant, a man has noticed the sign on the window: 'You eat, your grandchild will pay!' He enters inside and eats his fill. Just when walking out the door, someone has said 'sir check'. 'Don't you see the sign?' the man has snapped back. 'The sign is correct sir we don't want the check of what you ate. We want that of your grandfather' they have said."

114 Vamık Volkan, *Kimlik Adına Öldürmek Kanlı Çatışmalar Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, Medine Banu Büyükkal (trans.), Everest, İstanbul, 2007, p. 202.

115 Vamık D. Volkan, *Kanbağı Etnik Gururdan Etnik Teröre*, Bağlam, İstanbul, 1999, p. 266.

116 Osman Sağırlı and Cemil Yıldız, "Ermenilerin hayat Felsefesi Herkesle Kavga Etmek", "Küs Komşu Ermenistan" article series, *Türkiye Newspaper*, 28 April 2010.

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A PROBLEM IN TURKEY-US RELATIONS IN THE 1980'S: ARMENIAN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

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Abstract: *In the 1980s there were many problems between Turkey and the US and some of these problems didn't stem directly from their bilateral relations. One of the problems was Armenian resolutions, which were brought forward in the US Congress by the Armenian Diaspora to officialise the date April 24 as the commemoration day of the so-called Armenian genocide. This issue has always been considered as a sensitive matter in Turkey-US relations. Turkey's reaction on the matter was sharp. In view of Turkey's reaction, the US administration sought to prevent the Armenian resolutions from becoming law, because the American strategic interests may have been affected badly and the bilateral relations with Turkey, which was an ally of the US, may have fallen out of track.*

The US administration communicated the concerns of the US to the Congressmen and also explicated that the strategic interests of the US may have been affected badly if the resolutions had become law. As a result of the US Administration's efforts, Armenian resolutions failed to become law. The Armenian terror, which had been seen as an important method in service of the Armenian radical group's interests, was replaced by civil activism in the second half of the 1980's. The US Congress became a platform on which this civil activism supported by the Armenian Diaspora sought to be effective. In this study, Turkey-US relations under the influence of the Armenian resolutions are examined.

Key Words: *Turkey, US, 1980's, Armenian Diaspora, Armenian Resolutions.*

With the outbreak of the First World War, Armenians freed from the Turkish, Russian, and Persian supremacy had sought to find independent Armenia and following the declaration of mobilization on August 3, the Armenian soldiers, grouped in guerrilla bands, fled from the Turkish army, attacked towns, and slaughtered civilians.¹ The Ottoman Empire had to fight at the World-War fronts and with the Armenian uprisings concurrently. Against this background, the

1 İlhan Akbulut, "Türk Tarihinde Ermeniler", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Volume:50, No:1-2, January-June 1995, p.35.

Patriarchate was warned repeatedly; it was notified that tougher measures would be taken in the name of securing stability. However, not only the warnings remained unresponded, but also the Patriarchate continued fuelling the uprisings even further.²

In the face of the bloody acts of the Armenian committees and uprisings that had reached an intolerable level, the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior ordered the closure of the Armenian-committee centres, arrest of the protagonists and the confiscation of all sorts of documents on April 24, 1915. This order has later constituted the ground for the draft decision of the “Genocide Memorial Day” that the Armenians seek to impose on the US Senate and European Parliaments. The 24 April decision did not end the upheavals –on the contrary, Armenians’ violent acts of resistance intensified. At the point of being unbearable, as the last resort, the Ottoman Government issued the Deportation Law on May 27, 1915 and ordered the population transfer of Armenians and their supporters within the Ottoman borders. The Deportation Law is not a genocide law. It aimed to conduct the domestic immigration of the rioters to the outside of the warzone and extend protection to life and property.²

The Armenian Patriarchate, churches and educational institutions on the 50th anniversary of the 24 April decision in 1965, imposed the date on the world public as Genocide Memorial Day. Later in 1973, Armenians asked the United Nations, European Community, and European parliaments to declare 24 April as Genocide Day and recognize the Armenian genocide of 1915 as the first genocide of the 20th century. Upon the opposition of Turkey and other states with commonsense, the motion was denied. Frustrated with the failure of their diplomacy, Armenians such as ASALA’s leader Agopyan and institutions such as the Armenian Studies Institute at Massachusetts suggested the imperativeness of terror. Throughout the 1970s, radical Armenian groups viewed terror as their way of struggle with Turkey. The Armenian terror lasted until the second half of the 1980s.⁴

A chronological survey of the Armenian terrorist acts display that between 1973 and 1985, 193 terrorist acts took place. From the second half of the 1980s, the terrorist acts grew into civilian initiatives.⁵ With its terrorist acts, ASALA sought to raise awareness for the Armenian genocide and draw the attention of the world public and media to this question. The civilian initiatives tried to build on this so-

2 İlhan Akbulut, “Türk Tarihinde Ermeniler” (Armenians in Turkish History), *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Volume:50, No:1–2, Ocak-June 1995, p.35.

3 Refet Yinaç, “Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi”, p.50.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

5 Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi (Armenians in History and the Armenian Question)*, 2.bs., İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987, p.CCXIII-CCXLVI.

called awareness and carried out a public-opinion strategy for the official and de facto recognition of the Armenian claims of genocide. This strategy aimed to influence as many parliaments as possible, especially the US Congress, to support the genocide cause and thus, to put Turkey under pressure to recognize the alleged genocide.

The American Armenians, who attained economic power and managed high level of organisation in the 20th century, have become the Diaspora leaders of Armenians. Armenian political parties, groups, religious and social organisations have accordingly moved their headquarters to the US or their US branches have assumed a leading role.⁶

In the bipolar international structure of the 1980s, Turkey saw the US as a balancing element in its relations with the Soviet Union, within the framework of Russian demands. Thus, the relations with the US bore particular importance. At the same time, the military aid and technology transfer by the hands of the US was critical for Turkey and its defence system. Given this strategic partnership between Turkey and the US, the radical Armenian nationalists focused on the US; one of the two superpowers of the 80s, to impose upon and maybe subdue Turkey.⁷

One may suggest that three factors played an essentially important role in the Armenian method of alienating the US from Turkey. The first factor was the American Armenians' economic power, which gave them an upper hand when compared to the Armenians in other countries and which enabled them to influence the American public opinion, media and political actors; in other words, which empowered them to lobby. The second factor was the Armenian conviction that the recognition of the genocide by the Armenian legislative body would be emulative for other states' parliaments, especially those of the US allies. The third factor was the expectation that Turkey would remain vulnerable subsequent to the dissolution of the good US-Turkey relations, which was a basic tenet of Turkey's Cold-War foreign diplomacy.

In the 1980s, American Armenians pursued ways to put pressure on the American public on the grounds that the Republic of Turkey was the descendent of the Ottoman Empire, which induced genocide at the beginning of the 20th century, and for Genocide Memorial Day to be recognized by the American Congress to remind this "man's inhumanity to man." The American Congress was thus seen instrumental for the recognition of the Armenian genocide. The fact that the American Armenians' initiatives had found support in the US Congress had caused tension in US-Turkey relations.

6 Sedat Laçiner, *Türk Ermeni İlişkileri (Turkish-Armenian Relations)*, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2004, p.79.

7 *Ibid.*

Genocide Allegations – Developments in 1984

The Armenian community and lobby in the US have been intensively active in the recognition of the Armenian genocide since the early 1980s.⁸ As a result of their actions, two draft decisions were brought forward immediately in 1984.⁹

On September 10, the draft decision stipulating April 24 as the Memorial Day for “man’s inhumanity to man” was accepted unanimously in the House of Representatives.¹⁰

With reference to this decision of the House of Representatives, another draft decision requiring the acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide in US foreign policy-making and implementation in the name of preventing possible future genocide acts was accepted unanimously at the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations. The full text of the draft decision of the Senate’s Committee is as follows:

“Calling upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian genocide, and for other purposes.

The Armenian genocide was conceived and carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the deportation of nearly 2,000,000 Armenians, of whom 1,500,000 men, women, and children were killed, 500,000 survivors were expelled from their homes, and which succeeded in the elimination of the over 2,500-year presence of Armenians in their historic homeland. The Armenian genocide and these domestic judicial failures are documented with overwhelming evidence in the national archives of Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, the United States, the Vatican and many other countries, and this vast body of evidence attests to the same facts, the same events, and the same consequences. The Honorable Henry Morgenthau, United States Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1913 to 1916, organized and led protests by officials of many countries, among them the allies of the Ottoman Empire, against the Armenian Genocide.

8 For detailed information on the Armenian Diaspora and lobbying please see: Şenol Kantarcı, *Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde Ermeniler ve Ermeni Lobisi*, İstanbul: Aktüel Yayınları, 2004.

9 İlhan Uzgel, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler” (Relations with the US and NATO), *Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy)*, Vol:2, Ed. Baskın Oran, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, p.62.

10 *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni (The Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry)*, No:9, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, September 1984, p.7.

House Joint Resolution 148, adopted on April 8, 1975, resolved: '[t]hat April 24, 1975, is hereby designated as 'National Day of Remembrance of Man's Inhumanity to Man', and the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe such day as a day of remembrance for all the victims of genocide, especially those of Armenian ancestry ...'

In his speech dated May 16, 1978 President Jimmy Carter stated that the Armenian Genocide was "probably one of the greatest tragedies that ever befell any group"

President Ronald Reagan in proclamation number 4838, dated April 22, 1981, stated in part 'like the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians, which followed it—and like too many other persecutions of too many other people—the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten'.

The House of Representatives calls upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide and the consequences of the failure to realize a just resolution.

The Senate also asks the President and the US Representatives to the United Nations to bring this issue forward at international platforms and to express their sadness towards all genocides, including the Armenian Genocide."¹¹

The decision issued by the US House of Representative and the US Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs was regarded with fury in Turkey. The declaration by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 11 and public speeches by Prime Minister Turgut Özal and President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Necmettin Karaduman on September 13 reproached the decisions in question. Similarly, the Turkish political parties denounced them.

On the US House of Representatives' decision of September 10, which declared April 24 as the day commemorating "man's inhumanity to man," Yalım Eralp, Head of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "*The decision in question, even though it has passed due to some technicality issues, will help an undesirable environment flourish to constitute ground for terror and new*

¹¹ "ABD Senatosu Dış İlişkiler Komitesi Kararından: Türkiye, 2500 Yıllık Ermeni Yurdu..." (From the Decision of the US Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs: Turkey has been the Armenian homeland for 2500 years), *Cumhuriyet*, 14 September 1984, p.8

violent attacks, despite the decisive stand of the US against international terror. Those, who has taken decisions to encourage the international terror for election concerns and petty domestic political calculations, instead of fulfilling their actual mission in the fight against terrorism will carry the heavy burden of the lives to be lost because of the international terror.”¹²

On September 13, 1984, on the same decision Prime Minister Turgut Özal said:

“With regret and indignation we witness that the US House of Representatives and Senate have tended to issue some purposeful draft decisions on matters related with our country. We assess those decisions taken on the eve of elections aiming short-term profit with surprise and concern.

We hereby submit to the world public opinion that the US extends its support to the terrorist acts of ASALA and similar terrorist organizations, hence to international terror, which has targeted the US citizens. It is a fact that such actions based on short-term political profits damage the good relations between states beyond repair –the relations established over the long run and with much hardship. Recent history clearly shows us how greatly such attitudes harm states’ long-term objectives.”¹³

In a similar light, President of the Turkish National Assembly, Necmettin Karaduman said on September 13, 1984: *“The arbitrariness of this decision is not understandable, since this is a decision which will provide legal support to new acts of international terror targeting multitudes including American citizens themselves. Those who offend their own allies for the sake of petty political calculations and extend their support to terrorism for a couple of months or so should remember that terror has harmed and will harm people of their own. On one hand, all civilized countries agree upon the necessity of international cooperation in the fight against international terror. On the other hand, at the national parliaments, which are supposed to urge the governments to further cooperate against terrorism, some interest groups seeking votes alone create atmospheres on the contrary. Such groups should be held responsible in the eyes of humanity. I hereby call upon the US House of Representatives and Senate to reconsider their decisions, which will result in damages and outcomes jeopardizing friendly international relations.”¹⁴*

12 *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni (The Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry)*, No:9, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, September 1984, pp. 18–19.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

14 *Foreign Ministry...*, pp.22–23.

Thus, he responded in parallel with Yalın Eralp and Prime Minister Turgut Özal.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vahit Halefoğlu, having summoned Robert Strausz Hupe, the US Ambassador in Ankara, conveyed the Turkish governments' concern and displeasure about the decision taken in the US.¹⁵ In his statement to the Turkish News Agency (TNA), he also underlined that "Turkey has, as always, taken the necessary measures immediately. I am not sure how they will respond. Nonetheless, they should be aware that Turkey will, from now on, stand firmer." Thus he drew attention to the fact that Turkey had always responded timely within the framework of international law, the US and other states remained arbitrary. As he also said "Turkey needs to be more careful and resourceful, because it can not afford compromising on this issue,"¹⁶ he emphasized that Turkish reaction against the US would be much firmer.

In return, the US Embassy in Turkey promised that the Reagan government would prevent the decisions' approval by the Congress,¹⁷ whereas the US Department of State assured the Turkish government that the decision did not have any significant meaning beyond reflecting the sentiments at the Senate.¹⁸

As the process progressed, the firm language of Turgut Özal was replaced by a more cautious tone. In his press statement dated September 17, 1984, he reminded the upcoming elections in the US and expressed that it would be wiser to wait until the end of the elections. In case the attitude that had greatly offended Turkey continued, the relations with the US should have reassessed.¹⁹

In the meantime, the US government expressed to Şükrü Elekdağ, Turkey's Ambassador in Washington, that Turkey should be more understanding in the face of the upcoming elections. Also, how the US government's attempts to prevent the decisions had failed because of the election atmosphere was recounted. The US and Turkey were expected to be on board again on the genocide debates only after the elections. Any decision until then should not have offended Turkey.²⁰

On the grounds that such decision could harm the friendly relations with Turkey, the Reagan government sought to influence the Republican Senators and emphasized the strategic importance of Turkey. As a result, some Republican senators tried to withdraw the recommendation decision on the "Armenian

15 "Türkiye ABD'ye Kaygı Bildirdi" (Turkey Communicated Her Concerns to the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 13 September 1984, p.1.8

16 "Ankara ABD'yi Yine Uyardı" (Ankara Warned the US. Again.), *Cumhuriyet*, 14 September 1984, p.1.8.

17 "Özal'dan ABD'ye Sert Tepki" (Özal's Harsh Reaction to the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 15 September 1984, p.8.

18 Ufuk Güldemir, "ABD Cephesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 15 Eylül 1984, s.1.8.

19 "Özal'dan ABD'ye Sert Tepki" (Özal's Harsh Reaction to the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 15 September 1984, p.8.

20 Ufuk Güldemir, "ABD Anlayış Bekliyor", (US Wants Sympathy) *Cumhuriyet*, 20 September 1984, p.1.8

Genocide” from the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs. In this way, the voting of the resolution at the Congress could have been delayed until September 4 and the intermission and the decision would not have become a Congress act.²¹

Nevertheless, despite the Reagan governments attempt to stall the resolution at the Congress, controversial moves were also made as three members of the Congress submitted an “additional petition” in favor of the “Armenian Genocide.” On the grounds that they had been absent on September 10 when the decision on “man’s inhumanity to man” had been taken and that they had not been able to speak at the session, they presented additional petitions to the House of Representatives General Council. Nancy Johnson from Connecticut (Republican), in her petition, stated that “Turkey’s denial does not change the reality of genocide,” whereas Edward Feighan from Ohio (Democrat) stated that “the US has offended the Armenians for not having recognized that Turkey did systematically massacre the Armenians” and stressed that a Congress act would soothe the pain of the Armenians. He also called upon the Americans to be sensitive to the “Armenian Genocide” and stressed his total agreement with the recommendation decision. Richard Lehman from California (Democrat), where the American Armenians constitute a large portion of the voters, extended his full support to the decision and wrote in his petition that “the fact that this decision has passed at the House of Representatives General Council without displaying any sign of partisanship is the proof that we will not allow the past and future mass murders by the barbarians.”²²

Meanwhile, at the US Embassy in Ankara, Ambassador Strausz Hupe met up with the journalists on September 27, 1984 and about the recommendation decision said: “The government policy is certain. It doesn’t foresee such decisions on Armenians and this policy won’t change.”²³ This message was received as a guarantee in Turkey and the US Government’s attempt to stall the resolution at the Congress became effective.

Turgut Özal, who had called the resolution “cheap and dirty politics,” in his written statement dated September 13 and warned about the worsening of the relations, said to the journalists on September 27, 1984: “We act restrainedly, because being the government comes with certain responsibilities...We are the ones with responsibility. We need to calculate our every move. We need to be careful about the next step. I was frustrated at the beginning as well. My first statement was quite firm in that matter. Nevertheless, it is important to keep things at a certain level.

21 Ufuk Güldemir, “Kongre’de Kararı Erteleme Eğilimi” (Congress Tends to Postpone the Resolution), *Cumhuriyet*, 21 September 1984, p.1,6.

22 Ufuk Güldemir, “ABD Kongresi’nde Ermeni Baskısı” (Armenian Pressure on the US Congress), *Cumhuriyet*, 28 September 1984, p. 1,8.

23 “Bilmeden Konuşmayın” (Don’t Speak without Knowing), *Cumhuriyet*, 28 September 1984, p.1,8.

You may not attain desirable outcomes in foreign affairs by yelling too much. Some issues may result in unwanted consequences, if fuelled up. We experienced similar outcomes in the past. We need to learn from our mistakes. We know our public. The Turkish public would not prefer agitation while handling its issues.”²⁴

Those words above demonstrated the softening of the relations. In his interview with Dr Joyce Stan, Director of the Near East Department at the International Strategic Researches, Özal repeated his words, “cheap politics,” on September 3, 1984.²⁵

Richard Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defense, having participated in the conference “Turkish-American Views on the Middle East” organized together by the Heritage Foundation and the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, emphasized that the recent decisions of the House of Representatives and Senate did not represent the official views of the US government and were received with regret.”²⁶ Having recommended restraint to Ankara, Perle said:

*“Turkey overreacts even to the most ineffective decisions of the Congress. What is striking here, the Turkish press does not distinguish between the US Congress and the US administration. This is not responsible action and does not serve the good relations between two countries.”*²⁷

While the US Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Perle recommended restraint to Turkey, the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Burt, on the subject of the recommendation decisions of the House of Representatives and the Senate’s Council on Foreign Affairs, pointed out that such draft decisions caused concerns over the US attitude towards the Turkish- American relations and assured that the domestic politics calculations would not be allowed to shape the US foreign policy.²⁸

Turkey’s Ambassador in Washington Şükrü Elekdağ stressed at the same conference that the “hostile attitude” of the US Congress had damaged the good relations between the two ally states and harmed the Turkish public.²⁹

24 “Özal’ın Geri Adımı: Başta Heyecanlandım” (Özal Tunes Down: Was Furious at First), *Cumhuriyet*, 28 September 1984, p.1.

25 *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, (The Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry)*No:10, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, September 1984, p.51.

26 *Ibid.*, 19.

27 ABD Savunma Bakan Yardımcısı Perle: Doğusundaki Boşluğu Türkiye Doldurmalı” (US Deputy Secretary of Defense: Turkey Must Fill the Gap in the East), *Cumhuriyet*, 4 October 1984, p.1,11.

28 *Dışişleri Bakanlığı...*, s.19..

29 *Ibid.*

The recommendation decision that had passed at the House of Representatives, but required the ratification of the Senate General Council and the approval of President Reagan at the final stage, and the recommendation decision that had passed at the Senate's General Council, but required the approval of the House of Representatives General Council and the President, were both stalled on September 4 as a result of the Reagan Government's efforts. Thus, the recommendation decisions failed to become Congress acts.

The re-election of Reagan in November meant the re-election of a government that would not support the alleged Armenian genocide cause. This was a relief for Turkey.³⁰

Genocide Allegations – Developments in 1985

In 1985, the Armenian National Committee summoned extraordinarily in Munich of West Germany declared that on the grounds of commemorating the 70th anniversary of the “Armenian Genocide,” they would launch an intensified campaign against Turkey on every possible platform including the American Congress.³¹

Subsequent to this declaration, the supporters of the Armenian lobby were involved in the preparation of new draft decisions to be submitted to the American Congress and came up with draft decisions. Those were draft No. H.J.R. 37 dated January 3, 1985 by Robert A. Joe (Democrat) from New Jersey asking for April 24, 1985 to be declared as the “Man's Inhumanity to Man and Armenian Genocide Day,” draft No. H.J.R. 192 dated March 19, 1985 by Anthony Lee Coelho from California asking for April 24, to be declared as the “Armenian Genocide,” draft No. S.J.R. 101 dated March 28, 1985 by Carl Levin from Michigan and, finally, draft No. H.R. 142 dated April 24, 1985 by Charles Jr. Pashayan (Republican), asking for the recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915-1923 in the conduct of the Reagan Government's foreign policy.³²

On the US Government's attitude towards those proposals, the US Secretary of State Shultz said: “The US government stands absolutely against the draft decisions submitted to the Congress. We do our best to convey to the Congress our opinion on the matter and concerns about the Armenian terror. However, as is known, in our

30 Sedat Laçiner, *Türk Ermeni...*, p.88.

31 “Ermeniler, 1985 Saldırı Planını Açıkladı” (Armenians Unveil their 1985 Plan of Attack), *Milliyet*, 1 January 1985, p.3.

32 “Tasarı Nısı Dörde Çıktı; ABD Kongresi'nde Ermeni Fıryası” (The Number of Resolutions is Four Now: The US Congress is Flooded with Armenian Resolutions), *Milliyet*, 3 May 1985, p.5.

constitutional system the executive body has the power only to recommend and convince. Such drafts are to be finalized and acted upon by the Congress alone. Nevertheless, the Congress acts reflect a point of view. Whatever the result is, it won't change the US Government's Turkey policy. It won't hinder our opposition to such drafts either."³³

Among the proposals pending at the Congress, draft No. H.J.R. 37 by Robert Roe lost its chance of being discussed at the session because of the inadequate number of supports that it had received.³⁴ Other proposals with the exception of draft No. 192 couldn't find their way to the Congress General Council either. Only draft No. 192 was submitted to the Congress.³⁵

The draft prepared by Anthony Lee Coelho from California to declare April 24 as the "Man's Inhumanity to Man" day was brought to the House of Representatives on May 21, 1985. Upon this development, the staff of the Secretary of State informed Turkey that all necessary warnings had been conveyed both by Ankara and Washington to prevent the approval of the draft decision in question. The US Embassy also assured the Turkish Government about the Reagan Government's stance against the proposal.³⁶

Reagan, having stated that he did not approve the draft decision No. 192 pending at the Congress, said: "I acknowledge that this is a sensitive issue and share the pain of those who had suffered during the incidents of 1915. By the way, I am also saddened by the fact that Turks and Armenians have not reconciled for so many years. I am nevertheless against terror." "...We are concerned that such proposals could encourage the Armenian terrorists to intensify their attacks against Turks and Armenian Turkish citizens. They could also harm our relations with an important ally. This is another reason why we are against this proposal. We hope that the Turkish public is now aware that in our government system, the executive body has the power only to convince and supervise the Congress. For that reason, when such proposals become Congress acts, they only reflect the viewpoint of the Congress. They cannot change my decisive stance in favor of Turkey and fight against international terrorism."³⁷

A statement by the Secretary of State expressed deep sorrow about the lives lost during the incidents that had taken place in East Anatolia during the decline of the

33 "Türkiye, ABD İçin Büyük Kazanç" (Turkey is a Gain for the US), *Milliyet*, 30 March 1985, p.9

34 Ermeni Tasarısı Kongre'de" (Armenian Resolution at the Congress), *Milliyet*, 26 April 1985, p.12.

35 Bill Summary & Status 99th Congress (1985-1986)" , <http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d098query.html>, 15 December 2005.

36 "Soykırım Tasarısı ABD'de Oylanıyor" (Genocide Resolution will be voted in the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 21 May 1985, p.1,6.

37 "Tuna Köprülü'nün Reagan'la Söyleşisi" (Tuna Köprülü's Interview with Reagan), *Hürriyet*, 31 March 1985, p. 1,5

Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 19th century. It also underlined that the US was in no position to pass judgment on the incidents.³⁸

As the campaign for the draft decision on the alleged Armenian genocide was intensified, 69 professors from various universities in 25 states and Washington issued a common declaration against the draft decision and warned the members of Congress not to commit an historical mistake.³⁹

As a matter of fact, the draft decision, which had been expected to be discussed at the House of Representatives General Council, was postponed in the last minute to an unspecified date in June and the owners of the proposal gave up on submitting it to the General Council. The Congress authorities later explicated that the House of Representatives Committee for Armed Services had been influential in the postponement of the proposal.⁴⁰

The members of the US House of Representatives Committee for Armed Services paid a visit to Turkey on May 27-31, 1985 and met with the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defense and Acting President of the Turkish National Assembly.⁴¹ They left the country with their promise of not allowing the draft decision on the “Armenian Genocide” to become a Congress act. Especially the promise of Melvin Price, Albert Bustamente and Marvin Leath who had signed the resolution prior to their visit of Turkey, was significant in the eyes of the Turkish authorities. Melvin Price, having expressed their sympathy with the Turkish public’s sensitivity on the draft decision No. 192, said: “I condemn all genocides. It is not possible to claim otherwise. Nevertheless, I am against this draft decision targeting Turkey, which has nothing to do with the Ottoman Empire of 1915. On this account, I have sent a message to the presidency of the House of Representatives and suggested the postponement of the draft-decision debates until our return. On our return, I will explain the meaning of this draft decision for Turkey to the Congress and ask them to vote against it. Even if the resolution has been approved, our opposition will prevent it from becoming a Congress act.”⁴²

The draft decision No. 192 was put to general vote on June 4, 1985 at the House of Representatives and as a result of the efforts by Turkish authorities and certain steps taken by the US government, the draft suggesting April 24 to be declared as

38 “Ermeni Tasarısı Haftaya Kaldı” (Armenian Resolution Due to Next Week), *Milliyet*, 27 April 1985, p.7

39 *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni (The Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry)*, No:17, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, May 1985, p.25

40 “ABD Kongresi Soykırım Tasarısını Erteleđi” (The US Congress postponed the Armenian Resolution) , *Cumhuriyet*, 22 May 1985, p.8.

41 *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni (The Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry)*, No:17, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, June 1985, p. 29

42 “ABD Temsilciler Meclisi Üyeleri: Ermeni Karar Tasarısını Meclisten Geçirtmeyeceğiz” (Members of the House of Representatives: We won’t Pass the Armenian Resolution), *Cumhuriyet*, 1 June 1985, p.3.

“Man’s Inhumanity against Man and Armenian Genocide Memorial Day” fell short of the minimum 274-vote and was not accepted.⁴³

Turkey’s Attitude to the Rejection of the Draft Decision

The rejection of draft decision No. 192 on the alleged “Armenian Genocide” at the House of Representatives General Council was received with contentment by the Turkish public and the US Government’s persistent attitude against the draft decision was appreciated by the Turkish Government.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which saw the rejection of the draft decision as a positive development, acknowledged the contribution of the sensible, realistic and reasonable members of the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, “it is apprehensive that this draft decision prepared within the framework of accusations and inconsistent claims based on fake documents and lies in contradiction with historical facts has been repeatedly submitted to the Congress and that it finds supporters at the national assembly of an ally country. This situation has been under our assessment.”⁴⁴

Vahit Halefođlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs also expressed his contentment with the rejection of the alleged Armenian genocide draft decision at the House of Representatives, but he also underlined that the number of votes casted in favor of the draft decision was “concerning.” On this issue, he said: “It is contending that the resolution on the alleged Armenian Genocide was not accepted at the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, it is also concerning to see that such a proposal distorting historical facts have received so many votes.

Recently, the members of the Armed Service Commission have paid a visit to Turkey and witnessed the Turkish public’s sensitivity in person. Their efforts on their return to convince the rest of the House of Representatives have been apparently influential. This fact demonstrates that those who come and visit Turkey act more aptly than those who haven’t.”⁴⁵

Genocide Allegations – Developments in 1986 and 1987

After the failure of the draft decision in 1985, the Armenian lobby continued with

43 “Ermeni Karar Tasarısı Temsilciler Meclisi’nde Reddedildi” (Armenian Resolution is Rejected at the House of Representatives), *Cumhuriyet*, 5 June 1985, p.1,11

44 “Ankara: İlk Bakışta Olumlu Sonuç” (Ankara: A Positive Result at the First Glance), *Hürriyet*, 6 June 1985, p.3.

45 *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni (The Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry)*, No:18, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, June 1985, p.13–14

its efforts of achieving recognition for the Armenian genocide. The members of the Congress, who had supported the previous draft decisions, delivered speeches on the alleged Armenian genocide in 1986.

On April 8, 1986, a speech delivered at the Senate proposed to declare April 3 as the day to honor the Armenians who had been freedom fighters and deported in 1915 from Anatolia to Syrian deserts and killed systematically between 1915 and 1923 in a number of around 1.500.000.⁴⁶

Similar speeches took place on April 22, 1986 at the Senate and the House of Representatives to commemorate the Armenian victims.⁴⁷ In the speeches at the Senate, the previous statements of Reagan and other American Presidents in support of the Armenian cause were cited, whereas the House of Representatives newspapers from the period 1915-1923 were read to support the cause for the Armenian genocide. Also, having referred to the Senate decision on the Genocide Convention approved in February, some members said that such decisions were symbolic only and would not prevent the future genocides from happening. The world needed to send the message that no genocide would go unpunished.⁴⁸

In the speech delivered by Joseph D. Early from Massachusetts on April 30 at the House of Representatives, April 24 was discussed as a dark day in history just as September 12, 1985, when draft decision No.192 failed to become a Congress act.⁴⁹

The efforts of the Armenian lobby began to bear consequences as they succeeded in bringing the “Armenian Memorial Day” forward at the House of Representatives Commission of Postal and Civil Services on April 23, 1987. The proposal carrying 138 signatures suggested to recognize April 24 as the Armenian Genocide Day from 1988 onwards on the grounds that 1,5 million Armenians killed between 1915 and 1923 in the Ottoman Empire were victims of a genocide, and emphasized that the genocide had taken place before the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. The proposal was accepted at the US House of Representatives Commission of Postal and Civil Services on April 22, 1987 by 18 votes to 4.⁵⁰

On the acceptance of the proposal at the House of Representatives Commission of Postal and Civil Services, İnal Batu, Deputy Undersecretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “we wish we had more proof that the US Government had

46 *US Congressional Record*, April 8, 1986, s.S3901.

47 *US Congressional Record*, April 22, 1986, p.S4628

48 *US Congressional Record*, April 22, 1986, p.H2101

49 *US Congressional Record*, April 30, 1986, p.E1470.

50 “Ermeni Tasarısı Komisyonundan Geçti” (Armenian Resolution Passes at the Commission), *Cumhuriyet*, 23 April 1987, p.1.12.

done all they could have done.”⁵¹ Batu also stated, “Those who prefer to humor Turkey by saying “the Congress issues numerous decisions on various topics” are in serious error.”⁵² In doing that, he responded to Richard Perle, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, who said and insinuated that the proposal should not have been given more importance than it normally had. “If the proposal passes as a Congress act, Turkey should not make a big deal out of it. This will not be the end of the world. The act will not extent support to the terrorist acts.”⁵³

In the statement by the US Secretary of State, the US Government repeated its stance against the proposal on the Armenian genocide accepted at the House of Representatives Commission on Postal and Civil Services. It was also stressed that the US Government would do everything in their power to prevent the proposal from gaining further recognition. It was communicated that the US Secretary of General Shultz had arranged meetings with the members of the Commission to prevent the proposal’s acceptance and that it was possible to stall the proposal at the bylaw commission, which had the authority to decide on the proposals to be sent in to the General Council. In the same light, the President of the Congress Jim Wright had the power to postpone the proposal’s voting at the General Council.⁵⁴

The staff of the US Secretary of the State, thus, emphasized once again that they were sympathetic with Turkey’s reaction against the proposal, not only because it damaged the friendly relations with an ally country like Turkey, but also because they took into consideration the Armenian terrorist acts that had targeted Turkish diplomats as well as 4 American citizens.

President Özal also stated that the decision at the House of Representatives Commission on Postal and Civil Service didn’t have a significant meaning, the decision had to go through other stages before it had been finalized, and that the US President had the power to veto the draft and whether he would have used his veto power or not would have been decisive.⁵⁵ At the same time, he sent a message to Ronald Reagan and drew his attention to draft decision No. 132 pending at the US Congress.⁵⁶

Özal’s message was followed by the recall of Şükrü Elekdağ, the Turkish

51 “Dışişleri: Yönetim Gerekeni Yaptı mı?” (Foreign Affairs: Has the Government Done What was Required?), *Cumhuriyet*, 24 April 1987, p.1,13.

52 “ABD ile Ermeni Krizi” (Armenian Crisis with the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April1987, p.1.

53 *Ibid.*

54 “ABD Yönetimi: Ermeni Tasarısına Karşımız” (The US Government: We are opposed to the Armenian Resolution), *Cumhuriyet*, 24 April 1987, p.13.

55 Özal: Reagan Veto Kullanacak mı Ona Bakmalı” (Özal: We Need to Look at whether Reagan will veto or not), *Cumhuriyet*, 24 April 1987, p.1,13.

56 Sedat Ergin, “ABD’ye Uyarı” (Warning to the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 26 April 1987, p.1.

Ambassador in Washington to Ankara and the cancellation of Turkey's President, Kenan Evren's visit to the US. In his assessment of these developments, Richard Perle, the US Deputy Minister of Defense expressed the displeasure caused by the "Armenian Genocide" draft decision – displeasures shared by many American citizens.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, he believed that reflecting the Armenian genocide question on US-Turkey relations would be a big mistake. The only way to put the problem behind seemed to be to solve the problem. Subsequent to the decision taken at the US House of Representatives Committee of Postal and Civil Services on June 18, 1987 the European Parliament voted in favor of a decision declaring that "the tragic actions that took place from 1915-17 was genocide as defined by the UN's General Council dated December 9, 1948.⁵⁸ Having thus recognized the Armenian deportation of 1915 as genocide, the European Parliament called upon the Turkish Government to recognize this genocide. Following the acceptance of the draft decision "Armenian Genocide" at the US House of Representatives Commission of Postal and Civil Services increased Turkey's discomfort. With the decision of the European Parliament, the arguments of the Turkish state had been thus denied completely on an international platform for the first time. Also, the term "genocide" had gained legitimacy on an international platform, which was preoccupied with the Armenian question. The European Parliament's decision would provide legal precedence for any future decision, which would beg for support at the UN or US Congress.

The European Parliament's decision evoked the severe reactions of the Turkish Government. In the statement handed out by Turkey's EU Representative in Strasbourg, these were explained as:

"The European Parliament's decision on the alleged Armenian question is racist in content and partial in character.

Given that the Political Commission has previously acknowledged its lack of jurisdiction on the matter, the decision, therefore, is received with indignation. With this decision, the European Parliament pretends to be a court of history and prefers to act on vindictiveness and partiality. In appreciation of the fact that the European Parliament was neither a court nor an history academy, many political groups with the European Parliament have refused to participate in the voting. We have received with indignation that this respectful institution, which has come forth as the

57 "Ufuk Güldemir'in Richard Perle İle Söyleşi" (Ufuk Güldemir's Interview with Richard Perle), *Cumhuriyet*, 3 May 1987, p.8.

58 "Ağır Tepki" (Severe Reaction), *Cumhuriyet*, 19 June 1987, p. 1, 15.

champion of human rights, has subdued its principles to the irrational demands of some militants. While thus justifying the past cruelty by the Armenians, the European Parliament has already extended its support to future tragedies of similar sort.

This decision taken by the votes of a minor group will serve nothing but the enhancement of the Turkish people's stance against the Armenian claims about the incidents that took place during the First World War in the East Anatolia.

The Turkish government denies these accusations with indignation."⁵⁹

Prime Minister Turgut Özal condemned the decision as well. Özal, who called the decision racist, one-sided and hostile, issued a statement:

*"It is not possible for us to take seriously this decision, which is clearly in defiance with the historical facts and based on unfair, ungrounded and ill-meant accusations against our country. This decision, which has been evidently taken under the pressure of the militant Armenian organizations and their accomplices, has compromised the prestige of the European Parliament."*⁶⁰ In this way, he communicated his reaction.

Subsequent to the decision of the European Parliament, the Özal Government launched an intensified diplomacy campaign to put more pressure on the US Government and to prevent the acceptance of the draft decision sent to the US House of Representatives General Council by the US House of Representatives Postal and Civil Services Commission.

During his visit to Turkey at the end of July 1987 to establish a closer cooperation between two countries, the US Deputy Secretary of State Michael Armacost, in the press meeting following his encounter with Özal, said that "the draft decision on the Armenian genocide does not involve Turkey directly. It is an affair related to the domestic politics and the draft decision does not have a binding character. Last year, the Turkish government reflected the Turkish public's sensitivity on the Congress through a very dangerous campaign. Then we have stopped the draft decision at the Commission. We will continue our efforts to prevent the draft decision from becoming a Congress act."⁶¹ With these words, he sought to mitigate the public's reaction.

59 "İrkçi ve Yanlı Tasarı" (A Racial and Partial Resolution), *Cumhuriyet*, 19 June 1987, p.1,15.

60 "Ağır Tepki" (Severe Reaction), *Cumhuriyet*, 20 June 1987, p.1,13

61 "Askeri Kredi Pazarlığı" (Negotiations for Military Aid), *Milliyet*, 29 July 1987, p.13.

Nevertheless, Armacost's words were not received with enthusiasm in Turkey. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement where the language was firm. The statement warned the US Government and the members of the Congress about the Turkish sensitivity on the issue and the undesired consequences that the draft decision may have born:

“As we have repeatedly explicated before, this draft decision is grounded in a distorted approach to history. Even historians cannot reach a consensus on events that had taken place 70 years before. If the Congress carries on with putting the draft decision on vote despite these facts, it will encourage terrorism and award the terrorists who pursued the “Armenian Genocide” claims to justify their terrorist acts. The fact that subsequent to the irresponsible decision of the European Parliament, the terrorist acts taking place in the East and Southeast Anatolia have been intensified should demonstrate this parallel between the resolutions and terror. The aforementioned decision has been included in the agenda of August 4 of the House of Representatives’ General Council, but we still would like to hope that petty political calculations would not take over the common sense. Depending on their previous promises, we must trust, the US will not allow such external factors to damage our relations based on mutual trust. Neither will it allow the finalization of the draft decision.”⁶²

When the resolution began to be discussed on August 3, 1987 at the House of Representatives, the US Secretary of State issued a statement repeating the Reagan Government's opposition to the draft decision. Turkey was an important ally of the US, a strategic member of NATO, given that in US-Turkey relations important national interest were at stake. Armenian terrorists had killed 45 Turkish diplomats since 1975 and the draft decision could be used to vindicate those terrorist acts. Leaders and electors in Turkey would perceive the decision as an ungrounded insult; hence the decision would eventually jeopardize the American strategic interest. Therefore, as the statement concluded, the members of the House of Representatives should reject draft decision No. 132.⁶³

Meanwhile, the US Secretary of State, George Schultz followed the same method that he had used in 1985 for the draft decision No. 192 and contacted every single member at the House of Representatives to communicate to them that Turkey was a friend of the US and a strategic member of NATO.⁶⁴

62 Ankara'dan Washington'a Çağrı: Tasarıya Engel Olun” (Ankara calls upon Washington: Stop the Resolution), *Milliyet*, 2 August 1987, p.8

63 *American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1987*, Washington: Department of State, 1988, pp.373–374

64 *US Congressional Record*, August 7, 1987, p.H7315.

Draft Decision No. 132 on “Armenian Genocide,” the Voting Process

On August 3, the draft decision No. 132 submitted to the House of Representatives Procedures Committee by Richard Lehman from California to declare April 24, the “Armenian Genocide Memorial Day” was agreed to pass on to the House of Representatives General Council by 8 votes to 5. It was also agreed that the draft decision would require simple majority rather than two-thirds majority, which was actually the more common requirement.⁶⁵

Prior to the session at the Procedures Committee, having believed that the relations would receive an irreparable blow, the Reagan Government had increased its pressure on the Congress. On one hand, they started phoning the members of the Congress; on the other hand, Şükrü Elekdağ, Turkey’s Ambassador in Washington contacted numerous members of the Congress and sought to explain the damages that the draft decision could cause.⁶⁶

There were strong reactions in Turkey against the acceptance of the draft decision at the Procedures Committee and its transfer to the House of Representatives General Council. The General President of the SHP (Social Democratic People’s Party) said:

“This attitude would revive old, forgotten hostilities and provoke invasionist tendencies, new fights –maybe new wars. What we need is to heal the past wounds. This draft decision demonstrates how inaccurate some politicians are in their fight for human rights and peace. If this draft-decision becomes a Congress act, no matter how trivial it has been presented, it will have negative effects on Turkey-US relations. Preventing this should be the US’s first priority. The Turkish governing party ANAP (Motherland Party) needs to assess all these developments from a realistic perspective.”⁶⁷ Similarly Hasan Esat Işık, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense said “Turkey can not see itself in alliance with those who accuse her of genocide.”⁶⁸

In face of the upcoming voting at the House of Representatives General Council, Ankara resorted to another diplomatic initiative. Acting Undersecretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mustafa Aşula summoned the US Ambassador in Ankara Robert Strausz Hupe at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and told

65 Ermeni Tasarısı İçin Karar Günü” (Decision Day for the Armenian Resolution), *Cumhuriyet*, 4 August 1987, p.1,8

66 Ermeni Tasarısında Karar Günü (Decision Day for the Armenian Resolution), *Milliyet*, 3 August 1987, p.8.

67 İnönü: ABD ile İlişkiler Altüst Olur” (İnönü: The Relations with the US could be Disrupted), *Cumhuriyet*, 5 August 1987, p.8.

68 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

him that Turkey was expecting much more serious efforts from the US government.⁶⁹

The draft decision put on the House of Representatives agenda of August 4 could not have been discussed because of the priority given to another draft decision. The discussions over the National Nuclear Regulatory Commission's draft decision were given priority.⁷⁰ The resolution on the alleged Armenian Genocide was put into discussion in a way which would not exceed 2 hours on August 6 and in the voting, simple majority was required. The discussions over the draft decision were procedural and not substantive.⁷¹

The debate over the draft decision on the alleged Armenian genocide at the House of Representatives was very similar to the draft decision No. 192, which had been debated at the House of Representatives General Council and denied in 1985. The speeches delivered before the voting displayed that there were 14 representatives in favor of the draft and 16 representatives against it. The main argument of the supporters of the Armenian genocide decision suggested that any future genocide in other parts of the world would be thus prevented.

The main argument of the opponents of the draft decision, on the other hand, stressed that the decision would harm relations with Turkey, a significant ally; hence the national interests of the US. The voting ended with 201 "No" votes, 189 "Yes" votes and 1 "Abstain" vote. For procedural reasons, the draft decision was thus rejected.⁷²

Turkey's Attitude in Face of the Rejection of the Draft Decision

The rejection of the draft decision was received as a positive step from the aspect of the future relations between Turkey and the US. In the written statement by the Information Department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the voting and rejection of the draft decision for procedural reasons were assessed as such:

"Turkey has for long expressed the inaptness of the political institutions' (such as the US Congress') voting on historical events from an ambiguous

69 Nur Batur, "ABD'ye Son Uyarı" (Last Warning to the US), *Milliyet*, 5 August 1987, p. 7.

70 ABD ile Kritik Günler (Critical Days with the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 5 August 1987, p.1

71 Ufuk Güldemir, "ABD ile Yumuşama Günleri" (Days of Reconciliation with the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 9 August 1987, p.1,8

72 Ufuk Güldemir, "ABD ile Yumuşama Günleri" (Days of Reconciliation with the US), *Cumhuriyet*, 9 August 1987, p.1,8

past. Only historians are qualified enough to judge such events and the historians have not reached a consensus on the "Armenian Genocide" discussions. The Armenians, by presenting their viewpoint as the only viewpoint, attempts to distort the historical facts and deceive the world public.

The rejection of the draft decision by the House of Representatives demonstrates the common acceptance of these facts and the triumph of common sense over ill-intentions. The result of the voting is a positive development in the future of the US-Turkey relations."⁷³

To Turkey's contentment, the draft decision was rejected on procedural grounds and it wasn't voted on substantive grounds. Thus, the House of Representatives showed that it didn't want to distort the debate over the Armenian genocide and the supporters of the draft decision had failed to manipulate the Congress as a propaganda platform.⁷⁴

The rejection of the draft decision was received well by Turkey, which had repeatedly stressed that such decision would have worsened the relations with the US. The firm stance of the Reagan Government played a decisive role in the rejection. The US Government's support extending to Turkey should be seen as proof of Turkey's strategic importance.

Genocide Allegations and 1988 and 1989 Developments

In 1988, because of the presidential elections, no draft decision on the "Armenian Genocide" was submitted. The question of Mountainous Karabagh and the Armenian-Azeri conflict diverted the Armenian Diaspora's attention to the Caucasus. Nonetheless, subsequent to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Armenian Diaspora reinvigorated their strategy on the genocide allegations. In September 1989, a new draft decision prepared by Robert Dole, the US Senate Minority Leader, evoked a new crisis in US-Turkey relations to have lasted till the end of year.⁷⁵

Immediately after the submission of the draft decision prepared by Robert Dole (Republican) from Kansas, Turkey launched a counter-campaign. Nüzhet Kandemir, Turkey's Ambassador in Washington, arranged meetings with the staff

73 Ufuk Güldemir, "ABD ile...", p.1,8.

74 Sami Kohen, "İstenince Oluyor" (It Happens When Wanted), *Milliyet*, 9 August 1987, p.8

75 Refet Yinanç, "1965'ten Günümüze Ermeni Sorunu" (The Armenian Question. From 1965 to Today), *Yeni Türkiye (New Turkey), Ermeni Sorunu Özel Nosu I (Special Issue on the Armenian Question)*, No:37, Yıl:7, Ocak-Şubat 2001, s. 268.

of the Secretary of State and some senators and explicated the undesired consequences that the decision would have caused.⁷⁶

The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz sent a letter to the US Secretary of State James Baker asked for his support on the matter.⁷⁷

When the US Senate's Justice Commission postponed the debate on the draft decision on the Armenian Genocide for two weeks, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a written statement to re-emphasize that the decision would have an "extremely negative and irreversibly destructive impact" on the US-Turkey relations.⁷⁸

Following the steps taken by Nüzhet Kandemir, Turkey's Ambassador in Washington and Mesut Yılmaz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Federation of Turkish American Associations in New York and its members all around the US launched a letter and telegraph campaign to the Senators for the withdrawal of the draft decision. In his letter, the President of the Federation asked for the withdrawal of the draft decision and warned that the decision would have jeopardized the American interest in the region. The letter sent by 27 members of the Federation to the Senate reminded that the Ottoman archives provided the best sources on the 1915 incidents and based on that information, the senators should not have backed up this draft decision. The letter also emphasized that in case of the continuation with the voting process, Turkey, as a NATO member and US ally, would have been extremely offended.⁷⁹

The political parties at the Turkish Grand National Assembly wrote a letter to call the US Congress to reject the resolution. The letter expressed their discomfort with the fact that those genocide allegations were kept alive for political purposes. In their statement, the Turkish members of parliament invited the US Senate "to act on commonsense and to reject the draft decision seeking to declare April 24 as the Armenian Genocide Day."⁸⁰

Mesut Yılmaz, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his speech at the Turkish Parliament's General Council, said, "the decision would award the terrorist acts that have killed 72 people." He also stated that "...a serious situation. The Turkish public has doubts over how the cooperation between two countries will continue in

76 *Ayn Tarihi (History of the Month)*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, October-November-December 1989, p. 5.

77 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

78 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

79 Kongre'ye Mektup" (Letter to the Congress), *Milliyet*, 8 October 1989, p.1,12.

80 ABD ile Tamiri İmkânsız Yara" (Irreparable Damage in the Relations with the US), *Milliyet*, 12 October 1989, p.1,15.

the light of the attitude of the American Congress. The alliance with the US is significant in Turkey's defense policy. Nevertheless, as in every democratic country, our government cannot ignore the Turkish people's justified reaction and indignation. A decision accusing Turkey of a genocide will, within this framework, result in irreparable damage in Turkey-US relations, as well as in development whose outcomes cannot be predicted."⁸¹

In parallel with Mesut Yılmaz who delivered the firm speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly condemning the attempts at declaring April 24 as genocide day, the opposition parties too criticized the draft decision harshly. The leader of the Social Democratic People's Party Erdal İnönü said: "The US Congress should be aware that US-Turkey relations are at crossroads. They should vote accordingly."⁸²

The leader of the True Path Party Süleyman Demirel stated that although he didn't think the draft decision would be accepted, "President George Bush needs to clarify what his stance is on the issue."

On the draft decision, President Kenan Evren and Prime Minister Turgut Özal also sent letters to the US President George Bush. In his letter President Evren wrote that the 1915 incidents were exploited by the Armenians for political purposes, research at the Ottoman archives should clarify the unclear points, the Turkish government rendered the documents accessible to the researchers and the draft decisions on the Armenian genocide submitted annually to the US Congress crippled Turkey-US relations. Before this "foreign and arbitrary element has been removed from our relations, a satisfactory cooperation between two countries would not be possible."

Prime Minister Turgut Özal stressed in his letter that the genocide allegations stemmed from events of the previous century and the distorted facts spread because the Ottoman archives had not been accessible. Recently, however, the archives were opened to the use of historians and the researches should unveil the truth. He also emphasized that mutual relations had been enhanced with the Bush presidency, but the Armenian genocide allegations was an issue to which the Turkish public was very sensitive and therefore, it still had the potential to damage these good relations.⁸³

Despite Turkey's efforts, the draft decision on the so-called Armenian genocide was accepted by 8 votes to 6 votes at the US Senate's Justice Commission and passed on to the General Council.⁸⁴

81 ABD ile...", p.1,15.

82 "Muhalefet ABD'den Açık Tavır İstedi" (Opposition Wants Clarity), *Milliyet*, 13 October 1989, p.15

83 Bush'tan Kesin Tutum İstendi" (Bush is Asked for a Certain Attitude), *Milliyet*, 14 October 1989, p.9

84 ABD'den Ermeni'ye Yeşil Işık" (Green Light from the US to the Armenians), *Milliyet*, 18 October 1989, p.1,15

Subsequent to the pass of the draft decision No. 212 prepared by the US Senator Robert Dole, the White House and US Secretary of State issued oral and written statements. In the statements they underlined:

“The US government opposes the draft decision. The US government sympathizes with the tragic pain of the Armenian people and their cause for the commemoration of the victims of the 1915-23 incidents. Nevertheless, to the same extent, we believe in the importance of strong and close relations with Turkey.

The US government is aware of the varying opinions on how those horrible events should be named. We hope that the Congress will reach a decision that will not hurt the Armenian people and the Republic of Turkey, the crucial friend and ally of the US.”⁸⁵

As the statement must display, the US Government thus began to pursue a policy to keep both Turkey and the Armenians content at the same time. On one hand, the Bush Government, having responded to Turkey’s reaction, expressed their opposition to the draft decision of Senator Robert Dole. On the other hand, by having asked not to offend Turkey, they insinuated that a softened draft-decision might not have been opposed to.

US Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs Roman Papaduk, in his briefing at the foreign press center, re-emphasized the US Government’s opposition to the draft decision, but also stressed that “the US Government is extremely sensitive to the Armenians’ concern about the incidents that had taken place between 1915 and 1923.”⁸⁶

The acceptance of the draft decision at the US Senate’s Justice Commission was received in Turkey with severe reactions. In his statement, the President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Yıldırım Akbulut expressed his discomfort on the issue and expectation that the US Senate would not have granted the Justice Commission’s decision. Thus, the Turkish Grand National Assembly conveyed its stance on the issue to the US and reminded that an undesired decision would have crippled Turkey-US relations.⁸⁷

In a similar light, Mesut Yılmaz the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke out on behalf of the Turkish Government and drew attention to the fact that the US’s attitude was

85 ABD Kaş Yapayım Derken Göz Çıkardı” (The US Makes Matters Worse while Trying to Help), *Milliyet*, 19 September 1989, p.14

86 “Beyaz Saray’da Ermeni Pazarlığı” (Armenian Negotiation at the White House), *Milliyet*, 20 September 1989, p. 10.

87 “Yılmaz’dan ABD’ye Uyarı” (Yılmaz: A Serious Development), *Milliyet*, 19 October 1989, p. 14.

in offence of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. This attitude was unacceptable and incomprehensible to Turkey. “We expect from the US Government to deny this draft decision together with the pretexts that it is grounded in. We expect to see the active attitude required by our alliance engagements. Otherwise, it will be inevitable for Turkey to draw the necessary consequences and make the required adjustments.”⁸⁸

The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, prior to the voting at the Senate’s Justice Commission had met with the US Secretary of State James Baker in the US and informed him that the Armenian lobby would have sought to influence the US Congress once again to revive the debate on the alleged Armenian genocide. The Turkish Government was expecting from the Bush Government the same effort that the Reagan Government had made. Baker gave his word.⁸⁹

In his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Mesut Yılmaz reminded the US Government of Baker’s promise and asked them to honor this promise.

In the same speech, Yılmaz also informed the Turkish public that the Turkish Government had in fact taken some precautions and in case of accepting the draft decision at the US Senate “those precautions will be permanent policies.”⁹⁰

Upon the speech by Mesut Yılmaz, the Acting Undersecretary for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hüseyin Çelem invited US Deputy Ambassador in Ankara, Grossman and communicated to him the message that the draft decision would cause severe problems. The message was conveyed to President Bush:

*“The Turkish Government and public consider the Bush Government’s opposition and influence on this decision-making process vital for the future of US-Turkey relations. Before the inaction of the Bush Government has led to a more serious situation, we expect the US Government to take a more active stance.”*⁹¹

The inaction of the Bush Government in face of this draft decision aiming to make the US Congress recognize the Armenian genocide allegations, and despite the official opposition to the draft decision, the Government’s discourse confirming the “sympathy with the tragic pain of the Armenian people and the necessity of commemorating the victims of the events 1915-1923,” showed that the Bush Government had to take a more active and efficient stance and that Turkey needed

88 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

89 Yılmaz’dan ABD’ye Uyarı” (Yılmaz Warns the US), *Milliyet*, 28 September 1989, p.14

90 *Ayn Tarihi (History of the Month)*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, October-November-December 1989, p.40

91 “Yılmaz: Serious...”, p. 14.

to take new measures to prove how serious it was. Accordingly, Mesut Yılmaz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, put the first part of the Turkish Grand National Assembly's measures into force. About the content of the measures, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense acted in strict co-ordination and secrecy. These measures did not mean to create tension. They sought "as stressed" to prevent the developments that could bring along tension. The measures were taken simply to clarify Turkey's approach to the allegations and how severe damage that the decision could have caused. About the measures, Minister of National Defense, Safa Giray said:

"These measures are set in accordance with the level that the Armenian slanders and allegations have reached. The draft decision accepted at the Senate's Commission. Now it is at the General Council. If the draft decision is accepted at the General Council as well, then we are obliged to put the second part of the measures into action. We hope that we will not have to resort to any further action on the matter."⁹² Thus, he stressed that the revocation of the measures were up to the Congress' attitude to the Armenian allegations."

About the draft decision No.212 aiming to declare the date April 24, 1990 as the 75th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, Turkey displayed its discomfort through written and oral statements as well as tangible measures. Senator Robert Dole, who had prepared the draft decision No.212, delivered a speech at the Senate's General Council to state that the draft decision should have never had an effect on US-Turkey relations, because it didn't target the contemporary Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Government and it covered the incidents taken place prior to the foundation of modern Turkey. Also, having presented himself as ready to listen to all senators and other Americans concerned with the issue, Dole said:

"I have talked to some of the senators. The US Government has been lobbying against the draft decision. Meanwhile, the Turkish Embassy has contacted many senators. They give the impression that with the acceptance of the draft decision, Turkey-US relations would suffer a huge blow."

With the draft decision, this is not what I aim. I am aware how important Turkey is to NATO. I appreciate Turkey much. For that reason, in the preparation of the draft decision, no phrase had been used that could be offensive to Turkey."⁹³ He stated that the draft decision was prepared to show the effects of genocide on the humanity and how terrifying it was.

92 ABD'ye Askeri Kısıtlama" (Military Restraints for the US), *Milliyet*, 20 October 1989, p.10.

93 Ermeni Tasarısının Sahibi Günah Çıkartıyor" (Confessions from the owner of the Armenian Resolution), *Milliyet*, 21 October 1989, p. 14.

Following this statement by Dole, who underlined that his draft decision did not intend to offend Turkey, the US Government expressed their unease about the military measures taken by Turkey and asked for the revocation of those measures. Despite the mutually agreed secrecy of the measures taken, the US Government gave some specifics about the matter. Within the framework of the measures taken, the US Government unveiled that the US navy's use of Turkish ports were restricted, the US F16 jets' bombardment training was temporarily suspended along with the ongoing modernization of some US bases in Turkey. Again, according to this statement, the periodic meetings on military issues between the Turkish Government and the US Embassy in Turkey were also frozen. The staff of the US Defense Secretary emphasized that Turkey's measures would have damaged the military cooperation programs and that they were trying to convince the Turkish Government. The spokesperson for the US Secretary of State Margaret Tutweiler confirmed that those military measures were taken by Turkey and they had called upon Turkey to revoke them.⁹⁴

In reply to the US Government, the Spokesperson for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Murat Sungar stressed that the Turkish Government was "cautious optimist" in face of recent developments.

The cautionary measures taken "within the framework of SECA have inclined the US Government to be more efficient. I would like to express this point in a cautious optimism. Nevertheless, we have difficulties in understanding why the US spokesperson has revealed the specifics of the measures that Turkey has taken. We will remain in cooperation with the US Government."⁹⁵

Meanwhile, the Turkish Government, having refused to revoke the measures to enable the Bush Government to stop the draft decision, communicated to the US Government through Turkey's Ambassador in Washington Nüzhet Kandemir that in case of the acceptance of the draft decision at the Senate's General Council, Turkey would have put another package of cautionary measures into action.⁹⁶

In this way, Ankara sent the message that in case of the acceptance of the draft decision at the Senate's General Council, a second party of cautionary measures, this time more serious and tougher, would have kicked in. As long as the draft decision remained on the agenda of the Senate, the first group of measures would not have been revoked.

94 "Washington'da Alarm Zilleri" (Washington is Alarmed), *Milliyet*, 27 October 1989, p.13

95 ABD'ye Ödün Yok" (No Compromise to US), *Milliyet*, 28 October 1989, p.8.

96 *Aynı Tarihi (History of the Month)*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, October-November-December 1989, p. 63.

In face of the measures taken by Turkey to prevent the acceptance of the draft decision at the US Senate, the US Government underlined the tension that the draft decision had created in Turkey-US relations and expressed their discomfort repeatedly.

The US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Raymon Seitz, in a speech delivered at the session “Latest developments in Europe” of the House of Representatives’ Sub-committee on Europe and Middle East, drew attention to the draft decision pending at the Senate and to the problems it had caused. He repeated the opposition of the US Government to the draft decision.⁹⁷

At the bilateral meeting between the US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the Turkish Minister of National Defense Safa Giray at the NATO’s Defense Planning Group meeting, Cheney conveyed Washington’s discomfort with Turkey’s military measures against the US because of the draft decision on the “Armenian Genocide.”⁹⁸

In the meantime, Senator Robert Dole who prepared the draft decision No.212 said that he would bring the draft decision forward at the Senate’s General Council in the coming legislative term.⁹⁹

The draft decision No.212, which had coincided with the last days of Özal’s prime ministry, continued to become a problem in US-Turkey relations during the first months of his fresh presidency.

During a NATO meeting in Brussels, the new prime minister of Turkey Yıldırım Akbulut urged the US President George Bush to take a more active role in preventing the draft decision.¹⁰⁰

Similarly, in his visit to Washington in January, President Turgut Özal warned the US once again about the draft decision on the “Armenian Genocide.”¹⁰¹

As messages between the US and Turkey on the matter continued back and forth both ways, on February 20, 1990 the US Senate began to debate the draft decision No.212. On February 22, the draft failed to achieve the 60% vote, which was required be incorporated to the agenda. There were 49 “Yes” and 49 “No” votes. Two senators were absent.¹⁰² At the second voting of the draft decision on February

97 “Ermeni Tasarısında Geri Adım” (One Step Back in the Armenian Resolution), *Milliyet*, 2 November 1989, p.16.

98 <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1989/kasim1989.htm>, 2 August 2006.

99 *Ibid.*, 2 August 2006.

100 <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1989/aramik1989.htm>, 2 August 2006.

101 <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1990/ocak1990.htm>, 2 August 2006

102 http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=101&session=2&vote=00016, 3 August 2006.

27, 1990 at the US Senate, there were 48 'Yes,' 51 'No' votes and one senator was absent. Thus, draft decision No. 212 was rejected.¹⁰³

In the aftermath of the voting at the Senate's General Council, Morton Abromowitz, the US Ambassador in Ankara was summoned at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 1, 1990 and communicated that Turkey had revoked the military measures against the US.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

The draft decision on the "Armenian Genocide," thus, left an important impact on US-Turkey relations during the last days of Turgut Özal's prime ministry. The draft decisions concerning the incidents of 1915-1923 had, in fact, dominated the course of US-Turkey relations throughout Özal's prime ministry. Özal, while having responded with caution to other problematic issues such as the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, SECA and the American aid; hence having avoided sudden and firm reactions, adopted an uncompromising stance against the Armenian allegations and insisted on a solution. There is no doubt that the Turkish public's intensive concern and pressure had been effective. The Özal Government's initiatives had been well received by the Reagan Government and they, in return, had stopped the draft decisions on the genocide allegations at the Congress more swiftly. Nevertheless, following the change of government in the US, the US stance against those allegations also changed. The Bush Government, in the beginning, at least attempted to be responsive to both sides. Because the Bush Government gave some credit to the distorted historical facts, the Özal Government resorted to some measures against the US mostly concerning the military. Also, certain privileges and facilities granted to the US were limited. Those measures resulted in serious tensions between Turkey and the US. As a result, the last days of Özal's prime ministry were preoccupied by a series of meetings and statements between the two parties.

103 http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=101&session=2&vote=00017. 3 August 2006.

104 <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1990/mart1990.htm>, 2 August 2006.

NOTES ON “DIALOGUE SUR LE TABOU ARMENIAN”¹

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Abstract: *This article is a commentary on some views expressed in the book entitled “Dialogue sur le tabou arménien”, published in France. The book is an interview conducted with Prof. Dr. Ahmet Insel and Michel Marian.*

Keywords: *Armenian Genocide allegations, Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian*

Introduction

Professors Ahmet Insel,² at Galatasaray University in Istanbul and Michel Marian,³ at Paris School of Political Science (Sciences Po) have carried out an exchange of views, together with Ariane Bonzou,⁴ and this was published in 2009 as a book of 169 pages under the title of “DIALOGUE SUR LE TABOU ARMENIAN” (*A Dialogue over the Armenian Taboo*). This article is based on this book and provides insights to the content of the book while presenting established facts and truths of international law which at times were ignored in the dialogue of these two professors.

Before providing insights to the above mentioned book, it is important to highlight the meaning of the term *taboo*. According to the Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary, “taboo” means “forbidden”; “it is a Polynesian (or other) system of prohibition connected with things considered holy or unclean.”

It is known through experience that Armenians are not willing to discuss or to engage in dialogue with those who do not subscribe to their one sided interpretation of the law of genocide as a whole. Armenians are not satisfied even if the US Presidents do not pronounce the word “genocide” in English and refers to the same concept by saying “*metz jegern*” in Armenian. Genocide became an Armenian taboo.

1 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), “Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien,” Liane Levi, 2009.

2 Ahmet Insel has been the Chair at the Economics Department, Galatasaray University since 2007, also works at the “İletişim” Publishing House.

3 Michel Marian is a professor at the Paris School of Political Science. He has published articles in the *Esprit* and *Nouvelles d’Arménie* on the Armenian question.

4 Ariane Bonzou is a journalist. She was the Istanbul correspondent of the ARTE television channel between 1996 and 2000.

Michel Marian's dialogue partner, Ahmet Insel shares his views in many ways, thus their "dialogue" was possible, and it is totally aimed to underline the validity of the Armenian taboo. In the following sections, it will be possible to see to what extent the arguments mentioned in the book are sound and objective as one would expect from established professors at two distinguished universities.

Families, Years of Childhood and Youth

The first 73 pages of the book are dedicated to Marian's and Insel's exchange of accounts of their family life, childhood and their youth. Marian's grandfather and family are immigrants from Bayezit and Erzurum in Turkey. Insel's family immigrated from Serez (Greece) to Turkey. Marian's grandfather had fled Bayezit (Eastern Turkey) in 1915 and his father Martin Haroyan was born in Armenia. Fate brought Martin to France and there he took the last name of Marian to hide his real identity. When Michel Marian's father Martin Haroyan was working as a journalist in Armenia, the Second World War broke out. The Russian troops surrendered to Germans in Crimea. Since Father Haroyan spoke German, he joined the German Army and became their interpreter, thus "*unlike other Armenians, he could escape the concentration camps.*" Having accompanied the German Army, he went to France and Italy. It is known that many Armenians joined the German Army during the Second World War. Finally, in compliance with the agreement between de Gaulle and Stalin, soldiers of Armenian origin serving in the German army, were handed over to Russia. If Marian hadn't changed his name and birthplace and gotten rid of his German uniform, he may not have survived the Stalin era. His son, Michel Marian, was born and grew up in France as a militant opponent of Turkey. Among the French Armenians, anything in favor of Turkey was offensive for being evil and unfair.⁵

Ahmet Insel says that in his youth, the histories of old tragedies (including the Armenian tragedy) were not really mentioned. Marian, on the other hand, recalls from his childhood the use of the words "jart" (slaughter) and "gart" (exile) defining the fate of Ottoman Armenian community.

In the 1970s, both Marian and Insel were in France and they belonged to the extreme leftist camp. Insel was a member of the French Communist Party⁶ Meanwhile, Marian participated in studies on "the Armenian genocide and the unfair treatment of the Armenians." He says that he was afraid of the Turks.⁷

5 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, p.53.

6 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, p.58.

7 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, p.62.

They disagree on the Term of "Genocide"

The views of Ahmet İnsel and Michel Marian demonstrate similarities from a variety of aspects. There is, however, one point they do not agree upon, that is the term "genocide".⁸ For that reason, I would like to first start with elaborating on this part of the dialogue. Some other aspects are further presented under separate sections below.

Bogus "Nürnberg Criteria" Made by Michel Marian

Michel Marian suggests focusing on the "Nürnberg Criteria"⁹ to qualify the tragic events of 1915 as genocide.

When Marian emphasizes the Nürnberg criteria, is he, in fact, referring to Nürnberg Laws¹⁰ issued by Nazi Germany? Probably not. Are his Nürnberg criteria included to the London Agreement of August 8th 1945? Or could he be highlighting Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal?¹¹ Finally was it referring to the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 96 (1) dated December 11, 1946 on the Crime of Genocide?¹² These questions are unanswered. Most probably this is a new attempt to render the legal content of the *1948 Genocide Convention* dysfunctional by inventing alternative criteria and/or concepts.

Under the title of "Jurisdiction and General Principles", the Charter of the Nürnberg Military Tribunal includes categories of "crimes against peace", "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity." The crime of genocide is not included in this list.

Genocide is an international crime; its definition is clearly stipulated in legal terms by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December 1948. By creating his own Nürnberg criteria with regard to the crime of genocide, Michel Marian amends the definition laid down by the Convention.

8 Ahmet İnsel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, pp. 109-125.

9 Ahmet İnsel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009.

10 Sevin Elekdağ, "Ermeni Olaylarını Anlamak: Holokost ile Karşılatırmalı Analiz" (Understanding the Armenian Question: A Comparative Analysis with the Holocaust), *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi* (Armenian Studies Journal), No: 32 (2009), p. 91 n. 17. "The Nürnberg Laws, which constituted a fake scientific ground for the racial discrimination against the Jews were made of two laws: Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor and the Reich Citizenship Law."

11 Ahmet İnsel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, p. 31.

12 "Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human group, as homicide is the denial of right to live of individual human beings, ...The Punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international concern.Genocide is a crime under international law, which the civilized world condemns and for the commission of which principals and accomplices, wheter private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and -whether the crime committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds- are punishable.

Marian tries to explain his own Nürnberg criteria as follows: His first criterion supposedly suggests that the specific intent of genocide targets one community's ethnicity and religion. Let me say that his version remains incomplete when compared to the Genocide Convention. The Convention introduces a more comprehensive definition by having included "nationality" and "race" in the targeted groups. Political groups are excluded from the protected groups. The second criterion appears to be the nature of the act. Marian, however, does not provide details on this subject and claims that this point has not received attention. Marian argues that "forceful religious conversion" should be considered as an act of genocide. This has not been included either in the content of the Genocide Convention. Marian apparently ignores the fact that the International Preparatory Conference, which drafted the Convention, discussed the matter at the time, but refused to incorporate it into the content.

To be able to write and comment on Genocide law, one should definitely read the Proceedings of the 1948 Convention's International Preparatory Conference.

Michel Marian's third criterion seems to be concerned with the "government's involvement in the crime of genocide." This subject is also not covered by the Genocide Convention. Article IX of the Convention refers to the responsibility of a State (*and not of the Government*) in another context. This context is about the right of State parties to the Convention to address the International Court of Justice regarding the disputes (including the responsibility of the State) between them, on the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the Convention.

Finally, the fourth Marian/Nürnberg criterion rests on the "intent to destroy." At this point, Marian once again conveniently fails to mention the essence of the Genocide Convention which focuses on the words "as such".¹³ On this matter, the International Court of Justice lays down the strict conditions concerning the proofs needed for the establishment of the crime of genocide. Without the "special intent" none of the acts enumerated in Article II of the Genocide Convention will constitute genocide. Instead, those acts may be interpreted either as war crimes, or crimes against humanity, or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, or unlawful criminal acts as defined by national legislations of the countries in question.

The fundamental principles of the Genocide Convention are summarized below.

One may argue at this point that "*all these are petty legal details and should not*

13 Article II. : In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such a) Killing members of the group: b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group:c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction in whole or in part: d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group:e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

matter much. What is important on the matter is the annihilation of the Ottoman Armenians." This aspect is probably the most important difference of opinion and appreciation between the majority of the Turks and Armenians. The great majority of the Turks do not deny the sufferings and the immense losses due to the tragic events of 1915; but they insist that -according to their evaluation- the "specific intent" to destroy the Ottoman Armenian community "as such" did not exist at that time. A substantial amount of document in the archives proves this. In addition, the Turks underline the great losses incurred by the Muslim Ottomans and the responsibility of Armenian revolutionary gangs on that. The Armenians, however, defend the contrary and request from the Turks and the international community to accept their selective reading of history and their genocide dogma; for them the losses of the Muslim citizens of the Ottoman State are negligible and cannot be compared with the Armenian losses; they vehemently refuse to enter in an objective exchange of documents and/or views by asserting that their undeniable historical truth can not be put to debate. Furthermore, those who insist on the recognition of the Armenian genocide, close their eyes to Armenian atrocities and to the Balkan type use of violence, which constituted a model in that the terrorist groups would attack the civilian Muslim population of the Ottoman State and provoke them to retaliate. If the Muslims retaliated or if the administration took military action, there would be loud cries of persecution and calls on Europe to intervene.¹⁴ The works of the Armenian authors who have written on Armenian Revolutionary Movements give a clear picture and need no further comments.¹⁵

Fundamental Principles of Genocide Law

For the determination of the crime of genocide and incriminating the perpetrators of such a crime, four fundamental principles of law should be taken into account.¹⁶ First is the principle of legality: There will be no crime without law –*nullum crimen sine lege*–, and no punishment without a law –*nulla poena sine lege*–

14 Gündüz AKTAN, "the Armenian Question. Basic Knowledge and Documentation" Ankara, 2009, Teraz.i yayınları pp. 282

15 Louise NALBANDIAN, "Armenian evolutionary Movement: the Development of Armenian Political Parties through the 19. century" Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963. pp 110-11

"...The Hinchag program stated that " Agitation and terror were needed to elevate the spirit of the people. The people were also to be incited against their enemies and were to profit from the retaliatory actions of these sane enemies. Terror was to be used as a method of protecting the people and winning their confidence in the Hinchag program.....the most opportune time to institute the general rebellion for carrying out immediate objectives was when turkey was engaged in a ware....."

K.S. PAPAŽIAN, "Patriotism Perverted" Boston, Bakar Press, 1934 pp.14-15 "...The purpose of the Dashnag federation is to achieve political and economic freedom in Turkish Armenia by means of rebellion.... terrorism has from the first, been adopted by the Dashnag Committee of the Caucasus as a policy or a method of achieving its ends... Method No.8 is as follows: To wage fights, and to subject to terrorism the Government officials, the traitors; Method No. 11 is to subject the government institutions to destruction and pillage.

16 Dr. Şükriü M: ELEKDAĞ "The crime of Genocide from the perspective of international criminal law" September 10,2006 . Unpublished notes handed over to participants during the meeting.

Second is the principle of individual responsibility. According to Article IV of the Genocide Convention, only individuals can commit this crime¹⁷ and be punished. Legal persons and the States cannot be incriminated by this crime. This principle appeared in the Nürnberg and Tokyo Tribunals Statutes. The Nürnberg International Military Tribunal's judgment held that "Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can provision of international law be enforced." The International Criminal Court Statute of Rome, in its Article 25 provides only for individual criminal responsibility. Michel Marian carefully avoids to include this "real Nürnberg" principle in his "Bogus Nürnberg" criteria.

Third is the conduct of due process of law. According to Article VI of the Genocide Convention, the competent tribunal is the competent court of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or the international tribunal the jurisdiction of which has been accepted by the parties.¹⁸ Parliaments or other bodies, scholars, journalists etc. are not competent authorities or persons to decide on the existence of the crime of genocide. Michel Marian like all other Armenian scholars and their supporters never mention this basic *sine qua non* element of the genocide law. They prefer to ramble in troubled political waters instead of taking the right and legal path.

Fourth is that genocide is distinct from other international crimes, like war crimes or crimes against humanity, because it requires a special intent (*dolus specialis*) to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such. The importance of the words "as such" is also highlighted by the decision of the International Court of Justice in Bosnia / Serbia case: The International Court of Justice in its decision dated 28 February 2007 placed special emphasis on the question of intent. It underlined that genocide, as defined in the Convention requires both acts and intent:

"Article II (of the Convention) requires the establishment of the intent to destroy, in whole or in part the protected group, as such. It is not enough to establish that deliberate killings of members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be established and defined very precisely. It is often referred to as a special or specific intent or dolus specialis. It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts

17 1948 Genocide Convention Article IV. "Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."

18 1948 Genocide Convention Article VI "Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction"

listed in Article II must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The words "as such" emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group.

Great care must be taken in finding in the facts, a sufficiently clear manifestation of the intent¹⁹ "Ethnic cleansing", deportation... the expulsion of a group or part of a group does not in itself suffice for genocide. The Court has long recognized that the claims against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive.

There is a clear evidence indicating that the Ottoman Government of the time had no intention of exterminating the Armenians as a whole or as part. Members of the gangs that attacked the Armenian convoys and those officials who exploited the Armenian plight, neglected their duties or abused their powers were court-martialed."²⁰

In fact, 1673 persons (528 of them members of the armed forces or State security services, police or other public services) were court-martialed in 1916. 67 of them have been sentenced to death penalty, 592 persons have been sentenced to various prison charges during the tenure of the Union and Progress Government."

Insel Holds the Opinion that 1915 Events Should Not be Qualified as Genocide

For different reasons than those commonly known, Insel does not consider the incidents of 1915 as genocide, since he believes that the 1915 events fall into the category of "crime against humanity" and that the Ottoman Government bore full responsibility for them (p.114). But -as a friendly compromise towards his dialogue partner- he underlines that "*he is willing to reconsider his conclusion in the light of new information to come forward in twenty years, two years, six months or one day proving the genocide accusation.*"

One wonders whether Insel reached his conclusions upon a meticulous reading of the definitions of "crime against humanity", "war crime" and "crime of genocide" provided by the Roma Statute which founded the International Criminal Court;

19 The International Court of Justice in its decision of 26 February 2007 on the Bosnia/Serbia case underlined this emphasis with the following statement : "With respect to killing members of the protected group ..the Court finds that it is established by overwhelming evidence that massive killings throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina were perpetrated during the conflict. However the Court is not convinced that those killings were accompanied by the specific intent on the part of the perpetrators to destroy in whole or in part, the group of Bosnian Muslims. It acknowledges that the killings may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, but that it has no jurisdiction to determine whether this is so.

20 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien," Liane Levi, 2009, PP. 197-209.

because, Insel asserts “*that genocide has been mainly associated with the Shoah of the Jews and that the term stands for the specific and systematic destruction of every single member of a community including the children and elderly.*” However, the massacre of the Armenians, as Insel continues, seems to be in compliance with the Ottoman tradition of massacre committed against its own peoples. To support his argument, he stresses that “*Kuyucu Murat Paşa (Murad Pasha the Well-Digger) had decapitated Alevis and Druzes, and filled wells with their heads; deportation was not uncommon in the Ottoman State tradition and that the Republic of Turkey extended this tradition with the forced migration of Kurds in 1934 and 1950.*” Insel continues by criticizing some Turkish officials and intellectuals who argue that “*in 1915 the Ottoman Empire was in the state of war and Armenians were deported away from the borderlines for having conspired with the Russians against the Ottoman government.*” According to Insel, this argument is not valid, for even if the establishment of a security zone had been the main concern of the Ottoman State, the deportation of the Armenians of Izmir, Çanakkale or Bursa, which are located thousands of kilometers away from the Russian border, could not have been explained by security reasons.

To the argument regarding the similarity between the relocation of Ottoman Armenians and the internment of United States citizens of Japanese origin during the Second World War, he adds that the Japanese American internment camps of 1941 were not similar to the Turkish-Armenian deportation of 1915.

On the overall, Insel argues that “*the Ottoman government targeted Armenians and meanwhile put some of its other non-Muslim subjects into jeopardy as well. However, the Turkish conduct of deportation lacked Germany’s specific intent to destroy, it was not designed to destroy an entire race and some Armenian women and children were spared; therefore, it should not be appropriate to use the term genocide for the events of 1915.*”

Marian brings a new answer to the question, “*why the international community should recognize the Armenian genocide.*” He argues that:

“The deportation of the Armenians was not only a population transfer. It intended to destroy the Armenians. This act, according to the 1948 definition, is genocide. Then, what is the use of debating over words? A positive law of some sort to punish such a crime was non-existent in 1915. The Armenians paid the toll for the entire losses of the Ottomans accumulated up until that time. Since the Armenians are long dead, there is no possibility that their losses could now be compensated. The courts could not punish the responsible ones because they also are not alive. And there is no court which could try the criminals. For that reasons, the world should recognize the incidents of 1915 as genocide. Only this act would prove apt to the

historical development of the sense of law and justice. Given that genocide is an undeniable historical fact, why are we deprived of the credit of this fact? The denial of the genocide is a problem of civility for Turkey and the international community. The differences of opinion over this question should not hinder other developments and the doors to dialogue should not be closed on the grounds that the genocide has not been recognized. One can discuss the differences between the Shoah and the 1915 incidents, but under one condition: the incidents of 1915 should not be evaluated as the massacres of Srebrenica. The resemblance is rather than with the Shoah. One of the differences between the Shoah and the Armenian genocide is the Islamization of the women and children.²¹ This Islamization, nevertheless, should not reduce the genocide elements of the incident, since those women and children were not given a choice – others had been either slaughtered or abandoned in the desert. Today some families, especially Kurdish ones, think it is chic to have a grandmother of Armenian descent. The situation is different for us, the Armenians. Until today, we have been known without religious identity.”²²

Srebrenica Was Not Genocide !

According to Professor Insel, what happened in Srebrenica is not genocide: “*If Srebrenica was to be called genocide, then the Armenian deportation should also be considered as such.*”²³ Never doubting that the incidents of 1915 are genocide, Marian shares Insel’s conclusion on Srebrenica. One is rather amazed – not to use stronger words - that both Professors Marian and Insel seem to ignore the wordings of the 1948 Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute and the Decisions of the International Court of Justice as well as the International Penal Tribunal on Yugoslavia.

Overall Lack of Knowledge on Genocide Law

On this occasion, it should be underlined that a Professor of Political Science – no matter how militant he may be - should comply with his academic responsibilities, and in such a dialogue seeking reconciliation, should avoid any misleading comments that could put his credibility in question.

The remarks of both Marian and Insel demonstrate a “lack of knowledge” on

21 Please see Sevin Elekdağ, ‘Ermeni Olaylarını Anlamak’ (Understanding the Armenian Question), pp. 87-107.

22 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), “Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian,” Liane Levi, 2009, pp. 117-119.

23 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), “Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian,” Liane Levi, 2009, p.113.

genocide law. Another explanation to these two professors' selective readings on the matter could be their willingness to take the discussions outside the legal framework of the 1948 Genocide Convention and the International Court of Justice.

Despite the final verdict by the former Yugoslavia's Criminal Court ruling that the acts of two Serbian officials were crimes of genocide, both Insel and Marian claim the contrary.²⁴ Thus, they posit themselves in the place of self made judges and pretend that a valid decision of the competent international tribunal does not exist.

For God's sake, if these two professors express these views openly in Switzerland, they may well be sentenced for defying the crime of genocide; a delinquency foreseen by Article 22 *bis* of the Swiss Penal Law. Or.. "denial" seems to be an indisputable right exclusive to them.

Difference Between "Genocide" and "Crime Against Humanity" According to Michel Marian

With reference to Insel's remarks arguing that the 1915 incidents should be seen as crime against humanity, Marian says: "*There is an important difference between 'crime against humanity' and 'genocide'. Genocide is the specific intent to erase people completely from the surface of the earth, whereas crime against humanity, as it was in Srebrenica, is a partial destruction in terms of numbers and targeted population. For the sake of civility this difference should be acknowledged.*"

Marian's above words, in fact, verify his lack of knowledge on the differences between the definitions of "crime against humanity" and "genocide", clearly laid down by the Rome Statute. The elements of these crimes are enumerated below.²⁵

Marian: "Armenians are Growing Impatient"

Marian maintains that the Armenians, including himself, are growing impatient. 2015 is their deadline for the recognition of the genocide and further delay is

24 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien," Liane Levi, 2009, p.115.

25 The elements of the Crimes Against Humanity as laid down by the Article 7 of the Rome Statute(*creatig the International Penal Tribunal*): Crimes against humanity by : murder, extermination,enslavement,deportation or forcible transfer of population,imprisonment or other severe dceprivation of physical liberty,torture,rape,sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,forced pregnancy,enforced sterilization, sexual violence,persecution, enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid or other inhumane acts.

The elements of genocide as laid down by the Article 6 oof the Rome Statute :Genocide by : killing,causing serious bodilyiy or mental harm,deliberatly inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction,imposing mesaures intended to prevent bïrths, forcibly transferring children.

unthinkable. Responding to this, Insel says "*I sympathize with your impatience.*"²⁶

At the following stage of the dialogue, Marian underlines that he does not approve when "*Armenians make advantage of their moral upper hand in their relations with Turks and adopts an accusing tone.*" Similarly, he does not agree with attacking the people who "do not use the term genocide" or the historians such as Fuat Dündar who "uses the term genocide in a functional way."²⁷ Because the denial of genocide or diminishing its extent doesn't commensurate with the very act of it; the Turks who deny the genocide could not be treated as the committers of this crime.²⁸

Expectations from Turkey

Insel says that the Turks must perform a "*memory exercise*" and adds that "*they first must not be confronted with historical events long past forgotten and denied*". He says that "*the acknowledging of the history will take some time and this exercise must start from the bottom (not the top). If not, the Turkish State may create a sudden and unexpected reversal by stating that the truth known until now has changed and the new truth now is different...*"

Marian Advocates that Europeans May Put Pressure on Turkey to Recognize the Armenian genocide

According to Marian, Armenians have waited for 90 years. He believes that those who hold the key to the doors of Europe support the Armenian cause and could put pressure on Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide, as a precondition for their entry to the European Union. But if the balance of power giving Europe a negotiating advantage changes, the Armenians may never get what they want.

Marian argues that "*the first AKP government played an important role in breaking the ice*" between Turks and Armenians. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in a speech made in Düzce on May 23, 2009 said, "*for years people with different ethnical identities have been expelled from the country. This has not been done with good intentions. It has been done in a fascist way.*" This was another step forward. On the other hand, the Turkish President Abdullah Gül, has not agreed with American President Barack Obama's approach in April 2009. But according to Marian, "*Gül also is likely to abandon the official policy of denial. "On this*

26 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien," Liane Levi, 2009, p.114.

27 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien," Liane Levi, 2009, p.18.

account, although Turks may not accept the Armenian viewpoint, Armenians could still expect from Turkey to give up its official discourse of denial. In doing that, Turkey could, for instance, stop teaching its diplomats on the denial of the genocide; rewrite its schoolbooks, and withdraw its support from the institutions openly praising the Young Turks, as well as from the nationalist groups abroad.”

Conveying his expectations, Marian says, “*The Tribunal aspect, what Armenians have been waiting for since the 1960s, is now a dream only. The International Criminal Court has decided not to try the incidents prior to its establishment.²⁹ What is more, the States cannot be put to trial. Only the officials can. It is very disappointing that there will be no court like the Nurnberg Court for the Armenians. In 1915, the Allied Powers warned the Committee of Union and Progress that they would be held responsible if they continued killing the Armenians. Such a warning was, then, a novelty in international law. Afterwards, the Allied Powers did not pursue the idea of establishing a court for the crimes committed against Armenians; instead, they took over the Ottoman territories on the grounds that Turks were not fit to govern non-Turkish peoples.*”³⁰

What Marian and like-minds need to be reminded is that the Ottoman officials exiled to Malta were exonerated and released for lack of evidence without trial. The non-mention of this fact should be seen as another manifestation of selective reading and forgetfulness of the inconvenient truth.

According to Marian, “*There is a rise of consciousness among the Armenians about the importance of moral satisfaction as opposed to claims for territory. Of course, some minority groups insist on their claims for territory. How can this moral satisfaction be attained other than through the recognition of the genocide? How can the return of the Armenians to their old land be possible without the creation of an Armenian homeland? Maybe, the Turkish government, as a symbolic gesture, could give half of Mount Ararat to Armenians or could give the historical capital Ani. From the practical aspect, the Armenian ships could be allowed to disembark at the Trabzon port. Again, there could be gestures made by the residents of Van to the Armenians of Van origin and by the residents of Muş to the Armenians of Muş origin. Those gestures do not have to be granting citizenship; they could very well be about acknowledging the Armenian existence.*” “*Naturally, my suggestions could encounter some objections in Erzurum where my family is from. I still very much want to go to Erzurum, but I am scared*” (pp. 136-137). “*Nonetheless, for the*

28 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), “Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian,” Liane Levi, 2009, p. 132.

29 There is not such a decision taken by the International Court of Justice. A certain Mr. de Zayas, expert paid by the Armenian diaspora published a pamphlet defending the opposite view

30 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), “Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian,” Liane Levi, 2009, p. 77-78.

sake of total freedom of expression, the Turkish government should put an end to the propaganda war."³¹ Insel agrees with Marian and says that all those suggestions, however, depend on strong public demand.

Reading these statements on Armenian demands is particularly interesting in terms of understanding how far Marian and like-minds have fallen out of the truth or would like to be. They believe that some major powers such as the US, France, and the European Parliament could still exert pressure on Turkey in the way that had been done before and after the First World War. When these people are told that such pressures bear consequences opposite to what they desire, they remain surprised and even disbelieving. They hold on to their expectations fuelled by the promises and guarantees given to them by some American and European politicians. Nevertheless, it is a clear concern that the disappointment, which will be caused by the impossibility with regard the fulfillment of these expectations, could lead to another "Armenian trauma".

The Number of Armenians

In terms of confronting history, Insel speaks about the working papers by some non-governmental organizations. Among them, there is a history-book project assigned to Ahmet Kuyuş by TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association). In the draft book, the attacks carried on the Ottoman citizens by the Armenians are recounted as events that took place later in 1916, rather than events that preceded the 1915 incidents. Also, the number of the Armenian casualties is cited as 600.000. Insel, though regretting that the TUSIAD book has not been incorporated into the curriculum, rejoices that it has nonetheless inspired some school teachers. In 1923, as he goes, there were 300.000 Armenians residing in Anatolia and it is imperative that the Turkish people confront those Armenians' ordeal. More generally, Turks need to free themselves from the paranoia nursed by Kemalism and count the skeletons in their own closets. Otherwise, they will have more "other and newly forgotten." In his view, Turkey owes recognition to Armenians. As he concludes, Insel submits that one of the reasons of this great tragedy was the notion of "internal enemy" and this should not persist. Today, Insel says, the same internal enemy discourse has been renewed for the Kurds.³²

Marian, on the other hand, reminds that the number of the Armenian casualties pronounced by Taner Akçam is 800.000, but the number that they are used to hear

31 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, p. 114.

32 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, p. 136.

is 1.500.000. Among the Armenian losses, there were those who had died during the deportation, of exhaustion, hunger and cold. The Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire was believed to be 1.900.000; they had 3000 churches and 2000 schools. However, this battle of numbers should not, Marian says, prevent the rewriting of schoolbooks.

Slaughter Committed Upon the Ottoman Turks

İnsel holds that not only the Armenians but “*fate of the Muslims who were exiled from the Caucasus and Balkans and slaughtered should also be taken into account. The official Turkish viewpoint, in the 1970s and 80s put particular emphasis on the ASALA terror and the treason of the Armenians in collaboration with France and Russia during the First World War and thus, shuffled the chronology of events.*”³³ For instance, according to İnsel, the Armenians who had fled to Russia, together with the Russian troops, did in fact slaughter the Muslims, after their return to Ottoman territories subsequent to the 1915 incidents.

Additionally, “*During their uprising, prior to 24 April 1915, which is accepted as the symbolic date for the Armenian intellectuals exile from Istanbul, the Armenians of Van had killed Muslim civilians. Can these killings, however, justify the deportation of hundred thousands of Armenians from Mid-Anatolia and Marmara? This is a question that has not been asked until recently.*”³⁴

Marian’s response to this comment is equally noteworthy; “*Be careful! Taner Akçam argues that Van uprising, which was especially highlighted in the Young-Turk propaganda took place subsequent to the Armenian killings in the region. From the outbreak of war to April 1915, 55.000 Armenians had been killed.*”

Acts by Armenian Terror Organizations

On the Armenian terror acts, Marian says; “*The first attacks of ASALA put the Armenian community in between the dilemma of events’ positive reflection on the media and the Armenians’ association with terror*”.

When a Dashnak group launched the infamous “*Operation Van*” “*against the Turkish Embassy in 1981, minimum violence was resorted to as only one guard was killed in the hostage-taking incident.*” Marian tells that he participated in the manifestations in front of the Turkish Embassy and “*yes, the Armenians and Turks*

33 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), “Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien,” Liane Levi, 2009, p. 80 and 135.

34 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), “Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien,” Liane Levi, 2009, p.81.

clashed, but this incident was not essentially different from the Armenian attack against the Ottoman Bank on 26 August 1896. There had not been any casualties back then either."³⁵ Insel says at this point that he was not at the Turkish Embassy during the attack of 1981, because he was not on good terms with the embassy staff.

In his reply to a question, Marian stresses that he is not a supporter of ASALA when he says *"yes, to the pleasure of awakening, but that is it."* Referring to his article published in the French literary magazine *Esprit* in 1984, he says his views on ASALA were basically as such; *"No to terror, but the plainness of the terrorist acts and the support of terror have resulted in a democratic participation of some sort and unfortunately these terrorist acts have been received well by the Armenians in Diaspora."* According to Marian, *"The assassination of the Turkish officials served as a megaphone that awakened the Armenians' memory."*³⁶

In his subsequent writings, Marian adopts a stance for the recognition of the genocide, against terrorism. Within this framework, the association, which he was a member of, worked in close cooperation with the Belgian MEP Vandemeulebroucke for the European Parliament's decision in 1987 recognizing the Armenian genocide. Now, Turkey's recognition of the Armenian genocide is a precondition for Turkey's EU membership. As Michel Marian admits its close relation and collaboration with the Euro-Armenian Association, it is difficult to imagine that he ignores the verdict of the European Court of Justice, which rejected the precondition plea of the Armenian associations.³⁷

Ahmet Insel contributes by saying that *"The Armenian terror has intensified Turkey's active policy of denial. Turkey is a country in which the state exerts violence and at the same time expects its peoples' approval of this violence."*³⁸

35 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009., p.36.

36 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, p. 83.

37 Decision of the Court of the European Communities.:

Subject Turkey's status as a candidate for accession to the European Union

"The (Armenian) applicants applied for ... the suspension of the procedure for examining the Republic of Turkey's candidature for accession to the European Union... the requested that the resumption of the accession procedure be made conditionnal on prior acknowledgment by that State of the Armenian genocide (page 2)"

Decision of the court : "the entire action of the applicant must be dismissed" "the recognition of Turkey's status as a candidate for accession to the European Union is the result of an act of the European Council.... The European Parliament decision is a document containing declarations of a purely political nature which may be amended by the Parliament at any time. It cannot therefore have binding legal consequences ...

The claims for suspension of the accession negotiations and compensation are manifestly unfounded.... The Court of first instance orders 1) the action is dismissed). The applicant shall bear the costs.

Luxembourg 17 December 2003

The appeal of the Euro-Armenian Association has also been rejected on 29.October 2004

38 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménian," Liane Levi, 2009, p. 82.

Turkey's EU Bid and Genocide

Marian believes that the EU will insist on the recognition of the genocide as a precondition to Turkey's membership.³⁹ The Republic of Armenia also sees Turkey's membership as a way to their rapprochement with Europe. Be this as it may, the Armenian Diaspora objects to Turkey's membership altogether because of the risk that Turkey's denial may somehow gain official recognition.⁴⁰ With the condition of recognizing the genocide, however, the majority of Armenians are ready to back up Turkey's membership and even to defend its bid. On the other hand, Insel seems to keep his distance to Turkey's membership process. He argues that Turkey may not need the EU in the future, but Turkey's relations with Armenia, which have been held hostage by the Armenian-Azeri conflict, should still be normalized.

Archives

When Marian suggests that research in the archives should be encouraged on the grounds that no living witnesses have survived to this day, Insel responds that the members of the Union and Progress Committee must have destroyed their personal archives. On the issue of Armenian property, the General Staff's archives alongside the Dashnak archives could be helpful. Also, he reminds that the Turkish National Committee banned the publication of the cadastral records translated from Ottoman Turkish in 2005, because the records could have been used to legitimize the Armenian demands of property⁴¹ and underpin the arguments for the recognition of the genocide.

What Has Been "Learned" from the Dialogue?

The last part of the book is entitled "What We Have Learned" Among the issues that the two partners in dialogue seem to agree upon are as follows:⁴²

39 Please read the previous footnote and decide if Mr. Marian's stand on this issue is due to ignorance, selective reading or wishful thinking

40 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien," Liane Levi, 2009, p. 139.

41 With regard the Armenian property demands (if any) Professor Ahmet Insel seems to ignore the settlements reached by the Lausanne Treaty, as well as the compensation paid by the Turkish Republic to the United States pursuant to the Agreement of December 24, 1923 (See on this subject : American -Turkish Claims settlement. Opinion and report prepared by Fred Nielsen in accordance with the Act of March 22, 1935. 49.Stat.67. United States Government printing Office, Washington, 1937

42 Ahmet Insel, Michel Marian, Ariane Bonzou (Interviewer), "Dialogue Sur Le Tabou Arménien," Liane Levi, 2009, p. 148.

- *The 1915 incidents are a chain of atrocities, uprisings and political conflicts.*
- *The political group governing the Ottoman State had the will to destroy the Ottoman Armenians*
- *The Republic of Turkey is obliged to recognize its responsibility on this question.*
- *Denial damages democracy. What the speakers haven't agreed upon is not the events themselves. The use of the words such as the Shoah is still problematic and the dialogue partners shall return to that topic.*
- *Different information and viewpoints on some of the events and explanations have been taken notice of.*
- *The continuation of such dialogue is useful. Nevertheless, the dialogue process cannot go on forever. The trap of a prolonged dialogue could intensify the disappointment even further in the future. Dialogue could flatten out the bumps on the road and help the politicians and non-governmental organizations that are in the position of coming up with the right gestures and words.*

The apology letter dating December 2008 signed by Turkish intellectuals and the thank you letter written in return by 60 people of Armenian origin alongside a chronology and bibliography are annexed to the book.

Conclusion

This book in itself is a remarkable example of how the universal standards of academic principles and values are undermined by two established professors. It is also a noteworthy example of lack of knowledge in terms of international law, denial of existing court decisions and all the relevant literature on the subject. And it does not require further comments as the book speaks for itself.

“Turkey bashing” is apparently the favorite pastime and self-stimulation of so-called intellectuals.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE KARABAKH QUESTION

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Abstract: *As known, endeavors aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the Karabakh question has been continuing for about 15 years now. The member states of the OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) have charged at a meeting convened in 1994 in Minsk, capital of Belarus, a group of countries including the USA, Russian Federation and Turkey, which would later be named as the Minsk Group, with helping in finding a solution to the question. Although the problem hasn't been solved yet, there has been several developments in the recent years, especially since 2006. In this article, we will focus on the developments in the last four years.*

Key Word: *Minsk Group, Karabkh, Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan*

As known, endeavors aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the Karabakh question has been continuing for about 15 years now. The member states of the OSCE (*The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*) have charged at a meeting convened in 1994 in Minsk, capital of Belarus, a group of countries including the USA, Russian Federation and Turkey, which would later be named as the Minsk Group, with helping in finding a solution to the question. Later on, this mission has been carried out by the USA, Russian Federation and France, as Co-chairs of the Group. In the course of the years, an agreement seemed to emerge on the fundamental principles for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, with the exception of a single issue. According to this, Armenia would withdraw from the seven 'rayons' (*provinces*) that surround Karabakh, the Azerbaijani refugees would return to these territories and, an international peace-keeping force would be deployed in the region. Nakhchivan would thereby be linked to Azerbaijan.

The point over which no agreement could have been reached is what the status of the Karabakh would be. Armenia insists on a status of independent state for Karabakh. Azerbaijan demands that this region should stay dependent to Azerbaijan yet have a very substantial autonomy. In the face of these incompatible stances of the two sides, the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group have started in the recent years to propose that the question of the status of Karabakh

be indefinitely postponed or taken up in the coming years. Although the two parties do not seem, in principle, to oppose postponement, then came up, this time, the question of how the status of Karabakh will be determined following the postponement period. According to Armenia, the people of Karabakh should self determine their destiny through a plebiscite to be held in Karabakh by the end of the said period, and, this period should not be set too long. On the other hand, Azerbaijan claims that first the issue of the return of the Azerbaijani people of Karabakh to their homes should be materialized, and, hence the postponement period needs to be long. Azerbaijan opposes a plebiscite to be held solely for Karabakh; because the result is already predictable for the Azerbaijanis will constitute at most 30 % of its population even if all of them return back to this region. In other words, the Armenians of Karabakh will most probably vote for uniting with Armenia or for the independence of Karabakh if Armenia will, due to some tactical reasons, demand so. Yet, according to Article 3 of the Azerbaijan's Constitution, a plebiscite to change country's borders can only be held¹ over the whole country. In this respect, a plebiscite to determine the status of Karabakh needs to be made with the participation of the whole of Azerbaijan. It is already obvious that such a plebiscite will not have any other result than the continuation of Karabakh's status as dependent to Azerbaijan. This stance of Azerbaijan is based on the conviction that the Karabakh region is part of the Azerbaijani territories. On the other hand, the Armenian view claims that Karabakh proclaimed its independence before Azerbaijan did the same for itself and therefore Karabakh has never been a part of an independent Azerbaijan. This, however, is not true; because Armenia, like Azerbaijan (and all other countries that left the Soviets), in accordance with the Constitution of the Soviet Union, are accepted as having proclaimed their independence. This constitution does not, however, give the autonomous regions the right to proclaim independence.

The Azerbaijani authorities, led by President İlham Aliev, have on many occasions said that they were, if needed, able to rescue the occupied territories of Azerbaijan by using force. The speedy improvement of the Azerbaijani economy and, parallel to this, the increase in its defense expenditures along with the target set by Aliev stipulating that the Azerbaijani defense expenditures should be equal to the budget of Armenia, shows that a great difference to the benefit of Azerbaijan will come about in the future and liberating the territories under Armenian occupation with force will become a possibility. President Aliev says that there exists a cease-fire between the two countries and that the war has not yet ended.² In the legal sense the situation is like this indeed.

1 Kamil Agacan, Nagorno Karabakh: Is 2006 a Golden Opportunity? Strategic Analysis, Feb. 2006

2 idem

Developments in 2006

Bearing in mind that due to the Parliamentary elections in Armenia in 2007 and Presidential elections in both Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2008 it would be difficult to ensure any progress in these two years, it has been a generally accepted view also endorsed by the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group that it was required to try to resolve the Karabakh question earlier i.e., in 2006. Therefore, in the year 2006 the activities to find a solution to this question were intensified. Besides the numerous get-togethers of the foreign ministers of the two countries, Aliiev and Kocharian have met in February in Rambouillet (France), in June in Bucharest, and in December in Minsk, but couldn't reach an agreement on the status of Karabakh.

In the meantime, on the of June 2006 the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group have communicated to the OSCE Permanent Council, to whom it is accountable, the key principles they envisage for the solution of the Karabakh question.³ These principles which mainly conform to the information we furnished above in the first paragraph of this text can be summarized as follows:

- *withdrawal of Armenian forces from the territories surrounding Karabakh,*
- *stipulation of special provisions for the Kelbajar and Lachin provinces (this means setting up a land-based corridor between Armenia and Karabakh),*
- *disarming the said territories,*
- *a referendum or population vote to determine the final legal status of NagornoKarabakh. (the date of this referendum and how it will be performed shall be determined through negotiations)*
- *an international peace-keeping force shall be deployed to these territories,*
- *a joint commission shall be established to implement the agreement that will contain these issues,*
- *international aid shall be supplied for clearing the mines, executing the required repair and reconstruction work, and for the return of the persons to the occupied territories and the areas of Karabakh affected by the war,*
- *the two sides shall refrain from using or threatening to use force,*
- *bilateral or international security guaranties shall be provided.*

3 Statement by the Minsk Grup Co-Chairs to the OSCE Permanent Council, Armenian Daily, 29 June 2006.

In this connection, Armenian Foreign Ministry has publicized a declaration⁴ and expressed that these principles are deficient and there was no mention to the corridor to link Armenia to Karabakh and the status to be granted to Karabakh for the time interval till the date the referendum will be held. Yet it was also stated by Armenia that these principles constituted a serious base for the continuation of the negotiations. On the other hand, it was underlined that Armenia would insist that Azerbaijan should directly meet with the Karabakh administration if it continuous the create obstacles to prevent negotiations.

In the declaration⁵ published by Azerbaijan in response to this, it was stated that Azerbaijan re-affirmed preparedness to grant Nagorno-Karabakh highest status of self-rule within the framework of the internationally recognized territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and based on the current Constitution of Azerbaijan, emphasis was made on the point that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity could not be a subject of negotiation and, on the other hand, it was pointed out that Azerbaijan would continue to participate in the ongoing negotiations.

Towards the end of the year, on the 10th of April 2006, a new constitution was accepted by referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh. It states that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is a sovereign, democratic, legal, social state and will henceforth be called as "The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic". There exists no legal basis of Nagorno-Karabakh's self declaration as a sovereign state for it is an integral part of Azerbaijan. This initiative was reprimanded by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a statement phrased as "a new violation by Armenia of Azerbaijan's political unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity". And the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry stated that this move meant a violation of Azerbaijan's constitution, that it would have no judicial consequences and, would not be able to deceive the international community.⁶ With this occasion, we must state that no country has recognized either the above cited "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" or the previous Armenian administrations in Karabakh.

As is seen, Azerbaijan and Armenia has continued without a major interruption to conduct negotiations via the Minsk Group although they were devoid of any conclusions. This is a corollary of Russia's and USA's desire for the continuation of the negotiations and their pressure on the two sides in this context. Moreover, the negotiation process prevents the current disaccord from turning into an armed conflict. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Minsk Group Co-chairs couldn't have been successful in resolving the disagreement. Despite this, the negotiations have continued all through the election years, 2007 and 2008.

4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Armenia, Press Release, 26 June 2006.

5 "About the Latest Statement of Armenia on NK", Azerbaijan Today, 27 June 2006.

6 "Communiqué du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères azerbaïdjanais sur le référendum du 6 décembre", Armennews, 6 December 2008.

Developments in 2007

A meeting of the two country's presidents during the Commonwealth of Independent States Summit convened in Petersburg in 2007 also produced no results. In a communique⁷ they published in this connection, the Minsk Group Co-chairs stated that there were limited numbers of obstacles preventing an agreement, that the presidents could not overcome these remaining differences and, that, in their capacity as mediators, they were not in a position to take decisions on the two countries behalf. In the same communique, it was also underlined that declarations involving threats to use force and inspiring a conviction implying war could resolve the conflict are not contributive to the preparation of the peoples for peace.

With reference to the Presidential elections to take place in Karabakh, they stressed in the same communique that, like all other members of the international community, their countries do not also recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state.

The first president of Karabakh, which proclaimed its independence in 1991, was Robert Kocharian. After he became Armenia's prime minister in 1997 (and he was elected to Armenia's presidency in 1998) Arkady Gukasian replaced him as the premier of Karabakh. Gukasian was re-elected to the same post in 2002, yet did not participate in the preceding elections for a third term was not allowed by law. In the elections that took place in 19 June 2007, Bako Saakian who attracted 85 % of the votes, became Karabakh's premier. Saakian, who was born in 1960, has joined the Karabakh war and has later held security related posts in this region including that of interior minister. He has been serving as the head of the "National Security Services" since 2001.⁸

It is needless to say that the "presidential elections" in Karabakh has not been recognized by any country but Armenia. In the meantime, The Foreign Ministry of Turkey has released a statement⁹ in this connection before the elections and expressed that it viewed these elections as "a part of the efforts to legalize the current illegitimate situation in Nagorno-Karabakh" and, that these elections constitute an outright violation of "the principles of international law, the UN Security Council Decisions and the principles of OSCE. While the statement reprimanded the election on the one hand, it stressed that it wouldn't have any binding effect as regards international law and that its consequences will not be recognized, on the other.

7 "OSCE MG: Preservation of the Status Quo in the Karabakh Conflict May Seem Less Difficult for Sides Than Mutual Compromises", PanArmenian.Net. 13 July 2007.

8 "Bako Saakyan Elected as Nagorno Karabakh President", Regnum, Russia, 20 July 2007.

9 "Explanation of on the Elections in Nagorno Karabakh", 16 July 2007.

Before the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE member states on 29 Nov 2007 in Madrid, the Co-chairs of Minsk Group has met the Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers and gave them a document containing the “Basic Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict” to be delivered to their heads of state. The Co chairs stated that the two sides narrowed their differences through their mediation in the course of the negotiations held for the last three years and that the joint proposal that was transmitted today offered just and constructive solutions to the remaining differences. Furthermore, they requested the two parties to endorse the proposed Basic Principles and to commence as soon as possible drafting a comprehensive Peace Agreement.¹⁰

This document contains 3 issues: the points agreed upon, the ones on which no agreement has been reached and, the proposals to resolve them.

The points that have been agreed upon can be summarized as follows.

- *Armenian troops are to be withdrawn from five out of seven Azerbaijani regions surrounding Karabakh,*
- *The Azerbaijani population displaced during the war is to return to these regions,*
- *Kelbajar will be freed at a later stage, with subsequent return of the Azerbaijani population. This step is conditioned by the progress of the process of determining the future status of Karabakh,*
- *The Latchin region or part of it will serve as a corridor to secure a permanent land communication between Armenia and Karabakh,*
- *Security will be ensured by an international peace-keeping force.*

These essential points provide limited information on the properties of the Madrid Principles. In addition, a more detailed form of these principles entails essential points regarding the settlement of the conflict and provides information on the state parties' current approaches towards the issue. The Madrid Principles in detail present resolution recommendations to the parties working towards finally bringing the conflict to an end.

In the Madrid Principles, some recommendations have first been provided to the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. To protect security and the international peacekeeping force, armed troops of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to withdraw from all occupied territories, especially Kelbajar and Latchin, surrounding

10 <http://www.osce.org/item/28515.html> OSCE Mins Group Co-Chairs issue statment on NagornoKarabakh, Madrid, 29 November 2007.

Nagorno-Karabakh, and fugitives and migrants to take steps in returning to their territories have been requested from the Azeri and Armenian leaders until the elections to take place in 2008. Moreover, it has been expressed to both leaders that the existing status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be identified through voting, until this takes place, a temporary status should be appointed, and all trade-shipment routes should be opened. The last proposal to the Azeri and Armenian leaders has been for the political leaders to develop the appropriate basis for a positive atmosphere directed towards peace and comfort in campaigns for the elections to take place in 2008 and to indicate the controversial sections of a script if an agreement has not been able to be reached on the entire script.¹¹

Secondly, recommendations have been made to Armenia-Azerbaijan governments and the de-facto administration of Nagorno-Karabakh. At this point, to act in compliance with the ceasefire signed in 1994, to abandon forceful actions, increase the defense budget, and to abandon mutual accusations and statements being far from peace and entailing provocations have been requested from the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Furthermore, the necessity to encourage state parliaments to conduct such negotiations and strengthening relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians has been expressed. Among the suggestions directed towards the de-facto administration of Nagorno-Karabakh are positioning of Armenians, continuation of privatization activities in the concerning regions, creation of new construction areas and ending the establishment of local buildings. Last of all, working towards granting the opportunity to Karabakh Azerbaijanis to elect the leader of their own communities, increasing transparency for all citizens and migrants to benefit from oil revenues, and reducing corruption has been requested from the Azerbaijan administration.¹²

The third group in which recommendations have been delivered with the Madrid Principles is the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group. In this context, improving the existing activities for the approval of the essential principles and registering to records any divergence of opinions which could arise after the elections to take place in Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2008 have been requested from the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group. While stating that the representative levels of the Co-chairs must be increased, the request from them to provide more details on the talks taking place and the expectation from the Co-chairs to prevent the exaggeration of some statements have been expressed.¹³

11 Araz Aslanlı, *Karabakh Problem – History, Essence, Solution Process*, Baku Nurlar Press, 2009, referred to p.97 by Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, “Madrid Prensipleri Karabağ’a Barış Getirecek mi”, SDE, 1 April 2010.

12 Araz Aslanlı, *Karabakh Problem – History, Essence, Solution Process*, Baku Nurlar Press, 2009, referred to p.97 by Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, “Madrid Prensipleri Karabağ’a Barış Getirecek mi”, SDE, 1 April 2010.

13 Araz Aslanlı, referred by Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, “Madrid Prensipleri Karabağ’a Barış Getirecek mi”, SDE, 1 April 2010.

Last of all, in the Madrid Principles, recommendations have been put forth to the European Union. While wanting the European Union to increase the role of its special representative for the Southern Caucasus, the representative to closely follow the Minsk process and establish relations this way between all parties have been requested. Moreover, the necessity to communicate with the citizens of Azerbaijan who have become migrants and work together with the European Commission for economic aid have been emphasized. Finally, by utilizing the European Neighborhood Policy Strategy and economic aid operations, attention has been drawn to the expectation from the EU to work towards establishing institutions which will serve in strengthening trust towards human rights and supremacy of law.¹⁴

As can be predicted, the point not agreed upon is the status of Karabakh. To once more repeat, contrary to Azerbaijan's view that Karabakh should continue to juridically adhere to Azerbaijan though with a very wide-scale autonomy, Armenia insists that this region be granted independence. It is not known what proposals were made by the co-chairs of the Minsk Group for the determination of Karabakh's status. It is probable, however, that they are not far from the referendum concept previously proposed. Another probability is to be content with evacuating the Azerbaijani provinces surrounding Karabakh and leaving the determination of Karabakh's status to an indefinite date. In that case, Armenian domination over Karabakh will continue and Azerbaijan will be able to keep on claiming rights on the region for its status is undetermined.¹⁵

Developments in 2008

The most noteworthy development in Armenia in the first half of 2008 was the presidential elections. Compared to the previous one, the issue of Karabakh was debated in a much more intense manner during these elections. The reason for this was Levon Ter Petrossian's bringing to the agenda the subjects leading to his resignation from presidency in 1998 linked with the Karabakh question and Robert Kocharian's, who played the main role in his resignation, accusations while responding to Petrossian's criticisms.

The chaos gone through in Armenia following the elections has also affected the Karabakh question and clashes started with Azerbaijan at the border regions and this stirred the concerns of a renewed war campaign.¹⁶ The US Government called

14 Araz Aslanlı, *Karabakh Problem – History, Essence, Solution Process*, Baku Nurlar Press, 2009, referred to p.97 by Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, "Madrid Prensipleri Karabağ'a Barış Getirecek mi", SDE, 1 April 2010.

15 Emil Danielyan, "Karabakh Peace in Question After Armenian Vote", Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3 April 2006.

16 "Vers une nouvelle guerre au Haut Karabakh", Armen news, 8 March 2008.

on Armenia and Azerbaijan not to violate the cease-fire. Soon after this, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group have made a similar demand and invited the parties to talks. Following the elections, meetings have taken place first at the foreign ministries level and later Aliev and Sarkisian met during the NATO summit in early April, yet once more without any conclusions. Despite the over-optimistic statements by the Minsk Group and, in particular by the US Representative Matthew Bryza who was a member of this Group, disagreement continues as regards the future status of Karabakh and this constitutes the biggest obstacle to finding a solution to the question. To demonstrate this situation let us present an example of how the authorities of two sides approach the issue.

In a communique,¹⁷ delivered to the press regarding the principles on which the Karabakh question should be based, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan said that at the top of the list came the one ensuring that Nagorno Karabakh cannot be under the authority of Azerbaijan. And President Aliev once more stressed his country's stance in a speech in early August with his words "Azerbaijan will never grant Karabakh any status outside Azerbaijan's territorial integrity."

It is obvious that the co-chairs of the Minsk Group have not been able to find a solution to the problem despite all the efforts exerted. On the other hand, from their proposing the referendum alternative, it is apparent that they are not quite willing to endorse Karabakh region's juridical adherence to Azerbaijan, a matter which has a particular significance for Azerbaijan. This stance of Azerbaijan is based on territorial integrity, one of the fundamental principles of international law. Although Armenians insist, in response to that, on another fundamental principle, i.e., self-determination, implementation of the self determination principle is no more possible due to the fact that they totally Armenianized the region during the war by massacring the Karabakh Azerbaijanis just as they did in Hodjali or forced them to flee by other means. If this point is taken into account, then it is highly important that Azerbaijan has to make the international organizations including primarily the UN, acknowledge the validity of the principle of territorial integrity. In fact, Azerbaijan has already undertaken some successful initiatives within this framework.

a) The Decision of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

For some time now, the Organization of Islamic Conference has been taking some decisions in line with the viewpoints of Azerbaijan regarding the Karabakh

17 Just and Peaceful Resolution of Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Remains a Priority of Armenia's Foreign Policy, Armradio, 23 June 2008

question. These decisions are taken up in the annual meetings of the Foreign Ministers and in the biennial Summit conferences, and, referrals are made to these decisions at the conclusion texts of these meetings.

The unabridged English text of the decision titled “The Aggression of the Republic of Armenia Against the Republic of Azerbaijan” taken in Dakar on 13-14 March 2008 [decision Nr. 10/11-P(IS)] can be seen in the “Actual Documents” section of our Periodical. Important points of this decision can be summarized as follows.

- *Aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan is strongly condemned*
- *The actions against civilian Azerbaijani population are considered as crimes against humanity*
- *Looting and destruction of the archeological, cultural and religious monuments in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan are strongly condemned*
- *The implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 8530 874, 884 of the 1990s and the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied Azerbaijani territory included Karabakh are strongly demended and Armenia is urged to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan*
- *The UN Security Council is called on to recognize the existence of aggression against Azerbaijan; and to take the necessary steps, in line with the decisions it has previously taken, stipulated in Chapter VII of the Charter of UN. (in other words, withdrawal of the Armenian forces should be realized)*
- *Urges All states to refrain from providing any supplies of arms and military equipment to Armenia and, stresses that the territories of the member states should not be used for transit of such supplies*
- *Peaceful settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan should be based on respect for the principles of territorial integrity of states and inviolability of internationally recognized borders*
- *The activities of the OSCE Minsk Group and consultations held at the level of the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia are supported and it is believed a step-by-step solution will help to ensure gradual elimination of the consequences of the aggression against Azerbaijan*

As mentioned above, this decision and all the decisions taken by the OIC organs in connection with this question reflect the viewpoints of Azerbaijan and strongly support this country's demands pertaining to Karabagh issue. Like OIC's decisions concerning other issues, these decisions do not enjoy much publicity neither in the world nor in the Turkish media. The main reason for this is that they are of an advisory nature and are devoid of a binding quality. Despite this, the unconditional support of the OIC that has more than fifty member states, for Azerbaijan regarding the Karabakh question shows that Azerbaijan's viewpoints will enjoy popularity at the international organizations where Muslim countries are also members of and that the Armenian views will not have a chance of approval. In fact, as will be explained below, just the same occurred at the General Assembly of the UN in early 2008.

b) The Decision Of the UN General Assembly

By taking the Karabakh question to the UN General Assembly, Azerbaijan has succeeded in having a decision coherent with its views taken at this international platform. We must right away make clear that UN General Assembly decisions are not binding just like those of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe or the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. They are rather decisions reflecting the majority's views and are of an advisory nature. However the UN General Assembly decisions have a special significance due to the fact that the governments are represented therein. A party who can have a decision taken in its favor at the UN General Assembly gains an important edge in connection with the negotiation process.

The unabridged English text of the decision titled "Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan" taken by the UN General Assembly on 14 March 2008 (decision Nr. 62/243) can be seen in the "Actual Documents" section of our Periodical. Important points of this decision are as follows.

- *Respect and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders is hereby reaffirmed. "Internationally recognized borders" are the borders of Azerbaijan at the time it seceded from the Soviet Union. Karabakh is within these borders.*
- *Immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is demanded. (Here the term "all Armenian forces" means both the Armenia and Karabakh military forces.)*

- *The inalienable right of the population expelled from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan to return to their homes is reaffirmed.*
- *The necessity of providing normal, secure and equal conditions of life for Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan is reaffirmed. It is underlined that this will allow an effective democratic system of self-governance to be built up in this region within the Republic of Azerbaijan. (In this section, it is pointed out that, contrary to the current situation, Armenian and Azerbaijani communities will live together and self govern, in other words, that Karabakh will be autonomous but will stay within Azerbaijan. These expressions put an end to Armenian’s dreams of an independent Karabakh and at least shows that an independent Karabakh will not be recognized.)*
- *The stipulation that no state shall recognize as lawful the situation resulting from the occupation of the territories of neither Azerbaijan nor render assistance in maintaining this situation is reaffirmed as well. (These expressions mean that a change, by means of for example granting independence or annexing to Armenia, in the statuses of Karabakh as well as the Azerbaijani territories surrounding this region will not be accepted.)*
- *Support is expressed for the international mediation efforts, in particular those of the Co chairs of the Minsk Group aimed at peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, and the necessity of intensifying these efforts is recognized. (What is important here is that not only the Minsk Group but all international mediation efforts are mentioned and supported. Furthermore, an indirect reference is made to sovereignty and territorial integrity by stating that the solution should be in conformity with the principles and rules of international law.)*
- *The UN calls upon member states and international organizations to contribute to the process of settlement of the conflict.*
- *Lastly, the Secretary-General of the UN is requested to submit a comprehensive report at the 63rd session on the implementation of this resolution and decides to include in the agenda of that session the item “Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan”. (Inclusion of the issue in the agenda of the next session and the Secretary-General’s preparing of a report in this connection shows that the subject of Karabakh and occupied Azerbaijani territories will be discussed also next year.*

In the voting of the decision 39 countries voted in favor, 7 against, and 97 abstained. 46 countries did not participate in the voting process. For the votes of the abstainers are not counted, the decision was accepted.

Of those 39 countries who voted in favor, 31 were OIC members. The remaining 8 are Cambodia, Georgia, Moldavia, Myanmar, Serbia, Tuvalu and, Ukraine. These countries show neither a geographic nor a political homogeneity. Their votes were received mainly with the influence of Turkey and/or Azerbaijan. No EU member country has voted in favor. Among the “Turkic” countries only Turkmenistan voted in favor, besides Azerbaijan.

Among those 7 countries who voted against, three are the co-chairs of the Minsk Group: the USA, the Russian Federation and, France. Naturally, Armenia also voted against. The reason why India voted against may be the good relations between Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Why Angola in Africa and Vanuatu in the Pacific voted against is not known. Yet it is often witnessed that some small countries vote in a biased manner at the General Assembly votings and this, in general, reflects lack of consciousness or irresponsibility.

The 97 countries that abstained constitute approximately half of the UN members. All the EU member countries except for France have casted abstention votes. Furthermore, important countries like Japan, China, Brazil and Israel are also among them. The main reason why the number of the abstaining countries is so high is that the Minsk Group co-chairs, i.e., the US, Russian Federation and France have advised them to do so. For the OIC member countries have already taken the Dakar Summit decision with unanimity, their doing the same for the UN decision would at least have been a consistent attitude. However 8 OIC members abstained in the voting. They are Albania, Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, 13 Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Surinam and, Togo. It is possible to see the influences of France (Algeria, Cameroon, Surinam, and Togo) and the Russian Federation (Kazakhstan) in this phenomenon.

Some UN member countries are very small. It is not possible for them to take part in all activities and votings. Yet it is normally expected from countries with organized representations to vote in favor, against or to abstain, in other words, to show their preference. But, 17 of the OIC countries have not voted. Important countries like Iran and Syria are among them. Among the “Turkic” countries, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan also did not take part in the voting.

The most peculiar feature of this voting is the against votes of the Minsk Group co-chairs. Normally, these countries were expected to abstain when their mediation role is taken into consideration. When the decision is analyzed in its entirety, voting

against meant opposing the respect for Azerbaijan's sovereignty and territorial integrity; immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan; and, the return of the Azerbaijanis expelled from their occupied territories to their homes. The interpretation of the co-chairs, however, differ from this and in and" explanation of vote" they jointly made after the voting, they stated that during the OSCE's Madrid meeting in November 2007 they have given Azerbaijan and Armenia a document containing the "fundamental principles" for resolving the Karabakh question, and, that they did not vote for the Azerbaijani decision due to the fact that only some of those principles were included in it.

Close assessment of the Azerbaijani decision reveals that the only principle it doesn't contain is "self-determination" one. Azerbaijanis rightly oppose a population vote in Karabakh where only the Armenians live. We believe that the actual reason for the co-chairs' opposition to this decision is the fear that they would lose the control they currently have in case the Karabakh question is taken up at organizations other than the OSCE, especially at the UN General Assembly where the Muslim countries possess considerable weight. Yet the Co-chairs could not have prevented the decision. Moreover, the fact that the same issue will be discussed also next year will make it possible for the approval of a new decision.

The last development as regards the Karabakh question is Russia's intervention , though only for a while, of Georgian territories by excessive force due to the events of Ossetia and, the serious strain experienced in the US-Russian relations because of the anti-missile systems deployed in some countries in Europe. This development brought forth the probability of influencing their cooperation at the Minsk Group. On the other hand, this Group's being unsuccessful in resolving the question for more than 16 years now, have led to the thinking that trying some new formulations might prove useful. In the meantime, more voices have started¹⁸ to be heard in Azerbaijan regarding the appointment of Turkey to the position of Co-Chair of the Minsk Group or speculations were made such that Turkey wants the Minsk Group's mandate to be taken over by the Platform for Stability and Cooperation in Caucasia.¹⁹

At the meeting of Abdullah Gül and Serge Sarkisian in Yerevan on 6th of July, the Karabakh question was also taken up. Later, when replying questions of a journalist concerning this issue Sarkisian stated "Mr. Gul said that if need be he is ready to help for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. I have accepted it with pleasure because only an abnormal man can turn down an offer of help. However, there

18 "Azerbaijan Urges Turkey to co- Preside in the OSCE Minsk Group", Panarmenian.net, 9 September 2008.

19 "How Do Azerbaijani Political Scientist Value Turkey Recent Initiatives for Solutions to Nagorno Karabagh Conflict-Opinion Pool", Azerbaijani Press Agency, 11 September 2008.

should be made distinction between assistance and mediation. I am sure that any step designed to contribute to the Minsk Group co-chairs' activities in the resolution of the issue should be assessed positively”.

From the interpretation of Sarkisian's words one could reach the conclusion that the Karabakh question will be handled within a two-plan approach. The official negotiations will continue through the mediation of the Co-Chairs and the question will also be dealt with at the meetings to be held among Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is understood that Turkey will, in this context, assume the role of a type of unofficial mediator.

Developments in 2009

Compared to 2008, rapid developments have taken place in 2009 on the Karabakh conflict. The parties to the conflict have engaged in intense dialogues within the framework of the Minsk Group and as a result of private meetings with international organizations. During this period, especially Russia starting to play a more active role during the process of settling this conflict has drawn attention. As known, due to its relations within the Azerbaijan-Armenia framework and for being among the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group, Russia maintains an indisputable position and power among the actors working towards the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Therefore, based on either their regional interests or global interests, what Russia will do in the Caucasus region and the Karabakh conflict and what it cannot do – will not do – has played the key role in the possible settlement of this conflict.

The first meeting held in 2009 regarding the Karabakh conflict has taken place in January. The Co-chairs of the Minsk Group have met in Azerbaijan's capital Baku. During their contacts, Group Co-chairs Matthew Bryza (USA), Bernard Fassiné (France) and Yuri Merzlyakov, (Russia) have met with Azerbaijan President İlham Aliev and Foreign Minister Elmar Memmedyarov.

Anjey Kaspshik, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman has also attended the meetings. In the statement issued by the Presidency of Azerbaijan following the meetings, it has been expressed that in this meeting, issues related to Azerbaijan-Armenia relations and the current condition and perspective of the actions taken towards the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem have been addressed.²⁰ No detailed explanation has been provided regarding the talks. Following these contacts, the Minsk Group has gone to Armenia. The explanations given following

20 “Minsk Grubu Eş Başkanları Bakü’de” (Minsk Group Co-chairs are in Baku), *Dünya Bülteni*, 19 January 2010.

the contacts in Armenia have been no different than those provided after the meetings in Baku.

About a week later, Aliev and Sarkisian have come together at the World Economic Forum in Zurich on 28 January 2010. The following statements have been made:

“The Co-Chairs explored with the two Presidents their thoughts on how to finalize the Basic Principles on the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, proceeding from the proposal presented to the sides at the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Madrid in November 2007. The Co-Chairs agreed to work with the Foreign Ministers on elaborating proposals for the consideration of the two Presidents on the most important remaining differences between the sides existing within the framework of the Basic Principles. The Co-Chairs hope the parties will be able to bridge these remaining differences in the nearest future to secure a peace agreement that is far better for all parties than the status quo. Their goal is a just and balanced agreement based on the Helsinki Final Act principles of territorial integrity, self-determination, and non-use of force.”²¹

After these meetings, Azerbaijan President İlham Aliev has given an interview to the Wall Street Journal on 2 February 2009, expressing that the Armenian troops must withdraw from Azeri territories for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and he has emphasized the following points:

“The conflict remains unsolved despite years of negotiations. The issue must be solved in accordance with international law. Unfortunately, Armenia does not comply with international law and this is the main reason why the conflict has not been resolved. The talks have had some progress, but not enough, the OSCE Minsk Group stated that Nagorno-Karabakh’s recognition cannot be a matter of debate after the conflict in Georgia. The events must not set a precedent, the group added. But from the geopolitical point of view, if your neighbors are at war, it is of course not beneficial for you. Georgia and Russia are our neighbors and we maintain good relations with them both. The Armenian-Azerbaijani talks have nothing to do with the difficulties that we faced during the war in Georgia.”²²

The interesting point in Aliev’s statements is his reference to the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and his emphasis on the OSCE Minsk Group’s statement that it is not possible for the events taking place as a result of this war to

21 Tatul Hakobyan, “Presidents Sargsian and Aliyev to meet again in Davos on”, Reporter.am, 28 January 2010.

22 Glenn R. Simpson, “Plouffe to Donate Speaking Fee to Pro-Democracy Groups”, The Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2009.

stand as an example to the Karabakh conflict. At this point, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that Aliiev has been uncomfortable and partially worried with Russia's recognition of Southern Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independences.

In February, NATO has made an assessment on the Karabakh conflict. NATO Secretary General's representative to the South Caucasus and Central Asia Robert Simons has said that NATO's position on the peaceful resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is clear. "The NATO is actively cooperating with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both of them are our partners. Each of these countries has action plan on cooperation. I am glad about the progress in peaceful solution of the conflict through talks. Azerbaijani and Armenian Presidents have met several times and reached certain agreement."²³

As known, an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) exists between NATO and Azerbaijan. Within the framework of this plan, Azerbaijan and NATO have conducted numerous partnership actions. NATO also tries to improve its relations with Armenia within the context of the IPAP. While expressing that Armenia will not become a member of NATO, Armenian President Sarkisian has stated that within the framework of the IPAP they hope their cooperation with NATO in the area of security will be efficient, particularly for the success of reforms in the army and participation in peace operations. By keeping these facts in mind, one could foresee that NATO would like to intervene in the Karabakh conflict in the medium and long term.

The Turkish Foreign Minister of that period Ali Babacan has attended the Munich Security Conference held in Munich on 6-8 February 2009 and has met with Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan. Babacan has indicated that since the First World War, the most intense talks are being held between Turkey and Armenia and has stated that relations must develop in this direction. Following his contacts here, Babacan has travelled to Baku together with Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Elmar Memmedyarov. During his visit, Babacan has expressed that the settlement of the Karabakh conflict could be possible through peaceful means within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and international law and principles.

Towards the end of February, in a statement by the OSCE Minsk Group regarding the Karabakh conflict, the following points have been emphasized:

"The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group stress that, despite two reports circulated at the request of the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to

23 Robert Simons, "NATO supports all OSCE Minsk Group steps to solve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict", 2 February 2010; <http://en.trend.az/news/important/opinion/1415103.html>

the United Nations on December 24 and 29, 2008, there is no military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Co-Chairs further underscore the non-use of force as a core element of any just and lasting settlement of the conflict. Presidents İlham Aliev and Serge Sarkisian described their most recent meeting, in Zurich on January 28, 2009, as useful and constructive, despite two Azerbaijani reports circulated in the United Nations General Assembly one month earlier. At the conclusion of their Zurich meeting, the Presidents reiterated their commitment to the Minsk Group peace process, and asked the Co-Chairs to intensify their efforts to help the parties bridge their remaining differences with regard to the Basic Principles.”²⁴

It is understood from this statement that a military settlement for the conflict is definitely out of the question and the parties are working to get rid of their differences regarding the Madrid principles.

During the days following this statement, tension has arisen from time to time in the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, problems have developed in border security, and small-scale armed attacks have occurred. Concerning these events, a statement has been made on behalf of the EU on 5 March 2009 in the 752nd meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council.:²⁵

- *The European Union associates itself with the condemnation that has just been voiced by the Chairmanship and by the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group. We deplore the armed incidents that have increased along the line of contact in recent weeks and have claimed victims on both sides. We also truly regret the shooting that led on 26 February to the cancellation of the ceasefire monitoring mission, which was operating in the region of Filouzi, even though written guarantees of security had been given to Ambassador Kasprzyk by the local military officials.*
- *The European Union would like to mention once again the particular importance that it attaches to the continuation without hindrance of the ceasefire monitoring activities on the line of contact and along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which unquestionably contribute towards reducing tensions in the conflict zone and preventing a total deterioration of the situation. In this regard, the European Union calls on the parties to ensure that the OSCE observers have the security conditions they need to be able to implement their mandate.*

24 “Statement of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group”, 19 February 2009; <http://www.osce.org/item/36355.html>

25 PC.DEL/123/09, “Statement by the European Union at the 752nd Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh”, 5 March 2009

- *The European Union renews its call for strict respect of the ceasefire and urges the parties to respect in good faith their commitments not to resort to violence, which they again recently reiterated to the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group during the visit that the Co-Chairmen have just made to the region. We regret on this occasion that the recommendations made at the Ministerial Council meeting in Helsinki by the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group concerning the implementation of confidence-building measures and the consolidation of the ceasefire have still not had effect on the ground. In this connection, we strongly encourage the parties to sign an agreement on confidence-building measures and consolidation, including a commitment with a view to stopping the deployment of snipers, who are responsible for civilian and military casualties.*

The EU has conveyed with this statement how sensitive it is even for small scale armed incidents.

While these developments in the Karabakh conflict were experienced in the first quarter of 2009, the declaration in April that a road map has been agreed upon for the normalization process of Turkey-Armenia relations has caused Turkey-Azerbaijan-Armenia relations to gain a new dimension. In the Turkish Foreign Ministry's statement issued regarding this road map, the following has been expressed:

"22 April 2009

Turkey and Armenia, together with Switzerland as mediator, have been working intensively with a view to normalizing their bilateral relations and developing them in a spirit of good-neighborliness, and mutual respect, and thus to promoting peace, security and stability in the whole region.

The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified.

*This agreed basis provides a positive prospect for the on-going process."*²⁶

The strongest reaction to the road map agreed upon by Turkey and Armenia has come from Azerbaijan. The main reason for this reaction has been the Karabakh issue. In the statements provided by Azerbaijan, it is stated that Karabakh is the first

26 "Joint Statement of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and Republic of Armenia and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs", No: 56, April 22, 2009, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-56_-22-nisan-2009_-turkiye-ermenistan-iliskileri-hk_.tr.mfa

problem which needs to be settled and without its resolution, any agreement between Turkey and Armenia will greatly hinder Azeri interests.

During his visit to Azerbaijan in May, Prime Minister Erdoğan has delivered a speech at the Azerbaijan Parliament and has stated that the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh is a reason why the border is closed. Indicating that opening the border without ending the occupation is out of the question, Erdoğan has also emphasized that Turkey will not take any step without agreeing beforehand with Azerbaijan. Erdoğan, who has expressed his pleasure in Azerbaijan supporting Turkey's proposal of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, has mentioned that Turkey and Azerbaijan's view towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict does not differ. Erdoğan, by stating that 20% of Azeri territories are under occupation, has ended his speech by emphasizing that this situation must be resolved within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.²⁷

As a result of Erdoğan's speech, the strained relations between the two countries over the Karabakh conflict have partially become stable again. For Azerbaijan, this approach of Turkey is highly significant, because the side which must make concessions in order to reach a solution for the Karabakh conflict or enter a phase of its resolution is Armenia. Since Azerbaijan has lost territories, there are no concessions it can make for this issue. At this point, the following question emerges: Could Armenia be forced to make concessions over Karabakh, how can they be forced? The possibility of Europe, America and Russia to pressure Armenia to make concessions is quite low. Yet, as stated earlier, a draft resolution was adopted in the UN General Assembly on 14 March 2008 which emphasized Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and entailed the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Azeri territories. However, the governments of the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group have voted against the draft resolution. Linking the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict is significant in this context. Only in such a process could Armenia make concessions to a certain degree, because in return, their goal of opening the Turkish border gate will be fulfilled. Especially in the area of trade, opening of the border will not only rescue Armenia from being dependent on the Russia-Georgia line, but will enable Armenia to easily be involved in energy projects in the region.

Another important development taking place in May has been the carrying out of the first summit of the EU Eastern Partnership Program in Prague, the capital city of the Republic of Czechoslovakia. In this summit, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia have held talks in the US Embassy in Prague. This selection of location carries a symbolic significance and is an indication of the Obama administration

27 "Başbakan Erdoğan Azerbaycan Meclisinde Konuştu" (Prime Minister Erdoğan Delivered a Speech at the Azerbaijan Parliament), *Hürriyet*, 14 May 2009.

finally having influence over the process. The preliminary work of the Armenian-Azeri summit in Prague has been carried out in Washington. The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan have travelled to Prague from Washington.²⁸

Sarkisian-Aliev meeting started with the participation of the Foreign Ministers of the two states, the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, as well as the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office.

The Armenian side assessed the Prague meeting as useful which allowed the parties to further define approaches over the basic principles for the NK conflict resolution, as well as to bring positions of the parties over some issues closer together. The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan instructed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to continue with the Minsk Group Co-Chairs their work based on the Madrid Principles and aimed at further rapprochement of the basic principles of the conflict resolution and prepare the next meeting of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the request of the French Prime Minister, President Sarkisian presented the ongoing processes of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue and the NK peace negotiations. Speaking about the NK peace process, the President of Armenia noted that the core issue of the problem was the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and said that the negotiations in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group and main principles, which serve the base for negotiations, allow it to move forward. President Sarkisian underscored that Armenia was ready to accept a solution which would bring lasting peace. In his turn, the Prime Minister of France expressed readiness to support the NK peace process. Francois Fillon welcomed and expressed support for the ongoing Armenian-Turkish dialogue and for the efforts aimed at the normalization of the relations between the two countries.

On the other hand, President Abdullah Gül has had the opportunity to meet with both Aliev and Sarkisian in the summit in Prague. President Gül has conveyed his pleasure for generally being in agreement with Sarkisian on the relations between Turkey and Armenia and for some constructive developments to take place between Aliev and Sarkisian. Gül who has stated that he hopes the process will continue positively and as a result, peace and stability will be maintained in the Caucasus; has also emphasized that all countries in the area could benefit from that kind of outcome.²⁹

Within the context of the Karabakh conflict, May 2009 also carries a different significance for being the 15th anniversary of the ceasefire signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994. On this subject, Ambassador Yusuf Buluç, the Turkish Permanent Representative of the OSCE, has delivered a speech on 14 May

28 Kadri Gürsel, "2009 Fırsatını Kaçtırmayalım" (We Should Note Lose the 2009 Chance), *Milliyet*, 8 May 2009.

29 "Prag'da Gül-Sarkisyan Zirvesi" (Gül-Sarkisian Summit in Prague), Anadolu Agency, 8 May 2009.

2009 in the Permanent Council. In his speech, Buluç has touched upon the following points:

“The 15th anniversary of the ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh marks an event worthy of commemoration. The hostilities which resulted in thousands of victims were stopped but untold human misery continues to this day.

While not understating its significance, we see it as an intervention to create a pause and room for finding a lasting political solution to the conflict. We do not take the fact that it has lasted 15 years necessarily as an end or achievement in itself.

The same anniversary as in the preceding 15 years drives home the sad fact that despite all efforts of the international community, a solution continues to elude us.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict accords the region a distinct political character that sharply contrasts with the rest of the OSCE geography and thus renders it a status of unequal and divided security.

On various previous occasions we have underlined the opportunities that the region is being deprived of on account of this conflict. We do not need to repeat them today. As highlighted in the Prague Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, an initiative which we welcome, those opportunities are broad and tangible.

We should rather take the present deliberation of the Permanent Council as an exhortation to intensify and sharpen the focus of efforts by the Minsk Group countries, not least its Co-Chairmen and the wider OSCE community designed to promote a political solution. Let us make today’s review of the situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh to mark our common dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, renewed commiseration with the victims and their continuing suffering. In the context of the human dimension of our agenda the rights of uprooted and displaced persons to their decent and dignified exercise deserve no less priority or focus than, for example, national minorities or other vulnerable groups.

My government as a member of the Minsk Group is firm in its determination to continue its contribution to the process, both within and outside the Minsk Group, communicate directly with parties to the conflict at several levels to bring its positive influence to bear on this challenging task.

Our national input is premised on an assessment that the distance covered in the process is measurable and significant but not yet far enough nor has the required speed. The successful visit paid by the Prime Minister of Turkey to Azerbaijan which he concluded yesterday was a further evidence of such determination which we hope to be a stimulus and a contribution reinforcing and complementing the efforts by the parties and the Co-Chairmen.

As to the latter, let me conclude by reassuring the Co-chairs that in the conduct of their leadership role they are not alone.”³⁰

As can be seen, Ambassador Buluç has clearly put forth Turkey’s stance on the issue of the Karabakh conflict and has emphasized that Turkey will continue its efforts towards the settlement of this conflict.

Taking the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire, a statement has also been made by the EU in the Permanent Council of the OSCE:

“Fifteen years have elapsed since the entry into force on 12 May 1994 of the ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While that agreement put an end to the hostilities, the reports by Ambassador Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office, unfortunately remind us that the situation on the ground remains volatile and that armed incidents continue to claim victims, including civilians, on both sides of the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh. These incidents constitute unacceptable violations of the 1994 ceasefire agreement.

On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the implementation of this agreement, the European Union would like therefore to solemnly renew its call for strict respect of the ceasefire modalities and the additional measures agreed in 1995. It also urges the parties to respect in good faith their commitments not to resort to force. Furthermore, as it already stated in the Permanent Council on 5 March 2009, the European Union lends its full support to the recommendation made by the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group at the Ministerial Council meeting in Helsinki concerning the development of confidence-building measures on the ground. In this regard, we regard the unconditional withdrawal of the long-range precision weapons, which are responsible for many civilian and military victims, as being particularly important.

The European Union welcomes the regular meetings between the

30 PC.DEL/358/09, “Statement by the Permanent Representative of Turkey, Ambassador Yusuf BULUÇ at the 761th Meeting of the Permanent Council”, 14 May 2009.

Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which attest to the vitality of the negotiation process and the constructive nature of the relations that have been established between them. The meeting between President Aliev and President Sarkisian on 7 May, which took place in Prague on the sidelines of the summit launching the Eastern Partnership that we have just spoken about, is the fourth such meeting in less than a year. It follows the meetings in St. Petersburg in June 2008, in Moscow in November 2008 and in Zurich in January 2009, which took place in an open and constructive climate.

The mediation on the part of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group to reach a fair and lasting solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was confirmed at the highest level on this occasion. The European Union reaffirms its complete confidence in the French, Russian and American Co-Chairmen to make progress in all fairness in the search for a political settlement of the conflict, which is vital for the future and stability of the entire region.

While it welcomes the willingness reiterated once again in Prague by the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents to progress with and intensify the dialogue, the European Union urges the parties to finalize as soon as possible the basic principles that were submitted to them at the Ministerial Council in Madrid some 18 months ago. We believe that it is now time to open up a new phase in the negotiations.

As it has already underscored on several occasions, the European Union recalls that the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group can be successful only if the parties take responsibility and agree to the necessary compromises. It therefore urges them to be realistic and show the political will that is indispensable for the conclusion of a balanced and mutually acceptable conclusion.

Lastly, the European Union reiterates its determination to work closely with the parties to promote stability and prosperity and to consolidate democracy and the rule of law in the region, and to strengthen its co-operative relations with the parties within the framework of the Eastern Partnership that has just been launched in Prague.

The candidate countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, and the European Free Trade Association countries and

members of the European Economic Area Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway align themselves with this statement."³¹

In short, this statement emphasizes that the fights taking place at the border of Nagorno-Karabakh from time to time are unacceptable, that the EU supports the Minsk process and is highly confident about it, and that the sides coming together within the framework of the Eastern Partnership program have been noted with pleasure. Through the Eastern Partnership Program, the EU strives towards adopting a more effective and prominent position in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. For the EU, the Caucasian region being stable and far from fights is important for the energy resources of Caspian-Middle Asia to securely reach Europe. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand the EU's interest in the Karabakh conflict.

In June, it can be observed that the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group have again held meetings in Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, they have refrained from giving definite statements on them and it has been informed that works have been continuing within the context of the Madrid Principles.

Four days after the Economic Forum, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has met with Aliiev and Sarkisian separately and then the three leaders have come together at dinner. Moreover, Sarkisian and Aliiev have held a bilateral talk. Medvedev's Spokeswoman Natalia Timokova has expressed that the three leaders have addressed the situation in the Caucasus, including the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Kremlin foreign policy aide Sergei Prikhodko stated that they do not expect any significant progress in the talks, any new agreements to be made or extraordinary developments, such as the detailed evaluation of the issue, to take place, but that they are working towards supporting direct communication between the two leaders.³² While Aliiev has expressed that he is pleased with Azerbaijan's relations with Russia, Sarkisian has said that they are continuing to work towards securing the protection of Nagorno-Karabakh's local community and allowing them to independently determine their faith. In the statement issued by the Armenian Presidency, it has been stated that this meeting on the Karabakh conflict has been constructive.

In July, the sides have once again met in Moscow. Medvedev's foreign policy aide Sergei Prikhodko has once again expressed that Medvedev, as the Co-chair country of the OSCE Minsk Group, is ready to contribute in every way and to support the attempts to find a solution which could be mutually accepted by both

31 PC.DEL/349/09, "Statement by the European Union at the 761st Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh" 14 May 2009.

32 Saban Kardas, "Aliyev and Sarkysyan Meet in Moscow", The Jamestown Foundation, 21 July 2009.

sides. Prikhodko who has expressed that the leaders have assessed the solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has also stated that “despite the continuing disagreements on very important issues, the meeting has been very comprehensive and constructive. For us, it was a highly constructive meeting. Some specific problems were focused upon. Aliev and Sarkisian expressed their pleasure in President Medvedev’s efforts to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to bring Armenian and Azerbaijan positions closer to each other.”³³

Following the meetings, US representative Matthew Bryza from among the OSCE co-chairs has also provided explanations. Although expressing his discomfort with not being able to reach new decisions at the end of Aliev and Sarkisian’s meeting, Bryza has also not failed to convey his satisfaction with the leaders discussing the issues very openly for the first time. Moreover, Bryza has also emphasized that despite not everything being perfect, the process has been continuing at a serious level.³⁴

In both Russian aide Prikhodko’s and US representative Bryza’s statements, an interesting point exists. Both of them have expressed that a progress in the settlement of important matters has not been achieved and reconciliation has not been reached. It is not difficult to presume that what is meant by “important matters” is the evacuation of Karabakh and the seven regions surrounding it.

Perhaps, the most important reason for progress not being able to be achieved is Armenia being distant to the Madrid Principles. A serious opposition exists in Armenia who does not want the Madrid Principles to be accepted. Therefore, Armenia is acting cautiously and slowly on this subject.

On this matter, a specialist on the Caucasus, Alexander Jackson’s evaluations draws attention: “For Armenia, domestic (and semi-domestic) concerns may have played a role in slowing down the talks. At home, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) warned President Serge Sarkisian on July 17 that if he signs an agreement with Azerbaijan’s President Aliev on Karabakh, the ARF will call for his resignation. A few days earlier, the ARF demanded the sacking of Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan, also for his allegedly soft stance on peace talks. The semi-domestic problems come from the separatist ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ (NKR), which insisted that the current negotiating format was “deficient” and that no deal could be signed without the active participation of the NKR. To defuse the tension, Mr. Nalbandyan travelled to the region to reassure the leadership, declaring that

33 Saban Kardas, “Aliyev and Sarkysyan Meet in Moscow”, The Jamestown Foundation, 21 July 2009.

34 “Aliyev ve Sarkisyan Petersburg’da Görüştü” (Aliev and Sarkisian Meet in Petersburg), Radikal, 18 July 2009.

“Armenia cannot make any agreement without the approval of the people and leadership of Karabakh”.³⁵

A French Co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Bernard Fassier has also expressed his thoughts and said that their primary aim is to put Nagorno-Karabakh's final status aside and bring the sides closer to each other based on certain principles and that the process is continuing successfully within this framework. In summary, the French Co-chair has stated that the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh has been put aside for the time being and the first target to reach is the evacuation of all Armenian occupied regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and returning them to Azerbaijan. Fassier has stated that at the basis of this project is the belief that it is not possible for Nagorno-Karabakh to join to or separate from Azerbaijan except through war and the reasons for the process to drag on so much is the resentment between the two communities and the issue being made into an instrument of domestic policy. While indicating that they have remained at an equal distance to both sides during the meetings, Fassier has also touched upon the subject of Turkey's possible co-chairmanship, expressing that it is not possible for Turkey to attend the meetings as a mediator like France and Russia, as the concept of “one nation, two states” between the Turks and Azerbaijanis prevents this from taking place.³⁶

It could be understood from the French Co-chair's statements that even if the talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are completed successfully under the Minsk Group, the uncertainty in Karabakh's status will continue and the definite determination of its status will be delayed to an unknown date. Moreover, it has been emphasized that Karabakh's status will be determined with a referendum. It is not difficult to already guess the result which will be obtained from such a referendum. In such a situation, the Azerbaijan government experiencing difficulties with its public opinion will be inevitable.

The French Co-chair's assessment on Turkey's co-chairmanship is not only ungrounded, but also contradictory within itself. If the Co-chair is sincere in his view, then he must express that it is also wrong for Russia to have the status of co-chair, because the very intensive relations between Russia and Armenia are much deeper than relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has the power to sustain their existence as a state without Turkey. However, what kind of a situation Armenia, which is in the position of almost being Russia's satellite, will find itself in without Russia is highly difficult to foresee.

35 “The Internal Dynamics of Armenia's Karabakh Policy”, CU Issue 40, 20 July 2009.

36 “AGIT Minsk Grubu'nun Fransız Eş başkanı Fassier'in Açıklamaları” (Statements of French OSCE Minsk Group Co-chair Fassier), Cihan News Agency, 22 July 2009.

In October 2009, a very important development has taken place in the Karabakh conflict and Turkey-Armenia relations. On 10 October 2009, two protocols on the “Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and “Development of Relations” have been signed between Turkey and Armenia. It has been decided that the protocols would enter into force two months after the ratification by the parliament of the two states. However, neither Turkey nor Armenia has been able to complete the procedures for the ratification of the protocols. There are different reasons for this. The reason for Turkey not to immediately ratify the protocols is the Karabakh conflict. As a matter of fact, Prime Minister Erdoğan had repeated many times that it was not possible to implement the protocols without the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. For Armenia however, different reasons exist. It could be seen that despite signing two protocols with Turkey, Armenia attempts to amend some dispositions of the protocols. In Sarkisian’s “Call to Armenians” speech delivered on 11 October, it has been expressed that their relations with Turkey does not mean that the “genocide” truth will be questioned, genocide must be recognized and condemned by humanity, and the sub-commission mentioned in the Second Protocol is not a commission of historians. This statement almost suppresses the function of the Sub-commission on the Historical Dimension. Moreover, stating that the existing border conflict between Turkey and Armenia will be settled based on norms and principles of international law and that the protocols have not gone beyond this. President Sarkisian has given the impression that Armenia is definitively not recognizing the borders between the two countries .

At this point, considering the reasons put forth by both sides, the following conclusion can be obtained: Turkey has continued to maintain their Karabakh condition after the signing of the protocols and there is no change in their stance, since its position on that matter is known long time before the signing of the protocols. However, Armenia has attempted to amend some dispositions of the protocols which they had signed a day before.

While these developments have taken place in Turkey-Armenia relations, presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia have come together in Munich in November. Before the meeting, İlham Aliev has displayed a rather strong stance and has not only mentioned that this meeting is the last chance for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but that if the meeting with Sarkisian remains inconclusive then they will have no choice but to use military power. He also expressed that they do not want war, but they will no longer allow Armenia to put them off.³⁷ However, the possibility of Aliev to put this statement into practice is quite low. This subject will be touched upon in the last section of this article.

37 Fahriye Keskin, “Karabağ Sorunu Bağlamında Münih Görüşmesi” (Munich Meeting in the Context of the Karabakh Conflict), SDE, 24 November 2009.; “Sarkisian-Aliyev Regular Meeting”, Armtown.com, 23 November 2009.; <http://www.armtown.com/news/en/Ira/20091123/16027/>

Apart from Aliev and Sarkisian, the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group have also attended the meeting. At the end of the meeting, French Co-chair of the Minsk Group Bernard Fassier has stated that the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia have made significant progress on the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the meeting, but also some difficulties and conflicting views have been noticed. It will be remembered that the French Co-chair had also expressed that conflicting views existed on important matters in his statement delivered in July. Consequently, during the five-month period that passed by, no progress has been made on “important matters”.

In December, a conference of the foreign ministers of OSCE member countries has taken place. In this conference, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia have touched upon the Karabakh conflict in their speeches.

The Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has addressed the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the context of regional security and has emphasized the unresolved existing problems in Azerbaijan-Georgia-Moldova under a single heading. Regarding the issue, Davutoğlu has made the following explanations:

“Unresolved conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova continue to threaten the security and stability of our continent. While they have different roots, different historical and political backgrounds and therefore need to be addressed within their own parameters, however, the relevant international norms and principles applicable to all of them must be consistent.

Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity must constitute the bedrock of any settlement. In this vein let me reiterate the continued support of Turkey to the mediation efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group and its Co-Chairmen. We encourage both sides to build upon the existing momentum in order to achieving a breakthrough without further delay. Turkey is of the view that efforts aimed at the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the creation of an environment of durable peace and stability in the region are mutually reinforcing and have a direct impact on one another. The two processes cannot be seen in isolation.

The war in Georgia in 2008 was a reminder that the so-called frozen conflicts are not so frozen after all. The damage which this war has inflicted upon the overall political climate and its negative impact on other areas of the OSCE's work have yet to be remedied. A successful outcome of the Geneva talks would be a first step. The closure of the OSCE presence in Georgia is regrettable and we hope that Kazakhstan will continue the efforts

of the Greek Chairmanship in order to re-establish a meaningful OSCE field operation in Georgia.

We are pleased to see a renewed political momentum in the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict, generated by the resumption of the talks in “5 plus 2” format. This format remains the basic negotiating platform capable of addressing the interest and concerns of all the parties.”³⁸

It is important for Davutoğlu to refer to the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, while mentioning Turkey’s efforts towards solving regional disputes. At this point, he has emphasized that the existing “frozen” disputes cannot always remain like this, Davutoğlu has expressed that the events experienced in Georgia confirms this and therefore, has implied that the Karabakh conflict must be settled as soon as possible in order to prevent a similar war.

Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov has also emphasized the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in his speech and by drawing attention to the fact that this conflict has not been able to resolved for 15 years, has expressed that they are pleased with the meetings taking place between Armenia-Azerbaijan leaders and believes that the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied territories will be beneficial to everyone in the region. The part of Mammadyarov’s speech related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is as follows:

“The Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still remains a major source of instability and impediment to the economic development and integration of the entire region of the South Caucasus into the European and Euro-Atlantic architecture. As a result of this conflict almost 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan has been still occupied by Armenia, around 1 million ethnically cleansed Azerbaijani population has become internally displaced and refugees, thousands of Azerbaijani historical-cultural heritage items on the occupied territories devastated and looted.

This year was remarkable in terms of the intensiveness of the meetings between the Presidents of the both sides, and the detailed and in-depth discussions of the most important yet unresolved issues. I should admit that there are the positivedynamics through the latest talks and both sides together with the Minsk Group Co-chairs agreed to intensify negotiations. Azerbaijan maintains a position of constructiveness and stands for peaceful and cooperative coexistence of Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. This will create basis for

38 MC.DEL/59/09; “Address by H.E Ahmet Davutoğlu Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey”, The OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Athens, 2 December 2010.

normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Providing self-governance for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan will be a just and durable solution, as well as it can dramatically reduce tensions and challenges for peace and stability in the region.

We in Azerbaijan strongly believe that withdrawal of Armenian troops in a fixed time framework from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan will open a tremendous opportunity for the region, providing different environment of predictability, development and benefit for everyone and for the entire region. This is the core of the issue.”³⁹

On the other hand, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan has not only addressed the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but has brought Azerbaijan’s increasing armament to the agenda and has underlined the process of Turkey-Armenia protocols with the following statement:

“The passing year marked serious round of discussions on the future of arms control arrangements in the OSCE area. We value in particular the efforts to strengthen arms control measures, including through the initiative on the Vienna document 1999.

In this context, the pattern of non-compliance of one State, Azerbaijan, to the core arms control regime, particularly by substantially exceeding maximum levels of holdings in at least two categories of armaments set by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, combined with the war rhetoric, raises concerns about that country’s real intentions. Azerbaijan violates one of the basic principles of the OSCE – the principle of non-use or threat of use of force.

Today, I am pleased to state that we have made a significant step forward with the Turkish side, by signing the Protocols on the establishment of diplomatic relations and on the development of bilateral relations, on 10 October in Zurich. The next important step that the parties have committed to make is the ratification of the Protocols. We hope that this important step will be made and Armenia and Turkey will start implementation of the agreements reached. Unreasonable delays and preconditions in this process, including attempts to link this and Nagorno-Karabakh processes may harm the both.

In accordance with the same values, Armenia continues its active

³⁹ MC.DEL/63/09/Rev.1; “Address by H.E. Mr. Elmar Mammadyarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, at the 17th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council”, Athens, 2 December 2010.

involvement in the efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During this year the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan have had six meetings within the OSCE Minsk Group process, which remains the solid framework for negotiations. Although the negotiating parties have made some progress in the discussion of the Madrid document, there are still issues that need to be addressed. Armenia is committed to a peaceful solution of the conflict, based on the norms and principles of international law, particularly the principles of non use or threat of use of force, self determination and territorial integrity, which were reflected yesterday in the Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

We are convinced that in order to create an opportunity for the progress in the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the parties should commit to refrain from the steps that could hamper the peace process, including the attempts, which have been made here in the speech of the Azerbaijani minister, to misinterpret the essence of the conflict and of the ongoing negotiations.”⁴⁰

As can be seen, 2009 has witnessed comprehensive diplomatic activities regarding the Karabakh conflict. Failing to obtain a final conclusion has created unrest, especially in Azerbaijan, because Azerbaijan believes that Armenia is following a policy of stalling and has repeated many times that they will not allow for this to happen. Moreover, Azerbaijan has criticized the Minsk Group from time to time and has emphasized that the works conducted have not been sufficient. However, it should not be overlooked that Azerbaijan does not have the luxury to stay outside the Minsk process towards the resolution of the conflict.

Developments in 2010

Just as 2009, 2010 has also been a year where important meetings have taken place on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue; however, the resolution of the conflict has not been obtained.

In January, Prime Minister Erdoğan has conducted a visit to Russia during which bilateral relations have been saved and the Karabakh conflict has been discussed. Erdoğan, in a speech delivered at Moscow State University, has emphasized the vital importance of ending the occupation of Azeri territories and finding a permanent solution to the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. Expressing the Minsk

⁴⁰ MC.DEL/72/09; “Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia H.E. Mr. Edward Nalbandian at the 17th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council Athens”, 2 December, 2009.

Group's responsibility for the Karabakh conflict, the Prime Minister has said that the Minsk Group established to settle this conflict has been deficient, because this question has not been able to be resolved for 20 years. On the Other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan has emphasized the necessity for Russia to be more active for that question.⁴¹

It can be seen that Prime Minister Erdoğan has openly criticized the Minsk Group and has expressed that they have not been able to reach a solution on the Karabakh conflict until now. At the same time, by implicitly expressing that Russia also has great responsibility, has sent a message to that country. At a time when Turkish-Russian relations have gained momentum, this criticism of Erdoğan towards Russia displays Turkey's sensitiveness towards the Karabakh conflict.

During the Erdoğan visit to Russia on 12 January 2010, the Armenian Constitutional Court took a decision concerning the protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia and practically drifted apart the protocols from their purpose, making them almost void. There is no direct reference to the Karabakh conflict in the decision of the Court. However, the stipulation saying that the provisions in the protocols are of an exclusively bilateral interstate nature and cannot concern the relations with any third party concerns Karabakh and means that the protocols can in no way be related to the Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, the part of the Second Protocol stating "cooperating for enhancing regional stability and security and the parties reiterating their commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes and conflicts on the basis of the norms and principles of international law" are indirectly related to Karabakh. However, the Constitutional Court has not touched upon this point at all.⁴²

Another development in January is the meeting between Sarkisian and Aliev in Moscow on January 25. However, no concrete result has been obtained from this meeting either. In a statement delivered after the meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has expressed that the parties who have held talks since 2 November 2008 for a permanent resolution within the framework of the Madrid Principles determined by the Minsk Group in 2007, have not been able to agree upon a document which could constitute a road map. Lavrov has also stated that the most important result obtained from this meeting is the parties accepting an introduction to be drafted for the proposed agreement, which will be prepared based on the renewed Madrid principles. In this introduction, the two parties could indicate what they will accept and what they will reject; Lavrov has underlined that even listing the conflicting points item by item is a success at this point.⁴³

41 "Erdoğan, Medvedev ve Putin ile görüşti" (Erdoğan Met With Medvedev and Putin), CNN Turk, 13 January 2010.

42 Ömer Engin Lütem, "The Protocols: A Return to the Beginning", Center for Eurasian Studies, 21 January 2010.

43 Sergey Lavrov, "Karabakh Problem to be solved soon"; ruvr.ru/slavrov%20/2010/01/25/

During a visit to the United Kingdom in February, Armenian President Sarkisian has delivered a speech at Chatham House entitled “Values in the Southern Caucasus and Security”. In his speech, Sarkisian has made the following explanations regarding the Karabakh conflict:

“The problem has many sensitive and delicate aspects. I urge everyone to exercise utmost caution when making public statements on the problem of Mountainous Karabakh, to take into account all the dimensions, possible consequences, and the perceptions of the sides, and always to rely on the positions of the organizations that are familiar with the details of the problem and specialize in its peaceful resolution: in this case, it would be the OSCE. The problem can only be resolved in the context of the international law principles of the self-determination of nations, territorial integrity, and the non-use of force. All the stakeholders now realize this truth. Whenever one refers to the Mountainous Karabakh conflict, the notion of territorial integrity should not be emphatically underlined, especially that even if that notion is perceived to be the only one applying in the case of the Mountainous Karabakh conflict, it would not lead to its application in the form envisioned by Azerbaijan.”

We are confident that the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations can become the greatest input of the recent decades in achieving peace and stability in the South Caucasus. With this vision, we have agreed to move forward without any preconditions, not making our relations contingent upon Turkey’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide. However, if, as many suspect, it is proven that Turkey’s goal is to protract, rather than to normalize relations, we will have to discontinue the process.

I would not claim that the process has so far been easy. It is common knowledge that Turkey repeatedly attempted to voice preconditions related to the resolution of the Mountainous Karabakh issue. It is, however, obvious that attempts to link these two processes will undermine both the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations and the talks around the Karabakh issue. I, however, believe that the rapid normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations can set an example of a proactive problem-solving attitude that will positively stimulate and set an example the resolution of the Karabakh conflict.”⁴⁴

Some points of Sarkisian’s statements is worth mentioning. Firstly, Sarkisian has expressed that the Karabakh conflict could only be resolved in conformity with

⁴⁴ “Serzh Sarkisian Speech at the Chatham House”, Armeno Live Journal, 11 February 2010.; <http://armeno.livejournal.com/18494.html>

international law and using military power would not be beneficial. However, the Karabakh conflict has emerged as a result of Armenia using military power. Secondly, Sarkisian has asserted that Turkey has attempted to protract this conflict. This is directly contradictory to Turkey's policy of "zero problems" with its neighbors. Another interesting point is the diverging views between Turkey and Armenia towards the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. While Turkey argues that the steps taken towards the settlement of the Karabakh conflict will accelerate and positively influence the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, Armenia emphasizes on the contrary that the progress in Turkey-Armenia relations will positively affect the Karabakh conflict. In short, while Turkey expects a positive step from Armenia regarding the Karabakh conflict, on the opposite, Armenia expects a positive step from Turkey regarding bilateral relations.

April of 2010 has also witnessed intense developments towards the Karabakh conflict. On April 20, the US State Department Spokesman Mark Toner, in response to the accusations of some Azeri officials alleging that the US is favoring Armenia, has said that the US remains neutral on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and there is no discord on this issue with Azerbaijan. Regarding the criticisms, Toner has made the following statement:

*"There is no cooling in the Azerbaijani-U.S. relations, As co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States for a long period has made every effort to rapidly resolve the protracted conflict together with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The United States does not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. We are not at anyone's side, we support the Minsk Group and the peaceful settlement of the conflict. We stand for the normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations, which corresponds to the interests of the region. At the same time, we highly support the Minsk process. We would like to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and to work with both Azerbaijan and Armenia."*⁴⁵

On April 22, Armenia has declared that they have suspended the ratification process of the protocols. In a statement, the parties forming the Government has expressed, among others, that Prime Minister Erdoğan linking the ratification of the protocols to the Karabakh conflict is unacceptable.⁴⁶

On April 25, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Kirill, Mufti of Azerbaijan Allahşükür Paşazade, and the Catholicos of all Armenians Garegin II have come

45 "U.S. is neutral over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and supports OSCE Minsk Group's efforts", Today.az, 21 April 2010.; <http://www.today.az/news/politics/66506.html>

46 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Armenia Suspends the Ratification of the Protocols", Center for Eurasian Studies, 23 April 2010.

together in a summit in Baku. The religious leaders, who want the enhancing of peace and stability in the region, have signed a joint declaration related to the Karabakh conflict. Following the summit, Patriarch Kirill has expressed that the summit has taken place at the right time and as the right step and that the religious leaders lack political or state power, but have the opportunity show how similar the values and ideals of believers are to each other. Kirill has expressed that they hope this step will allow the tension in the region to ease, reconciliation to develop and leaders who bear political responsibility for the settlement of problems in disputes to be supported.⁴⁷

Catholicos Garegin II has expressed that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must also be settled through peaceful means, has emphasized at this point that their greatest task as religious leaders is to support the presidents in continuing the process and finding a solution to the conflicts.⁴⁸

In April, some discussions have taken place regarding the composition of the Minsk Group. Ali Ahmedov, the Vice-Chairmen of the New Azerbaijan Party has expressed that time has come for change in the Minsk Group's structure. Accusing some countries for not acting justly during the Karabakh process, Ahmedov has stated that for the Minsk Group to mature and be completed, Turkey could be the most crucial member.⁴⁹

Moreover, Azerbaijan President İlham Aliev's chief assistant for public policy Ali Hasanov has also stated that during the Minsk Group's meetings, the issue of Turkey's membership has occupied a place in the agenda. By expressing that the status of the OSCE Minsk Group could change, has put forth that it might be possible for France as a co-chair, to represent the EU.

The first response to the proposal of Azeri authorities has come from Russia. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Andrey Nesterenko who has stated that no formal proposal on Turkey becoming co-chair has been conveyed to Russia. He has emphasized that in any case, in order to be able to discuss such an issue, the consent of at least all conflicting parties is necessary. Nesterenko has also gone on further to state that the suspension of the ratification process of the protocols which foresees the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations has created question marks regarding this issue.⁵⁰

47 "Rusya, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan Dini Liderlerinden Ortak Yukarı Karabağ Açıklaması" (Joint Declaration on Karabakh by Religious Leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), Cihan News Agency, 26 April 2010.

48 "Rusya, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan Dini Liderlerinden Ortak Yukarı Karabağ Açıklaması" (Joint Declaration on Karabakh by Religious Leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), Cihan News Agency, 26 April 2010.

49 "Nurettin Atmaca, "Türkiye Minsk Grubu'nun Eş Başkanı Olsun" (Turkey Should Become Co-chair Country of the Minsk Group), Doğan News Agency, 20 April 2010.

50 "Moskova'ya Göre Türkiye'nin AGIT Minsk Grubu Eş Başkanlığı Zor" (According to Moscow Turkey's co-chairmanship for the OSCE Minsk Group is Difficult), Haberrus, 30 April 2010.

With a diplomatic language, Russia has expressed that they are against Turkey's prospective co-chairmanship. Here, it is not difficult to understand Russia's opposition. Taking into account Azerbaijan-Turkey relations and the existing regional competition between Turkey and Russia (despite the developing bilateral relations in the recent years), Russia not wanting to see Turkey at an active position within the Minsk Group in the Karabakh conflict is necessary for their own strategy. Russia aims to keep the possible developments in the Karabakh conflict within their own control. Therefore, it also conducts meetings outside the Minsk Group at every possible opportunity with Azeri or Armenian leaders.

Two days after Russia's statement, Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry's Spokesman Elhan Polukhov has expressed that it is not possible for Turkey to become Co-chair of the Minsk Group which conducts negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through peaceful means. The reaction of Russia causing Azerbaijan to take a step back in a short period of time is also quite meaningful.

However, it is noteworthy to underline a point within this process. It is quite clear that Azerbaijan is not very satisfied with the stance of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs displayed in the meetings conducted up till now. Azeri authorities have accused the co-chairs many times for not being neutral. Certainly, this view of Azerbaijan will negatively affect the function of the Minsk Group in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Therefore, it is crucial for the countries represented by co-chairs to take into consideration Azerbaijan's views and to continue their mission in a way as neutral as possible. The opposite can not only cause Azerbaijan to be withdrawn from the process, but there is also a slight chance that the fighting taking place from time to time in the region could increase.

Towards the end of April, Stefan Füle, the commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy to the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs has provided information to the members of the European Parliament after visiting Ukraine and the Southern Caucasus. In response to the criticisms that the initiatives of the EU is not efficient in the Karabakh conflict, he has stated that they have done their best for this conflict, that miracles should not be expected from them, and that over time their roles will become much more active and strong. It could be understood from Füle's statement that a lengthy process is still required to come close to the resolution of the Karabakh conflict.

In May, again some interesting developments have taken place. First of all, on May 11, Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov has made a visit to Azerbaijan. It has been declared that during the visit, military cooperation and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been addressed, but a detailed explanation has not been

provided. On the other hand, in a statement given before the meeting, Azeri Defense Minister Abiyev has indicated that the works of the OSCE Minsk Group for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are not efficient and have not given any results. Despite criticisms like these coming from Azeri authorities and targeting the Minsk Group from time to time, the possibility of the implementation of a new platform in a short period of time where the Karabakh conflict could be discussed is quite low.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has stated in his two days visit to Turkey, starting on May 12, that Karabakh is a complicated conflict, but is not the only conflict in the Caucasus and that steps taken towards the settlement of the conflict does not mean that an agreement has been reached on all issues. He has also emphasized that the problems must be dealt with by all conflicting sides and one must not be contented with the point reached.⁵¹

Perhaps the most significant development in May related to the Karabakh conflict is Resolution 2216 adopted in the General Assembly of the European Parliament for the implementation and preparation of the EU's Southern Caucasus strategy. The most important part of the Resolution is the following:

“Fully supports the Minsk Group Co-chairs’ mediation, the Madrid Principles and the Moscow Declaration; condemns the idea of a military solution and calls on both sides to avoid militant rhetoric; furthermore calls on both sides to show more ambition in the peace talks and to abandon the tendency to prefer perpetuating the status quo created through military conquests in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions; calls on the international community likewise to show courage and political will to overcome the remaining sticking points which hinder an agreement;

Recalls that hundreds of thousands of persons who fled their homes during or in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh war remain displaced and denied their right to return; calls on all parties to unambiguously and unconditionally recognise this right and the need for its prompt realisation; calls on the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities and leaders of relevant communities to demonstrate their commitment to the creation of peaceful inter-ethnic relations through practical preparations for the return of displaced persons and other means; considers that the situation of the IDPs should be dealt with according to international standards, having regard inter alia to the recent PACE Recommendation 1877(2009), ‘Europe’s forgotten people: protecting the human rights of long-term displaced persons’;

51 “Rusya’yla Gündem Karabağ” (Russia’s Agenda is Karabakh), Dünya Newspaper, 14 May 2010.

Notes that interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh could imply interim legitimisation of the de facto authorities there; believes that inter alia in order to raise their credibility with a view to such a prospect, these authorities should rapidly abandon the positions that Nagorno-Karabakh includes all Armenian-occupied Azerbaijani lands and that displaced persons' right of return cannot even be discussed at the present stage; calls on the Government of Armenia to exercise its influence in this respect and on the Council and Commission to join this call;

Stresses that security for all is an indispensable element of any settlement; recognises the importance of robust peace-keeping arrangement.”⁵²

The resolution has emphasized that the European Parliament is pleased with the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process and the six meetings held in 2009 between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in conformity with the Moscow Declaration is a good example for this. During the meeting, Bulgarian MP Yevgeni Kirillov who prepared the draft text has stated that the Southern Caucasus is not only a frontier zone for the European Union and just as its economic and political importance for the EU, it is also strategically crucial. A point drawing attention in the Resolution is that the situation in Karabakh has been regarded as an Armenian occupation and the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azeri territories and allowing migrants to return to their homes have been foreseen. While it has been emphasized that Karabakh and the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations are separate processes, it has also been expressed that a progress developing in one of these processes will have a positive impact on the entire region.

This Resolution adopted by the European Parliament has caused dissatisfaction in Armenia. Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan has made the following statement regarding the Resolution: “The provisions of that report about the Karabakh conflict are in line neither with the Madrid Principles nor with the Moscow declaration. There is an apparent chaos of formulations”. Levon Zurabyan, Coordinator of the Armenian National Congress Party in the Opposition has evaluated the adoption of this document as a disgrace for Armenian diplomacy. According to Zurabyan, with this document, the European Union has for the first time adopted a resolution which entails the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Azeri territories. Chairman of the Armenian National Assembly Ovik Abramyan has written a letter to the President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek in which he has emphasized that four of the six articles in the document (6, 7, 8, 10) related to Nagorno-Karabakh are contradictory to the resolution process of the conflict through peaceful means, to the statements delivered by the OSCE and

52 Evgeni Kirillov, “EU Strategy for the South Caucasus (2009/2216(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs”, 21 May 2010.

the European Community in Athens in 2009, and to the European Parliament's 2008 resolution.

It is worth to mention that this Resolution is not binding in any way. However, this does not mean that the Resolution is unimportant. This Resolution has the capacity to increase the pressures over Armenia for the Karabakh conflict in the future. At an international platform, following the resolutions of the United Nations (resolution no. 822, 853, 874, 884), Azerbaijan has at least gained another advantage over Armenia.

In the recent years, the Organization of the Islamic Conference has also adopted some resolutions concerning the Karabakh conflict. On May 19, the OIC, in its meeting in Dushanbe, had adopted another resolution on this question which essentially emphasized that: Armenia is the aggressor in the 22-year Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh".⁵³ Just as the European Parliament Resolution not being binding, the OIC Resolution is also not binding, but it will surely contribute to Armenia's isolation in the international area for the Karabakh issue.

Another development on the Karabakh conflict has been elections being held in Karabakh on May 23. Since 1993, this is the fifth elections held in this region. However, these elections are only recognized by Armenia; many countries had objected to them as they are not recognizing an independent Karabakh. With this election, Armenia aims to influence and mislead the world public opinion.

These elections have been highly criticized by Azerbaijan. In a statement of the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan regarding this issue, it has been emphasized that these elections has been an unsuccessful attempt to justify the occupation of Azeri territories, Armenia has not been able to gain the support of anyone except for its own community, and the elections will not create any results in the region other than negative ones. Moreover, it has been expressed in the statement that the only solution to the conflict is based on the recognition of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.⁵⁴

In June, the Azeri and Armenian sides have once again met in Moscow. In the meetings hosted by Russia President Medvedev on June 17, no significant information has been given, apart from stating that the process for the Karabakh conflict conducted within the framework of the Madrid Principles has been addressed.

53 "Organization of the Islamic Conference Takes Aim at Armenia", Eurasianet, 20 May 2010.

54 "Azerbaycan, Karabağ Seçimlerini Kınadı" (Azerbaijan condemned the Karabakh Elections), TRT, 24 May 2010.; "Azerbaijani NGO: Conducting "parliamentary elections" in Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia's disrespect for International Law", Trend News, 25 May 2010.

Three days after these meetings, some small scale fights have taken place in Karabakh between Armenian and Azeri troops and four Armenian and one Azeri soldier have lost their lives. Lately, an increase in that kind of small skirmishes has been noticed in Karabakh. These clashes raise the question of whether the possibility to settle the conflict by using force in the future exists. Azeri officials and in particular President İlham Aliev, had stated many times that they could rescue the occupied Azeri territories by using force if necessary. Economic development taking place in Azerbaijan and in parallel to this, increase in national defense expenditures and Aliev declaring that Azerbaijan's defense expenditures should equal the whole to Armenia's budget have shown that as far as the armed forces are concerned, there will be a great difference to Azerbaijan's advantage in the future and therefore, the territories under Armenian occupation being rescued by using force seems possible. President Aliev has stated that a ceasefire exists between both countries, but the war has not yet ended. Legally, this is indeed the case.

Going into further details, President Aliev has stated that according to international financial institutions, Azerbaijan will earn 140 billion dollars in the next 20 years and taking advantage of this, will strengthen its army in order to take back their territories which have been occupied. Azerbaijan's defense expenditures which were 135 million dollars in 2003, has approximately seven folded and reached 1 billion dollars in 2007. According to Aliev, Azerbaijan's GNDP is expected to be 25-30 billion dollars. On the other hand, Armenia's is around 4-5 billion dollars. Against Azerbaijan's option to use force, Armenian officials have expressed that influenced by the military achievements in the beginning of the 90's, Armenia still maintains its military superiority and economic power does not necessarily mean military power.⁵⁵

Which is important on that subject is the stance of the US and Russia. Apart from the consent of either of these countries, the possibility of a long-running conflict to start in the region is very low.

The last development taking place in June has been the joint statement issued by Presidents Obama, Medvedev and Sarkozy after the G-8 Summit taking place in Canada on 25 June 2010. The three leaders who are at the same time the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group have made public the following statement:

Joint Statement On The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by Dmitry Medvedev, President Of The Russian Federation, Barack Obama, President Of The United States Of America, and Nicolas Sarkozy, President Of The French Republic

55 Ömer Engin Lütem, Facts and Comments, Ermeni Araştırmaları, No. 30, p. 45.

Muskoka, 26 June 2010

We, the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group's Co-Chair countries, France, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America, reaffirm our commitment to support the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan as they finalize the Basic Principles for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

We welcome as a significant step the recognition by both sides that a lasting settlement must be based upon the Helsinki Principles and the elements that we proposed in connection with our statement at the L'Aquila Summit of the Eight on July 10, 2009, relating to:

the return of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh,

interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteeing security and self-governance,

a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;

final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined in the future by a legally-binding expression of will,

the right of all internally-displaced persons and refugees to return, and

international security guarantees, including a peacekeeping operation.

Now the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan need to take the next step and complete the work on the Basic Principles to enable the drafting of a peace agreement to begin. We instruct our Ministers and Co-Chairs to work intensively to assist the two sides to overcome their differences in preparation for a joint meeting in Almaty on the margins of OSCE Informal Ministerial.”⁵⁶

In this statement, the points which have already been known, such as evacuation of the surrounding areas of Karabakh, determining a temporary status for Karabakh, determining its permanent status with a referendum to take place at an unknown date in the future, and returning of individuals who were forced to abandon this region have been repeated. Therefore, its importance is rather limited.

56 Emil Sanamyan, “Obama, Medvedev, Sarkozy want Karabakh Basic Principles”, Reporter.am., 26 June 2010.

Conclusion

Taking into consideration the developments taking place from 2006 until today on the Karabakh conflict, the following conclusion could be drawn. The meetings held between Armenia and Azerbaijan on this matter has become organized by the Minsk Group and within the framework of the Madrid Principles accepted in 2007. In the subsequent four years, numerous meetings have taken place between the sides on different platforms, but not even a partial solution has been achieved. Expecting a solution in the short term will also be a highly optimistic approach, because Karabakh has become such a conflict that even if the parties reach an agreement on all issues, the implementation and obtaining desired results will require 5 to 10 years. Moreover, although the Karabakh conflict seems interesting for only Armenia and Azerbaijan, in practice the US and Russia stances will be the determining factor of the conflict. On the other hand Turkey linking the ratification of the protocols to the positive development of the Karabakh issue has also become an important component of the conflict.

Taking all these points into account it does not seem logical to expect that the Karabakh issue could be resolved in a short and even in a medium term.

RECENT DOCUMENTS

**DOCUMENT 1: STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA
ON ARMENIAN REMEMBRANCE DAY**

**DOCUMENT 2: THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA**

**The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
April 24, 2010**

**Statement of President Barack Obama on
Armenian Remembrance Day**

On this solemn day of remembrance, we pause to recall that ninety-five years ago one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century began. In that dark moment of history, 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.

Today is a day to reflect upon and draw lessons from these terrible events. I have consistently stated my own view of what occurred in 1915, and my view of that history has not changed. It is in all of our interest to see the achievement of a full, frank and just acknowledgment of the facts. The Meds Yeghern is a devastating chapter in the history of the Armenian people, and we must keep its memory alive in honor of those who were murdered and so that we do not repeat the grave mistakes of the past. I salute the Turks who saved Armenians in 1915 and am encouraged by the dialogue among Turks and Armenians, and within Turkey itself, regarding this painful history. Together, the Turkish and Armenian people will be stronger as they acknowledge their common history and recognize their common humanity.

Even as we confront the inhumanity of 1915, we also are inspired by the remarkable spirit of the Armenian people. While nothing can bring back those who were killed in the Meds Yeghern, the contributions that Armenians have made around the world over the last ninety-five years stand as a testament to the strength, tenacity and courage of the Armenian people. The indomitable spirit of the Armenian people is a lasting triumph over those who set out to destroy them. Many Armenians came to the United States as survivors of the horrors of 1915. Over the generations Americans of Armenian descent have richened our communities, spurred our economy, and strengthened our democracy. The strong traditions and culture of Armenians also became the foundation of a new republic which has become a part of the community of nations, partnering with the world community to build a better future.

Today, we pause with them and with Armenians everywhere to remember the awful events of 1915 with deep admiration for their contributions which transcend this dark past and give us hope for the future.

IN THE NAME OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

**THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA**

**ON THE CASE ON DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF CONFORMITY
WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA OF
THE OBLIGATIONS STIPULATED BY THE PROTOCOL ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND
BY THE PROTOCOL ON DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE REPUBLIC
OF TURKEY SIGNED IN ZURICH ON 10 OCTOBER 2009**

Yerevan 12 January 2010

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia, composed of G. Harutyunyan (President), K. Balayan, H. Danielyan, F. Tokhyan, M. Topuzyan, V. Hovhannisyan (Case Rapporteur), H. Nazaryan, R. Papayan, and V. Poghosyan; With the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia Edward Nalbandian as the official representative of the President of the Republic; Acting in accordance with Article 100(2) and Article 101(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia and Articles 25, 38, and 72 of the Republic of Armenia Law on the Constitutional Court;

Examined in a written procedure in public "the Case on Determining the Issue of Conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia of the Obligations Stipulated by the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey and by the Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey Signed in Zurich on 10 October 2009."

The case was initiated by the Application lodged by the President of the Republic with the Constitutional Court on 17 November 2009.

Having reviewed the Application, the written report of the Case Rapporteur, and the written statement of the official representative of the President of the Republic; having examined the Protocols and other documents in the case, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia FOUND:

1. The Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey and the Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey were signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey in Zurich on 10 October 2009. In accordance with Article 2(2) of the Republic of Armenia (RA) Law on the International Treaties of the RA, any written agreement " ... compiled in the form of a treaty, agreement, convention, memorandum, protocol, or a document with any other designation, or expressed through the exchange of notes or letters" is considered "an international treaty of the RA." In accordance with Article 24 of the aforementioned Law, interstate international treaties are subject to ratification by the RA National Assembly. Article 7 of the Law provides that political, cooperative, or consular relations with another country are among the relations governed by an interstate treaty. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Articles 2 and 14), Article 81(2-e) of the RA Constitution, and Article 24 of the RA Law on the International Treaties of the RA stipulate that any international treaty the text of which prescribes ratification shall be subject to ratification.

In accordance with Article 100(2) of the RA Constitution, the RA Constitutional Court shall, prior to the ratification of an international treaty, determine, in a procedure of prior control prescribed by law, the conformity with the Constitution of the obligations stipulated in such treaty.

2. The materials of the case show that diplomatic relations have not been established between the two neighboring countries after the Republic of Armenia declared independence; in and due to the absence of such relations, numerous legal and treaty issues have accumulated, which cannot be solved by the single act of establishing diplomatic relations. With this consideration in mind, a Protocol on Development of Relations between the two countries was signed in addition to the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. While the two Protocols are in a formal sense two separate documents, they regulate interrelated and complementary matters, were signed on the same day, are linked through cross-references, and prescribe mutual obligations that are also interrelated. In view of the aforementioned circumstances, the instruments of their ratification shall be exchanged simultaneously, and they shall enter into force on the same day. Moreover, Article 2(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

The aforementioned two Protocols together are the first step constituting the legal basis for further action within the authority of the two respective states aimed at the regulation of interstate relations.

3. The examination of the Protocols at hand reveals that the two countries, acting on the basis of the fundamental principles of international law; referring to their obligations under multilateral international agreements; governed, in particular, by the commitment to promote international peace and security as well as to recognize the sovereign equality of the member states, as stipulated in the UN Charter; and pursuing the establishment and development of normal interstate relations in different spheres through engaging in dialogue on the level of states; have agreed, on the basis of reciprocity:

-To establish diplomatic relations in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and to exchange Diplomatic Missions; -To open the common border within two months after the entry into force of the Protocol on the Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey; -To conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries;

-To implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;

-To make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard; -To develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the two countries;

-To cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides and launching common cultural projects; -To establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of the two countries;

-To take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation between the two countries; and -To engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.

The Parties have also agreed to establish an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions. To prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a working group headed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Parties shall be created during the prescribed time period. The procedure of approving the

modalities, as well as the timetable for starting the work of the intergovernmental commission and the sub-commissions have been agreed upon. The timetable and elements agreed by both sides for the implementation of the Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey are mentioned in the annexed document, which is integral part of the Protocol. As stated above, the aforementioned obligations being undertaken by the Parties are interdependent; hence, the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey and the Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey shall enter into force on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month following the exchange of instruments of ratification. It implies further that either Protocol cannot acquire legal force or take effect without the other.

The Protocols are done in Armenian, Turkish and English authentic copies in duplicate. In case of divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail; the latter has also been examined by the Constitutional Court.

4. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional-legal content of obligations being undertaken by the Republic of Armenia and the context, object, and purposes of the Protocols, the Constitutional Court, acting within its authority, sets forth the following legal positions:

a) The mutual obligations being undertaken by the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey and the Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey are, under the principles of international law, exclusively of a bilateral interstate nature, and cannot concern, or by various references be attributed to, any third party or the relations with such third party of the signatories of such Protocols.

b) Generally-recognized terms, which are widely used in the preambles of international treaties, such as "taking into account," "taking into consideration," "recognizing," "noting," "guided by," "in pursuit up," "acknowledging," "emphasizing," "confirming," "reiterating," "asserting," "referring," "recalling," "accepting," "being convinced," and others, denote existing realities, wishes, aims, aspirations, certain common principles, and the like, which the treaty parties take into account in mutually agreeing to undertake certain international legal obligations. Two of the concrete obligations being undertaken by the Protocols, i.e. "to establish diplomatic relations" and "to open the common border," have an interrelated underlying significance. Therefore, any other obligation prescribed by the Protocols can have international legal effect only if the existing border is open

and concrete diplomatic relations exist between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey, providing for the prerequisites necessary for the fulfillment of the treaty obligations undertaken by the Parties.

c) The Protocols do not stipulate any procedures or provisions on the settlement of disputes or the termination or suspension of treaty obligations. The emphasis is primarily on wishes, aims, and the intention to create prerequisites for the further development of relations. Therefore, the Constitutional Court takes into consideration that the establishment and further development of relations between the two countries in different spheres will be anchored in specific agreements concluded between the two countries in written form and governed by international law (according to Article 2(I-a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). The constitutionality of obligations being undertaken under such specific agreements will be examined and evaluated separately under Article 100(2) of the RA Constitution and Article 72 of the RA Law on the Constitutional Court.

d) The commitment of the Republic of Armenia in the context of the Parties' commitment to open the common border stipulated by the Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey is related to the willingness of the Republic of Armenia to resolve legal-organizational and institutional issues connected to safeguarding the normal operation of border checkpoints.

e) International treaties can have legal effect for the Republic of Armenia only in line with the provisions of Article 6 of the RA Constitution, with due regard for their validity in international law and their being a constituent part of the legal system of the Republic of Armenia in the procedure prescribed by the RA Constitution.

5. The RA Constitutional Court also finds that the provisions of the Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey cannot be interpreted or applied in the legislative process and application practice of the Republic of Armenia as well as in the interstate relations in a way that would contradict the provisions of the Preamble to the RA Constitution and the requirements of Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia.

6. The Constitutional Court finds necessary that the steps by the Republic of Armenia towards undertaking the contemplated obligations and towards ensuring legislative and institutional safeguards necessary for the fulfillment of such obligations be consistent with the legal positions set forth in this Decision and the fundamental principles of the constitutional order stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia. Based on the outcome of the examination of the case,


taking into account the legal positions set forth in the Decision, and governed by Article 100(2) and Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, as well as Articles 63 and 64 of the Republic of Armenia Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia DEC IDE S as follows:

1. The obligations stipulated by the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey and by the Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey are in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia.

2. According to Paragraph 2 of Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, this Decision is final and enters into force upon pronouncement.

PRESIDENT G.HARUTYUNYAN

12 January 2010



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FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

 Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's Visit to Lebanon and Turkey's Relations with Lebanon

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Northern Iraq Notes II: Sulaymaniyah Observations

All the PUK authorities we interviewed said that the elections were a big gain for democracy. Probably, the reason for these statements isn't only the development of democracy. We got the impression that the Change List, formed by the PUK's veteran leaders, may reunite with the PUK.

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Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations: How to Switch from Brotherhood Slogans to Strategic Partnership?

It is time to develop a closer relationship. By adding block into place each year, a common future that is based not only on bureaucrats and politicians but also on the entire nation and with the aim of improving friendship, peace and prosperity between Turkey and the Azerbaijan will be built.

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The Importance of the Turkey-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) High Level Strategic Dialogue Meeting

According to the GCC members, Turkey is the

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ORSAM REPORTS

 **IRAQ'S PIVOTAL POINT: TALAFAR**

 **THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PIRACY: THE SOMALIA CASE AND TURKEY'S POSITION**

[ARCHIVE](#)

EVENTS

 **ORSAM-TRT Cooperation for the Documentary of Turkish Straits**
The topics of the documentary film include the issue of Turkish Straits.

 **ORSAM Middle Eastern Studies Summer School Completed**
ORSAM held a summer school program from July 1-15, 2009.

 **Tal Afar Conference in Istanbul**
A conference was held on "Tal Afar: From the Invasion to the Present," on June 13, 2009 in Istanbul.

 **Obama's Middle East Policies Discussed**
New American Policies and the future of Turkish-American relations were a topic at the meeting.

 **The Priorities of Turkey's Iraq Policy Evaluated**
A brainstorm was arranged at ORSAM seeking to answer the question: "What should the

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